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Date: 03/07/2025 Location:   United States U.S. Department of Justice disrupts covert operation targeting U.S. Navy Overview On July 3, 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice unsealed charges against two individuals accused of acting as illegal agents of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), specifically working for the Ministry of State Security (MSS). This case represents another serious disruption of PRC covert intelligence operations inside the U.S., with a strong focus on U.S. military infiltration and espionage. Two defendants were charged; Yuance Chen, 38, who arrived in the U.S. on a visa in 2015 and became a lawful permanent resident, and a new arrival past spring, entering Texas; Liren "Ryan" Lai tasked with supervision of the clandestine espionage operation. Key intelligence and operational findings 1. Targeting U.S. Navy personnel The MSS network actively focused on collecting intelligence about U.S. Navy personnel and facilities. Their objectives included: Mapping Navy base structures and operations. Understanding job roles that offer access to classified or sensitive information. Identifying and cultivating potential insider recruits within specific naval occupations: Intelligence Specialists  – with access to classified threat assessments and tactical planning. Information Systems Technicians  – with access to Navy networks, communications, and cybersecurity infrastructure. Mass Communication Specialists  – able to gather internal narratives, media plans, and potentially manipulate messaging. 2. Use of social media for spotting and assessing MSS operatives used open-source intelligence (OSINT) techniques on platforms like LinkedIn, Instagram, Facebook, and potentially Discord or Reddit to: Identify military members with exploitable vulnerabilities. Initiate contact under false identities. Gauge loyalty, financial stress, or personal grievances as leverage for recruitment. 3. Video game platforms as covert communication channels Consistent with a known MSS tactic, online multiplayer video game platforms (e.g., Call of Duty, PUBG, or others with voice/text chat) were used for covert messaging. These environments provide: Anonymity and deniability. End-to-end encrypted communication via in-game chats. A pretext for pseudonymous, informal conversations that are harder to trace. 4. Use of “Dead Drops” for physical communication The suspects were directed to conduct physical dead drops, including: Leaving USB drives in public locations. Dropping off packages containing cash or documents at predetermined spots. Collecting materials from locations to avoid direct interaction. This technique highlights MSS's reliance on traditional spycraft even while using modern digital tools. Implications This indictment underscores the hybrid espionage model  employed by the MSS: combining traditional HUMINT techniques (recruitment, dead drops) with cyber-enabled and open-source targeting. It also: Reveals continued and systematic PRC interest in U.S. military infrastructure . Emphasizes the risk of social engineering and insider threats  from service members with critical roles. Demonstrates that China’s MSS is evolving : blending covert digital engagement with classic espionage tactics. Strategic insight for organizations (especially military, defense contractors, academia) Review social media exposure of personnel. Train employees on foreign recruitment tactics , especially those who travel, game online, or are active on social platforms. Reinforce insider threat detection mechanisms . Monitor suspicious engagement or contact patterns, including unsolicited inquiries related to defense work. At Dyami | Security Intelligence , we work closely with a wide range of partners to raise awareness among businesses and government agencies about these threats, and to help them build resilience against espionage and unwanted interference — including through our subscription-based intelligence briefings . Through Dyami | Academy , we also offer the training course “The World of Espionage”  — an interactive awareness program that immerses professionals in the methods, motives, and risks of intelligence activities, with a focus on the defence, dual-use, and critical infrastructure sectors. Want to bring this topic to the forefront within your organization? Get in touch with us. Count on us to keep you one step ahead.

Written by Arianna Luca While just a few years ago Ecuador was a regular stop in most tourists’ itineraries and considered  to be a “haven for peace and stability in the region”, over the last couple of years an unprecedented wave of gang violence has turned the country into one of the most violent  in Latin America. Ecuador’s recent surge of unrest can be traced back to different causes. A series of internal political choices, and the implementation of stricter measures and controls in the bordering countries have indirectly created a fertile ground for the growth of the drug trade, turning Ecuador into a strategic transit hub for cocaine . A critical economic situation, aggravated by the Covid-19 pandemic, has impacted marginalized communities, increasing the levels of poverty, which has brought many young people closer to criminal activities. Stricter controls and measures implemented in other countries brought a shift in criminal routes and found a fertile ground in Ecuador. In addition, the government lacks a long term strategy to control the economic crisis and current social turmoil, beyond the promise to defeat gangs.   Ecuador's President Daniel Noboa has focused his approach on empowering the military, which has generated high approval among the Ecuadorian population alarmed by violence and instability, in the short-term. Extreme militarization has been a common response to security threats in the history of Latin America. However, whenever governments have responded to organized crime with violence, they have often generated a cycle of violence and repression . The examples of Mexico, Honduras, and El Salvador have shown that militarization is mostly impacting civilians, leading to violence being used against innocent citizens and for easy arrests, not improving security in the long term. Ecuador is likely to follow this path, too. Crime rates are increasing and gangs are still far from defeated, and public support is slowly going down. While the state of emergency ended last April 8, President Noboa maintained a state of “ internal armed conflict ”. The security situation of the country is still critical, and Ecuador's armed forces will continue carrying out joint anti-crime operations with the police.  President Noboa’s government is going through a critical moment, worsened by the recent raid of the Ecuadorian police to the Mexican embassy in Ecuador, which led to a break of diplomatic ties between the two states. On April 21, 2024 the Ecuadorian population will vote in a referendum on tightening security measures , toughening prison sentences, and enshrining the use of the military for domestic security into law. The outcome will be important to understand the support for and influence of Noboa’s presidency in the country and his fight against gang-related crime and violence.  The cocaine market   Ecuador’s crisis is inextricably tied to the cocaine market . Historically, the country has managed to be shielded from the region’s crime and drug-related dynamics, despite its proximity to two leading producers and exporters of cocaine, Colombia and Peru. However, over time, the accumulation of different factors, internal and external, has turned Ecuador into an important actor  in the drug trade.  Internally , a rise of inequality and poverty in 2016, after a strong earthquake, forced the government to cut costs. Several institutions were eliminated, including the Justice Ministry, and the authorities’ control over the country fell drastically. President Correa’s administration (2007-2017) took some crime-reduction initiatives that turned out to have a counterproductive effect, like dismantling an American naval base, leaving ports poorly guarded, and the construction of mega-prisons, the expansion of which is going to be discussed in the coming referendum. This measure led to overcrowding and inmates being housed according to their gang membership, turning prisons into focal points for criminal organizations. Functioning as centers for networking between criminals, they have facilitated gang organization and the forming of alliances with other drug-trafficking organizations, like Mexican cartels and the Albanian mafia. Gang leaders started conducting their businesses from behind bars, and   have infiltrated many organs of the government. Finally, the Covid-19 pandemic left many young people jobless, making them ideal recruits for gangs surging in power and influence. External factors  involved a tightening of policies and controls against drug trafficking in neighboring countries  which turned transnational criminal groups to Ecuador’s poorly controlled ports. As a result, Ecuador’s precarious social and economic situation, its dollarized economy, strategic location, and poor coastline protection made Ecuador the ideal place to work as a   transit point for international drug cartels.  Today, 70%  of the cocaine that arrives in Europe (with the main destination ports being Rotterdam and Antwerp) departs from Ecuador, capitalizing on the scarcity of port controls after Covid, and the start of conflict between Russia and Ukraine.  The current spike of violence  Last January, two events caught global attention. Authorities reported the prison escape  of one of the most powerful narco bosses and leader of Ecuador’s leading drug-trafficking gang Los Choneros. Shortly after, members of a gang, wearing balaclavas and firing shots, took control of a television station  during a live broadcast, helding members of the staff and journalists hostage.  After these events Noboa declared Ecuador to be in a state of war . His announced “Phoenix Plan” to allow the government of “new Ecuador” to combat crime and violence focuses on increased power and authority to the military. As part of this plan, the government has given complete immunity to all police forces, and deployed tens of thousands members to combat the “internal armed conflict”. However, the gangs also declared war when the government announced a state of emergency, and the security forces’ aggressive actions have inspired equally aggressive responses by Ecuadorian gangs, which have escalated to kidnappings of law enforcement offices and attacks to police stations.  Moreover, police repressive counter measures have been criticized by human rights groups, warning that loosening ties to the police authorization to arrest people is mostly affecting innocent civilians . It is also opening the doors to easy profiling and making arrests based on poor evidence, deteriorating the population’s democratic civil liberties , and weakening state  institutions' reliability .  Noboa’s strategy resembles the approach of El Salvador’s president Nayib Bukele . The Ecuadorian President’s admiration is addressed particularly at Bukele’s implementation of a massive prison model. Bukele’s campaign of mass arrests have made him domestically popular, but he was heavily criticized for the widespread human rights abuses . However, unlike El Salvador, Ecuador’s gangs exist within a network of international cartels and ex-Colombian guerrillas that are better armed, richer and more powerful than the gangs in El Salvador, and they are connected to the cocaine trade.  What’s at stake One of the major long-term consequences of this widespread is the risk of deterioration of the country’s democracy . The raid of the Mexican embassy carried out by the Ecuadorian security forces last April 5 was a first instance. Ecuador’s government forced its way into the facility to arrest former Vice President Jorge Glas, who is wanted for corruption charges, and had sought refuge in the embassy since last year. Mexico has now cut diplomatic ties with Ecuador , and asked for the cancellation of Ecuador’s membership from the UN. The Community of Latin American and Caribbean states (Celac) has expressed support for Mexico, together with the Organization of American States (OAS). Moreover, Venezuela has closed its embassy in Ecuador, and Honduras has recalled its senior diplomat in Ecuador. The Colombian government denounced the actions and filed a suit with the International Commission on Human Rights. Despite the widespread criticism of his actions, President Noboa said he had no regrets over his actions.  However, a possible breakdown in relations with key regional partners may have repercussions for Ecuador’s security. Strained ties with Colombia, the source country for the cocaine trade trafficked through Ecuador, could severely hinder Ecuador’s ability to monitor cocaine flows and counter the criminal networks of both countries. In the same way, a rupture with Mexico could have severe repercussions for security cooperation, considering the importance and role of Mexican drug trafficking organizations in Ecuador. For now, Mexican President López Obrador has dismissed Noboa’s invitation to meet for a talk, indicating that a meeting is unlikely going to happen in the near future.  Conclusion  The recent escalation of violence in Ecuador is the outcome of a crisis caused by different intertwined factors. Ecuador’s government has been fighting back, increasing the militarization of Ecuador’s law enforcement forces. However, this might not be enough to address the systemic issues that have allowed the empowering of gangs. Moreover, Noboa’s recent diplomatic crisis with Mexico has alienated key security partners of the country. There is uncertainty over the outcome of the coming referendum to tighten security measures, and Noboa now has to weigh his political moves and decisions, as they will determine his political support and the security and stability of the country.

Areas of major targeting between Israel and Iran from June 12 to June 24, 2025 Date: 02/07/2025 Introduction: A Turning Point for Regional Stability Following Israeli and US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities during the most significant confrontation between the countries to date, from 13 to 24 June 2025, Iran’s legislative body, the Majlis, approved a motion to cease cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The decision was swiftly ratified by the Supreme National Security Council, formally ending the limited international oversight that had remained under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) framework. This development marks a pivotal shift in the region’s security landscape, as it removes a key mechanism for independent verification and transparency. While Iranian officials maintain that the country’s nuclear programme remains peaceful, the absence of even minimal monitoring has raised concern among some observers that, under certain conditions, Iran could acquire the technical capacity to develop nuclear weapons. The end of IAEA access increases the likelihood of strategic misperceptions and significantly limits the international community’s ability to assess Iran’s nuclear trajectory. This growing uncertainty may prompt preemptive or preventive actions by states such as Israel or the United States, both of which have previously responded assertively to suspected proliferation threats. It may also trigger broader regional shifts, encouraging countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey to reconsider their nuclear postures in an evolving security environment. While the long-term consequences will be examined in more detail later in this paper, the immediate concern lies in the potential for renewed conflict, not necessarily triggered by confirmed actions, but by a climate of opacity, mistrust and rising strategic pressure. To read the full report, contact info@dyami.services

Date: 02/07/2025 Location:   Goma, North Kivu Province, DRC; Nyabibwe, South Kivu Province, DRC; Kalehe, South Kivu Province, DRC; Bukavu, South Kivu Province, DRC. Kinshasa, Kinshasa Province, DRC. Bunia, Ituri, DRC. Historic context: On 28/01/2025, the Mouvement du 23 mars (March 23 movement; M23) seized Goma, one of Congo’s biggest cities in the east with a population of more than 2 million, and large swaths of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) North and South Kivu provinces in a lightning offensive.  Since then, M23 has been asserting control in Congo’s east, fighting the Congolese army and allied militias. Thousands were killed, including civilians, and many more were displaced.  This latest outbreak of hostilities is part of a conflict that has persisted for 30 years. Millions of Hutus fled to Congo to escape potential retribution after the Tutsi forces, led by Paul Kagame, seized control of Rwanda following the 1994 Rwandan genocide. In Congo, these Hutu refugees formed new militias, including the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR). The Congolese government has consistently accused Rwanda of supporting the M23 rebel group. Despite UN experts saying that Rwanda exercises direct control over the rebels, Kigali vehemently denies these claims. In response, the Congolese government cut diplomatic ties with Rwanda following M23’s offensive in January. There are official Rwandan soldiers in the DRC, however, Rwanda insists that this contingent, estimated to be between 7.000 and 12.000 men strong, is there for self-defence purposes: to protect the country against Hutu militias with roots in the 1994 genocide.  What happened: Despite decades of hostilities, the DRC and Rwanda signed a US-brokered peace agreement on 28/06/2025 in Washington DC.  The critical parts outline respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity , and sources reported that one of the conditions is that  Rwanda must withdraw its troops from the DRC within 90 days . This will be monitored by an international mechanism. Aside from that, the agreement calls for the disengagement, disarmament and conditional integration of non-state groups, including M23,  operating in the DRC. Both countries also commit to ceasing support for armed groups on each other’s territory. The DRC is also expected to conclude military operations against the FDLR within the same 90-day period in which Rwanda is expected to retreat from Congo.  Another key part of this deal is the economic dimension. The ‘economic integration plan’, intended to formalize and secure mineral trade in the region and, therefore, attract significant Western investment. This plan is still being finalized, however, and exact details are not yet clear.  Analysis The peace agreement between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo is a crucial step in the right direction for a conflict that has been going on since the 1990s, with hundreds of thousands of people displaced as a consequence. Its success, however, remains to be seen. A few factors stand in the way. The biggest hurdle by far is that the peace deal is made on the state level, and it remains to be seen to what extent the non-state groups fighting this conflict will adhere to its terms. There will need to be incentives for them to do so. This, of course, counts for the militias fighting on the DRC’s government’s side, but mostly for the M23 and their aligned smaller militias. M23, and not Rwanda, occupies most of the territory in the eastern DRC, and it was not present at the negotiations; instead, separate negotiations are being conducted between the DRC and M23, mediated by Qatar. At the time of writing, it is not yet clear where that will go, however, it is clear that these two ‘parallel’ peace talks need to be brought to fruition in order to avoid a situation in which one peace deal torpedoes the other.  Moreover, despite the pledge to 'stop supporting armed groups on each other’s territory,' Rwanda has never officially acknowledged its support for M23. There remains a possibility that such support could continue under the cover of plausible deniability. Thus, it can be concluded that this peace deal is a positive development in light of the 30 years of tensions in the region, but the outcome of the parallel DRC-M23 negotiations appears to be just as important . It is still too early to celebrate. If both sides truly uphold the agreement by withdrawing their proxies, ending support for armed groups, and formalizing the mineral trade, whose illicit networks have long fueled regional tensions, this could mark the beginning of reduced violence and better living conditions, potentially driven by increased Western investment. However, without strong monitoring and sustained economic incentives, the deal risks falling apart. A key part of understanding this peace deal is examining the broader geopolitical context.  At its core, the agreement ties into the United States’ broader goal of securing stable access to critical minerals  like cobalt and lithium, essential for high-tech industries. By formalizing the mineral trade and encouraging transparency, the deal aims to create better conditions for US and European companies to operate. At the same time, it reflects Washington’s effort to strengthen its foothold in Africa and counter China’s longstanding dominance in Congo’s mining sector . The hope is that by attracting more Western investment and deepening economic ties, the deal will not only secure vital resources but also shift the regional power dynamics, thereby reducing China’s grip on Africa’s valuable mineral wealth. Conclusion The peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda is a positive development after months of intense fighting, but whether it will actually hold remains uncertain. One of the main challenges is that the deal was struck at the state level,  while the recent flare-ups in eastern DRC haven’t directly involved the states themselves, even though Rwanda is widely accused of backing and influencing the M23 rebels. Separate negotiations between M23 and the Congolese government are still ongoing, and there’s hope that whatever is agreed upon will not undermine the broader deal reached between Kigali and Kinshasa in Washington. A major, though still vaguely defined, component of this deal is its economic aspect.  What’s especially noteworthy is its geopolitical significance. It signals Washington’s strategic use of economic incentives—not just to secure critical minerals like cobalt and lithium, but also to reassert its presence in Africa after years of losing ground to China . The goal is clear: by encouraging Western investment and deeper economic ties, the U.S. hopes to loosen China’s grip on Africa’s mineral wealth. Dyami Services Security is not a luxury but a necessity. With Dyami Security Intelligence as a Service, you gain a proactive, flexible, and affordable solution to manage risks, monitor geopolitical threats, and respond immediately to crises. Why subscribe to security? ✅ Resilient business operations in today’s world✅ We act as your security department and Geopolitical Risk Officer✅ Direct access to security expertise without high costs✅ Prevent crises with up-to-date threat intelligence✅ Scalable subscription plans✅ Access to our unique global network Want to know how this protects your organization? Request a free consultation! Subscription options Dyami Security as a Service: a flexible security subscription that keeps your organization protected at all times, without the need for costly internal capacity.

Date:   27/06/2025 Where?  Togo: Lomé What happened?  On 05/05/2025 , Faure Gnassingbé, previously President of the Republic, was sworn in as President of the Council of Ministers, the country’s de facto most senior role. He received the title without official term limits, enabling him to be re-elected by parliament indefinitely.   On 26/05/2025 , a popular rapper and government critic, Tchala Essowè Narcisse (stage name: Aamron), was arrested after having posted a satirical video on TikTok calling for protest mobilisation ahead of Gnassingbé’s birthday on 6 June. His arrest, which was carried out without a warrant, sparked public outrage.  On 05/06/2025  and 06/06/2025 , large anti-government protests erupted in Lomé following this arrest , despite a ban on protests imposed since 2022 after a deadly market attack in the city. Demonstrators denounced constitutional changes, rising electricity prices implemented at the start of May , and the arrests of dissenters. Security forces used tear gas and batons to disperse crowds, and dozens of protesters were arrested.  Some of the arrested demonstrators were released in the week following the protests, showing signs of torture or other forms of ill-treatment. This was followed by the release of Aamron from a psychiatric facility, where he was sent after his arrest. On 16/06/2025 , Togo’s regulatory High Authority for Audiovisual and Communication (HAAC) suspended Radio France Internationale (RFI) and France 24, restricting independent media coverage of the current situation in Togo . A journalist from the French public broadcaster TV5 was also reportedly detained without charge for several hours at a police station, whilst footage she had filmed at a rally during her detention was deleted. On 26/06/2025 , renewed protests emerged after protest organisation ‘Hands Of My Constitution’ called for three days of gatherings, which were quickly dispersed by soldiers after the first day. Military personnel used tear gas and batons to disperse protesters who blocked the main roads in Lomé. Videos of soldiers severely beating up protesters have emerged online. In the suburbs of the capital, some protesters were seen burning wooden furniture and tyres used for makeshift barricades. Many shops in the city remained closed as clashes continued into the afternoon.  Protesters have been demanding political reforms, an end to police brutality, including the release of all detainees from the previous protest earlier in June, and improvements in living conditions amid worsening economic hardship and rising electricity costs. Analysis Togo's 2024 constitutional reforms sparked more protests in the latter half of last year, following years of protest against the dynastic rule of the Gnassingbes. These reforms eliminated the direct popular vote for President of the Council of Ministers, instead granting parliament the sole power to elect the leader. Consequently, the presidential election on May 3, 2025, through which Gnassingbé secured his new role, was in effect an indirect vote by the National Assembly rather than a popular vote. The President of the Republic, elected by parliament for a four-year term, has become a largely ceremonial figure with limited powers, following the constitutional changes. Real executive authority now lies with the President of the Council of Ministers, who leads both the government and the armed forces. This makes the President of the Council of Ministers effectively the highest power in the state’s executive branch. The role is renewable with a six-year term, dependent on parliamentary support, rather than fixed-term limits. This effectively means there are no term limits.  With Faure Gnassingbé having been in power since 2005, following his father's long rule that began in 1967, the Togolese population is unhappy about the continuation of what many perceive as an entrenched family dynasty, fearing the erosion of democratic principles and the perpetuation of authoritarian rule under the guise of constitutional reform . Demonstrators are therefore calling for Gnassingbé's resignation. Faure Gnassingbé has pledged to strengthen democracy; however, his actions seem to confirm the opposite. The hard suppression of previous protests and the government's refusal to engage or respond to inquiries about the military actions during these protests has further fueled tensions.  Press freedom is also under attack, with the reported detention of a TV5 journalist and the three month suspension of French international broadcasters RFI and France 24 for an alleged lack of impartiality in their coverage of the protests.  The economic grievances behind the current protests in Togo are closely linked to a worsening cost-of-living crisis, with the recent hike in electricity prices acting as a key trigger. Many protesters, especially unemployed youth, express frustration over rising basic expenses that strain already precarious livelihoods The demonstrations against the Gnassingbé family's dynastic rule are expected to persist in Lomé and potentially intensify. While the military has adhered to government directives thus far, these circumstances create a fertile ground for a future coup. The government's forceful tactics—including tear gas, arrests, and alleged detainee mistreatment—have fueled rather than suppressed dissent, especially among unemployed youth struggling with deteriorating economic conditions. Conclusion The constitutional reforms have deepened the political crisis in Togo by institutionalizing indefinite rule under Faure Gnassingbé, provoking sustained youth-led protests and widespread dissatisfaction. The government’s repressive tactics may suppress protests temporarily, but will likely exacerbate tensions. Although an immediate coup seems unlikely given the military’s current stance, the potential for a sudden political rupture remains if the crisis persists without reform. The situation demands close monitoring as Togo navigates a fragile transition marked by contested power and popular unrest. For visitors, heightened vigilance is advised, especially in urban centres where protests are more likely to occur. Avoid large gatherings and demonstrations, as they can quickly turn confrontational. Stay informed on local news and government advisories, and be aware of potential disruptions to transport and services. Consider consulting with your embassy or consulate for specific safety recommendations before and during your stay.

Date:   27/06/2025  Where:  Middle East, particularly Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE Who’s involved: Israel, Iran, United States Key developments No exchange of attacks between Israel and Iran took place between 25 and 26 June,  suggesting armed confrontation between them has subsided.  Airspace over eastern Iran has been officially opened for commercial flights , although the western part of the country remains closed. Iran’s Guardian Council ratified a bill by parliament suspending the country’s cooperation with the IAEA,  stating the reason as US and Israeli attacks on its nuclear facilities.  Israel reopened its airspace on 24 June, and airports continue to operate . Repatriation flights are underway, and travel restrictions have been lifted. National carriers have resumed operations, though most foreign airlines are extending flight suspensions through summer.  Airspace in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Qatar and the broader Middle East remains open. No serious maritime security threats have been identified in the Middle East , and shipping lanes remain operational at standard capacity. GNSS interference over the Persian Gulf, especially near the UAE coastline and around the Strait of Hormuz, appears to have decreased.  Although risks are getting lower with each passing day the ceasefire holds,  the situation still remains uncertain at the time of writing. All non-essential operations (ground and overflight) to the affected areas, including Israel, Iraq, Syria and Iran, should be avoided. Context The Iran-Israel conflict that erupted on 13 June with Israeli strikes on Iranian military and leadership targets quickly escalated into one of the most serious confrontations between the two countries, prompting Iranian retaliation with UAVs, ballistic and hypersonic missiles, drone swarms and energy infrastructure attacks that caused over 500 casualties, including civilians. Israeli airstrikes, conducted with US and some European support, reached deep into Iran, while China, Russia and several Gulf states condemned the attacks. Following a US strike on Iranian nuclear facilities on 22 June and Iran’s retaliatory attack on Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar on 23 June, a ceasefire was announced by President Trump on 24 June. No further exchanges occurred on June 25 or 26, suggesting that hostilities have paused. Israel reopened its airspace on June 24, and airports are fully operational, with repatriation flights ongoing. However, most foreign airlines are maintaining suspensions through the summer. Iranian airspace remains largely closed, except for the east, while airspace over Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Qatar, and the broader region remains open. Iran’s Guardian Council ratified a bill suspending cooperation with the IAEA in response to the strikes, raising the risk of renewed escalation. Maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al Mandab continues at normal capacity, and GNSS interference in the Persian Gulf, particularly near the UAE and the Strait of Hormuz, appears to have decreased. Looking ahead Iran’s Supreme National Security Council recently ratified a decision to halt cooperation with the IAEA, raising the risk of retaliatory strikes by the US or Israel. While a fragile ceasefire between Iran and Israel has enabled the reopening of airspace across much of the Middle East, including over Israel, Iran (excluding parts of the west), Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the UAE, tensions remain high. Airlines are still navigating the aftermath of the 12-day conflict, facing elevated operational costs and complex evacuation planning. Though the US claims to have “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, uncertainty persist on the true efficacy of US strikes, with doubts over the destruction of Iran’s stock of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and reports that the Iranian authorities had moved it to unknown sites before the first strikes by Israel, questions also persist on the damage to nuclear centrifuges which some US intelligence officials believe are still “largely intact”. These reports would suggest that the strikes only delayed the program a few months. If this is the case, the attacks have likely pushed Tehran to accelerate the production of nuclear weapons, with Israeli officials indicating military action could resume. Maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al Mandab remains active but vulnerable to Houthi strikes, Iranian interference and GNSS disruption. Without meaningful diplomatic progress, the region faces a heightened risk of renewed conflict and a broader arms race in the coming weeks.

Date:   26/06/2025  Where:  Armenia Who’s involved: Armenian government, opposition groups, Armenian church What happened? On 25 June , in an unprecedented move, Armenia’s government detained at least 14 opposition figures , adding to around 15 detained on 20 June. Detainees include church officials, businessmen, civic activists, and MPs from the exiled parliament of Nagorno-Karabakh, among them two women. Authorities allege the opposition aimed to launch a coup  through sabotage, arson and bombings, claims many see as politically motivated. The arrested include Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, a growing symbol of popular resistance following years of military defeats and widespread corruption throughout the country. Among those arrested are leaders tied to the Armenian Church and local opposition figures, including ethnic Armenians from Nagorno Karabakh’s political structures, now increasingly marginalized by prime minister Nikol Pashinyan's administration. The arrests coincided with Pashinyan’s first official visit to Turkey on 20 June, seen as part of his strategy to secure Ankara’s backing and satisfy preconditions for peace allegedly tied to Turkish and Azerbaijani demands. Relations with Russia have deteriorated, while the US and EU have remained largely disengaged , offering only symbolic statements amid more pressing global concerns like Ukraine, Israel and Iran, and energy security.  Analysis Since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and the region’s final fall to Azeri troops in 2023, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has implemented a broad realignment of Armenia’s domestic and foreign policy. Viewed as a democratic reformer when coming to power in 2018, he now exercises consolidated control over the security apparatus, judiciary and legislature , enabling the suppression of dissent and further centralization of power. He has publicly indicated direct involvement in judicial and other functions beyond the executive’s traditional remit. Under his leadership, Armenia has distanced itself from historic partners such as Russia and the diaspora, while drawing closer to Ankara and Baku , after attempts to forge strong ties with Washington and the EU.  Both Turkey and Azerbaijan are reportedly pressing for extensive concessions in peace negotiations , including constitutional amendments, the return of 300,000 ethnic Azeris and an unsupervised extraterritorial corridor through Armenia’s south to connect mainland Azerbaijan to the Nakhichevan exclave and Turkey, terms widely regarded as compromising Armenian sovereignty. Analysts assess that such a settlement would signal a major geopolitical shift, prioritizing regime stability and electoral positioning ahead of the 2026 elections, over strategic autonomy. Prime Minister Pashinyan has recently adopted rhetoric and policies that increasingly align with long-standing Turkish and Azerbaijani objectives . These include efforts to marginalize the diaspora, assert control over the Armenian Apostolic Church, moderate official references to the Armenian Genocide, deny entry to pro-Armenian foreign figures, and revoke the citizenship of displaced Karabakhi Armenians following the 2023 loss of Nagorno-Karabakh. Such measures mark a clear shift from prior state policy and have raised concerns about democratic erosion and the consolidation of executive power.  The arrests of opposition figures, clergy and members of the exiled Karabakhi leadership, alongside pressure on the head of the Church, are viewed by some as part of a broader attempt to reconfigure Armenia’s political identity in line with external regional priorities. On 18 June, Armenian-Russian businessman Samvel Karapetyan was detained after expressing support for the Church. Shortly thereafter, Pashinyan announced plans to amend legislation to allow the nationalization of Karapetyan’s company, Electric Networks of Armenia, while issuing indirect warnings to employees reportedly considering protest participation. Approximately 15 opposition figures were arrested on 20 June, followed by at least 14 more on 25 June including another businessman and clergy members, all accused of plotting to overthrow the government, while on 26 June, a court case was opened against another popular archbishop and government critic, with the same charges.  The establishment of a new interior ministry from the former police structure, increased pay for security personnel, relaxed recruitment standards, and a visibly expanded police presence in Yerevan indicate a tightening of domestic security measures. Although demonstrations remain modest in scale, they are regularly met with heavily mobilized police forces tasked with containment and control. Collectively, these developments suggest a broader trend toward increasing domestic authoritarianism . Looking ahead Armenia’s domestic and foreign policy direction appears to be becoming more authoritarian and strategically aligned with Ankara and Baku. With limited institutional oversight, a marginalized opposition and reduced civil society presence, Prime Minister Pashinyan is positioned to further consolidate control ahead of the 2026 elections. Since 20 June, approximately 30 opposition figures have been detained, in addition to around a dozen already political prisoners, according to remaining civil society groups. This is so far the largest crackdown on opposition seen in the country since independence in 1991. The absence of effective institutional checks may contribute to a political environment that is less predictable for both domestic actors and international partners. These developments present growing concerns for foreign businesses operating in Armenia. The arrest of and harassment of prominent business figures and government signals regarding potential nationalization reflect a deteriorating climate in terms of freedom of movement, speech and investment. The gradual expansion of security forces, the appointment of politically loyal figures to senior positions and lowered recruitment standards indicate an increased focus on internal control. At the same time, public discontent appears to be rising, and may be met with harsher government crackdowns, raising further questions about the country’s political stability. The risk of renewed conflict with Azerbaijan remains unresolved, with no clear mechanisms for de-escalation. While Armenia’s limited air corridor is unlikely to face major disruption in the event of renewed hostilities, presumed to be short and geographically confined to the south, persistent uncertainty may affect investor confidence and the broader business environment in the months ahead. 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Date:   26/06/2025  Where:  Middle East, particularly Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE Who’s involved: Israel, Iran, United States Key developments No  exchange of attacks between Israel and Iran took place between 25 and 26 June,  suggesting armed confrontation between them has subsided.  Airspace over eastern Iran has opened for commercial flights , although the west of the country continues to be closed. Israel reopened its airspace on 24 June, with airports now operating at full capacity. Repatriation flights are in progress, and restrictions on inbound and outbound travel have been lifted. While national carriers have resumed operations, most foreign airlines have extended their flight suspensions through the summer. Airspace in Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Qatar and the broader Middle East remains open. No Houthi attacks on maritime vessels have been reported in the past 24 hours. Despite speculation about a possible closure of the Strait of Hormuz, maritime traffic through both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab remains largely unaffected . However, GPS jamming persists in the Persian Gulf, especially near the UAE coastline and around the Strait of Hormuz. The US aircraft carriers USS Nimitz  and USS Carl Vinson  remain deployed in the Middle East, supported by at least two guided-missile destroyers in the Red Sea and five in the eastern Mediterranean. In total, more than a dozen US warships are operating in the region, along with approximately 100 aircraft stationed on the carriers. Although risks are getting lower with each day the ceasefire holds, the situation still remains uncertain at the time of writing. All non-essential operations (ground and overflight) to the affected areas, including Israel, Iraq, Syria and Iran should be avoided. Context The recent Iran-Israel conflict, which erupted on 13 June with Israeli strikes on Iranian military and leadership targets, quickly escalated into one of the most dangerous confrontations between the two countries. Iran responded with UAVs, ballistic and hypersonic missiles, drones and attacks on energy infrastructure, resulting in over 500 casualties, including civilians. Israeli air operations penetrated deep into Iran via regional airspace, drawing support from the US and some European nations, while others, such as China, Russia, and several Gulf states, condemned the attacks. Following a US strike on Iranian nuclear facilities on 22 June, and Iran’s retaliatory attack on Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar on 23 June, a ceasefire was brokered by former President Trump and announced on 24 June. Although Israel reportedly launched a final strike just before the truce took effect, major hostilities have since paused. As of 26 June, airspace over Israel, Jordan, Syria and Iraq has reopened, though many foreign carriers continue with flight suspensions into Israel. Iranian airspace is still mostly restricted, with only eastern regions partially open. Maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab remains active despite ongoing GPS jamming near the Strait. Meanwhile, regional tensions remain high amid a significant military build-up, unresolved questions around Iran’s nuclear program, and continued disruption to civilian air travel. Looking ahead The ceasefire between Iran and Israel has created a narrow opening for de-escalation, prompting the reopening of regional airspace across much of the Middle East, including over Israel, Iran (with the exception of parts of the west), Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE. Airlines are still adjusting to the aftermath of the 10-day conflict, facing elevated operational costs and challenges in coordinating potential evacuation efforts. Although the US claims to have inflicted damage on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, concerns persist that Tehran may continue pursuing a nuclear deterrent. Israeli officials have signaled that military action could resume, putting the fragile ceasefire at risk. Meanwhile, maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab remains active but exposed to potential Houthi attacks and Iranian disruption, with ongoing GPS jamming in the area. In the absence of meaningful diplomatic progress, the region remains at high risk of renewed conflict and a broader arms race in the weeks ahead.

Date : 24/06/2025 Situation in Sudan as of 01/06/2025. All credits go to @ThomasVLinge on X .   The blue triangle was added by the author. What happened?   On 24/06/2025, a New War Cargo Ilyushin IL-76TD freighter (Reg. EX-76019) departed from the UAE and landed at Kufra Airport in southeastern Libya. This flight is part of the critical logistical network that enables the RSF, which, following a joint offensive with Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), seized control of the strategic Egypt-Sudan-Libya tri-border area earlier this month on 10/06/2025. On 11/06/2025, the RSF announced that they seized control of this strategic tri-border area, as indicated by the blue triangle in the image above.  That same day, the SAF announced that they had withdrawn from the area. The Sudanese army described the joint attack  as an “outright aggression against Sudan” and vowed to protect national sovereignty.  Analysis Following a joint offensive with LNA troops from Libya, the RSF seized control of the strategic Sudan-Libya-Egypt border triangle— a crucial smuggling route and the gateway to Libya and Egypt. This is a significant win for the RSF after months of retreat, most notably from Khartoum and surrounding villages and cities.  The RSF's capture of the border triangle is significant for two reasons. First of all, a strong presence in western Sudan allows the RSF to open a new front in the Northern State and Nile Valley, areas that are important to the Sudanese army and, until recently, basically impossible to reach. They can now attack the whole of Sudan from the west. A second reason this is a strategic win for the RSF is that it provides them with a long border with Libya.  This border is crucial for the RSF as it works to reduce its dependence on supply routes that primarily pass through Chad. Reports indicate that Chadian President Mahamat Déby is facing mounting domestic pressure from military generals to block the RSF's use of eastern Chad as a supply corridor. The RSF is therefore trying to diversify its supply lines. As a consequence, there have been reports  of increased air traffic into Libya’s Kufra district, allegedly originating from the United Arab Emirates, carrying military aid intended for the RSF. Conclusion After months of fighting in Sudan during which the SAF had the clear upper hand, this development reflects the first real win for the RSF. It remains to be seen if the RSF can capitalize on this win. It must also be noted that the border area is far from the current RSF strongholds in North Darfur, and the RSF risks overstretching its forces, which, especially after recent months, have taken significant losses. Nevertheless,  if these potential risks are avoided, control over this corridor brings significant strategic benefits for the Rapid Support Forces.  Not only does it provide them with a new front to launch operations on SAF strongholds previously considered out of reach, but it also opens up a frontier with Libya, which could become a new supply route for military support.  Aside from that, this also brings implications for the broader region.  This is the first time that the Sudanese civil war spilled over the border. For now, it remains to be seen what the consequences of that will be, but this threat of regional spillover can lead to dangerous and unpredictable situations. It also puts Egypt, which neighbors Sudan to the North, in a predicament.  Egypt is a key ally to the SAF, but also supports Haftar. This puts Cairo in a precarious position, given that the RSF is approaching its southern border.  This development in the Sudanese civil war indicates that this conflict is far from over. The RSF, led by Mohamed ‘Hemedti’ Dagalo,  intends to continue its battle against the SAF and its leader, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. Khartoum/HSSS FIR remains closed.

Date:  25/06/2025  Where:  Middle East, particularly Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE Who’s involved: Israel, Iran, United States,   Areas of Israeli (blue) attacks between 24 and 25 June 2025 Key developments Confrontations between Israel and Iran subsided between 24 and 25 June , following the acceptance of a US-brokered ceasefire. While the latter half of 24 June (Israel-Iran time) saw no major attacks from either side, reports indicate that Israel launched a significant strike within an hour of the ceasefire being announced, before subsequently halting further operations against Iran. On 24 June,  Israel reportedly carried out a strike on a radar installation in the Iranian Caspian Sea town of Babolsar , along with an attack that killed an Iranian nuclear scientist and his family. Following these incidents, no further significant attacks were officially reported. In the early hours of 25 June, authorities in Tel Aviv stated that two UAVs, believed to have originated from Iranian territory, were intercepted. No significant Iranian attacks on Israel were reported after mid-day 24 June.   No retaliatory strikes were launched against Iran following its attack on the Qatari airbase housing US personnel and equipment, which had reportedly been evacuated in advance. Information on the precise damage caused by US strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, as well as Iran’s attack on the Qatari base hosting US and UK forces, remains limited . No changes in radioactivity levels have been reported to date. Iraqi airspace has officially reopened for flights, while Jordanian airspace continues to operate for international traffic. Increased activity has also been observed in Syrian airspace, including international flights. Israeli airspace remains open, though most operations appear limited to Israeli carriers. Iranian airspace shows no signs of activity and remains effectively closed. At the time of writing, airspace over Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE had reopened following temporary closures prompted by Iranian attacks on Qatar. No Houthi attacks on maritime vessels have been reported in the past 24 hours. Despite speculation over a potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz, maritime traffic through both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab remains largely unaffected. However, GPS jamming continues in the Persian Gulf, particularly near the UAE coast and the Strait of Hormuz. The US aircraft carriers USS Nimitz  and USS Carl Vinson  remain deployed in the Middle East , supported by at least two guided-missile destroyers in the Red Sea and five in the eastern Mediterranean. In total, over a dozen US warships are operating in the region, along with approximately 100 aircraft stationed aboard the carriers. Given the unprecedented level of volatility and the risk of unintended escalation, all non-essential operations (ground and overflight) to the affected areas, including Israel, Iraq, Syria and Iran should be avoided until further notice.  Context The recent confrontation between Iran and Israel marks one of the most direct and dangerous escalations in their history. The crisis began on 13 June, when Israel launched major strikes on Iranian military, strategic and leadership targets. Iran responded with hypersonic and ballistic missiles, UAVs, and attacks on energy infrastructure. Over 500 people have been killed or injured, including civilians in major cities. Israeli air operations reached deep into Iranian territory via Jordanian, Syrian and Iraqi airspace, and speculations through Azerbaijani airspace. The US and some European governments backed Israel, while others, such as China, Russia and several Gulf states condemned the attacks. Following US attacks on Iranian nuclear sites on 22 June, Iran targeted the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, itself resulting in condemnation from regional countries. Amid mounting destruction and international pressure, a ceasefire brokered by US President Trump was announced on 24 June. However, Israel reportedly launched a final large strike within an hour of the ceasefire, after which both sides largely paused hostilities. Airspace across Israel, Iraq, Syria and Jordan appears to be open, though Israeli airspace remains limited in use to its national airline companies. Iranian airspace, by contrast, remains highly restricted, with no commercial flights observed over its territory. Air traffic has resumed over Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE. The extent of damage to Iran’s nuclear facilities is still unclear, with indications that nuclear material may have been relocated prior to the strikes, or that key sites were not significantly affected. Further indications of efforts to continue with nuclear enrichment were noted in Iran’s parliament approving to cease cooperation with the IAEA on 25 June, pending ratification from the country’s executive body. While Iran’s nuclear programme continues, civilian air travel across the region continues to face disruption, with rerouting, insurance complications, and ongoing evacuation efforts taking place under media blackouts. Maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab remains active, though GPS jamming persists, particularly near the Strait of Hormuz. A significant military build-up continues in the region, with two US carrier groups deployed and reports of Chinese naval presence in the Persian Gulf. With tensions at their highest in years and no progress on diplomatic engagement, the risk of renewed conflict and prolonged instability remains high. Looking ahead The ceasefire between Iran and Israel has opened a narrow window for de-escalation, enabling the gradual reopening of regional airspace over Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE. Iranian airspace remains closed, while Israeli airspace is operating primarily for domestic carriers. Civilian aviation continues to face widespread disruption, with ongoing flight cancellations, rerouting, and elevated operational risks. Airlines are contending with higher costs, complex navigation requirements, increased insurance premiums, and difficulties coordinating potential evacuation flights. Although the US claims to have damaged Iran’s nuclear facilities, there are growing concerns that Iran may still be pursuing a nuclear weapon as a deterrent. Israeli officials have signaled that their military campaign could resume shortly, placing the fragile ceasefire at risk. Consequently, most governments are expected to delay lifting travel restrictions or advising citizens to return. The maritime sector remains similarly exposed. Key shipping routes through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab are currently operational, but the threat of renewed Houthi attacks or Iranian-imposed restrictions could severely impact global trade. Maritime operators are already facing increased insurance costs, tightened security measures, and possible delays. Any escalation—particularly involving further progress in Iran’s nuclear programme—could prompt a regional arms race, with countries such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt potentially seeking similar capabilities. In the absence of credible diplomatic efforts, the risk of renewed conflict and lasting regional instability remains high.

Date:   24/06/2025  Where:  Middle East, particularly Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE Who’s involved: Israel, Iran, United States, Qatar, Iraq Areas of Israeli (blue), Iranian (green) and unknown targeting (grey) between 23 and 24 June 2025 Key developments Al Udeid Airbase in Qatar came under aerial attack by Iran at around 22:00 Qatari time on 23 June 2025 , with ballistic missiles targeting the base, which hosts the largest concentration of US, UK, and Qatari military assets in the region. No injuries or major damage were reported, as Qatari authorities stated that nearly all incoming missiles were intercepted. The US, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Palestinian Authority, Bahrain, Kuwait and UAE all officially condemned Iran’s attack on Qatar as a violation of sovereignty , while France stated their “solidarity with Qatar” amid the attacks. China called on the parties to show restraint  stating that the US attack on Iran sent “wrong signals to the world,” while Turkey, Russia and Pakistan refrained from officially condemning the attack.  Early on 24 June (Iran-Israeli time), both Tel Aviv and Tehran had officially acknowledged that a ceasefire was in place, following a similar statement by US president Trump.  Between 23 and 24 June 2025, Israel experienced an increased number of air raid alerts during the morning , indicating the most intense wave of ballistic missile strikes from Iran in the past ten days. These attacks reportedly killed at least four Israelis, following Israel’s strike the previous day on IRGC facilities, where Israel claimed “hundreds” were killed. Additionally, Taji military base in Iraq was reportedly targeted by an unknown side, according to Iraqi officials, in what was the first time Iraqi soil has been targeted during the confrontation.  Israeli officials reported targeting IRGC facilities, Evin Prison in Tehran, and ballistic missile launchers in western Iran using at least 15 fighter jets. Strikes also hit Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon’s Jezzine and Nabatieh areas.  Israeli attacks on Iran during the time period of this report appear to have decreased, compared to previous days.  Iran launched ballistic missiles and UAVs targeting northeastern Israel (Golan Heights), Be'er Sheva, Jerusalem, Haifa, and Tel Aviv on unspecified targets, with residential areas reported as targeted, killing at least eight, in what appears to be one of the largest attacks since the start of the conflict . Airspace over Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE was temporarily closed during the night of 23 to 24 June, and has since reopened at the time of this report. Hundreds of flights were cancelled or delayed throughout 24 June at airports in Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, the UAE, and particularly Qatar. Information on the precise damage from US strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, as well as Iran’s attack on the Qatari base hosting US and UK forces, remains limited.  There have been no reports of changes in radioactivity levels, nor any announced US retaliation for Iran’s attack on the Qatari base. No attacks on maritime vessels by Houthi forces have been reported in the past 24 hours. Despite speculation about a possible closure of the Strait of Hormuz, maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab remains largely uninterrupted . GPS jamming and interference continue in the Persian Gulf, particularly near the Emirati coast and the Strait of Hormuz. At the time of writing,  there is no indication that US military or naval vessels have withdrawn from the Middle East.  The USS Carl Vinson, USS Nimitz, over 18 warships, and around 100 military aircraft remain within striking distance of Iran. Given the unprecedented level of volatility and the risk of unintended escalation, it is strongly advised to avoid all non-essential operations (ground and overflight) to the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia until at least 25 June. The current advice to avoid any operations in or over Israel, Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon remains in effect. Context: The confrontation between Iran and Israel has escalated into one of the most direct and dangerous in their history, setting off a chain of events with serious consequences for the region. The crisis began on 13 June 2025, when Israel launched large-scale strikes against key Iranian military and strategic sites, including the residences of senior officials and scientists. Iran responded with hypersonic and ballistic missiles, as well as UAVs, with both sides expanding their attacks to target energy infrastructure and government buildings. Israeli air operations have penetrated deep into Iranian territory, crossing Jordanian, Syrian and Iraqi airspace. At least 500 people have been killed or injured on both sides, including many civilians in major cities. The international response has been divided, with the United States and some European governments backing Israel, while China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE, Pakistan and Afghanistan condemned Israel’s initial strikes. Following US attacks on Iranian nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz and Esfahan on 22 June, Tehran launched missiles at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, which hosts the largest contingent of US forces in the region. Regional states condemned the attack, while China, Russia, Pakistan and Turkey refrained from issuing formal condemnation. Following Iran’s attacks on the Qatari airbase, on 24 June US President Trump announced a ceasefire between Israel and Iran. However, hostilities have continued. Airspace over Iran, Israel, Iraq, Syria and Jordan remains closed or heavily restricted, while maritime traffic continues despite increasing GPS interference near the Strait of Hormuz and the Israeli coast. Both countries have imposed media blackouts since 17 June, though amateur footage has revealed widespread destruction caused by the strikes. Two US carrier strike groups remain deployed in the Middle East, comprising around 18 warships and 100 aircraft, alongside reports of Chinese naval vessels in the Persian Gulf. The confrontation between Israel and Iran has led to the highest level of tension in the region in years, with tens of thousands of foreign nationals stranded in Israel, Iran and neighboring countries due to airspace closures and flight cancellations. Evacuation efforts have proved challenging, with numerous countries dispatching special flights to repatriate their citizens. Given the intensity of the attacks, neither side appears willing to engage in negotiations — particularly Iran, which now seems increasingly determined to continue its nuclear energy program, raising concerns that this could ultimately result in the acquisition of a nuclear weapon, despite official denials. Looking ahead: Despite announcements of a ceasefire, the situation between Iran and Israel remains highly volatile, with no clear indications of de-escalation. The United States and Israel have both signaled ongoing concern regarding Iran’s leadership. The US Vice President has stated that Iran will remain a national security priority for at least the next three years. In parallel, the Israeli government, led by Prime Minister Netanyahu, has indicated that it no longer views Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, as a legitimate figure. Reza Pahlavi, son of the former Shah, has appeared more frequently in US media and alongside Israeli officials, calling for changes in Iran’s leadership during televised statements. The current tensions could place Iran at the center of a broader regional crisis with significant consequences for stability in the Middle East. For these reasons, it is still strongly advised to avoid all non-essential operations (ground and overflight) to the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. The current advice to avoid any operations in or over Israel, Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon remains in effect. Looking ahead, the situation is expected to continue affecting civilian air travel, with further flight cancellations and diversions likely as regional airspace restrictions persist. Airlines may face higher operational costs, complex rerouting, insurance challenges, and increased difficulty in organizing evacuation flights. The maritime sector also faces risks: while shipping lanes through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab remain open, renewed Houthi attacks on commercial vessels or potential restrictions by Iran could disrupt global trade. Maritime operators may encounter higher insurance premiums, enhanced security requirements, and operational delays. Any further escalation — particularly if Iran advances its nuclear program and obtains a nuclear weapon — could prompt other regional states, such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt, to pursue similar capabilities, increasing the risk of an arms race. Without meaningful diplomatic engagement, the likelihood of wider conflict and regional instability remains significant. At the time of writing, numerous countries, including the US and some EU member states have officially advised their citizens to immediately leave the affected areas due to limited consular reach and security threats.

Date:   23/06/2025  Where:  Middle East, particularly Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan and Syria Who’s involved: Israel, Iran, United States, Houthi forces          Approximate areas of Israeli (blue), Iranian (green) and Houthi (red)  targeting between 22 and 23 June 2025 Key developments As of 23 June 2025, Iranian authorities have not yet militarily responded to US attacks. Regional governments, along with the EU, Russia, the US and others, have issued statements reflecting their views on the situation.  Israeli officials reported continuing attacks on Iran with around 50 combat aircraft between 22 and 23 June , targeting radar and satellite centers throughout the country, anti-air defenses in Kermanshah, airstrips, underground tunnels, aircraft in “west, east and central Iran”, in addition to targets in Madan, Tehran and Yazd. Iranian authorities announced having launched a mix of solid and liquid-fuel based ballistic missiles and drones at Israeli targets , including the Khorramshahr-4 and/or a Kheibar Shekan, both considered among the country’s most advanced missile systems. Reports indicate that in the morning of 23 June areas near the Knesset in Jerusalem and a power station in Ashdod were targeted. On 22 June 2025, at around 02:00 hours local time in Iran, the US carried out aerial attacks on the Fordow and Natanz fuel enrichment plants, and Esfahan’s nuclear technology center with seven B2 bombers deployed from the continental US, an 18 hour flight, deploying a decoy unit flying west over the Pacific. A total of 14 massive ordinance penetrator (MOP) bombs in addition to an unspecified number of Tomahawk missiles on Esfahan reportedly from a nuclear submarine in the Gulf of Oman, in what US officials claimed as a success.  Iranian authorities confirmed the attacks, stating however, that nuclear material had been previously removed from those facilities , and that damage was repairable.   Iranian authorities vowed a “decisive response” against the US  for their attacks, not specifying any details. The country’s Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced that negotiations on their nuclear program are no longer going to take place due to the failure of diplomacy.  At the time of writing, there was no information allowing for an independent assessment of the damage and result of the US attacks on Iran , with some experts casting doubt on whether the US attack accomplished its goal of destroying the targets.  US Vice President J.D. Vance announced that countering Iran’s nuclear program will be on the US agenda for the next three years , stating that previous leaders who started wars in the Middle East were “dumb,” and president Trump on the contrary, is someone “who can accomplish goals.”  The Houthis reported launching a missile at Israel , which in turn reported intercepting a missile over Eilat, in addition to a parliament session being interrupted due to a missile threat.  The aircraft carriers USS Carl Vinson  and USS Nimitz  are now operating in the US Central Command area of operations , placing around 18 warships and more than 100 US military aircraft within striking distance of Iran. Other US bases in the region may continue on high alert, awaiting a possible attack from Iran.  The airspace over both Iran and Israel remains closed due to the threat posed by missiles and military activity in the region. Major airports in all Gulf states continue to operate , although flight cancellations have been noted in many of them.  The possibility of Iran closing the Straits of Hormuz remains, with the country’s legislators approving its closure, now pending a final approval by the executive body . The US has officially called on China to prevent Tehran from closing the straits, affecting energy markets worldwide.  At the time of writing, there were no clear signs of maritime traffic being disrupted through the Red Sea or the Strait of Hormuz , although the latter could be closed by Iranian authorities in response to US attacks. Context: The confrontation between Iran and Israel has escalated into the most direct and dangerous in their history, triggering a chain of events with serious regional consequences. The crisis began on 13 June 2025, when Israel launched large-scale strikes against key Iranian military and strategic sites, including the homes of senior officials and scientists. Iran responded rapidly with hypersonic and ballistic missiles, as well as UAVs, with both sides expanding their attacks to energy infrastructure and government buildings. Israeli air operations have reached deep into Iranian territory, crossing Jordanian, Syrian and Iraqi airspace. Hundreds have been killed or injured on both sides, many of them civilians caught in strikes on major cities. Airspace over Iran, Israel, Iraq, Syria and Jordan remains closed or heavily restricted, while maritime traffic has continued despite increasing GPS interference near the Strait of Hormuz and the Israeli coast. Since 17 June, both countries have imposed media blackouts, with Israel reportedly barring foreign journalists and Iran severely limiting internet access. The international response remains divided, with the US and some European governments backing Israel, while China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE, Pakistan and Afghanistan have condemned Israel’s initial strikes. On 22 June 2025, at around 02:00 local time in Iran,  the US launched aerial attacks on Iran, likely driven by concerns over a deteriorating situation for Israel. Areas targeted were the Fordow and Natanz fuel enrichment plants, and Esfahan’s nuclear technology center. The operation reportedly involved seven B-2 bombers deployed from the continental US on an 18-hour mission. US officials claimed the operation was a success, while  Iranian authorities confirmed the attacks but stated that nuclear material had previously been removed and that the damage was repairable. Tehran had warned that any US attack would trigger strikes on American military assets across the region, but no such retaliation had been observed. The deployment of the USS Nimitz , USS Carl Vinson , B-52 bombers at Diego Garcia, and US aircraft from Cyprus and Crete places significant force within striking distance of Iran. Maritime traffic through the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz has so far continued, although closure of the latter remains a possibility. The situation remains highly volatile, with no sign of de-escalation. Looking ahead: The security outlook for aviation, maritime operations and broader regional stability remains highly precarious as the Iran-Israel confrontation deepens, now compounded by direct US involvement. Ongoing airspace closures over Iran, Israel and parts of neighboring countries, alongside widespread flight cancellations and delays, are expected to continue amid intensified missile exchanges and military activity. The deployment of additional US military assets — including carrier strike groups, surveillance aircraft and THAAD batteries — together with the presence of Chinese naval vessels in the Persian Gulf, points to a sustained and elevated risk environment for civil aviation. Increasing GPS interference in key corridors such as the eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz further heightens navigational hazards for both air and maritime traffic. Airlines are likely to maintain rerouting or suspension of flights through affected areas, while shipping operators will need to exercise heightened caution near military zones and GPS disruption hotspots. Renewed Houthi threats to target US vessels in the Red Sea raise the risk of resumed strikes on commercial shipping, with potentially severe consequences for global trade and supply chains. The intensifying conflict is placing Israeli air defenses under significant strain, with Iranian missile strikes reportedly breaching defenses and hitting key sites in Tel Aviv and elsewhere. The US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities have further escalated tensions, signaling a deepening American role in the conflict. The build-up of military forces, including three US carrier strike groups, a UK carrier and Chinese surveillance ships, increases the likelihood of the confrontation expanding to involve other powers. Should exchanges between the US, Iran, Israel and the Houthis intensify, further airspace closures, maritime disruptions and impacts on critical commercial routes across the Middle East, and potentially extending into the Caucasus, are highly likely. It is advisable to avoid flying through or operating in the airspace of Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon at any altitude and reconsider operations in the Middle East, at least until Iran's response will be clear. The resulting uncertainty poses serious risks for regional security, aviation operations and international trade.