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Date: 20/09/2024 Who’s involved : Tunisian government, civil society  Context: After the Jasmine revolution and the Arab Spring in 2011, Tunisia seemed to move toward a democratic future, and Ennahda, a self-defined Islamic democratic political party, emerged as the strongest party. In 2014, Beji Caid Essebsi  was elected as president, becoming the first directly elected head of State after the Arab Spring  uprising. The president helped draft a democratic constitution , which guaranteed fundamental rights such as freedom of speech, and co-brokered a  power-sharing deal between his Nidaa Tounes movement and Islamist party Ennahda , which helped to steady the country under a unified government. However, after Kais Saïed was elected in 2019 , the country has descended into a form of autocracy. During Covid-19 crisis, through a unilateral executive decree, Saïed took control of the country , dismissing the elected parliament and since then tried to hold on to power by arresting opposition leaders, journalists and other perceived dissent.  On 20/07/ 2024  the Tunisian President expressed his willingness to seek a new five-year term, and Tunisians will be able to cast their vote in the presidential elections on 06/10/2024 . What has happened recently? In May 2024,   Tunisian authorities intensified their repression on media and freedom of expression across the country. On 22/05/2024 , the Tunis First Instance Court sentenced two journalists to a year of prison. The two journalists, Borhane Bsaies, a talk show host on private TV and radio channels and Mourad Zeghidi, a political commentator, were charged for nine video clips of statements made between February and April 2024. Zeghidi was additionally sentenced for his Facebook post supporting an investigative journalist who was already serving a six-month sentence for publicly questioning a government ministry’s public spending. On 26/05/2024,  president Saïed replaced the interior and social affairs ministers following a series of arrests targeting human rights activists, lawyers, and journalists. In August, the electoral commission eliminated three prominent candidates from the race, citing alleged irregularities in their candidacy filings, and on 05/08/2024 , president Saïed denied that his government was using judicial intimidation against the opposition and the media. On  02/09/2024 , the police arrested politician Ayachi Zammel, one of the two challengers to Saïed in the polls. He is the head of the opposition Azmoun Party, and was arrested with charges of falsifying voter signatures on the candidacy paperwork. He later called the charges manufactured by Saïed. On  13/09/2024, thousands of Tunisians marched in the streets to protest against the President Kais Saïed, whom they accuse of trying to rig the upcoming elections by detaining and intimidating his rivals. On  14/09/2024,  at least eighty members of Tunisia’s largest opposition party Ennahda were arrested, as thousands took to the streets to protest against the current President.  On  18/09/2024,  presidential candidate Ayachi Zammel was sentenced to 20 months in prison. On 22/09/2024 , a draft law by Tunisian lawmakers sparked a new wave of protests. The proposed law limits the powers of the administrative court and would threaten the role of the judiciary to preserve elections’ integrity, according to Tunisian Network for Rights and Freedoms. Analysis : The current president's repression of the media and the opposition, the dismantling of the democratically elected municipal councils, and the recent arrest of the opposition leader Zammel, indicate that there will likely be unfair elections. In the previous months, the authorities have been arresting or prosecuting several candidates that would have run for office, and the Independent Higher Election Authority has banned fourteen of them from running on procedural grounds. Ultimately, the only candidate running for elections and confronting the current President is Zouhair Magzhaoui, who is part of People’s Movement, one of the parties supporting the exceptional measures imposed by Saïed since 2021. Since the only other candidate running is part of a political party that supports Saïed centralization of power, it is probable that Saïed will either win or make sure the government will still have the same policies and type of regime. Therefore, the political environment in which the election will take place will probably be characterized by repression and opacity. However, given the recent turmoil in the country, the elections are likely to lead to a new series of protests, stronger than the current ones. The anti-government protests and political tension might lead the situation to escalate into a revolution and regime change.  Conclusion Tunisia is turning towards an authoritarian regime. The coming presidential election has unleashed turmoil in the country, and the population has begun to protest against the current government, which has been arresting and preventing candidates from the opposition from running for elections. The situation is tense, and the coming elections on October 6th will be a test for Tunisian democracy and civil society, and may have an impact on the neighboring countries as well.

Date : 24/09/2024 Where : Sahel Region, West Africa Who’s involved : Sahel Region, AES (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso)  ECOWAS (Benin, Nigeria, Togo) Russia, U.S., France, Italy, Germany Al-Qaeda-linked JNIM, Islamic State What happened? On 15/09/2024 , the US completed its removal of their roughly 1000 troops located in the Sahel region  thus marking the end of nearly all Western influence in the area. Italy is an exception given that they still have around 300 troops that remain in the region. This removal also finalizes the end of the previous agreement between Niger's government and the US, preventing them from continuing their counter-terrorism efforts. On 16/09/2024 , the AES announced the introduction of new biometric passports , which will be implemented in the next few days. According to the Malian Junta Leader, this will facilitate seamless travel for all citizens within the AES in addition to standardizing travel documents across the alliance . There are also plans to implement a shared information channel to foster the exchange of information among the alliance. On 16/09/2024 , two police officers were ambushed in northern Benin near the border with Niger. This incident follows a similar attack in June 2024, in which  seven soldiers were killed  in Pendjari National Park, on the border with Burkina Faso. The rise in cross-border attacks  underscores the growing security concerns in northern Benin. On  17/09/2024, a major jihadist attack  occurred in the Malian capital Bamako . The Al-Qaeda-linked group JNIM has since claimed responsibility. The attack began at 5.30 a.m, targeting the  gendarmerie training center  in Falidie district and Modibo Keita International Airport.   The attack resulted in significant human and material loss,  fire was set to several military, government and UN aircraft. This is the first major attack on the capital since 2015, when Mali was ruled by a civilian government and assisted by French troops.  Islamist armed groups  in the Centre-Nord region of Burkina Faso  have significantly increased attacks on civilians . Between January and September 2024, jihadist attacks resulted in at least 2,000 civilian deaths . Large portions are now controlled by jihadist groups, leaving the government in control of roughly half of the country’s territory. Analysis  Since the withdrawal of western and UN troops,   there has been a noticeable increase in attacks  from groups in the AES area. According to ACLED, civilian targeting has increased in the first half of 2024, with 3064 reported fatalities compared to the previous six months which had 2520 civilian fatalities. JNIM is the most active rebel group in the Sahel with data showing that violent events conducted by them occurred three times more from 2022 to 2023. There is a strong indication that violence, in particular towards the civilian population, is only going to continue and potentially worsen without Western aid.  Most recently,  attacks have taken place in Bamako, Burkina Faso and on the border with Benin.  With Western troops departing the region, the AES countries' ability to tackle the threat of jihadist groups linked to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State have significantly reduced. With growing anti-western sentiment and the desire for non-western alliances, the AES has turned to an alliance with Russia . Mali hosts around 2000 Russian soldiers, while only an estimated 100 are present in Burkina Faso. Niger also received Russian units, but the number is unknown. However, the aid of Russia’s Africa Corps (former Wagner group) has until now been limited in scope, with questions arising regarding their ability to aid in the counterterrorism efforts while also protecting civilians. Therefore,  there is the concern for an escalation of significant threats across the AES and potentially beyond.  With the potential for escalation, the number of displaced persons might also rise, thus putting a strain on bordering countries. The ECOWAS has been established for 49 years between 15 West African nations . Its aim is to promote regional peace, stability and foster security and growth across the region through integration and cooperation amongst its members. Following the departure of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso , the already faulty integrity and credibility of the ECOWAS was diminished further. With the introduction of the biometric passports, the previous coordination and collaboration between the nations is further fragmented  in various ways. The prior protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment across the ECOWAS allowed citizens of its member states to travel using a standardized passport, which enhanced the ease of travel and trade across its borders. The introduction of the AES biometric passport will disrupt this movement  and is exacerbated by the standardization of AES travel documents. Beyond this, it could signal that the Sahel countries are simply prioritizing their own security threats rather than focusing on threats to the entire West African region. Overall, this will likely weaken the efforts of the ECOWAS to coordinate and integrate security measures, trade and movement across the region that have taken 49 years to attain. Conclusion The increase in attacks and the potential spread of conflict is crucial to observe because the violence can expand into bordering ECOWAS countries, such as Benin and Togo. The protection that the AES-countries had from Western troops against the Islamic State and JNIM groups is also no longer present and will have significant repercussions on the rest of the wider region and continent. Increased displacement, disruption of movement, and a strain on trade across borders would affect the countries within the AES and the nations within the ECOWAS.

Date:   23/09/2024 Where :  Turkey Who’s involved :  Turkey, BRICS Nations What happened? On 04/09/2024,  Yuri Ushakov, President Vladimir Putin’s foreign affairs aide told reporters that Turkey formally applied to join the BRICS economic forum  (Brazil, Russia, India and China). On 01/01/2024,  BRICS admitted Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, United Arab Emirates, signaling a desire for further growth and influence. On 20/08/2024, Azerbaijan formally applied to join BRICS, this will make it easier for Turkey to align with BRICS policies as Azerbaijan is Turkey’s main partner in the Caucasus region. The 2024 BRICS Summit will be held in Kazab, Russia, from 22/10/2024  to 24/10/2024 .  Analysis : BRICS is a block of emerging major economies founded on 16/06/2009 that seeks to reshape the global order and challenge western dominance . BRICS aims to promote multipolarity, reform international institutions, and enhance cooperation in area’s like trade, finance, and development. The move marks another step in Turkey and Azerbaijan’s deepening alignment on foreign policy . This is one of Turkey’s biggest steps since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, during which Turkish armed forces were involved in training and arming the Azerbaijani forces. Turkey’s bid indicates a potential shift in its foreign orientation. Turkey’s motivations include economic diversification, geopolitical leverage and regional leadership aspirations .  First, the Turkish economy is experiencing numerous obstacles, including a continuous currency crisis and excessive inflation. Ankara's post-2023 economic model is mainly reliant on getting investment from Western countries. However, these expectations have not been met, with new investments predominantly focused on short-term financial benefits rather than long-term growth. The BRICS grouping, particularly China and the New Development Bank, represents an alternate source of investment and funding.  By joining with the BRICS economies, Turkey seeks to gain access to new trade opportunities, alternative investment sources , and improved integration into global supply networks. Turkey's desire for BRICS membership suggests its desire to play a larger role in global governance and demonstrate its strategic autonomy. The move reflects growing discontent with the stalled EU accession process and perceived neglect of its security issues within NATO.  Turkey aspires to diversify its alliances  and lessen its reliance on traditional Western partners, particularly in light of continued differences over critical issues including defense procurement, regional security, and political alignment. By joining BRICS, Turkey hopes to get a voice in global economic policy changes and engage more directly with major global actors such as China, India, and Russia. Moreover, Turkey's BRICS bid could have consequences for the bloc's dynamics, as well as Ankara's regional and global status. It emphasizes Turkey's vision of a multipolar international order and willingness to serve as a bridge between the East and the West. Turkey's potential participation in BRICS would provide strategic depth, allowing the bloc to enhance its influence in the Balkans, Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus.   President Erdoğan's anticipated presence at the 2024 BRICS meeting in Russia will offer significant perspectives on the bloc's openness to accepting Turkey's bid for membership. It is expected that the meeting would cover BRICS expansion, paving the way for future talks on Turkey's accession.  Turkey's potential BRICS membership carries significant implications for a range of actors: Turkey: Economic diversification: Gaining access to BRICS' markets and development money might help Turkey's economy and reduce its reliance on Western investment. Geopolitical leverage: Turkey's membership in both NATO and BRICS would provide it power and maneuverability in global affairs. Regional leadership: Turkey may strengthen its position in the Middle East and Central Asia, potentially managing crises and boosting economic cooperation. BRICS Nations: Expanded influence:  Gaining a NATO member would enhance BRICS' global reach and legitimacy, challenging Western-centric institutions like the EU. Economic benefits:  Turkey's strategic location and economic potential could boost intra-BRICS trade and investment and help China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Internal dynamics:  Turkey's membership could shift the power balance within the bloc, requiring adjustments in existing member states' strategies. EU and US: Strained relations:  Turkey's closer alignment with BRICS could further strain its ties with the West, potentially impacting trade, security cooperation, and even its NATO membership. Geopolitical challenges:  The West might face increased difficulty navigating a multipolar world with a more assertive Turkey aligned with BRICS. Regional Actors: Middle East & Central Asia:  Turkey's growing influence within BRICS could impact its relations with regional rivals and allies, particularly those with conflicting ties to BRICS members. Conclusion:  The conclusion of this bid has big implications, affecting Turkey's relations with both Western and non-Western states. The changing geopolitical landscape emphasizes the importance of constant assessment and change as Ankara navigates its complex relationships with many global entities.  Acceptance: The BRICS may admit Turkey under specific circumstances. These could include policy changes concerning trade, investment, currency, or even foreign policy alignment. China, as a significant BRICS actor, may use its influence to guarantee that Turkey remains impartial on matters involving Taiwan, the South China Sea And the persecution of Uyghurs. Russia, which is increasingly isolated, may see Turkey's admission as a diplomatic win and an opportunity to enhance ties. India, concerned about Turkey's connections with Pakistan, may seek assurances of regional stability. Rejection of the Bid:  In an unlikely scenario, BRICS could reject Turkey's application, citing concerns about its geopolitical alignment with the West or internal disagreements among existing members. However, given the bloc's expansion plans and Turkey's strategic importance, this outcome appears less likely.

Date:  20/09/2024 Where : Beijing, China  Who’s involved : China, CCP, African continent, FOCAC participants What happened? On 04-06/09/2024 , the 9th summit of the 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation  ( F OCAC) was held in Beijing. 53 African leaders attended the summit this year. As a result of the summit, China has pledged more than US$50 billion , of which US$140 million in military assistance grants, for the next three years to the African nations, largely to invest in sustainable projects to help the continent develop.  Countries that have made  bilateral agreements  during FOCAC 2024 regarding security and defense cooperation are Liberia, Mali, Togo, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan and Mozambique . These agreements include joint military exercises and training, Chinese support in strengthening national defense and the armed forces, and combating terrorism. During FOCAC 2024, Senegal, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Gabon, Republic of the Congo,   the   Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Namibia  have agreed to significantly expand their relationship and cooperation with China, elevating their status to the highest level of ‘Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partner’ to China. However, of these countries only Mozambique has made new defense agreements with China during this year’s summit. The most common new agreements China made with these countries include developing their soft infrastructure  (agriculture, education, health, local economic development in Africa, technology and telecommunications proje​​cts), (sustainable) energy , trade  (currency swap and export agreements), and public relations  (cultural exchanges and media sharing agreements).  However, the lack of transparency around the consequential debt owed to China by the recipient countries leads to concerns surrounding the possible ‘debt-trap’ African countries may be subjected to. During the FOCAC 2024 summit, China did not announce the much sought after debt relief by African countries. Eswatini is the only African country that does not participate in FOCAC, as it has explicitly stated that it recognizes Taiwan as an independent and autonomous country. Analysis : China is among the top largest developing countries in the world and the African continent has the most developing countries. Due to this shared status, China and Africa established FOCAC in 2000  and hold a summit every three years. During the FOCAC summits, China and partnering African countries strategize for mutually beneficial milestones that elevate the two parties’ development, decreasing dependency on predominantly the US and Europe. An example of this is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), aimed at developing the hard-infrastructure of many African countries, increasing trade and diplomatic ties between Africa and China, and allowing China to position itself as a leader of the global South. China has significant interest in the African continent for various reasons. China seeks mutually beneficial and profitable cooperation with Africa, while also presenting itself as an alternative to the US and Europe to help African countries develop further. This reinforces  China’s aspiration to challenge the U.S. as the current international major power holder , and instead push towards a multi-polar world. An example of this is China’s plan to fund the FOCAC agreements using the China yuan instead of the dollar. So far, China has been seemingly successful, as U.S. FDI in Africa was less than half of China’s in between 2015 and 2022, and that Chinese aid to the African continent is more in line with Africa’s hopes for a multi polar world. China’s increasing presence in Africa also further increases existing political and economic tension between China, Europe and the US. For example,  China’s greater access to African natural resources leads to China’s ability to upscale production of renewable energy technologies . This positions China as a strong competitor for EU manufacturers of products such as solar panels and electric vehicles.  Militarily, China is seeking to be  a stronger  military competitor than the United States and Europe . A s U.S. troops completely withdrew from their bases in Niger on 16/09/2024, China has announced additional fundings and training commitments. The recent expansion of military cooperation is in line with China’s ambition to strengthen and expand its military presence into the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Guinea . The US government has in the past attempted to counter China’s ambitions for military presence in this region, as this would mean the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is coming increasingly closer to US shores. Despite the withdrawals from their Nigerien bases, the U.S. Africa Command has stated on 12/09/2024 they will ‘pivot’ their military resources to West African countries of Ghana, Benin, and Cote d’Ivoire. For the African continent, Chinese investments meant significant development in areas such as infrastructure and sustainable energy, but also led to additional financial problems. Africa owes $1.152 trillion in external debt as of 2023, of which around 14% is owed to China, and is struggling to pay it off. China has been often accused of purposefully subjecting Africa to ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ , as the Trump administration described it in 2018. In this system, borrowing countries are subjected to excessive loans they will likely fail to pay back, leaving the borrowing country under the lender’s influence and, to some extent, control. This contradicts  China’s  foreign relations ambitions of good relations, mutually beneficial cooperation, and non-interventionism . A Chatham House study  of 2022 indicated that economic factors were indeed the primary driver of BRI projects. ‘Debt-traps’ accusations are also in part based on the assumption that borrowing countries are incapable of estimating their ability to pay back the loans and dismiss the behavior and sometimes poor governance of such states. This, however, does not discount that billions in Chinese loans come with significant strategic leverage, whether Beijing planned for it or not.     Conclusion : The FOCAC is a multi-faceted undertaking, helping both China and 53 African countries develop economically, militarily and politically. The emphasis the FOCAC places on mutual collaboration between China and the African nations involved, allows room for developments in all these areas and reach the individual and shared goals through a south-south cooperation. By funding the African countries and developing their hard- and soft infrastructure, military capabilities and economic competition, China is showing the (developing) world it could be an alternative to the US as the global leader, or at least play a vital role in a multi-polar world. However, the increasing debt Africa is facing as a consequence is a point of contention.

Date:   19/09/2024 Location:   Venezuela  Who’s involved : Venezuelan government, Venezuelan President Maduro, Spain, United States, UN, international community  What happened:  Following the contested re-election of Nicolas Maduro as Venezuela President, which was widely criticized for the lack of transparency, the government intensified the crackdown on the opposition, protests, and civil society to suppress dissent.  On 18/09/2024 , Venezuela opposition leader  Edmundo González Urrutia  stated he was forced to sign a letter of acceptance of Maduro’s victory at the 28 July elections by Venezuela’s top court. Following the ratification of Maduro’s victory by the country’s National Electoral Council (CNE) and Supreme Justice Court, arrest warrants over accusation of conspiracy and other crimes, including attempted electoral fraud and incitation of violence, were issued for opposition figures including González and the former opposition leader Machado. González is currently in Spain, where he was granted asylum.  On 17/09/2024 , the UN reported a sharp deterioration of the repression  in Venezuela, including crime against humanity of politically motivated persecution, following the elections of July 2024. The report described Maduro's government strategy to silence the opposition as “one of the most acute human rights crises in recent history”. Reportedly, in the past two months, at  least 25 protestors were killed and nearly 2500 arbitrarily detained  with the accusation of terrorism.  On 15/09/2024 , the Venezuelan Interior Minister announced the arrests of six foreign nationals from the US, Spain and Czech Republic over an alleged plot to overthrow President Maduro and “destabilize” the country. Upon requests from foreign governments for information on the arrests, Venezuela reported that two Spanish nationals were arrested for allegedly being linked to Spanish intelligence services and engaged in a plot to assassinate prominent political figures and officials. Also, a Czech citizen and three US nationals, including a Navy member, were arrested for alleged involvement in terrorist acts. Venezuelan authorities stated that the US nationals were part of a CIA-led plot to kill President Maduro. The US State department rejected the allegations. A few days later, on 17/09/2024 , the detention of a fourth US citizen was confirmed by the Venezuelan Ministry of the Interior. While the man's identity has not been confirmed, it was reported that he was arrested for photographing military installations, state entities, and electrical and oil infrastructure.  The arrests came a few days after the souring of diplomatic relations between Venezuela and Spain . The  Venezuelan government recalled its ambassador to Spain , following the meeting between exiled Venezuelan opposition leader González and the Spanish PM Pedro Sanchez, the Spanish parliament's recognition of González as the winner of the presidential election, and a remark by the Spanish Defense Minister calling the Maduro government a dictatorship.  On  12/09/2024 , the  US Biden administration announced the imposition of sanctions on sixteen allies of Venezuelan President Maduro government in response to the electoral fraud, human rights abuses and violent crackdown of the opposition, including the President of Venezuela’s Supreme Court, the director of the electoral council, and several military and intelligence officials.  Analysis : The recent presidential elections in Venezuela have triggered a deep domestic political crisis and international controversy. Although the Maduro regime claims victory in the polls, opposition forces and several Western nations dispute the results and denounce the manipulation, lack of transparency, and credibility of the electoral process. Available data from polling centers reportedly record an estimated 67% of the votes for the leading opposition candidate González Urrutia . Nonetheless, the regime of President Maduro, who has been in office since 2013, is increasing its grip on power, demonstrating complete control of the country's electoral, judicial, and military bodies. Recent developments suggest an irreparable deterioration of democracy, the rule of law, and civil and political liberties in the country.  Venezuela is experiencing a period of unprecedented political violence and repression . To halt protests and rampant dissent against Maduro's re-election, the government is carrying out systematic repression and persecution of actual or alleged opponents of the regime, such as opposition members, civil society activists, journalists, ordinary citizens, and foreign nationals.  Along with the alarming levels of violent repression against the Venezuelan population, the political crisis and souring diplomatic relations raise concerns about the country’s international standing. The UN, the US, Spain, other EU members, and some Latin American countries recognized González as the winner of the Venezuelan presidential elections . Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico have asked Venezuela to release the results to be independently validated. The firm reaction of the US administration to back the Venezuelan opposition and the imposition of new sanctions against Venezuelan officials could also have dire implications for the local population, regional actors, and US interests. In the past, US sanctions have aggravated Venezuela's economic crisis that forced over 7.7 million people to flee the country. So far international pressure and sanctions have proven to be ineffective against the Maduro regime .  Despite international pressure for democratic electoral transition, it seems unlikely that Maduro, bolstered by the support of military elites and judicial bodies, will not retain power after the end of his term, on 10/01/2025. The inauguration of the new administration is scheduled for January 2025 , and municipal, regional, and parliamentary elections are also planned for next year.  Conclusion : The Maduro government's violent crackdown on post-election protests, including human rights abuses and crimes against humanity, raises concerns for the liberties and security of the Venezuelan people. In response to the systematic repression of dissent and the authorities' rejection of the democratic transition, the international community is responding with diplomatic and economic pressure through the imposition of new sanctions and backing of the Venezuelan opposition. So far, though, the international community's strategy is not producing positive change and instead risks exacerbating current issues . While the restoration of democratic institutions and addressing the economic crisis are priorities, the international community, especially the US, should evaluate a  thoughtful use of sanctions and of exit strategies for Maduro  and government officials to encourage regime change.

Date : 17/09/2024 Who’s involved : Parties: Israel, Hamas, Houthi, IRGC, Hezbollah  What happened? A military raid was launched by Israel in the occupied West Bank, including Jenin, on 28/08/2024 , involving hundreds of ground soldiers,  fighter jets and drones resulting in the arrests and deaths of several militants. On  31/08/2024 , the bodies of six Israeli hostages were found in the Gaza strip  by the IDF, retrieved from a tunnel under the city of Rafah. This recovery ignited days of protests against the Netanyahu  government telling him to forge a deal with Hamas on the release of the remaining hostages. On 02/09/2024  the United Kingdom suspended 30 out of 350 arms exports licenses to Israel , fearing that they could have been used in serious breaches of International humanitarian law.  Despite the Israeli protests on  02/09/2024 demanding a ceasefire, on 03/09/2024 Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu defined the control of the Philadelphi Corridor as a necessary part to reach a ceasefire agreement, and blamed Hamas for the stalling of the deal and the killing of the hostages  on 31/08/2024. On 05/09/2024,  Hamas affirmed not to be willing to agree on a new ceasefire deal for Gaza, since it had already accepted the U.S. proposal of July 2. Instead, it pressured Israel to accept the already existing one, and it accused Netanyau of using the Philadelphi corridor in southern Gaza as an excuse to thwart the deal and continue the violence against palestinians. On 06/09/2024,  the American-Turkish activist, Aysenur Eygi, was killed during a protest in the occupied West Bank  by an Israeli sniper. The IDF claims it was targeting another person at the protest who was carrying a molotov cocktail. An investigation is pending.  On 08/09/2024,  Israeli special forces attacked an Iranian missile production facility in Syria, destroying the site, and targeted a Syrian military headquarter. During the raid four IRGC commanders were captured and abducted by Israeli troops. On 11/09/2024 , the US government demanded an overhaul of Israeli military conduct in the occupied West Bank. On the same day, Israel launched several airstrikes on southern Lebanon, killing a senior Hezbollah commander. According to the Israeli defense minister Gallant,  the focus is shifting from Gaza to Lebanon. He is preparing the troops for a ground operation in the region. On 12/09/2024  Turkey opened an investigation into the death of the Turkish-American activist, and showed the willingness to request an international arrest warrant. On  15/09/2024,   a long-range ballistic missile was fired by the Iranian-backed Houthis. The missile hit central Israel and triggered air raid sirens in Tel Aviv and the Ben Gurion international airport. On 17/09/2024 , several members of the Israeli government announced that returning displaced Israeli citizens from the north back to their homes has first priority. The Netanyahu government believes that the only way for them to return home is when Hezbollah can no longer launch missiles and UAVs at the north from the south of Lebanon, implying that a military operation is on hand.   Analysis : The ongoing conflict and the long impasse on a peace deal between Israel and Hamas is causing turmoil amongst Israelis, who are pressuring the government to accept the ceasefire.  Hamas is reiterating its willingness to accept the already existing US proposal for a ceasefire with Israel, but Netanyahu is sticking to his conditions regarding the Philadelphi Corridor. The more time passes, the higher the likelihood of a decline in Netanyau’s political consensus.  If the hostilities with Hezbollah continue and escalate into a war, there is a possibility of further worsening of the internal political and social situation. The past months have seen an escalation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah. The attacks between the parties continue, and the IDF is getting ready to undergo military operations in Lebanon.  It is likely that this will lead to a ground war between Hezbollah and Israel in the southern part of the region, Beirut and the Bekaa Valley, which would all suffer a severe humanitarian crisis. The conflict will likely entail the intervention of Iran and its proxies, and would probably affect the current peace negotiation between Israel and Hamas, leading to other internal protests in Israel. The war would likely spread in all the neighboring countries like Lebanon, Syria and possibly Jordan and have severe economic, social and political consequences. Iranian influence in Israel's neighboring countries is widespread, and the involvement in the recent attacks against Israel makes the situation more unstable. The hostilities between Israel and Iran are escalating, and it is likely that the latter will use its relations with Syria and Hezbollah to play a pivotal role in the conflict.  Israel has been targeting Islamic Republican Guards Corps troops working in Syria through air strikes and raids by special forces. It is likely that Israel will continue to do this as the tensions with Hezbollah are increasing. Israel will target the weapons and advisors pipeline that comes from Iran into the Levant. Conclusion The war between Israel and Hamas may come to an end soon as Hamas has suffered severe losses and is ready to accept a ceasefire.  The Philadelphi corridor seems to constitute an obstacle in the negotiations, but Israel seems to be ready to end its major operations and focus on surgical attacks.. However, Iran and its proxies have ramped up their attacks on Israel from several different fronts , such as Yemen, Syria and Lebanon. It is likely that Israel will respond by targeting military facilities across the region where the IRGC has been training and arming Iranian proxies. Air strikes and special force incursions in Syria, Lebanon and Yemen are likely to continue the coming weeks, and a vast Israeli ground operation against Hezbollah in the south of Lebanon is now likely to happen.

Written by Jacob Dickinson The political revolution in Bangladesh on 5 August 2024 was a turning point in global politics. As the world’s eighth most populous country in the world, with a population of 173 million people, Bangladesh’s revolution marks a struggle for democracy in a region characterized by authoritarian politics. Termed the ‘Monsoon Revolution’ within Bangladesh, the student-led protests that took place in Dhaka throughout the summer evolved into mass demonstrations against Sheikh Hasina’s authoritarian rule when on the 5 August, she resigned and fled to India. The new interim prime minister Muhammad Yunus has attempted to provide order to the country. With a struggling economy, recurrent power cuts, and ensuring free and fair elections, the new government faces a host of challenges as it begins a transition to democracy. The change in Bangladesh’s politics also has profound implications for the geopolitics of South Asia, given the country’s geography. Bangladesh’s shares borders with India and Myanmar. As a mid-way between emerging India and Southeast Asia, any land link between these economic spaces must go through Bangladesh. The vast coastline is home to three out of the twelve ports facing the Bay of Bengal, making it a strategic hub for projecting power into the Bay. Given its importance geographically, Bangladesh is also caught in the regional rivalry between India and China. India is intensely suspicious of China’s expanding maritime ambitions in the Indian Ocean and strong ties with countries in India’s sphere of influence. While China does not see India as an immediate threat, China is also wary of India’s growing engagement with the US and sees the growing partnership as an attempt to contain China’s rise. What does Bangladesh’s ‘Monsoon Revolution’ mean for Bangladesh’s position in South Asia’s geopolitics? Monsoon Revolution The events that Bangladesh has experienced since the beginning of August 2024 caught everyone by surprise. Sheikh Hasina, daughter of the leader of Bangladesh's independence war in 1971, had held on to power since 2009. Her Awami League increasingly took control of state apparatus in the police force and forged fake election   results in 2014, 2019 and 2024. Reports of electoral manipulation and imprisoning opposition figures in the rival Bangladesh National Party (BNP) were widespread and her rule seemed impenetrable.  Yet by August 2024,  the authoritarian state erected by Sheikh Hasina fell in a matter of days . After months of student-led protests over a quota system in June 2024 in Dhaka, the authorities violently cracked down on the largely peaceful demonstrators. Hundreds of protesters were killed and reports of the torture of students by security forces took Bangladesh's society to the streets as they called for the ruling PM Sheikh Hasina’s resignation. Splits emerged within the military and police  factions as it became clear that the protests could not be stopped. On 5 August, protesters stormed her presidential palace and ransacked the building. Sheikh Hasina resigned and fled to New Delhi, India, where she remains. While she has applied for asylum in UAE and the UK for safety, they have so far refused extradition calls. The new government quickly came to power with Muhammad Yunus , a Nobel prize winning economist, as the new acceptable head of government . He released political opponents of Sheikh Hasina, including the leader of one of Bangladesh’s main political parties, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), and scheduled new elections to be held within 90 days. He also pledged to remove the Awami League’s hold over state institutions, firing police chiefs and other members of the state apparatus. Amid reports emerging  of violence targeting members of the Awami League following Hasina’s resignation, he quickly called for calm and a stop to vigilante violence as he pledged a transition to a new democratic government.   India’s wrong-footed strategy  India saw the removal of Sheikh Hasina as an acute setback for India’s security, trade and possible loss of regional influence in South Asia. India backed Sheikh Hasina throughout her time in power. This was a historical commitment, as India backed her father’s war for independence when it separated from West Pakistan. In talks over new infrastructure deals, she chose Indian companies instead of Chinese companies, resolved some territorial conflicts with India and claimed to clamp down on armed ethnic groups using Bangladesh as a base to attack India’s unstable Manipur region.   The removal of Sheikh Hasina will likely lead to tensions between Bangladesh and India. The International Crime Tribunal in Bangladesh has taken steps to extradite  Sheikh Hasina from India and called for Sheikh Hasina to be held to account, which India has so far refused. Bangladesh will remember that India firmly backed the ousted Sheikh Hasina and her party, the Awami League, while she manipulated elections and arrested opposition-leaders. Moreover, Indian Prime Minister Modi’s acutely anti-Muslim rhetoric has led to considerable criticism within Bangladesh. India has not forged  closer ties with the popular opposition party, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), which is confident that it will win the next general election planned in November 2024. India is therefore intensely suspicious of what comes next in Bangladesh. External Minister Jaishankar did not rule out the suspicion that ‘outside forces’ played a role in ousting Sheikh Hasina, pointing to the suspicion of India toward the Pakistan-China relationship. India feels that it is being encircled  by an emerging China in South Asia with its infrastructure policies and emerging military capabilities in the Indian Ocean. There are also signs that India’s foreign policy is not working. India’s formerly close partners are turning away. The Maldives’ newly elected president, Mohamed Muizzu, asked the Indian military stationed in the country to leave in May 2024. Nepal’s new prime minister Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli led to new agreements with China to establish a new infrastructure deal. If new elections are held in Bangladesh, India believes it could lose influence to China too.   China’s strategic gain? China has not taken a side in the aftermath of Bangladesh’s revolution. After Sheikh Hasina resigned at the beginning of August 2024, China’s nationalist Global Times newspaper stated that China “hopes that social stability will be restored soon”. However, China’s diplomatic core has since sought to take the initiative. A Chinese foreign service spokesman said  that “we want to further develop the all-round strategic partnership with the new government in Bangladesh’. This puts China potentially at an advantage diplomatically for the new government as it does not hold on to the former Sheikh Hasina.  Despite Sheikh Hasina’s close ties with India, she cultivated close ties with China too. Bangladesh joined China’s vast overseas infrastructure-based project the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 and built several seaports, railway tracks and powerplants. Up to 70% of the weapons for the Bangladeshi military were bought from China, including tanks, missiles and other weapons. China and Bangladesh announced joint military exercises held in May 2024, to the intense opposition of India’s foreign policy establishment.  China’s ties with Bangladesh could deepen in the future. The probable victory of the next election in Bangladesh, the BNP, could look more toward China to fulfill its infrastructure and development needs over India. But the relationship is not without its issues. Bangladesh’s finance ministry has also warned that China’s investment deals and excessive borrowing have led to ‘debt-traps’, citing Sri Lanka’s default in 2022 as evidence. In negotiations earlier in 2024, Sheikh Hasina’s visit to the country did not result in many new infrastructure deals or an agreement to buy more goods from Bangladesh. Whether China is willing or able to capitalize on its diplomatic opportunity is still uncertain.  Looking Forward Bangladesh’s transition to democracy will be challenging. Attempts at achieving justice for families killed and persecuted for years by the security services. At the same time, Bangladesh’s geopolitical position embroils it in the larger geopolitical competition for regional dominance between China and India  in South Asia. With India seemingly protecting Sheikh Hasina from extradition to face a trial in Bangladesh, ties between the two are likely to worsen. India’s government may distrust and dismiss Bangladesh’s next government as moving toward China. While there is a hope that this is the first step in a democratic transition, Bangladesh will find itself stuck between a rock and a hard place.

Date:   11/09/2024 Where : Afghanistan Who’s involved : Taliban, International airlines, other aircraft operators What happened? Since the taking of power by the Taliban in Afghanistan, most aviation operators have been avoiding the airspace over the country (except airway P/G500). Recently, some countries such as Canada and the Netherlands are starting to overfly the country with a minimum altitude restriction in place of FL320 . This routing can save a significant amount of time when flying between Europe and Asia, compared to alternatives.  Analysis : As far as it is known, the Taliban and other militant groups in Afghanistan do not have the capability, and to some extent the intent, to target overflying aircraft at cruise altitudes. Airlines and other operators, however, must consider the consequences if problems on board challenge the ability or choice to stay at cruising altitude. When entering the airspace below FL320, an aircraft will quickly descend into the range of anti-air weapons present in the country. The shoulder fired anti-air missiles (MANPADS) in the country are largely able to reach FL150 , due to range augmentation by the high altitude of much of the country’s territory. ‘Perfect’ circumstances will allow for ranges reaching FL200 over the majority of the central part of the country .  Mechanical issues: Obvious reasons for aircraft to descend, or commit to a full emergency landing stem from mechanical issues. For example, a loss of cabin pressure will force an aircraft to descend well within the range of MANPADS  as explained above. Other issues that can force an aircraft to land will make a flight very likely land in Afghanistan considering the size of the country. This presents the challenge of not just getting pax and crew out, but also eventually the aircraft itself.  Medical issues: An easily overlooked perspective is if medical problems occur with either crew or pax on board of an aircraft over Afghanistan.  Deciding to land in Afghanistan does not only bring an aircraft in range of the many weapons in the country, but it also does not guarantee the necessary medical care and services to those who need it. This would also mean the aircraft and all of its crew and pax are now on ground in Taliban-led Afghanistan . The alternative –not landing– can also be a difficult decision that falls on the pilot(s). In, for example, the scenario where one of the pilots becomes incapacitated, the colleague(s) sitting next to them is/are now in charge of the difficult decision to attempt to find rescue in the country or to continue flying, possibly sealing the fate  of the colleague. Similarly, there is also the cabin crew and all of the pax who can have medical issues.  Conclusion : While operating over Afghanistan under normal circumstances is secure, the situation can quickly escalate as soon as anything out of the ordinary happens during the flight. Consequences of both mechanical and medical events should be strongly considered when deciding to operate over Afghanistan. Besides the presented security issues in this document, safety and ethical issues exist about operating over the country. The country has no ATC and the money paid to gain overflight rights goes to the Taliban, which is a terrorist organization that severely restricts freedoms and violates the rights of its citizens, especially women.

September 2024 India is the world’s largest democracy and one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, making it an attractive destination for Dutch entrepreneurs. With its young workforce, expanding middle class, and evolving business landscape, India offers significant opportunities. The Netherlands is already a key investor in India, and the relationship between the two countries is set to strengthen in the future. While China remains a global manufacturing hub, rising geopolitical tensions and costs have led many companies to shift operations to India. India's vast market, particularly in rural areas and tier 2 cities, presents Dutch companies with opportunities to make a significant impact on millions of lives. However, Dutch entrepreneurs face challenges in India, including navigating a complex political climate, language barriers, and significant cultural differences that affect business practices.  India’s efforts to attract foreign business Doing business in India requires time and effort in order to understand its diverse and segmented market, which closely resembles Europe's variety of national markets, each with specific needs and regulations. By co-designing our services with Indian experts in the political, legal and economic realms, Dutch businesses can effectively tailor their offerings to local demands. Indian politics and its challenges for foreign business India's political environment presents a complex landscape for foreign businesses due to its multi-party system and the significant influence of state-level politics on business regulations. India’s federal structure of governance, where states have substantial autonomy over various sectors, contributes to the complex business environment. The success of foreign investments in sectors like renewable energy, agriculture, health, and water management depends heavily on understanding and adapting to these political and legislative dynamics. Renewable Energy  In India, while sectors like Renewable Energy and Agriculture allow 100% Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), navigating the diverse regulatory landscape across states can be challenging. For example, states like Tamil Nadu and Gujarat offer different incentives for solar energy projects, leading to a lack of uniformity in approvals, land acquisition policies, and tariff structures. Political shifts and regional regulations often introduce additional layers of complexity.  Agriculture  In Agriculture, despite open FDI in areas like food processing, political opposition and public protests can disrupt operations and lead to policy reversals. One example is the extensive farmers protests that took place in 2020-2021 against agricultural reforms proposed by the national government. The months of negotiation caused uncertainty for foreign businesses looking to invest in the country. A good awareness of the political importance of agriculture is vital for those looking to invest in the sector.  Water Management Water management in India is also influenced by political shifts, with states controlling water resources and varying regulations based on their focus (agriculture, industry, or urban development). State-level political parties often tailor their water management policies to the needs of their voter base, resulting in policy changes when power shifts occur. Similarly, sectors like Space Exploration and Defense require high-level government approvals for FDI, tying investments to the political climate and key political relationships. Recent relaxations in FDI rules, such as allowing up to 74% FDI in defense under the default route, reflect India's gradual openness but also emphasize alignment with government priorities. India’s security challenges  As well as the constantly shifting policy in key sectors, there are also security concerns for doing business in India. With India being such a diverse country and a major player on the regional and global playing field, there are some security concerns that need to be considered when doing business there. Political risk Political risk is an ongoing concern in India In recent years the Indian political system has shown changes that are taking the country away from its democratic principles. Prime Minister Modi has, through his politics and decrees, shown that he wants the future of the country to be one with more emphasis on Hindu Nationalism. The BJP’s propaganda often blames economic or societal problems on minority religions, increasing repression of the Muslim community in particular. Taking into consideration the closely intertwined political-business fields, political developments are highly relevant for entrepreneurs in India.  Protests and activism are a common phenomenon in India, varying in degree of disruption and inconvenience. For example, protests across India began after a sexual violence crime in West Bengal on August 9, 2024. Health workers and politicians, some seeking political gain, have driven the demonstrations, which have been met with teargas and water cannons. Sexual violence remains a major issue in India, and the protests have disrupted healthcare services, affecting thousands of patients nationwide.  Espionage risk Due to India’s economic and international political significance, corporate and other forms of espionage have become an additional risk for visiting businesspeople. Access to WiFi networks, spyware, phishing and other forms of electronic surveillance such as the Aadhaar biometric ID system, increase government tracking capabilities. India’s booming military industry has also become a target for foreign spy agencies to obtain blueprints and other information from businesses in the defense industry. India and (inter)national tensions India’s national security is also not a stranger to conflict. As a continent-sized country with a diverse population, there are several independence movements across the country. The BJP’s focus on Hindu nationalism further intensifies the decades long tension between India and Pakistan, both of which have large armies and nuclear capabilities. In the northern Kashmir region, forces are known to use violence against Indian government representatives and threaten national security. Additionally, India has accused Pakistan of actively recruiting local Kashmiris to act as militants, further escalating tensions in the region. These regions and their militias are not likely to soften, nor do they seem willing to sign cease fire or peace agreements with the Indian government.  India-China tensions  India and China also vie for dominance in South Asia and Southeast Asia, and their rivalry has led to military confrontations, most notably the Galwan Valley clash in June 2020. This violent skirmish, which occurred along the disputed Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Himalayas, resulted in casualties on both sides—the first deadly conflict between India and China in over 40 years. The clash heightened tensions and led to a significant military buildup along the border. There is a rising risk of India being drawn into a conflict if China faces off with the Philippines, as India supports the Philippines against Chinese naval incursions. India is, in that sense, in a difficult political and geographical position, surrounded by potential escalating conflicts. Cultural differences  To operate successfully in a new foreign environment requires appropriate preparation. Familiarizing yourself with local norms and values is a prerequisite for transitioning smoothly onto the foreign market you are trying to enter. Being prepared for India’s cultural diversity will lead to better decision making within the country. Language  Not being able to read or understand Hindi can lead to risks that could be easily avoided if you work with somebody who can translate relevant information and interpret it in a way that applies to you. Although English is widely spoken in India and commonly accepted as a language for corporate communication, much of what goes on in daily life, the news and local events can be overlooked when you are not familiar with the local language. Business culture  Learning about Indian cultural differences also plays a significant role in determining your future success in India. Understanding how a hierarchy works within your Indian partnering company team, for example, can minimize the possibility of unnecessary conflicts arising.  Knowing the appropriate gestures (anjali mudra, putting your hands together to greet), forms of address (sir or ma’am) and key phrases (namaste or namaskār) on the other hand leave a positive impression, which is a critical factor for successful business interactions, gaining trust and building a reliable network.   Looking forward It is essential that Dutch entrepreneurs wishing to enter the Indian market are thoroughly informed about the changing policy environment, security situation and cultural sensitivities in the region they are operating in. Taking proactive steps to protect their business and enforce CSR standards are necessary to minimize risks and maintain operational continuity. Dyami in partnership with Vyuh Consulting helps to identify these risks. With a good understanding of the opportunities and safety concerns, Dutch entrepreneurs can make the most of the opportunities of India while ensuring their operations remain secure. About Vyuh Consulting Inspired by the Sanskrit word "Vyuh," which signifies strategy, Vyuh Consulting  is a dedicated team of professionals with over a decade of experience in election management, branding, and strategic advisory. The firm specializes in crafting custom campaigns, offering strategic insights, and delivering in-depth political intelligence. With a broad network across India, Vyuh Consulting leverages its deep understanding of the country's diverse political landscape to provide actionable solutions. The firm's mission is to guide clients through political challenges, helping shape a more informed and effective future for India.

Written by Arianna Lucà, Jacob Dickinson, Mark Bruno, Kevin Heller, Sara Frisan  Russia-Ukraine : As Ukraine invades Russia, operationalizes F-16s and domestically develops weapons to hit targets within Russia, Moscow is advancing on Pokrovsk.  Israel:   With the recovery of six hostages who were killed by Hamas, Netanyahu feels the pressure from inside and out to strike a deal with Hamas.  Myanmar: Arakan Army gains control of Rakhine State and resistance forces gain more territory as humanitarian crisis deepens. Sudan:   As Sudanese army boycotts U.S.-led peace talks, no end in sight to Sudan conflict. Libya:  The two main rivaling groups in Libya are both mobilizing forces and calling on militias to join their side in the run up to the October 2024 general elections.  Turkey: As Turkey continues to conduct lethal airstrikes in a cross-borders counter-terrorism campaign, it attempts to improve relations with Iraq and Syria. Burkina Faso: Unprecedented deadly attack in Burkina Faso shows military junta's struggles to combat rampant extremist violence. Indonesia: Proposed electoral law is canceled after thousands protests in Jakarta. DRC: Ceasefire with M23 fails as fighting resumes in eastern DRC. Venezuela:  As the crackdown on protests continues, the Maduro government issues an arrest warrant for the opposition leader.  Haiti: As Haiti is rocked by gang violence, the slow progress of the MSS raises concerns about the effectiveness of the UN-backed mission. China-Philippines: Coast guard vessel confrontation over another island in the South China Sea, the Sabina Shoal. Conflicts, August 2024 Russia-Ukraine In August 2024, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine saw a significant development, with Ukraine invading Russia . The surprise i ncursion into the Kursk region resulted in over 1200 km2 captured by the Ukrainian Armed Forces and hundreds if not thousands of Russian soldiers taken as POWs. Being Putin's latest 'red line' crossed, even this direct invasion of Russian soil has not triggered any of the escalation scenarios feared by the Western leaders . Ukraine publicly stated it has no long-term plans to keep Russian soil under its control; however, the defensive works put in place indicate it will not give it back without a fight. For now, Ukraine is still on the advance in the region , likely looking to take the Russian soldiers caught in the cut-off and surrounded area between Ukraine and the Seym River out of the fight.  On the other side of the spectrum and the conflict lies the Donetsk region ,  where the Russian Armed Forces have concentrated their offensive efforts . With their eyes set on Pokrovsk, the Russian Armed Forces are slowly but steadily making their way to the city. In a movement that worried many analysts about a potential breakthrough, fighting will likely arrive in Pokrovsk within the coming month . A town comparable in size to Bakhmut, the question is whether the world will see a repeat of the meat grinder that was Bakhmut. Russia took around six months to take that city, losing an exorbitant amount of manpower.  Airstrikes between the two nations are only escalating as the war continues,  with Russia recently launching its biggest aerial attack since the start of the full-scale war. This attack also gave the recently arrived F-16s their official baptism of fire, as they were used to fend off the incoming attack. One F-16 was lost  in this operation, which was claimed to have been an accident. Much about this is unclear for now, with claims from Ukraine that there was no case of pilot error.  As permission to engage targets with donated weapons inside Russia was not granted by (all) western countries, Ukraine sees more and more domestically developed long-range weapons on a regular basis. Their latest product is a new ' rocket drone ' which is meant to attack Russian targets well beyond its borders. Being a multitude faster than any of the current drones Ukraine uses to attack Russia at the moment, the success rate of this new weapon is likely to be higher. The war continues with no clear future victor in sight . Weapon developments continue steadily , both to outdo their opponent or to fill gaps left by supporting countries.  Israel The conflict between Israel and Hamas is still ongoing. Hamas and Israel have both agreed to return to the negotiation table to talk about a ceasefire in Gaza and to talk about the release of the Israeli hostages , of which 100 are still believed to be in the hands of Hamas. With the recovery of the bodies of six hostages who were killed by Hamas, the pressure on Netanyahu to reach a peace agreement with Hamas is growing . The United States, Europe, and the Arab countries all call on Netanyahu to reach a deal as soon as possible so the last hostages can be released. Meanwhile,   Israeli citizens have taken to the streets to demand a hostage deal as quickly as possible. However,  the right-wing parties and commanders in the IDF are convinced that Hamas is close to being completely defeated  and are very reluctant to sit down for a peace agreement, as a peace deal could give Hamas time to replenish resources and recruit new troops. Israel has been conducting military operations in Gaza aimed at denying Hamas recuperation since August 2024 by destroying their weapon caches, tunnels, and several headquarters.  Hamas has not been able to launch any significant attacks on Israel  or Israeli forces, and the ceasefire negotiations are likely to be the only means for Hamas to be able to survive the coming months. After the targeted assassinations of Hamas leader Haniyeh in Tehran and Hezbollah commander Shukr in Beirut on July 30 , both Iran and Hezbollah have threatened to retaliate against Israel. On August 25, the Israeli Air Force sent 100 fighter jets into Lebanon to  destroy over 1000 Hezbollah missile installations  in a pre-emptive strike as intelligence showed Hezbollah was preparing to launch hundreds, if not thousands, of missiles, rockets and UAVs into Israel. In response to the pre-emptive strike, Hezbollah managed to launch over 400 missiles and UAVs into Israel, which were either intercepted by Israeli air defense systems or did minimal damage to the countryside. According to several United States intelligence services, Iran is still willing to strike at Israel, but it is unclear why there is a delay in the execution of the plan. The pressure put on Iran by the US is likely to be a significant factor. At the same time, Iran is undergoing an intensive audit of its security forces as it seems that valuable information has been leaked to Israeli intelligence services  on the strengths of Iran’s weapons programs and the whereabouts of high-ranking Iranian, Palestinian, and Lebanese leaders and commanders. The coming months will show whether or not any of the involved parties in the conflict are willing to agree to a ceasefire or that the conflict will continue and perhaps escalate even further. It is clear, however, that Israel will not easily submit to ceasefire negotiations now that it feels it is winning the war against Hamas and it has such a grip on the movements of Iran and Hezbollah. The pressure from the US on all parties is likely to keep the region from completely falling apart into a regional war , especially since most Arab states have shown reluctance to support Iran, Hezbollah, or Hamas recently and are making various forms of business treaties and agreements with Israel. Myanmar The Myanmar civil war is ongoing. The resistance groups against the military junta have taken wrested control from the military in Shan, Kayah, and the Kachin State . The Arakan Army (AA) has taken most of the central and northern parts of the Rakhine State, on the border with Bangladesh, and has taken numerous important cities previously held by the military. There are reports of  widespread human rights abuses against Rohingya Muslims  from the military junta’s forced conscription to the AA’s attacks on civilians. The intense fighting between AA forces and the military  and airstrikes against civilian areas has led to a humanitarian crisis as hundreds of thousands flee. The UN said that the food aid being supplied to civilians has also been prevented from entering the state, with over 600,000 civilians at risk of starvation .  In mid-August  the government announced that certain civilians will be allowed to carry weapons  as the resistance forces approach the country’s second largest city, Mandalay. After the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) captured Lashio, a major military operations center in the northeastern Shan State, the military has been attempting to shore up further support from China. The  TNLA’s seizure of a Chinese-owned nickel mine has threatened China’s economic interests  and the ability of the military junta to control its interests in the country. The Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi met with the US, Thailand and the UN to discuss the issue at the same time as launching live-fire military exercises on the border with Myanmar.  The military junta’s loss of control in key areas  as well as the ineffectiveness of deadly airstrikes has led to more delays in its proposed elections. The National Unity Government, the main opposition coordinating the resistance forces, has called the next elections as a sham . While the majority of the country as well as western governments will see the elections as illegitimate, for China and other regional actors, this is seen as an opening to some kind of political settlement. Yet the challenges faced by the military and the progress of the armed groups suggest that the civil war is likely to continue in the coming months .  Sudan In August 2024, the  US-brokered peace talks  to resolve the ongoing Sudan conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). were held in Geneva. However, neither of the warring parties showed up . Although the RSF delegation was present in Geneva, it boycotted the negotiations. Sudan's de facto governor, army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, decided not to attend the talks in Switzerland following RSF's continued armed and drone attacks in the country. The talks in Geneva proceeded despite the absence of the SAF delegation. While the negotiations did not result in a cessation of hostilities or steps toward ending the conflict, some progress was made regarding access to humanitarian aid . The warring parties agreed to reopen the Adre border crossing from Chad, which is connected to the Darfur region, and the Dabbah road from Port Sudan.  Despite the non-attendance in Geneva, the SAF sent a delegation to Jeddah to meet with U.S. mediators in early August and announced its presence at a meeting in Cairo to discuss humanitarian assistance with the US and Egypt.  As peace talks stall, the  humanitarian crisis in Sudan continues to worsen . According to a UN report released in early August,  over half a million people in Sudan are living in famine  and nearly 27 million are experiencing acute hunger. Moreover, armed violence and clashes between RSF and the army , as well as attacks targeting civilians persist in the country. On August 17, at least 85 people were killed in the central  province of Sennar during a paramilitary attack on the village of Galgani. RSF attacks persist in North Darfur, an area recently affected by massive floods. At least 30 people were  killed in early August during an attack on El Fasher, capital of North Darfur. In the last few weeks, extensive Sudanese army airstrikes have been reported in the region. On September 1, at least 10 people were killed and over 40 wounded in airstrikes in the city of Mellit in North Darfur.  Alerts, August 2024 Libya On August 9, the UN mission in Libya, UNSMIL, warned of a  possible new conflict   in the already war-torn Libya . The country has been run by two rival governments since 2014. The Western government, the Government of National Accord, is supported by the UN and the EU. In contrast, the eastern government, called the Libyan National Army, receives support from various sources, including Iran, Russia, and some Arab and sub-saharan states.  The Libyan National Army, run by former warlord Khalifa Haftar, feels it has the right to run more of Libya and has been desperate to take control of strategically important cities. Haftar's forces, led by his son Saddam, have attacked Tripoli in 2019 in an attempt to take control of the entire country. The attack failed, and a peace deal was signed in 2020.  Since the end of July and the beginning of August 2024, Haftar has been mobilizing his forces  again and has called for the help of other local tribes and clans to join his forces. In response,  the Government of National Accord mobilized its forces  and called on other clans and militias to strengthen its forces. The fragile peace in Libya has not been under this much pressure for years, and several observers and analysts fear that a renewed conflict is unavoidable . The recent arrival of a large merchant vessel in one of the Haftar-controlled harbors is believed to be under the authority of the Russian government. Some believe that Russia has just delivered a new set of weapons for Haftar in his bid to take control of Libya. The appointment of a new president of the National Bank on August 15   has not helped calm the situation down, as both parties feel the other is trying to gain control over the economy. In response, the Libyan National Army has shut down oil production in its areas of control. As an OPEC member this provision could affect the international price of crude oil. Oil workers in the harbors of Libya have said that they are continuing to fill oil tankers up and have not heard anything about the reported shutdown. The coming weeks will prove whether or not Haftar is truly intent on gaining more control over cities, airports, and harbors. The reaction of the international community  will determine whether or not such a move will turn into a full-blown war. Turkey This summer has seen a number of developments in the conflict between Turkey and the various Kurdish independence movements , broadly referred to as the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK). Turkey considers all of the groups that fall under this umbrella as affiliated with the insurgent Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) , which is internationally recognized as a terrorist organization. Despite any differences in motivation, national origin, or objective, all of these groups are considered terrorists by Erdoğan’s government, and have been targeted in various military operations that have taken place not only in southern Turkey, but outside national borders in Iraq and Syria. The Turkish state has pushed this campaign as a broader anti-terrorism effort  that it has contributed to against ISIS and other IS affiliates. Turkey’s mixed strategic priorities in the region have complicated its relationships with several allies. Particularly, Turkey has been at odds with the United States and Iraq, who support various parties within the KCK  (though not the PKK). Developments in Turkish campaigns have gone largely underreported due to the unfolding regional conflict centered on Israel. In   attempts to improve relations with Iraq and the Assad regime in Syria, Turkey and Iraq have developed a new military cooperation pact . Part of this has included a promise to hand control of a Nineveh-province airbase back to Iraq’s Army. At the same time, the Syrian regime has declared that it will no longer demand that Turkish troops leave the country , as both governments discuss re-normalizing their relationship. It should be noted that both the Turkish and Syrian governments have fought various elements of the KCK, even as all three factions have been at war with ISIS. This could be indicative of further positioning of both militaries against the PYD/YPG, who are allied with the United States. As well, the normalization may be part of an attempt to re-home Syrian refugees staying in Turkey , who have recently faced increased persecution and political pressure since the beginning of the year. Turkish airstrikes into Iraq have continued , with an August 23rd strike into Iraqi Kurdistan, controlled by other KCK affiliates, killing three people, and another on September 2nd, killing twenty. The second strike was claimed by the Turkish government as being against purely PKK targets with no civilian casualties. That same day, a former PKK operative and Turkish citizen was sentenced to four years and three months of prison in Germany on terrorism charges. On September 3, two US marines were attacked by a group of fifteen assailants in the port city of Izmir. The attackers were members of the Turkish Youth Union, an extreme nationalist group. Both marines were returned to their unit uninjured and the assailants arrested. Burkina Faso On August 25, 2024, an unprecedented armed attack by the Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin group (JNIM) , an Al Qaeda affiliate in West Africa, killed more than 200 people and injured at least a hundred. The strike occurred in the village of Barsalogho, located about 80 kilometers north of the capital, Ouagadougou, near the strategic town of Kaia. Despite Al Qaeda-linked JNIM's claim that the victims were militia affiliated with the Burkina Faso army, local sources report that most of the victims were instead civilians. Since 2015, Burkina Faso has suffered regular armed attacks by jihadist groups  in a conflict that has claimed more than 20,000 lives. The military government, which lacks control over vast areas of the country, especially near the porous borders with Mali and Niger, has strengthened its partnership with the Russian government  in recent months to secure support in the fight against extremist terrorist attacks.  In July 2024, the military juntas of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger created a confederation called the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) , formalizing their exit from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and distancing themselves from Western partners. Although the new alliance promises to effectively combat extremist terror and militia attacks in the region, the rapid spread of violent extremist organizations, including the al-Qaeda-linked Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), is alarming. After the exit from the ECOWAS bloc  and the withdrawal of all Western forces from the three countries, which are among the most affected by the Islamic groups' violence, international observers and ECOWAS leaders fear a spillover of jihadist groups into neighboring countries. Following the late August attack, the UN called on the Burkina Faso government to re-engage with the international community  and the ECOWS to ensure security and obtain support  in combating the rise of extremism in the region.  While extremist violence rages, Burkina Faso is experiencing a severe humanitarian crisis,  with more than 6 million people in need of humanitarian assistance and food insecurity. The government is tightening its authoritarian grip on the population , increasingly restricting freedoms and rights in the name of "national security." The political isolation of the AES military juntas makes hopes for democratic government restoration in the region unrealistic.  Indonesia People in Indonesia’s capital Jakarta have protested   against a government attempt to reverse a ruling by Indonesia’s top court on August 22 . This ruling determined that parties do not need a minimum of 20% of the vote in their regional assemblies as a prerequisite for fielding a candidate. While most of the protests in Jakarta  remain peaceful, some protesters tried to breach the gates of the Indonesian House of Representatives. Police fired tear gas and water cannons. Protests also took place in the cities Yogyakarta, Bandung, Surabaya, and Makassar on August 23. These protests focussed on outgoing president Jokowi’s attempts to prolong his political influence  through installing his sons to positions in Indonesia’s political system. Eventually, it was stated by the deputy speaker that  the revision of the regional election law would not be implemented  on August 22. It is unclear whether the government will try to implement the revisions again in the future, but worries in Indonesia about Jokowi's increase of political influence are growing . Jokowi changed the constitutional age limits to allow his son to run for vice president in the 2024 general elections. Tensions have risen after the protests on August 22 and August 23 and future political maneuvers by Jokowi and his government could lead to more protests in the near future.  Updates, August 2024 Democratic Republic of Congo Despite signing an Angola-brokered ceasefire between the Congolese government and Rwanda , which came into effect on August 4, clashes in eastern DRC North Kivu intensified in late August 2024. Heavy fighting renewed between Congolese forces and the M23 rebel group near the densely populated areas of Lake Edward and Lake Kivu. It was reported that Rwanda-backed M23 had made a significant advance , taking control on August 25 of the eastern town of Kirumba. On August 28, M23 accused the Congolese army for the first time of violating the ceasefire, claiming that Kinshasa-backed rebels, such as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and Wazalendo militias, but also international forces, including those of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), were violating the ceasefire. The  fragile ceasefire was also undermined by rising tensions between the DRC and Rwanda governments , which peaked after Rwanda President Kagame criticized Congolese President Tshisekedi on August 11 for failing to address the deteriorating security situation in the region. The DRC announced that it will sue Rwanda in the East African Court of Justice  on September 26 over charges of violating its sovereignty, committing atrocities against civilians, and violating international law with its involvement in the conflict and support for the M23.  While the resumption of clashes threatens to worsen the  humanitarian crisis  in the country, the DRC is also facing the rapid spread of the Mpox epidemic . Although Mpox is endemic in 11 provinces in the DRC, the number of cases has been rising sharply over the past two years. Between January and August 2024, more than 16,000 suspected cases were reported in almost all 26 provinces. Displaced people and people affected by the conflict are particularly at risk. Humanitarian aid and vaccines are delayed.  Venezuela Political and social unrest  continues to grip Venezuela following the contested presidential election on July 28. On August 22, the Venezuelan Supreme Court (TSJ) confirmed President Maduro's victory , a ruling that is final and has sparked widespread condemnation both internationally and regionally. The TSJ also accused opposition candidate Edmundo González of attempted electoral fraud and inciting violence alongside opposition leader María Corina Machado. Both González and Machado went into hiding. However, Machado resurfaced on August 28 to join the  latest protests against Maduro in Caracas . In a recent interview, she asserted that the opposition has a strong strategy, emphasizing that coordinated internal and external efforts, including peaceful protests and international pressure, still hold the potential to unseat President Maduro. On September 2, Venezuela's attorney general's office confirmed that a court had issued an arrest warrant for opposition leader Edmundo González , accusing him of conspiracy and other crimes against Maduro's government.  Since the election, anti-government protests have resulted in at least 23 deaths, nearly 200 injuries, and over 2,400 arrests . Amid the deepening crisis,   the government has escalated its crackdown by imposing tighter restrictions on NGOs and forcing over 100 state employees at the state oil company PDVSA to resign for opposing Maduro. The Venezuelan military has pledged loyalty to Maduro , who has increasingly relied on security forces to maintain his hold on power. Diosdado Cabello, a hardline ruling party leader, has been appointed as interior minister with control over the police forces, raising fears of an intensified crackdown on dissent. International pressure on the Maduro government persists . On September 2, the US seized Venezuela's presidential airplane in the Dominican Republic, allegedly purchased in violation of sanctions. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights urged Venezuelan authorities to end actions that instill terror in the population. However, the crisis shows no signs of abating,  and further protests are expected as tensions continue to escalate. Haiti Anti-gang operations in Haiti are progressing slowly , two months after the arrival of the first Kenyan police forces. Currently, 400 Kenyan soldiers are deployed out of the 2,500 planned, and concerns are mounting over the effectiveness of the UN-backed Kenya-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission aimed at assisting Haitian police in restoring security. While the Kenyan forces have successfully reclaimed infrastructural sites in Port-au-Prince, including the airport and the largest hospital, challenges persist. In late July 2024, Kenyan troops conducted an operation in Ganthier, a town east of Port-au-Prince that had fallen under gang control. However, the operation saw limited success as gang members fled before the security forces arrived, only to retake the town after the Kenyan and Haitian police withdrew. Moreover, the MSS strategies are not clear, and there is  limited involvement of Haitian police  and authorities in the operations, undermining the credibility and effectiveness of the mission. Reports of inadequate equipment for the MSS forces have prompted the U.S. military to announce, on August 24, the delivery of additional armored vehicles and equipment to enhance operational effectiveness during joint missions with Haitian police. To strengthen the military corps in fighting gangs, the  Haitian army has opened a recruitment campaign inciting citizens to enlist for national security. At least 3,000 candidates have already been selected. For many young people, in most cases unemployed and without job opportunities, the chance to become a soldier is particularly attractive. On August 19,  Haitian police used tear gas to disperse hundreds of peaceful protesters in Port-au-Prince  who were demanding more decisive action against   gang violence, frustrated by the recent failures of law enforcement. These protests occurred just days after a new prison breakout in Saint-Marc, central Haiti, the third such incident this year. Eleven suspected escapees were killed in shootouts with police, and one was recaptured. Haiti continues to grapple with severe challenges , including persistent gang violence and domestic political turmoil, with the interim council facing accusations of corruption. China-Philippines Tensions in the South China Sea calmed somewhat after an agreement between China and the Philippines allowed the Philippines ship in the Second Thomas Shoal to be resupplied with food and water. However, in late August, the Philippines and China claimed that both sides had rammed coast guard vessels near another disputed island in the South China Sea.  The Sabina Shoal, located 120 km from the Philippines and 1,000km away from mainland China, is emerging as the latest flashpoint between the two sides. The US responded by backing its treaty ally, the Philippines , and criticized China’s actions in the region. The Chinese defense ministry has repeatedly claimed that the US is pushing the Philippines to provoke China and damaging regional security. The international response has become more of a factor in the South China Sea. The Philippines and Vietnam signed a significant defense cooperation agreement i n late-August as both sides share concern over the growing assertiveness and claims in the South China Sea. Vietnam has also been constructing islands in its exclusive economic zone to control parts under threat from China in the South China Sea. However, the new collaboration reflects a recognition that it has to work with the Philippines. The competing claims over many of the islands in  the South China Sea will continue to be a point of tension in the coming months.  About the authors  Arianna Lucà Arianna is an intern at Dyami, covering the role of Research Intelligence Analyst to enrich her background knowledge in International Relations with topics involving security and conflict. She holds an MA in International Relations from Leiden University and an LLM in European Criminal Justice from Utrecht University. During her academic career, she volunteered for different NGOs, mainly Amnesty International, and Emergency and ActionAid, embracing humanitarian and conflict security causes, and addressing issues like famine and lack of security in different regions of the world. With Dyami, she is contributing to joint publications, writing articles, and keeping up to date with key regional developments. Jacob Dickinson  Jacob studied Global Political Economy at Leiden University. He is passionate about international development and is looking to expand his expertise in geopolitics and crisis management. Curious about other cultures, he has traveled in Europe and Asia for both academic study and professional purposes. His expertise includes the geopolitics of oil and industrial upgrading in the electronics global value chain. He is particularly interested in the evolving political and economic relationships between China and ASEAN, and the consequences for regional development and security.  Kevin Heller Kevin has over a decade of experience in the world of counter-terrorism as a consultant, trainer, and analyst. His background is in military Close Quarter Battle/Combat and Krav Maga for Military and Law Enforcement agencies. As a Global Intelligence Analyst, he writes Intel Briefs on conflict zones and terrorism.He has extensive knowledge of conflicts, politics, and other events happening in the Middle East. Kevin also has a background in Journalism and International Affairs/Conflict Studies. Mark Bruno Mark is a former noncommissioned officer in the US Army whose experiences and education have led him to a career as a cybersecurity and conflict analyst. His background in cyber and electronic warfare, combat medicine, open source intelligence, and information operations, have helped provide valuable insight to the Dyami team, where he now serves as the Information Security Officer. Sara Frisan  Sara works at Dyami as a Geopolitical Intelligence Analyst, leveraging her background in Peace and Conflict Studies. Sara joined Dyami after completing her MA in Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University and held an MA degree in International Sciences and Peace Studies. During her academic career, she conducted research in South America, primarily Colombia, on the dynamics of collaboration and resistance between civilians and non-state armed groups in violent settings. In her previous internship at the investigative think-tank InSight Crime, Sara developed some expertise on transnational organized crime and political-criminal alliances.

Date:  02/09/2024 Where :  France Who’s involved :   Pavel Durov (Telegram CEO/Founder) French Authorities The broader intelligence community What happened? Pavel Durov , the founder and CEO of the social media and messaging platform, Telegram , is currently facing significant legal challenges in France.  Durov  was initially detained at Le Bourget Airport near Paris on August 24, 2024 . On August 28, 2024 , he was formally charged with several serious offenses, including complicity in illegal activities facilitated through Telegram . The specific charges against Durov  include: Complicity in Managing an Online Platform for Illegal Activities:  This includes accusations that Telegram has been used to facilitate the distribution of child sexual abuse material and drug trafficking. Refusal to Comply with Legal Requests:   Durov  has been charged with refusing to share information or documents with French authorities when required by law, which is seen as obstructing justice. Money Laundering:  This charge relates to allegations that Telegram has been involved in financial transactions that may have violated money laundering regulations. Criminal Association:  This charge suggests that Durov  is being implicated in a broader network of criminal activities facilitated through the platform. Providing Cryptology Services Without Prior Declaration:   Durov  is also charged with offering encryption services through Telegram without adhering to the necessary legal declarations required by French law. He is required to remain in France and posted a €5 million bail under the condition that he must report to a police station twice a week. The case has been highly controversial throughout multiple domains of the security industry , and has led to discourse of mixed productivity, but also a massive spread of misinformation and disinformation. Telegram  is utilized heavily by criminal elements, law enforcement, military personnel, and investigators in most security fields. Analysis Telegram is a messaging service that functions very similarly to WhatsApp, with a greater emphasis on users being able to broadcast announcements to publicly visible channels. It is globally the third most popular of such services, just behind Facebook Messenger, with nearly 1 billion users.  Telegram is extremely popular in eastern Europe. It has arguably become the most important line of communication between the public and combatants in Ukraine. Telegram  distinguishes itself by having an option to engage in “secret chats” that are allegedly end-to-end encrypted while still using the same account as one’s broadcast channel. This means that the Telegram  service itself is not supposed to be able to see what’s discussed between users in “secret chats”. WhatsApp , Facebook Messenger , and Signal  have this option enabled by default in Europe . Telegram   does not have end-to-end encryption enabled by default. Being able to pivot from these private chats to public channels is part of the appeal for groups that want to maintain a level of privacy while still attracting a public audience. This is why Telegram is the preferred messaging service for criminal and paramilitary organizations. Intelligence professionals routinely monitor Telegram , as it offers unique insight into military , criminal , and extremist  activity. Competitor, Signal ,  is strictly end-to-end encrypted , and therefore cannot be found criminally liable in similar situations. Concerns have been raised that this could be threatened based on precedent set during Durov ’s upcoming trial. The arrest has prompted an extremely strong backlash within the intelligence and security communities, with many in favor of Durov ’s arrest, and others decrying it as a point of major privacy and civil liberties concern. Others are cautious of threats to Telegram ’s existence, as it would remove a major primary intelligence source. Some defenders of Durov  argue that his arrest could set a dangerous precedent where platform operators are held criminally responsible for user-generated content, potentially stifling freedom of expression by forcing platforms to over-censor to avoid liability. This argument has been taken up by Elon Musk , whose own platform, X, was recently banned in Brazil for related reasons. Many of the arguments have ignored the fact that the evidence being presented by the French government have come from the unencrypted public chat rooms  hosted by various threat actors. Under current regulations in most EU countries, these are not protected, and are subject to cooperation by the platform owner, as they can access the unencrypted information. Telegram has refused its opportunity to join the Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM) reporting agreement known as the Tech Coalition. It’s a subset of the WePROTECT Global Alliance, which includes platform owners Google, Microsoft, Meta (Facebook, WhatsApp), X corp (Twitter), Apple, Amazon, Snap Inc. (Snapchat), TikTok, and LinkedIn. Durov’s rights since his arrest have also curiously been championed by the Russian government, who Durov, himself has been fleeing since 2014. In 2018, Russia attempted to block Telegram after Durov refused to comply with demands to hand over encryption keys. Despite the ban, Telegram continued to function in Russia due to the platform’s use of various technical workarounds, and the ban was unexpectedly lifted in 2020. Durov has publicly stated that no concessions had been made to the government. Conclusion Despite the concerns voiced by the intelligence and security communities,  Pavel Durov ’s situation is grounded in serious allegations that, for the time being, don’t have to put the government’s actions at odds with privacy rights or the legality of end-to-end encryption. While Durov ’s stated stance regarding the management of Telegram  is one of “privacy first”, it’s also led to accusations of negligence, particularly in not taking adequate measures to prevent the misuse of the platform for criminal purposes. The French government’s actions appear to be legally justified under current laws, particularly concerning unencrypted public channels. The bigger civil rights question demanded of this case is whether or not platform owners should be liable for what is posted on their platform. If the cases go to trial, it will be crucial to watch for its potential influence on other platforms and the broader tech landscape.

Written by Paula Boden Indonesia faces severe hazards such as rising sea levels, extreme heat, and natural disasters. As a reaction, the Indonesian government has initiated mega-development projects, such as relocating the capital from Jakarta to Nusantara. However, these governance strategies are not always effective, especially for the least privileged. This, in turn, leads to radical Islamist and hard-line religious-conservative groups exploiting and utilizing the situational distress caused by climate change to infiltrate and recruit people for their cause. The risk of linked climate change/rising radicalism extends beyond Indonesia, likely affecting the broader ASEAN region. Consequently, for effective (inter)national and also regional cooperation, climate change needs to be recognized as an underlying risk for rising radicalism to successfully integrate preventive action into counter-radicalism strategies. Introduction Extreme heat, mass floods, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions in Indonesia cause an increase of mental stress, physical loss of homes and more deaths to come. Indonesia is facing an unprecedented catastrophe on multiple levels due to climate change. The link between climate change and (in)security has already been the focus of several investigations. Especially in the case of Indonesia, rising sea levels and extreme heat put the population at high risk of food and water scarcity, displacement, and weakening economic stability. Considering that hidden insecurities related to climate change such as mental distress and anxiety are added to the physical disappearance of land and homes, climate change can fuel the rise of religious radicalism.  With the President-elect Prabowo taking office in October 2024, the potential rise of hard-line religious radicalism in Indonesia needs to be considered more seriously. Prabowo, a former lieutenant general and in 2014 Jokowi’s presidential opponent, is feared to align with radical groups due to his past associations with religious hardliners.  The Islamic puritanism movement Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia  (HTI) uses climate-linked narratives to take advantage of grievances of people who are affected by climate change challenges. By picking up climate change in their Islamic-radical propaganda, HTI is successful in improving their ideological standing mostly in climate change-prone regions.  Indonesia’s current situation and its climate change challenges Indonesia is the world's fourth most populous nation, with 275.5 million inhabitants and home to the third largest surviving area of tropical rainforests. The country is highly vulnerable to climate change impacts and is listed  as the 47th country most at risk of climate change hazard (out of 191). Main climate change risks posed to Indonesia's population are  extreme heat stress, pollution, rapidly reducing water supplies, and food insecurity. The natural hazards hitting Indonesia are earthquakes, floods, tsunamis, cyclones, volcanic eruptions, and droughts. There have been several governmental attempts to tackle climate change-related security issues. As a political reaction to the sinking capital Jakarta, President Joko Widodo announced several mega-development projects to tackle climate change. Widodo started relocating the capital to the new IbuKota Nusantara (Capital of the Archipelago) to Borneo island, building a completely new green Eco-Forest City from scratch. The estimated costs of the project lead up to US$45 billion. Nusantara is currently being built on more than 250,000 hectares of forest – around three times the size of Jakarta. Still, in comparison to the 10 million Jakartian citizens, the new capital will only initially host 500,000 citizens. The first relocation deadline for 1,800 civil servants for the new seat of government is in August 2024.  The current national strategy is called ‘2045 Golden Indonesia’ and marks Indonesia’s proclaimed independence from Dutch colonial rule on August 17, 1945. By this, Widodo follows a political stance of progress and development. He aims to showcase the rise of a middle-income nation to a high-income country resilient to climate change challenges. However, it is questionable to what extent Widodo’s mega-development visions will leverage effective climate protection. Especially after the national election early in 2024, environmentalists fear that the decade of deforestation that took place under Widodo could unleash a new ecological catastrophe of mining, coal burning, downstreaming, and deforestation. Further loss of forest will have serious impacts on climate change, not only in Indonesia but worldwide. Deforestation will be associated with more frequent droughts, massive heat waves, and severe sea level rise. This is a high risk, especially in Indonesia, where most of the population lives in coastal areas. NASA Earth Observatory images by Michala Garrison, 2022 & 2024 Wikimedia Commons Indonesia is home to 50 to 70 million Indigenous people, which make up 18 to 25 percent of the total population. Deforestation, large-scale nickel mining, resource competition and tensions over land are a continuous threat to Indigenous people and their well-being. The construction of the new capital now exacerbates these social inequalities and abuses against Indigenous peoples. The Indonesian government offered small compensation if Indigenous communities were to relocate. However, several reported cases of human rights violations show that Indigenous people are being forcefully displaced and are under threat of losing their homes.  Such issues may be exacerbated once President-elect Prabowo Subianto will take office in October 2024. Activists and opposition fear further democratic backsliding. Human rights groups claim that Prabowo was involved in human rights violations in Timor-Leste in the late 1980s. Even though he confirmed to follow Widodo’s democratization efforts and development plans, Prabowo military background and his controversial past suggest that he might take a more centralized and controlled governmental stance.  His appointment would further increase the military’s involvement in domestic political affairs. There is also a chance for recurring political connections between religious Islamist hard-liners and Prabowo's government. Prabowo has past associations with hard-line Islamist groups. In the lead-up to the 2019 election, he appeared to be forming a populist-military-Islamist alliance. During this period, his allies allegedly played a key role in organizing mass protests against Jakarta’s Governor Basuki Purnama (known as Ahok), targeting him for his ethnicity and alleged blasphemy. These protests were led by Islamist groups such as Front Pembela Islam  (FPI) – who call for violent jihad. Indonesia’s standing in ASEAN region and internationally Indonesia is the largest economy in Southeast Asia and a crucial player in peace and security issues in the region. Regarding climate change, current research highlights that four ASEAN member states are among the world’s highest committers of perpetuating global warming while also experiencing and facing the harshest climate change-related hazards and impacts. In Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam, extreme heat is considered the most extreme physical risk.  On the international stage, Indonesia will likely continue to play an active role under President-elect Prabowo. Indonesia’s government is likely to present itself as the most green, sustainable and high-tech country in Southeast Asia. Officially, Indonesia already launched an Energy Compact and thereby joined a global community of member states who commit to the SDG7 and strong net-zero goals. Initially these goals were set to be reached until 2030 In more current speeches, Widodo set climate goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 32% below the business-as-usual by 2060.  Indonesia’s political challenge of radical Islamist groups Indonesia’s counter-terrorism strategies have been partly successful in the past. As a reaction to the 2003 Bali Bombings, the counter-terrorism Special Detachment 88 or Densus 88 was formed. Densus 88 was equipped and trained by the US and Australia. In 2006, a Transnational Crime and Terrorism Task Force was established by the Indonesian Attorney General’s Office. Another national accomplishment was the creation of Indonesia’s Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) in 2010.  The focus of Indonesian deradicalization programs was to ensure that those under arrest did not re-engage with radical Islamist groups once they were released. Additionally, Indonesia has opened four prisons for high-risk terrorists. These major political activities against the violent Islamist discourse and against activism calling for a violent jihad have forced the radical religious-conservative Islamist groups to shift towards implementing the shari’a from grassroots and activist level.  Radical Islamist and religious-conservative groups have gained influence over politics since the late 2000s by organizing grassroot campaigns and charities as well as by forming a political party. In the Indonesian People’s Da’wah Party the terrorist organization Jamaah Islamiyah  (JI) operated through its disguise. Up to 7,000 members work within government institutions and are spread across civil and religious organizations. Extremist Islamist groups in Indonesia have benefited from weak public institutions, consequently also building religious-oriented schools called Pesantren as well as instilling young people on social media. In 2022, Indonesia’s National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) revealed that 68 Pesantren are affiliated with JI. However, looking at the total estimated number of 30,000 Pesantrens in Indonesia, it’s important to note that the majority of Pesantrens, as the oldest educational institution rooted in Indonesia’s Muslim communities, carry the spirit of religious moderation promoting tolerant views of Islam.  Radicalism on the rise due to climate change? Members and former activists of HTI support a climate narrative that legitimizes and supports a global caliphate. Figures show that young Indonesians perceive the climate crisis as a fundamental threat to their personal and national security. The majority of respondents of a national survey  in 2021 (81%) think Indonesia must protect and preserve the environment even though it will slow down economic growth. Another 84% of respondents agree that action on climate change/crisis must be carried out immediately. The study shows that 52% are very concerned about environmental degradation, while 32% are very concerned about Islamist radicalism in politics. So, even though young Indonesians fear Islamist radicalism, talking about the most pressing environmental concerns seems to be working: by considering climate change in their Islamist-radical propaganda, HTI is successful in improving their ideological standing mostly in climate change-prone regions. The Islamist involvement in politics from grassroot levels is not a new phenomenon – especially in Indonesia, extremist groups and sympathizers have set up decentralized charities. This way radical religious-conservative groups manage to infiltrate and propagate their radical visions without using violence or openly denouncing democratic governance. The misuse of charities and support mechanisms for their own hard-line religious cause is just another way of influencing the Indonesian youth and people affected by climate change.   With the President-elect Prabowo taking office in October 2024, the potential rise of hard-line religious radicalism in Indonesia needs to be considered more seriously. It is a possibility that radical Islamist groups will utilize the mega-development projects – issued by Widodo – which apparently only support already privileged Indonesian/ Nusantara citizens in their progress and development goals.  Due to the fact that the new capital Nusantara will not be able to host all 10 million Jakarta’s citizens, radical Islamist groups could get involved in relocation efforts for Jakartan citizens who are more underprivileged and disregarded by the government.  As the map shows below, locations for known radical Islamist groups and their grassroots level engagement are mainly based on Java island – which is mostly affected by climate change-related hazards. The map also highlights that the locations of Cirebon, Indramayu, Karawang, Bandung, and Tasikmalaya on West Java are quite close to Jakarta and, therefore, similarly at risk from extreme climate change challenges.  The infrastructure for radical Islamist engagement and activities already exists in West Java. On the one hand, this makes it easier from the outset for already active Islamist groups to convince vulnerable people and those threatened by climate change with their ideology and shari’a-based climate change narratives. On the other hand, it paves the way for new radical developments and hard-line religious-conservative groups to gain new members and radically exploit the grieving situations of helpless residents in West Java, Indonesia.   Map made by  Paula Boden Now, particularly with the new government under Prabowo, these tendencies towards Islamist radicalism are feared by Democrats and moderates across Indonesia. One scenario could be that Prabowo’s formerly close ties to hardline Islamists will be reactivated and revived. This would only worsen climate change challenges in Indonesia while fuelling Islamist activities in disaster response. But Prabowo himself projects a more moderate image for his presidency, not least through his social media appearance on TikTok as ‘ cuddly grandpa ’ during the election campaigns. Prabowo taking office in October 2024 has therefore the power and tools to pave the way for positive political turnarounds: such as tackling tendencies towards radical Islamist movements at an early or at least still developing stage through engaging in preventive climate change action. This would make it more likely that Prabowo turns his back on solidifying with radical political parties and groups for good and engages more with his country’s agreement towards international climate change combat such as committing towards SDG 7  and regional cooperation of counter-radicalism.  Change could be achieved through more inclusive development projects that not only benefit the 500,000 citizens of Nusantara but all societal segments, including Indigenous communities and socially disadvantaged people in West Java. So, extensive preventive governmental action under Prabowo that recognizes a link between climate change and the rise of radicalism could lead to effective (inter)national counter-radicalism and counter-terrorism strategies.    Conclusion Climate change is the one underlying risk for multiple security threats in Indonesia, where the population faces life-threatening climate-related risks and is simultaneously influenced by radical Islamist groups and their misuse of Islamic views. Climate change is not only a risk multiplier but an underlying risk for increased radicalism, especially in West Java. Vulnerabilities posed by climate change-related hazards are exacerbated. The underlying risks of climate change also represent and incorporate a potential opportunity for Indonesia’s national and international standing. Through extensive preventive action, Indonesia, under President-elect Prabowo, could incorporate climate resilience and protection into counter-radicalism strategies to depict potential radical Islamist activities at an early stage. Additionally, by proactively addressing climate change challenges to simultaneously mitigate radicalism, the Indonesian government could collaborate with regional partners in ASEAN and could further manifest its progressive standing internationally. This approach would, for example, include a more inclusive stance on development that benefits all social layers and their economic and basic needs. Thereby, it would reduce the pool of potential recruits for radical Islamist and hard-line religious-conservative groups. Profile Paula Boden is a Freelance Journalist with a main focus on migration and climate crisis. She has years of professional experience in political education and Project Management. Currently, she pursues her MSc degree in Security Risk Management at the University of Copenhagen where she specializes in OSINT-research and Intelligence.