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Date: 24/03/2026 Throughout March 2026, Russia has capitalised on a global energy supply shock to generate substantial emergency revenue.  In the first fifteen days of March, the Kremlin extracted  €7.7 billion from fossil fuel exports, averaging €513 million per day, according to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air. This was up from a €472 million daily average in February. The financial surge was made possible due to a confluence of events: the near-complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran and the subsequent emergency suspension of US sanctions on Russian oil.  The resulting capital accumulation provides immediate liquidity to a Russian state sustaining significant wartime expenditure and battling constant drone attacks by Ukraine on its oil and gas refineries and pipelines.  The Supply Shock The Strait of Hormuz historically facilitates the transit of roughly one-fifth of global daily oil consumption. Its closure instantly removed a significant volume from global supply, creating an acute procurement crisis, especially for Asian economies dependent on Middle Eastern exports.  Large-scale refineries cannot pause operations when supply chains are severed. Facing immediate operational risk, international buyers moved to secure alternative physical volume under significant time pressure. Despite Russia’s international pariah status due to the Ukraine invasion, the cold reality of economic necessity made it the perfect alternative supplier as one of the largest oil producers in the world. Additionally, the decision  by President Donald Trump to lift sanctions on Russian crude for a month should not be seen as a diplomatic concession, but as a needed market stabilisation measure. Before the waiver, Western price caps blocked the provision of maritime insurance and shipping services to vessels carrying Russian crude above a set price ceiling. Lifting it allows Moscow's tanker fleet to serve as an immediate substitute for disrupted Middle Eastern supply.  India moved fastest. With its refining capacity far exceeding domestic crude production, Indian buyers had the most urgent need for alternative baseload. Its imports  of Russian crude surged 50 percent in the first half of March compared to February. This is a systemic shift in Russia’s short and middle-term financial outlook. Russian oil arriving at Indian ports moved from trading below Brent to commanding an estimated $5 premium over it. Because Russian extraction costs are relatively fixed, that price shift translates directly into margin. Financial Times market modelling in mid-March estimated  Russia would make a surplus of $110 million to $150 million per day. The longer the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, the more this will increase.   A chart comparing the price of Brent (blue) and Russia Urals crude (red). Source: Sky News. A Fiscal Tourniquet The capital generated by the Hormuz supply shock buys Moscow time, munitions, and short-term budgetary relief. But it does not address the structural condition of a wartime economy dependent on degrading and actively targeted hydrocarbon infrastructure. The €7.7 billion influx in early March, and the billions that follow, are a great help. But unless the war drags on for far longer, it will not be enough for Russia to make a sustainable financial recovery.  Before the March supply shock, the Kremlin was drawing down sovereign reserves to cover wartime expenditure. The National Wealth Fund held approximately  $130 billion in liquid assets at the start of the war. That buffer had fallen to an estimated $50 billion by early 2025. The estimated $150 million daily surplus generated by the Hormuz premium directly offsets. In an economy utterly dominated by wartime expenditure, this can cover soldier signing bonuses, munitions procurement, and near-term budget gaps.  But the Russian economy’s dependency on oil revenue has left it in stagflation . The state has shifted to a war-economy model, redirecting civilian industrial capacity toward the defense sector. The civilian economy contracted  for three consecutive quarters through late 2025. Foreign direct investment has cratered. To finance a 2026 federal budget deficit projected  at 3.8 trillion rubles ($49 billion), the Kremlin has raised  the corporate profit tax  to 25% and the VAT as high as 22%, both of which are accelerating domestic inflation.  When the energy market stabilizes and the Hormuz premium disappears, Russia will revert to its previous position: heavily sanctioned, structurally constrained, and without internal growth mechanisms to compensate. Why Ukraine Targets the Infrastructure Ukraine has exploited this weakness. Kyiv has systematically targeted Russian refineries, oil depots, and pipeline networks on the calculation that degrading the physical supply chain is the most effective way to constrain Russian finances. The scale of the campaign is significant. Across 2024, 2025, and into early 2026, Ukraine has executed  around 200 confirmed strikes on Russian energy infrastructure, hitting almost half of Russia's 38 major refineries, including the Rosneft Ryazan plant , the Volgograd refinery,  and the Slavneft-YANOS facility in Yaroslavl.  On March 23, Ukrainian drones struck  the Russian oil port of Primorsk, on the Baltic Sea. At various points, these strikes have taken up  to 17% of Russia's total refining capacity offline, prompting emergency bans on domestic gasoline exports to protect military and agricultural fuel supply. A map of Russian refineries. Red, orange and yellow icons have been struck or targeted by Ukraine. Source: Caspian Policy Center, March 2026. The Expanding Strike Radius Ukrainian long-range drone development has shifted the geographic scope of the conflict. Its ordnance now has a range exceeding 2,000 kilometers. Importantly, these drones are not constrained geographically, as is the case with several missile systems. This has been confirmed through strikes on the Lukoil-Ukhtaneftepererabotka refinery  in the Komi Republic in February 2026 and the Antipinsky refinery  in the Tyumen region of Siberia. That range places the majority of Russia's industrial and hydrocarbon infrastructure, including facilities in the Urals and western Siberia, within operational reach. This creates a difficult resource allocation problem for the Russian Ministry of Defense.  Air defense assets must be distributed to defend the frontline, industrial bases, energy infrastructure, military bases, airfields, and major cities. There are simply too few air defense assets to provide sufficient coverage among these locations, meaning some are left without any significant cover, leading to predictable outcomes once targeted. Frontline Attrition The revenue surplus also cannot reverse current battlefield momentum.   Throughout 2025, Russian forces were unable  to sustain combined-arms offensives, advancing at a glacial pace while incurring significant casualties. In early 2026, the Ukrainians also conducted a series of localized counterattacks which were accelerated by Russia’s sudden loss of Starlink, as SpaceX, Starlink’s owner, moved to blacklist unverified systems, which the Russians depended on due to sanctions. The reallocation of Russian air defense assets away from the contact line has given Ukrainian forces greater operational freedom. That has enabled Ukrainian infantry to degrade fortified Russian defensive positions and apply pressure to critical logistical nodes in the Donbas and Zaporizhzhia sectors. Domestic Friction The situation in Russia is worsened by escalating controversy at home. Since early March, the government has initiated  severe internet throttling and localized communications blackouts across major cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg.  The recent targeted bans on Telegram and other widely used apps and social media reflect a profound state insecurity regarding domestic stability and may be the precursor to a more permanent type of information control. This has led to surprising protests, with even a traditionally pro-state newspaper publishing direct criticism  of the communication blackouts. Conclusion In the current landscape, Dyami views the fiscal windfall as a temporary bonus rather than an early sign of Russian economic stabilisation.  The Hormuz-driven fiscal windfall is real, but its strategic value is constrained by the same conditions that have made Russia so vulnerable. Moscow can use the surplus to cover immediate wartime expenditure, soldier bonuses, and near-term budget shortfalls. It cannot use it to reconstitute degraded refining infrastructure, replace sanctioned industrial components, or reverse its profound recession. The emergency US sanctions waiver applies strictly to crude oil exports, not to the import of high-technology components needed to repair and maintain oil refineries. Worse, the extra injection of cash may worsen inflation. Injecting surplus petrodollars into a war economy operating at full industrial capacity, with a severe labour shortage and no meaningful civilian output growth, will only accelerate price instability.

Utrecht, 7 September 2023 – Dyami Academy proudly welcomes Charlotte Bakker, an accomplished training actress and contributor, to its team of experts dedicated to enhancing security and awareness across diverse industries. Charlotte Bakker joins Dyami Academy With a rich background in theater and a proven track record as a theater director, Charlotte's unique talents will play a vital role in advancing Dyami Academy's mission. Charlotte Bakker's journey in the world of performing arts began in the theater, where her passion for storytelling and captivating audiences took root. Her experiences as a theater director allowed her to refine her skills in creating compelling narratives and engaging performances. Now, as a member of Dyami Academy, Charlotte artfully blends her theatrical expertise with a strong commitment to improving security awareness in various sectors. In her role at Dyami Academy, Charlotte Bakker will focus on developing immersive and lifelike scenarios that serve as essential training tools for organizations looking to enhance security and awareness. Her creative approach to crafting realistic situations will empower businesses, NGOs, and the aviation sector to train their personnel effectively and prepare them for an array of security-related challenges. "We are thrilled to have Charlotte Bakker join Dyami Academy," said Sophie Buur, head of training at Dyami Academy. "Her unique background in theater and her dedication to enhancing security awareness align perfectly with our mission. Charlotte's contributions will undoubtedly help organizations prepare for and respond to security challenges more effectively." Charlotte Bakker's addition to Dyami Academy's team represents a significant step forward in the organization's commitment to providing innovative and immersive training solutions for a safer and more secure future. For more information about Dyami Academy please visit dyami.services or contact us at info@dyami.services. About Dyami Academy Dyami Academy , part of Dyami Security Intelligence Services is a leading provider of security and awareness training solutions for organizations across various sectors. By offering immersive and realistic training scenarios, Dyami Academy equips personnel with the knowledge and skills needed to respond effectively to security-related challenges. Through a commitment to innovation and excellence, Dyami Academy strives to create a safer and more secure world for all.

Date: 21/03/2026 Three weeks into the US-Israeli campaign against Iran, the security environment across the Gulf has continued to deteriorate. The conflict shows no credible signs of resolution. Iran's offensive capacity, while degraded, remains sufficient to sustain daily strikes across the Gulf and even new targets significantly further afield than anticipated.  Energy infrastructure has been systematically targeted and gas fields, oil tankers, and even nuclear sites are now clearly viable targets. The continued blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has not only sent fuel prices skyrocketing, it has also severely affected fresh food and water supply chains.  Besides this, both Israel and the US continue to send mixed messaging about the potential for a ground incursion into Iran. Dyami’s assessment is that, even without “boots on the ground,” the situation in Gulf States and neighboring countries (UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Iraq) will worsen before it improves.  We urge all companies, NGOs, and multinational organisations with staff and families in the Gulf to reassess their presence now. We recommend to move non-essential personnel to safety while the means to do so remain available, based on a realistic assessment of what the coming weeks are likely to bring. Over the past three weeks, Dyami has been actively working with organisations across the region to plan and execute the safe relocation of hundreds of staff and their families. If your organisation has personnel in the Gulf and wishes to assess its exposure or plan a bespoke evacuation , please reach out to us directly at info@dyami.services . The Nuclear Dimension The Natanz uranium enrichment complex was struck the morning of 21/03, without leakage of radioactive material, according to Iran. Iran informed the IAEA, which confirmed no off-site radiation increase was detected and stated it is investigating. IAEA Director General Grossi has reiterated calls for military restraint to avoid a nuclear accident. This follows ordnance striking the site of the Bushehr nuclear power plant on 17/03, with a projectile landing just 350 meters from the reactor.  The combination of active strikes near nuclear sites and degraded monitoring capability represents a category of risk that has no precedent in this conflict and no reliable mitigation outside a halt to operations. Clients should be aware that a radiological incident, however low its current probability, would trigger immediate and unplanned evacuations across a wide geographic area with very limited notice. The Strait of Hormuz and the Humanitarian Consequence The Strait remains effectively closed to normal commercial traffic. Iran has established an IRGC-run registration and vetting system requiring extensive disclosure of vessel ownership and cargo destination, with at least nine ships understood to have used the corridor and one tanker reported to have paid approximately $2 million for transit clearance. The system provides no guarantee of safety, with rogue IRGC factions assessed as capable of seizing or delaying vessels regardless of clearance status. The humanitarian consequences of the closure are now becoming acute. Saudi Arabia imports more than 80% of its food, the UAE approximately 90%, and Qatar around 98%. The majority of food shipments to the region transit the Strait. With the waterway effectively blocked, alternative routes are costlier, slower, and unable to replace the volume of flow. Approximately 20,000 sailors aboard 3,000 commercial ships are stranded in the Persian Gulf, with reports of fuel and drinking water shortages onboard. The World Food Programme has warned that supply chain disruption may reach the most severe level since the Covid-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war in 2022. Shipping companies continue to refuse transit given the insurance environment, and wartime clauses in freight contracts have activated, giving carriers the right to divert shipments to alternative ports. The food security situation across the Gulf will worsen materially with each additional week of closure. Evacuation Assessment Governments across the region have largely stopped evacuation operations and recommend that citizens seeking to leave should use commercial flights. However, while local carriers are operating some flights, most international carriers have not reinstated suspended routes to the Gulf and the broader Middle East and have limited plans to do so.   The operational environment can change rapidly. Dubai International Airport (DXB) has been forced into temporary closures multiple times in the past week alone.  Dyami's assessment is that the conflict will continue for at minimum several more weeks and more likely longer. There is no credible ceasefire framework in place, no agreed US or Israel war objective, and Iran retains sufficient military capacity to sustain pressure across the Gulf indefinitely. Commercial Flight Status Emirates and flydubai are operating heavily restricted schedules from Dubai, prioritising stranded passenger clearance over new bookings.  Etihad is running a limited return service from Abu Dhabi to select hubs. Qatar Airways is operating a reduced schedule subject to rolling airspace clearances. Gulf Air has suspended hub operations in Bahrain entirely. El Al is running a minimal network from Tel Aviv, currently limited to six non-stop flights to New York designated for American citizens. British Airways has frozen all routes to Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Amman, and Tel Aviv until at minimum 31 May. Singapore Airlines has cancelled Dubai indefinitely. KLM and Air France suspensions are being pushed back repeatedly without confirmed resumption dates. Air Canada, Lufthansa Cargo, Philippine Airlines, AirBaltic, Aegean, Finnair, and Oman Air have all suspended Gulf and Levant routes until dates ranging from late March to late October. The suspension of international carriers is now compounding an emerging jet fuel shortage that is acute in several key markets. Australia holds reserves for fewer than 30 days. Vietnam's major importers have warned of default in April. China's hard ban on refined fuel exports, combined with South Korea and Thailand's export restrictions, has removed significant jet fuel supply from the Asian market at precisely the moment that rerouted flights around Iranian, Iraqi, and Israeli airspace are consuming more fuel per sector than normal operations. IATA has warned ticket prices could rise by up to 9%. The industry can absorb a geopolitical premium for weeks. It cannot absorb a structural fuel supply contraction of this scale for months. Dyami's assessment is that clients should not plan around a commercial aviation recovery in the near term.

Date: 12/03/2026 Executive Summary On 7 March 2026, twelve Latin American leaders gathered at Trump National Doral, a golf course in Miami, and signed a document. This document, named the Doral Charter, creates a new US-led regional security framework called the Shield of the Americas. And within this is the Counter-Cartel Coalition, a seventeen-nation military alliance chaired by President Trump and committed to using lethal force against transnational criminal organisations. However, membership in the Shield of the Americas appears to be based on a paramount governing logic: Washington will protect you if you side with the United States economically and kick China out. The U.S. offers security guarantees, financial assistance, and trade access to governments that remove Chinese telecommunications infrastructure, replace Chinese port scanning technology, and cancel subsea cable projects connecting the region to Chinese networks. The administration frames this as the Donroe Doctrine (a pun on Donald Trump and the Monroe Doctrine) that asserts the U.S. right to remove opponents already present in the hemisphere. We’ve already seen it in action with the January capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in Caracas. But the summit was also significant for who was not there. Canada, Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia, four of the hemisphere's largest economies and three of the primary drivers of the drug trafficking supply chain, were absent.  All have left-leaning governments. All have stood up in some way to Trump. None of them were invited. An alliance seeking to fight cocaine without the main cocaine producer and two critical drug through-points has a problem. Signatories to the Shield of the Americas. Context  The Donroe Doctrine: The Trump administration has formalised a policy it calls the Donroe Doctrine, a portmanteau of Donald Trump and the Monroe Doctrine, asserting the U.S. right to intervene militarily anywhere in the Western Hemisphere to remove foreign rivals. On 3 January 2026, U.S. forces raided Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro's compound in Caracas, captured him, and flew him to New York to face drug charges. It was the first time the United States had forcibly removed a sitting head of state in the region in the modern era. Last year, it renamed the Gulf of Mexico as the Gulf of America. The Counter-Cartel Coalition. This is a seventeen-nation military alliance whose members have committed to lethal force against drug trafficking organisations. In the week before the Miami summit, US and Ecuadorian forces conducted joint strikes against the Comandos de la Frontera in the Ecuadorian Amazon. Since September 2025, U.S. naval and air assets have carried out 45 strikes against drug vessels in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific, killing over 150 people, including in the territorial waters of St. Vincent and the Grenadines without that government's authorisation. Project Vault.  The Shield also announced the creation of Project Vault, a U.S. Export-Import Bank programme that offers governments financing and tariff reductions in exchange for exclusive U.S. access to critical mineral reserves and the removal of Chinese technology from their infrastructure. In practice, this means systematically ejecting Chinese companies from contracts about telecommunications, transport, infrastructure, and mineral rights. 5G networks, replacing Nuctech port scanners with U.S.-approved alternatives, and cancelling cable projects that connect to Chinese network infrastructure. Argentina's $20 billion bailout is conditional on U.S. lithium extraction rights. Bolivia entered Shield membership through lithium negotiations that displaced an existing Chinese joint venture. Panama has already completed the technology overhaul and serves as the template other signatories are expected to follow. The Americas Energy Compact.  Before Maduro's capture, Venezuela's oil moved through Chinese and Russian trading infrastructure. That has now changed. The U.S. Treasury has issued licences for Venezuelan oil exports to private companies operating outside Chinese supply chains, and state gold producer Minerven is now shipping up to 1,000kg of gold doré per consignment to U.S. refineries via Trafigura. Across the rest of the region, U.S. LNG and nuclear technology are being offered as replacements for Chinese-financed dams, grids, and generation capacity in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Central America. The Shield of the Americas: What Happened? The summit at Trump National Doral was a signing ceremony for an architecture that had already been built, deal by deal, base by base, over more than a year. Paraguay On 15 December 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Foreign Minister Rubén Ramírez Lezcano signed a Status of Forces Agreement in Washington that grants U.S. military and civilian personnel operating in Paraguay full immunity from local prosecution -- legal status equivalent to diplomatic staff. Any use of force during joint operations falls exclusively under U.S. criminal jurisdiction. Critics in the region have called it a formalisation of impunity. The administration calls it interoperability. In exchange, Paraguay received an $11 million military modernisation package: fast patrol boats for river border control, advanced night-vision and tactical equipment, and an accelerated contract with Northrop Grumman for a radar system providing 100% national airspace coverage. That last element matters. The Paraguayan Chaco has historically been one of the hemisphere's most active corridors for narco-flights operating below radar coverage. It no longer is. U.S. Navy SEALs are already conducting special forces training in-country. The $11 million buys Washington a permanent forward presence in the Tri-Border Area -- the hemisphere's primary node for illicit finance, Hezbollah-linked money flows, and First Capital Command cartel logistics -- without the political cost of a formal base. The deal was ratified by Paraguay's Chamber of Deputies on 10 March 2026, just three days after the Doral summit, by a vote of 53 to 8. The Senate debate was contentious -- sovereignty concerns were raised and largely ignored. What settled it was the promise of Project Vault financing and inclusion in the U.S. technology replacement programme. Paraguay is the first country to legislatively codify the Doral Charter's lethal force mandate into domestic law. Ecuador Ecuador's transformation over the past fourteen months has been the most dramatic of any signatory state. President Daniel Noboa declared an internal armed conflict in January 2024 after a wave of cartel violence that included a live television studio takeover and mass prison massacres that killed over 450 inmates since 2021. Washington responded with hundreds of millions of dollars in security assistance across Navy and Air Force modernisation and the establishment of vetted counter-trafficking units trained by Homeland Security Investigations. In November 2024, Ecuador adopted the U.S. DARTTS AI and machine learning customs profiling system, integrating its port screening infrastructure directly into American intelligence architecture. In December 2025, U.S. military personnel and intelligence were deployed to the former U.S. base in Manta, weeks after Ecuadorian voters rejected a referendum that would have formally permitted foreign military bases on national soil. By 3 March 2026, US SOUTHCOM was announcing joint operations publicly. U.S. and Ecuadorian forces struck Comandos de la Frontera positions in the Amazon. The same day, a coordinated U.S.-Ecuador-Europol operation dismantled a Los Lobos trafficking network operating into Belgium and the Netherlands. Noboa imposed nightly curfews across four provinces -- Guayas, Los Ríos, El Oro, and Santo Domingo de los Tsáchilas -- running from 15 to 31 March, covering the near-entirety of Ecuador's cocaine supply chain from the Colombian border to the container port. At the Miami summit, Noboa expelled the Cuban ambassador as a public demonstration of alignment, pledged to serve as the Coalition's operational vanguard, and formalised U.S. access to Eloy Alfaro Air Base and Galapagos facilities for regional power projection.   Argentina No government in the hemisphere has moved faster toward Washington than Javier Milei's Argentina. Since taking office, Milei has visited the United States sixteen times, withdrawn Argentina from BRICS, and welcomed US SOUTCOM officials to Ushuaia, a strategic port the administration has designated as an access point for Antarctic operations. The ideological alignment is genuine: Milei is a radical libertarian who frames his relationship with Washington as an existential geopolitical necessity rather than a transactional calculation. The transaction is substantial nonetheless. Argentina received a $20 billion bailout backed by the U.S. and multilateral partners, explicitly linked to securing lithium extraction rights under Project Vault. At the Miami summit, Milei was a featured speaker and announced Argentina Week 2026, a major investment roadshow in New York targeting American capital for the country's energy and mining sectors. Argentina's lithium reserves, among the largest in the world, are now effectively committed to the U.S. supply chain decoupling programme. Chile Chile presents the most complex transition of any signatory state, because it is mid-handover. The outgoing Gabriel Boric government was excluded from the summit and has spent its final weeks resisting U.S. pressure to abandon the proposed Valparaíso-to-Hong Kong subsea cable, a project the administration has designated a red line on data sovereignty grounds. That resistance ended on 11 March. President José Antonio Kast and his nominated Defence Minister Fernando Barros attended all major sessions at Doral despite Kast not yet holding office, pledged Counter-Cartel Coalition membership as a first act of government, and signalled that cancellation of the subsea cable will follow inauguration. The transition from one of the region's most vocal critics of US interventionism to a full Shield signatory took less than a week. The Kast government's broader posture, described by the incoming administration itself as Trumpista  on crime and immigration, suggests Chile will move quickly toward full technology compliance. Venezuela Venezuela was not invited to the Doral Summit but it is feeling its weight. The 3 January 2026 raid on Maduro's compound in Caracas and his transfer to New York to face drug conspiracy charges established the Donroe Doctrine's outer boundary: the United States will remove a sitting head of state by military force if it judges him sufficiently adversarial. The country is now governed by an interim administration under Delcy Rodríguez, which has agreed to re-establish diplomatic and consular relations with Washington and accepted the commercial arrangements that followed. Those arrangements are substantial. The Treasury Department has issued licences for Venezuelan oil exports to designated private companies, reintegrating Venezuelan production, which represents approximately 17% of global reserves, into US-accessible supply chains. Minerven, Venezuela's state gold producer, has agreed to ship up to 1,000kg of gold doré bars per consignment to U.S. refineries via Trafigura. Venezuela did not attend the Miami summit officially, but its energy and security planning is fully integrated into the Shield framework.   Panama Panama's alignment with the Shield predates the summit and established the operational template for technology compliance that every other signatory is now measured against. President José Raúl Mulino has committed to removing Chinese-linked companies from Canal operations and replacing Chinese-manufactured port infrastructure with U.S. and allied alternatives. The Nuctech port scanning systems that Washington designated as potential espionage infrastructure have been removed. The Canal itself is being commercially reoriented away from Chinese logistics operators. At the Miami summit, Mulino formalised these commitments and secured expanded U.S. security assistance in return. Panama's importance to the Shield extends beyond symbolism. Control of the Canal's technology and scanning infrastructure gives the United States visibility over one of the world's most critical maritime chokepoints. That visibility was previously shared with Chinese-manufactured systems. It no longer is. Bolivia Bolivia's shift under President Rodrigo Paz has been striking. For years, Bolivia's foreign policy was explicitly anti-imperialist, aligned with Venezuela and hostile to Washington. Paz has abandoned that posture in favour of a pragmatic calculation: Bolivia holds some of the world's largest lithium reserves, and Washington is offering money for access to them. A signal of alignment was Bolivia's withdrawal from the Hague Group, a coalition focused on opposing Israeli military operations in Gaza, a foreign policy adjustment made specifically to bring Bolivian positions into closer alignment with the Trump administration's regional preferences. Lithium negotiations with Washington are now underway under the Project Vault framework. Bolivia is the signatory most exposed to Chinese economic decoupling risk: Chinese infrastructure investment is deeply embedded across the country's energy and transport sectors, and the financial benefits of the U.S. partnership have not yet materialised to offset what severance of those relationships will cost.   The Absent Three The governments of Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia were not absent from the Shield of the Americas by oversight. Each absence carries distinct implications. Mexico, under President Claudia Sheinbaum, has been publicly characterised by the Trump administration as a state where the cartels are functionally in control. Trump has threatened massive import tariffs and raised the prospect of unilateral military operations on Mexican soil. Sheinbaum has responded by extraditing dozens of senior traffickers to the United States and taking U.S. intelligence to kill the most dangerous drug trafficker in the country, CJNG boss El Mencho. But the tariff threat is unresolved and active. Brazil, under President Lula, has condemned the Maduro capture as a violation of the UN Charter and positioned itself as the hemisphere's primary institutional resistance to the Donroe Doctrine. Brazil's deep commercial integration with China makes the Shield's decoupling logic existentially threatening to its economic model. And Colombia, under President Petro, has carried out joint operations with Ecuador, while being heavily critical of Trump and refusing the premises of the Shield. The three governments collectively represent the majority of regional GDP, the primary narcotics production zones, and the most significant trade corridors on the continent.

Date: 06/03/2026 Context At approximately 11:30  on 5 March 2026 , Azerbaijani authorities reported that four drones entered Azerbaijani airspace and struck locations inside the Nakhichevan exclave , damaging parts of the Nakhchivan International Airport  terminal building and a field near a school; two injuries  were reported. Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a formal statement condemning the attacks and demanding an explanation from the Iranian Government, an investigation, and measures to prevent a recurrence. Iran’s Foreign Minister denied that any projectiles were launched from Iranian territory  towards Azerbaijan, instead referring to the role of Israel in “diverting public opinion and undermining Iran’s good relations with its neighbours”. This constitutes the first attack of its kind on Azerbaijan’s Nakhichevan exclave and expands the areas affected by the ongoing Iran–US/Israeli conflict. Azerbaijan’s Baku FIR issued two NOTAMs temporarily restricting airspace on 5 March 2026, citing reduced ATC capacity and modified routing. These measures may cause reroutes and delays, especially for traffic transiting southern Azerbaijan and at FIR boundary crossings, although typical air traffic through the area is generally low. ATC sector closure:  Baku FIR ACC Sector South is closed for operational reasons from 07:39 to 19:39 UTC. Expect ATC rerouting/holding and potential flow restrictions through the southern portion of Azerbaijani airspace. Waypoint outages and reroute guidance:  Waypoints ULDUS, BATEV, LALDA, PARSU are temporarily unavailable from 15:00 UTC (5 Mar) to 03:00 UTC (6 Mar). Flights to/from Yerevan FIR should use MATAL as the boundary entry/exit point; flights to/from Turkmenbashi FIR should use MARAL/METKA/RODAR/LARGI. Analysis: airspace risks Aviation risk reporting indicates that the immediate operational impact was driven less by confirmed runway damage and more by airspace risk controls: a NOTAM temporarily closed the southern sector of the UBBA (Baku FIR) around Nakhchivan (UBBN), while noting that the initial visible damage appeared concentrated on the terminal area (with no confirmed runway impact at the time of writing). Flight-tracking sources showed at least one civilian airliner diverting back to Baku, and local media cited the airport/press service as saying that flights were temporarily suspended, supporting the assessment that connectivity to the exclave was disrupted immediately after the incident. Nakhchivan’s airport is a dual-use (civil/military) facility with few international routes. The airport is known to have housed Turkish-acquired (or Turkish-operated) Bayraktar TB2 combat drones as of 2024, kept in hangars near the airport, as well as Mi-35-type gunship helicopters based at the same site. This dual-use role may increase the airport’s exposure to risk in the event of further attacks. Hangers housing military helicopters and TB2 Bayraktar UAVs Source: Google, Airbus, image date 05 March 2024 Despite perceptions of cordial relations, there are signs that Azerbaijan and Iran remain wary of one another. Iran’s mistrust largely stems from Azerbaijan’s strategic partnership with Israel, through which Baku has purchased billions of dollars’ worth of advanced weaponry and supported joint production with Israeli defence firms inside Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan, meanwhile, is primarily concerned about Iran’s influence—however limited—within its society, particularly among religious communities, as well as Tehran’s broader efforts to expand its regional footprint in the South Caucasus. In response, Baku has sought closer ties with Turkey, partly out of concern that Iranian influence could grow. Bayraktar TB2 UAVs in a hangar at Nakhchivan International Airport Looking ahead Azerbaijan is likely to treat the incident as justification for a tighter air-defence and security posture around Nakhichevan, including stricter local airspace controls, sharper attribution messaging, and potentially more restrictive border management—especially given that Azerbaijan’s land borders remain closed to routine passenger movement under the “special quarantine regime”. Further incidents, whether attributable to Iran, a third party, or non-state actors operating from within Iran, would raise the risk of escalation and more frequent NOTAM-driven constraints, such as sector closures, waypoint suspensions and enforced reroutes. If the northern Caucasus air corridor becomes unreliable or closes, there are few comparable alternatives in the region, and a much larger share of long-haul traffic would be forced to concentrate on the Saudi/Red Sea corridor, intensifying congestion, delays and capacity strain in airspace that is already heavily burdened by rerouted flights.

Date:   06/03/2026 Executive Summary Ecuador is entering an active phase of US-supported military operations against domestic criminal groups designated as foreign terrorist organisations (FTOSs) by the United States government. On 3 March 2026, US Southern Command announced joint operations with Ecuadorian forces targeting “terrorist groups.” The US has designated Los Choneros and Los Lobos, the two principal armed criminal networks controlling the country's drug trafficking infrastructure, as FTOs. However, the first action was aimed at Comandos de la Frontera, a Colombian drug trafficking group also operating in northern Ecuador. The same day, a coordinated US-Ecuador-Europol operation dismantled a Los Lobos trafficking network operating into Belgium and the Netherlands. Ecuador's President Noboa has imposed nightly curfews across four provinces, including Guayas, home to Guayaquil's José Joaquín de Olmedo International Airport, effective 15–31 March 2026. Interior Minister John Reimberg also told  people in these provinces on March 3 to “stay at home. We are at war.” On March 4, Ecuador revealed US assets had helped plan the operation against Comandos de la Frontera, a heavily armed Colombian drug trafficking group which also operates in Ecuador. While the full extent of US involvement was not revealed, Ecuador’s Joint Command said the US provided logistical and operational support. For aviation operators, the immediate operational consideration is a NOTAM issued in January 2026 covering the Eastern Pacific, citing military activities and GPS interference, valid through 17 March 2026. This reflects active US maritime interdiction operations against narco-trafficking vessels, a campaign that has intensified significantly since late 2025. Ground operations and curfew enforcement in the Guayas province present secondary considerations for crew movements and ground handling. This is assessed as an elevated but stable risk environment. Scheduled commercial operations at GYE are not currently disrupted. The situation is developing, with military engagement expected to deepen through March 2026 and potentially beyond. Details Who US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), and Ecuadorian armed forces and National Police joint operations against Comandos de la Frontera, as well as Ecuador's Los Choneros and Los Lobos, both designated FTOs by the US. What Ecuador is simultaneously the subject of overlapping but distinct operations. At sea, US forces are conducting maritime interdiction in the Eastern Pacific targeting narco-trafficking vessels. On the ground, Ecuador is operating under a national state of emergency declared in January 2026, with nightly upcoming curfews imposed across four provinces, including Guayas, home to Guayaquil's international airport, set to run 15–31 March 2026. Since March 3, US assets supported Ecuadorean troops against drug trafficking interests, a situation which may ramp up through March. These lines of operation are coordinated: the maritime campaign disrupts outbound shipments, the ground operations target the domestic infrastructure of the organisations moving them, and international takedowns close off the European end of the supply chain. The result is the most significant security mobilisation Ecuador has seen since President Noboa declared an internal armed conflict in January 2024. Where The Eastern Pacific is the maritime theatre, where US forces are conducting interdiction operations against narco-trafficking vessels in international waters. On the ground, the operational focus is set to be concentrated in the four provinces placed under nightly curfew from March 15:  Guayas, which contains the Port of Guayaquil, the primary exit point for Ecuadorian cocaine; Los Ríos, the inland transit corridor connecting the Colombian border to the coast, dotted with stash houses and clandestine airstrips;  El Oro, the southern gateway bordering Peru and home to the Port of Machala;  and Santo Domingo de los Tsáchilas, the logistics junction linking the Pacific coast to the Andean interior.  These four provinces map almost exactly onto the cocaine supply chain from border crossing to container ship.  When 2024 - Ecuador receives hundreds of millions of dollars in US security assistance across Navy and Air Force modernisation, elite vetted police units, and direct operational support. November 2024 - Ecuador adopts the US DARTTS AI/ML customs profiling system, integrating port screening into American intelligence infrastructure. September 2025 -  US State Department designates Los Choneros and Los Lobos as FTOs. December 2025 - The US deployed military personnel and equipment to a former U.S. base in Manta, Ecuador for a “temporary operation” focused on anti-narcotics and intelligence gathering. This move followed a November 2025 referendum where Ecuadorian voters rejected a proposal to allow foreign military bases in the country.  January 2026:  NOTAM issued over the Eastern Pacific citing military activities and GPS interference, signalling activation of US maritime interdiction operations. March 3, 2026:  SOUTHCOM publicly announces joint operations against designated terrorist organisations. Ecuador imposes nightly curfews across four provinces to run from March 15-31. Why Ecuador sits between Colombia and Peru, the world's two largest coca producers, and handles an estimated 70% of global cocaine exports, the bulk of it leaving through the Port of Guayaquil. The money and weapons received over the past decade have turned gangs like the Choneros and Lobos into transnational criminal enterprises with the resources to challenge the state directly. Faced with an Ecuadorian state both incapable of dismantling these groups alone and an administration willing to cooperate closely with Washington, the US administration views Ecuador as the next step in militarizing the Latin American drug war after strikes on drug boats in the Caribbean, seizing President Nicolas Maduro of Venezuela, and assisting in the killing of Mexican drug trafficker and CJNG boss, El Mencho. How The precise nature and extent of US military involvement as of 3 March 2026 is not fully established. SOUTHCOM's announcement of joint operations against designated terrorist organisations was deliberately unspecific, and Ecuador's Ministry of Defense declaration of a "new phase against narco-terrorism" offered no operational detail. But the convergence of simultaneous developments on 3 March, the SOUTHCOM announcement, the curfew decree, Interior Minister Reimberg's declaration that "we are at war," and the Europol takedown, alongside an active Eastern Pacific NOTAM citing military activities and GPS interference, suggests a coordinated operational activation rather than an incremental policy step.  Analysis Los Choneros and Los Lobos are not conventional criminal targets. Over the past 7-10 years, sustained income has transformed them from street gangs into groups with the financial resources, territorial control, and institutional penetration of a parallel state. Their prison infrastructure alone illustrates the problem: Ecuador's penitentiary system, the site of more than 450 inmate deaths in gang massacres since 2021, functions as an operational headquarters from which leadership communicates, coordinates, and commands. The corruption penetration runs deeper still. The December 2025 arrest of Ecuador's former national police chief on charges of collaboration with Los Lobos confirmed that the institutions being deployed against these organisations, including in collaboration with the U.S., have been systematically compromised by them. Vetted units and HSI-trained TCIUs partially address this problem, but they operate within a broader institutional environment that these organisations have spent years corrupting at every level, from beat officers to the head of the national police. Territorial entrenchment compounds the problem further. In significant parts of Guayas and Los Ríos, Los Choneros, Los Lobos, and other gangs are a form of government. They provide jobs, collect revenue, enforce orders, and even deliver basic services the state does not. Displacing an structure with that degree of community embeddedness requires not just military pressure but sustained state presence and service delivery afterward. Ecuador has demonstrated neither the capacity nor the resources to provide that at scale. All four curfew provinces matter, Guayas is where sustained operations carry the heaviest economic consequences. The Port of Guayaquil is Ecuador's primary trade gateway, the exit point for the bulk of the country's agricultural exports, including bananas, shrimp, and cut flowers, and the entry point for a significant proportion of its imports. José Joaquín de Olmedo International Airport handles the majority of Ecuador's international passenger and cargo air traffic. Both operate within a province soon to be under nightly curfew, elevated military presence, and active security operations of uncertain duration. In the short term, curfew hours create manageable but real friction: crew transport, ground handling schedules, and cargo movement require coordination with local operators who are themselves operating under constrained conditions. The more significant risk is duration.  Curfews imposed in environments where the underlying security problem is structurally resistant to rapid resolution tend to get extended.

As governments and airlines fail to come to a consensus about evacuation protocols from countries affected by the Iran conflict, it is Dyami’s strong recommendation that travelers based in Gulf States (UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman) should stay put.  There are three main reasons. 1.  The threat to Gulf residents is lower than it looks. Despite highly visible and disruptive strikes on infrastructure such as Dubai Airport or the Crowne Plaza in Bahrain, Iran’s ability to cause widespread casualties in Gulf States is low. Over the four days of the conflict so far, it has expended thousands of missiles and drones, with a strike rate of less than 10 percent. Excluding Israel and US military personnel, which have borne the brunt of the loss of life on the coalition side, fatalities in Gulf States have remained in single-digits.  2. The airport is a worse place to be than your hotel. As the war continues, even assuming Iran retains deep missile stocks and Gulf interceptor reserves are under pressure, Tehran's ability to materially shift the conflict through conventional strikes diminishes over time. Sustained random attacks on Gulf States would likely trigger Saudi Arabia or the UAE as active belligerents long before they achieved meaningful strategic effect. Thousands of foreign citizens crammed into an airport waiting for evacuation flights makes a far more coherent and appealing target. Furthermore, analysis that the IRGC may have decentralised launch authority to regional commanders, meaning individual strikes may not require central approval, only adds to this fear. 3. Evacuation capacity is finite.  Evacuations are finite resources, especially since only Emirates and Etihad, the UAE’s home airlines, are currently planning any whatsoever. Thousands of people trying to force an early exit creates a logistical "bottleneck" that hampers the movement of high-priority personnel, including essential medical staff, technical recovery teams, and diplomatic security details, whose presence is required to maintain the very infrastructure residents rely on for safety. A premature rush to the gates by non-essential personnel compromises the duty of care for those most at risk. Until a stable air corridor is established and verified by multiple intelligence sources, staying put ensures that these channels remain clear for those whose extraction is a matter of immediate life or death.

Date: 11/02/2026 Summary The New START Treaty has long been a cornerstone of strategic stability between the United States and Russia, placing firm limits on deployed nuclear weapons while providing verification measures that reduced uncertainty and mistrust. With the treaty now expired after its final extension, the world enters a new phase where legally binding constraints on the two largest nuclear arsenals are no longer in place. This article explores what New START achieved, why its expiration matters, and how its absence could reshape geopolitical relations and global security in the years ahead. New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) is a landmark arms control agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation that was designed to limit and bring transparency to the two largest nuclear arsenals in the world. Originally signed in 2010 and entering into force in February 2011, the treaty placed concrete limits on each side’s deployed strategic nuclear forces, including caps on 1,550 deployed strategic warheads, 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers, and a total of 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers, along with comprehensive verification measures such as data exchanges and on-site inspections to reduce the risk of misunderstanding or miscalculation. New START was structured to remain in force for 10 years with an option for a single five-year extension, and in 2021 the United States and Russia agreed to exercise that extension, keeping the treaty legally in force through February 4, 2026. This extension preserved the treaty’s limits and monitoring mechanisms at a time when broader nuclear arms control efforts were under strain, and it reflected a shared interest -despite political tension- in maintaining some structure around strategic nuclear forces. As of February 5, 2026, however, the extension period has officially expired, meaning the New START Treaty is no longer legally binding. Its lapse marks the first time in more than five decades that there are no formal, legally enforceable limits on the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia. The expiration has sparked concern among diplomats, arms control experts, and international organizations, who warn that without a replacement framework the absence of binding limits could lead to a renewed arms race and decline in transparency between the world’s two principal nuclear powers. In September 2025, Russian leadership publicly offered to continue observing the established New START limits for an additional year after the treaty’s expiration, provided the United States agreed to reciprocal action, but no formal extension was agreed. Proposals for new arms control arrangements that might include other nuclear states such as China remain under discussion. This integration of the extension into the New START story shows both the historic role of the treaty in stabilizing nuclear competition and the uncertainty now emerging as it lapses without a direct successor in place.   Looking ahead Looking ahead, the expiration of New START removes one of the last remaining formal guardrails in US–Russia relations and risks accelerating a return to strategic uncertainty. Without binding limits and verification mechanisms, both sides may feel increased pressure to modernize and expand nuclear capabilities, not necessarily because of immediate intent to strike, but because reduced transparency fuels worst-case assumptions. This dynamic could further harden geopolitical relations, deepen mistrust, and increase the risk of miscalculation during periods of crisis, especially as conventional conflicts and cyber operations increasingly overlap with nuclear signaling. At the same time, the absence of a successor treaty may push global arms control into a more fragmented era, where nuclear stability depends less on bilateral agreements and more on shifting alliances, deterrence postures, and emerging technologies such as hypersonic weapons. In this context, nuclear arms control is likely to remain a key strategic issue—not only between Washington and Moscow, but also in broader debates involving China and other nuclear states, potentially reshaping diplomatic leverage and global security priorities for the coming decade.   Conclusion The expiration of New START may look like a dramatic geopolitical rupture, but it does not automatically trigger a new nuclear arms race. The treaty’s end removes legally binding limits on deployed US and Russian strategic nuclear weapons and eliminates formal inspection and transparency mechanisms. That weakens predictability and reduces mutual confidence. At the same time, expanding nuclear forces is not a switch that can simply be flipped. Uploading additional warheads or increasing deployments requires available delivery systems, industrial capacity, trained crews, and time. Russia’s defense industry is heavily burdened by the war in Ukraine, and the United States also faces procurement timelines and budget realities. Structural constraints still shape what is realistically possible. The greater risk is therefore not an immediate surge in warhead numbers, but a gradual erosion of transparency and stability. Without agreed limits and verification, both sides may increasingly plan for worst-case scenarios, slowly intensifying strategic competition over the long term rather than overnight.

Date: 04/02/2026 Who’s involved : United States, Iran What happened? On 04/02/2026,  an F-35C launched from the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln in the Arabian sea shot down an Iranian Shahed-129 drone . The drone "aggressively approached” the aircraft carrier with “unclear intent” according to US Central Command.  The shootdown took place just hours before Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps forces  attempted to board the US flagged merchant vessel Stena Imperative , but were driven off by US destroyer USS McFaul with air support from the US Air Force.  US forces in the region responded. The USS McFaul, an Arleigh Burke-class (Flight II) Aegis guided missile destroyer, escorted the tanker away from the area  as the US Air Force provided defensive air support. There are no reports of shots fired as the Iranian vessels withdrew.  Several hours after the shoot down of the Shahed drone two Iranian gunboats approached the MV Stenna Imperative, a chemical tanker operating under a US flag and crewed by Americans, as it was transiting the strait of Hormuz. The gunboats reportedly passed the ship three times at high speeds as an Iranian Moh ajer   r econnaissance drone flew overhead. It is alleged that the Iranians threatened to board and seize the vessel, even though it was operating in International waters. The Shahed-129 is an older variant of the Shahed-139 and can be used for both reconnaissance and strike purposes. It is currently unclear if this specific drone was carrying any ordnance. Iranian state owned TASM news agency indicated that the drone was on its usual and legal mission in international waters engaged in reconnaissance, monitoring, and filming , which are considered normal and legal actions. Analysis : These escalatory measures took place during a tense stand-off between Iran and US led military forces . The US has been building up its forces in the region for possible action against Iran while it demands complete denuclearisation  - a move Iran is unwilling to make.  These actions of Iran are likely aimed at signalling a willingness to risk an engagement to strengthen its perceived position in possible negotiations with the US.   This is the first Iranian shoot down since the 12 day war. It does not however constitute a fundamental change of the situation  as President Trump indicated that negotiations will continue. A single drone, whether armed or not, poses no threat to the carrier strike group it was surveilling. Its intelligence however can possibly be used to more accurately target the carrier  in the future. Conclusion: These events take place as tensions are high between longtime adversaries Iran and the USA. They began to rise again as Iran’s government spent weeks violently quelling protests that began in late December against growing economic instability before broadening into a challenge to Islamic Republic leadership. President Donald Trump had promised in early January to “rescue” Iranians from their government’s bloody crackdown on protesters, which later morphed into a pressure campaign to get Tehran to make a deal over its nuclear program. The U.S. shot down the drone hours after Iran’s president said Tuesday that he instructed the country’s foreign minister to “pursue fair and equitable negotiations” with the U.S., marking one of the first clear signs from Tehran it wants to try to negotiate with Washington despite a breakdown of talks last summer.

Date:   13/01/2026 (12:30 UTC+1) Where?  Iran Who’s involved? Iran, Israel, the United States What happened? Since 28/12/2025  protests have taken place throughout Iran. The protests originated largely due to a continuously deteriorating economic situation in the country, where high inflation and subsequently higher exchange rates have risen to unprecedented levels in recent years. As an example, on 01/10/2022  —during Iran’s last large-scale protests following the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini while in police custody— the USD/IRR (Iranian Rial, RI/RIs) exchange rate stood at an already high $1=336.000 Rls. Three years later, at the beginning of June 2025, just before the Israel-Iran War, the exchange rate stood at $1=822.000 RIs, in the following months, the exchange rate continued to climb and is now at around $1=1.400.000 RIs.  The government quickly pivoted to lethal force to suppress protests, and the funerals of the first deceased protesters on 02/01/2026  increased unrest, with the protests having increasingly grown in size and spread throughout the rest of the country. Reports now suggest the protests have spread to all 31 ostānha (provinces). On 05/01/2025 , reports surfaced alleging that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had prepared a contingency plan to leave the country should the situation escalate to a point where it is deemed necessary. Rising numbers of fatalities have been reported on both sides, including among protesters and security personnel. As demonstrations have become increasingly aggressive and volatile, with protesters setting fire to regime properties, the security forces’ crackdown has also intensified. On 12/01/2026 , Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi referred to the protesters as “terrorists”, also accusing armed groups having infiltrated the protests and reiterating claims of US and Israel involvement. Iranian regime officials also referred to the protests as the next phase of the Israel-Iran War, highlighting concerns on external interference. Since 08/01/2026, the Iranian government blocked internet access nation-wide, likely aiming to hinder protestor’s communication and thus coordination and organization, as well as decreasing the ability for citizens to share images and videos of violent, repressive behavior from security forces. Nonetheless, a small amount of videos and limited communication continued, thanks to some citizen-owned Starlink (satellite internet service) routers. Since 11/01/2026, the regime has jammed this service too, effectively imposing a country-wide internet blackout. US President Trump indicated he might contact Elon Musk to request assistance in restoring internet access using Musk's Starlink satellite service, though no further comments have yet been made on this by Musk or Trump. As of 12/01/2026, the large majority of media about the protests comes from official Iranian state media channels, which are the only ones remaining continuously online and broadcasting.  Since 01/01/2026 , President Trump’s rhetoric with regards to Iran has become more aggressive. Trump has stated his readiness and openness to intervene ‘in favour of the protesters’. At the same time, Israel has regularly held security cabinet meetings over the past weeks discussing the situation in Iran and the country’s options, with former IDF Intelligence chief, Tamir Hayman, stating Israel “nearly struck Iran twice in recent weeks”. On 11/01/2025  Iran warned Israel and the US that if attacks were to be carried out by the US its military and shipping centers would be targeted. On 12/01/2026 , US President Trump announced that the US will impose 25% tariffs with all the countries that do business with Iran, “effective immediately.” Since 09/01/2025 , several airlines, such as Turkish Airlines, Emirates, and FlyDubai among others, have cancelled flights to and from Iran, highlighting the severity of the situation. Temporary airspace closures in certain parts of the OIIX/Tehran FIR have been issued over the past days. On 12/01/2025 , the US also issued a notice advising its citizens to leave the country. On 11/01/2025 , President Trump stated that Iran had reached out to propose nuclear talks, prompting subsequent diplomatic engagement between US envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian officials. The following day, on 12/01/2025 , the White House reaffirmed President Trump’s willingness to use military force, while emphasizing that diplomatic channels remained open. Unconfirmed reports indicate that Trump reportedly set out conditions aimed at preventing US intervention and including demands related to the protests, uranium enrichment, and long-range missile development. However, they are unlikely to be accepted by Iran. On 12/01/2025 , pro-government protests took place in Tehran, joined by Iranian President Massoud Pezeshkian, underscoring the ongoing attempts by the Iranian regime to calm the protests, in this case by creating a parallel, seemingly citizen-led pro-government movement that could aim to confuse still swayable citizens into thinking that Iranians support the government. As per Aragchi’s comments, the government-led counter-protests likely aim to confirm Tehran’s statement that protestors are a “terrorist”-like minority.  Analysis The current wave of protests in Iran represents a significant escalation of internal instability, driven primarily by a severe economic crisis and awaited by Israeli PM Netanyahu, who explicitly referenced this outcome during its war with Iran in June last year. While the immediate trigger pointed towards national crisis and economic hardship, the regime's lethal crackdown, followed by a government-imposed national internet blackout has intensified the situation. This internal volatility is further complicated by an aggressive stance from the US and Israel, including President Trump's declared openness to intervention, raising the likelihood of external interference. The timing and imminence of this potential military threat however is unsure, given that the US currently does not have the assets available in the region to execute certain military actions, and US assets movements in the region have not increased. The question that needs to be asked is what Trump aims are and what he is able to achieve. Whether the objective is regime change through civil unrest or a coup, or the pursuit of a nuclear agreement, reliance on military force alone risks producing chaos rather than a favorable outcome. Though the perspective exists that certain scenarios of major military action are less likely at this stage, because it might undermine the protests, this does not exclude action from the US against Iran. Cooperation with Israel, whether directly or through joint operations, remains a possibility. Furthermore, potential actions following up on the recently imposed sanctions such as cyberattacks, information campaigns, and assassination attempts of regime officials/leaders cannot be ruled out. Reports state Trump is expected to hold a meeting with his national security team on  13/01/2025  to discuss options for supporting the protests and weakening the Iranian regime. However, what can be stated with confidence is Iran’s heightened alertness, driven by fears and expectations of imminent external action amid ongoing internal unrest. Implications for aviation and maritime security Over the past few days several NOTAMs for the OIIX/Tehran FIR have already been issued, with more airspace restrictions, temporary closures, and disruptions to civil aviation expected to follow. Particularly in the event of US and/or Israeli military intervention, sudden airspace closures across other Middle Eastern countries are likely, mirroring the disruptions observed during the Israel–Iran War last June. Iran’s recent threats of retaliatory targeting of US military and maritime assets further highlight the risk of disruptions to maritime operations. Additionally, an escalation of conflict, particularly if it continues over an extended period, could cause major disruptions at strategic maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Bab al-Mandab (connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean). Sustained instability in these areas could have severe consequences for maritime operations and logistics, given that these routes are critical for maritime trade. Conclusion The economy-driven protests that began on 28/12/2025 have since expanded to an extent that poses a credible threat to the Iranian government. The Iranian government is walking a tightrope and its attempts to suppress the demonstrations, with censored media coverage, internet blackouts, and the use of violent suppression, have so far achieved limited results. The Iranian government has expressed openness to resume nuclear negotiations with the US in an effort to ease rising tensions and concerns over potential strikes. This however leaves key questions unresolved on the timing, scope and specific means of a potential US or Israeli intervention. Primarily due to the limited prospects for success in these ongoing diplomatic efforts, particularly in light of the demands the US has allegedly presented to Iran. Therefore, the situation remains highly volatile and poised for further escalation, with a likely continuation and increase in popular protests and a looming threat of external intervention.

Date: 05/12/2025 Executive Summary During 2025, reports have been made indicating the presence of uniformed, armed personnel (likely Russian-associated) aboard civilian vessels thought to be part of the vast Russian ‘shadow fleet’ comprising ageing, uninsured oil tankers and cargo vessels registered under flags of convenience and with deliberately confusing ownership structures. These uniformed personnel serve intelligence, surveillance, and command-and-control functions aboard vessels operating in the North Sea, Baltic Sea, and in proximity to critical energy and telecommunications infrastructure.  This development represents an escalation in Russia's hybrid warfare operations, transforming the shadow fleet from a sanctions-evasion mechanism into an active military intelligence platform with direct implications for North Sea-dependent economies. For North Sea littoral states, this poses an immediate and evolving threat to critical undersea cable infrastructure, offshore energy operations, port security, and maritime commerce. The presence of armed military personnel aboard civilian vessels in European waters, combined with documented drone operations taking place throughout European territory and the use of shadow fleet vessels to damage undersea cables, indicates Russia is preparing for potentially coordinated hybrid attacks on critical European infrastructure. Details Who Highly likely Russian military personnel (reportedly identified as wearing Russian Navy camouflage uniforms); embedded on civilian shadow fleet oil tankers registered under flags of convenience (Panama, Gabon, Comoros, Liberia, etc.); protected by Russian military air assets. What Armed personnel installed aboard civilian merchant vessels; observed photographing bridge passages and critical infrastructure during transits; exercising authority over international crews; intimidating maritime pilots and foreign crew members; gathering intelligence on European maritime infrastructure and critical facilities. Where Baltic Sea (primary focus). North Sea, especially critical infrastructure choke/crossing points.  Danish waters (routes transiting through Øresund Strait and Great Belt). Approaches to German, Polish, Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian ports. European Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). Approaches to critical oil transfer facilities, LNG terminals, undersea cable landing stations, and port infrastructure. When July 2025 – DanPilot reports uniformed personnel observations. August 2025 – Swedish Herald reports of spying on Danish critical infrastructure by shadow fleet personnel. September–November 2025  – Further Danwatch investigations. November 2025  – DanPilot confirms pattern of uniformed personnel sightings; ongoing through December 2025. Why Intelligence gathering : Russia deploying military observers to map port infrastructure, piloting procedures, security gaps, critical facility locations, NATO military response Tactics Techniques Procedures (TTPs). Crew control : Maintaining operational security and preventing crew defections or reporting of irregular activities. Intimidation : Demonstrating Russian state control and deterring pilot cooperation with European authorities. Diversifying of recent hybrid warfare : Extending Russia's intelligence collection and sabotage preparation into European waters. Political messaging : Signalling Russian willingness to violate international maritime law with near-total impunity. How Insertion of Russian military/state security personnel on board civilian ships as ‘ship's officers’ (particularly ‘second mate’ positions with de facto command authority, mirroring Soviet-era political commissar roles). Use of false credentials and opaque crew manifests. Operation under flag-of-convenience vessels with minimal transparency. Coordination with Russian naval and air assets providing protective cover. Exploitation of international crew diversity to conceal Russian personnel among mixed-nationality crews . What happened? Throughout 2025, several reports have documented an escalating pattern of almost certain Russian military personnel aboard Russian ‘shadow fleet’ vessels transiting European waters. Beginning in mid-2025 and intensifying through November, Danish investigative outlet Danwatch, in coordination with internal reports from DanPilot (Danish state pilotage service), identified seemingly uniformed Russian military or state security personnel embedded aboard civilian oil tankers operating under flags of convenience. These uniformed personnel have been observed conducting apparent surveillance activities, namely photographing bridge passages and critical infrastructure during transits, and exercising command authority over international crews. Pilot reports and internal maritime authority communications indicated that this practice has become increasingly common, with multiple shadow fleet vessels now following similar patterns of embedding uniformed Russian personnel, particularly in senior crew positions such as "second mate" with actual command-level authority over the vessel and crew. These personnel conduct reconnaissance by taking photographs of areas of interest and are likely also able to conduct aerial reconnaissance through the deployment of small drones for surveillance. These tactics, refined during the war in Ukraine, are now being deployed throughout Europe to undermine European societal resilience against potential attacks on infrastructure.   Analysis: Why does this matter for government and businesses? For North Sea Littoral State Governments Direct Escalation of Russian Hybrid Warfare in Sovereign and EEZ Waters The placement of armed Russian military personnel aboard civilian vessels operating in North Sea waters represents an escalation beyond Russia's previous hybrid warfare tactics. This is no longer simple sanctions evasion or passive intelligence collection; it is an active Russian military presence conducting surveillance, infrastructure reconnaissance, and sabotage preparation in European waters, frequently within nations' Exclusive Economic Zones where legal ambiguity complicates response. The concurrent deployment of Russian military aircraft to protect shadow fleet operations and systematic drone reconnaissance across German, Norwegian, Belgian, and Dutch territory indicates Russia has integrated the shadow fleet into a comprehensive European-wide hybrid warfare campaign combining maritime, aerial, and land-based intelligence collection and potential sabotage platforms. Challenge to Maritime Sovereignty and Legal Framework Russia has demonstrated it can: Insert armed military personnel aboard vessels in European waters with near-total impunity. Conduct surveillance and intelligence gathering on European critical infrastructure. Intimidate European maritime officials (pilots) without facing enforcement consequences. Maintain operational security despite NATO monitoring. Operate under flag-of-convenience vessels that complicate jurisdictional response. Coordinate with Russian military assets (aircraft, naval vessels) providing direct protective cover. This signals that North Sea littoral states lack coherent legal, operational, and political mechanisms to enforce maritime sovereignty against Russian hybrid operations. Convergence of Multiple Threat Vectors The shadow fleet armed personnel operations are not isolated, rather, they operate in coordination with: Systematic drone reconnaissance of military installations and critical infrastructure across European territory. increasingly using proxy actors and online recruitment of third-country nationals to carry out sabotage and intelligence gathering in European nations. Several cases of fibre optic cable sabotage throughout Europe since 2022. Russian fighter jet operations in European airspace (Su-35 fly-pasts of Estonian naval vessels attempting to interdict the vessel, JAGUAR, Lithuanian airspace violation October 2025, several Russian drone incursions in Romanian and Polish airspace since 2022). Several incidents since February 2022 are believed to have involved Russian shadow fleet vessels, or those of Russia’s allies, in undersea cable sabotage operations, with such activity necessitating the launch of NATO mission, OPERATION BALTIC SENTRY. The YANTAR (IMO: 7524419) laser-dazzling incident targeting Royal Air Force (RAF, UK) aircraft over critical North Sea cable infrastructure in November 2025.  This convergence suggests Russia is preparing for coordinated hybrid attacks combining maritime, aerial, cyber, and undersea elements to disrupt European critical infrastructure simultaneously. Threat to Critical North Sea Infrastructure Interdependencies The North Sea contains: Approximately 20+ critical undersea fibre optic cables carrying ~90% of North Sea region communications and transatlantic traffic. Multiple energy interconnections and power transmission cables. LNG terminal approaches and offshore oil/gas platforms. Port facilities housing energy transfer terminals. Maritime chokepoints (Øresund Strait, Great Belt) where all Baltic maritime traffic must transit. These infrastructure systems are critically interdependent: disruption to one cascades across multiple sectors. A coordinated attack on cable landing stations in the Netherlands, Belgium, and UK combined with drone strikes on power distribution and port facilities could simultaneously disrupt communications, energy supply, and maritime commerce across the entire North Sea region and UK-Europe trade. Financing Russia's War and Intelligence Operations The shadow fleet finances Russia's war effort to a significant degree. Russian military personnel embedded aboard shadow fleet vessels serve to: Ensure operational security and optimize sanctions evasion efficiency. Gather intelligence on European enforcement capabilities. Pre-position personnel for future sabotage or attack operations. Coordinate with other Russian intelligence and military assets. This means allowing shadow fleet operations with impunity directly finances Russia's continued military operations in Ukraine and preparations for potential NATO conflicts. For Critical Energy and Telecommunications Infrastructure Operators Intelligence Collection Targeting Facilitie s Russian military personnel aboard shadow fleet vessels have been systematically photographing: Port infrastructure and facility layouts at critical energy terminals. Pilot procedures and maritime traffic management systems. Security protocols and vulnerability gaps. Undersea cable landing station approaches and infrastructure. This intelligence will directly inform Russia's sabotage and target development planning. Given Russia's demonstrated interest in undersea cable targeting (YANTAR operations, GUGI capabilities, Baltic Sea cable incidents, etc.), the collection of North Sea port and cable facility intelligence suggests preparation for future attacks. Operational Vulnerability from Drone and Maritime Coordination The documented pattern of: Armed personnel aboard vessels gathering infrastructure intelligence. Concurrent drone sightings near military and critical facilities across European territory. Demonstrated Russian capability to launch drone operations from European-based recruits (via Telegram) or maritime platforms. Russian military protection of shadow fleet vessels via fighter jets and naval assets. These identified indicators can act as advanced warnings for several stakeholders. This activity suggests Russia is preparing for coordinated attacks combining maritime-based sabotage with drone strikes on land-based infrastructure. For North Sea operators, this means a single infrastructure disruption event could be accompanied by drone attacks on backup systems, power distribution, or personnel. Threat from Amphibious Drone Operations Originating from Shadow Fleet Vessels The legal ambiguity surrounding vessels' freedom of navigation in EEZs creates an operational vulnerability: shadow fleet vessels can position themselves near critical infrastructure, disable AIS beacons, and launch drone operations into European territory with minimal risk of immediate interception. Key factors enabling this threat: Drone range: Commercial and military-grade drones have varying ranges, with many being able to fly over 12Nm (22km), allowing launch from offshore vessels to target facilities kilometres inland. Unverified cargo: Many ships' cargoes are not checked when transiting from Russian ports through European waters, meaning vessels could carry drone systems, explosives, other materiel without detection. Vessel ID/ownership opacity: Opaque ownership and management structures make assignment of responsibility extremely difficult. AIS spoofing/shutdown: Shadow fleet vessels often disable tracking systems (AIS; Automatic Identification System) and operate more covertly while positioning for operations. The vessel can also have its position artificially altered, showing it in a location where it currently is not. Legal ambiguity: Foreign vessels enjoy freedom of navigation in EEZs, making it difficult to legally challenge their presence even when armed personnel are visible. Coordination with Land-Based Russian Recruitment Networks Russia maintains networks across European territory of individuals motivated by financial needs ("useful idiots") recruited via social media and messaging platforms (Telegram) to conduct drone reconnaissance of sensitive sites. The October 2025 timing, when Putin laughingly stated he would not send drones into Europe, immediately followed by drone sightings over German military installations, suggests deliberate coordination between: Maritime-based personnel and platforms (shadow fleet vessels). Land-based reconnaissance networks (recruited European operatives). Russian intelligence services coordinating operations. This means attacks on North Sea critical infrastructure could be preceded by drone reconnaissance conducted by European-based operatives, with targeting data shared with Russian military and maritime assets, enabling coordinated strike planning. Cascading Failure Risk in North Sea Region The interdependence of North Sea critical infrastructure means: Disruption to undersea cables affects communications, energy control systems, and financial networks simultaneously. Power system disruption affects port operations, LNG terminals, and offshore platform operations. Port disruption affects energy exports, maritime commerce, and supply chains. Coordinated disruption combining maritime sabotage with drone strikes could cascade across multiple interdependent systems. A single well-planned, coordinated attack could simultaneously disrupt energy supply, communications, maritime commerce, and financial systems across the entire North Sea region. Moreover, if these events happened on the borders of littoral nations’ EEZs, significant delay could be seen whilst nations identify who is responsible for reacting to the incident and repairing damaged assets. Conclusion Incidents taking place throughout Europe such as arson, sabotage, and cyberattacks will almost certainly continue albeit at a slower pace given that European intelligence and security agencies are becoming more aware of these tactics. However, more attention is highly likely to be placed on exploiting the power the Russian state has over a vast and murky maritime fleet that allows it to navigate and evade the rigidity and slow bureaucratic nature of Western authorities’ responses. The documented presence of armed Russian military personnel aboard shadow fleet vessels transiting North Sea waters represents an immediate and evolving threat to the security, sovereignty, and critical infrastructure of North Sea littoral states. This threat operates in coordination with drone reconnaissance operations across European territory, Russian military escort of shadow fleet vessels, and preparation for potential coordinated hybrid attacks on critical energy and telecommunications infrastructure. The North Sea region is uniquely vulnerable due to: Concentration of critical undersea cables and energy infrastructure. Geographic interdependence creates cascading failure risks. Legal ambiguity surrounding military activity in EEZs. Fragmented European response mechanisms. Russia's demonstrated operational skill and willingness to escalate. However, North Sea littoral states possess legal, operational, and strategic tools to respond decisively if political will exists. UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), MARPOL (The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships), SOLAS (The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea), and national maritime laws provide authority to board, inspect, detain, and exclude shadow fleet vessels. NATO coordination enables unified threat response. Critical infrastructure operator participation enables security hardening and redundancy. The narrow window of opportunity to establish effective enforcement and deterrence will close if Russia successfully integrates the shadow fleet as a routine presence in European waters. Acting decisively now is essential to defend North Sea sovereignty and critical infrastructure. Failure to act decisively can signal to Russia that shadow fleet armed personnel operations can continue with impunity, likely encouraging further escalation and increasing the risk of major incidents affecting European energy security, communications infrastructure, and maritime commerce.

Date:  02/12/2025  (11:30 UTC+01:00) Where?  Tanzania: Dar es Salaam, Arusha, Mwanza, Dodoma (and possibly more cities) What happened?  Recently, it was announced that Tanzania will cancel its celebration for its 64th Independence Day, held on  09/12/2025 . The official reason is that the money for the festivities is needed to rebuild infrastructure damaged during the post-election protests that swept the nation in early November. The decision appears to have deeper political motivations beyond the stated budgetary concerns. Significant national anniversaries often serve as catalysts for political activism and civil resistance movements. This pattern was evident during Kenya's Saba Saba  (July 7th) protests  earlier this year, during which a historic commemoration date became a focal point for mass demonstrations.   A similar scenario is plausible in Tanzania, which continues to grapple with the aftermath of severe post-election violence . Following widespread protests against President Samia Suluhu Hassan's electoral victory - widely viewed as fraudulent - security forces responded with lethal force. According to some estimates, hundreds of people were killed during the unrest. A trusted internal source indicates that the government plans to impose a new curfew beginning on 5 December,  lasting for roughly five days, coinciding with a planned internet shutdown aimed at inhibiting coordination of Independence Day demonstrations. Given the government’s demonstrated willingness to use force to pre-empt political mobilization and its extensive reliance on internet disruption and curfews during the post-election unrest, such measures should be considered a credible scenario. Building on that,  authorities are also likely to deploy significant security forces to key arteries, junctions, and protest hotspots , including Morogoro Road, city-centre districts, and approaches to Julius Nyerere International Airport (DAR/HTDA) beginning several days before 9 December. Due to the expected heavy security presence, large-scale protests in Tanzania’s cities are considered unlikely, as the police will move quickly to disperse crowds and use force if necessary. The possibility of widespread unrest across multiple districts, accompanied by multi-day communication disruptions, is less likely but remains a credible scenario given the intensity of public anger and the government’s sensitivity to international scrutiny. For staff residing in Dar es Salaam, Arusha, Mwanza, and Dodoma, the most significant risks between 5–10 December will stem from transit disruptions, disproportionate security responses, short-notice curfews, and loss of communication capability . Keep into account that stocks in supermarkets and other shops might run out; keep an emergency supply  of food and water available. Don't save photos or videos of the recent violence in Tanzania, as it may be considered a criminal offence For more information, contact Dyami at info@dyami.services