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Part 1: The far-right* As Belgium confronts growing social unrest and protest movements, the risk posed by right-wing radicalization has quietly ascended into a more prominent security dimension. Where Part 1 of this series explored the radical left, the Belgian State Security Service (VSSE) since 2024 monitors an estimated 64 individuals linked to far-right extremist networks versus just 14 for the left, underscoring a notable shift in focus. The Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (OCAD/OCAM)’s 2024 annual report confirms this trend, identifying far-right extremism as the most dynamic form of domestic radicalization over the past two years, particularly among younger demographics active online. The contemporary far-right threat is less about large hierarchical organizations than about agile, online-driven micro-networks targeting youth, mainstream institutions, and protest environments. Its relevance to the Belgian security landscape lies in its ability to exploit moments of disruption—general strikes, infrastructure vulnerability, ideological flashpoints—to inject violent or confrontational elements into otherwise legitimate civic action. This complicates the response, reducing warning time and amplifying downstream risk to critical infrastructure, public order, and democratic resilience. Copyright HLN.be Right-wing radicalization in Belgium is best understood as a diffuse, digitally enabled ecosystem rather than a set of tightly structured organizations. Recruitment and ideological reinforcement occur primarily online; across closed-channel messaging apps, fringe forums, algorithmic video platforms, and increasingly within the manosphere, an international online subculture that fuses misogyny, anti-feminism, and male-grievance narratives with broader conspiratorial and nationalist ideas. This ecosystem, while global in origin, has begun to gain ground among Belgian audiences, particularly younger men who encounter such content on mainstream platforms before being exposed to far-right framings of identity, victimhood, and social decline. Within these digital spaces, conspiratorial rhetoric blends with more familiar motifs of ethno-nationalism, anti-immigration sentiment, and anti-Islam animus—discourses that resonate with populist messaging from Vlaams Belang , Belgium’s primary far-right political party, and social-media influencers. The Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (OCAD/OCAM)’s 2024 analysis highlights that this ideological landscape is reinforced by transnational narratives circulating through European far-right online networks, notably those focusing on the “Great Replacement” theory and anti-globalist conspiracies. Belgian extremist channels increasingly borrow rhetoric from French, Dutch, and German counterparts, revealing a regional digital ecosystem where linguistic proximity accelerates radical content diffusion. Collectively, these environments lower entry barriers for youth, normalize transgressive discourse, and provide low-risk on-ramps—through memes, irony, and “edgy” humor—that can harden into grievances. Compared to the classic cell model, the contemporary Belgian pattern tilts toward loosely connected micro-clusters and self-radicalizing individuals who share symbols and talking points but rarely exhibit sustained command-and-control. Offline expression tends to be opportunistic and event-driven. Right-wing actors piggyback on broader moments of social tension (mass protests, polarizing policy debates, or high-salience crimes) to stage presence, recruit, or provoke confrontations. Their favored activities include targeted harassment, vandalism against symbolic sites, and counter-demonstrations where antagonism with left-wing groups can escalate quickly. While Belgium has not seen regular complex, coordinated far-right plots, OCAD/OCAM notes a rise in violent rhetoric and hate-motivated incidents, including small-scale arson and threats against journalists and politicians. The combination of youthful profiles, online incitement, and porous boundaries between internet narratives and street action sustains a non-trivial risk of spontaneous violence. The 2011 Anders Breivik attack in Norway remains a reference point for European intelligence services—a case in which a lone actor, radicalized through online echo chambers and ideological manifestos, translated digital grievance into mass violence. Similar dynamics, albeit on a smaller scale, represent the most plausible severe-harm pathway in Belgium, particularly where personal grievance, notoriety-seeking, and accessible targets intersect. Analyst’s Note:   Both OCAD/OCAM 2024 and the VSSE’s strategic assessments explicitly incorporate “lone-actor ideology risk” into Belgium’s current threat model. OCAD/OCAM classifies the far-right threat as “moderate but evolving,” warning that online-to-offline radicalization has accelerated since 2022. Belgian authorities regard this hybrid of digital grievance, ideological isolation, and performative violence as the most difficult threat vector to detect. Counter-radicalization efforts now emphasize early detection through school and community networks, enhanced cyber-monitoring, and targeted digital-literacy campaigns for youth. This is a shift OCAD/OCAM frames as “preventive resilience.” Ideologically, Belgian right-wing extremism draws from a transnational repertoire but is refracted through local concerns. Economic strain, immigration, and distrust in “the establishment” (government, media, academia) are common accelerants. Narrative frames often depict mainstream institutions as corrupt, positioning “defensive” action as a moral imperative. This framing widens the target set beyond minorities or asylum infrastructure to include journalists, officials, and civic venues associated with pluralism. The visibility of Vlaams Belang ’s anti-immigration rhetoric and nationalist-identity discourses contribute to mainstreaming exclusionary ideas, creating interpretive overlap that more radical actors can exploit. OCAD/OCAM notes that this mainstreaming effect—where extremist tropes are echoed in legitimate political discourse—acts as an “amplifier” of grievance culture, complicating early-intervention thresholds and enforcement boundaries. From a security perspective, the principal vulnerabilities arise at convergence points: large demonstrations, charged court cases, memorial dates, and locations that confer symbolic value. These are settings where small numbers can create outsized disruption, where anonymity in crowds masks intent, and where hostile-counter-hostile dynamics increase the probability of rapid escalation. OCAD/OCAM’s 2024 threat matrix explicitly identifies critical-infrastructure protests, refugee reception sites, and media facilities as potential flashpoints for far-right mobilization. The online-to-offline pipeline is also shortening; calls to action may coalesce within hours, leaving limited lead time for preventive measures unless digital indicators are actively monitored. Predicted Future Security Issues Early-warning indicators in the Belgian context include spikes in local propaganda (e.g., content tied to a specific municipality, school, or official), cross-posting of “event packs” (graphics, chants, route maps) from transnational channels into Belgian groups, sudden growth in newly created chats that cluster around a single grievance, and the appearance of doxxing materials targeting individuals. Among youth, abrupt shifts toward dehumanizing language, fixation on martyr narratives, or interest in weapons and/or violence topics can signal radicalization. Because much activity is ephemeral in encrypted spaces, effective detection depends more on pattern recognition across multiple weak signals. Looking ahead, the near-term outlook is for continued online mobilization with street-level episodes, rather than a steady campaign of organized violence. The risk profile is asymmetric: most content remains performative, but a small subset will translate rhetoric into action, particularly when catalyzed by specific events. OCAD/OCAM anticipates that election cycles, austerity debates, and migration policy disputes will serve as short-term accelerants of polarization for the remainder of 2025. Mitigations with the highest return are those that shorten the sensor-to-response loop in the digital domain (timely detection of Belgium-specific mobilization cues), strengthen de-escalation capacity at mixed-ideology gatherings, and expand youth-focused prevention that treats online culture as the operational environment, not a peripheral concern. Coordination between police, local authorities, schools, and social services improves the odds of intercepting at-risk individuals before grievance hardens into intent. In summary, right-wing radicalization in Belgium is characterized by fluid networks, youth exposure, and opportunistic offline expression. It is less about hierarchical organizations than about a narrative ecosystem that periodically condenses into action. Threats will likely manifest as low- to mid-level violence, targeted intimidation, and protest-adjacent disorder, with lone-actor harm as a low-probability but high-impact tail risk. Effective posture balances proportionate security measures, digital situational awareness, and community-level prevention—aimed not only at deterring incidents but also at narrowing the pool of individuals for whom radical narratives become operational. *This article is part one of a two-part series on radicalization and security within left- and right-wing leaning groups.

Part 1: The left-wing dynamic* In October 2025, Belgium experienced nationwide protests against proposed austerity measures by Prime Minister Bart De Wever’s government. While most demonstrations were peaceful, a subset of radical left-wing groups engaged in violent acts such as vandalism, clashes with police, and property damage. These events are part of a broader cycle of unrest, as major trade unions — ABVV/FGTB, ACV/CSC, and ACLVB/CGSLB — have already announced three additional strike days on 24, 25, and 26 November 2025. The upcoming strikes will successively involve railway workers, public-sector employees, and culminate in a nationwide general strike, targeting the government’s austerity and pension reforms. Authorities fear that these actions, coinciding with ongoing social tension, could once again attract radical groups and trigger new outbreaks of violence. © Kristof Vadino - https://kristofvadino.com/   While the majority of the October demonstrations were organized by trade unions and remained largely peaceful, a subset of radical elements reportedly engaged in violent acts during the protests. Groups were observed among the protesters and initiated violent actions, including vandalizing buildings and clashing with police forces. For instance, near Pacheco Boulevard, a splinter group threw projectiles, paint bombs, and fireworks at a federal migration services building, causing damage and small fires. The Brussels public prosecutor’s office charged five individuals in connection with these incidents, including charges of criminal association and vandalism. Authorities noted that these individuals wore masks and blended into the larger crowd to avoid identification. The unrest occurred amid widespread opposition to the government’s proposed reforms, which include raising the retirement age, freezing wage indexation, and reducing early retirement options. These measures have been criticized for potentially undermining Belgium’s social welfare system. While major unions led the protests, several political figures, such as Defense Minister Theo Francken, condemned the violent actions by radical elements, labeling them as “extreme left-wing Antifa thugs” and calling for stronger police responses. The involvement of radical left-wing groups in recent protests highlights the complex dynamics of Belgium’s current social and political landscape. While most demonstrators sought to express opposition peacefully, the actions of a small minority have raised concerns about possible escalation during future protests, including the planned November strikes. The recent riots, particularly those on October 14, 2025, have been linked to several left-wing groups with a history of direct action and anti-capitalist activism. Members of Antifa reportedly participated in riots, engaging in acts of vandalism and clashes with police. Code Rood, a climate activist collective, staged a separate protest on October 11, 2025, blocking the entrance to a steel factory in Charleroi to protest alleged arms-related steel exports to Israel. Stop Arming Israel Belgium also joined the October 11 protest, emphasizing its opposition to Belgian arms exports to conflict zones. Authorities have since arrested individuals linked to the incidents and called for increased security measures during future demonstrations. In drawing links between these recent events and the historic Cellules Communistes Combattantes (CCC), several ideological and tactical parallels emerge. The CCC, active in the early 1980s, carried out bombings targeting NATO, U.S., and Belgian institutions, motivated by anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist ideology. Both the CCC and modern radical left-wing groups share these ideological foundations and a willingness to use direct action. The protests against austerity, multinational corporations, and military support to Israel reflect similar opposition to perceived capitalism and imperialism. However, critical differences remain: the CCC was a clandestine terror organization capable of executing coordinated bombings, whereas today’s groups are loosely organized, relying on spontaneous violence within protest movements rather than premeditated terror campaigns. The CCC’s actions were strategically targeted at state and military symbols, while modern incidents primarily involve opportunistic vandalism of government and corporate property. As of October 2025, there is no direct organizational link between the historic CCC and the radical groups active in Belgium today. Nonetheless, former CCC member Bertrand Sassoye remains an influential figure in the far-left scene, serving as an ideological reference point for some younger activists. He continues to advocate for revolutionary anti-capitalism and has participated in events and discussions that bridge generational divides within Belgium’s radical left. This connection underscores how historic extremist ideologies can persist through influence and discourse rather than organizational structure. In parallel, Belgium faces a growing threat from right-wing extremism. The VSSE (State Security Service) currently monitors approximately 64 individuals linked to far-right radical networks, compared to 14 linked to left-wing extremism. Right-wing radicalization is increasingly taking place online, targeting youth through hate-based propaganda and nationalist narratives. Authorities are concerned that the simultaneous rise of both left- and right-wing extremism may result in ideological confrontations, particularly during major public demonstrations. This topic will be explored in part two of this series. Predicted Future Security Issues Belgium is likely to continue experiencing localized security incidents during large-scale protests, driven by radical left-wing groups. While coordinated terrorist activity remains unlikely, future risks include property damage, targeted direct actions, and street-level confrontations. The ideological influence of figures like Bertrand Sassoye could encourage more confrontational tactics among younger activists. Authorities should maintain enhanced monitoring of radical networks and prepare for potential escalation during the November 2025 strikes. Separately, the Belgian government’s military deployment plans in Brussels, initiated by Defense Minister Theo Francken, are primarily focused on addressing drug-related violence rather than the recent protests. However, these deployments may indirectly strengthen the city’s preparedness for unrest. Security Concerns at Zaventem and Charleroi Airports Amidst National Unrest The nationwide general strike on October 14, 2025, led to significant disruptions at Belgium's major airports. At Brussels Airport in Zaventem, all departing flights were canceled due to a walkout by security staff, while Charleroi Airport, a hub for Ryanair, also ceased operations entirely. This widespread disruption affected approximately 120 flights, including around 72 between Belgium and the UK, impacting nearly 13,000 passengers. These events underscore the vulnerability of critical infrastructure to labor actions and public unrest. The proximity of these airports to Brussels, where protests and riots have been concentrated, raises concerns about potential spillover effects. While there is no direct evidence linking the airport disruptions to the protests, the simultaneous occurrence highlights the interconnectedness of public sector labor actions and urban unrest. Looking ahead, authorities may need to consider enhanced security measures at transportation hubs to mitigate the risk of further disruptions. This could include increased coordination between airport security, local law enforcement, and intelligence agencies to monitor and respond to potential threats stemming from the ongoing social unrest. *This article is part one of a two-part series on radicalization and security within left- and right-wing leaning groups.

Summary Global supply chains for rare earth elements (REE) are under significant strain due to China’s export controls, geopolitical conflicts and rising demand for green technologies. The US and EU are accelerating efforts to diversify supply, increase domestic production, and boost recycling, but face challenges in meeting ambitious targets. Market volatility and regulatory uncertainty continue to impact manufacturers and downstream industries. Recent developments The Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) recently announced new export restrictions ahead of a planned meeting between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Both nations have been engaged in trade negotiations to ease tensions following a series of reciprocal tariffs earlier this year, some of which were later reduced. REE remain a significant point of leverage for China in its dealings with the US. In its “announcement No. 61 of 2025,” China revealed it would expand export controls to include five additional REE—holmium, erbium, thulium, europium, and ytterbium—on top of the seven elements already restricted since April. These additional elements are especially critical in the production of dual-use (military-civilian) technology, ranging from wind turbines to fighter jets. To put the new export rules in perspective: of the 17 REE, China now restricts exports of 12. The new measures also cover specialized equipment used for refining REE. Most of these rules will take effect on December 1. Under the new policy, foreign and domestic companies must secure special approval from Beijing to export rare-earth magnets and certain semiconductor materials containing at least 0.1% heavy REE (HREE), a specific group of elements with higher atomic numbers within the REE grouping. China’s dominance in the rare-earth sector has long been a concern for the US and other countries, but worries intensified after Beijing’s export controls in April. Those earlier restrictions affected the supply of samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium, requiring export licenses for companies shipping these materials and finished products abroad. This announcement followed similar controls imposed in February on certain elements, including tungsten and bismuth. The US increased domestic rare earth production to 45,000 metric tons in 2024 but still relies heavily on imports for refined materials and magnets. Recent US tariffs on Chinese goods and federal investments aim to build a more resilient supply chain, but progress is slow. The EU enacted the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) in May 2024, setting targets to mine 10%, process 40% and recycle 25% of its annual needs by 2030. It also launched 47 different projects to diversify supply and reduce dependency on specific countries. The CRMA encourages circularity, strategic reserves, and joint purchasing mechanisms to protect the EU from future supply shocks. The global demand for REE is rising, driven by the shift toward renewable energy and electric vehicles. According to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), investment in renewable energy must triple to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. By 2030, the energy transition will require three times more copper, lithium, nickel, cobalt, and other materials compared to current levels. To meet these net-zero targets, an additional 50 lithium mines, 60 nickel mines, and 17 cobalt mines will need to be opened. Rare earth elements in current conflict zones Ukraine Ukraine possesses significant deposits of REE, accounting for approximately 5% of the world’s reserves, even though the country covers only 0.4% of the Earth’s surface. These materials—including lithium, cobalt, scandium, graphite, tantalum, and niobium—are essential for manufacturing devices used in green energy technologies. However, access to these resources is currently affected by ongoing conflict, making their development both challenging and crucial for Ukraine and its international partners. Key resource sites, such as Kruta Balka in Donetsk and Shevchenkivske in Zaporizhzhia, are currently under Russian occupation. Myanmar Myanmar's Kachin State, rich in REE like dysprosium and terbium, has become a focal point of conflict. Since the 2021 military coup, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), an ethnic armed group, has taken control of key mining areas, including Chipwi and Pang War. These regions have seen a surge in mining activities, with over 370 active sites by the end of 2024. The KIA then closed all but about 10 of the REM mining sites again in October 2024. However, the rapid expansion of mining operations has led to severe environmental degradation, including deforestation and river pollution, impacting local communities and ecosystems. Additionally, the KIA had implemented taxation on mining activities, further complicating the region's economic and political landscape. REE are reportedly being smuggled into China through unofficial routes now. Madagascar In Madagascar, the Steenkampskraal and Ampasindava sites are rich in heavy REE such as neodymium and dysprosium, elements essential for magnets in renewable energy technologies and electronics. Despite the economic potential, local communities have repeatedly protested mining operations. Their concerns focus on deforestation, water contamination, and the displacement of farmland, with several projects experiencing delays or legal challenges due to disputes over land rights and environmental protection. This tension exemplifies how local resistance can effectively shape the trajectory of resource extraction in resource-rich but economically vulnerable regions. Greenland Similarly, Greenland has emerged as a point of contention over its Kvanefjeld project, which contains large deposits of REE, alongside uranium, although the project remains undeveloped. Nevertheless, indigenous Inuit communities and environmental groups have voiced strong opposition to the mining project, highlighting the risks associated with both radioactive waste as well as the extraction of REE, which carry high environmental and health risks and would disrupt the traditional livelihood of Inuit communities. The Greenlandic government faces the delicate challenge of balancing economic development and international investment interests against environmental safety and indigenous rights. Brazil In Brazil, the Minas Gerais region, particularly around Araxá, is home to niobium and rare earth deposits. Mining in these areas has provoked concerns among local populations and environmental organizations over tailings contamination, deforestation, and water pollution. Legal disputes and community protests have slowed some projects, illustrating the persistent tension between resource extraction and environmental stewardship in countries with comparatively strong legal frameworks and active civic engagement. Vietnam Vietnam has also experienced localized disputes in regions such as Lai Chau and Lam Dong, where deposits of monazite and bastnäsite are present. Farmers and indigenous groups in these areas have resisted mining operations due to fears of environmental degradation and the loss of agricultural land, which highlights the recurring theme of conflicts between mining interests and local livelihoods in emerging economies. DRC In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the rare earth issue is intertwined with broader conflicts over cobalt and other valuable elements. While cobalt dominates the discourse, some REE occur alongside these deposits. In certain regions, artisanal miners and armed groups exploit these resources, fueling low-intensity conflicts, human rights abuses, and environmental harm. The informal and sometimes illicit nature of this extraction complicates governance and exacerbates local instability. Looking ahead Between 2025 and 2030, REE supply chains are expected to be shaped by several major geopolitical and economic conflicts. The rivalry between the US and China is intensifying, with China’s broad export controls on REE and related technologies, and the US imposing tariffs as high as 130% on selected Chinese imports. These actions have escalated trade tensions and are increasingly used as strategic tools, especially targeting defense supply chains and advanced manufacturing. As a result, US and NATO defense industries, which depend on Chinese-origin REE for critical systems like fighter jets and missiles, face significant supply bottlenecks. China’s new licensing rules now specifically block exports to foreign militaries, raising the risk of direct disruptions in future crises. NATO countries are trying to boost domestic production and stockpiling, but full independence from foreign sources remains years away. The US is also pressuring allies such as Ukraine and Australia for access to alternative supplies, sometimes linking security guarantees to mineral deals. In Europe, tensions with China are also high. The EU remains heavily dependent on China for REE imports, with some elements sourced almost exclusively from Chinese suppliers. China’s export controls have already caused production delays in European industries, particularly in automotive and green technology sectors. In response, the EU is working with the US and G7 to counter China’s restrictions through joint projects and efforts to diversify supply chains. However, progress is slow, and the risk of future supply shocks remains significant. Delays in rare earth supply threaten the EU’s climate and energy goals, and could spark internal disputes over resource allocation and industrial priorities. Ukraine and Eastern Europe present another flashpoint. Ukraine’s large reserves of REE have recently become a point of contention with Trump’s return to the White House. Control over these resources is likely to remain contentious, with Russia seeking to retain occupied, resource-rich territories. The US and EU have offered mineral deals with Ukraine, with the US even trying to coerce Ukraine into allowing resource access in exchange for military aid. However, most deposits are located in conflict zones, and extraction is limited by war and infrastructure damage, creating a high-risk, low-reward scenario for Western supply chains. As global competition intensifies, resource-rich regions like Ukraine could see renewed or prolonged conflict, driven by the strategic value of elements rather than purely territorial disputes. Asia and Africa are emerging as new frontiers, but also new sources of risk. China continues to dominate mining and processing in Asia and is expanding its influence in Africa and Central Asia through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and bilateral deals. This increases the risk of “resource diplomacy” turning into economic coercion or proxy conflicts. Countries such as Burundi, Myanmar, and Vietnam are ramping up production, but face political instability, weak governance, and the risk of foreign intervention. Africa’s mineral wealth is central to future supply chain battles, with both China and the West vying for control. Rapid expansion of mining in fragile regions could trigger local conflicts over land, water, and pollution, further complicating global supply chains. Finally, the Arctic and Greenland are becoming new arenas for competition. The US, EU, UK, and China are all seeking access to Greenland’s REE, but environmental and indigenous rights concerns add complexity. As the Arctic melts, new resource frontiers are opening up, but so are new geopolitical tensions. Conclusion In summary, the next decade will likely see resource conflicts shift from traditional military confrontations to economic, technological, and proxy battles over supply chain control. Rare earths and strategic elements are now central to national security, green transitions, and global power dynamics, with regions like Ukraine, Africa, and even the Arctic at increased risk for future conflict, while US–China and EU–China tensions continue to drive global supply chain instability.

Report date: 14 October 2025 (17:00 hours UTC+2) Executive summary Recent military activity by the United States and Venezuela in the southern Caribbean increases exposure for civilian airliners and merchant ships to short-notice airspace and sea-lane restrictions, re-routing and delays. Night-time reconnaissance patterns in the southern Puerto Rico FIR, added airlift and refuelling flights, and exercises near busy approaches raise the chance of misidentification, especially in low visibility or during degraded communications. Electronic interference, such as GPS disruption, radar clutter or radio degradation, could complicate navigation, air traffic control co-ordination and collision avoidance. Concentration of Venezuelan movements in the north, alongside US units operating outside the Venezuelan EEZ, may create congested diversion paths, tighter logistics for energy supply, crew duty pressures and higher insurance and operational costs. Overall, the operating environment for civil traffic is more fluid and carries a higher risk of inadvertent spillover from military actions. Current situation  While political tensions between Venezuela and the United States date to Hugo Chavez’s rise in 1999 and continued under Nicolás Maduro Moros after 2013, recent months show a sharper US political rhetoric and subsequent militarisation of the southern Caribbean as political goals of the US translate into military pressure. President Trump appears to be sustaining a maximum-pressure approach linking Venezuela to organised crime and terrorism, namely the Tren de Aragua cartel, designated as an International Terrorist Organisation (ITO) in February of this year. The cartel was sanctioned in July, and referred to Venezuela’s current president Nicolas Maduro as its leader. A month later, in August, the US Secretary of State officially referred to Maduro as a “fugitive from American justice,” increasing a bounty on him from $25 million placed in January to $50 million. The same month, the US armed forces were authorised to use military force against drug-trafficking boats and deployed around seven warships and a submarine to the Southern Caribbean, targeting the first reported Venezuelan narco trafficking boat in or near Venezuela’s exclusive economic zone on 02 September, killing 11. US policy on Venezuela has evolved across administrations, from designating the country as a national security concern under Obama, with sanctions placed on senior officials during both the Chávez and Maduro governments, to the current developments under the Trump administration.   Parallel to the new US posture, in  September, President Maduro responded  with a rare press conference in which he alleged the US was seeking regime-change, among concerns of US officials meeting several Venezuelan opposition leaders months before. He also stated that “Venezuela’s military is super prepared,” warning that any US attack would trigger armed resistance and mobilisation. In September, Venezuela then mirrored the late August-to-September US amphibious assault exercises in Puerto Rico with exercises on La Orchila and Patos islands, deployed over 25,000 personnel across multiple areas, mobilised and trained militia units, and placed its aerospace forces on high alert on 3 October after five F-35 aircraft reportedly came within 70 km of their coastline the previous day.  Both the US and Venezuela have stepped up not only rhetoric against each other, but have deployed numerous military assets in what appears to be an unprecedented militarisation of the south Caribbean region. In this context, not only are the two countries subjected to threats and risks from each other, but civilian airliners and maritime vessels using Venezuela’s flight information region (FIR) and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) are at increased risk when operating in the region due to the possibility of accidental targeting, be it through missiles or non-kinetic radio frequency, GPS or radar  jamming, or other electronically-disruptive measures.  Beyond politics, long-term causes for tensions  Beyond political rhetoric, underlying factors for US-Venezuela tensions may be found in the energy security dynamics and a more robust foreign policy projection by the Trump administration, expected to last throughout his presidential term. In 2019, about 41% of Venezuelan crude exports went to the United States but by 2023 this had fallen to 23%, while China’s share rose from 25% to approximately 69%. Over six years, exports to the United States were cut in half and exports to China almost tripled, showing China’s growing influence on an energy security partner who, even during Hugo Chavez’s time, did not significantly modify energy exports to the US.  Even with the US administration’s decision in July 2025 to renew Chevron’s licence for limited operations, American investment and activity remain constrained, with Venezuela constituting the only OPEC member in the western hemisphere linking part of its energy policies to a non-regional organisation.  Immediately adjacent to Venezuela, strategic US interests have appeared in Guyana, linked in the energy security sector. Around €12.3 billion US direct investments have flowed instead into neighbouring Guyana between 2020 and 2024. Between 2015 and 2019, roughly 96% of total foreign direct investment in that period came from the US aimed at developing significant offshore discoveries leading to first production of oil in the country in 2019. Washington is also strengthening its military posture; at Guyana’s presidential inauguration on 8 September the US Embassy in Georgetown reaffirmed support for the country’s defence, signalling beyond counter-narcotics to backing Guyana in its decades-long dispute with Venezuela over the Essequiba, particularly after renewed claims by the Venezuelan leadership in 2023.  The current increase in US pressure on Venezuela may aim to quell the Venezuelan claims on Guyana, reassert US influence in former Monroe Doctrine areas during a reformulation of the US military-foreign policy doctrine under the current administration, protect US energy interests and leave open the possibility of regime change in Caracas to a more regionally-integrated government. Additionally, US interests in safeguarding energy security have seen it competing with China in an area traditionally under its geopolitical sphere of influence, as Beijing increases its reach and presence in Latin America to include not only trade deals, but police training programmes and other security-related cooperation. Similar ties also include Venezuela, pursuing mutually exclusive interests with the US for over two decades.  Growing militarisation of the southern Caribbean?  Significant US naval deployments to the Caribbean Sea have historically been rare and short-lived. However, since August 2025 at least ten US naval vessels have operated in the region, presumably outside but in areas bordering Venezuela’s EEZ. The build-up heightens risks to civilian aircraft and merchant shipping, as both sides possess capabilities that could prompt airspace and sea-lane closures and raise the chance of misidentification or accidental targeting. Military flight activity has also increased, particularly night-time reconnaissance patterns in the southern Puerto Rico flight information region (FIR) and additional airlift and refuelling flights by the US military, while most Venezuelan movements remain concentrated in the north of the country. Overall, the regional posture suggests an elevated risk environment in which routine civil traffic could be disrupted with little warning. Military presence in the southern Caribbean Sea: Deployments, patrols and operations Significant United States naval deployments to the Caribbean Sea are not common, as the perceived threat level to the United States in the area does not warrant such operations. Since 2017, deployments in the area have typically involved single-ship missions for storm or earthquake relief or military exercises, excluding simple transits through the region between home ports or other overseas deployments. Previous deployments of United States naval assets in the Caribbean Sea, before the current one, have included the following: April 2024: Aircraft carrier USS George Washington, guided-missile destroyer USS Porter  and the USNS John Lenthall  replenishment ship deployed only temporarily in the area for the Southern Seas 2024 exercises during which they circumnavigated the South American continent.  August 2021 : USS Arlington , LHD deployed for earthquake relief to Haiti. October 2020 : USS Gerald Ford deployed off the coast of Florida for test and trials ahead of deployment. July 2020 : Landing helicopter assault ship USS Tripoli sails through Caribbean to get to home port in San Diego, no military operations. October 2018 : USNS Comfort , a hospital ship present in the Caribbean en route to Honduras to support US Southern Command’s operations such as the Enduring Promise initiative to boost partnership, not related to direct military operations. September - October 2017 : Aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman Amphibious assault ships USS Wasp  and USS Kearsarge , as well as the dock landing ship USS Oak Hill  deployed to areas between Dominica and Puerto Rico to provide humanitarian relief to areas affected by hurricanes Irma and Maria. USS Iwo Jima and USS New York also deployed with the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit.  Beginning in August 2025, the United States deployed at least ten naval vessels in the southern Caribbean, according to publicly-available information.  This development appears to be unprecedented since Operation Just Cause in Panama between 1989 and 1990 and the 1983 intervention in Grenada. There is no evidence to suggest that any United States naval ships are operating within the Venezuelan Exclusive Economic Zone, as all official reports indicate their positions have placed them outside that area. Current United States deployments in the Caribbean include the following warships: USS San Antonio:  Amphibious transport dock vessel, berthed at Ponce, Puerto Rico, as of 6 October. USS Fort Lauderdale:  An amphibious transport dock, part of the Amphibious Ready Group, operating in an undisclosed area south of Puerto Rico as of 6 October. USS Iwo Jima:  Landing helicopter dock, last reported at St Thomas, United States Virgin Islands, during a port visit; capable of carrying at least three CH-53E, ten MH-60S and fourteen MH-60R helicopters. USS Jason Dunham:  Guided-missile destroyer based at Mayport Naval Station, Florida. USS Gravely:  Guided-missile destroyer based at Norfolk Naval Station, Virginia. USS Stockdale:  Guided-missile destroyer based at San Diego Naval Station, California; deployed at Ponce, Puerto Rico, as of 6 October. USS Lake Erie:  Guided-missile cruiser based at San Diego Naval Base, California; officially reported as operating in an unspecified area of the Caribbean,  unofficially reported to be off the east coast of Trinidad and Tobago as of 04 October. USS Minneapolis–Saint Paul:  Littoral combat ship located at Guantánamo Bay. MV Ocean Trader:   Merchant vessel converted into a special operations mothership, thought to have been used in military operations around the world, was unofficially reported to be off the east coast of Trinidad and Tobago as of 04 October. USS Newport News : Nuclear-powered attack submarine reportedly deployed in the Caribbean region according to media sources, unconfirmed by US official sources. Deployments of US naval assets in the Caribbean Sea as of October 2025 *Exact current locations of vessels may differ from those shown on map The growing militarisation of the southern Caribbean Sea could pose serious risks to commercial airliners and merchant vessels. While the combat readiness of US forces is generally high, their exact willingness to engage perceived adversaries, in this instance Venezuelan assets, is not publicly known. Although there have been no recorded incidents of the Venezuelan military engaging US forces, any potential confrontation would endanger not only military targets but also civilian aircraft and shipping in the area. The specific weapons fitted to US warships may vary according to mission requirements and are not always publicly disclosed, but a combination of the following systems could be employed by those currently deployed in the region: Mk 46 30 mm gun systems : Range up to 4,000  metres, used against high-speed surface targets.  Phalanx CIWS radar guided 20 mm cannon : Used against high-speed sea/surface craft, and low flying aircraft,  rate of fire 3,000 to 4,500 rounds per minute, presumed range 3,600 metres.  RIM-116 missile:  Solid-fuel supersonic surface-to-air missile known to have been used by amphibious assault (LHA, LHD) and littoral combat vessels, fired from the Rolling Airframe Missile system, infrared passive radar homing guidance (fire-and-forget), range between 9 and 16 km depending on the model.  RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile : Solid fuel surface-to-air and surface-to-surface  missiles launched through the MK 41 Vertical Launching System, range up to 50 km.  SM-2 missile : Surface-to-air missile, primary defence missile of the US navy, fired from the MK41 Vertical Launching System, command guided and semi-active radar homing, able to target at an altitude of 19,800 metres and range of between 160 and 240 km.  SM-3 missile : Surface-to-air ballistic missile used against exo-atmospheric ballistic targets, command, GPS and infrared guided, range 700 km. SM-2 missile launched from an unspecified US warship during trials unrelated to the current US-Venezuela tensions Source: Raytheon In relation to military flights between the United States and the central Caribbean, sample data from May, August, September and October indicates an increase in activity during the latter two months. According to publicly available AIS flight-tracking software, cargo aircraft were the main type to show this rise, operating between the continental United States, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands. When cross-referenced with official statements from both Venezuelan and US authorities, the following aircraft have been identified as active in the aforementioned areas: F-35 Lightning : Thought to be deployed alongside US forces in the Caribbean, possible based out of Puerto Rico. On 02 October, Venezuelan authorities reported five F-35 aircraft flying 75 km off the country’s coasts, also sighted by a civilian airliner from Avianca. The use of these is thought to be for reconnaissance purposes, although their combat capabilities may also be used for further show of force.  AV-8B Harrier II : Thought to be deployed on the USS  Iwo Jima , these aircraft briefly flew over the Guyanese capital on 07 September during the country’s presidential inauguration. Official notifications from the US embassy in the country stated that the flyover  "symbolises the US’ full solidarity with the Guyanese people” as both advance “regional security.” Suggesting the presence or willingness to deploy combat aircraft on Venezuela’s eastern flank in Guyana.  P-8 Poseidon : Used for reconnaissance, these aircraft have been tracked operating in the southern portion of the Puerto Rico FIR. Regular sorties are observed between 20:00 and 04:00 Puerto Rico time (UTC−4), with the vast majority routed towards the southern FIR boundary between Puerto Rico and Venezuela. C-17 Globemaster III : Numerous flights originating from the continental United States (e.g. El Paso, Fort Walton Beach, Charleston, Tampa and Alamogordo) to Ceiba, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands have been tracked during US military exercises at the beginning of September this year and in the first week of October. Although the cargo is more likely than not military grade, given the origin and destinations, the contents of cargo remains unidentified.  KC-130J Super Hercules : Similar to C-17 flights, KC-130 flights have been seen from areas in the continental US such as Charleston and Miami en route to Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands.  KC-135 Stratotanker : Although less frequent, at least one flight was confirmed to have departed an air base in Tampa, Florida, transited near the southern edge of the Puerto Rican FIR, then returned to base shortly before entering the Venezuelan FIR on 7 October. No other aircraft were tracked or identified in the vicinity, though the sortie likely supported an unspecified air mission in the area. KC-46 Pegasus : At least two confirmations of this air-to-air refuelling aircraft were observed, the most recent on 16 September, when it departed the US Virgin Islands, flew south towards the boundary between the Puerto Rico and Venezuelan FIRs, then dropped from public tracking roughly halfway to the latter. This pattern suggests it was supporting an air mission deeper into the Caribbean, possibly close to the Venezuelan coast. RQ-4  Global Hawk : Numerous social media reports have claimed the involvement of this aircraft type from bases in Puerto Rico, although these remain unverified. Additionally, in mid-September, Venezuela’s Ministry of Defence issued a statement suggesting that RQ-4 flights were being conducted and extended into night-time hours. While unconfirmed, the US military routinely employs these aircraft for reconnaissance in other theatres of operation. Troop presence A potential US force relevant to Venezuela is the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), reportedly embarked on the USS San Antonio after forming at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The MEU consists of Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 263 providing rapid air mobility, Combat Logistics Battalion 26 for sustainment and engineering support and a Battalion Landing Team built around 3rd Battalion 6th Marines with attached armour, fires and reconnaissance enablers. Operating from an amphibious platform, it can conduct maritime security, show-of-presence patrols, limited amphibious raids, air assault insertions, non-combatant evacuations and crisis response along littoral areas. Its presence would not confirm intent but offers a flexible and scalable option for contingencies in the wider Caribbean. Exact numbers and locations of deployments remain unspecified.  There has been no explicit and significant detection of increased US troop numbers or movements around the Caribbean beyond official reporting on the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit. Troop numbers and movements from other US bases in the region appear unchanged, with no significant indicators of a broader build-up according to publicly available information. Although US military flights to and from Colombia (Barranquilla), Costa Rica (Daniel Oduber Quiros airport), US Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico and Antigua, as well as in the airspace over Honduras and El Salvador, have been observed by AIS-based software, these movements alone do not constitute clear evidence of heightened deployments and may reflect routine patterns rather than a substantive shift in posture. Venezuelan air defence  Venezuela fields a layered combination of S-300VM, Buk-M2E, S-125 Pechora-2M systems and at least 4,000 Igla-S MANPADS that, if engaged, could complicate both civilian and military aviation around key hubs and approach corridors. Although locations and readiness remain largely unconfirmed, reported positions at Manuel Ríos, Caracas, Puerto La Cruz, Isla Margarita and La Carlota imply engagement ranges from high to low zones that raise the risk of misidentification, airspace restrictions and inadvertent engagements. BUK 2M : Official statements indicate Venezuela acquired three Buk-M2 air-defence systems in 2013, while unofficial reporting suggests the total could be as high as twelve. Given their mobility on tracked and wheeled chassis, precise deployment locations are uncertain, though sightings and analysis point to Punto Fijo, location of the country’s largest refinery with a 940,000 b/d capacity, Caracas (including La Carlota airfield as of 05 October 2025), La Orchila Island during September 2025 exercises, and movements to or from Güiria port in the east. The systems are believed to be distributed across multiple branches of the armed forces. The Buk-M2E is a radar-guided, medium-range system with an engagement range of up to 50 km.  S-125 Pechora 2M : With an approximate range of 35 km and mounted on tracked or wheeled vehicles, Venezuela acquired at least eleven of these systems in 2014. Footage from military exercises over the years shows them being tested, and they have been reported or sighted near Cúcuta (on the Colombian border), Maracay, Caracas, Puerto La Cruz and Isla Margarita, although precise deployment locations remain officially unconfirmed. S-300VM : With a range of up to 250 km, open-source geolocations indicate Venezuelan S-300VM systems at Manuel Ríos Air Base (115 km S of Caracas). Additional reports, all officially unconfirmed, place S-300 systems in Caracas (defending government sites), Puerto La Cruz (commercial port, second largest refinery, Rafael Egañez Marcano naval complex), and on Margarita Island, this latter according to an exiled admiral with limited other verifying sources. Typical S-300VM deployment would include a command post, acquisition radars, an engagement radar and interceptors, enabling high-altitude, long-range area defence and limited intercept capability. Actual Venezuelan inventory, readiness and missile loads are unverified. Igla-S MANPADS : With an approximate range of 6 km and maximum flight altitude of 11,000 km, Venezuela purchased two separate batches of 2,000 Igla MANPADS from Russia in 2010 and 2012. Their precise distribution across the country remains unclear, but units are believed to be deployed within the army, navy and air force, as well as at strategic sites such as military bases, airports, government facilities and refineries. The system has appeared frequently in footage of military exercises and is thought to have a shelf life of around ten years from the date of manufacture, although those dates are unknown. Without maintenance or life-extension work, many of these systems may be prone to misfires or malfunctions. Left to right: Venezuelan S-125 2M Pechora, BUK 2M and S-300VM anti-air defence systems Source: Alys Blanchard, FAF-Club, date of image unknown (accessed 13 October 2025) Air and Naval bases in Venezuela Venezuela has at least sixteen air bases and airports, some believed to be dual use and others dedicated to military roles. Although the status of several sites is unclear, flight tracking shows activity at a number of them. Major air bases are concentrated in the north and are thought to operate Russian-acquired Su-30s and legacy F-16s procured in the 1980s. Other air assets include C-130 transports, Chinese Shaanxi Y-8s, Mi-35 attack helicopters and Mi-17 utility helicopters, plus smaller types and up to fifteen Iranian-designed Mohajer armed UAVs acquired around 2012. Naval assets number about thirty-five and include three diesel-electric submarines, six gunboats and at least twenty patrol craft of varying tonnage based at several Caribbean ports. The exact level of readiness and crew training remains uncertain, though the systems listed have appeared in exercise footage in recent years. Air and naval bases in Venezuela known to be active at the time of writing Venezuelan military flights and naval movements are less numerous on AIS tracking software, and open-source reporting likewise offers limited detail on exact locations and assets. In parallel with an increase in US military flights in September and October this year, Venezuelan military flights, although with limited visibility in open sources, have increased by 100% based on flight samples taken from May, August, September and October. These flights mainly include east–west C-130 transport sorties and coastal tracks over the Caribbean Sea resembling reconnaissance by an unspecified low-flying, low-speed aircraft taking off from and returning to Caracas’s Francisco de Miranda Air Base. No significant north–south movements have been identified in open sources, suggesting the majority of military movements in the country remain in the northern area. US military deployments (left) and participating military hardware in the Caribe Soberano 200 snap drills (right) on Orchila Island as reported by Venezuelan authorities  Source: TeleSur Military exercises by Venezuela In response to Venezuela’s perceived threats, a series of military drills were carried out between September and October of this year. Venezuela’s true combat readiness and capabilities remain unclear and are unlikely to withstand a large-scale US incursion. If imagery shared by official and unofficial accounts is accurate, the main risks stem from inadvertent targeting of merchant vessels or civilian and military aircraft. The following outlines what was reportedly conducted. Isla de Orchila : Venezuela conducted a three-day Caribe Soberano 200 exercise on La Orchila Island, centred on the Antonio Díaz naval base, with over 2,500 personnel, 12 navy vessels (including six Lupo-class frigates, four Avante 2400 offshore patrol vessels, U-209/A-1300 diesel-electric submarines, logistics and multipurpose ships), 22 aircraft, and 20 militia peñeros. Activities included Su-30MK2 over-water flights with Kh-31 anti-ship capability, employment of armed UAVs for air defence and surveillance, Buk-M2 surface-to-air missiles, ZU-23 anti-aircraft artillery, coastal live fire, amphibious landings with armoured vehicles, air-defence drills, parachute drops, cargo airdrops, and tactical air support. Special forces conducted air, sea and land infiltration and underwater reconnaissance, while intelligence and electronic warfare units practised call interception, jamming and communications disruption. The Bolivarian Militia operated armoured vehicles and co-ordinated shipboard electronics, and the National Police supported reconnaissance tasks. Images of Venezuela’s military exercises on Isla de Patos, 10 km from Trinidad and Tobago Source: Venezuelan authorities Isla Margarita : Around 8 October, Venezuelan officials reported the start of “Operación Defensa Insular Luisa Cáceres de Arismendi 200” along Margarita Island’s coasts and adjacent waters, though participation levels remain unclear. Unconfirmed reports suggest the event was cancelled or scaled down in response to increased US military presence in the region. Prior official descriptions pointed to intensive patrols, maritime surveillance and exploration with artisanal fishing councils, plus parachute and cargo drops within integrated air–sea–land manoeuvres. A co-ordinated military–police–civil approach was highlighted for deterrence and maritime control, but the actual extent of execution remains uncertain. Isla de Patos : Footage and reports emerged that Venezuela was conducting rare live-fire exercises simulating an amphibious landing using patrol boats and anti-air exercises 10 km from Trinidad and Tobago on the northeastern end of Venezuela, with the participation of a Los Frailes class transport vessel and smaller landing craft. Zu-23 23mm anti-air cannons were observed in a video, as were what appeared to be .50 calibre guns firing on the island. Unconfirmed reports stated the event disrupted local fishing operations, although this remains unverified. Venezuela’s defence minister showing a map of the “Caribe Soberano 200“ military exercises on La Orchila island Source: TeleSur, September 2025   Threats to maritime and aviation Military presence of the two sides can be broken down into deployments, patrols and operations, each side interacting with the other in a tense environment where split-second decisions or misidentification of adversary aircraft may contribute to a serious incident.  Maritime field Accidental targeting, misidentification : Heightened alert states, non-standard interventions (missile targeting of suspected drug trafficking boats) and rapid decision cycles increase the risk that civilian craft are misidentified as hostile or narcotics carriers. Contributing factors include low visibility, AIS outages, high-speed approaches, poor radio communication and profile similarity to narcotics-laden craft. Probable outcomes range from boardings and warning shots to disabling fire, with elevated risk near exclusion perimeters, convoys and exercise boxes.    Collateral damage to nearby vessels : Exchanges of fire with suspected threats, air or surface weapon tests during exercises, as well as missile interceptions can endanger merchant vessels and small boats operating in the proximity of such events. Risks include stray rounds, fragmentation, shock effects and debris fields. Choke points or port approaches may be of particular concern during live-fire periods, air-defence alerts or when multiple forces manoeuvre in confined spaces.  Deviation due to closed maritime spaces : Short-notice activation of exclusion zones for exercises or operations, modification of patrol lines and ad hoc safety corridors can close or constrict established routes. Even with Notices to Mariners (NOTMAR), rerouting may be required with limited warning, causing schedule disruption, traffic compression, higher collision risk and pilotage challenges at primary hubs. Expect rolling adjustments to sea lanes around task groups, tanker routes and approaches to major Caribbean ports. Aviation field Accidental targeting, misidentification : Aircraft operating in or near conflict zones face a heightened risk of misidentification, where a military actor may mistake a civilian flight for a threat and engage it. This has occurred in the past, notably PS752 (Ukraine International Airlines), shot down shortly after take-off from Tehran in January 2020, and J2-8243 (Azerbaijan Airlines), reportedly shot down near Grozny in December 2024 by Russian air defence. Small, low-flying aircraft are at greater risk, particularly following deviation from a cleared route or during loss of communication. While such incidents are unlikely, they remain a credible consideration amid regional tensions. Source: FlightRadar24 (flight data) Heightened GPS jamming and spoofing : These forms of electronic interference can disrupt or manipulate satellite-based navigation and timing signals, potentially affecting civilian airliners transiting the area. At present there are no signs of heightened digital interference in the area in question. If the situation were to escalate, significant interference would be a likely scenario. Flight interruptions, Closed airspace, airports : Sudden closure of airspace during armed confrontation can occur and cause significant disruptions for aircraft, passengers and businesses. Individual airports may also close at short notice if landing and take-off are deemed unsafe. This can cause disruptions, re-routing and aircraft to enter holding patterns. If tensions escalate, these are very likely scenarios and aircraft may need extra fuel for possible re-routing.

Date:   13/10/2025 (15:00 UTC+2) Where?  Madagascar; Antananarivo, Toamasina, Antsirabe, Toliara, Antsiranana, Mahajanga What happened?  On 13/10/2025 , it was reported that the President of Madagascar, Andry Rajoelina, had been flown out of the country on board a French military aircraft following a deal with President Macron.  This latest development follows weeks of civil unrest and protest all over the island nation, with people calling for Rajoelina’s resignation.  It all started on 25/09/2025  when protesters, mostly youth, took it to the streets against water and power cuts. However, the protests soon evolved into a wider expression of dissatisfaction with the country’s governance; high unemployment, corruption and prices spiraling out of control while wages stagnate.   Following the escalating situation, a curfew was declared in the capital Antananarivo on 26/09/2025 .  Unrest continued, which prompted Rajoelina to dissolve parliament on 29/09/2025 . Protesters were meanwhile calling for his resignation.  On 06/10/2025,  Rajoelina appointed an army commander, General Ruphin Fortunat Zafisambo as prime minister to restore order in the country, as protests were ongoing for the 12th day in a row.  However, this did not help easing tensions in the country. Despite calls for dialogue from the president and his administration, people on the street continue to call for his resignation.  On 12/10/2025 , it was reported that an elite army unit from the national army of Madagascar CAPSAT had joined the protesters  and called for the resignation of Malagasy president Andry Rajoelina. This unit earlier played a vital role in the 2009 Malagasy coup, when it stood by Rajoelina’s side ousting president Marc Ravalomanana.  Shortly after the announcement, CAPSAT declared it “took control over the armed forces” - the extent to which they actually exercise control over the state’s security forces remains unclear at the time of writing. CAPSAT soldiers were also reportedly seen escorting protesters  in the capital to May 13 square, where most protests are taking place.  Analysis What began as a simple protest for access to clean water and electricity slowly grew into one of the biggest waves of protests that the island nation has endured in years. It also presents the most serious challenge to Andry Rajoelina since he became president in 2019 (Rajoelina has been in power earlier, between 2009 and 2014 as head of the High Transitional Authority following a military-backed outset of Marc Ravalomanana). This wave of protests in Madagascar fit into a broader global pattern also observed earlier in, for example, Kenya and Nepal. Young people, connected through social networks, protest against their ruling elite, perceived to be deeply corrupt and responsible for declining living standards and a lack of any real perspective, as many developing economies have also been struggling since covid.  Looking back at the period since the protests started in late September, it is clear that Rajoelina was counting on his state security services to crack down on the protesting youth and slowly ‘smoke out’ the protesters in this way. At least 22 people were killed so far during this outburst of violence, according to the United Nations. The appointment of a general as new PM also points to this militarization of governance.  The mutiny by the CAPSAT unit marks a turning point. Historically loyal to Rajoelina (they stood on his side during the 2009 coup mentioned earlier), their defection signals a possible collapse of regime cohesion. It is very likely that this was the last straw which prompted him to leave the country.  All taken together, the coming period will be crucial for Madagascar and its nearly 32 million citizens. Given the fact that it could be possible that Rajoelina fled the country or considering he could do so later if protests continue to escalate, this could lead to a power vacuum in which civilian governance could break down. Conclusion President Andry Rajoelina’s departure from Madagascar aboard a French military aircraft marks the dramatic climax of weeks of escalating unrest. What began as a simple revolt over water and electricity access grew - much like in Kenya or Nepal - into a broader movement challenging the country’s government and leading to the probable collapse of the country’s government. Now, it is likely that the nation will head into a power vacuum. In that scenario, the army could potentially take over power again, as it had done before in 2009. How that will unfold is still hard to gauge. Nonetheless, the coming days will prove to be crucial for the future of the island nation.

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Report date:   06/10/2025  Approximate location of US F-35 aircraft flights 75 km from Venezuela’s capital Caracas (yellow circle) Where: Venezuelan exclusive Economic Zone, Southern Caribbean Who is involved: US military,  Venezuelan authorities What is happening?  Venezuela’s defence minister, Vladimir Padrino Lopez, stated that on 02/10/2025, five US F-35 aircraft were detected flying approximately 75 km off the country’s coast, though he did not specify the exact location or an altitude.   Venezuelan defence authorities said in a 02/10/2025 statement that they will keep the Integrated Aerospace Defence System on high alert and stand ready to exercise their full rights to the defence of sovereignty in response to the F-35 flights reported near their coast. In mid-September, Venezuela’s defence minister accused the United States of tripling reconnaissance flights over areas near its territory, alleging the use of RC-135, P-8 Poseidon, E-3 Sentry aircraft and suggestions of possible MQ-9 Reapers without mentioning the latter explicitly, and expanding operations to include night-time missions in addition to the usual daytime patrols. On 04/10/2025, a former Venezuelan air force officer in exile, Eduardo José Figueroa Marchena, claimed that the five US F-35 aircraft were detected visually by a civilian aircraft, which relayed the sighting to Caracas’ Maiquetía Airport via its contacts. The veracity of this claim remains unclear, but it raises concern that aircraft not detected by radar could lead to a serious airspace incident in the region. The incident coincided with a fourth US strike on what defence officials described as a narcotics-trafficking boat off Venezuela’s coast, reportedly killing four on board. It followed similar actions on 02, 15 and 19 September this year. No significant deviations or unusual flight patterns were observed on 02/10/2025 or in the days that followed. Air traffic activity in the region remained consistent with established civilian and military flight corridors, and there were no confirmed reports of radar anomalies or unauthorised incursions beyond the Venezuelan statement regarding F-35 detection. As of 05/10/2025, airlines reported to be overflying Venezuelan airspace include Air Europa, Air France, Arajet, Avianca, Azul, Gol, Iberia, LATAM, Turkish Airlines, and Wamos Air. A sample of 20 flights from various airlines overflying Venezuela between 28/09/2025 and 05/10/2025showed an average cruising altitude of 11,576 metres, consistent with that of flights over Colombia, Guyana and Brazil, with no indication of altered or restricted flight patterns prior to and after the F-35 incidents. No formal statements of concern or NOTAMs have been issued by airlines operating in the area, indicating that no significant collision risk involving off-route or unidentified aircraft has been assessed at the time of writing. Analysis The F-35 sighting appears to be one of the first notable incidents involving US military fighters operating close to the Venezuelan coast in recent times, amid increasing tension and rhetoric between both governments. The most plausible explanation is that US Air Force flights operated in international airspace inside the Maqueitia FIR roughly 75 km offshore, supporting maritime interdiction or reconnaissance of Venezuelan military or governmental activity. Caracas announcing a “detection” without releasing details such as coordinates or altitude allowed it to demonstrate vigilance while maintaining ambiguity over what its sensors actually tracked. The unverified claim by the exiled Venezuelan air force officer, that a civilian aircraft first observed the jets rather than them being detected by radar, aligns with official reports mentioning a civilian Avianca flight sighting the aircraft. However, the same statement also referred to F-35s being “detected” without specifying the means. There is no publicly verified information indicating that Venezuela possesses radar systems capable of tracking stealth aircraft, suggesting that visual contact would be necessary for identification. This, combined with heightened alert levels and the perception of increased external threats, raises the likelihood of more frequent Venezuelan military patrols, which could intermittently interfere with civilian air routes in the area. In mid-September, Venezuela’s defence ministry accused the United States of increasing aerial surveillance near its territory, alleging a threefold rise in reconnaissance missions using RC-135, P-8 Poseidon and E-3 Sentry aircraft, with possible MQ-9 Reaper involvement, and extending operations into night-time hours. The claim coincided with data released by Venezuela’s Strategic Operational Command, which reported US flights entering the Maiquetía FIR over Caracas and La Guaira, an area Venezuela treats as part of its defensive perimeter though the United States considers it international airspace. The episode followed a series of maritime encounters, including Venezuelan troop deployments and a Venezuelan jet approaching a US Navy vessel earlier in September. These developments reflect a gradual escalation of surveillance and counter-surveillance activity by both governments, with Venezuela using such incidents to reinforce its narrative of vigilance and sovereignty while Washington maintains a visible regional presence under the banner of lawful intelligence gathering and deterrence. Probable area of F-35 flyover near Venezuela’s coast as reported on 02 October 2025 Source: FlightRadar24, 02 October 2025 (accessed 06 October 2025) On 03 October, further reports indicated that at least one Venezuelan S-125 Pechora air-defence system was moving west from Maracay towards Carabobo along the Autopista Regional del Centro, a day after the F-35 reports, suggesting a bid to strengthen coastal air defences and signal readiness. The S-125 offers mobile, medium-altitude cover but is of limited use against fifth-generation stealth, with the move perceived as largely demonstrative. Venezuela also possesses Russian-supplied S-300VM batteries, which could be postured to augment coverage with a range of up to 250 km and create a more layered air-defence system. If pushed forward, the S-300VM’s longer-range engagement zones would widen the offshore coverage area, warranting tighter civil–military deconfliction even if routine overflights remain unaffected for now. Examples of Venezuela’s S-300VM and S-125 Pechora air defence systems  Sources: Venezuelan Armed Forces, 2025 Venezuela’s readiness cycle has clearly shifted. A publicly declared high-alert posture usually translates into shorter response times, stricter rules of engagement, and more frequent radio challenges or intercepts of aircraft near the country’s coast that are perceived as potential threats. It also increases the likelihood of short-notice airspace restrictions if radar tracks appear ambiguous or uncoordinated. This heightens the potential for friction at the civil–military interface, as commercial flights transiting near Venezuela’s coastline could experience brief altitude holds, vectoring instructions, or additional identification checks such as squawk or voice verification. Although none of these effects were observed during the 02 October F-35 episode, the declared defensive posture indicates greater sensitivity to perceived incursions and reduced decision-making time for radar operators and air defence crews—factors that, in congested airspace, can amplify the risk of miscommunication or inadvertent escalation. Avianca flights over Venezuela throughout the day on 02 October 2025 Source: FlightRadar24, 02 October 2025 (07 October 2025) Looking ahead The 02 October F-35 episode signals a new operating baseline off Venezuela’s coast. US military flights close to, yet outside, Venezuelan airspace are likely to become more routine as part of ongoing maritime interdiction and reconnaissance, alongside continued strikes on suspected narcotics-trafficking vessels since early September. In combination with Venezuela’s heightened air-defence posture this raises the probability of false radar contacts, near-coast intercepts or short-notice airspace measures. Forward posturing of S-125 and potential S-300VM assets could extend the offshore risk envelope and compress decision times around coastal fixes. Area of F-35 sightings, Avianca flights and high-altitude airways on 02 October 2025 Source: FlightRadar24, 02 October 2025 (accessed 05 October 2025) For civil aviation the present impact remains limited as carriers have maintained normal overflights and no formal advisories or NOTAMs have been issued. Persistent military presence along busy international air corridors inherently raises the risk of misidentification or unintended escalation, especially if radar detection or communications falter. If US sorties continue at current or higher tempo, Venezuelan forces operating with shorter timelines and tighter rules of engagement could misread an aircraft’s intent, prompting abrupt restrictions or delays even without hostile intent. The risk remains low but potentially high-impact, as illustrated by incidents such as Iran Air 655 downing by a US warship in 1988 over the Persian Gulf, the Siberia Airlines 1812 accidentally shot down by a Ukrainian fighter in 2001 during an exercise, the Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 targeted by Iranian air defence in 2020 or the 2024 Red Sea friendly-fire downing of a US F/A-18, highlighting the need for robust civil-military deconfliction, clear channels and close monitoring of air and maritime activity around northern Venezuela. 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Date:  03/10/2025 What happened?  Soon, the second anniversary of the 2023 October 7th attack will take place on Tuesday, 07/10/2025. We expect an increased risk of attacks by either Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran or others on this day. On the same day last year, on 07/10/2024, Hamas carried out a rocket barrage at targets in Israel. Six days earlier, on  01/10/2024, Iran launched around 200 ballistic missiles against Israel, under Operation True Promise II. The environment has changed significantly over the past year, with Hamas having lost most of its capabilities to launch rocket barrages, Iran likely aiming to avoid a re-escalation following June’s Twelve-Day War, and Hezbollah now facing a potential forced disarmament. Nevertheless, affiliated groups and individuals may still carry out attacks within Israel and among Jewish communities. Potential targets may include Israel and its strategic assets, but threats could also extend more broadly to Jewish communities worldwide, such as schools, synagogues, or other sites connected to Judaism. Recent incidents support the threat of increased risks. On 01/10/2025 , it was reported that German security forces had arrested three suspected Hamas members accused of preparing a serious act of violence against Jewish targets in Germany.  On 02/10/2025, Yom Kippur , the holiest day of the year in Judaism, took place. On that same day, a terror attack on Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation Synagogue in Manchester, England, led to two people being killed. The attacker was killed by police. These threats occur against the backdrop of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which continues to polarize global opinion. In particular, the expansion of IDF operations in Gaza, the leveling of most residential buildings in the city and the resulting humanitarian crisis - with widespread hunger and tens of thousands of casualties as a consequence - have intensified criticism of Israel’s actions. Many now view these operations as unlawful and in violation of human rights, leading to a stronger shift in public opinion toward the Palestinian cause. Consequently, anger could be directed at Jewish people who may be perceived—rightly or wrongly—as complicit, potentially increasing the number of individuals susceptible to carrying out attacks. Analysis The upcoming second anniversary of the October 7, 2023, attack, falling on next Tuesday, presents a heightened risk of violence in the form of potential attacks from Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, or affiliated groups on this date. Attacks from non-affiliated individuals acting independently may also occur. These attacks, often due to the perpetrator's lack of affiliation with a known group and the lack of coordination with other cells that may already be known to authorities, can be harder to prevent.  While Israel and its strategic assets remain primary targets, threats could extend more broadly to Jewish communities worldwide, including synagogues, schools, and other locations associated with Jewish identity. On October 1, 2025, German authorities arrested three men suspected of planning a serious attack on Jewish targets in Germany on behalf of Hamas. On October 2nd, a terrorist attack outside the Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation Synagogue in Manchester during Yom Kippur, a Jewish holy day, resulted in two fatalities and several injuries. These attacks demonstrate the importance of anniversaries for politically motivated attacks, providing both symbolic significance and operational motivation for extremist groups. Attacks may also be directed against IDF-manned checkpoints, with the latest such attack occurring on 02/10/2025 (with no victims besides the assailants). A similar attack also occurred on 18/09/2025, when a Jordanian truck driver opened fire against two IDF soldiers at the Allenby/King Hussein Bridge, between Jordan and the West Bank.  The current state of affairs surrounding Israel also contributes to an increase in the risk of attacks. The expansion of IDF operations in Gaza, including the leveling of most residential buildings, has triggered a severe humanitarian crisis, with widespread hunger and tens of thousands of casualties. These events have intensified criticism of Israel’s actions, with many regarding them as unlawful and in violation of human rights. In this charged environment, anger could be directed at Jewish people who may be perceived as complicit, potentially increasing the number of individuals inspired or radicalized to carry out attacks. Given these factors, potential targets may include Israeli institutions and diplomatic missions, as well as Jewish schools, synagogues, and cultural centers in Europe, North America, and beyond. Extremist motivations are likely to be multifaceted, combining ideological, retaliatory, and symbolic objectives. Conclusion  The combination of symbolic anniversaries, recent arrests and attacks, and ongoing regional tensions underscores a heightened threat environment around October 7, 2025. Extremist groups and radicalized individuals may enshrine this date to target both Israeli and Jewish sites globally, and the current humanitarian and political context increases the risk of attacks being carried out or inspired. Vigilance, preparedness, and reinforced security measures remain essential to mitigate potential threats.

Report date:  01/10/2025 What happened?  On 15/08/2025, Mali’s junta announced it had detained a French national accused of spying for the French intelligence services. Colonel Assimi Goïta's government claimed “foreign states” were supporting a plot to destabilise Mali’s institutions, allegedly involving a small group within the Malian armed forces.  France rejected the charges as baseless and demanded the immediate release of its staff member, stressing he was a duly accredited diplomat. On 14/09/2025 , five French diplomats were declared persona non grata   by the Malian junta and left the country. This incident was a direct result of the aforementioned diplomatic clash between the two governments. In a corresponding move, the French ordered two Malian diplomats to leave the country on 19/09/2025  and suspended all bilateral counter-terrorism operations with Bamako. The suspension of intelligence sharing between Paris and Bamako can carry serious consequences for the nation that is fighting security threats on multiple fronts. That said, this incident follows a pattern of steady deterioration of relations between the two countries. Historical context The latest rift between Bamako and Paris can only be understood when put in the proper historical context. The deterioration of French-Malian relations follows a steady pattern since its peak in 2013, when French President François Hollande visited French troops stationed  in the country and was met by cheering crowds in downtown Bamako. That year, the French military launched Operation Serval to fight back an alliance of jihadist and Tuareg nationalist rebels who threatened to overrun the Malian capital, deploying not only troops but also intelligence officers. France’s DGSE (foreign intelligence) and DRM (military intelligence) worked closely with local forces, using drones and surveillance aircraft from local airbases, and deploying SIGINT (intelligence-gathering discipline that involves intercepting and analyzing electronic signals and communications) capabilities to support counterterrorism operations under Operation Barkhane. Despite initial successes, the collaboration with the French also had its downsides. While not always publicized, local accusations of espionage occasionally surfaced, with mostly Mali and Burkina Faso claiming Western agents operated beyond agreed frameworks. In August 2020 Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta was overthrown by Colonel Assimi Goïta in a coup that came in the wake of mass protests against corruption, poor governance, and insecurity in northern Mali. In May 2021, Goïta staged a second coup, removing transitional president Bah N’Daw, thus consolidating power under the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP). After the military junta expelled French forces and welcomed Russian military contractors, pro-government media accused French soldiers of “espionage” and even staging massacres (notably around Gossi, 2022, when France released drone footage to counter Malian claims). Not just in Mali: similar accusations were made against French diplomats and NGOs in Burkina Faso in 2023 and 2024, alleging interference and intelligence gathering. Some French and European staff were expelled under that pretext. After the coup that overthrew President Bazoum in 2023, Niger’s junta accused France of clandestine operations and claimed to have dismantled a French spy network. Paris denied this. As the accusations of espionage against Paris piled up and the French troops gradually left Africa, ending France’s centuries-long presence in Central and West-Africa, the Russians gradually filled the gap the French left behind. Since 2021, the Russian PMCs Wagner Group  and Afrika Corps  have been active in Mali and, to a lesser extent, Burkina Faso. The Russian paramilitaries have been accused of running counter-espionage operations, monitoring NGOs and suspected Western operatives. Multiple reports in 2023 and 2024 indicate that Russian advisers have encouraged Sahelian military governments to crack down on Western intelligence networks, thereby shifting regional intelligence dynamics in favor of Russian-aligned operations. Analysis  The suspension of intelligence sharing between Paris and Bamako marks a significant rupture in Mali’s ability to track and respond to jihadist threats. For years, France supplied SIGINT, satellite imagery, and drone surveillance that Malian forces could never have obtained on their own. In return, Mali contributed valuable on-the-ground insights, drawing its own military networks. With this exchange now cut off, both sides are left weaker. Mali faces a dangerous intelligence gap against jihadist groups active in its territory, while France loses situational awareness that Malian forces could once provide from the ground. The breakdown of cooperation extends beyond intelligence. Although Operation Barkhane formally ended, France continued to support Malian forces through logistics, staff-level training, and joint planning. This coordination provided a degree of cohesion in the fight against Al-Qaeda–linked  Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin  (JNIM) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). Without it, the Malian army must rely almost entirely on its own overstretched capabilities and on Russian support, particularly from Wagner’s successor formations such as the Africa Corps. This shift risks producing more fragmented and less effective military operations. France, meanwhile, maintains partnerships with Niger and Chad, but Mali is in danger of becoming a blind spot within the regional counterterrorism architecture. The timing is particularly perilous. Jihadist groups are expanding their reach in central and northern Mali and may seize the opportunity created by the diplomatic rift. Civilians, aid workers, and local officials already face severe risks, and the absence of coordinated counterterrorism efforts could embolden militants to push closer to Bamako. The weakening of Mali’s defenses also threatens to spill across borders, with neighboring states such as Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, and Ghana potentially exposed to an intensification of cross-border raids and insurgent expansion. Beyond the security consequences, the diplomatic fallout signals a deeper geopolitical realignment. By severing ties with France, Mali is doubling down on its strategic turn toward Russia. Moscow provides weapons, training, and paramilitary forces, but this support emphasizes raw military power over intelligence-driven operations. The result is a counterterrorism posture that risks becoming more militarized, less integrated with regional and Western partners, and increasingly isolated from international donors such as ECOWAS and the African Union. The espionage dispute has thus accelerated Mali’s drift into a new security orbit—one in which Russian influence rises while traditional Western alliances erode. Conclusion In sum, the latest espionage dispute is less an isolated incident than the culmination of a long decline in Franco-Malian relations since their 2013 peak. The rupture in intelligence cooperation leaves Mali exposed to jihadist threats, which only seem to increase, and pushes Bamako further into Moscow’s orbit. A more fragile and militarized security situation is what remains, one that risks isolating and destabilizing Mali diplomatically and weakening regional counterterrorism efforts at a moment when the threat environment is worsening across the Sahel.

Report date:   01/10/2025  Where: EU, Mediterranean and Middle Eastern airspace Who is involved: US military, US government, NATO militaries, Turkey Locations of military exercises involving the United States in September 2025 (yellow circles) What is happening?  Unverified online reports and posts on social media have claimed that the United States is preparing airstrikes on Iran, citing screenshots and data from flight tracking platforms. However, a thorough review shows no evidence of planned large-scale military operations against Iran.  Information on US military cargo flights over European, Mediterranean and Middle Eastern airspace suggests there has been little change in numbers between the last two weeks of September and August, with around 109 flights in September compared with 97 in August. The slight increase in cargo flights appears linked to several military exercises in Europe, including the week-long Decisive North 25 in Belgium, a large multinational NATO-related exercise in Germany and the Neptune Strike exercises in the Adriatic Sea, as well as two additional exercises, all of which involved US forces.  No significant rhetoric from either Iran or the United States during September has indicated an increased likelihood of confrontation, suggesting that tensions have remained unchanged from previous months. In the 13 days leading up to the US airstrikes on Iran on 22 June, at least 160 US military transport aircraft were identified flying through European, Mediterranean and Middle Eastern airspace. This compares with 109 flights recorded in the final 13 days of September, and 97 in the final 13 days of August, suggesting a significantly lower movement of assets compared to June.  Analysis The higher number of US military flights in September is consistent with scheduled exercises and routine rotations rather than preparation for operations against Iran. While open source data indicates about 565 US military flights in September compared with about 450 in August and 412 in July, 109 cargo movements were logged in the final 13 days of September versus 97 in the same August window, while the 13 days before the 22 June strikes on Iran saw at least 160 transports, through to be transporting air-defence assets (e.g. Patriot batteries) and other armament types to support the airstrikes. Additionally, September saw five military exercises in Europe compared to only two major ones in August. Taken together the pattern points to support and recovery of exercise forces rather than a pre-strike surge. Source: ADS-B Exchange, 20 June 2025, 11:32 hours UTC  The exercise schedule provides the operational context for this traffic and explains the additional lift and tanker tasking observed. US military exercises in Europe during September included the following: Neptune Strike 2025 : Large-scale multilateral exercises were held in the Adriatic Sea between 22 and 26 September, involving more than 10,000 personnel from the naval, air and land forces of 13 countries. The exercise featured the USS Gerald R. Ford and the command-and-control ship USS Mount Whitney, alongside vessels from Turkey, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Poland, Italy and others. Assets included amphibious assault ships, submarines, frigates and reconnaissance aircraft, with the focus on combined operations across multiple domains. Decisive North 25: Smaller in scale than the other two military exercises, this drill was held at Kleine-Brogel Air Base in Belgium with the participation of the US 701st Munitions Support Squadron and the Belgian Air Force’s 10th Tactical Wing. It was designed to prepare aircrews for high-stakes scenarios and included handling unexploded ordnance as well as rapid-response exercises for specific situations. Saber Junction 25 : A NATO-related exercise in Germany ran from 14 August to 21 September, bringing together more than 7,000 participants and around 1,000 vehicles from 15 countries, including the United States. The exercises involved infantry and other ground forces and required extensive supply and transport routes both within Europe and across the Atlantic from the United States. Quadriga 2025 : Germany led multinational naval exercises in the Baltic Sea from 29 August to 12 September, focusing on countering threats from the air, sea and land and on improving coordination between forces. The United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and other allies also took part. MASCAL 2025 : Chaplain and religious affairs teams from the United States military based in Italy, Germany and Belgium carried out exercises at Ramstein Air Base in Germany, practising mass casualty scenarios. Between 15 and 19 September, around 120 US Army and Air Force chaplains took part alongside 45 counterparts from other NATO members. Additional training was also conducted at the nearby Sembach Kaserne military base. Tanker activity supports the same interpretation. Coronet transits present as grouped KC-135 and KC-46 sorties escorting fighter elements across the Atlantic into established hubs for exercise participation and rotations. There is no sustained rise in tanker loitering near contested airspace, no unusual forward dispersal of fighters identified and no change in activity such as persistent AWACS coverage or electronic warfare platforms. Routing and timing appear to follow routine tracks and established airspace arrangements. A modest increase in tankers and reconnaissance platforms may also reflect ongoing support to NATO allies along the Baltic region and in Poland, including air policing, deterrence patrols and reinforcement exercises. A  Lakenheath-based US F-15 Eagle flying near Mildenhall-based KC-135 tankers engaged in regular air-to-air refuelling exercises over the UK on 28 September Source: ADS-B Exchange, 25 September 2025, 11:28 hours UTC  Daily number of US military flights in the Mediterranean, UK, EU and Middle Eastern airspace between May and September 2025 A review of cargo mix and routing is consistent with deployment and redeployment cycles. Movements concentrate on Ramstein, Moron, Rota, Aviano, Lakenheath, Spangdahlem, Sigonella and Souda Bay with return flights that match exercise schedules. Loads align with personnel rotation, spares, munitions resupply and exercise support rather than forward staging for combat. There is no parallel surge of specialist enablers such as Rivet Joint, stand off strike fleets or a bomber task force and no unusual basing activity that would indicate an impending operation. Additionally, only one Carrier Strike Group, the USS Nimitz  is currently operating in Middle Eastern waters, compared to at least two during the June confrontation leading up to the US airstrikes on Iran.  US military cargo flights towards the Middle East on 20 June 2025 during the height of the Israel-Iran confrontation Source: ADS-B Exchange, 20 June 2025, 11:32 hours UTC  Looking ahead A United States confrontation with Iran cannot be ruled out, but current indicators point away from an imminent move. September saw no material escalation in public rhetoric from Washington or Tehran and US strategic attention remains focused on Ukraine and developments around Venezuela. The air picture is best explained by support to scheduled training and routine posture management in Europe. An increase in cargo sorties on its own does not imply preparations for operations. Historic build ups feature a marked rise in tankers and fighters, the forward movement of specialised enablers and munitions, visible command and control activity and political signalling that frames intent. Those elements are not present. The prudent assessment is that current US air movements reflect the support and return of assets for planned exercises and readiness cycles rather than the opening phase of a new operation. Dyami Services Security is not a luxury but a necessity. 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October 02, 2025 – New York – MD ONBOARD , a global leader in remote aviation medical advisory and health risk management, and Dyami , a renowned specialist in aviation security intelligence and training, are proud to announce a new strategic partnership. Together, the companies will provide the aviation industry with a comprehensive, end-to-end health and security ecosystem that raises the standard of care, preparedness, and resilience across commercial and business aviation. This collaboration unites MD ONBOARD’s aviation-trained emergency medical expertise and risk advisory services with Dyami’s world-class aviation security intelligence, AVIATION SECURITY training, and risk consultancy. The result is an unparalleled offering that addresses the intertwined health and security challenges facing airlines, airports, and business aviation operators worldwide. “At MD ONBOARD, we know that safety in aviation extends far beyond the aircraft cabin—it is about protecting crew, passengers, and operations at every stage,” said Wehda El Aridi Chief Growth Officer of MD ONBOARD. “By joining forces with Dyami, we are bringing airlines and business aviation stakeholders a unified solution that combines world-leading medical advisory with cutting-edge security intelligence and training.” Through this partnership, aviation stakeholders will benefit from: ● 24/7 Remote Aviation Medical Advisory Services – real-time inflight medical guidance, pre-flight clearances, and crew health management. ● Risk Intelligence, Overflight & Destination Assessments – tailored overflight and destination risk assessments. These assessments are grounded in our continuous monitoring and analysis of human-based intelligence, and other trusted sources. ● Aviation Security Awareness Training – equipping managers and operators with regulatory knowledge, risk awareness, and geopolitical leadership skills. ● Disaster Preparedness & Simulation Exercises – integrated medical and security scenarios designed to strengthen response and resilience. ● Medical & Security Infrastructure Support – from WHO-compliant medical kits and infection control protocols to scalable security programs for major events and global operations. “The aviation sector is navigating an era of unprecedented complexity, where medical, operational, and security risks are increasingly interlinked,” said Eric Schouten , CEO of Dyami. “Our partnership with MD ONBOARD ensures that airlines and business aviation operators have access to holistic, PEOPLE-CENTRIC and intelligence-driven solutions that safeguard both people and operations and enable business.” The partnership arrives at a pivotal moment for the aviation industry, as global carriers, business aviation providers, and event organizers seek to strengthen resilience against health crises, evolving security threats, and operational disruptions. Together, MD ONBOARD and Dyami will deliver solutions that are innovative, scalable , and aligned with international best practices, ensuring that aviation stakeholders are better equipped to protect passengers, empower crews, and enhance operational confidence. About MD ONBOARD MD ONBOARD is a leader in aviation medical solutions, dedicated to enhancing inflight safety and healthcare for both commercial and business aviation worldwide. Specializing in remote medical support, first aid training, and regulatory compliance, MD ONBOARD provides aviation-specific medical guidance and comprehensive training to equip crew members with the information needed to manage inflight medical emergencies. With a commitment to quality and innovation, MD ONBOARD partners with airlines, aviation organizations and industry partners to improve passenger safety and crew readiness globally. MD ONBOARD is a fully owned subsidiary of Northwell Health. For more information, visit www.mdonboard.com, and follow us on LinkedIn. About Dyami Dyami is an internationally recognized security intelligence and aviation risk management company. With expertise in people-centric aviation risk intelligence solutions, analysis and forward looking reporting, including risk consultancy, Dyami empowers aviation stakeholders to anticipate threats, improve resilience, and meet international security standards. This forward-looking intelligence ensures that clients are not only aware of risks but also prepared to act on them - turning uncertainty into informed decisions. Dyami Academy delivers practical, scenario-driven training programs that instil a “security mindset” across industries. For more information, visit www.dyami.services, and follow us on LinkedIn. Media Contact: Sandy Dell sandy.dell@mdonboard.com

Areas of reported drone sightings in Denmark between 22 and 24  September 2025.  Report date:   26/09/2025  Where:  Denmark, Jutland peninsula.  Who is involved: Airport authorities, Danish National Police, unknown drone operator(s), Danish government.  What happened?  Between 22 and 23 September over 30 flights  to Copenhagen Airport were delayed or diverted to Billund and Aarhus in Denmark as well as Malmo and Gothenburg in Sweden due to two to three large drones spotted flying in the airfield vicinity during nocturnal hours. Starting 21:44 hours local time on 24/09/2025 , drone sightings were reported in the vicinity of Aalborg Airport,  used for both commercial and military flights, resulting in the diversion of at least two flights to Copenhagen and one to Karup. North Jutland police reported the final drone sighting at 00:54 . On 25/09/2025 at 04:21 hours local time , reports indicated drone activity in the vicinity of Billund Airport , prompting authorities to close the airspace for one hour as a precautionary measure, although local authorities were unable to confirm any sightings at the time of writing  Unconfirmed drone sightings were also reported at multiple critical locations in Southern Jutland, including Sønderborg Airport , as well as Esbjerg, Holstebro (noted for critical military infrastructure), and Danish airforce base Skrydstrup.   Authorities chose not to neutralise the drones to avoid collateral damage such as injuring passengers or damaging fuel depots or aircraft.  On 26/09/2025 , Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen announced that Denmark faced sustained hybrid threats that have shown vulnerabilities enabling better counter hybrid attacks, raising alert levels and preparing for different scenarios, including a mandate to shoot down enemy drones in the future.  No perpetrator, drone-type, origin or destination have been definitively identified by Danish authorities for any of the incidents.  Areas of reported drone sightings in Denmark between 23 and 24 September 2025 Flights diverted and in holding patterns as Copenhagen airport halted operations due to drones in the vicinity on 22/09/2025 Source: FlightRadar24 (accessed 24/09/2025) Analysis In the past couple of weeks, there has been a notable increase in airspace-violating related incidents reported in eastern Europe and Denmark. The recent reports indicate drone flights in Aalborg, Billund and Southern Jutland, all operating with visible indicator lights, similar to the incidents reported in Copenhagen  earlier in the week, suggest that the perpetrator seeks to disrupt, sow public turmoil and show capability rather than attacking assets.  In the broader European context, similar incidents possibly indicate the beginning of a trend: airport drone disruptions offer organized actors high impact at relatively low cost , undermining public confidence and straining security resources. While some observers have raised questions about potential external involvement, official investigations have not yet attributed the sightings to any particular actor or country. These developments illustrate the growing complexity of the regional security environment, especially in the aviation and critical infrastructure sectors, and the heightened vigilance required by Denmark and Europe. In this context, Denmark also recently announced two military commitments. On 14 September, Denmark approved a temporary law that will allow the country to host Ukraine’s missile fuel production near the F-35 base in Skrydstrup. While on 18 September, Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen announced the decision to acquire European-made long-range precision weapons. This signalled a significant shift in national security policy, showing the government’s anticipation of regional instability and the need for enhanced defence capabilities. Recent disruptions may be deliberate attempts to test defence capacity and response, similar to the events in Poland and Estonia.   In a statement given on 26 September, following the recent events, Frederiksen emphasized that Denmark has been subjected to hybrid attacks in recent days and that drones have been seen near several critical infrastructure both military and civilian considering it as a new reality for Europe and Denmark. This marks a shift from ad‑hoc crisis handling to a proactive attitude towards threats posed by drones and aviation disruptions. Expect tighter rules of engagement around airports/bases, with authorities raising alert levels and preparing for multiple scenarios and obtaining a mandate to shoot down enemy drones.  Looking ahead European governments and airport operators are expected to implement faster response protocols to drone sightings and invest in advanced detection systems integrated with clear handover procedures for police and military authorities. Pressure is likely to increase for tighter regulation, including mandatory registration, expanded geofencing and defined legal authority to neutralise drones where this can be done without endangering passengers or infrastructure, especially after the mandate to shoot down enemy drones announced by PM Frederiksen. Airlines may be required to refine diversion strategies and passenger management processes to mitigate operational disruption. At the strategic level, a continuation of drone incidents combined with uncertainty over US security commitments may drive EU and NATO members to seek greater American support to accelerate their own security measures airspace protection, which is increasingly perceived as vulnerable. Incidents involving drones causing flight disruptions are expected to continue in the upcoming weeks given recent patterns, requiring stakeholders in the aviation field to make contingency plans and expect situational changes on short notice.