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Sudan Update: RSF gains control over strategic border zone with Libya

  • laure7549
  • Jun 25
  • 3 min read

Date: 24/06/2025


Situation in Sudan as of 01/06/2025. All credits go to @ThomasVLinge on X.  

The blue triangle was added by the author.


What happened?  

  • On 24/06/2025, a New War Cargo Ilyushin IL-76TD freighter (Reg. EX-76019) departed from the UAE and landed at Kufra Airport in southeastern Libya. This flight is part of the critical logistical network that enables the RSF, which, following a joint offensive with Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), seized control of the strategic Egypt-Sudan-Libya tri-border area earlier this month on 10/06/2025.

  • On 11/06/2025, the RSF announced that they seized control of this strategic tri-border area, as indicated by the blue triangle in the image above. 

  • That same day, the SAF announced that they had withdrawn from the area. The Sudanese army described the joint attack as an “outright aggression against Sudan” and vowed to protect national sovereignty. 


Analysis

Following a joint offensive with LNA troops from Libya, the RSF seized control of the strategic Sudan-Libya-Egypt border triangle—a crucial smuggling route and the gateway to Libya and Egypt. This is a significant win for the RSF after months of retreat, most notably from Khartoum and surrounding villages and cities. 

The RSF's capture of the border triangle is significant for two reasons. First of all, a strong presence in western Sudan allows the RSF to open a new front in the Northern State and Nile Valley, areas that are important to the Sudanese army and, until recently, basically impossible to reach. They can now attack the whole of Sudan from the west.

A second reason this is a strategic win for the RSF is that it provides them with a long border with Libya. This border is crucial for the RSF as it works to reduce its dependence on supply routes that primarily pass through Chad. Reports indicate that Chadian President Mahamat Déby is facing mounting domestic pressure from military generals to block the RSF's use of eastern Chad as a supply corridor. The RSF is therefore trying to diversify its supply lines. As a consequence, there have been reports of increased air traffic into Libya’s Kufra district, allegedly originating from the United Arab Emirates, carrying military aid intended for the RSF.

Conclusion

After months of fighting in Sudan during which the SAF had the clear upper hand, this development reflects the first real win for the RSF. It remains to be seen if the RSF can capitalize on this win. It must also be noted that the border area is far from the current RSF strongholds in North Darfur, and the RSF risks overstretching its forces, which, especially after recent months, have taken significant losses. Nevertheless,  if these potential risks are avoided, control over this corridor brings significant strategic benefits for the Rapid Support Forces. Not only does it provide them with a new front to launch operations on SAF strongholds previously considered out of reach, but it also opens up a frontier with Libya, which could become a new supply route for military support. 

Aside from that, this also brings implications for the broader region. This is the first time that the Sudanese civil war spilled over the border. For now, it remains to be seen what the consequences of that will be, but this threat of regional spillover can lead to dangerous and unpredictable situations. It also puts Egypt, which neighbors Sudan to the North, in a predicament.  Egypt is a key ally to the SAF, but also supports Haftar. This puts Cairo in a precarious position, given that the RSF is approaching its southern border. 

This development in the Sudanese civil war indicates that this conflict is far from over. The RSF, led by Mohamed ‘Hemedti’ Dagalo,  intends to continue its battle against the SAF and its leader, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

Khartoum/HSSS FIR remains closed.


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