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Written by Arianna Luca
While just a few years ago Ecuador was a regular stop in most tourists’ itineraries and considered to be a “haven for peace and stability in the region”, over the last couple of years an unprecedented wave of gang violence has turned the country into one of the most violent in Latin America. Ecuador’s recent surge of unrest can be traced back to different causes. A series of internal political choices, and the implementation of stricter measures and controls in the bordering countries have indirectly created a fertile ground for the growth of the drug trade, turning Ecuador into a strategic transit hub for cocaine. A critical economic situation, aggravated by the Covid-19 pandemic, has impacted marginalized communities, increasing the levels of poverty, which has brought many young people closer to criminal activities. Stricter controls and measures implemented in other countries brought a shift in criminal routes and found a fertile ground in Ecuador. In addition, the government lacks a long term strategy to control the economic crisis and current social turmoil, beyond the promise to defeat gangs.
Ecuador's President Daniel Noboa has focused his approach on empowering the military, which has generated high approval among the Ecuadorian population alarmed by violence and instability, in the short-term. Extreme militarization has been a common response to security threats in the history of Latin America. However, whenever governments have responded to organized crime with violence, they have often generated a cycle of violence and repression. The examples of Mexico, Honduras, and El Salvador have shown that militarization is mostly impacting civilians, leading to violence being used against innocent citizens and for easy arrests, not improving security in the long term. Ecuador is likely to follow this path, too. Crime rates are increasing and gangs are still far from defeated, and public support is slowly going down.
While the state of emergency ended last April 8, President Noboa maintained a state of “internal armed conflict”. The security situation of the country is still critical, and Ecuador's armed forces will continue carrying out joint anti-crime operations with the police.
President Noboa’s government is going through a critical moment, worsened by the recent raid of the Ecuadorian police to the Mexican embassy in Ecuador, which led to a break of diplomatic ties between the two states. On April 21, 2024 the Ecuadorian population will vote in a referendum on tightening security measures, toughening prison sentences, and enshrining the use of the military for domestic security into law. The outcome will be important to understand the support for and influence of Noboa’s presidency in the country and his fight against gang-related crime and violence.
The cocaine market
Ecuador’s crisis is inextricably tied to the cocaine market. Historically, the country has managed to be shielded from the region’s crime and drug-related dynamics, despite its proximity to two leading producers and exporters of cocaine, Colombia and Peru. However, over time, the accumulation of different factors, internal and external, has turned Ecuador into an important actor in the drug trade.
Internally, a rise of inequality and poverty in 2016, after a strong earthquake, forced the government to cut costs. Several institutions were eliminated, including the Justice Ministry, and the authorities’ control over the country fell drastically. President Correa’s administration (2007-2017) took some crime-reduction initiatives that turned out to have a counterproductive effect, like dismantling an American naval base, leaving ports poorly guarded, and the construction of mega-prisons, the expansion of which is going to be discussed in the coming referendum. This measure led to overcrowding and inmates being housed according to their gang membership, turning prisons into focal points for criminal organizations. Functioning as centers for networking between criminals, they have facilitated gang organization and the forming of alliances with other drug-trafficking organizations, like Mexican cartels and the Albanian mafia. Gang leaders started conducting their businesses from behind bars, and have infiltrated many organs of the government. Finally, the Covid-19 pandemic left many young people jobless, making them ideal recruits for gangs surging in power and influence.
External factors involved a tightening of policies and controls against drug trafficking in neighboring countries which turned transnational criminal groups to Ecuador’s poorly controlled ports. As a result, Ecuador’s precarious social and economic situation, its dollarized economy, strategic location, and poor coastline protection made Ecuador the ideal place to work as a transit point for international drug cartels. Today, 70% of the cocaine that arrives in Europe (with the main destination ports being Rotterdam and Antwerp) departs from Ecuador, capitalizing on the scarcity of port controls after Covid, and the start of conflict between Russia and Ukraine.
The current spike of violence
Last January, two events caught global attention. Authorities reported the prison escape of one of the most powerful narco bosses and leader of Ecuador’s leading drug-trafficking gang Los Choneros. Shortly after, members of a gang, wearing balaclavas and firing shots, took control of a television station during a live broadcast, helding members of the staff and journalists hostage.
After these events Noboa declared Ecuador to be in a state of war. His announced “Phoenix Plan” to allow the government of “new Ecuador” to combat crime and violence focuses on increased power and authority to the military. As part of this plan, the government has given complete immunity to all police forces, and deployed tens of thousands members to combat the “internal armed conflict”. However, the gangs also declared war when the government announced a state of emergency, and the security forces’ aggressive actions have inspired equally aggressive responses by Ecuadorian gangs, which have escalated to kidnappings of law enforcement offices and attacks to police stations.
Moreover, police repressive counter measures have been criticized by human rights groups, warning that loosening ties to the police authorization to arrest people is mostly affecting innocent civilians. It is also opening the doors to easy profiling and making arrests based on poor evidence, deteriorating the population’s democratic civil liberties, and weakening state institutions' reliability.
Noboa’s strategy resembles the approach of El Salvador’s president Nayib Bukele. The Ecuadorian President’s admiration is addressed particularly at Bukele’s implementation of a massive prison model. Bukele’s campaign of mass arrests have made him domestically popular, but he was heavily criticized for the widespread human rights abuses. However, unlike El Salvador, Ecuador’s gangs exist within a network of international cartels and ex-Colombian guerrillas that are better armed, richer and more powerful than the gangs in El Salvador, and they are connected to the cocaine trade.
What’s at stake
One of the major long-term consequences of this widespread is the risk of deterioration of the country’s democracy. The raid of the Mexican embassy carried out by the Ecuadorian security forces last April 5 was a first instance. Ecuador’s government forced its way into the facility to arrest former Vice President Jorge Glas, who is wanted for corruption charges, and had sought refuge in the embassy since last year.
Mexico has now cut diplomatic ties with Ecuador, and asked for the cancellation of Ecuador’s membership from the UN. The Community of Latin American and Caribbean states (Celac) has expressed support for Mexico, together with the Organization of American States (OAS). Moreover, Venezuela has closed its embassy in Ecuador, and Honduras has recalled its senior diplomat in Ecuador. The Colombian government denounced the actions and filed a suit with the International Commission on Human Rights. Despite the widespread criticism of his actions, President Noboa said he had no regrets over his actions.
However, a possible breakdown in relations with key regional partners may have repercussions for Ecuador’s security. Strained ties with Colombia, the source country for the cocaine trade trafficked through Ecuador, could severely hinder Ecuador’s ability to monitor cocaine flows and counter the criminal networks of both countries. In the same way, a rupture with Mexico could have severe repercussions for security cooperation, considering the importance and role of Mexican drug trafficking organizations in Ecuador. For now, Mexican President López Obrador has dismissed Noboa’s invitation to meet for a talk, indicating that a meeting is unlikely going to happen in the near future.
Conclusion
The recent escalation of violence in Ecuador is the outcome of a crisis caused by different intertwined factors. Ecuador’s government has been fighting back, increasing the militarization of Ecuador’s law enforcement forces. However, this might not be enough to address the systemic issues that have allowed the empowering of gangs. Moreover, Noboa’s recent diplomatic crisis with Mexico has alienated key security partners of the country. There is uncertainty over the outcome of the coming referendum to tighten security measures, and Noboa now has to weigh his political moves and decisions, as they will determine his political support and the security and stability of the country.
