Written by Jacob Dickinson
The political revolution in Bangladesh on 5 August 2024 was a turning point in global politics. As the world’s eighth most populous country in the world, with a population of 173 million people, Bangladesh’s revolution marks a struggle for democracy in a region characterized by authoritarian politics. Termed the ‘Monsoon Revolution’ within Bangladesh, the student-led protests that took place in Dhaka throughout the summer evolved into mass demonstrations against Sheikh Hasina’s authoritarian rule when on the 5 August, she resigned and fled to India. The new interim prime minister Muhammad Yunus has attempted to provide order to the country. With a struggling economy, recurrent power cuts, and ensuring free and fair elections, the new government faces a host of challenges as it begins a transition to democracy.
The change in Bangladesh’s politics also has profound implications for the geopolitics of South Asia, given the country’s geography. Bangladesh’s shares borders with India and Myanmar. As a mid-way between emerging India and Southeast Asia, any land link between these economic spaces must go through Bangladesh. The vast coastline is home to three out of the twelve ports facing the Bay of Bengal, making it a strategic hub for projecting power into the Bay. Given its importance geographically, Bangladesh is also caught in the regional rivalry between India and China. India is intensely suspicious of China’s expanding maritime ambitions in the Indian Ocean and strong ties with countries in India’s sphere of influence. While China does not see India as an immediate threat, China is also wary of India’s growing engagement with the US and sees the growing partnership as an attempt to contain China’s rise. What does Bangladesh’s ‘Monsoon Revolution’ mean for Bangladesh’s position in South Asia’s geopolitics?
Monsoon Revolution
The events that Bangladesh has experienced since the beginning of August 2024 caught everyone by surprise. Sheikh Hasina, daughter of the leader of Bangladesh's independence war in 1971, had held on to power since 2009. Her Awami League increasingly took control of state apparatus in the police force and forged fake election results in 2014, 2019 and 2024. Reports of electoral manipulation and imprisoning opposition figures in the rival Bangladesh National Party (BNP) were widespread and her rule seemed impenetrable.
Yet by August 2024, the authoritarian state erected by Sheikh Hasina fell in a matter of days. After months of student-led protests over a quota system in June 2024 in Dhaka, the authorities violently cracked down on the largely peaceful demonstrators. Hundreds of protesters were killed and reports of the torture of students by security forces took Bangladesh's society to the streets as they called for the ruling PM Sheikh Hasina’s resignation. Splits emerged within the military and police factions as it became clear that the protests could not be stopped. On 5 August, protesters stormed her presidential palace and ransacked the building. Sheikh Hasina resigned and fled to New Delhi, India, where she remains. While she has applied for asylum in UAE and the UK for safety, they have so far refused extradition calls.
The new government quickly came to power with Muhammad Yunus, a Nobel prize winning economist, as the new acceptable head of government. He released political opponents of Sheikh Hasina, including the leader of one of Bangladesh’s main political parties, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), and scheduled new elections to be held within 90 days. He also pledged to remove the Awami League’s hold over state institutions, firing police chiefs and other members of the state apparatus. Amid reports emerging of violence targeting members of the Awami League following Hasina’s resignation, he quickly called for calm and a stop to vigilante violence as he pledged a transition to a new democratic government.
India’s wrong-footed strategy
India saw the removal of Sheikh Hasina as an acute setback for India’s security, trade and possible loss of regional influence in South Asia. India backed Sheikh Hasina throughout her time in power. This was a historical commitment, as India backed her father’s war for independence when it separated from West Pakistan. In talks over new infrastructure deals, she chose Indian companies instead of Chinese companies, resolved some territorial conflicts with India and claimed to clamp down on armed ethnic groups using Bangladesh as a base to attack India’s unstable Manipur region.
The removal of Sheikh Hasina will likely lead to tensions between Bangladesh and India. The International Crime Tribunal in Bangladesh has taken steps to extradite Sheikh Hasina from India and called for Sheikh Hasina to be held to account, which India has so far refused. Bangladesh will remember that India firmly backed the ousted Sheikh Hasina and her party, the Awami League, while she manipulated elections and arrested opposition-leaders. Moreover, Indian Prime Minister Modi’s acutely anti-Muslim rhetoric has led to considerable criticism within Bangladesh. India has not forged closer ties with the popular opposition party, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), which is confident that it will win the next general election planned in November 2024.
India is therefore intensely suspicious of what comes next in Bangladesh. External Minister Jaishankar did not rule out the suspicion that ‘outside forces’ played a role in ousting Sheikh Hasina, pointing to the suspicion of India toward the Pakistan-China relationship. India feels that it is being encircled by an emerging China in South Asia with its infrastructure policies and emerging military capabilities in the Indian Ocean. There are also signs that India’s foreign policy is not working. India’s formerly close partners are turning away. The Maldives’ newly elected president, Mohamed Muizzu, asked the Indian military stationed in the country to leave in May 2024. Nepal’s new prime minister Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli led to new agreements with China to establish a new infrastructure deal. If new elections are held in Bangladesh, India believes it could lose influence to China too.
China’s strategic gain?
China has not taken a side in the aftermath of Bangladesh’s revolution. After Sheikh Hasina resigned at the beginning of August 2024, China’s nationalist Global Times newspaper stated that China “hopes that social stability will be restored soon”. However, China’s diplomatic core has since sought to take the initiative. A Chinese foreign service spokesman said that “we want to further develop the all-round strategic partnership with the new government in Bangladesh’. This puts China potentially at an advantage diplomatically for the new government as it does not hold on to the former Sheikh Hasina.
Despite Sheikh Hasina’s close ties with India, she cultivated close ties with China too. Bangladesh joined China’s vast overseas infrastructure-based project the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 and built several seaports, railway tracks and powerplants. Up to 70% of the weapons for the Bangladeshi military were bought from China, including tanks, missiles and other weapons. China and Bangladesh announced joint military exercises held in May 2024, to the intense opposition of India’s foreign policy establishment.
China’s ties with Bangladesh could deepen in the future. The probable victory of the next election in Bangladesh, the BNP, could look more toward China to fulfill its infrastructure and development needs over India. But the relationship is not without its issues. Bangladesh’s finance ministry has also warned that China’s investment deals and excessive borrowing have led to ‘debt-traps’, citing Sri Lanka’s default in 2022 as evidence. In negotiations earlier in 2024, Sheikh Hasina’s visit to the country did not result in many new infrastructure deals or an agreement to buy more goods from Bangladesh. Whether China is willing or able to capitalize on its diplomatic opportunity is still uncertain.
Looking Forward
Bangladesh’s transition to democracy will be challenging. Attempts at achieving justice for families killed and persecuted for years by the security services. At the same time, Bangladesh’s geopolitical position embroils it in the larger geopolitical competition for regional dominance between China and India in South Asia. With India seemingly protecting Sheikh Hasina from extradition to face a trial in Bangladesh, ties between the two are likely to worsen. India’s government may distrust and dismiss Bangladesh’s next government as moving toward China. While there is a hope that this is the first step in a democratic transition, Bangladesh will find itself stuck between a rock and a hard place.
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