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Written by Chris Dalby, Director of World of Crime The Kingdom of the Netherlands seems perpetually locked in a rivalry with its neighbor. This neighbor is accused of being more corrupt, more violent, and full of drug trafficking. Oh, no, this is not about Belgium. That would be too easy. This is about Venezuela. The coastline of South America’s most corrupt country lies just 65 kilometers from the island of Curaçao, a constituent country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Drugs , migrants , gold , weapons, and contraband  have flowed across this narrow strait, relying on the well-established criminal collusion within the government of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and security weaknesses in the Dutch Caribbean.   But the threats posed by Venezuela to the Netherlands have evolved. Venezuela’s largest gang, Tren de Aragua, saw its base of operations, the Tocorón prison, raided and its leadership scattered in 2023. But that has only multiplied the drug trafficking threat. The islands also provide traffickers with a plethora of options. A rise in violence in small islands across the Caribbean can be correlated with an increase of cocaine trafficking through the likes of Turks and Caicos, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and St. Lucia. These countries are destinations along “island hopping” routes, where drugs are moved by go-fast boats through different islands where they are temporarily stored before moving on. Many of these routes begin their journey through Aruba and Curaçao. Expansion of Venezuelan Gangs to Curaçao Venezuela’s transnational criminal presence does not begin and end with Tren de Aragua . But it may seem that way. Since starting inside one of Venezuela’s main prisons, in the state of Aragua, the gang has expanded its criminal tentacles by following the flow of migrants leaving the beleaguered country. Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru have all felt the presence of the gang, bringing with it homicides, human trafficking, and sex trafficking. Curaçao has not escaped this. Tren de Aragua has been connected to regular shipments of illegal migrants to Aruba and Curaçao. Millions of migrants have fled Venezuela over the last decade, but the small number fleeing to the Dutch islands has proven so profitable that Tren de Aragua is willing to fight to keep it. One route, from the town of La Vela de Coro in Venezuela to Curaçao, was dominated by a different gang until Tren de Aragua muscled in and took over, according to an investigation  by Invisibles. These migrants are charged exorbitant fees, with the chance of reaching a destination so closely connected to a European nation being all the more attractive. Policing this requires close cooperation between Dutch authorities as well as strong information-gathering in Venezuela, which is a tough task. Tren de Aragua may be the biggest name ferrying these migrants across, but they are not the only gang to do so. Plenty of small outfits operate across Venezuela’s Caribbean coast, often with the backing of local political elites, making it difficult to investigate and crack down on them.  Furthermore, in September 2023, thousands of Venezuelan police and soldiers raided Tren de Aragua’s base at Tocorón prison. This caused the group’s leadership to scatter, and there is little evidence they have regrouped in just one location.  Prisoners gathered during the raid at Tocorón prison. Source: Venezuelan Government Instead of a top-down hierarchy, reports of smaller cells have emerged, indicating a more scattered operation. However, it remains a real threat. In July 2024, the United States labelled Tren de Aragua as a transnational criminal organization, and it is one of the principal criminal threats in Chile. The Dutch Caribbean would be an obvious area for Tren de Aragua cells to maintain their presence. Beyond the easy money to be made from ferrying migrants, the existing Venezuelan diaspora, which makes up over 10% of the population of Curaçao, provides fertile ground to find new victims.  Vulnerabilities in Curaçao's Institutions and Defense Curaçao's institutions and defense mechanisms are vulnerable to corruption and require ongoing vigilance. The Royal Netherlands Navy frequently deploys vessels to the Caribbean to monitor and counteract drug trafficking and other illicit activities. These have proven crucial to seizing drugs and following go-fast boats. Seizures of cocaine by Dutch ships  such as the Zr.Ms . Groningen  are regularly among the most significant in the Caribbean and are an obvious way to show the Netherlands’ collaboration with American, British, French and Latin American partners. However, beyond the statistics, the impact of these patrols are limited.  Source: Koninklijke Marine For example, periods of increased criminal activity have been observed during the absence of these patrols. When a ship is rotating out of the Dutch Caribbean area, and replacements can need several months to be in place, a noticeable increase in drug-related crimes and smuggling activities, showing how this prevention does not actually harm long-term criminal abilities. And a March 2024 report stated  that “ the port of Curaçao is increasingly being chosen by international drug cartels as a starting point for shipping large quantities of cocaine to the Netherlands and other European destinations.” A major reason for this was that the Dutch Coast Guard had not had a patrol vessel assigned to the island for almost a year, allowing go-fast boats to operate with more impunity. Corruption has also long been a challenge, with prosecutors seeking prison sentences of up to 15 years now for corrupt port personnel. There have been several reports of law enforcement officials colluding with drug traffickers. Beyond drugs, the handling of Venezuelan crude oil stored  on Curaçao has also presented opportunities for graft. Worse, the treatment of migrants has come in for sharp criticism. An April 2024 investigation  by Dutch media, Pointer, found that Venezuelan migrants were abused, families were separated, and were not provided with legal protection. Instead of helping these migrants and sheltering them from criminal influence, this lack of support only enhances the chance they will fall into the clutches of Tren de Aragua or other Venezuelan gangs. Phenomenon of Island Hopping Island hopping has become a critical tactic for criminal organizations operating in the Caribbean, significantly impacting Dutch territories like Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao. This method involves using the geographic proximity of islands to Venezuela to facilitate the movement of drugs, arms, and human trafficking victims, making law enforcement efforts exceedingly challenging. Criminals exploit the close distances between these islands, allowing them to quickly transfer illegal goods and evade detection. One longstanding tactic is for traffickers to use high-speed boats to move cocaine from Venezuela to the Dutch Caribbean islands, where the drugs are then further distributed to Europe and North America. These small, fast vessels can easily navigate the archipelago, making it difficult for authorities to intercept them. And when they do, the crews don’t hesitate to use violence. On June 4, 2024, two Dutch craft responded  to a go-fast boat near Curaçao, suspected of carrying cocaine. Three men on board opened fire on the Dutch soldiers who defended themselves and sunk the ship and alleged traffickers. The quantities on board can be eye-watering, with around one ton of cocaine found on one vesse l in November 2023 and 1,600 kilograms dumped off  another last July.  This is nothing new, the cat-and-mouse game between traffickers and Dutch law enforcement has lasted for years. But the additional complexity of island hopping complicates the state response. While the Zr.Ms . Groningen  and other naval assets are a major strength for the Netherlands, integrated surveillance, data-sharing and other forms of cooperation with smaller Caribbean nations are weak. Crises to do with homicide, arms trafficking, and cybercrime in the region have triggered efforts to curb this lack of cooperation. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) began a cybercrime initiative  in 2022 and a “war on guns”  in 2023. Much of CARICOM’s work in the criminal and security sphere is focused on the threat from Venezuela.  However, the Netherlands-CARICOM collaboration is not yet fully exploited, since Curaçao only became  an associate member in June 2024. It is the only Dutch Caribbean island to have this status.  There is much for the Netherlands to offer, including the use of radar systems and aerial drones to warn other nations of suspicious ships and planes. Additionally, fostering stronger legal frameworks and joint task forces among Caribbean nations can ensure swift action to disrupt these sophisticated networks and secure the region more effectively​.

Written by Sara Frisan, Arianna Lucà, and Alessia Cappelletti   Following the 2024 Venezuelan Presidential election, protests have escalated in major cities nationwide. While the situation is still evolving, international reactions have been mixed.  A clear divide is visible. China, Iran, and Russia have rushed to congratulate President Maduro on his victory, while the U.S. and the E.U. have said  they would not recognize the election results until all votes were counted and records provided. U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken said the ‘result announced [did] not reflect the will of the voters’. The E.U.’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell stressed the importance to ‘ensure full transparency’ and respect the will of Venezuelans. Other countries  in Latin America have also expressed doubts about the outcome, and called  for an emergency meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS) permanent council on 31 July. Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Peru, and Panama have rejected the result or called for more transparency. In response, the Foreign Minister Yvan Gil has expelled  all diplomatic staff from these states to leave Venezuela with immediate effect.  Instead, other regional partners of Venezuela such as Cuba, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Bolivia have all congratulated President Maduro.  The international response so far is in line with Venezuela’s foreign ties under Maduro, which for the past decade have thrown him and his regime a lifeline. Over the years, Maduro's administration has strengthened ties with Russia and China, while distancing itself from the U.S.. This alignment has been exacerbated by sanctions that exclude Venezuela from the U.S. market. Venezuela has also become increasingly isolated, withdrawing from regional bodies like the Organization of American States and Mercosur, Latin America's largest economic union.  Caracas and Washington  The U.S. has imposed sanctions on Venezuela since 2005, targeting individuals and entities associated with the government. The sanctions intensified after Maduro's controversial re-election in 2018, which was marred by allegations of voter suppression and human rights abuses. The Trump administration, along with a coalition of Latin American countries, implemented "maximum pressure" sanctions aimed at ousting Maduro. These measures severely restricted Venezuela's access to U.S. financial markets and froze the assets of the state oil company, PDVSA. In 2023, a potential thaw between the US and Venezuela emerged with the Barbados Agreement, which sought to promote dialogue between the Maduro government and the opposition in return for allowing U.S. companies like Chevron to resume oil operations in Venezuela. However, following violations of the agreement, sanctions were reimposed in April 2024. As of July 2024, there were indications that Maduro sought to resume negotiations with the U.S. Following the National Electoral Council’s announcement of the election result, the US said  the results had been manipulated and did not reflect the will of the Venezuelan people. On July 30,  after a call between US President Joe Biden and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio da Silva, they issued a joint statement  on “the need for immediate release of full, transparent and detailed voting data”.  Caracas and Moscow   Russian President Vladimir Putin is among the few world leaders who congratulated Venezuelan President Maduro on his proclaimed victory in the Presidential election. Russia has been a pivotal ally for Venezuela since the early 2000s under Hugo Chávez, and the two countries enjoy a strategic partnership and robust political, military ties  and economic relations. They are also profoundly opposed to US foreign policy.  Venezuela has generally always supported Russia's actions, including Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and opposed NATO's defensive measures. In exchange, Russian oil companies are engaged in major exploration projects for oil and mineral resources in Venezuela, and they have recently agreed to increase the pace and volume of their cooperation in the field of nuclear energy and oil production. Russia has also provided Venezuela with military hardware, including advanced weapons systems, and has supported Venezuela's military elite.  Russia has consistently provided diplomatic support to Venezuela, voicing concerns about external interference of the West and blocking sanctions and embargoes on the Latin American country. By maintaining relations with Venezuela, Russia is also able to prevent US interests in Latin America generally, as well as claiming to have a more substantial role in international security. For example, in February 2024, Russia’s foreign minister Sergey Lavrov claimed to have arranged a meeting between Venezuela and Guyana to settle the territorial dispute over the Essequibo territory to form the basis for a constructive dialogue. Caracas and Beijing   The ties between China and Venezuela are long-standing and significant. On  July 29 , Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian congratulated  Maduro, saying China will strengthen relations with Venezuela.  China has opposed the re-imposition of US sanctions on Venezuela, and remains one of the most important buyers of Venezuelan crude oil. Despite criticism, with the reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Venezuela, China’s interest in Venezuelan oil is likely to increase. The sanctions make Venezuelan oil less expensive and reduce competition, presenting a more attractive opportunity for China. As the world’s largest importer of oil, China could benefit significantly from the lower prices and increased availability of Venezuelan crude oil. China has provided Venezuela massive investments and loans through state-owned banks in exchange for oil, making it Caracas’ largest creditor and bilateral lender. In September 2023, President Maduro visited China and the two countries upgraded their relationship by signing an “all-weather strategic partnership”  covering various sectors such as economy, trade, development, agriculture, and tourism. President Maduro expressed strong support for Chinese initiatives and international frameworks like the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, and the Global Security Initiative. Venezuela is also the top purchaser of Chinese military hardware in Latin America, a relationship that deepened after the U.S. prohibited arms sales to Venezuela in 2006. Between 2006 and 2022, China exported  around $629 million worth of weapons to Venezuela. Caracas and Tehran Iran and Venezuela, both under heavy U.S. sanctions, have forged a closer partnership, particularly in the oil sector. Iran has recently supplied Venezuela with gasoline and technical assistance to develop its oil industry, helping Venezuela circumvent some of the impacts of U.S. sanctions. However, economic challenges persist and Venezuela has had difficulties in meeting payment obligations to Iran. Why the Netherlands should observe this election The international community closely watched Venezuelan presidential elections, as the outcome could impact regional stability and global geopolitical dynamics. But with Maduro at the helm, at least for the foreseeable future, Venezuela’s stance in the world is unlikely to change.  The Dutch government warned  about the interference of the geopolitical interests of third parties (U.S., China, Russia) on its border with the country. The Kingdom of the Netherlands shares its longest border with Venezuela, through the Dutch Caribbean islands—Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao. The recurring socio-economic, political and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela has led to a mass exodus of Venezuelans to other countries in the region and the US. This has acutely affected the Dutch ABC island too. Aruba, in particular, has become a significant destination for Venezuelan refugees, with Venezuelans making up about 15% of its population. With the maintenance of US sanctions on the country, the economic situation could become worse in the future. In 2023, Venezuela and the Netherlands began to restore diplomatic ties, aiming to gradually reopen the borders that Maduro closed in February 2019. This closure was initially implemented to block humanitarian aid, which Maduro claimed was part of a plot to overthrow his government. Without a change of government, the tense relationship is likely to continue while Maduro is in power. While the likelihood of a conflict between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and Venezuela is low, Maduro has shown he is willing to use conflict as a means to try and shore up support from the military. Maduro’s threats  to annex Essequibo’s territory from Guyana in October 2023 demonstrates he is willing to restart territorial disputes with Venezuela’s neighbors. The Venezuelan elections are therefore important for the security of the Dutch Caribbean islands.  Edited by Chris Dalby, Director of World of Crime

Written by Sara Frisan, Arianna Luc à and Alessia Cappelletti The Security Strategy for the Kingdom of the Netherlands published in April 2023 highlights that the complex and evolving situation in Venezuela holds significant implications for the Netherlands. Venezuela's political instability, economic crises, extensive criminal networks, and growing alliances with non-Western powers like Russia, China, and Iran pose potential security and economic challenges that could ripple across the Caribbean and beyond. The Dutch Caribbean, particularly the ABC islands (Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao), which share maritime borders with Venezuela, are directly impacted by flows of illicit drugs and weapons, displacement, and regional security concerns.  In this three-part series, Dyami collaborates with World of Crime  to delve into the political, international, and criminal challenges facing Venezuela, and why these developments matter for the Netherlands. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for Dutch policymakers, businesses, and citizens in navigating the complexities of an interconnected world. In the first article of the series, we look at the Venezuelan elections held on Sunday July 28 and possible spill-overs.  Venezuelan election sparks hope for change  Venezuela  held its Presidential elections on July 28 and the situation is still evolving at the time of publication. For the first time in over a decade of growing autocracy, mismanagement, and economic crisis, hopes for political change are high – Venezuela could emerge from political and economic isolation and an eventual democratic transition. But challenging times lie ahead, whoever is confirmed the winner. President Nicolás Maduro, who first came to power in 2013, has consolidated his power by securing control over the military and institutions like the National Electoral Council, the Supreme Court, and the judiciary through political repression, censorship, and rampant corruption. Under Maduro's rule, Venezuela, home to the largest world's oil reserves, suffered economic collapse, hyperinflation, and chronic shortages of essential goods.  Compounded by plummeting global oil prices and U.S. sanctions against the Venezuelan government and oil apparatus, the country tumbled rapidly into a tight economic recession that forced nearly 8 million people to leave the country. According to a UN Human Rights Council report , today over 80% of Venezuelans live in poverty and 53% are unable to afford food.  Recent polls had predicted a victory for the opposition, showing that most Venezuelans  were eager for change and willing to exercise their right to vote. The favorite was opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia, the replacement for opposition leader Maria Corina Machado, who has been barred from running by the government. Despite efforts to disadvantage the opposition, most polls  predicted Maduro and his United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) wo uld lose by 20 to 40 points. However, in the early hours of Monday 29th July the National Electoral Council (CNE), controlled by Maduro allies, said Maduro had won with 51.2% of votes, against 44.2% for González Urrutia.   The result –and whether it is accepted– will be consequential for Venezuela, for its diaspora abroad, and the country’s foreign relations.  Contested results  On July 29th The National Electoral Council declared President Nicolas Maduro the winner of the presidential election, with Maduro claiming 51% of the vote against the opposition’s 44%. The result has been disputed by the opposition and many countries who observed the elections in the Americas and Europe. Leading opposition figure Maria Corina Machado claims González won 70% of the vote.  Opposition leaders claimed the election was rigged, saying that their witnesses were denied access to the CNE headquarters as the votes were counted, and that some votes were prevented from being processed. Instead, Maduro claimed  elections were fair and that outsiders tried to interfere.  Large protests will lead to a crackdown by security forces supporting Maduro, who warned the opposition of a ‘ fratricidal civil war ’ if he lost the election. Maduro has expressed no intention to step aside, while more countries are joining the widespread international community's lack of trust in the results. The OAS will hold a meeting on Wednesday, 31st of July, to discuss the results.  Despite the opposition leader calling for calm, protests took place in Caracas, and several other main cities, as well as other countries, including Argentina, against the election results on Monday evening.  Thousands of people took the streets of Caracas, chanting  “Freedom, freedom” and “This government is going to fall”. Protesters around the country took down at least two statutes of Hugo Chavez, Maduro’s predecessor. Security forces fired tear gas and rubber bullets at protesters, some responded by throwing molotov cocktails and rocks.  Maduro’s government is not new to protests and demonstrations. In 2014, 2017 and 2019 protests against the government have become increasingly violent. Maduro’s  government has been notoriously repressing dissent in the past, through violent crackdowns on street protests, jailing opponents, and prosecuting civilians in military courts, for the act of protesting, causing the human rights crisis that contributed to the Venezuelan exodus.  An important role is also played by the military and law enforcement authorities, as they enjoy a privileged position in Venezuela, which historically has a constructed militarized state apparatus. By giving the military money, prestige and power, Maduro has bought their political backing and their support, which Juan Guaidó, Maduro’s opponent in 2018, lacked . Currently, there are no signs that the military is breaking from the government.  Fraud and Electoral Manipulation  Venezuela has not held free and fair elections since 2013, and the opposition has been largely absent from elections since 2015 due to the government’s tested and proven repression and manipulation tactics.  In 2015, Leopoldo López, a prominent opposition leader, was sentenced to 14 years in prison, on charges of inciting violence during anti-government protests which the European Union defined as politically motivated. This followed a six-year ban from holding public office which began in 2008. In 2017, Henrique Capriles, another opposition figure, was barred from running for public office for 15 years, for alleged administrative irregularities. In 2023, the Maduro administration charged his most famous opponent, Juan Guaidó, with money laundering, treason, and usurping public functions, after years of intimidating him and his staff.  There are many more such examples. Most recently, the opposition's initial candidate, Maria Corina Machado, was banned from running in January 2024 over alleged fraud and tax violations, which caused the U.S. to reinstate sectoral sanctions lifted in October 2023. Machado has already faced criminal charges for her participation in anti-government protests 2014, when she also was stripped of her parliamentary seat. Maduro, however, still has a challenger. González, a less well-known career diplomat of Machado’s party, was leading in the polls  in the run up to the election. He has promised to revive the economy, restore independent institutions and free expression, and release political prisoners.  A free and fair election was far from guaranteed. Maduro has been manipulating both the campaign and the electoral process. Despite pledging to hold competitive elections, the regime holds power over key political institutions, including the National Assembly and the National Electoral Council (CNE). In mid-June 2024, six CNE members were forced to resign without explanation and the National Assembly immediately appointed a new CNE commission whose members have close ties to the ruling party.  Maduro has attempted to undermine the chances and credibility of the opposition through intimidation, deliberate arrests of opposition coalition members, journalists, and anti-government activists, and arbitrary disqualification of several opposition figures and electoral candidates, including Machado, from taking office. It is estimated that approximately fifty of the latest arrests among opposition ranks are linked to Machado and González.  In late June, the government banned  ten sitting mayors from holding offices, after González and Machado held rallies in their cities. On July 18, 2024, the head of security for Machado was arrested by authorities on charges of gender violence. Both Machado and González condemned this as a deliberate provocation to weaken their security just before the election.  The government is also taking advantage of the state-owned media and social media to prevent coverage of opposition candidates and pushing the narratives of the ruling party.  Despite the Venezuelan Constitution guaranteeing the right to vote for citizens abroad, the government is imposing bureaucratic obstacles to prevent the Venezuelan diaspora from voting. Currently, only a few  of the nearly 8 million Venezuelans living abroad have managed to register. The borders with Colombia were also closed  on the 27th and 28th of July for ‘security reasons, preventing citizens living on the border from traveling back to vote.  The E.U. was not allowed to observe the elections, but the U.N. and the Carter Center provided limited election monitoring and kept their findings confidential. The Carter Center has mentioned  they “will not conduct a comprehensive assessment of the voting counting, and tabulation process,” due to its limited presence.  Venezuela after the elections These elections are crucial for stability in Latin America. Maduro’s alleged victory has lead to increased tensions throughout the region. Any rapprochement with the U.S. and lifting of sanctions will now be far harder and he  will probably forge stronger economic ties with China, Russia and Cuba.  The alleged electoral defeat of the opposition and Maduro’s firm rejection of protesters' demands has closed the door to more cooperative relations with the international community. González was expected to pivot toward democratic governments in the region and with Washington, and work to rebuild international ties. He had announced plans to rebuild international ties with multilateral organizations, such as the IMF, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. With Maduro’s clinging to power, these options have been taken away. The contested election is far from over, and more civil unrest and protests are expected to happen. Even minor institutional victories at lower levels of government, these elections show the hold of the PSUV over Venezuela’s political institutions. Dismantling those institutions built over years of PSUV rule will not be easy to clean up. Maduro’s party still controls the military establishment and is likely to crack down on opposition protests. Any transition to a new government would take place six months from now, giving plenty of time for Maduro to derail the democratic process.  Edited by Chris Dalby

Date:   24/07/2024 Location:   Bangladesh  Parties involved:   Students in Bangladesh, the Government of Bangladesh, Bangladesh National Party (BNP) What happened? Bangladesh has been faced with large student protests   since early July . The protests demand a change to a quota system  which requires 30% of well-paid civil service jobs to go to veterans from the Bangladesh war of independence in 1971. Protesters argue that the quota system is biased in favor of the ruling Awami League party members. The protests in early July started peacefully, but became violent on 15/07/2024 . The authorities launched a harsh crackdown on demonstrators  with security forces targeting unarmed students, imposing a curfew in major cities and shutting down internet services around the country. PM Sheikh Hasina has claimed that the measures were necessary as political opponents were behind the protests and accused them of being ‘internal enemies’.  As of 23/07/2024 , various news outlets reported that the death toll had reached 160 and that over 2,500 people have been arrested. The United Nations and Human Rights Watch have condemned the crackdown on the protests by the authorities of Bangladesh. The protests took place in Chittagong , Natore , Rajshahi and the capital city of Dhaka . The protests mainly focused on university campuses, but in Dhaka also spread to other districts with protesters calling for a complete ‘shutdown’ of the capital. On 21/07/2024  Bangladesh Supreme Court decided to scale the job quota back to 5% for family members of 1971 independence war veterans and 2% for members of ethnic minorities, transgenders, and disabled people.  While the Supreme Court scrapped most of the job quota, the protesters gave the government a 48-hour deadline to meet new demands  on 22/07/2024 . The demands call for justice for the killed protesters and their families and call for Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to take responsibility. In addition, the protesters want the home minister and the road, transport and bridges minister to resign from cabinet and the Awami League party. Another demand is the resignation of the Vice Chancellors of multiple universities and the arrest of police officers that are responsible for the killings.  Analysis: Bangladesh became independent in 1971 following a brutal war of independence from West Pakistan. Originally a part of East and West Pakistan, the then ruling military junta began Operation Searchlight to target Bengali nationalists through a mass insurgency campaign culminating in the Bengali genocide. The secular Awami League, supported by India, drove the military junta’s troops out of the country and declared its independence as Bangladesh. The Awami League has been in power since 1971 . The current PM Sheikh Hasina is the daughter of the leader of the independence movement.  The violent response and crackdown on the protesters poses a serious challenge to the ruling Awami League . After winning the election on a low turnout with low voter participation and banning the main opposition party in January 2024, the grievances over inequality and corruption  are continuing to be key concerns. The resurgence of a coordinated student movement and support for the opposition Bangladesh National Party (BNP) could lead to a more violence response from the authorities, as they have cracked down harshly on opposition movements using live ammunition in extensive anti-government protests in 2018 and 2023.   The court ruling in favor of overturning the quota system on 23/07/2024  may calm the situation in the short-term. However there are still unmet demands by student protesters  who have posted further demands arguing for a public apology to the families of students who were killed from the PM Sheikh Hasina and the resignation of several government ministers. It is still unclear how many protesters have been killed or tortured, with conservative estimates stating at least 150 people have died. India has thus far remained neutral on the crackdown and curfew , calling it a matter of internal affairs. New Delhi has formed a close relationship with the ruling Awami League and may prioritize regime stability above accommodation. India is looking to maintain border stability with Bangladesh and prevent large inflows of refugees which could destabilize the delicate security situation in Manipur and Assam.  The UAE, India and Malaysia have evacuated citizens from major airports in Dhaka and Chittagong . Major airports are unlikely to be targeted but some protestors have called for airports which transport members of the ruling Awami League party to be blocked.

Written by Mark Bruno On July 9th, the U.S. Department of Justice, aided by Dutch and Canadian intelligence, disrupted an AI-driven Russian disinformation campaign. This operation involved seizing domains and social media accounts used to create fake personas and spread propaganda. The campaign, linked to Russian state media, and utilizing a proprietary AI software "Meliorator," aimed at influencing the U.S. elections and other international audiences. The Dutch General and Military Intelligence agencies also identified the misuse of Dutch infrastructure for these cyber activities. The seizure significantly hindered the campaign's capabilities, but it’s only one step in combating the massive narrative webs being laid out by Kremlin-backed actors.  ‘Troll Farms’, ‘Deepfakes’ and the Threat to Digital Truth Russia has long been recognized as a significant threat in hybrid warfare, particularly through its information operations . This capability was most notably demonstrated during the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the support for separatist factions in Donbas. Russian disinformation efforts aimed to justify the annexation  and undermine the Ukrainian government by using state-sponsored groups, social media bots, and social media trolls to amplify pro-Russian narratives and spread false information about the Ukrainian government and military actions. The confusion throughout the earliest days of the conflict empowered more kinetic, “irregular” operations on the ground, often involving Russian soldiers posing as separatist militants as they moved to occupy vast areas of Eastern Ukraine. It wasn’t until the 2022 full-scale invasion  began that Russia’s dominance of the narrative was largely unchallenged in popular culture.  This capacity for seeming to alter reality has only grown in the decade since, as Russian disinformation efforts spread across numerous platforms with fake or re-contextualized news, video, and written content. As well, the rise of Generative AI models (such as ChatGPT) has made both creating this content and spreading it far easier, possibly stifling consequences among the international community. This is why much attention has been focused on influencing elections in countries of strategic importance to Ukraine. The Recent Investigations and Takedowns Disruption of AI-Enhanced Bot Farms In July 2024 , the U.S. Department of Justice, in collaboration with international partners, disrupted a sophisticated AI-enhanced social media bot farm operated by a cooperation of Russian state entities such as the RT (Russia Today) media network, and the FSB (Russia’s Federal Security Service). This operation involved seizing domain names and finding 968 social media accounts used to disseminate disinformation . These bot farms created realistic fake personas to promote pro-Russian narratives and sow discord, targeting audiences in the United States and other Western countries. Other Recent Instances of Countering Disinformation In 2022, a report by the RAND Corporation  circulated, focusing on Russia’s persistent social media efforts and election interference as an additional avenue for its strategic gains in Ukraine. The conclusion of this report emphasized a dire need for international cooperation, and projected the need to address these concerns in NATO and EU-aligned countries  as 2024 approached–a year wherein, famously, over 50 countries would be going to the polls. In the time since, Chinese disinformation tactics have also been exposed  through international partnerships in other theaters. In 2023, pro-Chinese narratives featuring AI-generated content were circulating in an operation dubbed “Shadow Play” across YouTube and Facebook. The narratives targeted sensitive topics in the U.S. and Australia. It eventually resulted in a takedown of thousands of accounts across several of Google and Meta’s products .  Earlier this year, Moldova ’s upcoming elections came into the spotlight. A joint statement in June by the U.S., Canada, and the UK condemned Russia’s alleged electoral interference in Moldova . In response to the individual governments’ findings, representatives from the Five Eyes intelligence alliance have promised greater cooperation and offered assistance to Moldova’s government. Moldova, despite not being a part of NATO, has its own issues with Russian interference, particularly in the separatist region of Transnistria, recognized by the Russian government and a base for an estimated 1500 Russian soldiers. Moldova has become a target of interest for the Kremlin, due to its strategic position relative to Ukraine, and its recent ascendency to EU Candidate status. The Threat Actors and Campaigns  Involved in Current Russian Operations Russia’s network for generating and spreading disinformation involves a web of threat actors, deniable assets, and campaigns variably related to more “traditional” state-run media (such as Sputnik and RT), as well as military and foreign intelligence services. While there is no confirmation as to whether or not any of the following entities have been neutralized through recent operations, it’s suspected that they’ve been seriously impacted. CopyCop CopyCop is a network of disinformation creators that utilize AI to manipulate and spread politically charged content, targeting divisive issues in the US and Europe. This operation creates fake news by scraping and rewriting articles from conservative-leaning and state-affiliated media, amplifying pro-Russian narratives and aiming to influence election outcomes and public opinion. The infrastructure supporting CopyCop has ties to disinformation outlets like DCWeekly  and The Boston Times . DoppelGanger The Doppelganger operation clones legitimate media and government websites to distribute pro-Russian disinformation. Outlets they’ve attempted to clone have included Le Monde , The Guardian , Der Spiegel , and Fox News. By creating fake articles and videos, Doppelganger targets various countries, including the US and EU, spreading narratives that depict Ukraine negatively and undermine support for sanctions against Russia. Recent Reliable News (RRN) Recent Reliable News (RRN) is part of the Doppelganger operation, creating cloned versions of legitimate media websites to disseminate pro-Russian narratives. By mimicking trusted news sources, RRN spreads misinformation about the Ukraine conflict and undermines Western support, focusing on manipulating public opinion through realistic fake news. Project Kylo Project Kylo, managed by Russia’s SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service), focuses on spreading fear and uncertainty to destabilize Western governments and diminish support for Ukraine. This operation uses fake NGOs to organize anti-establishment demonstrations and leverages advanced technologies to bypass traditional media channels, thereby directly influencing Western audiences with disinformation campaigns. The link to the Russian SVR has been established through an SVR officer named Mikhail Kolesov. John Mark Dougan John Mark Dougan, a former U.S. Marine and police officer now in Russia, is accused of operating a disinformation network that produces and distributes fake news in association with DCWeekly  and RNN. His network generates content that appears to come from credible sources, significantly impacting public perception by leveraging advanced AI technologies to spread pro-Russian propaganda. (above) Pages from The Boston Times, a Russian disinformation conduit. Note that it shows relatively normal US conservative-leaning headlines in its recent posts next to obvious fake stories about Ukraine . The Role of Generative AI and Large Language Models Russian disinformation campaigns have increasingly harnessed Generative AI and Large Language Models (LLMs) to enhance their operations. Generative AI facilitates the creation of deepfakes—realistic yet fabricated images, audio, and video—that blur the lines between reality and falsehood. These technologies enable the production of highly persuasive and coherent text, mimicking human writing to generate misleading articles, social media posts, and comments that seamlessly integrate with legitimate content. Meliorator - The Kremlin’s Generative AI Model Proprietary AI models are another critical component of these campaigns. Deepfakes can be used to fabricate speeches by public figures or events that never happened, making it challenging for audiences to discern truth from falsehood. Advanced language models are used to create persuasive and coherent text that mimics human writing, which can generate misleading articles, social media posts, and comments. Meliorator  is an AI-enhanced software package developed under the direction of the Russian state news outlet, RT. It was designed to create and manage a social media bot farm, generating fictitious profiles to disseminate pro-Russian narratives and influence public opinion, particularly targeting the United States and other Western countries. LLMs and AI-generated content have advanced social media manipulation, allowing bots and trolls to generate personalized, contextually relevant responses, making interactions appear genuine. This sophistication enhances the spread of disinformation, with AI tools adapting to real-time events and conversations, providing disinformation actors agility in steering public discourse. The strategic use of these technologies allows for precision targeting of specific demographics, exploiting biases and deepening social divisions. The global reach of these advanced technologies has been suspected of significantly impacting elections and public opinion across multiple countries. The international community has responded with countermeasures like the EU’s East StratCom Task Force  and NATO’s StratCom Centre of Excellence  to combat AI-driven disinformation. However, the sophistication of Generative AI and LLMs poses significant challenges for detection and verification, necessitating the development of new technologies and methodologies to effectively counter these threats. Broader Impacts and Strategic Importance These operations will likely escalate, given the ongoing and evolving nature of the threat posed by Russian information warfare. By leveraging AI and other advanced technologies, disinformation campaigns have become more sophisticated, necessitating equally advanced countermeasures. The success of these efforts highlight the importance of international cooperation, advanced technological capabilities, and proactive measures in protecting democratic processes and public opinion from foreign interference.

July 2024 Violent clashes in the South China Sea are raising tensions in the region. On 20th June, photos emerged of China Coast Guard personnel threatening Filipino crew with knives and spears and attempting to board resupply vessels at the contested Second Thomas Shoal, a reef in the South China Sea.  Later that month, the Philippines ambassador to the US warned of the risks of a regional war. As the Philippines has a mutual defense treaty with the US, the provocations raise the potential of a new flashpoint between the US and China. The Second Thomas Shoal lies in the South China Sea, one of the world’s busiest waterways, with over $3 trillion in world trade passing through to China’s mega ports every year. Over the past decade, China has sought greater control over the waterway and kicked off territorial disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines to assert control. However, the new approach adopted by the Philippines to improve its naval defense capabilities in the South China Sea is a turning point in the security of the region. The Philippines is pursuing various security relationships with states other than the US to improve its position.  Repeated Clashes in the South China Sea The Second Thomas Shoal is a submerged reef in the Spratly Islands to the southeast of the South China Sea. China, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam all claim sovereignty over the island. Located 200 km west of the Palawan island of the Philippines, it is around 20 km in length and is largely submerged at high tide. There are no permanent features or infrastructure. However, a small contingent of Philippine Navy personnel have been stationed there on a rusting WW2-era warship, the Sierra Madre since 1999. They have been resupplied every year to maintain the territorial claim for the Philippines.   Beijing is determined to prevent the resupply missions from happening. China’s Coast Guard has used military-grade lasers aimed at Filipino ships, almost blinding one Filipino fishermen, ramming and water cannons. On June 15, 2024, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) implemented a new policy authorizing the Chinese coast guard to detain foreigners crossing into waters claimed by China, potentially arresting Filipino citizens.  China’s actions against the Philippines have raised the risks of a US-China confrontation over the Second Thomas Shoal. The US is obliged to come to the defense of the Philippines in the 1951 mutual defense treaty, which is frequently supported by the Biden administration. While Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos said  that China’s actions do not yet warrant invoking the pact, he stated  that the death of a Filipino in SCS clashes would be ‘very close’ to an act of war.  Significance of the Second Thomas Shoal   The Second Thomas Shoal lies in the SCS, a key strategic waterway in Asia’s geopolitics. Beijing has claimed sovereignty over the SCS based on the “nine-dash line”, a claim which puts it at odds with other states in the region. There are vast untapped oil and gas reserves in the SCS, estimated at over 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 billion cubic feet of gas. It is vital for international commerce as over one-third of all maritime traffic passes to the largest ports in the world. China’s Navy has built and maintained several island reefs with air bases and a host of missile arsenals, aircraft hangers and surveillance systems to project power into the SCS.  The Philippines sees the Second Thomas Shoal as key to its own sovereignty claims, given that it lies within its Exclusive Economic Zone. Following years of the dispute, the Philippines took the contested claim to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea which ruled in favor of the Philippines in 2016. The Philippines sees defending the Second Thomas Shoal as its territorial claim and standing up for international law. There are also concerns  that Beijing will aim to take the shoal and put air bases and surveillance systems as the Chinese Navy did with the Mischief Reef, located 40 miles away.  Washington sees defending territorial claims of the Philippines as key to maintaining its security role in Asia, especially as other claimant states are looking to the US to hedge against China’s actions in the SCS. The Biden administration wants to maintain the idea of a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’, where ships are free to travel in the SCS. At the same time, the US is seeking to avoid confrontation that would invoke military support for the Philippines.  Why the Philippines? Vietnam has been fast developing  new islands in its SCS claims, though there are no notable outposts or infrastructure as yet. Malaysia and Indonesia have also been developing offshore oil and gas resources in China’s claimed territory, with Beijing largely not offering  a response as harsh as toward the Philippines. However, China has decided to target the Philippines, who is a US treaty ally, and potentially send a signal to other states to undermine the US as a security provider in the region. China’s blockade of Philippine reinforcements may be an attempt to prevent the Philippines from becoming closer to the US. China’s defense ministry and People’s Daily regularly condemn the stationing of US military troops and missile deployments to the northern Philippine island Luzon, which lies 500 km from Taiwan. In April 2024, the US sent  new missile launchers capable of targeting ships at sea to Luzon. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. said  that the country could be pulled into a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. China’s view is that the Philippines is merely a part of a broader geopolitical strategy to contain China. China has repeatedly stated that it objects to US security arrangements near its territorial waters. Chinese diplomats have accused the US of establishing a series of alliance systems aimed at introducing an Asia-Pacific version of NATO, claiming that this is an attempt to encircle China. Beijing also views the Aukus alliance between the US, Australia and Britain as an organization to confront China. The Philippines increasing cooperation with US allies in the region is therefore seen as another geopolitical move to confront China’s interests in the region.  New regional security ties The imbalance between China’s and the Philippines’ naval capabilities has led the Philippines to pursue better relations with the US. Marcos has allowed  the US to double the number of Philippine bases American soldiers. He has to some extent supported US priorities in the Taiwan Strait, saying the Philippines will be involved in the event of a Taiwan Crisis because it is too close to the Philippines. With the onset of a Trump presidency however, US security ties are far from guaranteed. The Philippines has also started to develop ties outside of the US partnership to conduct security arrangements with other regional powers. Japan and the Philippines will soon announce  a reciprocal access agreement allowing their troops to enter each other’s territory for joint exercises. Japan has already supplied patrol ships to the Philippines Coast Guard to defend its territorial sovereignty. Japanese prime minister, Fumio Kishida, has agreed to provide new coastal surveillance radar systems through grants. Japan’s patrol vessels, defense equipment and radar to strengthen Philippines’ law enforcement capability.  The Philippines has also developed closer ties with Australia and India. Australia shares the Philippines concerns over China’s growing military assertiveness in SCS and has become a significant military partner in the Philippines naval capabilities. They regularly conduct joint amphibious landings. India’s growing geopolitical competition with China has prompted India to forge closer ties with the Philippines and Taiwan. While their collaboration is not as significant compared with other powers, their combined naval exercises through the South China Sea indicate their growing cooperation in the maritime field.  Risks of escalation While it is unlikely that there will be open conflict between the Philippines and China, there is a chance of a crisis if a red line is crossed. Even with low-level conflict this raises the risk that the mutual defense treaty with the US will be invoked. US president Biden states that the treaty also covers Filipino ships and personnel. China has increased the number of ships around the Second Thomas Shoal and is monitoring other states in the SCS. There are some signs that Beijing and Manila are willing to talk with each other to resolve the crisis through dialogue, perhaps through a shared cooperation agreement on oil exploration. Yet the low-level conflict is remaking security ties in Asia and offering new regional security arrangements against China’s growing assertiveness.

Date:   11/07/2024 Where : Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso  Who’s involved : Alliance of Sahel States (AES), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) What happened? On 06/07/2024 , the military rulers of  Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso signed a treaty establishing a confederation called the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and formalizing their departure from the Economic Community of West African States  (ECOWAS). The treaty was signed during a summit of the three military junta leaders in Niamey, the capital of Niger. The goal of the confederation is mutual defense  in case of external aggression, armed rebellion, or any attack on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the parties. The breakaway confederation has a marked anti-ECOWAS and anti-French stance .  The official formation of the new alliance between the West African military juntas took place a day before  the opening of ECOWAS 65th ordinary summit  in Nigeria’s capital, Abuja. Nigerian President Bola Tinubu, re-elected as ECOWAS chair during the summit, warned that the splitting of the juntas from the West African bloc puts  ECOWAS at "risk of disintegration" and "political isolation."  Senegalese President Faye was appointed by ECOWAS, along with the president of Togo, as a special envoy to negotiate and seek reconciliation with the governments of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.  On 07/07/2024, the US completed the withdrawal of about 1000 military personnel  from their air base in Niamey, Niger’s capital. The US is expected to complete the withdrawal of the remaining troops in the country by 15/09/2024, while Germany’s contingent will leave Niger by 31/08/2024. The Italian military maintains troops in the country, but a potential renewal will be discussed in September 2024. The withdrawal of US troops from Niger represents the loss of the last stronghold and ally for Western counter-terrorism in the Sahel States . Mali had already expelled French troops in 2022, while the withdrawal of French forces in Niger and Burkina Faso was completed in 2023.  The creation of the Alliance of Sahel States and its mutual defense pact was initially announced on 16/09/2023 , after the ECOWAS threatened to military intervene in Niger to restore constitutional rule and the deposed president following a military coup in July 2023.  On 28/01/2024, the three West African junta-led countries  simultaneously declared the withdrawal from the ECOWAS due to military and political pressure and the suspension from ECOWAS in the aftermath of their respective coups. Besides Niger's military coup in July 2023, which saw General Abdourahamane Tchiani self-proclaimed leader of the country, the Sahel region witnessed a wave of coup d’etat in the last three years , including the coups in 2020 and 2021 in Mali led by the current Malian President Colonel Assimi Goïta and the two coups in 2022 experienced by Burkina Faso, currently led by Captain Ibrahim Traoré.  Analysis : The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), established in 1975 as an economic coalition, evolved into a powerful regional political and economic union consisting of fifteen, now twelve, West African nations aiming to achieve "self-sufficiency" and economic cooperation  among member states to raise living standards and foster economic growth. ECOWAS also aimed to promote regional peace, stability, and security  through integration and cooperation among members and developing a peacekeeping force to address regional security issues such as terrorism and conflict. However, in recent years, increased regional instability, terroristic violence, and the bloc's inability to prevent military coups and restore democratic order have undermined ECOWAS' authority and credibility. The split of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso and the establishment of the AES risks exacerbating greater regional instability and further fragmenting and weakening the already crisis-ridden ECOWAS.  For ECOWAS, the exit of the AES member states, with their 72 million people, about one-fifth of the ECOWAS population, would undermine regional integration  about the free trade area (FTA), trade routes, industrial diversification and supply chains, freedom of movement and the right to work across borders. Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, on the other hand, will face economic challenges and risk worsening their economic and financial condition, already damaged by the sanctions imposed on them following the coups. Being landlocked countries , their trade routes depend mainly on the coastal members of ECOWAS. Leaving ECOWAS will also mean leaving the FTA, resulting in the reintroduction of tariff barriers and increased transactions, making their exports less competitive and imported goods more expensive. Moreover, the AES country will no longer benefit from ECOWAS development programs to foster food security, water management, agriculture, and energy in the region. International observers warn of the  risk of increased poverty, food security, and humanitarian crises in the countries.  AES announced the creation of the Sahel Economic Alliance to promote the confederation's economic development and self-sufficiency. Moreover, these countries are rich in mineral resources, mainly gold sold to non-ECOWAS countries , which could at least partially offset the economic consequences of leaving the regional economic bloc. Also, the junta-led countries announced the creation of a mechanism to allow the free movement of people, goods and services within the AES zone and their own investment bank. It is still unclear whether AES will also leave the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA). The withdrawal from ECOWAS will also imply growing political isolation for Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger and diminishing chances for the restoration of democracy. The lack of political cooperation with the ECOWAS will likely affect the efforts of the bloc and Western efforts to address the regional security challenges,  like armed groups, organized crime, and, especially, terrorism. The three junta-led states are among the most affected by violence and activities of Islamist groups, and ECOWAS leaders are concerned about the spillover of jihadist groups into neighboring countries  as a result of the collapse of joint counter-terrorism strategies and the withdrawal of Western military forces from the AES members.   The military juntas' estrangement from ECOWAS is also attributable to their strong anti-French and anti-Western stance . AES leaders have repeatedly accused the West African bloc of being "slaves" to France and acting on behalf of Western foreign powers rather than for regional interests. The expulsion of French forces and the more recent withdrawal of US contingents points at, besides counterterrorism implications, a geopolitical shift by AES in favor of non-Western powers seeking to expand their influence in the region. Russia has already consolidated its relations with members of the new alliance . Russia initiated military cooperation with Niger in 2024 and has openly supported Burkina Faso's military regime by deploying troops in the country. In addition, the presence in Mali of about 1,000 troops of the Russian private military group Wagner, which is responsible for atrocities against civilians, has been confirmed since 2021.  The US withdrawal from Niger could further the West African country's relations with Iran and Russia to boost their nuclear programs. Niger accounts for about 7 percent of the world's uranium production,  which has historically been supplied to France. Meanwhile, Russia’s Rosatom signed three cooperation deals in July 2024 with Mali’s military junta and discussed projects for a nuclear power plant. China is also expanding its influence and investment in the resource-rich Sahel region. For instance, in 2023, China invested extensively in Mali, which has one of the world's largest lithium reserves.   Despite ECOWAS's efforts for reconciliation, it is unlikely that the three military-ruled countries will opt to return to the West African bloc . The regional insecurity spawned by the new configuration of West Africa is likely to exacerbate increased violence against civilians, widespread terrorism and extremism, and a dramatic humanitarian crisis. International observers are concerned about restricting citizens' freedoms by military juntas and fear a greater authoritarian orientation in the region, even in neighboring states. The Alliance of Sahel States could likely also significantly impact migration flows to Europe . The reintroduction of cross-border controls will disrupt the usual migration routes, and the military juntas, with their stricter approach against illegal migration, will no longer be part of the cooperation framework on migration negotiated by ECOWAS and the EU.  Conclusion : The withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, members of the newly forged Alliance of Sahel States, from the ECOWAS economic and political bloc is likely to have  far-reaching impacts on regional and international stability and security . International observers are concerned that the new Sahel configuration will exacerbate a humanitarian crisis and a migration crisis, thus having repercussions for the European Union and migration routes. Moreover, the withdrawal of Western forces from the region increases the risk of expansion and strengthening of jihadist groups . ECOWAS reconciliation efforts with the AES are unlikely to produce any results. The weakening of ECOWAS, now made up of 12 member states, could also have ramifications for the influence and peacekeeping and counter-terrorism activities of its Western allies in the region, to the benefit of non-Western powers such as Russia, Iran, and China, already seeking to cement their ties with separatist military juntas.

Date:   8/7/2024 Where :  The Internet/Social Media websites   Who’s involved : “Little Bug”  group, CopyCop  network, John Mark Dougan , other Russian propaganda producers What happened? A June 18th  audit by media monitoring service, NewsGuard , concluded that the ten most used Generative AI models (including ChatGPT , Microsoft Copilot , Google Gemini , X (Twitter)’s Grok , and others) substantially and demonstrably amplified Russian disinformation and propaganda  campaigns. The report came just before the publication of a June 26th  piece by WIRED , regarding Russian propaganda video “deep fakes” being created and promoted with the assistance  of Generative AI and Large Language Models  (LLM). Both publications emphasize the research and accomplishments of various investigations conducted since early 2023  that have identified hundreds of websites  generating videos , news stories , and audio recordings . The NewsGuard  audit identified 19 significant false narratives attributed to 167 websites  that appeared in 31.75 percent  of the inquiries tested with the ten AI models. Analysis The AI models would authoritatively cite the Russian disinformation sources  as legitimate “local” news. Some of these Russian sources have deliberately attempted to trick the models by naming themselves after now-defunct legitimate newspapers, such as The Arizona Observer  and The Houston Post . Some of the reproduced narratives were extremely specific. They included topics such as US bioweapon labs in Ukraine, wiretaps at Donald Trump’s Mar-a-Lago properties, murder-coverups regarding property acquisitions by the Zelensky family, and  Ukrainian attempts to interfere with the 2024 US elections . Many of these narratives have been tied to the propaganda works of John Mark Dougan , a former US Marine and police officer who fled to Russia in 2016 to avoid legal allegations. He is alleged to be involved with the Russian disinformation network, CopyCop . As Russian influence operations shift some of their focus towards influencing US presidential elections , a Russian entity known as Little Bug , in association with the Doppelganger  disinformation network, have begun using publicly available Generative AI models to create artificial, “deepfake” music videos and public statements featuring US president Joe Biden.  Doppelganger ’s media has attempted to amplify criticisms of Biden by the America’s far-right, specifically narratives in line with the extremist “Great Replacement Theory ” of immigration and white supremacy, and reinforced accusations of unsubstantiated health issues related to Biden’s age. In May , OpenAI  released a report about how its own investigations showed that its tools (including ChatGPT  and DALL-E  image generator) were being used by disinformation actors in Russia , China , Iran , and Israel . When using some of NewsGuard ’s prompts in the newest available ChatGPT  models, it was shown that they have been updated to reflect that the identified propaganda sites are now sources of disinformation. The changes haven’t been applied perfectly. Both ChatGPT’s 4o and 4 models, which require a paid subscription, and the 3.5 model, which is available without payment, showed that with less context, some of these sites are still cited as legitimate sources: When pushed back just slightly, the model (in this case, the newest, GPT 4o) bafflingly contradicts itself: Conclusion As more tech companies offer AI integrations utilizing the models reported on by NewsGuard  and others, the reach of disinformation and propaganda threatens to grow exponentially. Additionally, Generative AI models don’t only offer the means to dispense disinformation, but to generate it, themselves. It’s important to note that even if the various developers, such as OpenAI , attempt to take steps to flag such information or sites as potentially harmful, this is only a reactive approach, and users can see that the models are not prepared to identify sources of disinformation with just the slightest changes to prompts and context. In part, the nature of AI Large Language Models, which scrape nearly the entirety of the internet for their training data, make a proactive approach impossible for developers because the disinformation is already integrated into the models. As it stands, the current onus of preventing this data scraping is on the producers of content. Disinformation networks such as CopyCop  have absolutely no incentive to engage in such protection of their data, as it would reduce their reach.

Date:  04/07/2024 Where : Turkey or Republic of Türkiye , Turkish-controlled northern Syria Who’s involved : Turkish President Erdogan, Turkish political opposition, Syrian refugees, Syrian President Assad What happened? On 30/06/2024, anti-Syrian riots erupted in Kayseri province, central Turkey.  Turkish residents stormed and torched businesses and properties of Syrian nationals. The unrest was sparked by allegations of sexual assault against a minor by a Syrian.  The unrest spread to the provinces of Hatay, Gaziantep, Konya, Bursa and several cities, including Istanbul. Over 470 people were arrested for suspected involvement in the riots.   Turkish authorities called for calm and heightened security at the Syrian consulate in Istanbul.  On 01/07/2024, Turkish President Erdogan blamed the opposition parties for promoting anti-immigrant sentiment and xenophobia  that spurred the violent riots. In response, Turkey's main opposition party, the Republican People's Party (CHP), has pointed to Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AK Party or AKP) and its refugee policy as culpable for the escalation of violence and for turning Turkey into "a refugee depot." The CHP called for a revision of Turkish foreign and refugee policy.  On 02/07/2024, Turkey closed its border with Syria after Turkish forces clashed with Syrian protesters in the Syrian border city of Afrin, in the Ankara-controlled northern Syria.  Seven people were killed in the clashes. Protests and acts of violence are spreading elsewhere in Turkish-controlled north Syria calling for the withdrawal of Turkish forces, with hundreds of Syrians taking to the streets, attacks on Turkish convoys and Turkish flags being removed.  The escalation of violence, both in Turkey and in Turkish-controlled north Syria, came a few days after both Turkish President Erdogan and his Syrian counterpart Bashar al-Assad signaled their willingness to normalize relations and restore bilateral ties between the countries,  interrupted after the 2011 Syrian civil wars. The separate announcement came after Turkey reopened, in late June 2024, the Abu Al-Zandeen crossing near the northern Syrian city of Al-Bab, restoring trade routes and connecting Turkish-controlled and Syrian government-controlled areas in eastern Aleppo. This triggered  massive protests on 28/06/2024 from the Syrian population . Analysis : With nearly four million refugees, Turkey hosts the world’s largest refugee population. Most of them, approximately 3.6 million, are Syrian.   Initially welcomed as refugees under temporary protection status in Turkey following the outbreak of Syria's civil war in 2011, Syrian nationals have been experiencing increasing hostility from the local population in recent years.  The rise of anti-immigrant sentiment in Turkey is firstly related to the current economic situation in the country . Since 2018, Turkey has been experiencing a deep economic crisis, which worsened in 2021 due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Currency devaluation, rising inflation, rising cost of living, and a high unemployment rate have fueled resentment toward immigrants and refugees perceived as competitors in the labor market and a burden on the welfare state. Moreover, the opposition’s strong criticism of President Erdogan’s flexible refugee police and his refugee deal with the EU  seems to be a factor in the spread of anti-immigrant rhetoric and protests. During the May 2023 general election campaign, the main opposition party, the CHP, focused its political agenda on nationalist rhetoric and the repatriation of Syrians. Moreover, in recent years, new parties with a prominent anti-immigrant and anti-Syrian narrative  have emerged, including the far-right Victory Party founded in 2021. Although these parties gained little support in the 2023 elections, President Erdogan claimed that their anti-immigrant rhetoric is fomenting the recent new escalation of violence and resentment against the Syrian refugee population.  The recent riots are not the first xenophobic protests in Turkey targeting Syrians. An analogous event happened in 2021 when massive anti-Syrian riots broke out in the capital, Ankara, following the death of a Turkish teenager during a fight with a group of Syrians.  Beyond Turkey, anti-refugee and anti-immigrant sentiment is expanding in the region . In Lebanon, home of 1.5 millions of Syrian refugees, resentment and violence against refugees increased since the start of the economic crisis in 2019. In April 2024, Syrian communities were attacked by the local population and  Lebanon security forces, following the abduction and killing of a major figure of a Christian party. The same anti-immigrant shift is also visible in other “safe havens” for refugees, including Tunisia, where the rising anti-refugee sentiments and violence led to discriminatory regulations and treatments of Sub-Saharan migrants. In recent months, the Tunisian government launched an unprecedented crackdown and abuse campaign against migrants, refugees and human rights defenders. The new escalation of violence risks reinforcing the already volatile situation and undermining the normalization efforts between Turkey and Syria , already jeopardized by recent protests in Syria after the reopening of the Abu Al-Zandeen crossing. Relations between Turkey and Syria have been strained since 2011, after the outbreak of Syrian civil war, as Turkey supported the rebels seeking to overthrow Assad. Moreover,  Turkey still controls a buffer zone in northern Syria , which has been the reason for the failure of previous attempts at normalization as Aleppo has repeatedly stated that respect for the Syrian sovereignty and the withdrawal of Turkish forces from its territory are preconditions for the restoration of bilateral relations.  Several factors may play a role in promoting normalization between Turkey and Syria, including regional dynamics like the Israel-Hamas conflict and the possibility of the outbreak of a regional war in southern Lebanon. Moreover, restoring relations with the Assad regime is crucial for Turkey to eliminate the threat posed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK ), active in southeastern Turkey, northern Syria and northern Iraq,  and terrorist groups like Daesh/ISIS. Finally, the Turkey-Syria normalization would be the first step toward advancing the Turkish plan to repatriate Syrian refugees  to their home country. However, to enable them to return safely, the Assad regime will first have to accept a democratic political transition. Conclusion : The recent escalation of violence against Syrian refugees in Turkey indicates an unprecedented upsurge in anti-refugee sentiments  in the country. Anti-refugee riots  are already spreading across the country, and there is a risk that they could escalate as occurred in 2021, jeopardizing the security of the Syrian population in Turkey and further exacerbating the social, political, and economic exclusion of refugees in the country. Moreover, despite normalization efforts between the two countries, t he unrest in Turkey and the outbreak of new violence and protests in Turkish-controlled northern Syria risk further deteriorating relations between Turkey and Syria . Heightened violence targeting refugees in Turkey comes on top of a volatile regional situation due to ongoing conflicts and the widespread anti-immigrant narrative gaining momentum in the region.

Written by Arianna Lucà, Mickey Beckmann, Jacob Dickinson, Iris de Boer, Kevin Heller, Sara Frisan Russia-Ukraine: The front has remained static despite Russian offensive operations in Kharkiv Oblast and Donetsk Oblast. Ukraine hit targets inside Russia with Western-supplied weapons. Israel-Hamas:  As Netanyahu's government faces instability, the conflict enters a new phase with Israel focused on eliminating Hamas leadership.  Myanmar: Civil war intensifies in the western Rakhine state and the eastern parts of the country as the military junta shuts down the internet.  Sudan:  Ongoing conflict between SAF and RSF in Sudan worsens the humanitarian crisis and increases the risk of regional instability.  Israel-Hezbollah: A war between Israel and Hezbollah seems inevitable. Several countries have called for its citizens to leave Lebanon as soon as possible. Kenya: Widespread protests erupted across Kenya against the government's planned tax hikes, resulting in deaths, injuries and many arrests. Mozambique: As SADC mission in Mozambique withdraws, violence resumes in the resource-rich Cabo Delgado province. Venezuela:  While opposition candidate González is far ahead in the polls, it remains uncertain whether Maduro will concede free and fair presidential elections on July 28.  Bolivia: Alleged failed coup deepens political instability ahead of Bolivian elections in 2025. New Caledonia: New protests erupt in New Caledonia after detained activists are sent to mainland France for trial. DRC: As the eastern provinces face a surge in attacks by M23 and ADF armed groups, escalating tensions between DRC and Rwanda heighten the risk of  violence  in the region.  Haiti: While the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support mission's arrival in Haiti is imminent, violence is spreading in rural areas.  North Korea-South Korea: Tensions rise between North and South Korea as they ramp up their propaganda campaigns and strengthen ties with allies.  China-Taiwan: Divisive legislative changes in Taiwan lead to mass protests as Beijing threatens ‘pro-independence leaders’ with the death penalty. Conflicts, June 2024   Russia-Ukraine In June 2024, Russia continued its offensive operations in Kharkiv Oblast  in the direction of Vovchansk and Kharkiv (city). Russia hit different cities in Kharkiv Oblast with deadly airstrikes and tried to push in the direction of Lyptsi. However, Russia did not manage to breach the frontline. The Ukrainian Armed Forces regained positions in the Lyptsi direction and also managed to remain in control of the majority of Vovchansk by conducting tactical counterattacks. Fighting continued in Donetsk Oblast , where Russia tried to make its way toward Chasiv Yar and captured a relatively small piece of Ivanivske.  On June 9, 2024, the head of the Chechen Republic stated that soldiers also captured the village of Ryzhivka in Sumy Oblast, but this was contested by Zelenskyy, who called it a “propaganda operation”. The pressure on the Russian Armed Forces is increasing because the promised Western aid for Ukraine has started to arrive . Nevertheless, this aid is not expected to lead to any significant changes on the battlefield before mid or late July. In late May and early June, the US, France, Germany, and other Western allies gave the green light for Ukraine to use the provided weapons to hit targets inside Russian territory . Hence, the Ukrainian Armed Forces hit targets in Rostov-on–Don, Belgorod Oblast, Azov, Sevastopol, and Voronezh Oblast. Some had their own military resources, and some had Western-provided resources. Moscow has publicly held the US. responsible for the deadly attack in Sevastopol, as it was conducted with five missiles that were supplied to Ukraine by the U.S.  On June 23, 2024, the cities of Derbant and Makhachkala in the Russian Republic of Dagestan were hit by a terrorist attack  targeting synagogues, churches, and a police post, killing at least 20 people. While most information currently points to Wilayat Kavkaz, the Northern Caucasus branch of Islamic State (IS), Russia has tried to blame the attack on Ukraine and the West, claiming that the terrorist attack is linked to the Ukrainian strikes in Sevastopol.  Israel-Hamas   The war between Israel and Hamas is moving to a new phase. The IDF has decided to focus more on special forces campaigns   against Hamas leadership, bomb makers, and weapon dealers instead of conducting large operations that cover entire cities in Gaza. Targeted strikes and assassinations or arrests will have priority in the coming months . Some IDF troops will be sent home or redeployed to the north now that the operations in Gaza are winding down and the war with Hezbollah is likely to start. Hamas is urging the US to put pressure on Israel to accept a peace deal, but Israel suspects Hamas is trying to stall for time so it can build up new strength in Rafah, Khan Yunis, and Gaza City. The US, Egypt, and Qatar are urging Hamas and Israel to return to the negotiating table, but so far, it has been unsuccessful. The humanitarian situation in Gaza is still dire, although more food trucks are arriving, and the US has resumed its project of a pier to distribute aid from the sea. The coming months will see Israel refocusing its forces to deal with the Hezbollah threat in the north  as Hamas seems to be on the verge of collapse. If the Netanyahu government survives the coming weeks, the chances of peace negotiations are remote . The Netanyahu government is further destabilized as some bills and decisions created a rift between the government's supporting parties. There is debate about whether or not to negotiate with Hamas or fully destroy the organization. Moreover, intentions for the management of Gaza in the future are unclear.  Protests are increasing in Tel Aviv and other cities , calling for a peace agreement with Hamas to free hostages. Meanwhile, the ultra-Orthodox community is rising against the passage of the mandatory conscription law for all Israelis, from which the ultra-Orthodox are no longer exempt.  Myanmar  The civil war in Myanmar has become more fluid over the past month. Pro-democracy forces and groups pushing for ethnic autonomy have made strides against the military junta, with fighting intensifying in the western Rakhine state . In early June, junta troops began emptying towns and villages in preparation for a planned attack on the regional capital, Sittwe, by the Arakan Army (AA), the armed ethnic organization of the Muslim Rohingya minority. The powerful AA said it was about to capture the city of Maungdaw, on the border with Bangladesh, and called on residents to evacuate as soon as possible. As the junta has lost territory, it has resorted to extreme measures , including indiscriminate bombing of towns and night drone attacks, targeting the Rohingya and Rakhine communities.  The military regime has also struggled to refill stocks of ammunition in aircraft and artillery as Russia, North Korea, and China are distracted or refuse to sell further weapons . China seems willing to talk to ethnic armed groups in the country. Within areas inside the junta’s control, like the capital, its conscription order has forced thousands of civilians to flee to Thailand. The junta also cut off VPN access  for as much as the country as possible, locking 20 million Burmese out of the internet. In Bangkok, supporters of Myanmar’s imprisoned leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, led a procession to object to the more than 20,600 people detained for opposing military rule.  Sudan   The civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan is deteriorating rapidly . Currently, the SAF seems unable to regain control of the country's main cities and infrastructure. Despite the slowdown in the RSF advance, it was reported on June 20  that paramilitaries took control of el-Fula, the capital of West Kordofan state. On June 15 , the SAF accused the UAE of supplying weapons to the RSF, allegations rejected by the UAE, which denied any involvement in the Sudanese conflict. Other countries like Egypt, Libya, Chad, Iran, and Russia have been accused of supplying weapons to either or both warring sides. Most countries deny their involvement. Russia is the only exception, as it has openly stated its willingness to aid both sides. The persistence of the conflict is aggravating the already dire humanitarian crisis  for the Sudanese civilian population. The Darfur region has been particularly affected by the war. Amnesty International reports that RSF is perpetrating crimes against unarmed civilians , with dozens of people executed or mutilated. The displacement crisis is fuelling the risk of regional instability. Approximately 2 million displaced Sudanese have been seeking refuge in neighboring countries, including Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, and South Sudan, which are struggling to handle the influx of refugees on top of their already volatile political and economic situations.  Alerts, June 2024  Israel-Hezbollah The conflict between Hezbollah and Israel is intensifying . Hezbollah forces have ramped up their missile attacks on Israel and have shown that they can fly a UAV over Haifa and military installations in Israel without being intercepted by air defense systems. This escalation has led Israel to state its intent to start a full-scale war with Hezbollah to oust them from the south of Lebanon. The Israeli government is facing considerable pressure to ensure the return of displaced citizens from the north of the country. The Israeli government has given the IDF the green light to start a war  once it is ready to do so. The IDF intensified its targeted killings of Hezbollah commanders, weapon smugglers, and bomb makers. This has rattled the Hezbollah leadership, prompting them to hide and reinforce their controlled neighborhoods in Beirut to thwart any Israeli attacks. A full-scale war would likely not only target Hezbollah, but the entire Lebanese infrastructure would be seen as a legitimate target . Beirut will especially be a likely target as Hezbollah uses the international airport  for storing and receiving weapons from Iran. The harbor is also a potential target  for the IDF as it will want to stop cargo vessels from delivering weapons to Hezbollah.  Several countries, like Canada and Kuwait, already called on their citizens to leave Lebanon as soon as possible , as it will be challenging to leave the country once the confrontations escalate. The US has been vague on whether or not it will support Israel in a war with Hezbollah. Israel is semi-dependent on intelligence gathered by US intelligence services and needs resupplies of weaponry coming from the US. The role of Iran and the IRGC  in a conflict between Hezbollah and Israel is yet to be seen. They might choose to remain in the background and offer advice and weapons or decide to commit to open warfare with Israel. Kenya Since mid-June, 2024, widespread demonstrations  erupted across Kenya in response to the government’s planned tax hikes laid out in the ‘Finance Bill’ , which many fear will worsen the cost-of-living crisis. Organized mainly by young Kenyans via social media, the heaviest protests occurred in Nairobi, where police used tear gas and water cannons. The clashes resulted in several deaths, hundreds of injuries, and about 200 arrests, including protesters, journalists, and human rights observers. The protests stem from discontent with President Ruto’s economic policies , which include raising $2.7 billion in additional taxes, equivalent to 1.9 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). Critics say Ruto has reneged on his promise to reduce taxes and lower living costs. Last month, Ruto defended the tax hikes, emphasizing the need to boost revenue and cut reliance on external borrowing, intending to make Kenya financially self-sustaining. The country faces a significant debt burden, with servicing costs soaring due to a two-year decline in the local currency's value, limiting President Ruto's options.  In response to the demonstrations, the government dropped several controversial tax proposals, including the 16% VAT on bread. However, the government indicated the cuts will result in a budget shortfall of 200 billion shillings (about £ 1,2 billion), prompting increases in fuel prices and export taxes, likely exacerbating living conditions as well. Despite the protests, parliament passed the Finance Bill's second reading on June 20, 2024 , leading to the continuation of protests in several Kenyan cities. On June 26, President Ruto eventually  decided to decline the finance bill . However, protests continued and people started to demand Ruto’s resignation  in the days after. Reuters reports that a widely shared pamphlet on June 28 called for seven days of activism , including nationwide strikes and road blockades on July 2 and July 4. Until the demonstrators’ grievances are addressed, the protests are likely to continue. Human rights watchdogs have accused authorities of illegal nighttime abductions of protestors, carried out by police in civilian clothes, and call for the release of all detainees.  Mozambique In recent months, Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province, rich in gas and natural resources and plagued by violence since 2017, experienced a surge in attacks by insurgents linked to the IS . More than 80000 people have been displaced since the start of 2024. Militant activity also prevents the provision of food and health services . The UN reports that about 1.7 million people in Mozambique need immediate assistance and protection. Between May 10 and May 14 , armed groups launched a major offensive on the town of Macomia , displacing about 1,500 people. The offensive comes as French oil company TotalEnergies is restarting a $20 billion liquified natural gas (LNG) terminal located at Palma, about 200 kilometers from Macomia, halted in 2021 due to escalating violence. ExxonMobil and its partner ENI are also developing LNG projects in Cabo Delgado. However, The mandate of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) mission, deployed in 2021 to help reduce the presence of the Islamic State (IS) militants in Mozambique's northern province of Cabo Delgado, is set to expire on July 15 , 2024 . Botswana and Lesotho already withdrew their forces in April, and Angola and Namibia are reportedly preparing to leave in the next few weeks, while 1,000 South African troops will remain in the country until the end of 2024. In late May, non-SADC country Rwanda announced the deployment of 2,000 additional soldiers to Mozambique due to escalating violence. As attacks in the province persist, international observers are concerned that the withdrawal of regional forces is premature since it could give further momentum to the jihadist insurgency . This would have dire implications for the humanitarian and security situation in Mozambique and the region.  Venezuela On July 28, 2024 , Venezuela will hold presidential elections . Current president and PSUV leader Nicolás Maduro is seeking a third term. However, for the first time in nearly a decade, an opposition candidate, Edmundo González Urrutia, has a viable chance of winning. González, a former diplomat, became the surprise candidate for the Platform Unitarian Democrática (PUD) after its leader, María Corina Machado, was barred from running by Maduro. Polls show that two-thirds of Venezuelans would support any candidate challenging Maduro . Millions have fled his authoritarian rule and economic mismanagement, and those remaining yearn for democracy and economic growth. However, the election process is expected to be neither free nor fair. Maduro controls the Electoral Council and judiciary and has placed many obstacles to prevent a strong opposition candidate. In recent months, Maduro has disrupted and intimidated the opposition  by detaining members, banning them from holding public office, and imposing measures to deter criticism, leading the US to reimpose in May the oil sanctions against Venezuela. Maduro also demanded opposition candidates sign an agreement to respect the election results. González refused to sign it, accusing Maduro of violating the pact by rescinding the invitation to EU observers, while the UN and the Carter Centre announced that they will provide limited election scrutiny, but keep the findings confidential.  The post-election scenario is uncertain. In the event of an opposition victory, it is uncertain if Maduro will accept the results, or if he would disregard the vote by disqualifying González. International observers argue that it would be hazardous for Maduro not to allow the electoral transition in case of an opposition victory. Besides international prosecution of his regime's crimes and violations, it might also exacerbate divisions among the parties that support the PSVU. Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded that Maduro will attempt to retain power  anyway. This could fuel the outbreak of protests and popular uprisings. Should González be recognized as president-elect, Venezuela's democratic transition is likely to be anything but simple. The new president will inherit a country strangled by economic crisis, mass migrations, corruption and inconsistency of democratic institutions and rule of law.  Bolivia On June 26 , Bolivia suffered a potential coup  when military forces seized control of the capital's main square with armored vehicles and stormed the presidential palace with a tank. In the following hours, the army general who led the coup attempt, Juan José Zúñiga, and 17 others were arrested  for their involvement in the failed coup. Zúñiga claimed, with no evidence provided, that President Arce staged the coup to boost his popularity ahead of the 2025 presidential election. Although the government immediately denied the allegations, some opposition figures called the riots a self-coup. During the coup, Arce posted a video calling on the Bolivian people to mobilize and organize against the coup in the name of democracy. On June 27, Bolivians took to the streets to support the president  and denounce the foiled military coup. The alleged coup attempt comes at a time of instability for Bolivia, rocked by protests over shortages of US dollars and fuel and political turmoil ahead of the 2025 elections due to the rivalry between Arce and former President Evo Morales. Despite the Constitutional Court disqualifying him for the 2025 elections, Morales intends to run against former ally Arce, creating a major rift within the Socialist Party and a battle between Arce and Morales for control of the ruling MAS  (Movement for Socialism) party. Although Morales still enjoys the support of labor unions and coca growers, many complain that the former president should not be allowed to run for reelection. Among them, Gen Zúñiga had threatened, before the alleged coup attempt, that he would block Morales if he attempted to return as president.  Even if the ramifications of the coup are still unclear, this event has strengthened Arce’s political position, despite investigations into his possible involvement in the coup attempt. The situation in Bolivia remains unstable; new protests and more violence in the coming weeks cannot be ruled out. Should the political crisis and fragmentation of the ruling party intensify, political violence could escalate ahead of the 2025 elections.  Updates, June 2024 New Caledonia After an initial break-in hostilities in May, 2024 , the population rose in protest again after seven activists, arrested for allegedly orchestrating the May riots, were taken to France to be tried there.  Riots broke out, and several buildings were set alight. Around 3500 French troops are currently on the island to support local forces restoring order. Moreover, it is reported that the protests in New Caledonia are also financed and supported by Azerbaijan as a response to French military supplies and pledged defensive support to Armenia against attacks by "outside forces," with which Azerbaijan is on the brink of conflict.  The unrest was sparked in response to French plans to allow French citizens who have lived in New Caledonia for over 10 years  to be able to vote in local elections. The local population fears that such influence will reduce their power and will make way for French companies and such to come and exploit the natural resources of the island. With the French general election that took place on June 30, 2024, it is still unclear what the French government's future policy toward the overseas territories will be. A far-right cabinet under the Rassemblement National will likely not favor greater independence for those territories, which could trigger more uprisings and riots in New Caledonia in the coming future. Democratic Republic of Congo The conflict between the Congolese army and the Rwanda-supported M23 rebels continues  to rage in mineral-rich eastern DRC, worsening the dire humanitarian crisis .  In 2024 alone, over a million people have been displaced, with about 23 million facing crisis levels of hunger. Despite plans to leave the country, the UN recently announced a temporary expansion of MONUSCO troops presence in eastern DRC  to counter the surge in violence. The situation is worsened due to the violence conducted by several militia groups vying for mineral resources. The ISIS-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) are carrying out substantial attacks  on multiple villages in the provinces of North Kivu and Ituri, eastern DRC. Local authorities reported around 150 civilian casualties attributed to the ADF in June 2024. On June 20 and 21 , the armed group Cooperative for the Development of the Congo (CODECO) reportedly carried out deadly attacks  on several villages in the mineral-rich Djugu territory, Ituri province.  Rising violence in the eastern DRC is fueling regional tension and increasing the risk of conflict in the region. The DRC is currently engaged in a bitter political confrontation with Rwanda , repeatedly accused by Kinshasa of funding the M23 and of the presence of Rwandan troops in the DRC, accusations denied by Rwandan President Kagame. Tensions are now rising following accusations by Congolese President Tshisekedi that Rwanda is orchestrating genocide in DRC's eastern provinces. In response, Kagame declared that Rwanda would be "ready to fight" against the DRC if necessary and blamed Kinshasa for funding extremist Hutu militias. Haiti After months of delay due to court rulings and the deteriorating situation in Haiti, the first Kenyan police units of the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission arrived in Port-au-Prince on June 25 . While the Presidential Transitional Council, which recently appointed a new PM, Garry Conille, is counting on the deployment of international forces to address gang-related violence, there is little transparency on the strategic plan, political agenda, and human rights oversight of the mission . Kenyan police are currently under investigation over allegations of excessive use of force against protesters in Nairobi in late June 2024. Moreover, although the United States has assured that the mission will be coordinated by Kenyan authorities, most of the funding has come from the Biden administration, which has announced a fund to assist Haiti that includes $95 million to support the security mission and $15 million to the Haitian national police. Finally, it is uncertain how gangs will react to the arrival and operation of the MSS . The likelihood of greater violence and direct confrontations from gangs and foreign forces cannot be ruled out. Since February 2024, escalating gang violence and prolonged political instability in Haiti have led to the displacement of more than 578,000 people. Despite the epicenter of violence being the capital city of Port-au-Prince, numerous gang attacks, massacres, kidnappings, and increased displacement were reported in June 2024 in rural areas of the country as well. North Korea-South Korea Tensions between North Korea and South Korea have risen in the last month . North Korea seems to feel empowered by the open support of Russia and the lack of consequences from the West for sending weapons to Iran and Russia. North Korea has been sending hundreds of balloons across the border into the south that carry garbage and excrement in a new form of the propaganda war between the two states. On June 24, 100 balloons landed in the Seoul area. In the third week of June 2024, North Korea and Russia signed a treaty that requires each country to provide aid and defense support in case of attacks by an outside force. South Korea, in return, has reignited its  propaganda campaign  and has been blasting music and speeches through megaphones across the border. It has also   reinforced  troops in the border region  and is investing large amounts of money into the development of new stealth fighter jets, MLRS platforms and other weaponry to modernize and vastly reinforce its army. In late June, South Korea started vast military drills  called Freedom Edge with Japan and US forces. On June 22, a nuclear-powered US aircraft carrier arrived in South Korea. This will be a show of force and a signal to North Korea to back down from its aggressive posture even though it seems likely that North Korea will continue to aggravate the south just short of starting an actual war. China-Taiwan Relations between Taiwan and China deteriorated in June. Protests drew 100,000 people outside of Taiwan’s legislature to show disagreement with a controversial law proposed by the opposition . The law allows the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan’s People’s Party (TPP) to call any government official to answer questions on issues of national security, including the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) president, Lai Ching-te. According to supporters of the bill, this is a measure to “consolidate and refine” Taiwan’s democracy. For the pro-independence DPP and the protesters, the measures were quickly passed through the legislature without the proper checks and balances necessary to prevent abuse. The bill was finally passed, causing several successive protests.  In an attempt to ramp up pressure on the island,  China threatened to impose a death penalty for Taiwan independence separatists , targeting "ringleaders" of the independence movement. Although Beijing has no jurisdiction over Taiwan, this indicates that Beijing is intent on increasing pressure on the island . Taiwan's president has stated that China should accept dialogue with the Taiwanese government, and the US urged restraint after the law was declared. There are risks of further tensions  as China increases its ship patrols around Taiwan's islands Matsu and Kinmen, hardens its positions toward Taiwan's government, and the US pledges to aid the island.  About the authors  Arianna Lucà Arianna is a new intern at Dyami, covering the role of Research Intelligence Analyst to enrich her background knowledge in International Relations with topics involving security and conflict. She holds an MA in International Relations from Leiden University and an LLM in European Criminal Justice from Utrecht University. During her academic career, she has volunteered for different NGOs, mainly Amnesty International, and Emergency and ActionAid, embracing humanitarian and conflict security causes, and addressing issues like famine and lack of security in different regions of the world. With Dyami, she is contributing to joint publications, writing articles, and keeping up to date with key regional developments. Mickey Beckmann Mickey is currently enrolled in the master’s program Conflict Studies & Human Rights at the University of Utrecht. As of a young age she felt the need to help people in dire circumstances, which evolved into a deep interest and drive to address sociocultural and political issues related to conflict. Motivated to make the world a safer and more accessible place, she completed a bachelor in ‘International Relations in Historical Perspective’ at Utrecht University. Eager to broaden her knowledge of geopolitical conflict and security, during her internship at Dyami she will actively participate in writing collaborative publications and authoring articles, with a main focus on the region North and Sub-Saharan Africa. Jacob Dickinson  Jacob studied Global Political Economy at Leiden University. He is passionate about international development and is looking to expand his expertise in geopolitics and crisis management. Curious about other cultures, he has traveled in Europe and Asia for both academic study and professional purposes. His expertise includes the geopolitics of oil and industrial upgrading in the electronics global value chain. He is particularly interested in the evolving political and economic relationships between China and ASEAN, and the consequences for regional development and security.  Iris de Boer Iris works as a Global Intelligence Analyst at Dyami, leveraging her background in Human Geography. Additionally, Iris holds an MA degree in Conflict Studies and Human Rights from Utrecht University, specializing in conflict analysis, peace processes, and geopolitics. Her MA thesis delved into the securitization of the war in Ukraine by the Heads of State, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and Ministers of Defense of the Netherlands and Poland. Within Dyami, Iris is actively involved in security risk management, travel security, and geopolitical analysis. Her enthusiasm for addressing topics in international security extends across a diverse spectrum of countries and regions Kevin Heller Kevin has over a decade of experience in the world of counter-terrorism as a consultant, trainer, and analyst. His background is in military Close Quarter Battle/Combat and Krav Maga for Military and Law Enforcement agencies. As a Global Intelligence Analyst, he writes Intel Briefs on conflict zones and terrorism.He has extensive knowledge of conflicts, politics, and other events happening in the Middle East. Kevin also has a background in Journalism and International Affairs/Conflict Studies. Sara Frisan  Sara joined Dyami as a Junior Intelligence/Research Analyst post-graduate intern to deepen her passionate interest in conflict analysis and security. Sara recently completed her MA in Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University and held an MA degree in International Sciences and Peace Studies. During her academic career, she conducted research in South America, primarily Colombia, on the dynamics of collaboration and resistance between civilians and non-state armed groups in violent settings. In her previous internship at the investigative think-tank InSight Crime, Sara developed some expertise on transnational organized crime and political-criminal alliances.

Written by Dyami analysts - June 2024 Years of underinvestment in defense industries and overreliance on the US security guarantee have resulted in the glaring lack of defense autonomy for Europe. Shortcomings in Europe’s defense industries for artillery shells and a wider industrial base have fallen short to adequately supply Ukraine’s security. As a result of this shortcoming, European defense industries are facing new calls to ramp up domestic production and reduce dependencies on overseas sources.  While European militaries are faced with funding problems, European militaries need to be also aware of the security risks of importing components from a resurgent China. This increases the risk of industrial espionage, Chinese influence on European defense, and gives China tools to pressure the EU into taking unfavorable stances in case of geopolitical tensions. Procurement strategies need to take into account their supply chains and sourcing programs to avoid the risks of being cut off from critical supplies from, for example, China. China’s role in Europe’s defense industry In 2023, it came to light that a Chinese government-owned company produced armored vehicles, including sensitive electronic warfare and command-and-control variants, and designed its interiors for the Dutch army for over a decade. Since the acquisition in 2013, Dutch intelligence services have not conducted screenings of the company which allowed continuing production and new orders worth millions.  While this is one example, there are many cases of Chinese companies selling subcomponents to European militaries. In most cases, this involves non-sensitive equipment with low security threats. However, some sales include subcomponents for sensitive systems such as radars, advanced communication equipment, and ISR sensors. Even when a Chinese (state-owned) company supplies subcomponents, the company could gain access to information about other components within the overall system, allowing China to improve their knowledge about these (sensitive) military systems. The larger concern is that NATO countries unknowingly source several key components for weapon’s systems from China. The task of reinvigorating a European Defense Industry  has raised awareness of the overreliance on sourcing microchips produced in China. For example, the Javelin anti-tank missile, a widely used weapon system by NATO members and its allies, contains over 200 microchips. This highlights the high demand for microchips in modern weapon systems, emphasizing the strategic importance of independence which could be sourced from China for these components.  Chinese components were also found in more advanced equipment like air defense radars and fighter jets. In 2022, it was discovered that an alloy sourced from China was used in the engine of the F-35 stealth jet. The Pentagon briefly paused production of the advanced fighter jets, but signed a national security waiver and resumed deliveries after an alternative was found. While the alloy was not a critical component and posed low espionage risks, it highlighted the lack of tracking of the increasingly complex supply chains by NATO militaries and their contractors. Large U.S. and European defense contractors are not aware of every detail in supply chains, especially in larger systems with many subcomponents. For adversaries like China, it is a window of opportunity to attempt to gain access to sensitive information about a supply chain and/or military system.  Chinese components are not only found in complex high-tech systems. Major European ammunition producers have repeatedly warned that Europe is overly reliant on Chinese cotton linters, which is a critical ingredient to produce artillery shells and other explosives. The high demands from the war in Ukraine has further strained imports from other sources and thus increased Europe’s dependence on China for critical military supplies. Security Risks from China’s Investment in Europe China’s sourcing of military procurement has not been met with the same concern as China’s investment in critical infrastructure. Security concerns over China’s investments in European critical infrastructure are becoming more obvious, given the Chinese Communist Party’s increasing control over both state-owned enterprises and private businesses. Chinese president Xi Jinping and the CCP have changed corporate governance to place more party control over International business to fulfill the strategic goals of the CCP. This has led to security concerns that China’s control over ports, telecommunications or rare earth minerals could be used for monitoring NATO movements or disrupting communications and strategic production lines.  China COSCO Shipping Corporation is owned by the central government and has invested  in strategically significant ports, where NATO troop movements and military exercises are regularly conducted. Another example is Hutchison Ports Poland, a subsidiary of the Hong Kong trading house CH Kuthinson Holdings which is partially owned by China Communications Construction Company. According to intelligence analysts, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is able to monitor the strategic NATO troop movements and supplies as well as the private companies passing through these strategically important ports. Screening measures to prevent Chinese companies acquiring critical infrastructure are in the process of being implemented at an EU level. The EU’s proposed European Economic Security Strategy in June 2023 focuses on better screening of potentially risky investments and encouraging skeptical capitals to adopt similar measures. However, the strategy does not cover other vulnerabilities in European security such as materials sourced from China.  Security risks in NATO’s aviation training China has been increasingly interested in pilot training programs of NATO and its allies with the goal of improving their own military flight academies. In the last decade, China has expanded their footprint in the (European) trainer aircraft industry. Next to economic opportunities, it is likely part of a larger campaign to gather military knowledge about NATO’s pilot training programs. While China is now capable of developing and producing advanced fighter aircraft, their training program is generally considered to be inadequate when compared to NATO standards. To combat this, China has intensified  their campaign to recruit Western (former) military pilots to train instructor pilots of the People Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). Dozens of former NATO pilots were successfully recruited through private firms around the globe with extravagant salaries, which allowed China to gather sensitive information about NATO pilot training without directly infiltrating or hacking NATO training programs. In addition to these aggressive recruitment efforts, China has also embedded itself in European companies producing trainer aircraft. As budget restraints remain a primary factor in the selection of new trainer aircraft for European air forces, security issues of Chinese companies with subsidiaries in Europe appear to be overlooked. In addition to information security threats, Chinese involvement in the procurement, production and operation of trainer aircraft of European air forces will allow the PLAAF to further expand their espionage on western training programs. This knowledge will then be used to improve their own training programs and increase China’s air power. This increased espionage risk highlights the need for a cautious approach to procuring new military (trainer) aircraft for European air forces, especially from companies with ties to China. A good example of this is the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), which is a state-owned aerospace and defense company that is working on aircraft/helicopter manufacturing, avionics, engine components, aircraft leasing and defense systems. The company has a history of acquiring European companies in the aviation sector. This means that European companies are not only at risk for espionage, the investments create dependency on China. With increasing tensions between Europe and China, it gives China an advantage in power with their ability to withhold investments. Looking forward As China becomes an increasingly belligerent power tacitly supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine, it is vital to be aware of the risks of becoming over reliant on the country for Europe’s defense needs. The awareness over critical infrastructure is welcome, but more attention is needed for Chinese investments in seemingly non-sensitive components or programs. China’s embedment into strategic programs and industries allows the country to gather sensitive information for both military and economic reasons without directly infiltrating companies or military programs. The increasingly complex and interconnected supply chains are being exploited for intelligence gathering. This trend is expected to further increase in the coming decade. Growing tensions between China and Europe calls for more awareness of the risks of Chinese espionage and influence in vital European industries.

The threat of Chinese espionage is becoming more known among the general public, because of news articles, research papers and other analyses published of incidents that have occurred. Also heads of intelligence services, especially in Europe, have warned its citizens of the threat China’s intelligence services pose for their national security. The Five Eyes (a joint cooperation between the intelligence agencies of US, UK, Canada, New Zealand and Australia that share signal intelligence) for example, told its citizens that ‘the threat has only gotten more dangerous and more insidious in recent years’. While some EU governments have become aware of the risks present in higher value espionage targets such as sensitive technology and energy projects, there are other industries at risk. The hotel industry is one such example where sensitive information can be gathered and used for intelligence purposes. It is thus important for the sector to remain aware of the risks in handling China’s sensitive investment in the industry. Methods of the Ministry of State Security The Ministry State of Security (MSS) is the primary intelligence agency of China who is responsible for Chinese foreign intelligence, counterintelligence and political security. All responsibilities are oriented towards the interests of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The MSS deems domestic as well as foreign actors or individuals as posing a risk to the CCP. The MSS plays an important role by conducting espionage activities to gather intelligence, but also in influencing operations, cyber attacks, policing and surveillance activities. These methods can overlap and are used for multiple purposes. In short, the methods can be described as: Gathering intelligence MSS officers use different types of sources to obtain the necessary information. For example, the MSS utilizes HUMINT (infiltrating organizations or recruiting insiders), OSINT (using open sources) and SIGINT (intercepting communications and deploying advanced electronic surveillance), to gain insights into foreign governments, military capabilities, economic conditions and technological developments. Influencing operations The MSS wants to shape the political, social or economic beliefs of foreigners in favor of the CCP. They do this by swaying the public opinion, manipulating political processes and influencing decision-makers abroad. Examples include propaganda, lobbying and engaging with local influencers/organizations/politicians to promote positive narratives for the CCP’s policies. Cyber attacks There are various hacker groups active, sometimes backed by the CCP, that conduct cyber attacks worldwide. This is a common way through which the MSS gathers information. The attacks include hacking into foreign government databases, corporate networks and critical infrastructure. Conducting a cyber attack is usually the first step of an operation, which can give perpetrators (digital) access to an organization’s assets. This gives them a strategic advantage for further actions. Police stations The MSS operates through covert police stations on foreign soil, to monitor Chinese nationals abroad, suppress dissidents and exert control over the Chinese diaspora. These operations extend the reach of Chinese law enforcement beyond its borders and help maintain the CCP’s influence over its citizens worldwide. These actions are illegal in most (European) countries. Surveillance The MSS employs extensive surveillance networks, using advanced technologies such as facial recognition, drones and artificial intelligence to monitor individuals and groups. This can involve physical surveillance by operatives (which is less used in foreign countries), electronic eavesdropping and monitoring digital communications (through Chinese apps for example). Surveillance is MSS’s way of tracking potential threats, gathering intelligence but also aiming to influence people of Chinese origin, particularly those involved in sensitive or politically significant activities. Overlooking security risks? The comprehensive national security strategy of President Xi Jinping aims to cover all aspects of Chinese society. It also extends to the CCP’s foreign adversaries. Nations, organizations and individuals opposed to the regime are targeted by MSS’s espionage activities. Several European intelligence agencies have marked Chinese investment as a security threat. According to the agencies, their target is primarily focussed on investing in vital infrastructure and sensitive technology.The European Union has to some degree recognised the problem of investments made with the wrong intentions or to benefit state interests. That’s why they have implemented an EU framework for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) screenings. The objective of the regulation is to make sure that the EU is better equipped to identify, assess and mitigate potential risks to security and public order. The framework is designed for critical infrastructure, critical technologies, supply chains of raw materials, access to/controlling sensitive information and freedom/pluralism of the media. China’s investments do not stop there. Many (private) companies that have different processes may have assets that are still targets for the CCP. What may be underrated but is vital for national security is travel intelligence (TRAVINT). This form of intelligence refers to information collected from and analyses of a wide range of travel companies. Hotels play a significant role in TRAVINT, because it is connected to every aspect of travel. The hotel industry is also an attractive target, because a large amount of personal data is processed by the hotels. A minimum level of personal information is always needed to book a stay for a guest. Following the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) the hotels need to strongly monitor the process of obtaining and controlling the information. Hotels need to explicitly ask permission to require the personal data and guests need to sign privacy statements. According to those statements, various kinds of information are obtained for different kinds of purposes. The CCP is specifically trying to gather enormous amounts of personal data, but it is unknown how and to what ends the CCP is going to use these amounts of data for. There is a likelihood that the CCP could deploy it to monitor/identify individuals and groups for possible recruitment/influencing purposes. Influence of investments Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is a way of investing into a business or organization in another country while establishing a lasting interest. From 2000 until 2016 the Netherlands was the 7th largest recipient of FDI originating from China and the majority of these investments were made through acquisitions. At the same time, 34,8 million USD was invested in real estate and hospitality. There is little record of clear connections between the CCP and the private sector in China, which makes it difficult to collect hard evidence on espionage attempts. Therefore, it is not clear if the CCP directly pushes the business sector to invest in foreign countries of their choice, but there are clear concerns of espionage risk due to previous incidents. In one example, in 2014 the Waldorf Astoria hotel in New York came under Chinese ownership, as one of America’s most famous hotels was sold to China’s Anbang Insurance Group for almost 2 billion USD. The acquirer was a Chinese state-owned insurance company, the first to enter the US market. After four years of ownership, the Chinese government took control of the insurance group meaning that the organization fell into the state-controlled China Insurance Security Fund. The fund issued a statement, saying it was acting to protect consumers of insurance products as Anbang threatened to go bankrupt. Together with the Waldorf Astoria other hotels were also acquired by Anbang, who were directly under control of the Chinese government. Before the direct involvement of the Chinese government, there was already fear of its influence on hotel guests during stays. In 2015 the US president Barack Obama refused to stay at the Waldorf Astoria hotel during the annual UN General Assembly. Even though the hotel was a fixed accommodation for the event, the fear of espionage pushed the US president, the Secret Service and Obama’s White House staff to stay at another hotel. There was a similar event with the Chinese HNA Group. HNA Group was a conglomerate of Anbang, which funded a lot of overseas acquisitions around 2010. Among those acquisitions was Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc. Through the years the CCP slowly seized control of the group by limiting their powers, which resulted in a request for bankruptcy. The CCP has stepped up to restructure HNA and to protect its assets against external threats. It still remains active to this day, with an executive chairman appointed by the Hainan government, an island to the south of China. Investments in the hotel industry, backed by the CCP, can cause consequences for the national security of European countries. A greater supply of Chinese FDI will decrease other investments. Secondly, an increase in Chinese FDI will give them more power on the market, making the hotel industry dependent on it. And lastly, potential interference of the CCP will increase the risk of espionage. Risks of espionage in the hotel industry Dyami Services has conducted an internal research on the risks of Chinese espionage for guests of hotel chains in the Netherlands, that can result in serious incidents with severe impact if not correctly acted on. The research gave a general indication of risks that apply to the hotel industry. The results of the research showed that there is a high risk of the MSS using the guest Wi-Fi to gather intelligence on a hotel guest, who is considered a target to the CCP. The guest Wi-Fi can be a vulnerability, because it is not always closely monitored by the hotel security department. There is also a high risk of cyberattacks conducted by state-backed hacker groups by breaching a Point of Sale (POS) system to gather Personal Information (PI). POS systems are hard- and software that accept payments from customers and are very vulnerable to hacking because it gives direct access to PI. Through the POS system the hacker groups can gain access to the network of the hotel, which can result in access to other hotels in the world who are part of the chain. There is a high risk of the MSS keeping Chinese hotel guests under surveillance by hacking Internet of Things (IoT) systems with Chinese technology. IoT devices are pieces of hardware, connected to the hotel’s network. It transmits data over the internet to its endpoint. This can be exploited by hackers as another access point. Especially when the hardware is made with Chinese technology. Looking forward The hotel chains can take measures to make guests of hotel chains more resilient against espionage activities performed by the MSS. Since the EU regulation for investments screenings does not always cover the hotel sector, the board of management of hotels should conduct detailed examinations of Chinese investments to understand their purposes and potential risks. This includes investigating their business partners for any connections with the CCP or the MSS and evaluating their intentions. Second, the hotel chains should be careful with choosing their technological devices, particularly those connected to the internet (IoT). It is crucial to understand the vulnerabilities associated with these technologies and the potential risk they pose. Two steps the hotel chains can undertake are conducting risk assessments on all the devices of the hotels and checking the background of the company selling the devices. Lastly, hotel guests themselves should be looking into the hotels they are staying at. When staying at a hotel that has Chinese investors, the risks named above should be considered. However, guests can avoid using guest Wi-Fi and the IoT devices. In addition, stays can be paid in advance, avoiding using POS systems. A disclaimer that should be pointed out is the balance between doing safe business with China for hotel chains, whilst not becoming a target for espionage. This is an issue that the Dutch government also struggles with. The balance is hard to find, which makes it difficult for hotel chains to protect their business. However, not every Chinese investor has the intention to support the CCP with spying activities. Hotel chains should be aware of the risks, when engaging with Chinese investors and take mitigating measures to reduce the risks as much as possible.