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Date:   12/08/2025 (14:00 GMT+2) Where?  Mali What happened?  On 11/08/2025 , it was reported that Malian authorities had arrested two dozen soldiers accused of plotting to overthrow the ruling junta. The arrests include several high-ranking officials, such as General Abass Dembélé, former governor of the Mopti region of the country and a respected military officer and General Nema Sagara, one of the few high-ranking female officers in the armed forces. The suspected coup attempt comes amid an increasingly oppressive political climate. On 10/07/2025 , a bill was signed into law granting General Assimi Goïta, who leads Mali’s junta, a new five-year presidential mandate, renewable “ as many times as necessary until the country is pacified ”, which essentially created the legal basis for Goïta to rule for life.  This followed an unprecedented political crackdown in the country. On 13/05/2025 , Mali’s military leadership formally dissolved all the political parties. Just one week earlier, on 07/05/2025 , the junta suspended all political activities across the country as a response to a protest planned  on 09/05/2025  calling for the return to constitutional rule and demanding presidential elections. Amidst the political turmoil, Mali continued to face grave security challenges, mostly coming from an insurgency which has gripped the country since 2012 by Islamist groups such as Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and also by Touareg rebels, who united under a group named the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA).   On 01/06/2025 , JNIM carried out an attack on a Malian army base, with reports estimating the number of casualties between 30 and 100. On 02/06/2025 , the same group attacked the Malian city of Timbuktu, with reports stating “ dozens of soldiers killed ”. On 05/06/2025 , JNIM again attacked two army outposts in Mahou and Tessit, leading to more soldiers killed. On 13/06/2025, FLA fighters clashed with the Malian army and Russian forces supporting them between Aguelhok and Kidal, leading to dozens killed. On 01/07/2025,  the city of Kidal was attacked and ransacked by JNIM. Conclusion After Assimi Goïta took over power in May 2021, his own regime now finds itself in an increasingly difficult position as it is struggling to contain the rampant security threats in his country’s territory, all while relying on repression to maintain control, much like his predecessors. Many actors who once supported his rise to power now find themselves considering alternative options - this thwarted coup was merely a symptom of those underlying shortcomings . Taken together, these things paint a bleak picture for a country whose regime needs military cohesion to maintain control.  Moreover, there appear to be two main scenarios for the current situation. The first one is that Mali will face enduring destabilization as military cohesion and the legitimacy of the junta continue to erode, creating fertile ground for possibly another coup. The other scenario involves ruling leader Goïta tightening his grip on power even further and centralizing it through repression, purges and loyalty-based promotions to secure his position after this latest foiled coup attempt. This might buy him time, but risks exacerbating the problems that initially led to this failed coup. This will only accelerate the instability in Mali - the instability that his rule meant to stop.  This is a shortened version of a more elaborate report. To access the full version, contact info@dyami.services

Date: 08/08/2025  (17:00 UTC+2) Where?  Lebanon What happened?  On 19/06/2025 , after months of pressure for the disarmament of Hezbollah following the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire deal, signed on 18/11/2024 , US special envoy Thomas Barrack delivered a plan to the Lebanese government officials. The plan entailed the full disarmament of Hezbollah within four months in exchange for a halt to Israeli air strikes and withdrawal of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) from southern Lebanon. The IDF has maintained a presence in five posts in southern Lebanon since first establishing a presence during the Israel-Hezbollah conflict of 2024, namely in Jabal al-Labouneh, Jabal Blat, Talat al Awida, Tallet al-Hamamamis, and Tallet Aaziyyeh. On 07/07/2025, the Lebanese government delivered a response to US envoy Barrack, which was so well received it even prompted Barrack to state he was “unbelievably satisfied” with Lebanon’s reply. This was, however, not a final agreement, and negotiations were to continue in order to finalize the deal.  Fast forward a few weeks, on 21/07/2025, during a press conference after a meeting with Lebanon’s PM, Nawaf Salam, when asked about the extent to which the US could act as a security guarantor for Lebanon and push Israel to respect its end of the deal, Barrack casted doubt over the US’ mediating power, stating that the US “has no business in trying to compel Israel to do anything”. On 29/07/2025, the US publicly pressured Lebanon to formalize its commitment to Hezbollah’s disarmament, pushing for the Lebanese cabinet to approve the disarmament of Hezbollah.   On 30/07/2025, Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem scorned calls to disarmament, stating that the group will “not submit to Israel” and that weapons are “an internal Lebanese affair”. On 31/07/2025, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun urged Hezbollah to disarm, arguing that avoiding doing so would only result in the continuation of Israeli air strikes in Lebanon. On 05/08/2025, the Lebanese Cabinet tasked the army to draw up a plan to establish a state monopoly on arms by the end of the year. As a response, Hezbollah supporters began protesting, especially in Beirut, where they had first gathered on Monday, 04/08/2025 . The plan is to be presented to the Lebanese government by 31/08/2025. During the cabinet meeting that led to this decision, Hezbollah’s Qassem repeated his refusal to disarm while threatening Israel that Hezbollah would retaliate if Israel were to re-intensify its air campaign on Lebanon. On 06/08/2025, Hezbollah leader Qassem repeated his disdain for the cabinet decision the previous day, stating that the Lebanese government was committing a “grave sin” by directing the Army to establish a monopoly on arms.  On 07/08/2025, the Lebanese Cabinet approved the US-proposed plan to disarm Hezbollah. Conclusion The recent Lebanese Cabinet decision to formalize the disarmament of Hezbollah represents a major change in the government’s stance towards the Iran-backed group that has essentially ruled the country for the past two decades. The decision comes after Hezbollah suffered heavy losses during the recent Israel-Hezbollah war, which resulted in the death of most of its leadership and a significant part of its fighters. Weakened both militarily and politically, Hezbollah could not avoid the appointment of Lebanon’s new President, Joseph Aoun, who was elected by a vast majority in parliament after more than two years since the last election.  Aoun, a former Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), has vowed to rebuild the country and has identified the State’s monopoly on arms as a crucial factor in the rebuilding process. On 07/08/2025, the Lebanese Cabinet approved plans for the LAF to conduct Hezbollah’s disarmament and deliver a result by year’s end. The plan, heavily pushed by the US, is likely not in line with what Aoun’s government, wary of fostering more dissent (Hezbollah still enjoys some popular support) by rushing the group’s dismantlement, would have preferred. Nevertheless, the plan is now in motion, and the LAF, following years of neglect and under-funding, faces a monumental task that warrants continued monitoring. This is a shortened version of a more elaborate report. To access the full version, contact info@dyami.services

Date:  08/08/2025  (15:00 UTC+2) Where?  Bosnia and Herzegovina; Republika Srpska Historic context: On 14/12/1995 , the Dayton Accords (officially the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina) was signed between the newly established states of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which at this point in history consisted of modern-day Serbia and Montenegro after the other former Yugoslav republics had declared independence. The Dayton Accords ended the Bosnian War that had raged between 1992 and 1995, and saw the country being divided into two parts: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on one side (gray on the map below), and the Republika Srpska (RS) on the other (red), encompassing areas populated primarily by ethnic Serbs.  Despite the fact that a formal peace was signed between the former Yugoslav republics, tensions persisted, primarily in BiH, between the Bosniaks (Bosnian muslims), ethnic Croats (mostly in the south) and ethnic Serbs. Grievances from the 1992-1995 war continued to fuel political disputes, ethnic segregation and occasional outbursts of unrest. What happened?  On 06/08/2025, Milorad Dodik, leader of RS, was dismissed from office by the  Bosnian election commission. He promptly declared that he would disregard the commission’s ruling and expressed his intention  to hold a referendum on his mandate. However, this latest wave of unrest in the young republic is part of a long-standing pattern of rising tensions  between the country’s ethnic groups, particularly between Serbs and Bosniaks, who largely reside in separate administrative units. The election commission’s decision follows a court order made on 26/02/2025,  which convicted Dodik to a one-year prison sentence and a six-year ban on holding public office.  This verdict was the result of a long-standing conflict between Dodik and the international High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Christian Schmidt. The High Representative’s function is to oversee the civilian implementation of the Dayton Agreement. He or she has the authority to impose laws and sack officials. Dodik was convicted for defying the High Representative by enacting laws in RS that blocked the implementation of the High Representative’s decisions and Bosnia’s constitutional court rulings—an act deemed an assault on the country’s constitutional order. Dodik responded that the verdict was ‘politically motivated’, driven by ‘racial and national hatred [against Serbs]’ and implying an agenda driven by Western actors against him, but also against the Serbs in general. He vowed not to recognize the authority of the judiciary in Sarajevo.  Shortly after, on 26/02/2025 , Dodik announced  that RS would adopt a series of laws aimed at effectively severing the administrative region from Bosnia’s state institutions. Among them was a law prohibiting the Bosnian Prosecutor’s Office from operating within the RS. Decisions made by Bosnian courts would no longer be recognized in the Serb-majority entity, and Bosnian intelligence and security services would also be barred from operating on RS territory.  Amidst the escalating tensions between RS and BiH, RS adopted a new draft constitution on 15/03/2025 , granting the territory expanded decision-making powers. A key provision of the draft is the elimination of the Council of Peoples, a body meant to protect the rights of BiH’s ethnic groups.  On 27/03/2025,  Bosnia issued an international arrest warrant for Dodik. On 23/04/2025 , Bosnian state police (SIPA) attempted to arrest Dodik in East-Sarajevo, which is part of RS. Local police instead prevented  the arrest. Despite the arrest warrant, Dodik made public appearances in Banja Luka, the RS capital, travelled to Serbia and maintained certain allies, such as Serbia’s Aleksandar Vučić, Russia’s Putin and Hungary’s Orban. The latter also stood up  for Dodik after his conviction, calling it a ‘political witch hunt’.  Tensions somewhat eased on 04/07/2025, when, after several failed arrest attempts, Dodik was pressured into appearing for questioning before prosecutors, which led the state court to lift the arrest warrant. Instead, restrictions were imposed, such as mandatory police check-ins. On 01/08/2025, it was reported that the earlier court verdict on 26/02/2025  would be upheld and that Dodik would be stripped of the RS presidency and receive a jail sentence. Analysis The political crisis surrounding Dodik highlights the persistent tensions between the RS and the central government in Sarajevo , with each side backed by its own allies. BiH — a state essentially shaped by the Dayton Accords and still overseen by the High Representative — faces ongoing disputes as RS and Dodik increasingly clash with both the High Representative and Sarajevo over actions taken within RS. Instead, they are turning toward alternative partners (usually those ideologically opposed to the West) such as Hungary, Russia, and Serbia, refusing to recognise the legitimacy of Bosnia’s constitution and portraying efforts at BiH state-building as part of a Western witch hunt driven by hatred against the Serbs. As a response to the clash between RS and Sarajevo, RS has introduced a series of laws creating parallel RS institutions and restricting state-level bodies from operating within its territory, essentially isolating the RS from BiH’s state institutions. These measures, combined with the adoption of a new draft constitution, illustrate an attempt to de facto  break from BiH, either laying the groundwork for a future secession or functioning as a parallel state in all but name. Conclusion The latest round of tensions largely reflects the pattern of unrest which has gripped Bosnia and Herzegovina since its independence , the direct result of the devastating civil war that took place between 1992 and 1995. The ethnic division of the country, as ‘designed’ in the Dayton Accords, may have temporarily eased hostilities, but it was never a sustainable foundation for long-term stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as mutual distrust and ethnonationalism remain widespread. Instead of solving underlying tensions, the Dayton Accords entrenched ethnic divisions within the country’s political architecture The result was a country where - despite being united - ethnic distrust always remained an obstacle to statebuilding.  Instead of compromising, voters in both entities have elected nationalist leaders who prioritize ethnonationalist agendas, perpetuating divisions rather than fostering unity. Milorad Dodik fits this trend, as he consistently uses divisive and nationalist rhetoric. This pattern is mirrored among Bosniak leaders as well, such as Haris Silajdžić, who similarly advocated for positions rooted in ethnic nationalism.  The latest outburst of tensions is a symptom of a much broader problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina, one without a quick or simple solution.  How Milorad Dodik will respond to his sentence remains uncertain, but regardless of his reaction, there is a real risk that it could further deepen internal divisions and spark renewed instability, not only within Bosnia and Herzegovina but across the wider Balkan region as well.

The recent cybersecurity incidents involving Qantas , Hawaiian Airlines , and WestJet  highlight that the threat to the aviation industry remains both severe and immediate. These breaches, often rooted in third-party vulnerabilities and sophisticated social engineering tactics, expose millions of passenger records and disrupt critical services. Additionally, major IT outages such as the one affecting Alaska Airlines  on 21 July 2025 and the widespread disruption at Delta Airlines  last year underscore the aviation sector's deep reliance on interconnected digital systems. Even non-malicious events can cascade into operational paralysis, affecting flights, passengers, and reputations.  The report will outline our understanding of a cybersecurity incident, identify the three most prominent threat actors commonly observed in this domain, and highlight the most essential cybersecurity basic hygiene practices necessary to reduce risk and enhance protection. While insider threats remain a critical concern, they will be considered out of scope for the purposes of this analysis. What is a cybersecurity incident? A cybersecurity incident is an event, often driven by malicious intent, that compromises the confidentiality (C), integrity (I), or availability (A) of information or systems. Examples of cybersecurity incidents in the aviation sector are: A hacker breaches an airline’s passenger database and steals personal information. A ransomware attack encrypts airport operational systems and demands payment. An employee accidentally clicks a phishing link, allowing access to the sensitive data of a company. DDoS attacks flood an airport’s website during geopolitical tensions, making it inaccessible to customers. Each incident carries a distinct type of impact, affecting different aspects of the CIA triad. What these examples demonstrate is that, despite existing security controls and mitigation strategies, threat actors continue to find ways to bypass defenses and cause real disruption. This highlights that organizations should not only focus on preventing cyber incidents (resilience), but must also invest in response readiness when an incident actually occurs. Threat Actor: Cybercriminals Cybercriminals are financially motivated. They target organizations that handle large volumes of data or revenue, like airlines and airports, aiming for quick monetary gain through ransomware, data theft, or fraud. Political or ideological factors are typically irrelevant to their goals.  The aviation industry has become an increasingly attractive target for cybercriminals, largely due to its growing profitability and global reach. As revenues continue to soar, so too does the incentive for malicious actors seeking financial gain. Scattered Spider , also known as UNC3944, Starfraud, Scatter Swine, or Muddled Libra, is a financially motivated cybercriminal group operating mainly from the US and UK.  They have targeted major airlines and airport service providers,  causing significant operational outages, delays, and compromising passenger data. Their modus operandi often involves impersonating employees or contractors to deceive IT help desks, bypass multi-factor authentication controls, and gain initial access to airline networks and third-party vendors. The group’s ability to tailor phishing campaigns with AI-generated deepfake voices or realistic spear-phishing messages has raised the bar on social engineering threats. Ransomware remains one of the most aggressive and damaging forms of cybercrime affecting the aviation sector. These attacks typically involve encrypting critical systems or stealing sensitive data, followed by demands for ransom payments to restore access or prevent public exposure. While the notorious 2023 LockBit ransomware attack  on Boeing's parts and distribution business is a well-known example, the threat has only grown. More recent incidents, such as the ransomware attack on AerCap  and the Rhysida ransomware attack  that crippled operations at Seattle–Tacoma Airport in 2024, demonstrate how both direct aviation operators and supporting infrastructure remain high-value targets. Threat actor: (H)activists Hacktivists, or cyber activists, are driven by ideology. Their attacks are meant to send a political or social message, often in response to specific events or policies. Aviation, as a high-visibility sector, can be a symbolic target to draw global attention to their cause. One of the most notorious hacktivist groups currently active is NoName057(16) , a pro-Russian collective known for launching politically motivated cyberattacks. Among their many operations, they target aviation infrastructure as a form of protest against foreign policies and to demonstrate digital allegiance to national agendas. In 2025, the group claimed responsibility for a DDoS (Distributed Denial-of-Service) attack on Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport . The attack temporarily disrupted online services and public access to key airport systems, aiming to send a geopolitical message amid heightened global tensions. This incident was just one in a series of attacks. However, such attacks are often limited in technical complexity and the impact is much lower than attacks intended by cyber criminals. Nevertheless, it can still result in somewhat of operational disruption, and strained public confidence, especially when timed with geopolitical flashpoints. Threat actor: Nation states Nation-state actors operate with strategic, long-term objectives aligned with national interests. They target aviation through advanced persistent threats (APTs). These attacks are often highly sophisticated and difficult to detect. State-linked cyber actors from Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea each pose distinct threats to the aviation sector, shaped by their strategic priorities.  Russian-affiliated groups are primarily engaged in cyber espionage , aiming to collect intelligence and to potentially disrupt infrastructure in adversarial countries. Chinese APTs   have a long history of industrial espionage, with a focus on stealing intellectual property related to aircraft design, engineering and maintenance processes, avionics software, and advanced materials information  that can accelerate both commercial and military (aerospace) programs. Iranian state-sponsored actors present a unique threat to Western aviation, driven more by political and surveillance objectives than by financial or industrial gain. One of their key interests lies in accessing passenger data from airlines and travel systems to monitor political dissidents  and individuals of strategic interest. North Korean APTs operate largely to sustain the regime’s strategic ambitions , combining cyber espionage with financially motivated attacks and disruptive operations aimed at adversaries. What to do? At a minimum, every organization in the aviation sector must take foundational steps to prepare for and mitigate cyber threats. First, identify the most critical systems, data, and processes that, if compromised, would have the greatest operational, financial, or reputational impact. Effective risk management must be in place to assess vulnerabilities, prioritize assets, and align protective measures accordingly. Organizations should also have crisis response plans and escalation procedures in place, regularly tested through exercises, and clearly communicated to all relevant teams to ensure swift and coordinated action when an incident occurs. In the case of ransomware, it is essential to define policies in advance, including positions on ransom payments.  For organizations without internal cybersecurity expertise, it is vital to outsource to trusted partners. Ask the right questions, demand transparency, and ensure service providers understand the specific risks and requirements of the aviation industry. Proactive preparation today can significantly reduce the impact of tomorrow’s incident.

Date: 05/08/2025  Countries of flotilla departures (yellow) and destination Israel/Gaza strip (orange)   Where: East Mediterranean Sea, coastal   waters off Gaza strip.  Who’s involved: Israeli government,   Israeli military, pro-Palestine sympathy   groups from Algeria, Australia, Austria,   Bahrein, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil,   Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France,   Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland,   Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia,   Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New   Zealand, Norway, Oman, Philippines,   Poland, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sri   Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand,   Tunisia, Turkey, the UK and US. What is happening?  ● Largest civilian flotilla destined to Gaza to date named the Global Sumud Flotilla,  including over 6,000 participants, dozens of vessels from over 44 countries to depart  from three different locations towards Gaza.   ● Departure points and dates are staggered : initial group departing on 23/08/2025 from  Malaysia, 31/08/2025 from Spain and 04/09/2025 from Tunisia. Routes are expected to  converge in international waters in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea.  ● The flotilla’s objective is to establish a maritime humanitarian corridor to Gaza ,  bypassing Israeli restrictions, challenging the current blockade of the territory by Israeli  authorities.   ● Participants include a wide range of individuals (lawyers, doctors, journalists) and  human rights defenders, as well as national delegations from over 30 countries , and  nationals from even more countries.   ● This flotilla is an effort from four different pro-Palestine initiatives: the Maghreb Sumud  Flotilla, the Freedom Flotilla Coalition, the Global Movement to Gaza, and Sumud  Nusantara. It also has the direct backing of the Malaysian Prime Minister who will see  the flotilla depart from Malaysia himself.   ● Training sessions for flotilla participants are being held at different departure points  to prepare crews and passengers for potential confrontation or media engagement,  also solidarity encampments at departure points will be organised for public  awareness efforts. Participants will undergo vetting, nonviolence training and safety  preparation according to the initiative.  Analysis  The Global Sumud Flotilla represents both a humanitarian initiative and a geopolitical point of  tension. Its scale, diversity of participation and high profile backing (Malaysian Prime Minister)  increase its symbolic and strategic importance. The flotilla constitutes a high-visibility act and  challenge to widely perceived international complacency for the ongoing blockade of Gaza  amid the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict.   Historically, the Freedom Flotilla Coalition has been actively challenging the Israeli blockade  since 2010, building on efforts that began in 2008. Past flotillas, most notably the 2010 Gaza  Freedom Flotilla (Mavi Marmara incident), have resulted in deadly confrontations when Israeli  commandos raided the ships in international waters.   From Israel’s standpoint, the flotilla will be viewed as a direct threat to national security and  territorial control. Interceptions are almost guaranteed, as seen with the The Conscience ,  attacked by Israeli drones in Malta in May of this year as it prepared to depart, followed by the  interception and detention of crews on the Madleen on 09 June and the Handala on 26 July, all  three vessels part of the international campaign Freedom Flotilla. Israel will likely intercept  vessels well before they reach territorial waters, a tactic that invites legal and diplomatic  pushback, especially if it occurs in international waters, an act organisers say would amount  to piracy under international law.   The situation may put pressure on air travel and maritime routes into and out of Israel,  particularly if a militarisation of the country’s coastal waters increases. Israeli airport  authorities, particularly at Ben Gurion International Airport, are likely to apply stricter screening  procedures, flag passengers from flotilla-supporting countries and possibly expedite  deportations or prohibit the entry of individuals of concern into the country. Civil society actors  onboard the flotilla (journalists, doctors, human rights defenders), add further complexity,  increasing reputational risks for Israel if confrontations occur or detentions are made.   Complicating matters further, the exact number of vessels expected to participate remains  unspecified, though organisers and an independent assessment suggests it may involve  hundreds of small and mid-size boats. According to the Sumud Flotilla Initiative , each vessel  will carry its own delegation equipped with legal, nautical and logistical support. The use of  smaller boats, reportedly harder to obstruct and less bureaucratic in documentation,  combined with a decentralised departure model and undisclosed launch locations, poses  operational challenges for Israeli forces attempting to intercept vessels before they reach Israeli waters. This fragmented and mobile structure could test Israel’s naval and intelligence  capacity, increasing the risk for miscalculation or inconsistent responses at sea.  Official map of the origin of participating delegations (orange), departure countries  (yellow) and flotilla convergence location (pink). Source: Global Sumud Flotilla (accessed 06 August 2025) Looking ahead  In the weeks leading up to the and following the flotilla’s convergence, increased scrutiny at  Israeli borders, particularly air and maritime can be expected. Airport authorities are likely to  continue flagging passengers from identified flotilla departure points (Malaysia, Spain, Tunisia)  and may restrict or deny entry to those suspected of affiliation. Maritime advisories and naval  presence in the Eastern Mediterranean adjacent to Israeli territorial waters will most likely  intensify, prompting the need for extra caution from commercial vessels navigating in the area. Internationally, the response will hinge on the outcome of the flotilla’s interception. A peaceful  resolution with minimal confrontation may pass with limited fallout, but any escalation  involving violence or legal violations could trigger reactions from governments and  international bodies. Protests and solidarity actions in various capitals are also likely to take  place, with increased mobilisation by pro-Palestine networks and groups.  The Global Sumud Flotilla is likely to face detention by Israeli authorities, as was the case with  vessels and crew of the Freedom Flotilla between May and July of this year, with Israeli forces  employing chemical sprays and detaining nationals from France, Spain, Turkey, Netherlands,  Germany, Brazil, and Sweden. With this flotilla expected to be much larger, potentially involving  hundreds of small vessels, it will present logistical challenges for the Israeli navy. A high number  of vessels will stretch Israeli interception capabilities, leading to the possible use of drones to  disable ships from a distance. Such actions carry risks, including injury, death or leaving crews  stranded at sea on disabled vessels. NGOs and human rights groups are expected to closely  monitor the situation and amplify any harm or mistreatment, increasing the likelihood of  international scrutiny depending on the outcome at sea or during detentions.  Finally, a large number of detained individuals by Israeli authorities could create challenges in  ensuring their welfare and whereabouts, as well as organising their eventual repatriation if  deported. Diplomatic missions in Israel, whose citizens may be detained, will face logistical and  legal challenges in providing assistance. Citizens of countries lacking diplomatic  representation or ties with Israel will face greater difficulties, with communication with family  back home and access to consular support severely limited, raising the risk of delays in  identification and increasing the number of potential missing persons due to the lack of  diplomatic channels able to assist them.

Date: 04/08/2025 15:00 UTC+2 Location:   Goma, North Kivu Province, DRC; Nyabibwe, South Kivu Province, DRC; Kalehe, South Kivu Province, DRC; Bukavu, South Kivu Province, DRC. Kinshasa, Kinshasa Province, DRC. Bunia, Ituri, DRC. Historic context: On 28/01/2025, the M23 rebel group seized Goma — one of eastern Congo’s largest cities — and large parts of North and South Kivu in a rapid offensive that left thousands dead and displaced many more. This renewed violence is part of a 30-year conflict rooted in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, which saw millions of Hutus flee to Congo, forming militias like the FDLR. The Congolese government has consistently accused Rwanda of supporting the M23 rebel group.  Kigali denies these claims, despite UN experts saying  that Rwanda exercises direct control over the rebels. In response to the offensive, Congo severed diplomatic ties with Rwanda. Although Rwanda has 7,000–12,000 troops stationed in the DRC, it claims they are there solely to defend against Hutu militias linked to the genocide. On 26/05/2025 , it was reported that Joseph Kabila, Congolese president from 2001 until 2019, returned to the country after years of self-imposed exile, a move that has intensified political tensions, given his fractured relationship with President Tshisekedi and his recent presence in rebel-held Goma after arriving via Rwanda. On 27/06/2025 , the DRC and Rwanda signed a US-mediated peace deal aimed at ending hostilities and laying the groundwork for long-term stability. The agreement included a ceasefire, withdrawal of foreign troops, a neutral monitoring force, and frameworks for regional economic integration and the disarmament of armed groups like the FDLR. It also committed both countries to cooperate on demobilization, reintegration, and border security. A couple of weeks later, on 19/07/2025 , the DRC signed a separate Qatar-brokered peace deal in Doha with the M23 rebel group and its political wing, the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC). The agreement called for M23’s phased withdrawal, reintegration of fighters into the national army, the safe return of displaced civilians, and local governance reforms in eastern Congo. Qatar pledged $300 million in reconstruction aid and will help oversee implementation alongside the UN and the African Union. What happened:  Despite two peace deals, fighting in the eastern DRC between M23 and Wazalendo (Swahili for ‘patriot’) militias aligned to the regime in Kinshasa has not stopped at the time of writing. There is a significant distrust on both sides. M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka also accused  the DRC of deploying extra troops and heavy weapons to the region, in violation of the ceasefire.  On 01/07/2025,  the armed forces of the DRC (FARDC) shot down an airplane in the Kivu province. They later claimed it entered Congolese airspace illegally and refused to identify itself. M23 claimed the plane was carrying food and medical supplies for locals.   On 05/07/2025, Rwandan President Paul Kagame publicly expressed doubt  over the DRC-Rwanda peace deal, stating that he does not believe that the DRC will be able to effectively deal with the FDLR, Rwanda’s biggest security concern within the DRC.  On 07/07/2025,   it was reported that  the U.S. company HYDRO-LINK will construct a $1.5 billion power line connecting hydro-rich Angola to southeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The project aims to deliver a stable electricity supply to the region, potentially supporting U.S. access to the critical minerals found there. On 09/07/2025 , large M23 troop movements southwards were reported by observers.  On 19/07/2025,  the DRC and M23 signed a declaration to end hostilities, outlining an immediate ceasefire and a commitment to begin talks.  On 01/08/2025 , the DRC and Rwanda held their first meeting of a joint oversight committee, an actual first step in implementing the decisions made during the peace deal weeks earlier.  On 02/08/2025 , Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo agreed on a draft economic framework under a US-brokered peace deal. The agreement includes cooperation on energy, infrastructure, and mineral supply chains. They also committed to linking new infrastructure to the U.S.-built Lobito Corridor—a major transport route connecting the interior of Africa to the Atlantic Ocean via Angola, designed to boost regional trade and export critical minerals. Analysis Pitfalls   The two parallel peace deals in the DRC - one between Rwanda and the DRC, and one directly between M23/AFC and the DRC - are a step in the right direction. They also overcame an important hurdle, which was outlined in our previous intel brief,  where it was concluded that a deal at the state level only might not suffice in bringing peace to Kivu. The declaration signed on 19/07/2025 directly addressed that concern by engaging both the state and rebel actors. However, challenges remain. Despite these agreements, it is still uncertain whether they will effectively end the decades-long cycle of conflict in the region. The deal between M23 and the DRC, which includes commitments to a ceasefire, a suspension of hostilities and further peacebuilding, is a step in the right direction, especially given Kinshasa’s initial refusal to have direct talks with M23. Experts have, however, called the agreements ‘vague ,’ which, combined with the fact that the parties seriously distrust each other, results in a difficult implementation. The deal between the DRC and Rwanda also faces major obstacles. Previous attempts to secure the Rwandan withdrawal from DRC territory failed. This means that a Rwandan withdrawal from Congolese territory - a non-negotiable demand for lasting peace from Kinshasa’s side - will likely be dependent on Rwanda’s most important demand: the ‘neutralization’ of the FDLR. However, the agreement lacks clear criteria as to what ‘neutralization’ means in this regard, and even if this was the case, eliminating the group will likely be challenging as it is deeply entrenched in Congolese society. Internal Congolese politics complicate the situation even further, mostly due to the problematic relationship between current president Felix Tshisekedi and former president Joseph Kabila. Kabila returned to the DRC this year after a period of self-imposed exile. Following his controversial reluctant departure from power in 2019. While the two initially had a power-sharing agreement, their alliance ultimately broke down, and their relationship severely deteriorated. Tshisekedi has since moved to sideline Kabila, who is likely trying to reclaim political influence by aligning himself with powerful actors such as M23 and Rwanda. This remains a hypothesis, but Kabila’s appearance in rebel-held Goma  and his arrival in the DRC via Rwanda gives reason to suspect it. This further complicates peace efforts as it ‘fractures’ the Congolese response to the crisis.   Prospects  Despite the ongoing difficulties in achieving lasting peace in Kivu, the economic aspect of the DRC-Rwanda peace deal holds some promise.. Part of the Washington Accord signed last June is the US-brokered regional economic framework, which aims to integrate the region’s economic infrastructure and includes elements of cooperation on energy, infrastructure, mineral supply chains, national parks and public health.  This is a clear attempt to ‘bank’ on economic ties to promote stability in the region. It essentially gives Rwanda precisely what they want: Kigali secured formal recognition and a key role in regional economic integration with the DRC, which is rich in resources such as tantalum, gold, copper, cobalt and lithium.  This way, the country could participate in joint industrial ventures, which means it can benefit the DRC’s mineral resources. For Kinshasa, the deal promises regulated, conflict-free trade and much-needed infrastructure, such as the Ruzizi III hydropower project  in Rwanda, which can also deliver power to the DRC. The US, which brokered the peace agreement between Kigali and Kinshasa, benefits too for two reasons. First, it provides the US with access to critical minerals it desperately needs. The country is notoriously dependent on China for certain minerals, which in recent years is increasingly choking off supply to Western companies . The regional economic framework encompasses joint mining operations, customs coordination, and industrial investment, particularly through the US-backed Lobito Corridor , which provides Washington with a more sustainable source of these minerals. Secondly, by securing alternative sources of critical minerals, the U.S. also challenges China's growing dominance in Africa, particularly in the DRC, where Beijing has established a firm foothold. This initiative could serve as a strategic counterbalance to Chinese influence in the region. Conclusion The peace deals made between the DRC and M23 on one side and Rwanda on the other still have significant difficulties, which is why it remains hard to gauge the extent to which they will achieve a durable peace. Deep-rooted mistrust, vague conditions and the rift between Kabila and Tshisekedi are the most complicating factors.  That being said, the economic framework does give reasons to be optimistic by aligning the two former rivals around a goal of shared development. The fact that they agreed on the outline for the economic framework on 02/08/2025,  as promised during the peace deal, is an indicator that both parties are willing to make it work. Furthermore, with backing from the United States, which has strong strategic and economic incentives to see the framework succeed, both nations have added motivation to adhere to its terms.

Date:   31/07/2025 (12:00 GMT+2) Where?  Angola; Luanda; Icolo e Bengo; Huambo What happened?  On 04/07/2025, Angolan authorities announced a 33% increase in the price of diesel, the most commonly used fuel for vehicles in Angola - the third price increase of 2025. The price will rise from 300 to around 400 kwanzas per liter. The new price amounts to €0,38 per liter. For context, the average salary in Angola equals €66,50 monthly. (€1=1050 kwanza per 31/07/2025).  This decision prompted minibus taxis, a common method of transportation for Angolans, to increase their prices by as much as 50%. This price hike also increased the price of staple ingredients, which need to be transported by road. The protests initially began as a three-day strike by taxi drivers on 28/07/2025  against rising petrol prices. However, by 29/07/2025 , the protests had grown  into one of the most widespread waves of protest the country has seen in recent history.  The protests mostly took place in the capital, Luanda. Shops were looted , and people set up roadblocks in the city. The provinces of Icolo e Bengo and Huambo reported similar disturbances. Reportedly, people chanted “down with the dictatorship” , as they complained about hunger, oppression and poverty.  President João Lourenço dismissed the protesters’ concerns, saying that protesters are using petrol prices as a pretext to undermine the government.  Reportedly, the police responded with force. In videos  circulating on the internet, police can be seen en masse, in riot gear, firing rubber bullets but struggling to contain the uprising. On 29/07/2025 , at least four deaths were reported. On 30/07/2025, protests continued. The Angolan government later reported that the total number of victims killed had risen to at least 22 . More than 1200 have reportedly been arrested.  As of 31/07/2025,  most major shops, banks and other businesses remain closed. Analysis What began as a three-day strike by taxi drivers quickly escalated into one of the largest popular uprisings Angola experienced in recent years. The 33% increase in the price of diesel, the most widely used fuel in Angola, not only affected transportation costs but also drove up the prices of basic goods delivered by road. With an average monthly wage of around 70,000 kwanzas (€66.50 per 31/07/2025), many Angolans are unable to deal with such price hikes, especially for essential items like food and transport. However, the protests reflect more than just frustration over this specific price hike. They quickly broadened to encompass a range of grievances and evolved into a wider critique of the Angolan government. Many took to the streets not only over economic hardship, but also out of growing discontent with the ruling MPLA party, which has held power for nearly five decades. The very nature of the fuel price hike is emblematic of this: Angola is one of Africa’s largest oil producers, yet lacks refineries to match domestic demand and therefore remains dependent on imported diesel.  The situation in Angola reflects a broader trend across several mid-tier African economies, where the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, global inflation, and domestic crackdowns on dissent have created a more difficult political climate and made everyday life increasingly challenging for ordinary citizens. This led to unrest, not just in Angola. Earlier this year, in June and July, Kenya saw massive protests  following the death of a popular blogger in police custody. However, these protests reflected a widespread frustration related to police brutality, economic inequality, corruption, and a perceived erosion of democratic freedoms. Ghana and Nigeria have likewise faced protests, each shaped by their own mix of political discontent coupled with economic troubles. Conclusion The current wave of protests in Angola started relatively small but grew into one of the biggest waves of civil unrest the country has faced in recent years. While a fuel price hike was the direct cause of the protests, this period of unrest is symbolic of more than just that: it reflects widespread grievances about proper governance in the country and frustration with stagnating living conditions.  For now, the situation in the country remains unpredictable. President Lourenço’s response that protesters are using petrol prices as a pretext to undermine the government signals that he might not be willing to make any concessions. If the government refuses to address the concerns behind the protests, the unrest is likely to continue, further challenging Angola’s stability.

Date:  31/07/2025 12:00 GMT+2 Where :  Oslo, Norway Who’s involved : Mohamed Orahhou Russian and Iranian Intelligence Services Norwegian Authorities US Embassy in Oslo What happened: On 23/07/2025,  Mohamed Orahhou, a Norwegian national in his twenties and former security guard at the US embassy in Oslo, was charged with espionage by Norwegian authorities. Allegedly, he was spying for Iran and the Russian foreign intelligence service, the SVR. The charges come after an eight-month investigation into claims that Orahhou shared private information about American diplomats and Norwegian intelligence officers. He is suspected of providing Russian and Iranian foreign intelligence officials with names, contact information, and evacuation plans for the embassy between March and November 2024 . Allegedly, the information was shared at classified meetings in Norway, Turkey, and Serbia. Norwegian authorities claim that in exchange for his collaboration, Orahhou received €10,000 from Russia and 0.17 Bitcoin (at the time worth around €10,000) from Iran. The indictment also alleges that Orahhou took deliberate measures to avoid detection, including transferring part of the money he received to bank accounts belonging to family members to prevent his employers from noticing a sudden spike in his own account, and later asking them to return the funds to him. Orahhou faces up to 21 years in prison. Analysis : The espionage case is one of the most serious diplomatic and national security breaches in Norway in recent years. The defendant’s access to embassy infrastructure and sensitive information once again underlines the vulnerability to foreign intelligence operations. Orahhou's cooperation with both Russian and Iranian intelligence suggests a coordinated joint operation, signalling emerging strategic cooperation between Moscow and Tehran in targeting Western diplomatic assets. The use of cash and cryptocurrency payments shows efforts to obscure financial trails, which have not been too prevalent in previous espionage cases. Internal security audits at NATO-aligned diplomatic locations throughout Europe may be triggered by the case, especially with reference to low-clearance employees and third-party contractors.  Despite the defense's claim that the leaked material was not classified, the presence of personal information and evacuation preparations raises concerns regarding the embassy staff's physical security. Advice and Mitigation: This case highlights the renewed threat of espionage and sabotage in today’s world. To reduce the risk of becoming the next target, there are some straightforward steps your organization should take: Limit access to sensitive information:  Ensure that only personnel with a legitimate need-to-know have access to classified or operationally critical data. Regularly review and update access permissions. Strengthen personnel screening and oversight:  Conduct thorough background checks, periodic re-evaluations, and monitor for behavioral red flags—especially among employees in sensitive roles or those with access to sensitive information. Practice discretion:  Avoid discussing sensitive work-related matters in public or semi-public settings, including cafes, transit, or online forums. Protect personal data:  Be cautious with sharing professional affiliations, job details, or travel patterns on social media or networking platforms. Secure communications:  Use encrypted messaging apps for sensitive communication, especially if operating in security, defense, or diplomatic sectors. Exercise caution during travel:  Be aware of risks when traveling through countries known to host intelligence operatives or serve as neutral grounds for clandestine activity. Report suspicious contact:  Immediately report any unsolicited approaches, requests for information, or unusual interest in your professional role to your organization’s security lead or local authorities.

Casper Huurdeman Introduction On 18 August 2020, soldiers of the Malian Armed Forces stormed the Soundiata military base near the capital Bamako and arrested senior officers. Shortly after, they headed towards the city and detained several government officials, including President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. The government was dissolved, and Keïta - under significant pressure - resigned. The coup d’état  had succeeded. Thousands flocked the streets of Bamako to celebrate. A new interim president, Bah Ndaw, was later appointed. Nine months later however, in May 2021, history repeated itself as Bah N’daw was taken into custody. Colonel Assimi Goïta issued a public statement, announcing that N’daw and other officials were stripped of their powers because they had tried to ‘sabotage the transition’  to democracy in Mali. New elections were promised to be held in 2022 while the military would ‘temporarily’ take over control. Two months prior to that, in March 2021, a coup attempt failed in neighbouring Niger. That same month, Mahamat Deby of Chad staged a coup in which he took over control of the country after his father’s, the former president, unexpected battlefield death. Guinea also experienced a coup in September of 2021. In January of 2022, President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré of Burkina Faso was ousted by the military; Colonel Paul-Henri Damiba took over power. Not for long though, because 8 months later, Damiba was ousted in yet another coup, and captain Ibrahim Traoré took over control. In July 2023, Nigerien President Mohamed Bazoum was also ousted in a coup by general Adbourahamane Thiani.  The world looked on as one African leader after another was overthrown in just a few years, some of them having been in power for decades. Across Africa, thousands took to the streets in celebration, fed up with corruption, economic mismanagement, and the persistent challenges that have plagued many nations. This wave of political unrest swept through Africa with surprising momentum and little resistance, forming a ‘coup belt’ stretching across the continent from west to central Africa. The rapid succession of coups across several African countries suggests they weren’t entirely isolated events. This report analyzes the coup d’états in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Gabon, Mali, and Niger between 2020 and 2023. While each coup had its own local dynamics, there are clear overarching themes between the coups during this ‘wave’, which offer valuable insights into Africa’s shifting position in a changing world—one where old alliances can no longer be taken for granted. Although other African nations, like Sudan, have also experienced military takeovers in recent years, this analysis focuses specifically on the former French colonies of West and Central Africa listed above. Their shared colonial legacy, regional proximity, and the prominent role of anti-French sentiment make for a good basis for analysis.  Ultimately, the coups that took place in Africa between 2020 and 2023 can be attributed to widespread resentment towards rulers perceived as corrupt, a failure of French policies to address certain challenges and a successful Russian disinformation offensive. That said, the bigger picture also is important here. The wave of coups reveals a recalibration in Africa’s geopolitical alignments. In a world where multiple powers compete for influence, African nations can now leverage that rivalry to shape their own partnerships, instead of Western influence being a given. Coups in Africa Mali (August 2020; May 2021) For the past decades, Mali has been gripped by instability and coups. In 2012, an alliance between a Tuareg rebellion led by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and islamist factions quickly seized control of key northern cities in the country.. The Malian government proved unfit to deal with the crisis, which led to a military coup against the president at that time, Amadou Toumani Touré, in March 2012.  Following said coup, the MNLA declared the independence of Azawad, though the declaration was not internationally recognized. As a response, France launched its military operation in Mali in early 2013 at the request of Bamako. Initially, the operation was successful to some extent: the French forces succeeded in pushing the insurgents out of key cities. However, the French-backed government never fully regained control over the north. The years that followed were marked by fragile governance, persistent insecurity and growing public frustration over the situation. Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta came to power in 2013, and soon faced similar issues as his predecessor: deteriorating security, corruption, economic stagnation, and collapsing public services. In August 2020, amid nationwide protests, a group of military officers led by Colonel Assimi Goïta staged a coup and forced Keïta to resign. An interim government was formed under Bah Ndaw, though de facto control remained in the hands of the military. When two prominent military figures were removed from their positions less than a year later, the military led by Goïta felt compelled to carry out yet another coup. Goïta accused the interim leadership of failing to live up to its promises and took control as transitional president. Since then, Goïta has gradually consolidated power. He banned political parties, sidelined civilian voices, and approved legislation that allows him to stay in power “ until the country is pacified ” - which in reality, could mean indefinitely.  Relations with Western partners, particularly France, rapidly deteriorated afterwards. Paris withdrew its security forces in 2022, citing a breakdown in trust and the junta’s refusal to return to civilian rule. Mali instead turned to other security partners. Russia’s Wagner Group   began operations in Mali in late 2021 , providing military support to the junta in its fight against insurgents and separatists. Although Wagner formally left in 2025, it was replaced by the Afrika Korps —a Kremlin-aligned group with a similar mandate. Niger (March 2021; July 2023) Niger, located in the Sahel as well, also has a history with coups. In February 2021, presidential elections were held to determine who would succeed Mahamadou Issoufou, set to step down after two terms in office (he himself came to power in elections held in the wake of a 2010 coup). Former interior minister Mohamed Bazoum won the elections widely considered democratic.  Bazoum’s inauguration on 2 April 2021, which followed a failed coup attempt just days earlier, marked the first transfer of power between democratically elected presidents since Niger’s independence from France in 1960. However, his presidency was marked by the same persistent issues as Mali, as explained earlier in this report. Niger was suffering from a deadly jihadist insurgency, particularly in the regions bordering Mali and Burkina Faso. Many were killed and many more displaced, and Bazoum’s administration appeared unable to properly deal with this threat despite the presence of French and international security forces.  The breaking point came on 26 July 2023, when President Mohamed Bazoum attempted to dismiss General Abdourahamane Tchiani, the influential head of the presidential guard. Although no official explanation was given, reports suggested that Bazoum was concerned about Tchiani’s growing power  within the Nigerien state apparatus. In response, Tchiani’s forces detained the president and declared a coup. Citing poor governance and a worsening security situation, the military junta announced it had taken control, suspended the constitution, dissolved all state institutions, and declared a transitional period. In the following days, pro-coup demonstrations erupted in the capital Niamey. Crowds were seen waving Russian flags , chanting slogans in support of the Wagner Group, and calling for the departure of French forces. This showed the growing disenchantment with Western partners—especially France—and the emerging regional trend of embracing Russia as an alternative security ally. The junta was quick to expel French diplomats and later its military forces in December 2023, which meant the end of the long diplomatic and military ties between France and Niger. Although Niger’s military government initially announced a three-year transition to return to civilian constitutional rule, little progress has been made as of writing in July 2025. On the contrary, Niger has drawn closer to the military regimes in Mali and Burkina Faso, forming the mutual defense pact AES . Like its neighbors, Niger’s junta increasingly positions itself as the defender of national sovereignty against foreign interference—framing the coup not so much as a break with democratic order, but rather as a reclaiming of it from ineffective governance and neocolonial influence. Chad (April 2021) On 20 April 2021, Chad’s long-time leader Idriss Déby was unexpectedly killed in action during a battle between Chadian army soldiers and rebels from the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT) north of the capital, N’Djamena. The military, an influential player in Chadian politics, feared a power vacuum and moved quickly to install his son, the 37-year old Mahamat Déby, as interim president. The military suspended the constitution, dissolved parliament and formed a council which promised elections within 18 months. Protests against this undemocratic transfer of power were violently suppressed. The 18-month transfer period that was promised was later extended, and Mahamat Déby remained in power beyond the original timeline. Elections were later held in May 2024, in which Déby won amidst allegations of fraud . Despite real concerns about the democracy in the country, France and Chad initially retained cordial relations  during the first years of Mahamat Déby’s presidency. However, the cooperation came to an abrupt end in November 2024, when the Chadian government unexpectedly announced it would terminate its military partnership with France. The official justification centered on national sovereignty and a reassessment of strategic interests. Chad’s foreign minister stated that the arrangement no longer aligned with “the political and geostrategic realities of our time”. Unofficially, analysts pointed to growing frustration within the Déby administration over what it perceived as French interference over its internal affairs. Chad later signed agreements  granting Turkish military advisors and drone technicians access to former French airbases in Abéché and Faya-Largeau. Turkish drones were deployed to improve reconnaissance and counterterrorism operations. N’Djamena also deepened its relationship with Beijing. A high-level visit by China’s foreign minister in January 2025  is evidence of the growing ties between the two nations. China also became Chad’s top trading partner. While Türkiye and China were expanding their presence in Chad, the French did the opposite - the last soldiers left Chad just before Christmas 2024. Guinea (September 2021) Alpha Condé was democratically elected as president of Guinea in 2010. During his second term however, Condé began consolidating his power, as he amended the constitution to permit him to seek more than two presidential terms. He controversially won a third term in October 2020 in an election marked by violence. This third term severely undermined both his popularity and the legitimacy of his government.  On 5 September 2021, members of the Guinean special forces stormed the presidential palace in Conakry, detained the president and announced the dissolution of government institutions. The coup was led by Colonel Mamady Doumbouya, head of the special forces, who declared that Guinea’s era of "personalised politics" was over  and that power would be returned to the people. Doumbouya became the head of a new junta and he was sworn in as interim president on 1 October 2021. There were no immediate post-coup protests. Rather, some crowds in Conakry shouted Doumbaya’s name, hoping that this could be an opportunity for change in a country where almost two thirds of the population was dealing with persistent poverty . In May 2022, Guinea’s junta announced a 39-month transition to constitutional, civilian rule. Doumbouya promised that no one in the interim government, including himself, would stand in the promised elections. Political protests were however banned soon after. A new election was planned in December 2024, which was later extended for 2025. As of this writing in July 2025, Doumbouya remains in power and whether promises to restore civilian rule are kept remain to be seen. Burkina Faso (January 2022; September 2022) The situation in Burkina Faso largely mirrored that of other countries in the Sahel: it is landlocked and one of the poorest countries in the world. On top of that, the Burkinabé military was fighting a jihadist insurgency which had gotten progressively worse since 2015. Tensions between the military and the democratically elected president of the country, Roch Kaboré, had been building for months. The military was spread thin and did not receive enough supplies, while being blamed for the deterioration of the security situation and losing many men. On 23 January 2022, these tensions erupted into a mutiny. Soldiers detained President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, dissolved the government and national assembly, suspended the constitution, and sealed the nation's borders. Declaring Kaboré unfit to lead, the coup leaders installed 41-year-old Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba as the head of a new military junta. The junta pledged a 36-month transition to constitutional civilian rule, during which Damiba would not run in future elections. Some pre-coup officials were reinstated, and regional governments seemed to accept the proposed roadmap to stability.  Stability was short-lived. Eight months after the coup, Burkina Faso experienced a ‘coup within a coup’ as the military turned against its own former leader Paul-Henri Damiba. Citing worsening security and the failure to curb extremist violence, the new coup leaders echoed January’s reasoning. Under Damiba’s brief rule, the situation deteriorated: over 620 terrorist attacks killed 567 people in his first 100 days , and by September 2022, the government controlled only about 60% of the country. A devastating attack on 26 September 2022 in Soum province, which destroyed part of a humanitarian convoy and left dozens dead or missing, proved to be a breaking point. On 30 September, the 34 year-old Captain Ibrahim Traoré announced on national television that Damiba had been deposed, the interim government dissolved, and the borders closed.  The junta again promised a gradual return to democratic governance.  Damiba’s downfall was not just the result of the worsening security crisis—it was also shaped by internal divisions within the junta itself. One member later admitted anonymously  that Damiba had resisted calls to diversify Burkina Faso’s security partnerships, particularly by reaching out to Russia. His reluctance to embrace this shift, alongside the continued surge in extremist violence, led to the second coup in 2022. In the days that followed, Traoré accused the French army of sheltering Damiba at one of its bases in Burkina Faso, after Damiba’s whereabouts were unknown. France denied the claim, but the accusation triggered violent protests at French diplomatic and military installations. Demonstrators waved Russian flags and attacked the French embassy, reflecting growing public hostility toward France’s continued presence. Damiba resigned and fled to Togo, and on 5 October 2022, Traoré was officially declared president. That same day, an ECOWAS delegation that arrived in Ouagadougou for a fact-finding mission was met with large pro-coup demonstrations, where protesters denounced the organization, waved Russian flags, chanted pro-Russian slogans, and demanded the withdrawal of French forces. This hostile reception reflected growing resentment toward what many in Burkina Faso perceive as ECOWAS’s alignment with French and broader Western interests, especially given its frequent sanctions and pressure on military governments in the region. While Traoré’s junta initially pledged to hold elections by 2024, that promise was abandoned in May 2024 when the transitional period was extended by five years, with the government citing ongoing insecurity. Relations with the West, particularly France, continued to worsen. The junta expelled French military forces, suspended French media outlets, and accused Paris of interference and neocolonial attitudes. In their place, Burkina Faso deepened its ties with Russia. Later in 2024, the Russian Afrika Korps arrived in the country and established a military base in Loumbila, northeast of the capital. Putin and Traoré shaking hands. The sign reads: “support the transition”. Gabon (August 2023)  On 26 August 2023, Ali Bongo Ondimba won Gabon’s presidential election, this third term and also another extension of the Bongo family’s 56-year dynastic rule. The election however was plagued by widespread allegations of fraud and irregularities, sparking outrage among opposition groups and drawing condemnation from the military itself. Just hours after the official results were announced on 30 August 2023, Gabonese soldiers led by General Brice Oligui Nguema announced that they had seized power and that Ali Bongo was placed under house arrest. They cited the “irresponsible and unpredictable governance”  of the regime as the reason for their coup. General Oligui Nguema became interim president following the coup. He promised a transition to civilian rule and pledged to restore institutional integrity. Yet, like the cases analyzed before, the junta only tightened control over Gabon’s political institutions. In November 2024, a national referendum  approved a new constitution that extended presidential terms to seven years, a change which many saw as a power grab by the military. While some in Gabon celebrated the fall of the Bongo dynasty and viewed the coup as an opportunity for renewal, others labeled it a ‘palace coup’, warning that one autocracy had simply replaced another. Unlike in Mali or Burkina Faso, where anti-French sentiment played a central role in post-coup politics, Gabon’s case was more ambiguous. In Libreville, anti-French sentiment was not as dominant as it was in, for instance, Burkina Faso. As a response, France also voiced a more balanced response to the coup, likely hoping to maintain relations with the new junta. There were no widespread anti-French protests, and General Oligui—himself trained in France—did not lean into anti-Western rhetoric. Instead, this coup fit within a different regional pattern: growing military impatience with entrenched elites and a growing appetite to reform. As with other recent juntas, Gabon’s leadership justified its continued rule by prioritizing stability and reform over immediate elections. When democracy fails to deliver Starting off, it needs to be reiterated that each of the aforementioned coups is unique, and shaped by its own internal dynamics. However, as stated in the introduction, some common themes can be identified, and these offer us valuable insights in the political future of Africa and the potential role of international actors on the continent.  Democratic disillusionment All countries analyzed in this report have faced public disillusionment with their democracies, which means that people have grown increasingly disconnected from political institutions, processes, and leaders, feeling that these systems no longer represent them or respond to their needs. This general distrust fuels frustration and a feeling of political powerlessness, which severely undermines the confidence people have in a democracy’s ability to bring about meaningful change.  To substantiate that, consider this: the countries considered rank among the poorest and least developed in the world. The Human Development Index (HDI), which measures a nation’s average achievements in health, education, and standard of living, consistently ranks Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, and Niger near the bottom globally . Only Gabon performs moderately better due to oil wealth. Economic stagnation, worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic, further contributed to stagnating living standards in said countries. These regimes are also ranked among the most corrupt in the world. In transparency International’s 2020 Corruption Perceptions Index , which mentions how corrupt citizens of countries perceive  their counties to be, all countries analyzed rank among the worst in the world. Despite an abundance of natural resources—such as oil in Chad and Gabon, uranium in Niger and Mali, and gold and other minerals in Guinea and Burkina Faso—this wealth failed to benefit the broader population. The case of Guinea serves as a good case in point. President Alpha Condé's controversial third term in 2020 seriously eroded the legitimacy of his administration. Following the successful coup, Mamady Doumbouya, who assumed power as interim leader, quoted the words of the former Ghanaian coup leader Jerry Rawlings : “if the people are crushed by their elites, it is up to the army to give the people their freedom”. This statement captures the core of this concept—the growing perception that political elites and institutions are no longer working for the good of the people. A troubled security landscape Another overarching theme is that most of these countries, especially Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, are dealing with persistent security threats. The Sahel region was designated by the 2020 Global Terrorism Index  as one of the most terrorism-impacted regions worldwide. The key threats stem from violent extremist organizations, including the Al-Qaeda linked Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), which exploit the region’s weak state presence and weak borders. Burkina Faso  ranks among the countries most affected by terrorism in the world. As described before, the country experienced two military coups in 2022, driven in part by deep frustration within the armed forces over the government's failure to counter the growing insurgency. Following the second coup, Captain Ibrahim Traoré gave a statement on national television , citing how Burkinabe soldiers keep dying while the insurgency only appears to worsen. Niger followed a similar pattern, as President Mohamed Bazoum’s government struggled to contain the jihadist threat, despite extensive French support. Same goes for Mali: patience ran out with presidential administrations which appeared to be unable to address the crises the country was facing.  In these cases, the mounting frustration over the inability of governments to contain escalating security threats created fertile ground for the military to take over. Coup leaders framed these failures as justification for ‘necessary’ takeovers and responses to national crises, which resonated with parts of the public and security forces alike. France’s eroding influence Another common theme linking the coups discussed is a strong anti-colonial—specifically anti-French—sentiment. Most coup leaders consistently framed their actions not only as responses to governance failures but also as a rejection of the regimes’ strong ties with France. Region most commonly referred to as Françafrique (Also includes former Belgian colonies) France was the colonial ruler of all the countries in question and, despite decolonization in the 1960s, it retained significant influence, consisting of political, economic, and military ties with— a system often referred to as Françafrique . This concept encompasses both formal mechanisms, such as continued military cooperation and monetary control through the CFA franc (a currency zone still overseen by France), and informal dynamics, including networks between French and African elites. Central to the grievances in the African nations discussed is the perception that France’s continued presence has been exploitative rather than supportive. French multinational companies maintain(ed) a dominant role in extractive industries in the region, with limited local re-investment. For many Africans, this dynamic is viewed and experienced as neocolonialism.  French President Emmanuel Macron stirred widespread frustration across several African governments when he remarked that African leaders had failed to ‘thank’ France  for its role in combating insurgents in the Sahel—particularly after being expelled by newly installed military juntas. Many saw it as tone-deaf, and emblemantic of precisely that that caused so much resentment in Africa: the lack of understanding about France’s controversial history with the continent.  Another problem for many of the deposed regimes in question was that they were being perceived as being too close to France. Gabon’s Ali Bongo maintained deep ties with Paris and the West generally; Chad’s Idriss Déby was a key French ally in the Sahel; Niger’s Mohamed Bazoum was on very good terms with Macron; Burkina Faso’s Roch Kaboré relied on France for military support; Mali’s Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta and Guinea’s Alpha Condé also had strong ties with the French government. Given France’s extensive presence in some of these countries while at the same time little changed, people felt like France was there not for cooperation but rather for extraction, and they began to see their regimes as complicit in this system. The coups therefore had a certain anticolonial element to them, which explains thousands flocking the streets of Bamako, Niamey and Libreville to celebrate afterwards.  Adding to that argument is France’s failure to effectively counter the deepening security crisis in the Sahel. Its operations were increasingly viewed by local populations and governments as ineffective, self-serving, and disconnected from the realities on the ground. This growing disillusionment extended to international partners more broadly, including the United Nations’ MINUSMA mission , which many Malians saw as overly bureaucratic and, most importantly, as an instrument of the West. As violence continued and dissatisfaction with traditional Western security partners grew, Mali's military leaders turned to alternative alliances—most prominently with the Russian Wagner Group, a private military company closely aligned with Russian state interests. They also sought closer ties with countries like China and Turkey, viewing them as better equipped to meet Mali's security challenges. A Russian narrative offensive One party that was able to capitalize on this growing resentment against France and perceived neocolonialism in general was Russia. Through political communication and disinformation campaigns on social media, Russian actors were able to destabilize western-aligned governments and ‘detach’ France from its international partners in the region. These influence operations, repeating tactics used previously in Syria, Sudan, and the Central African Republic, employ AI-generated content , fake polls, and local influencers  to shape public opinion and to undermine support for Western presence. The aforementioned Wagner Group plays a crucial role in this process. Though the organization is a separate corporate entity on paper, the company works for the foreign policy aims of the Kremlin with a degree of plausible deniability.  The narrative spread on social media usually revolves around casting pro-Western regimes as puppet governments, while presenting Russia as a trustworthy and effective security partner in the region, a narrative that found especially fertile ground in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. In Mali, following the two coups in 2020 and 2021, the military government under Assimi Goïta distanced itself from France and welcomed Russia's Wagner Group as a security partner, employing anti-French rhetoric to justify this transition . Burkina Faso followed a similar trajectory when Captain Ibrahim Traoré's junta accused France of sheltering the ousted leader Paul-Henri Damiba and embraced pro-Russian messaging; protests in the capital featured Russian flags  and slogans demanding French withdrawal. The government expelled French forces and partnered with the Russian Afrika Korps. In Niger in 2023, supporters of General Abdourahamane Tchiani's junta displayed Russian flags and praised the Wagner Group during mass rallies in Niamey. Russia did not have to invent any sort of discontent - they merely amplified and channeled sentiments that were already simmering. There were enough reasons for people in Françafrique to feel a certain degree of hostility towards the French. Russia, in this case, was there at the right time to guide the resentment to the party responsible. Through a carefully coordinated discursive strategy, they managed in a way to spread the rhetoric that France was the root of the issues at stake. Conclusion The wave of coups that swept through Francophone Africa between 2020 and 2023 radically changed the region’s political landscape and geopolitical alignment. Within just a few years, France—for long one of the most influential external powers on the continent— lost key strategic partners and experienced a dramatic retreat from a region once considered its stronghold.  While each coup considered—Mali, Niger, Chad, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Gabon—had its own unique drivers, overarching themes emerged that help understanding regional trajectories and thinking ahead for the future development of the region. The countries examined are among the poorest and least developed in the world, in which citizens increasingly saw their governments as corrupt, self-interested, and disconnected from public needs. This widespread frustration, coupled with persistent and severe security threats—especially across the Sahel—created a climate of instability fertile for unrest and military takeovers.  Another key factor is the enduring influence of France. French diplomacy and companies are perceived as advancing Paris’s interests more than contributing to local development. Anti-French sentiment, rooted in the horrors of colonialism and the perceived neocolonialism of Françafrique, became an important justification for the coups discussed in this report. Russian disinformation campaigns have effectively leveraged this longstanding resentment, amplifying anti-French and anti-Western narratives to further their own influence. France’s future in Africa As France’s influence in Africa continues to decline, it is critical to not only look at what has happened, but also what comes next; how will France respond, and what are the implications for Africa’s future? When Emmanuel Macron assumed the presidency in 2017, he was regarded as one of France’s most foreign policy-driven leaders in recent decades. Yet, under his administration, France has suffered its most significant geopolitical retreat on the continent since the decolonization era of the 1950s and ’60s. Across Africa, long-standing allies of Paris have been ousted from power, not only in the countries discussed in this report but elsewhere too. The symbolic end of this era came on 17 July 2025, when France handed over its last two military bases in Senegal —leaving it without a permanent military presence in either West or Central Africa. First, France is likely to double down on its remaining partnerships in the region while actively seeking to establish new ones. In Gabon, where the Bongo family had long maintained close ties with Paris, pragmatism will likely guide France’s approach to the current junta. Given that Gabon hosts two of France’s last military bases in Africa—alongside another in Djibouti—Paris has strong incentives to remain accommodating. France is also actively attempting to improve its relationship with Madagascar, exemplified by President Macron’s 2025 state visit  to the island and the symbolic return of historical artifacts . In light of their ongoing territorial dispute  over the Scattered Islands  (Îles Éparses), Paris may be willing to make concessions in order to keep Antananarivo on their side. Côte d’Ivoire also provides opportunities: although relations under President Alassane Ouattara are not necessarily pro-France, there remains room for strategic cooperation. Lastly, France is expected to make efforts to strengthen its historically close ties with Morocco, a longstanding regional partner.  As for new partnerships, Nigeria appears to be a strong contender. In November 2024, President Bola Tinubu conducted a two-day state visit to Paris , in which Macron welcomed him with warmth, emphasizing cultural and economic ties. Throughout 2025, Tinubu returned to France on multiple occasions , both in official and unofficial capacities. France is actively trying to sustain high-level engagement with Ghanaian officials, too. In April 2025, French officials conducted an official mission  to the African nation focused on strengthening cooperation across several sectors.  In the countries where ties remain intact, France is likely to adopt a pragmatic—rather than idealistic—approach in dealing with their respective governments, aiming to preserve what remains of its influence on the continent. To this end, Paris may choose to overlook practices that do not fully align with its professed democratic values, prioritizing strategic interests over principles. Offering targeted investments or economic incentives may also become a tool to maintain goodwill and strengthen bilateral ties where possible. A good case in point here is Mozambique. Despite the country also being notoriously warm with Russia - the two countries reaffirmed their commitment to defense cooperation  in July, 2025 - France plans to deepen cooperation relations  and increase trade with the country five-fold.  France also has a significant interest in keeping relations with Maputo stable, as its energy giant TotalEnergies is constructing a $20 billion LNG plant  in the north of Mozambique. As for the countries discussed, it is likely that for the foreseeable future they will not restore relations with France—and more broadly, with the West. In particular, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, and to a lesser extent Chad, are ruled by juntas that derive much of their legitimacy from anti-Western rhetoric. As a result, a meaningful thaw in diplomatic ties is unlikely in the near term. These countries are expected to pursue increasingly independent foreign policies, aligning with Russia and other non-Western powers when it serves their strategic objectives. Western engagement, diplomatic, commercial, and humanitarian, is expected to become increasingly difficult. Embassies may scale back their presence, international NGOs could encounter tighter restrictions, and the operating environment for Western companies is likely to become more constrained. This is already happening at the time of writing: Niger ordered the International Committee of the Red Cross earlier this year to close its offices , citing an alleged collusion with armed groups. A changing global context The core issue here is what the emergence of these juntas represents. These coups, the speed at which they took place in different countries and the public support they received, signal deep structural failures and a rejection of the old political order. It reflects a growing demand in Africa, at least in the countries analyzed, for government accountability and that they serve the interests of their people. This shift is unfolding within a completely different global context than the post-independence era of the 20th century. Western dominance in Africa is a thing of the past, and new powers such as Russia, China and Turkey are competing for influence. Influence in Africa is beneficial for a multitude of reasons: the continent is rich in critical minerals, which are essential for advanced weapon systems and the green transition. Africa offers strategic military footholds, diplomatic influence and access to expanding consumer markets.  People waving Russian flags in Niamey, enormous Chinese investment in Africa and the expanding military role of Turkey on the continent is evidence of the shift toward multipolarity on the continent. African nations are no longer locked into historical allegiances. Instead, they are actively reshaping the terms of engagement on their own terms. They are diversifying their partnerships and seek arrangements that better serve national priorities.  An example of that is the alignment of some African nations such as the ones examined in this report but also others, such as Mozambique  and the Central African Republic , with the Russian Wagner Group and Afrika Korps. In Mali, for instance, the Goïta-led junta not only expelled French forces but also invited Wagner to take over France’s role. Similarly, Burkina Faso under Captain Ibrahim Traoré turned away from Western military assistance and embraced Russian cooperation. Therefore, the wave of coups analyzed in this report should not necessarily be seen as a regional crisis but rather as a ‘symptom’, meaning it represents a change in Africa’s geopolitical alignment. The military juntas that took power present themselves as the agents of this change, tapping into longstanding resentment to justify their rule. It is still unclear to what extent they can actually live up to that promise. Looking forward This changing landscape requires the West to rethink its relationship with Africa, which can no longer rely on historical privilege or assumptions of automatic alignment. What happened in Françafrique is not just an uprising against African leaders - it is a broader call for sovereignty and genuine agency in international affairs. In order to retain cordial relations with modern Africa, Western countries have to acknowledge that and adapt to this new reality. It is not just a moral question - it is a strategic necessity.  When Ibrahim Traoré, junta leader of Burkina Faso, conducted a visit to Moscow in early May 2025 to commemorate the 80th May 9th parade, celebrating the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany, Putin sent a private jet to Ouagadougou to pick Traoré up and his delegation, which he had escorted by fighter jets once in Russian airspace. People on X (formerly Twitter ) were quick to comment on the gesture, most of them being from African nations applauding the gesture. One user wrote :  “Russia didn’t just invite President Ibrahim Traoré to Moscow — they sent a state aircraft to personally pick him up from Burkina Faso. That’s not diplomacy. That’s respect. That’s symbolism. In a world where African leaders are often summoned like subordinates, this moment flips the script. It tells a new story: of African sovereignty being recognized, of alliances built on mutual interest — not colonial residue.”  Symbolic acts like this can carry significant diplomatic weight. Perceptions shape alliances, and this reminds us that equal treatment can matter just as much as actual material support - especially in a region long denied both.

Date:  18/07/2025   (16:30 UTC+2) Where?  Somalia. Hiran; Galgadud; Middle Shabelle; Lower Shabelle; Mogadishu; Lower Juba What happened?  Since launching a renewed offensive in February 2025, the jihadist group Al Shabaab has made unprecedented gains across central and southern Somalia. On 18/03/2025, an IED was detonated near Ceel-Gaabta, targeting Somalian President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s convoy shortly after it left the presidential palace Villa Somalia. The explosion destroyed several vehicles and wounded presidential escorts; however, the president was unharmed.  On 16/04/2025, Al Shabaab captured Adan Yabaal in the Middle Shabelle region. This is a symbolic loss for the Somali national government, as the town used to be under Al Shabaab control until it was liberated by the Somalia National Army (SNA) in its 2022 offensive. On 22/04/2025, it was reported that Turkey, an important security partner for the Somali government, was sending another 500 troops to the country amidst Al Shabaab advances. On 18/05/2025, a suicide bomb attack killed at least 10 people in the capital, Mogadishu. On  16/06/2025  Al Shabaab carried out an attack with an explosives-laden vehicle against an AUSSOM convoy, followed by an assault, killing around 20 Ugandan troops, injuring over 40 others according to reports, in one of the deadliest attacks on AUSSOM to date.  On 17/06/2025, Abas Mohamed Hool, a senior Al Shabaab commander, was killed by a SNA attack.  On 30/06/2025, the Somali government announced plans to build a new airport south of Mogadishu in the Middle Shabelle region. The official reason given for this is to ‘decongest’ Aden Adde International Airport (MGQ/HCMM), but another likely reason could be that a new location could be better defendable.  That same day, a SNA offensive killed at least 35 Al Shabaab fighters in the Lower Juba region of the country.  On 03/07/2025, Al Shabaab captured Xagare and Gumare from pro-SNA militias,  less than 10km from the strategic town of Moqokori. On 07/07/2025, Al Shabaab captured Moqokori in the Hiiraan region after several months of clashes using explosives-laden vehicles to initiate the final assault. Dozens were killed, with local government-aligned Macawisley militias fleeing the area. The town is situated along a major roadway connecting the northern and southern areas of the country.  On 09/07/2025, the  Jale Siyad military base in Mogadishu suffered a suicide bomber attack, for which Al Shabaab claimed responsibility.  Between 13/07/2025 and 14/07/2025, Al Shabaab captured the town of (Gal) Tardo in Somalia’s Hiiraan region, a key crossroads linking several major urban centers. A Somali Armed Forces spokesperson stated that the fall of Tardo marks part of a broader push toward the capital, Mogadishu, and added that government forces and pro-government militias are preparing a counteroffensive. Tardo is located 170 km away from the Somali capital, Mogadishu.  Also on 14/07/2025, Al Shabaab carried out a bomb attack on Afgoye, west of the capital.  This is a small version of a more elaborate report. To access the full version, contact info@dyami.services

Date:  10 July 2025 Rafale Fighter Jet - Hellenic Air Force Incident summary On 9 July 2025 , four Chinese nationals were detained by Greek authorities  after being caught photographing military infrastructure near Tanagra Air Base  in central Greece. The individuals; two men, one woman, and a younger male, were seen documenting Rafale fighter jets  of the 114th Combat Wing  and facilities of the Hellenic Aerospace Industry (HAI) . Despite warnings from HAI security personnel, the group reportedly moved to a nearby bridge and continued photographing  sensitive military assets. They also attempted to upload the images to secure folders. They were subsequently intercepted by the Air Force Police  and transferred to the local police station. Strategic context Tanagra Air Base is home to Greece’s advanced Rafale fleet , central to Hellenic Air Force modernization and deterrence strategy. The adjacent Hellenic Aerospace Industry is involved in defense manufacturing, MRO, and co-development  of sensitive technologies. Both facilities are strategic targets for foreign intelligence gathering . This incident comes amid: Heightened NATO–China tensions over dual-use technologies Growing concerns across Europe about Chinese espionage  and intelligence-gathering near military or critical infrastructure Greece’s expanding defense cooperation with France  and Israel , and its participation in NATO missions Key intelligence points Photographic evidence:  Authorities seized a significant volume of photo material from the suspects. Evaluation is ongoing. Cover story unknown:  No information released about whether the individuals posed as tourists, researchers, or operated under diplomatic cover. Motives under investigation:  While espionage has not officially been confirmed, Greek counterintelligence units have launched a full review. Location of interest:  Suspects were observed photographing military aircraft , HAI facilities , and access routes  around the base. PRC Connection Not Ruled Out:  No formal link to China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) has been disclosed, but the pattern matches known PRC intelligence activity elsewhere in Europe. Implications for Europe & NATO Growing concern over non-traditional intelligence collection tactics  used by foreign nationals in open-source environments. Potential use of civilian travelers, students, or businesspeople  for intelligence-gathering roles. Risk to countries with understaffed or underprepared base security  in peacetime locations. Dyami risk insights For Aerospace, Defence & Critical Infrastructure Operators : Ensure awareness training  for employees and subcontractors on suspicious behavior near facilities Conduct regular physical and technical surveillance countermeasures  (TSCM) Tighten access control policies , including signage, patrols, and monitoring of public vantage points Consider periodic red teaming or scenario-based exercises involving foreign nationals posing as civilians Dyami Services Dyami offers specialized support for: Counter-Espionage Awareness Training Facility Threat Assessments Security Intelligence Subscriptions tailored to Defence & Aerospace Red Team / Insider Threat Simulations Crisis & Media Response Planning Contact us for tailored briefings or support: info@dyami.services  | www.dyami.services “The lines between tourism, business travel, and intelligence collection are increasingly blurred. Organizations must treat ‘benign’ behavior near sensitive facilities with a new level of strategic vigilance.” - Eric Schouten, CEO, Dyami Security Intelligence

Date:   25/06/2025 Where?  Kenya; Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Nakuru, Nyahururu, Kisii and more.  UPDATE: 26/06/2025 As of this morning, 16 deaths have been reported since protests erupted across Kenya yesterday. Amnesty Kenya, along with the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), confirmed that most fatalities were caused by police action. At least five victims were fatally shot. Additionally, over 400 individuals have been reported injured. The KNHCR on their official X -account , mentions heavy police deployment and "excessive use of force, including rubber bullets, live ammunition and water cannons, resulting in numerous injuries". The rising death toll signals escalating tensions and raises concerns about further instability if grievances are not urgently addressed. What happened?  On 25/06/2025 , Kenyans took to the streets to commemorate the one-year anniversary of the deadly 2024 ‘Gen Z’ protests against the widely unpopular tax bill , which culminated in the storming of the Kenyan parliament. Protesters on the streets demand the resignation of Kenyan President William Ruto , like a year ago. A trending hashtag on X is #OccupyStateHouse, a call for protesters to march to the official residence of the president. #RutoMustGo is also trending on Kenyan social media. On the internet, such as on X and on Telegram, videos can be found showing serious unrest. In multiple Kenyan cities, riot police are present in big numbers, using tear gas, water cannons, and firing rubber bullets in an attempt to disperse protesters.  Also on 25/06/2025, the Kenyan Communications Authority banned live broadcasts  of the countrywide protests  on the basis that it ‘incites to violence’. Some TV stations, like the privately owned KTN TV appear to ignore the live broadcast ban. Fears also exist of a wider internet shutdown. Currently, protests have spread to at least 20 of the 47 counties. Analysis These events unfold against the backdrop of the mysterious death of Albert Ojwang,  a famous Kenyan blogger who exposed the country’s security forces, accused for years of extrajudicial killings and disappearances. On 06/06/2025,  Ojwang was arrested for allegedly defaming Kenya’s Deputy Inspector General of Police, Eliud Lagat, on social media. He was then transported over 350 kilometers to Nairobi, where he died in police custody. Following his death, massive protests erupted across Kenyan cities, leading to violent clashes between protesters and security forces on  17/06/2025, on which one person   died after reportedly being struck in the head  at point-blank range by a rubber bullet fired by police, further intensifying unrest on the streets.  The planned protests on 25/06/2025 therefore only intensified an already volatile situation, making the escalation that followed inevitable . The police appear to be employing increasingly forceful tactics to suppress protests, utilizing tear gas and aggressive crowd control measures. Videos shared on platforms such as Telegram and X reveal chaotic scenes in downtown Nairobi, Mombasa and other major cities, where mostly young protesters face heavily armed security forces. The protests in Kenya, which came to be known as the ‘Gen Z protests’, are intensifying.  Demonstrators demand the resignation of President William Ruto, and calls to march to his residency go around on social media. They reflect a deep frustration, mainly among young Kenyans (hence the name) with their country’s governance . They highlight police brutality going unpunished, rampant corruption,  and people’s fear that President Ruto is dismantling Kenyan democracy. Ruto’s decision to prohibit live broadcasting of the protests fuelled such allegations. Aside from that, Kenya’s economy is struggling, partially due to IMF demands, which adds to the widespread frustration about the situation in the country.  Conclusion Kenya’s Gen Z-protests reflect a widespread frustration under the Kenyan population about systemic issues in their country. A harsh police response, meant to quell the dissent, appears to only escalate the situation further. How the government chooses to respond further will significantly influence the future of civic engagement and governance in the country. The situation remains fluid, with both the authorities and protesters showing no signs of backing down. For travellers, keep in mind that the situation in Kenya is very volatile right now, not just in Nairobi. It is advised to proceed with caution, if a decision is made to travel to the country. Expect delays and a heavy police presence in urban centers. Make your presence known with your embassy, and stay up-to-date on the latest news. There are currently no disruptions in aviation, nor are they expected.  Dyami Services Security is not a luxury but a necessity. With Dyami Security Intelligence as a Service, you gain a proactive, flexible, and affordable solution to manage risks, monitor geopolitical threats, and respond immediately to crises. Want to know more? Visit our security-as-a-service page!