Date: 06/08/2026 Cargo ships travel down the Rhine in Koblenz, Germany What happened? Europe's two principal commercial waterways, the Rhine and the Danube, are simultaneously experiencing record or near-record low water levels, causing the third major European low-water shock since 2018 and significantly disrupting supply chains, energy generation and fuel distribution. The Rhine's critical Kaub gauge fell as low as 21 centimetres overnight on 3–4 August, the lowest reading since records began in 1880 and below the previous minimum of 25 centimetres reached on 22 October 2018. It stood at approximately 19–20 centimetres on the morning of 6 August. Kaub is the principal reference point for navigation between the Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp refining and storage hub and industrial regions in southern Germany and Switzerland. Conditions are expected to remain exceptionally low for weeks. Germany's Federal Institute of Hydrology forecasts Kaub generally between 18 and 22 centimetres through 9 August, with some forecasts pointing to a renewed drop towards 17 centimetres by 8 August. Navigation has not formally stopped, but it has become marginal for many conventional barges. Vessels still able to operate are doing so at approximately 20% of normal capacity. Some loading and unloading points can no longer be reached, while only specialised shallow-draught vessels can operate reliably through the worst-affected sections. Tanker-barge freight from Rotterdam to Karlsruhe rose to approximately €150–160 per tonne on 4 August, up from €45 at the end of June and above the €130–140 recorded in late July. Argus has described oil-product barge rates to several Rhine destinations as being at record highs. On the Danube, the Budapest gauge was holding at approximately 19–20 centimetres on 6 August, continuing the modest recovery from approximately 10 centimetres on 3 August but still well below the previous all-time low of 33 centimetres recorded in 2018. This modest rise prevented the complete shutdown of Hungary's Paks Nuclear Power Plant. Around 01:30 on 4 August, the plant came within millimetres of the threshold that would have forced its last operating turbine offline, but the river stopped falling and had risen by 1.5 centimetres by morning. As of 6 August, the final 240-megawatt turbine remains online, keeping the plant at just over 10% of capacity, with the river holding a few centimetres above the shutdown threshold. A cold front expected on 7 August could bring rainfall in Austria that raises upstream levels. But the shut-down units can only restart once levels remain sustainably above the required threshold. Conditions are worse farther downstream. Danube flow entering Romania at Baziaș was approximately 1,500 cubic metres per second, well below the seasonal average, and is forecast to fall below the previous historical minimum by 10 August. Low levels are preventing barges from using several Romanian river ports and disrupting the movement of grain, fuel and other bulk cargo towards Constanța, a key export corridor for both Romanian and Ukrainian goods. The rivers are also constraining electricity generation in Hungary, Romania and Serbia by reducing nuclear cooling capacity, hydropower output and fuel deliveries to thermal plants. Analysis Low water levels on the Rhine and Danube are no longer only disrupting inland shipping. Both rivers are vital transport corridors for fuels, agricultural products and industrial goods. With vessels carrying only a fraction of their normal loads, transport costs are rising sharply and more freight is being diverted to already constrained rail and road networks. By early August, navigation through the Rhine’s Kaub bottleneck had become impractical for many conventional vessels. Shipping has not formally ceased because authorities do not impose a general closure at low water, but operators must decide whether individual passages remain safe and commercially viable. Loads must be divided among several vessels, shallow-draught barges command substantial premiums and some terminals have become inaccessible. The volume of Rhine cargo moving to and from Rotterdam was already approximately 10% below normal by the end of July. Chemical tankers, oil-product barges and dry-bulk vessels are particularly exposed because they generally require greater draught than container barges. Rail and road transport provide partial alternatives, but spare capacity is limited and several companies are seeking the same substitutes simultaneously. The increase in freight costs will be passed unevenly through supply chains. The first effects are likely to appear in fuels, chemicals and other products for which inland terminals depend heavily on Rhine deliveries. Food-price effects will take longer and will depend on the duration of the disruption, the availability of road and rail transport and whether producers can store grain rather than sell immediately. The original assertion that higher river freight costs would automatically produce an immediate increase in food prices was therefore too categorical. The impact is already acute across interconnected electricity markets. As domestic power generation declines in Hungary, Romania and Serbia, demand for imported electricity is increasing during a heatwave that is simultaneously driving air-conditioning use higher. Low river levels are also restricting fuel movements, reducing the ability of governments and utilities to compensate for lost generation. Serbia’s largest hydropower plant, Djerdap 1, is operating at approximately 20% of capacity. Low water has also disrupted cooling systems at the coal-fired Kostolac plants, reducing thermal generation. Serbia is consequently losing output from two major sources of electricity while its ability to import fuel by river has also fallen sharply. The government is opening part of the NIS refinery system to other domestic suppliers while seeking to preserve state reserves for a more severe emergency. Hungary’s Paks Nuclear Power Plant, which normally generates nearly half of the country’s electricity, is operating at just over 10% of capacity and may remain at that level for several weeks. Companies and households have reduced peak electricity demand following government appeals, while freight rail operations have been suspended during parts of the evening peak to reduce pressure on the grid. Romania has shut one of the two reactors at Cernavodă, which normally provides approximately one-fifth of national electricity. Authorities carried out controlled explosions on 3 August to remove a rock outcrop and redirect additional water towards the cooling channel for the remaining reactor. Romania has declared a nationwide state of alert for August, but its ability to replace lost production through imports is constrained by limited cross-border transmission capacity. As several countries seek additional electricity at the same time, regional markets become more vulnerable to price increases and supply shortages during peak summer demand. The consequences are mutually reinforcing: low water reduces domestic generation, increases electricity-import dependence, restricts fuel transport and makes alternative logistics more expensive. A controlled underwater explosion sends water and rock fragments into the air in the Danube on August 3 in Romania, where the water level is low due to heat and drought. Aviation Aviation is already being affected through higher fuel and distribution costs, so the immediate risk over the coming weeks from the dry rivers is an even tighter logistics chain. With the Kaub gauge expected to remain below the 77-centimetre low-water reference level through at least 18 August and likely beyond, barge deliveries of refined products from the Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp hub into southern Germany and Switzerland will remain severely restricted. Tanker-barge freight from Rotterdam to Karlsruhe has already reached approximately €150–160 per tonne, above the peak of around €118 recorded during the 2022 low-water episode. Higher transport costs will feed directly into delivered jet-fuel prices, while suppliers will rely more heavily on pipelines, terminal inventories, road tankers and rail deliveries. Frankfurt and Zurich airports are relatively resilient because both are connected to NATO’s Central Europe Pipeline System, while Frankfurt also receives fuel through the Rhein-Main pipeline network. So while restricted Rhine deliveries do not automatically cause an airport shortage, pipeline capacity is finite and must also be supplied from refineries and coastal storage. Prolonged low water will therefore reduce flexibility across the wider fuel-distribution system, particularly as road and rail alternatives are already under pressure from other displaced freight. The most likely operational effects during August are higher fuel costs, increased use of airport and supplier inventories, and greater tankering by airlines. Aircraft may carry additional fuel from less-constrained airports, reducing the amount they need to uplift at destinations exposed to Rhine disruption. This protects schedules but increases aircraft weight, fuel consumption and operating costs. Airlines may also adjust refuelling contracts and reduce discretionary uplift at more expensive or less reliable locations. The 2018 drought demonstrated the potential scale of the cost shock. The estimated cost of transporting fuel from Rotterdam to Basel rose from approximately US$5 per barrel in July to more than US$35 by late October, tightening petroleum supplies across southern Germany and Switzerland. However, the disruption developed later in the year. In 2026, Kaub has fallen below the 2018 record in early August, when aviation demand, industrial cooling requirements and agricultural transport are all elevated. The 2022 episode provides an even clearer precedent for aviation. When Kaub fell to approximately 32 centimetres, Lufthansa stopped moving its own jet fuel to Frankfurt by barge, although limited commercial deliveries continued. Frankfurt avoided a physical shortage because its pipeline connections were operating at full capacity. Zurich was more exposed and Switzerland released aviation fuel from strategic reserves after normal barge deliveries were disrupted. Current conditions are therefore more severe than in 2022 in terms of river level and freight cost, but the likely transmission mechanism remains similar. Disruptions are expected to worsen farther downstream. Danube flow entering Romania at Baziaș was approximately 1,500 cubic metres per second in early August and is forecast to decline to 1,350 cubic metres per second by 10 August. This would be below the previous historical minimum of 1,400 cubic metres per second and barely one-third of the August average of 3,900 cubic metres per second. Low Danube levels are preventing barges from using several Romanian river ports and disrupting the movement of grain during the harvest season. In Hungary, Serbia and Romania, barges and tankers are operating at approximately 30–40% of cargo capacity. Serbia received only 25% of its targeted monthly fuel imports in July as a result. The rivers are also constraining electricity generation in Hungary, Romania and Serbia by reducing nuclear cooling water, hydropower output and cooling capacity at thermal power plants. Short-term improvement at Budapest will not resolve the wider energy and transport disruption, particularly as flows continue to decline across the lower Danube.

Date: 21/07/2016 Context On 14/07, the EU held four accession conferences in a single day, the first time it has done so in more than two decades. Accession conferences are the formal meetings at which the EU and a candidate country open or close parts of the membership negotiation process. Holding four on the same day was a deliberate signal of momentum, and European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos described the date as a "Super Tuesday" for EU enlargement. The last comparable moment came in 2002, ahead of the bloc's big eastward expansion. The four countries advancing were Ukraine, Moldova, Montenegro, and Albania, though each at a different stage of the negotiation process. EU accession talks are organised into 33 thematic chapters, grouped into six clusters, each covering an area in which the candidate must align its laws and institutions with EU standards. Ukraine and Moldova opened Cluster 6 on external relations, which covers trade policy as well as foreign, security, and defence policy. Albania closed its first chapters, while Montenegro is now in the endgame of formal negotiations, having closed 18 of the 33 chapters. The renewed drive reflects a shift in how Brussels views enlargement. Once treated primarily as an economic and institutional process, it is now increasingly framed as a security project: a way to build resilience against Russian coercion, deepen defence cooperation, and develop a more integrated European security architecture. Kos made this explicit, stating that the future security architecture of the continent is "unimaginable without Ukraine." Russia, for its part, continues to view EU enlargement as a strategic threat and seeks to delay the accession process through hybrid activities. These include disinformation campaigns, cyber operations, political influence, and support for destabilising actors in candidate countries. China has expanded its economic leverage in the region, notably through investment and lending in the Western Balkans, but remains a secondary actor. Despite the political momentum, progress remains merit-based. Candidate countries must complete extensive reforms and receive unanimous approval from all EU Member States before joining. That unanimity requirement means any single member state can slow or block a candidate's progress, and even for the frontrunners, membership is likely still years away. Dyami’s Assessment Ukraine Ukraine has transformed into Europe's most combat-experienced military and now operates one of Europe's most battle-tested and operationally experienced integrated air and missile defence networks, combining Western systems (such as Patriot, SAMP/T, IRIS-T, NASAMS) with domestically developed capabilities. It views EU membership not only as an economic objective but as a long-term strategic anchor that complements its aspirations for NATO membership. Accession, in other words, is a two-way strategic bargain. What Ukraine seeks: A permanent European political and security anchor Long-term defence and economic support Access to the European defence industry Protection from Russia's sphere of influence What the EU gains: A highly capable military partner with extensive battlefield experience Advanced drone and defence-industrial capabilities Operational lessons that can strengthen European defence planning A more resilient eastern security frontier At the same time, the EU assumes long-term security responsibilities that extend well beyond previous enlargement rounds. This mutual security relationship is likely to deepen through joint weapons production and defence technology cooperation, exemplified by the recent EU-Ukraine "Drone Deal", which combines Ukraine's battlefield-tested drone expertise with the EU's industrial capacity. Ukraine's operational experience is expected to play a significant role in shaping European capabilities in integrated air and missile defence, drones, and electronic warfare. Russia, however, considers Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration a direct threat to its sphere of influence, making Ukraine the central geopolitical battleground between Russia and the West. As such, Russia is likely to intensify hybrid operations and long-range strikes aimed at undermining European support for Ukraine. Moldova Moldova remains one of Europe's most vulnerable security environments despite its constitutional neutrality. The country faces persistent Russian hybrid pressure through disinformation campaigns, cyber activities, and the unresolved Transnistria conflict, where Russian troops remain stationed. In response, Moldova has significantly strengthened cooperation with the EU, receiving financial support to modernise its air surveillance and air defence capabilities while accelerating accession reforms. On 13/07, the EU approved a €120 million support package under the European Peace Facility to fund a mid-range air defence system for Moldova. What Moldova seeks: Protection from Russian political interference Relief from energy pressure and cyberattacks A counterweight to the instability surrounding Transnistria What the EU gains: Strengthened preparedness on its eastern border Reduced space for Russian influence But also responsibility for a vulnerable state with limited military capacity As accession progresses, Moldova is expected to become more resilient to Russian coercion through closer integration into European political, economic, and security structures. It will, however, continue to rely heavily on EU support rather than developing significant independent military capabilities. Montenegro Montenegro is the most advanced of the current accession candidates. As a NATO member since 2017, its defence policy is firmly aligned with Euro-Atlantic institutions, despite previous Russian attempts to influence domestic politics, including the alleged 2016 coup plot. Although Montenegro has limited military capabilities due to its size, it contributes to NATO operations and places emphasis on maritime security, interoperability, and regional cooperation. Its geopolitical orientation is decisively Western, with relatively limited Chinese or Russian strategic leverage compared with other Balkan states. That said, Montenegro's experience with the Chinese-financed Bar–Boljare motorway convinced it of both the opportunities and risks associated with external investment. The nearly €1 billion loan from China's Export-Import Bank contributed to a sharp increase in public debt, prompting successive governments to rebalance towards EU and Western financial partners through currency hedging and fiscal reforms. What Montenegro seeks: Completion of its political and economic integration into the EU Strengthened institutional stability Investment and the long-term benefits of full membership What the EU gains: A politically and institutionally reliable partner that has consistently aligned itself with EU foreign and security policy A demonstration that sustained reforms and alignment with EU values continue to lead to membership, providing an important benchmark for other Western Balkan candidates Strengthened stability and maritime security cooperation in the Adriatic, even if Montenegro's direct military contribution remains modest Reduced opportunities for external influence in the Western Balkans and the elimination of another geopolitical grey zone in Southeast Europe As accession progresses, Montenegro is likely to close additional negotiating chapters while expanding cooperation on maritime security, regional interoperability, and NATO-EU coordination, reinforcing stability in the Adriatic and Western Balkans. Albania Albania has emerged as one of the EU's fastest-moving Western Balkan candidates while maintaining strong alignment with both NATO and EU foreign policy. It hosts NATO facilities, supports regional security initiatives, and has consistently backed sanctions against Russia following the invasion of Ukraine. Defence modernisation focuses on improving interoperability, cyber security, and support for NATO operations rather than developing extensive national capabilities. Geopolitically, Albania is among the most pro-Western countries in the Balkans, with limited Russian influence and comparatively modest Chinese economic involvement. What Albania seeks: Full political and economic integration into the EU Stronger democratic institutions Investment and reinforced long-term economic development Consolidation of its position within the Euro-Atlantic community What the EU gains: A reliable and firmly pro-Western partner that reinforces stability across the Western Balkans A demonstration that institutional reforms, rather than geopolitical alignment alone, remain the decisive criterion for membership, reinforcing the credibility of the enlargement process Consolidation of a coherent European political and security space, reducing opportunities for external influence The principal challenge to accession for Albania is not strategic alignment but institutional readiness. The pace of negotiations will depend on the sustained implementation of judicial, anti-corruption, organised crime, and rule-of-law reforms, supported by durable institutional results. As accession progresses, Albania is likely to deepen cooperation with the EU on cyber defence, regional security initiatives, and NATO interoperability, while continued progress on those reforms will remain the principal determinant of its accession timeline. Dyami’s Analysis The simultaneous progress of Ukraine, Moldova, Montenegro and Albania demonstrates that EU enlargement has evolved from a primarily economic and political process into a strategic security instrument. Rather than offering membership solely as a reward for reform, the EU is increasingly using accession to reduce vulnerable geopolitical grey zones, strengthen resilience against Russian coercion and create a more coherent European security architecture. However, the geopolitical bargain differs for each candidate. Ukraine brings substantial military capability but also significant long-term security commitments for the EU. Moldova primarily strengthens the Union by reducing Russian influence on its eastern border, despite limited defence capacity. Montenegro and Albania contribute less through military capabilities than through consolidating Western integration in the Balkans and reducing opportunities for external actors to exploit political and institutional gaps. As a result, future enlargement will increasingly be judged not only by candidates' progress on reforms, but also by its contribution to Europe's long-term security, resilience and strategic autonomy. Accelerating enlargement carries important risks. Political pressure to deliver rapid progress could outpace the implementation of judicial, anti-corruption and rule-of-law reforms, undermining the credibility of the accession process. Negotiations meanwhile remain vulnerable to bilateral disputes and unanimity requirements. Russia is likely to intensify hybrid activities aimed at delaying accession progress and weaken popular support. Unresolved territorial issues could also complicate integration. If these issues result in prolonged accession timelines, they risk generating public frustration in candidate countries, potentially weakening reform momentum and increasing opportunities for external actors to exploit domestic discontent.

Dyami Security Intelligence expands Middle East presence with strategic partnership and new operational hub in Beirut Beirut, Lebanon – July 1, 2026 – Dyami Security Intelligence is proud to announce the expansion of its Middle East operations through the opening of a new operational hub in Beirut, Lebanon, established through a strategic partnership with AC & Associates, a respected regional security consultancy with over two decades of experience supporting multinational organisations across the Middle East. The partnership represents a significant milestone in Dyami's international growth and further strengthens its ability to deliver intelligence-led security solutions, geopolitical analysis, operational support and crisis response throughout the Levant, the Gulf and the wider Middle East. By combining Dyami's European intelligence capabilities with AC & Associates' extensive regional presence and trusted operational network, organisations operating in complex environments will benefit from an integrated approach that combines strategic intelligence with local execution. The Beirut operational hub will support multinational corporations, aviation and maritime operators, logistics providers, insurers, government organisations, NGOs, executive travellers, critical infrastructure operators and international investors requiring reliable intelligence and operational support throughout the region. Expanded Regional Capabilities Through this partnership, Dyami significantly expands its regional capabilities by providing: ● Local intelligence validation and trusted human-source insight. ● Regional geopolitical intelligence and strategic forecasting. ● Aviation and maritime intelligence supporting operational and strategic decision-making. ● Executive protection planning and operational support throughout the Levant and Gulf. ● Emergency response, crisis management and evacuation coordination. ● Security assessments for corporate travel, expatriate personnel and visiting executives. ● Business continuity planning and Duty of Care support. ● Ground intelligence supporting aviation, maritime and overland operations. ● Security support for insurers, assistance providers and international organisations. ● Support for multinational organisations requiring both European geopolitical intelligence and regional operational capability. ● Crisis preparedness, contingency planning and resilience planning. ● Access to an established regional network of trusted security professionals and specialist partners. Eric Schouten, Founder & CEO of Dyami Security Intelligence, said: "Today's security environment demands more than information—it demands trusted intelligence, local validation and the ability to act. Organisations operating internationally require partners who understand both the geopolitical landscape and the realities on the ground. Through our partnership with AC & Associates and our operational presence in Beirut, we combine European strategic intelligence with regional expertise and trusted human networks. Together, we enable our clients to make informed decisions, protect their people and maintain resilient operations across one of the world's most dynamic regions." Peter van der Linden, Chief Operating Officer of Dyami Security Intelligence, added: "Security is ultimately about people. Intelligence only creates value when it can be translated into practical action. By strengthening our operational footprint in the Middle East, we enhance our ability to support clients throughout the full security lifecycle—from preparation and prevention to crisis response, evacuation support and business continuity. "Our partnership with AC & Associates gives our clients direct access to trusted regional expertise, proven crisis response, evacuation capabilities and operational support, while upholding the intelligence excellence and analytical standards that define Dyami." Ali F. Chahine, Managing Director of AC & Associates, commented: "We are proud to partner with Dyami Security Intelligence. Combining regional operational expertise with international intelligence capabilities creates a powerful platform for organisations operating in today's complex geopolitical environment. Together, we provide clients with trusted local support, strategic intelligence and practical operational solutions that help protect people, safeguard operations and support informed decision-making throughout the Middle East." The partnership reflects a shared belief that effective security is built on more than technology and data alone. Reliable decision-making depends on experienced analysts, trusted regional partnerships, validated human intelligence and the capability to transform intelligence into meaningful operational support when it matters most. For Dyami's clients, the new Beirut operational hub provides direct access to regional expertise while maintaining seamless integration with Dyami's global intelligence capability. The result is faster validation of emerging developments, enhanced situational awareness and improved support before, during and after critical incidents. The opening of the Beirut hub further strengthens Dyami's growing international network and reinforces its commitment to delivering people-centric geopolitical intelligence, aviation and maritime intelligence, travel risk management, crisis management and security advisory services to organisations operating around the world. As geopolitical developments continue to reshape global business, international travel and supply chains, Dyami remains committed to helping organisations anticipate emerging risks, protect their people, safeguard their operations and make confident decisions through intelligence-driven support and trusted regional partnerships. About Dyami Security Intelligence Dyami Security Intelligence is an international provider of geopolitical intelligence, aviation and maritime intelligence, travel risk management, crisis management, security advisory and intelligence-driven training services. Through a global network of experienced analysts, operational specialists and trusted regional partners, Dyami supports multinational organisations, aviation and maritime operators, insurers, governments, NGOs and critical infrastructure providers with actionable intelligence and operational support that enables safe, informed and resilient decision-making worldwide. Built on the philosophy "Preparation is Key," Dyami combines strategic foresight, trusted human networks and operational expertise to help organisations anticipate risk, protect people and operate confidently in an increasingly unpredictable world. About AC & Associates Founded in 2008, AC & Associates is a Middle East-focused security consultancy providing operational security support, executive protection, crisis management, security consulting and risk management services to multinational corporations, insurers, government organisations and international clients operating throughout the region. With an established operational network spanning Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman, AC & Associates has built a reputation for delivering practical security solutions in some of the world's most complex operating environments. The company has extensive experience coordinating emergency response and evacuation operations during regional crises, supporting corporate executives and government officials, conducting security assessments, and assisting multinational organisations through trusted local partnerships and deep regional expertise. Together, Dyami Security Intelligence and AC & Associates combine international strategic intelligence with regional operational excellence, creating a comprehensive intelligence and security capability for organisations operating across the Middle East and beyond. Media Contact Eric Schouten Founder & CEO Dyami Security Intelligence Email: eric.schouten@dyami.services Website: www.dyami.services

Date: 13/05/2026 The leaders of the G7 bloc, meeting in the Alpine spa town of Evian-les-Bains, on 17/06, tried to show a common front against China's dominance of the global critical minerals supply chain. They only partially succeeded. The discussions ended with a joint statement wherein the leaders committed to cooperation, but actual concrete measures were strikingly absent. All members agreed that China’s dominance over the critical minerals industry is a matter of national and international security. The assembled G7 heads of state during the June 2026 summit in France. Source: French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In recent years, China has shown increasing boldness in using critical mineral exports as leverage in broader geopolitical disputes. When Japan’s Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, made comments about Taiwan in January, China immediately banned exports of certain rare earth elements. Since April 2025, amid the US-China tariff war, Beijing also introduced export controls on several key rare earths and magnets, with China adding 10 more American defence and rare earth companies on its export control list on 22/06. However, despite this common agreement, G7 members severely differ in their preferred response, and this gap seems to only be widening. The G7’s architecture The G7 nations made a fair attempt at building a coordination architecture. The Évian declaration commits members to align stockpiling of minerals and share information on national systems, as well as recognizes the importance of recycling and transparency. More importantly, it stands up a non-binding Critical Minerals Resilience and Production Alliance, with the International Energy Agency (IEA) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) tasked to supply market data and early warnings of supply distortions. This initially might sound significant, but none of these agreements are binding or include actual steps to achieve these goals. Additionally, the declaration sets the target of reducing dependence on any single supplier outside the G7 for rare earths and permanent magnets to under 60% by 2030, and lower thereafter. China is not named, but it is the only supplier the target description applies to. This relatively toothless statement appears to be a diplomatic settlement, where the bloc’s common direction is announced, but any significant disagreements are left unresolved. The common problem China's sustained investment in the critical minerals industry means it now handles most of the world's rare earth processing. The problem goes beyond the extraction of minerals, where several G7 countries have already started to bridge the gap, and extends into midstream and downstream processing. China processes roughly 70% of the world's lithium, 65% of its cobalt and 85% of its rare earth elements. Extraction is comparatively diversified: Australia leads global lithium output, the Democratic Republic of the Congo accounts for most mined cobalt, and the Lithium Triangle of Argentina, Chile and Bolivia holds vast brine reserves. Yet a mineral can be dug up outside China and still reach the market dependent on Beijing, because it must first be refined there. Almost 80% of the world's cobalt is processed in China despite being mined in the DRC, and the bulk of Australia's lithium is shipped to Chinese refineries. This is why the G7's instinct to open new mines addresses the wrong stage of the chain. Catching up on extraction is slow in any case: the average lead time from discovery of a deposit to first production runs to around 15 years, and sites in Africa need heavy additional investment in power and logistics before they can produce at all. It is here that the G7 most needs to catch up, but it is here, above all, that its responses diverge. Different approaches Under President Trump, the US has invested heavily in securitising its critical mineral industries and now wants to move quickly. An executive order has directed a ramp-up in domestic production, which Washington has paired with equity stakes in producers such as MP Materials and USA Rare Earth and a federal stockpile, Project Vault, capitalised at over $10 billion. Above all, it has closed a run of overseas supply deals at a pace no other G7 member has matched. Most of these target extraction. Through its mediation of the Rwanda-DRC peace process, the US signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement with the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 4 December 2025, securing preferential access to copper, cobalt, zinc and gold. In April 2025, Ukraine agreed to a Reconstruction Investment Fund granting Washington preferential access to new mineral licences, including rare earths, titanium and lithium, in exchange for continued military support. And the January 2026 intervention in Venezuela, which removed President Maduro, is widely read as driven in part by the country's mineral and hydrocarbon wealth. Canada has likewise ramped up domestic output, and unlike most partners it is investing in processing as well as extraction. It has also leaned into stockpiling, offering the other G7 members priority access to its critical mineral reserves. Japan is the one G7 member with a substantial downstream base, presiding over a sophisticated rare earth magnet industry that is the only credible non-Chinese node in that part of the chain. Yet it remains far smaller than China's, and Tokyo has struggled to convert this into G7 backing after Beijing targeted the sector with its January 2026 export ban. The UK has recently been investing significantly in reducing its import reliance regarding critical minerals, announcing another £50 million invested spread across the extraction, processing and recycling aspects of the supply chain on 22/06. The EU has moved more cautiously. It has continued to engage Beijing diplomatically and has been slower than Washington to build domestic capacity or strike resource deals abroad, though it signed its own critical-minerals memorandum with the US in April 2026 and was due to debate tougher trade defence measures against China the day after the summit closed. France and Canada, meanwhile, have used successive summits to press for a multilateral solution, a G7-led trading bloc with shared governance. The US has shown little interest in that approach, and it is this divergence over speed and structure that the rest of the response now turns on. Dyami’s Assessment The G7 will struggle to assemble a coordinated counterweight to China's control of the critical minerals supply chain in 2026. The G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) have just concluded a complex summit from 15-17/06 which showcased their common concern about China’s critical minerals influence. However, despite a shared posture, cracks have immediately appeared in the G7’s ability to form a common front and put together a long-term coordinated counter-balance. Dyami assesses it is highly likely that the US course of fast bilateral resource deals, backed by domestic stockpiling and price intervention, becomes the de facto Western response, while European efforts toward a multilateral trading bloc stall for want of US participation. This will see critical minerals remain a national-level policy, with any response aimed at China at risk of seeing Beijing weaponize its control of the downstream mineral supply chain.

Date: 13/05/2026 Tankers cruising the Panama Canal. What happened: China has detained more than 90 Panama-flagged vessels at its ports since early March 2026, in what the US and a six-country Latin American coalition describe as targeted economic retaliation against Panama. The pattern has held for two months. Of the 123 vessels detained at Chinese ports in March alone, 91 were Panama-flagged, and similar ratios have continued into April and the first week of May. Speaking on 30 April, Panamanian President José Raúl Mulino said the country was "caught in a kind of tide" between two great powers but had no interest in further escalation. The detentions are the most visible element of a wider Chinese pressure campaign that began in February, after Panama dispossessed Hong Kong conglomerate CK Hutchison of its concessions to operate two strategic ports at the Panama Canal. The campaign also includes a freeze on Chinese state investment talks in Panama, formal demands that Maersk and Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) vacate the seized terminals, and warnings that Panama would "pay a heavy price both politically and economically." The dispossession itself was the culmination of more than a year of sustained US pressure on what President Donald Trump described as Chinese "operation" of the canal, and it has produced an unresolved international arbitration claim now exceeding $2 billion. DYAMI RESEARCH: Shield of the Americas rewrites US-LatAm relations The pressure campaign Panama operates the world's largest open-registry shipping flag, used across container, tanker and bulk fleets globally and including by Chinese carriers. Even modest delays at Chinese ports cascade through operators that have no connection to the underlying dispute, raising insurance, schedule, and demurrage costs across multiple trade lanes. China does not need to close a port, seize a vessel or announce sanctions to impose costs. By applying regulatory scrutiny disproportionately to a politically exposed flag state, it can convert routine port-state control into a tool of grey-zone economic coercion. The FMC has stated that the inspections appear to follow "unofficial instructions" amounting to reprisals. Beijing publicly denies any retaliation campaign, with Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian calling in late April the US accusations "completely unfounded" and accusing Washington of intending to seize the canal. Formal sanctions would create a clear legal and diplomatic confrontation. Unofficial inspection pressure is harder to challenge because each detention can be defended as a technical safety or compliance measure, even if the aggregate pattern points to political intent. The uncertainty forces shipping companies, insurers and charterers to price political risk into ordinary port calls. For Panama, the danger is reputational: its open-registry model depends on the assumption that a Panama flag will be treated as commercially neutral in all major ports. The shipping pressure has been accompanied by other measures. In early February, Beijing instructed state-owned firms to pause new project talks in Panama, freezing potential investments worth billions of dollars. China’s Ministry of Transport reportedly summoned senior executives from Maersk and MSC in March and demanded that the firms’ subsidiaries vacate the Panama Canal terminals they had taken over a month earlier. This broadened the dispute from Panama’s sovereign control over two concessions into a wider contest over who may operate infrastructure around a US-sensitive chokepoint, but neither company has complied. On 29 April, the United States, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guyana, Paraguay and Trinidad and Tobago issued a joint statement accusing Beijing of "targeted economic pressure" and politicising maritime trade. DYAMI RESEARCH: China Foreign Trade Law Presents Seismic Shift How Panama got here Since 1997, CK Hutchison Holdings, the Hong Kong conglomerate controlled by the family of tycoon Li Ka-shing, had operated the Balboa terminal on the Pacific entrance of the Panama Canal and the Cristobal terminal on the Atlantic side, through its subsidiary Panama Ports Company (PPC). The original concession was renewed for a further 25 years in 2021. The two terminals together handle close to 40 percent of Panama's container throughput, around 3.8 million TEU annually. The position made Hutchison the most consequential Chinese-linked operator at one of the world's most strategic maritime chokepoints. The concern for Washington was not that China operated the canal itself, but that Chinese-linked companies held influence around the canal ecosystem: terminal access, cargo flows, logistics data and commercial relationships at both entrances to the waterway. President Trump made the arrangement a public issue in his January 2025 inaugural address, alleging that China was "operating" the Panama Canal and pledging that the United States would "take back" the waterway. Under sustained American pressure, Hutchison announced in March 2025 that it would sell its non-Chinese port portfolio, including Balboa and Cristobal, to a consortium led by US asset manager BlackRock and including MSC's Terminal Investment Limited, for a headline figure of $22.8 billion. Beijing reacted sharply, describing the sale as Hutchison "kowtowing" to American pressure, and stalled the transaction through anti-monopoly review. Reporting at the time indicated Beijing had demanded a significant role for state-owned shipping giant COSCO as a precondition for approval. Panama then took matters out of Hutchison's hands. On 30 January 2026, the country's Supreme Court ruled the legal framework underpinning the 1997 concession unconstitutional, citing tax exemptions, the absence of a public tender for the 2021 renewal, and disproportionate advantages to the operator. The ruling gave Panama a domestic legal basis for the takeover, but the timing ensured that the decision would be interpreted internationally through the US-China competition around strategic infrastructure. The same day, Mulino signed Executive Decree No. 23, authorising the Panama Maritime Authority to take physical possession of both terminals. PPC employees were ordered out under threat of criminal prosecution. APM Terminals, a Maersk subsidiary, took over Balboa under an 18-month interim contract; MSC's Terminal Investment Limited took over Cristobal on the same basis. Hutchison did not concede. On 3 February, PPC filed international arbitration against Panama under the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, seeking $2 billion in damages. The claim was expanded on 24 March, with PPC alleging losses had escalated beyond that figure. Panama has resisted the ICC proceedings, requesting more time, contesting the scope of the case, and accusing Hutchison of trying to draw in parties not bound by the original contract. The longer the proceedings continue, the more the dispute becomes a test of how much room smaller states have to unwind strategic concessions once those assets become embedded in great-power competition. That legal exposure now sits alongside the commercial pressure generated by Chinese detentions of Panama-flagged vessels, creating a two-front cost structure for Panama: compensation risk on land and flag-risk at sea. Hong Kong legal commentators have flagged that the case could run for years and that the most plausible end point is monetary compensation rather than restoration of operations. For maritime trade, however, the larger precedent is already visible: strategic infrastructure disputes can spill into port inspections, flag registries, insurance exposure and shipping schedules. Ships do not need to be formally sanctioned to become pressure points.

Date: 28/04/2026 Venezuela’s former Defence Minister, Vladimir Padrino Lopez, alongside President Delcy Rodriguez. Executive Summary Venezuela is undergoing its most significant political and economic shift in over a decade. Since January 2026, the country has been governed by acting President Delcy Rodríguez, who assumed power after US forces captured former President Nicolás Maduro in a military operation in Caracas on 3 January. Rodríguez, previously Maduro’s vice president and a senior figure in the ruling United Socialist Party (PSUV), has since positioned herself as a reformist willing to cooperate with Washington, while retaining control of the party and military apparatus that sustained the Maduro government. The result is a transition strategy that pairs substantive economic reform with selective protection of individuals and structures inherited from the previous era. Understanding where the reform ends and the protection begins is essential for assessing the trajectory of Venezuela’s political and commercial environment. The reform track Venezuela holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves, but production collapsed over the past decade from around 2.5 million barrels per day to below one million, driven by corruption, mismanagement at the state oil company PDVSA, economic crisis, and sweeping US sanctions imposed from 2019. More than 7.7 million Venezuelans have emigrated since 2013, largely as a consequence of the resulting economic collapse. The most consequential reform under Rodríguez has been the overhaul of Venezuela’s hydrocarbons law, signed on 30 January. The legislation breaks with the nationalisation framework imposed by former President Hugo Chávez in 2006, which reserved exclusive crude marketing rights for PDVSA and limited private participation. The new law allows private and foreign companies to assume majority operational control of joint ventures with PDVSA and sets a royalty cap of 30 percent. It formalises a production participation contract model introduced by Rodríguez herself while serving as energy minister in 2024, under which oil output rose from 900,000 to 1.2 million barrels per day. International energy companies have responded. Spain’s Repsol signed an agreement in April to resume operational control of the Petroquiriquire asset and plans to triple production over three years. Chevron expanded its stake in a Petroindependencia joint venture. Shell secured a 30-year licence for the Dragon offshore gas field alongside Trinidad’s National Gas Company. PDVSA is reviewing 26 joint ventures, including agreements granted between 2024 and early 2026. The timing is significant: the closure of the Strait of Hormuz as a result of the US-Iran conflict has increased global demand for non-Middle Eastern oil supply, giving Venezuela’s reopening additional strategic weight. Washington has matched these moves with graduated sanctions relief. On 30 January, the US Treasury eased restrictions on Venezuelan oil transactions. In mid-April, it issued two further general licences: one authorising US entities to negotiate contracts for future commercial operations in Venezuela, and another facilitating financial transactions with Venezuelan state institutions. Both licences maintain restrictions on dealings involving China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and Cuba. Approximately $500 million in oil revenues from the initial US-brokered sales arrangement is held in accounts controlled by Washington, with the primary account reported to be in Qatar. On the institutional side, the IMF and World Bank formally resumed relations with Venezuela on 16 April after a seven-year pause, a step that could eventually unlock an estimated $5 billion in frozen special drawing rights and open the path to a financial support programme. On 27 April, Venezuela’s central bank announced that both it and the United States have each hired firms to audit Venezuelan assets held abroad. The bank’s president stated that the economy grew in the first quarter of 2026 and that the country is heading into a period of exchange-rate stability and falling inflation, though annualised inflation still stood at 649 percent through March. The protection track Alongside these reforms, the Rodríguez government has taken steps that insulate key figures and structures from the Maduro era. On 13 April, General-in-Chief Vladimir Padrino López was appointed Minister for Productive Agriculture and Lands, returning to the cabinet weeks after being removed as Defence Minister. Padrino López served as Maduro’s defence minister for nearly a decade and was identified by human rights organisations as a central figure in the violent repression of opposition protests in 2017 and 2019. He is the subject of a $15 million US reward for information leading to his capture on drug trafficking charges. His reinstatement in a civilian ministry signals that the Rodríguez government is unwilling to break with the military figures who sustained the previous regime, even as it pursues economic liberalisation. On 24 April, Rodríguez announced that the amnesty law approved in February to free political prisoners detained under Maduro would be wound down, just two months after its passage. During the Maduro years, the government detained thousands of political opponents, journalists, and activists. While 8,616 detainees have been released under the amnesty law, between 473 and 670 political prisoners remain in custody according to Foro Penal and other monitoring organisations. Rodríguez indicated that remaining cases would be redirected to alternative mechanisms, including a criminal justice reform commission. Provea, a Venezuelan human rights organisation, rejected the move as arbitrary and unconstitutional, arguing that amnesty for political prisoners must be a foundational element of any reinstitutionalisation process rather than a time-limited gesture. The Rodríguez government has also surpassed the 90-day constitutional limit on an acting presidency without a public legislative vote to extend the mandate, creating a legitimacy gap that remains unresolved. The National Assembly, still dominated by the PSUV, has not moved to address this formally. So what does the future hold? The pattern is consistent: reforms that serve US strategic and commercial interests, particularly in the energy sector, are advanced rapidly, while accountability measures that would threaten the cohesion of the ruling party and the military are constrained or reversed. This is not contradictory from a regime-survival perspective. The Rodríguez government needs international legitimacy and revenue to stabilise the economy, and it needs the loyalty of the security apparatus and party structure to remain in power. Oil reform and IMF re-engagement serve the first objective. The reinstatement of Padrino López and the winding down of the amnesty law serve the second. For external actors, the implication is that Venezuela’s commercial environment is likely to continue improving in measurable ways, particularly for energy companies willing to operate within the framework Washington and Caracas are jointly constructing. Legal certainty, foreign exchange access, and contract enforceability are all moving in a more favourable direction. However, the political environment remains structurally opaque: the ruling party retains control. of the legislature, the judiciary has not been reformed, and the treatment of political prisoners is now governed by ad hoc mechanisms rather than a statutory framework. The opposition remains fragmented. María Corina Machado, the most prominent opposition figure, is in exile and met with President Trump in Washington earlier this year, but the Trump administration has signalled that it regards Rodríguez as the more cooperative partner and has not pressed for Machado’s return to a governing role. Domestic opposition actors operate under constrained conditions, with limited institutional space to exert pressure for deeper political opening. The trajectory is one of managed liberalisation under authoritarian continuity. The Rodríguez government is offering enough reform to secure external support while drawing clear boundaries around internal accountability. Whether this equilibrium holds will depend on Washington’s willingness to tolerate the protection track in exchange for energy access and geopolitical cooperation, and on whether the economic improvements currently under way prove sufficient to prevent the kind of popular pressure that neither reform nor repression can easily contain.

Date: 20/04/2026 The 2026 revision codifies a decade of Chinese economic statecraft. Here is what it means for companies that trade with, source from, or invest in China. China’s Foreign Trade Law is the master framework that governs how foreign companies buy from, sell to, and invest in China. It was last rewritten in 2004, in the afterglow of WTO accession, to fit a country that wanted to join the global trading system. The 2026 version, in force since 1 March, is the first full rewrite since then, and it describes a country that expects the global system to keep fragmenting. The reasons have been accumulating for a decade.  China has been alarmed by foreign pressures. These range from the 2018 US tariff war, to the COVID-era weaponisation of supply chains, to successive US export controls on chips and AI.  Beijing has protested that global commerce is being used as leverage and concluded that trade law needed to do more than facilitate trade. It felt it needed to protect sovereignty, respond to pressure, and serve industrial strategy as a single instrument. The revised law does all three. It elevates national sovereignty and security to a core legislative objective, formalizes countermeasures against foreign sanctions, and folds intellectual property, digital trade, and green supply chains into one architecture. Enforcement is integrated across the board through customs, foreign exchange, and cross-border payments. For China, trade policy is now fused with industrial and security strategy. For foreign businesses, the environment is not closing. In several sectors it is opening faster than at any point since WTO accession. What changes is the conditionality. Access now comes with more scrutiny, more compliance, and more tools in Beijing’s hands when it feels pushed. China will stay open, but on its own terms, and it now has the legal infrastructure to make that stick. Seven takeaways follow. 1. Retaliation becomes a permanent feature The revised law formally codifies and unifies countermeasures against foreign sanctions, policy reviews of foreign trade measures, and trade restrictions on specific entities.  That move matters because of where it places the tools. A retaliatory power that lives in a dedicated sanctions law reads as a response to provocation. But a retaliatory power that lives in the overarching trade law reads as a standing feature of how China wants to trade. Beijing is telling foreign counterparts that its punishment toolkit is no longer reactive but routine. The volumes confirm a shift to China’s aggressive stance towards sanctions. In 2023, Chinese authorities added roughly seven targets to the Anti-Foreign Sanctions countermeasures list. In 2024, more than 100. Through 2025, even during the partial US-China trade ceasefire, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) added 76 entities to its Unreliable Entity List, against three the year before. The system has also become more surgical. Recent designations target smaller specialized firms, including unmanned systems makers and niche technology suppliers, especially ones producing dual-use (civil-military) components rather than only the large defence primes that dominated earlier rounds. In October 2025, MOFCOM added 14 defence and drone companies to the Unreliable Entity List. Listed entities are barred from importing or exporting to China, blocked from new investment, and their senior executives face entry bans and the revocation of work and residence permits. The legal basis sat in the Unreliable Entity List regulations, but the revised Foreign Trade Law now provides the umbrella under which such actions are explicitly anticipated. For companies operating across US-China lines, the practical implication is that the threshold for designation has dropped, the menu of consequences has expanded, and the legal framework has been hardened against legal challenge. Designation risk is now a baseline planning assumption, not a tail risk. 2. IP shifts from civil protection to trade-enforcement weapon The revised law contains a dedicated intellectual property (IP) chapter, which prohibits imports and exports of infringing goods, enables trade sanctions where IP violations disrupt trade order, and targets specific licensing practices including bundled licensing and restrictions on challenging patent validity. It permits retaliatory measures where foreign jurisdictions fail to protect Chinese IP adequately. This is a meaningful change. For two decades, the foreign complaint about China was not that IP laws did not exist on paper. It was that enforcement was weak, and that the old joint venture structures, combined with informal pressure, amounted to forced technology transfer. The US and EU have both argued that Chinese rules gave Chinese joint venture partners rights that foreign IP holders could not reciprocally enforce. Two changes have run in parallel since then, and they are easy to confuse.  The first is that the old blanket 51% Chinese ownership rule for foreign joint ventures is largely gone. The three old Foreign Invested Enterprise laws were repealed on 1 January 2020 when the Foreign Investment Law took effect. Securities and fund management moved from 49% to 100% foreign ownership between 2018 and 2020. The 50-50 rule for passenger car manufacturing, which had stood since 1994, fell in 2022. The 2024 Negative List, effective 1 November 2024, eliminated all remaining restrictions on foreign investment in Chinese manufacturing. Carve-outs persist in media, basic telecoms, rare earth mining, and parts of education and culture, but the blanket JV-ownership regime is no longer the dominant feature. The second change is that IP itself has migrated from civil protection into trade enforcement. Disputes that would once have been resolved slowly in Chinese courts can now be escalated into customs blocks, licensing restrictions, and cross-border payment friction. Chinese courts have awarded record damages to foreign IP plaintiffs since 2020, partly under Phase One Agreement pressure. So protection has improved. But the state now has direct trade-enforcement leverage where it previously had only the courts, and that leverage cuts both ways. A European licensor of industrial equipment today operates in a country where its patents are more likely to be upheld in court than they were five years ago, and where the state has more direct authority to intervene in licensing disputes than in any previous version of Chinese trade law. Both are features of the same regime. 3. Digital trade is welcomed, but only on China’s terms The revised law incorporates digital trade into the Foreign Trade Law for the first time. It embeds digital trade within China’s existing data governance stack: the Data Security Law, the Personal Information Protection Law, and the Cybersecurity Law.  China views digital trade as part of the conditions which it dictates to allow conditional market access. Foreign companies’ data handling must meet Chinese requirements, their products must pass a cybersecurity review, and their cross-border data flows are properly licensed or cleared.  The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) can effectively bar a foreign supplier from the Chinese market through cybersecurity review. The 2025 Cybersecurity Law amendments added the power to shut down mobile applications and, in severe cross-border cases, freeze assets of foreign organisations. Micron is the cleanest illustration of how this works in practice. In March 2023, the CAC initiated a cybersecurity review of Micron Technology’s products sold in China, the first time the regulator had proactively initiated such a review against a foreign supplier. Two months later, Micron failed the review. CAC cited serious cybersecurity problems and risks to the critical information infrastructure supply chain. Operators of Chinese critical infrastructure were ordered to stop purchasing Micron products. Roughly a quarter of Micron’s 2022 revenue had come from China. Tesla shows the other side. Tesla built a 210-acre data centre in Shanghai in 2021, localized all Chinese vehicle data, and in April 2024 became one of the first automakers to pass the vehicle data security requirements set by the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers. The result was the lifting of restrictions on Tesla vehicles at Chinese government compounds, airports, and highways.  4. Export controls are critical for rare earths and more The revised Foreign Trade Law does away with blunt export bans. Beijing instead moves toward a calibrated licensing regime that can be tightened, loosened, suspended, and selectively applied.  In October 2025, the country passed a law, requiring Chinese licences for foreign-made products containing even trace amounts of Chinese-origin rare earths or made with Chinese rare earth processing technology. That instrument mirrors a tool Washington has used for decades to restrict semiconductor exports. Its adoption by Beijing is not a coincidence. The concentration that makes this leverage credible is not in dispute. The International Energy Agency reports that China holds an average 70-percent market share across 19 of the 20 most strategic minerals in its role as the leading refiner. That dominance is the foundation on which the licensing regime stands. There is already an example of this. In April 2025, in response to the Trump administration’s tariffs, China imposed case-by-case export licensing on seven heavy rare earth elements including dysprosium, terbium, samarium, and yttrium, together with related compounds and magnets.   Export volumes cratered. With other rare earth prices reaching up to six times Chinese levels, carmakers in the US, Europe, and elsewhere reported production cuts. Some temporarily shut down factories for lack of permanent magnets. Following the Trump-Xi summit in Busan on 30 October 2025, Beijing suspended several of the October 2025 measures for one year. It will turn export controls on and off as a diplomatic instrument. 5. Trade enforcement is far more prevalent The revised law integrates trade enforcement with customs authorities, the financial system, and foreign exchange controls. Non-compliance with Chinese trade rules can now trigger customs clearance blocks, FX scrutiny, and payment restrictions.  For most foreign companies, the daily friction of doing business with China is at customs and for financial services.  The revised law unifies the response across the Ministry of Commerce, Customs, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and the People’s Bank of China. In 2025, previous changes brought the demand for real-name tax reporting for exports, full traceability across export supply chains, and enhanced documentation requirements that demand consistency between invoice records, customs declarations, and foreign exchange receipts. For foreign companies, the practical effect is that compliance is no longer compartmentalized. A trade dispute can become a customs problem, a tax problem, and a payments problem within the same week.  6. Green trade is written in as a future lever The revised law supports green and low-carbon trade, encourages environmentally sustainable imports and exports, and promotes green supply chains and technologies.  Read charitably, this is China aligning its trade regime with its climate commitments and creating opportunities for foreign providers of environmental goods and services.  But read more carefully, it is setting a legal basis to allow market access based on companies’ environmental credentials.  The current green-trade provisions in the Foreign Trade Law are soft and are designed to encourage foreign companies rather than compel. But the architecture is in place for this to change. If Beijing decides in five years that foreign exporters must demonstrate carbon-footprint compliance for certain categories, or that particular imports face environmental review, the law already provides its authority to do so. This is how conditionality has historically been built in China. Frame first, operationalize later. 7. Alignment with international standards is selective  The revised law positions China as aligning with WTO obligations, while preserving regulatory autonomy in national security, data governance, and industrial policy. China makes it clear it will align with international trade rules, when such an alignment serves its interests. For example, compliance could be expected to gain market access for Chinese exporters, predictable rules for Chinese firms operating abroad, and continued WTO participation. It will not align where alignment would constrain its strategic toolkit.  Foreign companies should therefore read Chinese trade policy as simultaneously liberalising and tightening.  Manufacturing is now fully open to foreign investment. Healthcare pilot programmes allow wholly foreign-owned hospitals in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Nanjing, Suzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Hainan.  At the same time, the countermeasures toolkit, the export control regime, and the data governance architecture are all becoming more assertive.  For foreign companies, that means treating Chinese trade policy as a portfolio of sector-specific regimes rather than a single posture. The country that welcomes a foreign-owned hospital in Shenzhen is the same country that bans Micron from critical infrastructure procurement.  Both decisions are coherent within Beijing’s new foreign trade framework.

Date: 14/04/2026 Key Takeaways 1. Ireland’s fuel protests have caused nationwide road closures, fuel depot blockades, and airport access disruption. They are the first European case study of how the Strait of Hormuz crisis translates into domestic civil disorder and transport paralysis. 2. The Irish experience will be replicated elsewhere. Several EU countries with high fuel taxation, limited refining capacity, and transport-dependent rural economies are exposed to the same dynamic. 3. European aviation faces a systemic jet fuel shortage within two to three weeks if Hormuz shipping does not resume at meaningful volume. 4. Business travellers should expect rising fares, schedule volatility, and an increasing probability of short-notice cancellations. 5. On 12 April, the government announced relief measures, sharply reducing taxes on fuel until July. The Irish Warning On 7 April 2026, convoys of tractors, trucks, and haulage vehicles began blocking  major motorways across Ireland. The immediate trigger was the sharp increase in petrol and diesel prices driven by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz following the US and Israeli strikes on Iran from 28 February. In Ireland, the price shock was amplified by a pre-existing structure where taxes account for approximately 59% of petrol prices and 52% of diesel prices. Green diesel prices rose from €0.97 per litre in late February to €1.80 per litre in recent weeks, although the government has acted  to mitigate this. The protests escalated rapidly. By 8 April, demonstrators had blockaded  fuel depots in Galway, Limerick, and Cork, including the Whitegate oil refinery, the only operational refinery in Ireland. The Taoiseach described the refinery blockade as an act of national sabotage. By 11 April, around 600 of Ireland’s 1,500 filling stations had run dry . The Defence Forces were deployed to assist police in clearing blockades. County Clare and the Shannon region were at the centre of the disruption. Slow-moving convoys choked the M18 and N18, the principal access routes for Shannon Airport, from the first day. The Shannon-to-Limerick Tunnel was closed.  While Shannon Airport Group confirmed that flights themselves were not delayed by the road protests, reaching the terminal became difficult for travellers dependent on road transport. Then, 11 April saw a separate but symbolically linked incident compounded the picture. A man breached the airport perimeter, climbed onto the wing of a US Air Force C-130 Hercules parked on a remote taxiway, and attacked the fuselage and wing with a hatchet. The aircraft, belonging to the 139th Airlift Wing of the Missouri Air National Guard and en route to a bilateral exercise in Poland, sustained damage. The attack was the latest in a series of security breaches at Shannon linked to opposition to its role as a US military transit hub, a role that has only intensified since the strikes on Iran began.  From Commodity Shock to Civil Disorder Corporations with frequent business travel in Europe should be watching the Irish example closely as the impact of the Strait of Hormuz causes cascading disruptions. International oil prices rise above $100 per barrel; domestic fuel prices spike, potentially amplified by national tax structures; transport-dependent sectors reach a pain threshold; organised protest action targets road networks and fuel supply infrastructure; cascading disruption affects airports, public transport, emergency services, and commercial activity. Ireland was the first EU member state to experience this full chain. The situation went from motorway convoys to full refinery blockades in three days.  The next question for the rest of Europe is where and when this dynamic will be repeated. The conditions for similar protest movements exist across multiple member states. France, with its long history of fuel tax protests, has both the structural exposure and the organisational precedent. Spain and Portugal have active agricultural and haulage unions with proven capacity to blockade. Poland, the Baltic states, and Greece each face combinations of high fuel dependency, limited domestic refining margin, and politically mobilised rural constituencies. The Netherlands and Belgium, as major logistics hubs, are disproportionately exposed to any disruption in overland freight movement. The European Aviation Fuel Outlook The broader European aviation fuel picture is deteriorating on a timeline measured in weeks, not months. On 10 April, ACI Europe, the trade body representing EU airports, wrote to the European Commission warning that a systemic jet fuel shortage would become a reality for the EU if Hormuz shipping did not resume in a significant and stable way within three weeks.  The International Air Transport Association reported  that jet fuel prices rose 103% month-on-month as of March 2026. The final jet fuel cargoes that passed through the Strait of Hormuz before its effective closure were projected  to arrive at European ports around 10 April. After that date, incoming volumes are expected to drop significantly unless the Strait reopens or alternative supply routes are secured at scale.

Date: 10/04/2026  Where?  The Strait of Hormuz, but bears consequences for global supply chains. Who’s involved?  Iranian authorities, global food and fertilizer supply chain. What happened?  On 28/02/2026 , Iran blocked the Strait of Hormuz as  a response to strikes by the US and Israel  on strategic targets in Iran, including military sites, Iran’s missile infrastructure, and the Iranian leadership. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has raised concerns about the global energy supply and has caused oil prices to soar. Beyond its role in energy markets, however, the strait is also crucial for transporting critical resources used in fertilizer production,  making it an important supply route for industries that depend on synthetic fertilizers. Analysis The Gulf region is a key producer of fertilizer  and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has therefore raised concerns about fertilizer shortages. The region especially produces nitrogen fertilizers, of which Urea is the most widely used. Nitrogen fertilizers are used for many types of crops, but especially grains, cereals, and leafy crops. Besides the final product, the Gulf region also exports various raw materials used for the production of fertilizer . The region is the source of 44% of the global sulfur trade  which is a critical ingredient of phosphate fertilizers, and an important exporter of natural gas , both a raw material and the primary energy source for the production of most nitrogen fertilizers. Particularly China, Morocco, and Indonesia rely on the Gulf region for their import of sulfur. Furthermore, fertilizer factories in India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan have closed down production due to natural gas shortages. India illustrates the scale of what is at stake. As the world's second-largest consumer of nitrogen fertilizers, India produces around 87% of its urea domestically but depends on Gulf imports for the natural gas and raw materials that make that production possible, with 30-40% of nitrogen imports and 70% of finished fertilizer imports sourced from the Gulf. The Indian government has already rationed natural gas to fertilizer plants. Prices are rising and farmers, many of whom were already trapped in poverty cycles and debt before this crisis, have begun hoarding supplies. The worse may be yet to come. A critical pressure point arrives in May, when procurement begins ahead of India's June planting season. These shortfalls will translate directly into reduced yields at the October-November harvest. The global impact would be significant. As the world's second-largest rice and cotton producer, leading milk producer, and largest beef and veal exporter, a significant drop in Indian food output will ripple through global supply chains. The disruption of the fertilizer supply and production chain will most likely result in a shortage and drive up global prices , which will negatively impact food production. The high price of fertilizer will directly increase the price of food . For instance, the price of fertilizer accounts for about 20% of the total cost of grain. Additionally, farmers might choose to delay planting, switch to crops that are less reliant on fertilizers (like legumes), or choose to reduce the amount of fertilizer used, leading to reductions in the eventual yields. As a result, food shortages might occur, specifically for foods produced with fertilizer-reliant crops. Fertilizer shortages are especially impactful as the spring planting season is about to begin, which is the time when most farmers prepare the soil for planting crops. Most farmers order fertilizer in March for April and May. Therefore, decisions farmers make at this moment will directly affect the available food supplies in a few months time , when the crops are supposed to hit the supermarket shelves.  Rising fertilizer and food prices will hit the poorest countries hardest, as they cannot pay for the increased costs, and negatively impact countries that are heavily reliant on imports for these products. Research on the effects of the increased fertilizer prices in 2021 and 2022, when gas prices increased as a result of the Ukraine war, shows that African farmers were most affected. Projections of the current disruption give similar results, with countries in South Asia and Africa specifically facing the potential of largest losses. Besides stimulating crop growth, nitrogen fertilizers are also often used to make IEDs  (improvised explosive devices). Therefore, increased prices for this type of fertilizer might also affect organised crime and terrorist groups that make use of these materials for their explosives. The full extent of these consequences are hard to determine, however possible consequences could include increased smuggling of fertilizers or increased use of other materials that make IEDS, like gunpowder or hydrogen peroxide. Food insecurity is a known destabilizing factor and driver of conflict.  Hence, if food shortages occur, the affected regions are also likely to become more unstable and see an increase in civil unrest and violence. Conclusion and assessment The blockage of the Strait of Hormuz has severely disrupted global supply chains for both natural gas and finished fertilizer products. As the Gulf region serves as a primary hub for nitrogen-based fertilizers and essential raw materials like sulfur, this closure has created an abrupt supply deficit in international markets. The resulting scarcity and surge in prices are projected to have serious implications for global food production, resulting in higher operational costs for farmers and an increased likelihood of widespread food shortages.  The effects of this are especially severe for developing nations and those with a high dependency on agricultural imports, specifically across Southern Asia and Africa, where the capacity to absorb such price shocks is limited. Given that food insecurity historically acts as a significant destabilizing force that can trigger or fuel regional conflicts, the current disruption poses a critical geopolitical threat. This must be considered when evaluating the future stability of impacted regions.

Date: 08/04/2026 Executive Summary The Trump administration's pressure campaign against Cuba is entering a crucial phase as the White House views Havana as its next priority to bring Latin America into line with its policies.   An oil blockade engineered through Venezuela's forced realignment with Washington has effectively collapsed the island's energy infrastructure. The situation is critical: hospitals have shut down, schools are suspended, and normal business has grounded to a halt. Cuba has responded with visible but carefully bounded concessions: a 2,010-person prisoner release framed around Holy Week, permission for diaspora Cubans to invest in island companies, and continued back-channel engagement with US officials. But it is flatly refusing to negotiate its political structure.  The administration is itself divided between Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who wants the Communist Party out, and a president who has described Cuba as "virgin territory" for US business and let a Russian oil tanker through the blockade saying "they have to survive."  That internal contradiction defines the current impasse. Cuba will not get the deal it wants. The US will not get the Cuba it wants. What happens in between, and how long it takes, determines whether the political, business and humanitarian opportunities that Cuba represents remain theoretical or not. The Pressure Campaign   Cuba's energy crisis has a specific and traceable cause. For over two decades, Venezuela supplied Cuba with between 26,000 and 35,000 barrels of oil per day at preferential rates, a subsidy relationship established under Hugo Chávez in 1999 and maintained through Maduro's tenure.  When US forces captured Maduro in January 2026 and Venezuela's acting president Delcy Rodríguez moved quickly to align with Washington, those shipments stopped.  Cuba had no comparable alternative. Russia provides limited volumes. China has been cautious. Iran is under its own US pressure. The result has been a cascade of infrastructure failures that would be difficult to overstate. In March alone, Cuba suffered two nationwide blackouts in a single week. Schools have suspended classes across multiple provinces. Workers in non-essential sectors have been furloughed to reduce energy consumption. Airlines including Cubana de Aviación have canceled long-haul routes because Cuba does not have sufficient jet fuel to operate them. Hospitals are running on backup generators where generators exist; where they do not, patients dependent on powered medical equipment are at direct risk. The Economist Intelligence Unit projects a 7.2 percent GDP contraction in 2026, a figure that represents a 23 percent cumulative decline since 2019. Survey data cited by Cuban economists suggests 80 percent of the population believes the current crisis is worse than the Special Period - the decade following Soviet collapse in 1991, during which the average Cuban lost up to five and twenty-five percent of their body weight. Trump allowed a Russian-flagged tanker to reach Cuban waters in late March. He described it as humanitarian: "They have to survive." A second is now on the way. The White House subsequently stated it was not a policy change.  That clarification reflects the administration's actual strategy accurately: the blockade is calibrated to produce maximum political leverage without triggering a collapse severe enough to generate a refugee crisis, a regional backlash, or a domestic humanitarian optics problem that would constrain Washington's options.  What Washington Wants  The administration does not have a unified Cuba objective. Rubio's position is the more clearly defined. He has long been a hawk against what he perceives as Communist enemies in Cuba and speaks for much of the right-wing Cuban diaspora in Florida.  He has stated publicly and repeatedly that Cuba requires new leadership, a new governing system, and a new economic model. In congressional testimony in January, he said the administration "would love to see the regime there change." In a Fox News interview in early April, he said there would be "more news fairly soon" on Cuba, and reiterated that the economy cannot be fixed without changing the government.  Trump's stated goals are different in emphasis and substance. He has described Cuba as "virgin territory" and has told advisers he sees opportunities in shipping, tourism, construction, and hospitality.  Lawrence Gumbiner, who led the US Embassy in Havana during Trump's first term, has assessed Trump's core interest directly: he wants economic access, not pluralist democracy, and would accept a compliant leadership figure willing to open Cuba's economy on US terms, structured similarly to the arrangement now in place with Rodríguez in Venezuela.  These two positions are not compatible in their end states. Rubio needs the Communist Party gone. Trump needs a counterparty to do business with. Cuba cannot simultaneously be dismantled and bought.

Date: 24/03/2026 Throughout March 2026, Russia has capitalised on a global energy supply shock to generate substantial emergency revenue.  In the first fifteen days of March, the Kremlin extracted  €7.7 billion from fossil fuel exports, averaging €513 million per day, according to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air. This was up from a €472 million daily average in February. The financial surge was made possible due to a confluence of events: the near-complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran and the subsequent emergency suspension of US sanctions on Russian oil.  The resulting capital accumulation provides immediate liquidity to a Russian state sustaining significant wartime expenditure and battling constant drone attacks by Ukraine on its oil and gas refineries and pipelines.  The Supply Shock The Strait of Hormuz historically facilitates the transit of roughly one-fifth of global daily oil consumption. Its closure instantly removed a significant volume from global supply, creating an acute procurement crisis, especially for Asian economies dependent on Middle Eastern exports.  Large-scale refineries cannot pause operations when supply chains are severed. Facing immediate operational risk, international buyers moved to secure alternative physical volume under significant time pressure. Despite Russia’s international pariah status due to the Ukraine invasion, the cold reality of economic necessity made it the perfect alternative supplier as one of the largest oil producers in the world. Additionally, the decision  by President Donald Trump to lift sanctions on Russian crude for a month should not be seen as a diplomatic concession, but as a needed market stabilisation measure. Before the waiver, Western price caps blocked the provision of maritime insurance and shipping services to vessels carrying Russian crude above a set price ceiling. Lifting it allows Moscow's tanker fleet to serve as an immediate substitute for disrupted Middle Eastern supply.  India moved fastest. With its refining capacity far exceeding domestic crude production, Indian buyers had the most urgent need for alternative baseload. Its imports  of Russian crude surged 50 percent in the first half of March compared to February. This is a systemic shift in Russia’s short and middle-term financial outlook. Russian oil arriving at Indian ports moved from trading below Brent to commanding an estimated $5 premium over it. Because Russian extraction costs are relatively fixed, that price shift translates directly into margin. Financial Times market modelling in mid-March estimated  Russia would make a surplus of $110 million to $150 million per day. The longer the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, the more this will increase.   A chart comparing the price of Brent (blue) and Russia Urals crude (red). Source: Sky News. A Fiscal Tourniquet The capital generated by the Hormuz supply shock buys Moscow time, munitions, and short-term budgetary relief. But it does not address the structural condition of a wartime economy dependent on degrading and actively targeted hydrocarbon infrastructure. The €7.7 billion influx in early March, and the billions that follow, are a great help. But unless the war drags on for far longer, it will not be enough for Russia to make a sustainable financial recovery.  Before the March supply shock, the Kremlin was drawing down sovereign reserves to cover wartime expenditure. The National Wealth Fund held approximately  $130 billion in liquid assets at the start of the war. That buffer had fallen to an estimated $50 billion by early 2025. The estimated $150 million daily surplus generated by the Hormuz premium directly offsets. In an economy utterly dominated by wartime expenditure, this can cover soldier signing bonuses, munitions procurement, and near-term budget gaps.  But the Russian economy’s dependency on oil revenue has left it in stagflation . The state has shifted to a war-economy model, redirecting civilian industrial capacity toward the defense sector. The civilian economy contracted  for three consecutive quarters through late 2025. Foreign direct investment has cratered. To finance a 2026 federal budget deficit projected  at 3.8 trillion rubles ($49 billion), the Kremlin has raised  the corporate profit tax  to 25% and the VAT as high as 22%, both of which are accelerating domestic inflation.  When the energy market stabilizes and the Hormuz premium disappears, Russia will revert to its previous position: heavily sanctioned, structurally constrained, and without internal growth mechanisms to compensate. Why Ukraine Targets the Infrastructure Ukraine has exploited this weakness. Kyiv has systematically targeted Russian refineries, oil depots, and pipeline networks on the calculation that degrading the physical supply chain is the most effective way to constrain Russian finances. The scale of the campaign is significant. Across 2024, 2025, and into early 2026, Ukraine has executed  around 200 confirmed strikes on Russian energy infrastructure, hitting almost half of Russia's 38 major refineries, including the Rosneft Ryazan plant , the Volgograd refinery,  and the Slavneft-YANOS facility in Yaroslavl.  On March 23, Ukrainian drones struck  the Russian oil port of Primorsk, on the Baltic Sea. At various points, these strikes have taken up  to 17% of Russia's total refining capacity offline, prompting emergency bans on domestic gasoline exports to protect military and agricultural fuel supply. A map of Russian refineries. Red, orange and yellow icons have been struck or targeted by Ukraine. Source: Caspian Policy Center, March 2026. The Expanding Strike Radius Ukrainian long-range drone development has shifted the geographic scope of the conflict. Its ordnance now has a range exceeding 2,000 kilometers. Importantly, these drones are not constrained geographically, as is the case with several missile systems. This has been confirmed through strikes on the Lukoil-Ukhtaneftepererabotka refinery  in the Komi Republic in February 2026 and the Antipinsky refinery  in the Tyumen region of Siberia. That range places the majority of Russia's industrial and hydrocarbon infrastructure, including facilities in the Urals and western Siberia, within operational reach. This creates a difficult resource allocation problem for the Russian Ministry of Defense.  Air defense assets must be distributed to defend the frontline, industrial bases, energy infrastructure, military bases, airfields, and major cities. There are simply too few air defense assets to provide sufficient coverage among these locations, meaning some are left without any significant cover, leading to predictable outcomes once targeted. Frontline Attrition The revenue surplus also cannot reverse current battlefield momentum.   Throughout 2025, Russian forces were unable  to sustain combined-arms offensives, advancing at a glacial pace while incurring significant casualties. In early 2026, the Ukrainians also conducted a series of localized counterattacks which were accelerated by Russia’s sudden loss of Starlink, as SpaceX, Starlink’s owner, moved to blacklist unverified systems, which the Russians depended on due to sanctions. The reallocation of Russian air defense assets away from the contact line has given Ukrainian forces greater operational freedom. That has enabled Ukrainian infantry to degrade fortified Russian defensive positions and apply pressure to critical logistical nodes in the Donbas and Zaporizhzhia sectors. Domestic Friction The situation in Russia is worsened by escalating controversy at home. Since early March, the government has initiated  severe internet throttling and localized communications blackouts across major cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg.  The recent targeted bans on Telegram and other widely used apps and social media reflect a profound state insecurity regarding domestic stability and may be the precursor to a more permanent type of information control. This has led to surprising protests, with even a traditionally pro-state newspaper publishing direct criticism  of the communication blackouts. Conclusion In the current landscape, Dyami views the fiscal windfall as a temporary bonus rather than an early sign of Russian economic stabilisation.  The Hormuz-driven fiscal windfall is real, but its strategic value is constrained by the same conditions that have made Russia so vulnerable. Moscow can use the surplus to cover immediate wartime expenditure, soldier bonuses, and near-term budget shortfalls. It cannot use it to reconstitute degraded refining infrastructure, replace sanctioned industrial components, or reverse its profound recession. The emergency US sanctions waiver applies strictly to crude oil exports, not to the import of high-technology components needed to repair and maintain oil refineries. Worse, the extra injection of cash may worsen inflation. Injecting surplus petrodollars into a war economy operating at full industrial capacity, with a severe labour shortage and no meaningful civilian output growth, will only accelerate price instability.

Utrecht, 7 September 2023 – Dyami Academy proudly welcomes Charlotte Bakker, an accomplished training actress and contributor, to its team of experts dedicated to enhancing security and awareness across diverse industries. Charlotte Bakker joins Dyami Academy With a rich background in theater and a proven track record as a theater director, Charlotte's unique talents will play a vital role in advancing Dyami Academy's mission. Charlotte Bakker's journey in the world of performing arts began in the theater, where her passion for storytelling and captivating audiences took root. Her experiences as a theater director allowed her to refine her skills in creating compelling narratives and engaging performances. Now, as a member of Dyami Academy, Charlotte artfully blends her theatrical expertise with a strong commitment to improving security awareness in various sectors. In her role at Dyami Academy, Charlotte Bakker will focus on developing immersive and lifelike scenarios that serve as essential training tools for organizations looking to enhance security and awareness. Her creative approach to crafting realistic situations will empower businesses, NGOs, and the aviation sector to train their personnel effectively and prepare them for an array of security-related challenges. "We are thrilled to have Charlotte Bakker join Dyami Academy," said Sophie Buur, head of training at Dyami Academy. "Her unique background in theater and her dedication to enhancing security awareness align perfectly with our mission. Charlotte's contributions will undoubtedly help organizations prepare for and respond to security challenges more effectively." Charlotte Bakker's addition to Dyami Academy's team represents a significant step forward in the organization's commitment to providing innovative and immersive training solutions for a safer and more secure future. For more information about Dyami Academy please visit dyami.services or contact us at info@dyami.services. About Dyami Academy Dyami Academy , part of Dyami Security Intelligence Services is a leading provider of security and awareness training solutions for organizations across various sectors. By offering immersive and realistic training scenarios, Dyami Academy equips personnel with the knowledge and skills needed to respond effectively to security-related challenges. Through a commitment to innovation and excellence, Dyami Academy strives to create a safer and more secure world for all.