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Date:  06/11/2024 Where:   Bolivia  Who’s involved:   Incumbent Bolivian President Luis Arce, former President Evo Morales, pro-Morales supporters  What happened? On 01/11/2024, Bolivian President Luis Arce reported that  armed supporters of former President Evo Morales  (2006-2019) had taken control of a military facility near the city of Cochabamba, holding at least 200 soldiers hostage  and seizing weapons. Although the foreign minister later called the attackers “irregular groups” without specifying their connection to Morales, the attack is the latest development of a three-week long social unrest sparked by legal investigations against former Bolivian leader Morales. The former leader is currently implicated in multiple  legal proceedings, including statutory sexual abuse and human trafficking.  Following the issue of an arrest warrant for Morales in early October, Morales supporters have been maintaining over 20 roadblocks in multiple areas of the country , including the central Cochabamba, traditionally Morales’s political stronghold. In the past few weeks, at least 61 law enforcement officers and nine civilians have been injured during clashes between protestors and security forces. Over 50 pro-Morales protesters have been arrested . The protestors claim that the ongoing investigations are nothing but a strategy of Arce’s government to prevent Morales’ candidacy.  On 27/10/2024, after his car was shot fourteen times while driving in Cochabamba, former President Morales claimed he was the victim of a staged government assassination attempt . The government denied the accusation, claiming that the former leader's convoy had fired at police during an anti-drug patrol.  After the issue of the arrest warrant, Morales took refuge in the central coca-growing province of Chapare in central Bolivia, protected by his supporters. His supporters demanded an end to the “judicial persecution” against Morales and threatened to intensify anti-government actions. As protests and blockades by Morales supporters calling for Arce’s resignation and the dismissal of the case against Morales  continued on 30/10/2024, President Arce appealed to the Bolivian people to end the roadblocks. According to Arce, they are exacerbating the already precarious economic condition and shortages of fuel and basic goods, and have already caused  more than $1.7 billion in economic losses . Arce warned that if the blockades and unrest persist, the government “will exercise its constitutional powers to safeguard the interests of the Bolivian people.” Morales reacted by criticizing Arce on X for threatening the people instead of seeking dialogue to resolve the conflict. On 03/11/2024 Morales announced that he is carrying out a hunger strike until Arce agrees to dialogue.  Analysis:  Ahead of the presidential elections of 2025 , Bolivia has been strangled for months by a deep political crisis. Tensions arise from the rivalry and competition for the leadership and candidacy of the traditional leftist Movement for Socialism (MAS)  party between President Luis Arce and his predecessor and mentor Evo Morales (2006-2019), a former coca-grower and first Bolivian indigenous President.    In its recent past, Bolivia has already experienced an escalation of turmoil and political crises.  In 2019, 21 days of uninterrupted protests rocked the country following the disputed elections that initially saw Morales' reelection. Due to alleged election fraud, the Organization of American States (OAS) opened an investigation against irregularities in favor of Morales. Forced to step down and replaced by an opposition senator, Áñez, after the election was annulled, Morales called the crisis a coup and incited massive protests by his supporters , which were violently suppressed by the interim government, resulting in dozens of deaths. The Áñez government was later accused of human rights violations, including the arbitrary detention of 600 protesters.  Arce, who was Morales' finance minister for 11 years, replaced the MAS leader in the 2020 elections while Morales was exiled in Argentina and barred from running following allegations of electoral fraud and incitation of violence in the post-election period. In the 2020 elections, Arce garnered 54 percent support of the vote, initially giving the perception that his presidency would ensure continuity to Morales' MAS political agenda and bring stability. However, as the policies of Arce’s administration deviated from Morales' political project, tensions arose among the former allies.  Upon Morales' return in 2021, the rivalry between MAS prominent figures created a deep rift in the ruling party that split into MAS-Morales and MAS-Arce.   In September 2023, Morales announced his intention to run for re-election in 2025  as the MAS candidate. However, in December 2023,  the Constitutional Court prohibited his reelection . The court ruled that no more than two terms as president, consecutive or discontinuous, are allowed. Morales, who rejected the legitimacy of the court, already tried to bypass the constitution in 2019 by seeking a fourth presidential term.  The peak of the MAS’s internal political conflict  was reached in June 2024, following an attempted coup by dissident armed forces dissidents  led by General Zúñiga. Following the foiled coup, former President Morales accused his political rival of orchestrating a “self-coup” to gain sympathy from the population. Arce does not enjoy much popular support in the country and is facing  simmering discontent and criticism over the ongoing economic crisis , which raises inflation and debts, and increases fuel, basic goods and US dollar shortages. Morales’ supporters consider Arce responsible for the collapse of previously one of South America's most successful economies. On the other hand, Morales enjoys great popularity  among substantial segments of the population, particularly among coca farmers, unions, and indigenous groups. During his tenure, Morales has been committed to improving socioeconomic conditions and promoting the political inclusion of marginalized segments of the population. His policies focused on the creation of social programs but also on economic growth. The left-wing President nationalized Bolivia's oil and gas industries, limiting the influence of foreign companies and governments, especially the US. According to the International Monetary Fund,  Bolivia's GDP grew by 4.8 percent per year from 2004 to 2017 under Morales’ leadership , while the percentage of the population living in extreme poverty was more than halved.  Morales has been accused by the opposition of growing authoritarianism, corruption, pressure on media and the judiciary, persecution of political opponents, and harming the environment. Controversies arose from Morales’ attempt to hold on to power for a fourth term and, more recently, his attempt to be reelected in 2025 despite a veto by the Constitutional Court. The dispute between Arce and Morales escalated into a  conflict between supporters of the two MAS factions . Morales' supporters promptly responded to their leader's appeals, wreaking havoc in the country. While roadblocks and clashes persist in several areas of the country, political instability and the social unrest are paralyzing the government's ability to address the country’s economic collapse  and led to a security crisis. This exacerbates an even more severe economic crisis. Conclusion: Five years after the political crisis of 2019, Bolivia is once again on the brink of a political and security crisis  that the Arce government seems unable to curb on its own. If Arce and Morales fail to reach a dialogue,  political polarization and nationwide protests  will likely increase and persist at least until the elections in 2025, given the overwhelming support that former leader Morales enjoys. The former indigenous President's determination to participate in the 2025 elections, in spite of his exclusion from the MAS party and veto to run, will surely open  new controversies and institutional challenges  in the coming months. Meanwhile, the unrest has already brought the Bolivian economy to its knees and anti-government frustration over economic hardship is growing ; prolonged protests will certainly result in a dramatic worsening of the economic crisis. The economic and political ramifications of the ongoing crisis in Bolivia could have  serious short-term as well as long-term repercussions for the country and the region , with even the possibility of an open conflict between pro-Morales protesters and the Arce government’s security forces .

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Date :  02/11/2024 Where :  Sudan Who’s involved : Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Rapid Support Forces (RSF), UAE, Egypt. What happened?  On 25/10/2024,  reports emerged of mass killings of civilians in Sudan’s Gezira state , allegedly carried out by the RSF . At least 124 civilians were killed in these attacks, local sources estimate that over 1,000 people have been killed in 50 villages across Al Jazirah and Sennar state in recent weeks. On 23/10/2024  after five days of fierce battle the SAF retook control of Al-Dinder  in the Sennar State back from the RSF. Al-Dinder city, some 25 km east of Singa, the capital city of Sinnar state, is considered to be a strategic location linking Sinnar and Blue Nile states with eastern Sudan .  On 05/10/2024, the SAF recaptured Jebel Moya area in Sinnar, a crossroads linking Gezira, White Nile, and Sinnar states. This recapture enabled the SAF to besiege the RSF fighters in Sinnar and cut off their supply lines. On 22/10/2024   the RSF shot down a Russian-crewed cargo plane over Darfur  after the RSF accused the company of supplying the SAF. Flight data suggests that, over the last year   it had been supplying the SAF from its stronghold, operating from Port Sudan. However, the aircraft was operated by New Way Cargo, a Kyrgyzstan-based airline, which has previously been reported to have supplied the RSF with aid from the UAE.  On 22/10/2024  the SAF conducted an air strike on a mosque south of Khartoum which resulted in the loss of 31 civilian lives.  On 21/10/2024  the SAF claimed that a commander from the RSF had defected  to the SAF with some of his troops, the first such move by a senior figure since the two sides went to war. On 13/10/2024  the SAF conducted an airstrike targeting the main camp occupied by the RSF, but in the process they hit a central market and nearby residential area, killing at least 23 civilians. On 10/10/2024 Hemedti , the head of Sudan's RSF, accused Egypt of being involved in airstrikes  on the group's troops, and training the opposing forces of the SAF . On 30/09/2024 a few days into the offensive, the UAE ambassador's home was attacked by a military aircraft. The SAF rejected accusations of the UAE that its forces had bombed the residence in Khartoum, blaming the RSF instead. Notably, the SAF has repeatedly accused the UAE of providing the RSF with military aid. The UAE has denied all allegations, despite a UN panel finding credible evidence.  On 26/09/2024 the SAF launched artillery and airstrikes in Sudan's capital ,  Khartoum, in its  biggest operation to regain ground  since early in its 18-month war with the RSF. Analysis : Since the SAF launched its major offensive, key strategic points have been taken in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum. However, the ground gained by heavy air strikes and artillery comes at the cost of increased civilian casualties . In the months leading up to the offensive, the SAF prepared thousands of recruits and established training camps for its ally, Darfur Joint Forces. In August, Russia and Egypt supplied the SAF with new fighter jets. The head of Sudan RSF also accused Egypt of training SAF forces and being involved in airstrikes. These accusations further deteriorate Cairo’s previous role, as host of peacekeeping talks between factions, making the scenario for a cease fire or further negotiations very difficult. The foreign influences supplying both sides are significantly complicating the conflict. The UAE has allegedly been supporting the RSF because it views Sudan as resource-rich and strategically located on the Red Sea opportunity to expand its influence and control in the Middle East and East Africa.  Additionally, the UAE's involvement stems from its significant trade relationships, particularly its purchase of large quantities of gold from Sudan. Egypt, on the other hand, is supporting the SAF primarily for strategic geopolitical reasons, including maintaining influence over the Nile River Basin and securing access to Sudanese territory for military operations against neighboring countries. Since the start of the war over 24,000 people have been killed, up to 11 million people have been displaced, and 3.1 million have fled to neighboring countries.  On 17/10/2024, the UN warned that Sudan faces one of the worst famines in decades as over half of the Sudanese population—approximately 26 million people—are experiencing acute food insecurity. 8.5 million are in emergency levels of hunger. In August, the Zamzam camp for over 500,000 internally displaced people was labeled as having famine conditions. Other areas in Sudan are also at risk of reaching famine conditions such as Darfur and South Kordofan. It is ever more vital to shine a light on the crisis and for the international community to come together to take the necessary steps to manage the conflict and the crisis that has arisen out of it. Conclusion: The ongoing conflict in Sudan's capital has reached critical levels, significantly escalating the already dire situation. Despite the urgent need for diplomatic solutions, the involvement of external actors complicates efforts towards ceasefire negotiations and de-escalation. The absence of clear progress in talks, coupled with allegations of foreign military support for both warring factions, suggests a prolonged conflict ahead. The international community faces significant challenges in addressing the mounting issues of sexual violence, food insecurity, and disease outbreaks, all while grappling with limited resources. As the situation continues to deteriorate, it becomes imperative for regional stakeholders and global powers to reassess their approaches and prepare for long-term engagement in resolving this complex and multifaceted crisis.

Written by Giulia Corradetti, Abigail Mikhail, Yusuf Babayusuf,  Marnix  Van ‘t Hoff, Iris de Boer,        Jacob Dickinson, Sara Frisan Russia-Ukraine : Zelensky announced Ukraine's intention to build nuclear weapons to ensure its security in case of a lack of NATO support. Middle East Region: While on-ground operations continue against Gaza and Lebanon, hostilities escalate between Israel and Iran.  Myanmar: After a year of Operation 1027 the military junta is on the backfoot, with crisis situation for millions of civilians  Sudan:   The conflict escalated following the SAF’s airstrike operations to regain ground in Sudan, particularly Khartoum. United States: With November 5th presidential elections approaching, concerns over post-election violence are growing.  Moldova: Second round presidential elections will be held on November 3rd, amid concerns over Russian interference.  Georgia: The opposition rejects the Georgian Dream party's victory, denouncing electoral fraud.  Mozambique: Massive protests erupt upon the release of the October 2024 presidential election results.  Bolivia: Ahead of the 2025 presidential elections, pro-Morales protests and social unrest intensify.   Turkey: The attack by the PKK on Turkish aerospace industries led to retaliatory airstrikes and heightened security measures. DRC: The M23 rebel group’s violence remains a pressing threat in the DRC. Haiti: The crisis in Haiti remains exceptionally acute, with gangs expanding outside the capital and the political transition at risk.  Mexico:  As cartel-related violence grips the country, the Supreme Court resigned to oppose judicial overhaul.  China-South China Sea: China’s coast guard assertiveness expands to Vietnamese fishermen and Indonesian oil projects.  China-Taiwan: Cross Strait relations are tense as China conducts naval and air military exercises around Taiwan. Conflicts, October 2024  Russia-Ukraine Earlier this month, Ukraine’s President Zelensky presented his ‘victory plan’  to Western supporters of Ukraine. The plan outlines a five-step plan to ensure Ukraine’s security, how to end the current conflict, and how to ensure Russia will not try taking Ukraine again. President Zelensky was frustrated with the relatively cold reception from Western leaders. On October 30, information from the secret part of the victory plan was leaked to the media , outlining Ukraine’s desire for Tomahawk cruise missiles to be donated, which have a reported range of 1500 to 2500 km. The results of this leak are playing out at the time of writing and might have long-term implications in the war, comparable to the breach of Ukraine’s plans for a summer counteroffensive in 2023. As a response to the lukewarm response to Zelensky’s ‘victory plan’ and the wavering and lacking support by the West to guarantee the security of Ukraine during and ‘after’ the war, Zelensky announced that Ukraine is considering to start rebuilding its nuclear arsenal . The country got rid of its arsenal (and the bombers attached to that arsenal) with the 1994 Budapest Memorandum in return for security guarantees from Russia, and protection from the United States and the United Kingdom. Since Russia has invaded the nation (both in 2014 and 2022) and neither the US nor the UK protected Ukraine’s sovereignty, Ukraine is left as the only country abiding by the Budapest memorandum , it claims there is no reason for it to keep doing so. However, after meeting NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on October 17, Zelensky said that Ukraine is not seeking to produce nuclear weapons after all.  Whether Zelensky genuinely wanted Ukraine to develop nuclear weapons, or it was made out of emotion, he has since toned down the call to develop nuclear weapons, especially in front of NATO member countries. The claim also might have been a calculated move to motivate NATO to include Ukraine in its protection  after the current war is over/‘frozen’, something currently not guaranteed or accepted as an idea by all NATO members.  Middle East Region  The conflict between Israel and Hamas is ongoing, and  the recent killing of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar on October 16 has dealt a blow to the organization . However, there seems to be little progress in ceasefire talks between Hamas and Israel. Talks regarding a ceasefire are in place, and on October 28, Mossad Chief discussed a new unified framework for the release of hostages with CIA Director William Burns and Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed Al-Thani. However,   on October 31, Hamas rejected the hostage release deal, which also included a one-month pause in fighting in Gaza.  This month also signed the  deadline for South Africa to present all the evidence to the ICJ to charge Israel guilty of genocide.  The report was submitted on October 28. Regarding human rights protection, Israel’s Knesset approved two bills to ban the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) from operating on Israeli territory and areas under Israel’s control. In addition, on November 1, Israeli bulldozers severely damaged the UNRWA office in West Bank's Nur Shams camp, which is now no longer usable. On the Lebanese front, the escalation of hostilities with Hezbollah has led to a ground war in the southern part of the country . Several Hezbollah strategic sites and financial institutions have been targeted over the weeks by Israel, which appears to be aiming at destroying the Iran-backed organization’s support. Israel is willing to consider accepting a ceasefire deal   if Hezbollah withdraws from its position close to Israel's northern border and stops firing rockets into Israel. The recent appointment of the new Hezbollah leader, Naim Qassem, might bring the country close to a deal. Indeed, the latter stated on October 30 that Hezbollah is open to a possible ceasefire deal with Israel but threatened that they could keep up the attacks for months. The past month has seen an escalation of hostilities between Israel and Iran . Iran launched over 180 ballistic missiles on October 1, 2024, against Israel and conducted several espionage operations in Israeli territory. On   October 25, Israel retaliated by conducting airstrikes targeting Iran’s military assets . Iran said it is ready to respond, but the damage it underwent seems quite severe and might create an obstacle to the country's direct response. It is unlikely that Iran will ignore the attacks and may respond in the future, but it is possible that it will refrain from an open offense. The situation is unstable, and although Israel and Iran have never directly been involved in an open conflict against each other, the tension could escalate. Neighboring Arab countries and the US fear that the whole region could become a warzone if the current conflicts continue and the tension between Iran and Israel escalates . Therefore, they have been pressuring for a halt to the hostilities and highlighting the necessity for a ceasefire in both Gaza and Lebanon.  Myanmar  October 2024 saw the anniversary of the beginning of Operation 1027 of the Three Brotherhood Alliance in the violent Myanmar conflict. The offensive has changed the pace of the Myanmar civil war significantly, with the mix of ethnic armed groups and pro-democracy forces now controlling swaths of the country in the northeast, in the west in Rakhine State, and approaching urban centers in Myanmar. The military junta has lost several strategic command posts  and is unable to mount an offensive. Military junta troops are deserting en masse, prompting the junta to mass conscription to fill its ranks. The military junta has tried to stop the progress of Operation 1027 by bombing villages with aircraft and artillery and killing thousands of civilians. In Rakhine State, the Arakan Army and the military junta have been implicated in war crimes against civilians and the thousands of Rohingya  who face starvation and mass displacement.  The Association of Southeast Asian Nations met in Vientiane, Laos, to discuss the crisis in Myanmar and implement a Five-Point Consensus for the conflict in Myanmar. The military junta was allowed to attend the summit for the first time since the coup in February 2021 due to its ties with the Laos special envoy. The plan proposes an end to the violence, constructive dialogue, and humanitarian aid but has yet to see results. Due to the military junta’s losing fight, China has been pushing the junta to hold elections , and the latter views China with increasing skepticism for endorsing the China-affiliated Kokang Army  in seizing territory from the military junta. Sudan  The humanitarian crisis is worsening in Sudan. October 2024 saw the Sudanese army (SAF) regain the advantage in the conflict  over the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). There was a significant escalation in the conflict from the start of the month following the SAF’s operation to regain ground in Khartoum at the end of September. The attack was the SAF’s most extensive operation to regain ground since the conflict began. On October 13, the SAF conducted an airstrike targeting the main camp in southern Khartoum, occupied by the RSF . The strike killed 23 civilians as it also hit a nearby market and residential area. Another airstrike carried out by the SAF targeted a mosque located in the south of Khartoum, which resulted in the loss of 31 civilians. The most recent operation was carried out on October 23, when the SAF took back control of Al-Dinder  in the Sennar State from the RSF.  On October 22, the RSF shot down a Russia-made ilyushin Il-76 cargo plane carrying Russian crew members in Darfur over suspects of carrying supplies to the SAF in Al-Fashir. On October 25, the RSF carried out one of the deadliest attacks since the beginning of the conflict . The mass killing targeted the Al Seriha village, South of Khartoum, and caused  at least 124 victims . The conflict shows no signs of slowing down and has been exacerbated following multiple accusations from both sides of the war, claiming that UAE provided the RSF with military aid and Egypt has trained the SAF as well as being involved in airstrikes. Both Egypt and the UAE have denied claims of supporting either the RSF or the SAF.  Most recent data from the United Nations state that the conflict has led to 11 million displaced people inside Sudan and 3.1 million people displaced outside the country . Increased sexual violence, high levels of food insecurity, and the spread of disease are increasingly growing issues in the country, while international aid and support are underfunded and limited.  Alerts, October 2024  United States Former President Donald Trump, as well as his challenger Kamala Harris, have ramped up their election campaigns as Election Day takes place on November 5, 2024 . Recent election polls suggest that it will be an extremely tight race between Republican candidate Trump and Democrat candidate Harris , with all eyes on the seven “swing states”, namely Georgia, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin, Nevada, and Arizona. While for most states, it is clear whether its voter base will prefer Republicans or Democrats, in these “swing states”, the preference of the voter base is not set in stone and can shift until the moment of voting. This means the “swing states” usually play a crucial role in US elections . In addition, it is important to note that preliminary election polls are not reliable, and the outcome of the presidential elections in 2016 and 2020 was very different from what the polls expected. Hence, it will remain unclear until the end of Election Day on November 5 (local date) who will become the next President of the United States of America.  As election rallies by Trump and Harris continue, there is a heightened chance of protests in the US , especially at the rally and voting locations. Most recent protests have expressed support for or discontent with the stances of the election candidates, for example, about abortion rights, climate change, or the role of the US in the war in Gaza.  Protests are expected to continue in the run-up to Election Day  as well as its aftermath, with most of them being peaceful. However, peaceful protests can escalate due to the high level of polarization in US society . In addition, intelligence officials have expressed worries over the possibility of Russian and Iranian-backed actors encouraging violent protests.   A recent survey by The Associated Press-NORC for Public Affairs Research finds that 4 in 10 voters are concerned about political violence and attempts to overturn the election results . Grounds for such worries can be found in the past, for example, when Donald Trump did not accept his loss in the 2020 elections against current President Joe Biden. This ignited a mob of Donald Trump supporters storming the Capitol Building in Washington D.C., in an unsuccessful attempt to hinder the certification of the election results. The spread of misinformation on social media, which played a significant role in the Capitol attack in 2021, can once again create a basis for political violence in the aftermath of the 2024 Presidential Elections. There is also a high risk of misinformation  being spread by fake social media accounts connected to unfriendly foreign actors. In addition, two assassination attempts on Donald Trump in 2024, confirmed by US authorities, further increase worries about political violence. Hence, security services will be on high alert during the upcoming weeks. Georgia Tensions in Georgia have risen over the 2024 Parliamentary Elections on October 26, 2024,  and its results. Voters were able to choose between the ruling Georgian Dream Party and four other opposition coalitions. The Georgian Dream Party has recently been following a pro-Russian foreign policy, with the opposition coalitions and Georgia’s current President favoring a pro-European course. The Parliamentary Elections were thus seen as a pivotal moment for Georgia’s alignment concerning its foreign policy. Early results indicated that the opposition groups were on the winning side, but later on, the official results named the Georgian Dream Party the winner.  The opposition coalitions and President Zourabichvili do not accept the results and accuse the Georgian Dream Party of  vote-rigging, intimidation, and violence . Following the release of results, US President Biden, the EU, and other Western leaders called for investigations over the alleged electoral fraud . So far, only a few countries have accepted the Georgian election results, namely Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey, China, and Hungary. The opposition called for protests on October 28, 2024, with thousands of voters adhering to the call  and waving EU and Georgian flags outside parliament in Georgia’s capital. The Election Commission claimed that a partial recount of the votes confirmed the win of the Georgian Dream Party. However, the opposition is now asking the election commission to release the election data to prove the electoral fraud. It is still unclear whether this data will be shared and if it would indeed prove election fraud if shared. Prosecutors stated on October 30, that they started a probe into the alleged election fraud.  While no additional opposition protests have been announced so far, it is possible that new protests against the election results will take place in the upcoming days.  Georgian security forces are known for taking harsh measures during opposition protests against the ‘foreign agent law’ in May 2024, with violent clashes between protesters and security forces. Similar situations could take place in the upcoming days, especially if the election results will not be shared and the opposition will call for new protests.  Moldova Elections in Moldova were held on October 20, 2024 , with an EU referendum  on the same day. The referendum was introduced by the current pro-European President, Maia Sandu, with her opponents claiming that the referendum was misused to guarantee her second term as President. While the referendum was expected to pass easily, the final results showed that just 50.4% of the voters chose 'yes' and 49.6% chose 'no'. According to Moldovan officials supporting the referendum, these results have been caused by Russian interference , creating irregularities in the voting process. The Moldovan General Police claimed that a Russian state bank and the Kremlin-supported opposition politician, Ilan Shor, have paid over 138.000 Moldovan citizens to vote ‘no’ during the referendum and to vote for pro-Russian presidential candidates.  It is still unclear whether the Moldovan Constitutional Court will confirm the referendum results, for which it will make a final decision on November 4, 2024. If the results are rejected, there will be a new vote within two weeks. If the results are accepted, Moldova will amend its constitution and include joining the EU as one of its goals . However, it is possible that opponents of the referendum will protest this decision due to the low margin of ‘yes’ votes. It seems that the opposition is fighting the referendum results in the hope that the referendum will pass with a higher percentage of the population supporting it in a new vote, increasing the legitimacy of changing the country’s constitution.  The Presidential elections will go to a second round of voting on November 3, 2024 , during which voters can choose between current President Maia Sandu and Alexandr Stoianoglo, who is supported by pro-Russian parties. While Sandu received a majority of the votes during the first round, it is possible that Stoianoglo’s votes will increase during the second round, with only two candidates to choose from. If Sandu loses the vote, she might reject the results and again blame Russia for its interference in the voting process.  Mozambique Mozambique is experiencing an intense political crisis and social unrest following the contested presidential election on October 9, 2024.  Massive protests erupted at the release of the official electoral results on October 24 , which declared the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) ruling party candidate, Daniel Chapo, the country’s presidential election winner, having secured over 70 percent of the votes. Hundreds of opposition supporters took to the streets of the capital, Maputo, and other major cities, denouncing fraudulent election results. Security forces violently repressed the protests; at least 11 people were killed , and dozens were injured by live bullets and tear gas. Local NGOs reported the arrests of around 500 protestors for alleged engagement in public disorder, looting of shops, destruction of public and private property, and attacks on police stations and cars. The opposition leader Venâncio Mondlane , who ended second place in the election with 20 percent of the votes for his PODEMOS party, called for a one-week general strike  starting on October 31. He also called for demonstrations at the National Electoral Commission (CNE) on November 7 to contest the results. On October 28, PODEMOS filed a lawsuit demanding the recount of the votes. In addition to Mondlane, Ossufo Momade, president of the traditional opposition party RENAMO, which gathered nearly 6 percent in the elections, called for the vote to be annulled. While election results still need to be validated by the Constitutional Council,  further protests across the country and violent crackdowns by security forces are to be expected .  The latest protests and clashes came after weeks of social unrest in the country. Since the beginning of the electoral campaign in late August 2024, there has been a spike in election-related violence and alleged irregularities in polling. In the run-up to the elections, international electoral observers reported escalating violence and abuses, including assassinations, fraud, and intimidation of opposition candidates.  Tensions escalated after PODEMOS Mondlane claimed victory on October 10 and denounced the assassination of two members of his party by security forces. The European Union, the African Union, and the UN called for investigations  over the electoral process irregularities and Mozambique government repression. Human rights organizations, like Human Rights Watch, are urging for the immediate end of violence and the release of all the unjustified detained people and denouncing the excessive use of force by riot police and severe human rights violations , including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, intimidation, repression of the freedom of assembly and expression.  Bolivia Bolivia is experiencing political instability and social unrest  amid the growing rivalry between incumbent President Luis Arce and controversial former President Evo Morales (2006-2019) ahead of the 2025 presidential elections . Arce and Morales were once close allies but now compete for dominance of Bolivia's Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) leftist party. Arce replaced Morales as party leader in 2019, after the latter fled Bolivia following allegations of electoral fraud and was briefly forced into exile, and won the 2020 presidential election. The rivalry between Morales and Arce caused a deep political rift within the ruling party. In September 2023, Morales tried to exclude Arce from the party and announced his intention to run in the 2025 elections as the MAS candidate, with the support of a significant portion of party members. However, in December 2023, Bolivia's Constitutional Court prohibited his reelection. Following an attempted coup orchestrated by dissident Armed Forces officers led by General Zúñiga on June 26, 2024, Morales accused President Arce of having staged a self-coup to regain public support.  Morales, though controversial, enjoys great influence and popularity among substantial segments of the population, including coca farmers, unions, and indigenous groups; on the other hand,  Arce is facing simmering discontent and critics of mismanagement for the ongoing economic crisis, rising inflation, and fuel shortages.   Since mid-September 2024, anti-government protests and clashes have intensified.  On September 23, major confrontations between Morales supporters and police forces supported by pro-Arce protesters occurred in the capital, La Paz. Tensions rose after Morales issued a 24-hour ultimatum to the Arce government, demanding cabinet change, and organized a week-long march across the country. Since October 14, Morales supporters have been maintaining roadblocks in multiple areas of the country to protest against Morales's possible arrest for the alleged rape of a minor. On October 27, Morales claimed he was the victim of a staged government assassination attempt after fourteen bullets hit his car. The Bolivian PM denied the allegations and stated the gunfight happened during an anti-drug check of the former President's convoy and that his security officers opened fire first. Pro-Morales protests to demand Arce's resignation turned violent on October 29. On October 30, President Arce made a plea to the Bolivian people to end the roadblocks that have caused more than $1.7 billion in economic losses over the past 17 days.  Updates, October 2024 Turkey  Conflict and security concerns escalated in Turkey in October 2024.  The PKK claimed responsibility for an attack on Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) on   October 23,  which killed five people and injured 22 more. This prompted Turkish forces to launch retaliatory bombings on PKK sites in Northern Iraq and Syria. In response to the attack, the government increased security throughout the country , especially during the Republic Day celebrations on October 29 . These measures included heightened security patrols at airports, transportation hubs, and public gatherings. The Republic Day celebrations in Ankara and Izmir were canceled.  In October 2024, Turkish authorities carried out major security operations, resulting in the arrest of over 230 people accused of having links to the PKK . Among these, the arrest of the mayor of Esenyurt caused outrage and raised questions about possible political intentions regarding the arrest. Social and political issues added to the difficulties in Turkey throughout October due to the broad condemnation of the attack on TAII and voicing concerns about human rights and political liberties. Democratic Republic of Congo The DRC continues to grapple with numerous armed groups, most notably the M23 rebel group, which reportedly generates $300,000 monthly  from its control over the Rubaya mining area in the eastern region. While negotiations between Rwanda and the DRC were scheduled to commence earlier this month, the DRC accused Rwanda of creating obstacles to resolving the M23 conflict. On October 21st, the M23 expanded its territory by seizing the town of Kalembe , although the  DRC army quickly reclaimed it the following day . This escalation in conflict has delayed the planned departure of UN MONUSCO peacekeepers, who are essential in providing aid, protection, and support to the  1.7 million people displaced  by violence. Their potential withdrawal by the end of December 2024 poses significant risks for an already vulnerable region, and given the ongoing instability, the mission may need to extend beyond the scheduled date.  At the beginning of October, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) reported over 30,000 suspected cases of Mpox and more than 900 deaths . On October 5th, the European Union and the United States donated 265,000 doses of Mpox vaccines. With the support of the Ministry of Public Health and Prevention, as well as UNICEF and WHO, these vaccines were prioritized for distribution in vulnerable provinces across the country. Additionally, a boat capsized on Lake Kivu, claiming the lives of 78 individuals . The ongoing conflict between the Congolese Army and various rebel forces has forced many passengers and traders to rely on this lake as an alternative route, as roadways have become too dangerous due to rebel blockades. Haiti  The situation in Haiti remains exceptionally volatile despite the deployment of Kenyan-led international support mission forces.  The United Nations reported that the security and humanitarian crisis in Haiti has worsened over the past three months,  with a 22% increase in displaced persons, which now exceeds 700,000. From July to September 2024, 1223 people were killed and 522 injured as a result of gang violence and security forces anti-gang operations. Among the gang-related casualties, at least 106 are attributable to arbitrary execution carried out by law enforcement . Among the targets of the security forces are also minors reported, at least six of whom are under the age of ten. Moreover, the UN reported an alarming rise in killings and violence by self-defense groups and sexual violence  against women and children. The UN estimates that there are currently 5,500 gang members, about 50 percent of whom are minors and children.  Violence is reaching new peaks in the capital city of Port-au-Prince,  which has been the epicenter of gang violence for months. Ramping-up gang attacks caused 10,000 internally displaced people in only a week. An increase in violence against civilians has been reported in the La Saline slum, with over 200 residents killed in the past few weeks. Gangs have also recently occupied the communities of Carrefour and Gressier in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, gaining complete control. Since October 18, gangs have carried out repeated attacks and a week-long siege on the community of Solino, one of the few areas in the capital not yet under gang control. On October 24, gangs opened fire and struck a UN helicopter,  forcing an emergency landing in Port-au-Prince, while two US airlines suspended flights to the Haitian capital. On October 25, the US announced the evacuation of all nonessential diplomatic personnel after gunmen targeted two US embassy vehicles. In October 2024, there was a new escalation of gang-related indiscriminate violence outside Port-au-Prince.  It has been reported that gangs started attacking small boats and kidnapping the staff of international cargo companies. On October 3, an armed attack by gangs in the town of Pont-Sondé left at least 115 civilians dead and dozens injured. Gang attacks also were reported in the coastal town of Arcahaie, located northwest of Port-au-Prince, and in the central city of Estere, where gunmen opened fire near a school.  Given the rampant gang violence,  concerns grow that the Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) lacks the capacity and personnel to contain and resolve the crisis.  In late October 2024, the President of Haiti's Transitional Presidential Council, Voltaire, urged the UN to transform or replace the MSS with a peacekeeping mission . The US, the main funder of the MSS, is also pushing for the installation of a peacekeeping mission to restore peace and political stability in Haiti. The  deteriorating political environment  further complicates the situation in Haiti, as the already fragile transition is hanging by a thread due to soaring tensions between PM Conille and the Presidential Transitional Council, which is urging the PM to replace some of the ministers.  Mexico  Only a few weeks into her term as Mexico's new President, Claudia Sheinbaum faces a complex political and security landscape . In recent weeks, the approval of a controversial judicial reform has sparked massive protests. Protesters and international observers argue that the reform could erode Mexico’s democracy by  undermining the independence of the judiciary and strengthening the power of the ruling Morena party . The reform entails a full-scale judicial overhaul, introducing the popular election of judges. The Mexican Supreme Court published on October 28 a proposal to invalidate key points of the controversial reform; nonetheless, on October 31, 8 of the 11 Supreme Court justices handed in their resignations, refusing to participate in the elections for Supreme Court judges scheduled for June 2025. Moreover, investors and economic partners, including the United States, have expressed concern about the  repercussions of the new legislation on foreign investment  in the country and Mexican economic relations.  Meanwhile, the new administration has to deal with a widespread wave of increased cartel-related violence across the country.  Sheinbaum launched a new security strategy, which renewed concerns over the increased presence of the militarized National Guard across the country. The killings of several political figures, including the latest murder of the mayor of Chilpancingo, Guerrero state,  on October 6, are fomenting anger and frustration among the population. Amid the wave of violence, journalists have also been recently targeted. On October 30, two journalists were killed in western states. Moreover, violence has been spreading in Mexican western Sinaloa state  as intra-cartel violence intensified since early September, following the arrest in the US of one of the cartel leaders, “El Mayo”, causing at least 300 victims and more than 250 others missing. On October 21, Mexican authorities announced the arrest of a local cartel leader and the killing of 19 alleged Sinaloa cartel members. On October 26, 14 civilians were killed in armed clashes in the state capital Culiacan. Despite the deployment of substantial security forces, including 650 National Guard and special forces officers, cartel violence and insecurity continues to worsen in the state of Sinaloa.  On top of the surge in violence and political turmoil, US election results will have significant impacts on the US-Mexican bilateral relationships on security, immigration, and trade.   As the US presidential election approaches, trade concerns in Mexico are growing about the  2026 U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) review.  A major risk for Mexico stemming from the US election is that a Trump administration could withdraw from the USMCA free trade agreement, leading to significant adverse impacts on the Mexican economy, inflation, and foreign investment. The migration crisis between Mexico and the US is also a hot topic for relations between the two countries. While Trump has promised mass deportations and Harris proposes tight asylum and migration control policies, the Mexican government has intensified the crackdown on illegal immigration,  moving all non-Mexican migrants to the south of the country to slow and limit the entry of migrants into the US.  China-Taiwan  Tensions are high in the Taiwan Straits. Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te made a speech on October 10, 2024, stating that China had no right to represent Taiwan and declared his commitment to resist annexation or encroachmen t, repeating the same line as his predecessor, Tsai Ing-Wen. China responded  on October 14 with extensive military exercises around the island, claiming that they were in opposition to ‘Taiwanese independence forces’. The Chinese military deployed the Liaoning aircraft carrier, ships, and aircraft to simulate a blockade of the island by cutting off ports and removing supplies to the island in the event of an invasion. The Taiwanese military was put on high alert  for the duration of the drills and closely monitored the activities closer to the island.  The tensions in the Taiwan Strait highlighted the stakes of the  intense geopolitical competition before the US presidential election.  At the end of October, the US sold advanced surface-to-air missile systems and radar to Taiwan in its attempts to deter China’s military  posturing on the island. As part of the Biden administration’s view that China poses a security threat to the Indo-Pacific, the US has sold further mid-range missile systems and placed them on the northern Philippines island of Luzon, established nuclear deals with Australia, the UK, and the US and established security ties between the cold neighbors of South Korea and Japan. China views the US military sales to Taiwan as stoking tensions on the Taiwan Strait and the broader system of alliances as an attempt to ‘contain’ China’s rise. Xi Jinping continues to make threats to build a military and capabilities to ‘fight and win wars’.  China-South China Sea The maritime disputes in the South China Sea expanded  beyond the China-Philippines in October 2024. In an expansion to other claimant states, Vietnam’s Communist Party condemned China’s ‘brutal behavior’ in its exclusive economic zone after it claimed that a Chinese Coast Guard attacked 10 Vietnamese fishing boats  near the Paracel Islands by boarding the boats, attacking the fishermen, and sending them toward the coast. Vietnam said that China had violated Vietnam’s sovereignty in the Paracel Islands and that international law and agreements should be used to manage territorial disputes. The Indonesian Coast Guard drove a Chinese Coast Guard vessel away from an Indonesian oil and gas area in the South China Sea after three similar incidents in one week.   While China’s assertiveness against Vietnam and Indonesia is nothing new, the events over October 2024 mark a shift in strategy. China’s coast guard is growing in confidence in defending its claims in the South China Sea . China and the Philippines’ disputes over the Scarborough Shoal took place over the previous year and they have come to an agreement on the resupply mission to the Second Thomas Shoal. China has, until recent events, allowed Vietnam to continue building a new military base in its maritime territorial claim and stayed away from provoking Indonesia. For now,  Vietnam and Indonesia are continuing their balancing act of encouraging infrastructure and economic links with China while reiterating their commitments to resolving territorial disputes peacefully and within the bounds of international law.  About the authors Giulia Corradetti Giulia is a junior intelligence analyst. She holds a BA in International Studies from the university of Trento, and she is currently studying Security Risk Management at the University of Copenhagen. During her academic career, she has collaborated with the University Journal “L’Universitario”, covering topics regarding international and security issues, such as conflicts involving the Asian region and human rights violations. With Dyami, she is contributing to joint publications, writing articles and briefs on current or developing security situations around the globe, and keeping up to date with key regional developments Abigail Mikhail Abbie is one of Dyami’s newest Security Analyst interns, bringing a strong academic foundation and international experience. She recently earned her Master's degree in Crisis and Security Management, with a focus on Intelligence and National Security. During her studies, she tackled a range of complex security issues, from the inner workings of the Chinese Intelligence Community to the repression in Iran. Her most notable project, conducted for the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), involved investigating the repatriation of foreign fighters and offering key recommendations. Having lived across multiple countries, with 11 years in Beijing, China, Abbie draws on her rich cultural and global background.  Yusuf Babayusuf Yusuf is a Safety and Security Management student at The Hague University of Applied Sciences, eager to apply his academic knowledge to real-world security challenges. He is particularly interested in geopolitical analysis, risk management, and the unique dynamics of Eastern Europe, Turkey, Central Asia and the Caucasus. Drawing from his cultural background and language skills in Turkish and Bulgarian. Yusuf is excited to learn from the experienced professionals at Dyami and contribute to their mission of creating a safer world. Marnix Van ‘t Hoff Marnix Van 't Hoff is an experienced Aviation Security Consultant & Trainer with a background in Aviation Studies from the Amsterdam University of Applied Sciences. He has a strong background in aviation security and has worked as a security risk and threat assessments (SRTA) specialist for aviation clients. He is an experienced crisis team leader and a HEAT trainer. His knowledge and expertise in these areas make him well-equipped to provide training, guidance and support to Dyami clients in ensuring the safety and security of their operations. Iris de Boer Iris works as a Global Intelligence Analyst at Dyami, leveraging her background in Human Geography. Additionally, Iris holds an MA degree in Conflict Studies and Human Rights from Utrecht University, specializing in conflict analysis, peace processes, and geopolitics. Her MA thesis delved into the securitization of the war in Ukraine by the Heads of State, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and Ministers of Defense of the Netherlands and Poland. Within Dyami, Iris is actively involved in security risk management, travel security, and geopolitical analysis. Her enthusiasm for addressing topics in international security extends across a diverse spectrum of countries and regions Jacob Dickinson  Jacob is a Geopolitical Intelligence Analyst at dyami. He studied Global Political Economy at Leiden University. Curious about other cultures, he has traveled in Europe and Asia for both academic study and professional purposes. His expertise includes the geopolitics of oil and industrial upgrading in the electronics global value chain. He specializes in the evolving political and economic relationships between China and ASEAN, and the consequences for regional development and security.  Sara Frisan  Sara works at Dyami as a Geopolitical Intelligence Analyst, leveraging her background in Peace and Conflict Studies. Sara joined Dyami after completing her MA in Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University and held an MA degree in International Sciences and Peace Studies. During her academic career, she conducted research in South America, primarily Colombia, on the dynamics of collaboration and resistance between civilians and non-state armed groups in violent settings. In her previous internship at the investigative think-tank InSight Crime, Sara developed some expertise on transnational organized crime and political-criminal alliances.

Written by Giulia Corradetti, Abigail Mikhail, Yusuf Babayusuf, Thijmen Kaspersma, Marnix  Van ‘t Hoff, Iris de Boer, Jacob Dickinson, Britt Verregghen,   Sara Frisan Russia-Ukraine : Ukraine destroys mass ammunition storages, as Russia is expanding on its Pokrovsk salient.  Israel: The focus of Israel is shifting from Gaza towards Lebanon, where it started a ground operation. The region is on the verge of a full-scale conflict. Myanmar: The Junta seeks a peace deal despite the resistance forces gaining ground and the worsening humanitarian crisis due to the conflict and a recent typhoon.  Sudan:   While fighting between the army and the RSF persists in several regions, the SAF launched a major offensive in Khartoum. Tunisia: As the October 6 elections approach, the government intensifies its crackdown on the opposition.  Mali: Following a major attack in Bamako, concerns over the expansion of Islamist militant groups in the region are rising.  Afghanistan: The Taliban further violates international human rights law as it prohibits women and girls from  letting their voices be heard in public.  Mexico: As violent intra-cartel clashes intensify in Sinaloa state, new judicial reform sparks nationwide protests. Colombia: The suspension of negotiations between the government and the ELN jeopardizes the Colombian peace process. DRC: While the M23 violence persists, trial hearings between DRC and Rwanda begin.  Venezuela: While crackdown on dissent intensifies, the arrests of foreign nationals strained diplomatic relations between Venezuela and Western countries.  China-Taiwan: Tensions keep rising between China and Taiwan because of increasing military actions of the PLA and growing interference from Western countries.  China-Philippines: China and the Philippines ended a standoff in the Sabina Shoal in the South China Sea following months of tensions over the Second Thomas Shoal.  Conflicts, September 2024  Russia-Ukraine The most notable event of the war in the past month is the first (publicly known) use of the recently announced Ukrainian ‘Palianytsia’ drone. This indigenously designed and produced drone was used in three separate attacks on some of Russia’s mass ammunition storage . The secondary explosions at these locations caused approximately 80% destruction among the stored munitions. It is likely that amongst these munitions were recently delivered North Korean and Iranian missiles , which were supposed to be used to strike Ukraine. The largest of these storages kept around 30.000 tons of munitions, which set off light earthquake warnings in the Baltic states as it detonated. There are six of such storage facilities within range of these new drones, two of which are situated near Moscow . The Russian advance towards Pokrovsk has slowed down significantly, but has expanded its salient southward , capturing significant portions of territory. Russia managed to all but encircle the Vuhledar stronghold, which Ukraine has been holding since the start of the war in 2014 and a focus point for Russian forces since the beginning of the full-scale invasion.   The US devoted another aid package , likely the last under the Biden administration, worth $8 billion. The future of US aid packages to Ukraine hangs in the balance as the US elections are approaching.  Israel The conflict between Israel and Hamas is ongoing . Despite the international urge for a ceasefire and the Israeli protests in the country, PM Benjamin Netanyahu seems to have shifted his focus.  Israel now appears less interested in a ceasefire and securing the hostages and more concentrated on attacking the Lebanon front , which is experiencing a rapid escalation of hostilities over the past few weeks, and is on the verge of a ground war. This month has seen the continuation of strikes and raids in the Gaza Strip and West Bank , where the killing of an American-Turkish protester and the closure of the Al Jazeera bureau have signaled a stringency in the   media repression , which has seen the death of more than 100 journalists since the start of the conflict. The  IDF also succeeded in eliminating the Hamas leader Fatah Sharif , which represents another defeat for the Palestinian group that has experienced severe losses in recent months. The past weeks have seen a rapid escalation of hostilities between Israel, Hezbollah, Iran, and its proxies . Heavy airstrikes and attacks were launched from both sides, culminating with the explosion of dozens of walkie-talkies and hundreds of pagers  belonging to the armed group Hezbollah, which resulted in severe losses for the Hezbollah and Iranian-backed allies. Despite the international call for a 21-day of ceasefire, attacks have continued, and most of the Hezbollah command has been killed. Lebanon has been severely damaged in terms of territory and political power, and it is not impossible that it will see the fall of the Hezbollah group.  The recent death of Hezbollah leader  Hassan Nasrallah has left the group very disorganized and has signaled a turning point in the conflict, leaving Hezbollah highly vulnerable.  This event is a blow to Iran’s influence as well. It is likely to weaken Hezbollah's Iran-backed allies, which have suffered severe losses in their operational commands by Israeli attacks. After warning the residents of the southern part of Lebanon to evacuate late on September 30, the Israeli military has begun what the IDF has called a “limited localized and targeted” ground operation against Hezbollah , which will probably become a proper ground invasion  of the southern part of the country.  Given the latest events, the possibility of de-escalating the conflict seems far from happening : Israel is shifting the balance of power in its favor, and with the Lebanon front severely damaged and the conflict against Hamas still ongoing,  Israel appears not to be close to accepting any ceasefire , and the whole region is likely to become a warzone. Myanmar  With increased hostilities and a rising humanitarian disaster further destabilizing Myanmar, September 2024 saw ongoing major issues in the country’s civil war. The military junta made an unexpected peace proposal  and started arrangements for a national census while confronting growing opposition to its authority. A possibly major change came from the military junta's unexpected offer for peace talks with ethnic armed organizations and resistance forces. But  the opposition responded with cynicism and conditional acceptance  and demonstrated the deep mistrust and significant political aspirations differences that still limit chances for a solution. At the same time as the junta's declaration of a national census, which indicates a possible path towards elections,  the viability of carrying out a credible census and election in a conflict-torn area is yet unknown. Combat continued in several areas during September , leading to ongoing civilian fatalities and displacement. In early September Typhoon Yagi   worsened the humanitarian situation   by leaving hundreds of thousands of people in need of immediate aid. Rising  violence in Rakhine state caused a fresh migration of Rohingya refugees to Bangladesh , therefore taxing resources and posing questions about regional stability. Sudan  Fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has intensified in the capital Khartoum. The RSF tried to attack various SAF strongholds in north Khartoum in September , among which a major SAF base. The SAF succeeded in repelling this attack. Other parts of the city also remained contested, and the SAF has targeted RSF locations in Khartoum with airstrikes from time to time. Around September 26, the SAF launched a new major offensive in Khartoum and took  control over three of the city’s main bridges. This is seen as a significant win for the SAF, as it cuts off supply routes used by the RSF. On September 30, the SAF was accused of bombing the diplomatic post of the UAE  in Khartoum. The SAF has denied the accusations and blamed the RSF. The government of Sudan has earlier blamed the UAE for supporting the RSF in the war, partially by providing weapons to the RSF. Fighting between the RAF and RSF also took place in the southeastern city of Sennar. Local NGOs reported dozens of civilian casualties , partly due to the RSF shelling a market in Sennar on September 8, Fighting also continued in the region of Darfur, where the RSF conducted a drone attack on RAF strongholds in el-Fasher on September 8. A few days later, on September 12, the SAF claimed to have thwarted an attack by the RSF in el-Fasher that killed dozens of RSF members. On September 13, Doctors Without Borders reported that the RSF has been blocking access roads to the Zamzam camp for internally displaced people  in the parts of el-Fasher it controls. This hinders the camp’s supply of food, drinking water, and medicines. High number of civilian casualties and alleged atrocities committed by the RSF were reported in September 2024.  September 2024 also marks the further stagnation of the humanitarian situation in Sudan as heavy rainfall continued causing floods   across 15 states in the country . The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that approximately 491,100 people have been affected. The floods have been a breeding ground for a cholera outbreak in 10 states in Sudan , with over 15,000 cases and 473 deaths reported by the health ministry.  Alerts, September 2024 Tunisia The past month has seen the rise of oppressive measures against political freedom from the Tunisian government in light of the upcoming presidential election  that will be held on October 6th. This has led to a rise of turmoil in the Tunisian population, which has begun to protest against the current government. Since the current Tunisian President Kais Saïed expressed his willingness to seek a new mandate, the country has experienced an intensification of media repression , together with a series of arrests of the opposition members, in order to prevent its leaders from running. Many candidates have been left off the ballot based on the government’s claim that their campaign fillings were incomplete. After a recent judicial order to reconsider some candidates as eligible, the Tunisian parliament amended a law to take decisional powers from the judicial courts. With the recent imprisonment of the opposition leader  Ayachi Zammel, the elections will see only one candidate facing Saïed, which is Zouhair Magzhaoui, member of People’s Movement, one of the parties supporting the exceptional measures imposed by Saïed since 2021, which has seen the president centralizing the political power.  The political environment in which the election will take place will probably be characterized by repression and opacity. It is likely that Saied will win the next mandate , and will try to strengthen his political control of the country, thereby making the possibility of a definitive authoritarian turn of the regime more likely.  The democracy of the country is at risk, and a new series of protests should be expected after the elections , the results of which will determine a turning point for the political regime of the country. Tension in Tunisia is high, and the risk of a civil revolution cannot be excluded.   The elections are likely to have an impact on the neighboring regions as well.  Mali  On September 17, a major jihadist attack occurred in the Malian capital, Bamako , marking a significant escalation in the ongoing conflict. This assault on the gendarmerie training center in Falidie district and Modibo Keita International Airport resulted in substantial human and material losses, with fires set to military, government, and UN aircraft. This was the first high-scale attack on the capital since 2015, when Mali was under civilian rule with French troop support. Militant Islamist groups are expanding their territorial control in Mali.  These groups have taken advantage of the power vacuum left by the  withdrawal of Western forces  following the departure of the French, US, and Germans. Italy is an exception, with around 300 troops in the area. This situation has led to increased instability and security concerns across the region. Many residents have fled the areas due to fears of violence and intimidation. However, some communities have formed self-defense groups to protect themselves against Islamist attacks. The Bamako attack highlights growing concerns about the increased capabilities of militant groups to reach southern Mali from strongholds in northern and central regions. There is potential for escalation of threats across the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and risk of cross-border attacks.  The rising number of displaced persons may also strain resources in bordering countries. These developments underscore the complex security landscape in Mali and its impact on the broader region as military-led governments pursue alternative alliances and strategies to address longstanding security challenges. Since moving away from Western forces, the three military juntas are   strengthening their relations and cooperation with Russia and China . In addition, the AES has launched a new biometric passport to facilitate movement within the alliance, solidifying its estrangement from the ECOWAS bloc .  Afghanistan   The living conditions for women and girls in Afghanistan have strongly deteriorated over the course of September 2024 as the Taliban started enforcing new laws that ban women and girls from letting their voice be heard in public . While the Taliban has defended the new restrictions as being in line with Sharia law, many human rights organizations and international bodies have condemned the new laws as they strongly contribute to the complete removal of women and girls from public life in the country. Women in Afghanistan have started an online campaign in which they record themselves singing and publish the videos on social media. The new laws add to earlier implemented laws that deny women  the right to education and employment. In addition, women are only allowed to leave the house with a male guardian and force them to cover their entire body and face in public. On September 25, Canada, Australia, Germany and the Netherlands announced at the UN general assembly to take the Taliban to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for gender discrimination . This is the first legal move taken against the Taliban since it took power in 2021. While the Taliban does not acknowledge the authority of the ICJ, supporters of the ICJ case against the Taliban are positive about the deterrent effect of the case on states that try to normalize their relationship with the Taliban. Human rights organizations have accused the international community and the UN of not speaking out against the Taliban’s violations of the international human rights law.  On   September 24, a spokesperson of the Taliban stated that the group has requested to join the upcoming BRICS economic forum in Russia  in October 2024. There has been no response from Moscow yet. While Russia established ties with the de facto government in Afghanistan and bilateral talks on trade were held in recent months, Russia did not recognize the Taliban as a legitimate government yet.  Mexico  The final weeks of outgoing Mexican President Lopez Obrador’s term , replaced by his ally and successor Claudia Sheinbaum on October 1, were marked by a tense political climate. In recent weeks, the approval of a judicial reform  that will allow voters to elect judges to the Supreme Court and other courts has sparked massive protests nationwide. Judicial workers called for demonstrations and strikes  in coming days and weeks to oppose the new judicial legislation, claiming it would undermine the independence of the judiciary and would jeopardize judges’ impartiality   while strengthening the power of the ruling Morena party . During the Senate vote, protesters broke into the building. In response, Lopez Obrador justified the reform, which officially went into effect on September 15. Obrador has presented the reform to be a necessary measure to eliminate corruption from the judiciary and make judges more accountable. Nonetheless, along with rising concerns on the legality and potential impacts of the reform on the rule of law and judiciary independence, Lopez Obrador’s new legislation could have implications on Mexico’s capability to comply with international obligations , especially with the United States. A weakened and politicized judiciary could  discourage foreign investment and affect Mexico's diplomatic relations.   Violence has been spreading in Mexican western Sinaloa state since fighting between two factions of the Sinaloa cartel erupted in the city of Culiacan on September 9. The trigger for the conflict dates back to the arrest in the US of Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada, top leader of one of the main factions of the Sinaloa cartel, allegedly after being kidnapped and handed over to authorities by a member of the rival faction, Los Chapitos. In the past three weeks, intra-cartel fighting resulted in at least 53 people killed and over 50 people missing.  As Mexican authorities tighten security, deploying additional 600 soldiers in the area, and intensify arrests of members of both cartel factions, the recent escalation of violence is spurring diplomatic tensions between Mexico and the US after the Mexican President claimed that the US should be considered "co-responsible" for the spiral of violence in Sinaloa state. The US administration ensured deep cooperation with the incoming Sheinbaum government to address armed violence and drug trafficking. The intra-cartel dispute in Sinaloa state is raising concern over potential spill-over of violence in other Mexican states .  Colombia  A new setback in peace negotiations jeopardizes Colombian President Petro's ambitious plan for stabilization and peace, known as “Total Paz”. Following a deadly explosive attack on September 17 targeting a military base in Aracua province, the government suspended negotiations with the National Liberation Army (ELN) , the largest guerrilla group in the country. Violent attacks targeting security forces and infrastructure and clashes involving the ELN have increased since the ceasefire with the government expired in early August. The latest attack came just a day after the Colombian government authorized the negotiations with ELN dissident faction Comuneros del Sur. In the last few months, the talks with ELN have been stalled after the government opened parallel negotiation in February 2024 with the faction Comuneros del Sur without the approval of the central command of the ELN, causing the split of the group from the guerrilla. The indefinite suspension of peace talks with the ELN raises fears of increased violence in the country and could undermine President Petro's political agenda credibility  as the "Total peace" policy loses one of its main components. Updates, September 2024 Democratic Republic of Congo Violence from armed rebel groups remains a pressing concern, particularly from the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group, who want to maintain political and economic influence in the mineral-rich eastern DRC. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring center, the M23 conflict caused 73% of the displacements in the DRC in 2024. Despite the government signing a cease-fire agreement with the M23 rebels  in July, the fighting persists. On September 27, HRW accused Rwanda’s army and the M23 rebel group of shelling camps for displaced people in eastern Congo, only deeping the humanitarian crisis. A day prior to this, the public hearing began by the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights regarding  DRC accusing Rwanda of violating its sovereignty, violating international law and committing atrocities against civilians.  In addition to the court case, the Congolese President called for sanctions to be placed on Rwanda for its support of the M23 rebel group. UN MONUSCO is still active in deploying troops, transporting civilians and providing emergency responses across the area. There have however been anti-MONUSCO protests . Despite their presumed withdrawal in the coming months, reports have claimed that the mission will continue past December 2024 due to fears that a security vacuum will occur if the mission ends. Amid the dispute with Rwanda and M23 violence, the government is dealing with other challenges, including addressing the Mpox outbreak in the region. Moreover, on September 2, there was an attempted mass breakout from the largest prison in the DRC that killed over 120 people. Due to significant overcrowding issues and poor conditions, authorities released over 2000 prisoners in the last few weeks. Also, in recent weeks the country’s military tribunal sentenced 37 people to death for their alleged involvement in a foiled coup last May , including three US citizens.  Venezuela  The recent presidential elections in Venezuela have triggered a deep domestic political crisis and international controversy . Although the Maduro regime claims victory in the polls, opposition forces and several Western nations dispute the results and denounce the manipulation, lack of transparency, and credibility of the electoral process. Available data from polling centers reportedly record an estimated 67% of the votes for the leading opposition candidate González Urrutia. Nonetheless, the regime of President Maduro, who has been in office since 2013, is increasing its grip on the country's electoral, judicial, and military bodies. On September 17, the UN reported a sharp deterioration of the repression in Venezuela , including crimes against humanity of politically motivated persecution. The report described Maduro's government strategy to silence the opposition as “one of the most acute human rights crises in recent history”. Reportedly, in the past two months,  at least 25 protestors were killed and nearly 2500 arbitrarily detained with the accusation of terrorism.   On top of the political crisis, diplomatic relations between Caracas and Western countries are souring. The Venezuelan government escalated its repression,  targeting foreign nationals and ordinary citizens.  In recent weeks, seven foreign nationals - four US nationals, two Spaniard and a Czech citizen - have been arrested for allegedly participating in plots to assassinate President Maduro. The arrests come just days after the  imposition of 16 new US sanctions on Venezuelan entities  - including the President of Venezuela’s Supreme Court, the director of the electoral council, and several military and intelligence officials - and rising diplomatic strains between Spain and Venezuela . In September, Spain granted asylum to opposition leader González and recognized his victory in the Venezuelan elections. The EU also formally recognized González as the legitimate winner. Tensions are also mounting between Maduro and some regional leaders, including Argentine President Milei, who asked Interpol to arrest the Venezuelan president. Neighboring country leaders fear severe repercussions for the region , especially for a likely aggravation of the migration crisis. The imposition of new sanctions could also have severe implications on the Venezuelan population and regional dynamics, aggravating the economic crisis and spurring mass exodus. Currently, no indicators suggest a resolution of Venezuela's political crisis.  China - Taiwan  Tensions keep rising between China and Taiwan because of increasing military actions  by the People’s Liberation Army of China surrounding territorial waters and the Taiwanese airspace. An increase in military drills seems to be the case every September for the last five years. China is trying to gain more power, for example, by executing joint landing exercises directly across the Taiwan Strait. This results in many Chinese military aircraft operating around the island and them breaching Taiwanese airspace multiple times. Another way the  CCP is trying to gain power is through meddling in the access to the Taiwanese Strait.  Since China is claiming Taiwan as its own territory, including the Taiwan Strait, they view countries that cross the Strait as provocative. For example, German warships that were passing through on September 13. Western countries (and Taiwan) say the Strait is an international waterway and are using it as a major trade route. By passing through, Germany wanted to show Beijing that they are standing with the Western allies during this time of rising tensions between China and Taiwan. The Kinmen island owned by Taiwan and located 3km from China is under pressure, because they want to be on good terms with China as well as Taiwan.  On September 16, another arms deal took place for Taiwan under the Biden administration . China claims that closer relations between the US and Taiwan and more interference from the US will only lead to the  destruction of ‘Taiwanese separatist forces’ . In addition, China has reacted to the arms sale by freezing the assets of nine US companies. However, the US interference grows with the bill stating that information will be published of CCP officials’ ‘illicit’ financial assets if China begins the invasion of Taiwan .  China - Philippines  On September 15, 2024, China and the Philippines ended a standoff in the Sabina Shoal in the South China Sea  after months of tensions over the Second Thomas Shoal.  The Philippines National Maritime Council said the Philippine Coast Guard flagship BRP Teresa Magbanua was leaving the Shoal, and China withdrew a mixture of coast guard and military forces from the disputed Shoal. China’s claims over most of the South China Sea as its immediate neighborhood have led to repeated clashes with the Philippines over the past few years, which have flared up over the past year.  China also launched criticisms of the Philippines and the US to keep mid-range missile systems deployed in April 2024 in the northern Philippines to boost deterrence in the South China Sea and against the prospect of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The Philippines and the US have stepped up joint training exercises , also in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines. The South China Sea has also seen rising military equipment build-up and naval exercises . At the end of September, the Philippines, the US, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand took part in military exercises in Manila’s exclusive economic zone to improve their naval and military coordination in the South China Sea. At a meeting at the Quad summit on September 22, the US, Japan, Australia and India met to discuss tensions in the East and South China Seas, in which they have not mentioned China explicitly.  About the authors  Giulia Corradetti Giulia is a new intern at Dyami as junior intelligence analyst. She holds a BA in International Studies from the university of Trento, and she is currently studying Security Risk Management at the University of Copenhagen. During her academic career, she has collaborated with the University Journal “L’Universitario”, covering topics regarding international and security issues, such as conflicts involving the Asian region and human rights violations. With Dyami, she is contributing to joint publications, writing articles and briefs on current or developing security situations around the globe, and keeping up to date with key regional developments Abigail Mikhail Abbie is one of Dyami’s newest Security Analyst interns, bringing a strong academic foundation and international experience. She recently earned her Master's degree in Crisis and Security Management, with a focus on Intelligence and National Security. During her studies, she tackled a range of complex security issues, from the inner workings of the Chinese Intelligence Community to the repression in Iran. Her most notable project, conducted for the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), involved investigating the repatriation of foreign fighters and offering key recommendations. Having lived across multiple countries, with 11 years in Beijing, China, Abbie draws on her rich cultural and global background. She is eager to deepen her expertise in conflict analysis and global security threats, making a valuable contribution to Dyami’s research and intelligence efforts. Yusuf Babayusuf Yusuf is a Safety and Security Management student at The Hague University of Applied Sciences, eager to apply his academic knowledge to real-world security challenges. He is particularly interested in geopolitical analysis, risk management, and the unique dynamics of Eastern Europe, Turkey, Central Asia and the Caucasus. Drawing from his cultural background and language skills in Turkish and Bulgarian. Yusuf is excited to learn from the experienced professionals at Dyami and contribute to their mission of creating a safer world. Thijmen Kaspersma Thijmen is currently in his final year of his bachelor's degree in Safety & Security Management at Avans University of Applied Sciences, 's-Hertogenbosch. During his education, he conducted assignments regarding public safety topics and raising security awareness in The Netherlands. Due to his recent completion of the Integral Safety and International Conflicts & Security minor, he is now eager to contribute to security internationally. Next to his research product, he will expand his expertise by joining the tasks of geopolitical conflict monitoring and writing analyses about various international security-related topics.  During the internship, he will focus his research product on the threat of rail sabotage. He is providing insights into the origin of this topic and the developments we can anticipate going into the future, aiming to make the target group more resilient. Marnix Van ‘t Hoff Marnix Van 't Hoff is an experienced Aviation Security Consultant & Trainer with a background in Aviation Studies from the Amsterdam University of Applied Sciences. He has a strong background in aviation security and has worked as a security risk and threat assessments (SRTA) specialist for aviation clients. He is an experienced crisis team leader and a HEAT trainer. His knowledge and expertise in these areas make him well-equipped to provide training, guidance and support to Dyami clients in ensuring the safety and security of their operations. Iris de Boer Iris works as a Global Intelligence Analyst at Dyami, leveraging her background in Human Geography. Additionally, Iris holds an MA degree in Conflict Studies and Human Rights from Utrecht University, specializing in conflict analysis, peace processes, and geopolitics. Her MA thesis delved into the securitization of the war in Ukraine by the Heads of State, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and Ministers of Defense of the Netherlands and Poland. Within Dyami, Iris is actively involved in security risk management, travel security, and geopolitical analysis. Her enthusiasm for addressing topics in international security extends across a diverse spectrum of countries and regions Jacob Dickinson  Jacob studied Global Political Economy at Leiden University. He is passionate about international development and is looking to expand his expertise in geopolitics and crisis management. Curious about other cultures, he has traveled in Europe and Asia for both academic study and professional purposes. His expertise includes the geopolitics of oil and industrial upgrading in the electronics global value chain. He is particularly interested in the evolving political and economic relationships between China and ASEAN, and the consequences for regional development and security.  Britt Verregghen Britt is currently a Security Management student at Saxion University of Applied Sciences. During her education, she conducted an assignment on behalf of the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence regarding the creation of security awareness around stability policing.. During the internship, she focused on researching Chinese interference with malicious intent in Dutch companies and organizations. Britt is interested in raising awareness about this subject and making this target group more resilient.  Sara Frisan  Sara works at Dyami as a Geopolitical Intelligence Analyst, leveraging her background in Peace and Conflict Studies. Sara joined Dyami after completing her MA in Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University and held an MA degree in International Sciences and Peace Studies. During her academic career, she conducted research in South America, primarily Colombia, on the dynamics of collaboration and resistance between civilians and non-state armed groups in violent settings. In her previous internship at the investigative think-tank InSight Crime, Sara developed some expertise on transnational organized crime and political-criminal alliances.

Date :   28/10/2024 Where :  Ukraine, Russia Who’s involved : Parties: Russia, North Korea, Ukraine What happened?   On 28/10/2024 , NATO confirmed that North Korea has sent troops to Russia to join the war against Ukraine and that they have been deployed in the Kursk region. The exact number of North Korean troops in Russia is still not yet determined. U.S. and South Korean intelligence have now claimed there are 3,000 North Korean troops training in Russia. Ukrainian intelligence claims the figure is closer to 12,000 troops. On 28/10/2024 , South Korea began diplomatic talks with the U.S. and NATO to discuss the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia. On 25/10/2024 , the Dutch Intelligence services joined Ukraine, the U.S. and South Korea in confirming that up to 1,500 North Korean troops have been sent to fight in Russia’s war against Ukraine on the battlefield, though their specific role is uncertain. The North Korean special forces units are expected to be deployed against the Ukrainian military within Russia’s Kursk region. On 25/10/2024 , South Korea and Poland are close to signing a deal that would send K2 tanks to Poland which would aid in their support in backing Ukraine in the war. On 24/10/2024 , South Korea warned that it might send weapons to Ukraine after North Korea deployed troops to Russia. The presidential office said it may upgrade its aid to Ukraine from purely defensive weapons to offensive weapons, depending on North Korea’s involvement in the war. On 18/10/2024 , South Korean National Intelligence services released satellite images which they claim show North Korean personnel in a training ground at Russia’s Ussuriysk military facility. More satellite images were released showing a Russia naval vessel which is suspected of transporting North Korean troops to a Russian port. Analysis : North Korea has shifted in importance to Russia from being just an arms supplier to now being an active participant in their fight against Ukraine. North Korea’s support for Russia in the Ukraine conflict has also proved m utually advantageous; it has earned North Korea approximately $540 million from arms sales to Russia. Russia and North Korea signed a landmark defense pact in June 2024 which would mean both countries would provide immediate military assistance to each other in the case of an attack. With North Korean troops possibly used for combat purposes, it offers a unique opportunity to test its military capabilities in real combat conditions. North Korea currently has 1.3 million active soldiers and 7.5 million soldiers on reserve with 8 to 10 years mandatory years of military service making them experienced but lacking exposure to real-life combat conditions. Russia’s training and deployment of North Korean troops in its conflict with Ukraine suggests that the war is not unfolding as Russia had planned.  Their reliance on foreign forces highlights a growing strain on Russia’s military, in which an estimated 600,000 troops have been killed or wounded since the full-scale war started in 2022. Moreover, the Kremlin’s increasing dependence on weapons deliveries from countries like Iran and North Korea point to a depletion in Russia’s own weapon stockpile. Despite Russia’s initial expectation of an expeditious campaign, recent development demonstrates they have faced challenges in maintaining a strong front in the war.  The participation of North Korea taking a more direct role in the Russia-Ukraine war could destabilize Ukraine's defenses. The additional North Korean troops will add more pressure to the Ukrainians’ defensive lines and maintain their positions in the Kursk region. However, it is not clear yet if they will make a difference to Russia’s war effort.  South Korea has stated that they are considering sending offensive weapons to Ukraine to aid in the war following intelligence on the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia.  South Korea is profoundly concerned that the deal includes assistance to raise Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear programme, or that Russian soldiers could be deployed to North Korea in the future. Russia’s reliance on North Korea enables North Korea to obtain more missile and nuclear capability technology.  Conclusion: Intelligence reports from western governments suggest that North Korean troops are being trained in Russian military facilities; the exact number of troops are still to be determined. Although it is not yet clear on the role of North Korean troops for the conflict, the strategic partnership and recent deployments have raised significant alarms for the international community. Whilst alliance mutually benefits Russia and North Korea, Europe and the Indo-Pacific should be fully prepared for an escalation in the conflict that could reach beyond the borders of Ukraine and exacerbate the already dire humanitarian crisis and mass displacement of people.

Date: 24/10/2024 Who’s involved :  Israel, Hezbollah, Hamas, Iran, United States. What happened? The Israeli Defense Force’s ground invasion of Lebanon and the Israeli Air Forces’ bombing campaign in the south of Lebanon aimed at crippling Hezbollah’s forces is ongoing. On 16/10/2024  an Israeli airstrike destroyed the municipal headquarters in a major town in south Lebanon, killing 16 people including the mayor. On the same day, the UN mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) said its peacekeepers observed an Israeli tank firing at their watchtower near southern Lebanon's Kfar Kila. On 21/10/2024  UNIFIL was accused of accepting money from Hezbollah in exchange for access for this latter to UNIFIL bases for conducting operations. UNIFIL denied the accusations, but the investigation is still ongoing. On  20/10/2024  the Israeli Air Force conducted a series of targeted, intelligence-based strikes against dozens of facilities and sites used by Hezbollah to finance its terrorist activities against Israel.   On 21/10/2024  seven Israelis were arrested by the Israeli security services on suspicion of espionage for Iran. Prosecutors alleged they had completed around 600 missions on behalf of Iran, including gathering intelligence on sensitive military and infrastructure sites, and identifying potential human targets for Iran.  On 21/10/2024  an Israeli official stated that two of Israel’s conditions for a ceasefire with Lebanon include allowing the IDF to engage in active enforcement to prevent Hezbollah from rearming and rebuilding its military infrastructure in the areas of southern Lebanon, and freedom for operations of the IDF in Lebanese airspace. The US Department of Defense deployed a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery (THAAD) and an associated crew of US military personnel to Israel. On 21/10/2024  a classified document regarding Israel’s plans to attack Iran was leaked without authorization on Telegram. The document assessed Israeli’s readiness to conduct the attack and its possible weaknesses. It also describes the possible use of long-range missiles to conduct a long distance aerial attack. On 18/10/2024  the Islamic resistance in Iraq, a coalition of armed groups based in Iraq, targeted two key military sites in the city of Eilat and in southern Israel. Over the past two weeks, Iran-linked militias in Iraq have launched about 40 aerial attacks involving missiles, drones or rockets on Israel.  On  17/10/2024  the Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was killed by IDF forces in an operation in Rafah, Gaza. Yahya was one of the masterminds behind the 7th October attack. His death is significant for the existence of the Hamas group, and many western countries hope that this event could lead to the signing of a ceasefire and the release of the hostages held captive by Hamas. The US has urged Israel to end the war in the Middle East and bring peace to Gaza, stating that the death of Sinwar has fulfilled Israel’s objectives in Gaza.  Analysis : After the Iranian ballistic missile attack on 01/10/2024 , Israel has vowed a response in retaliation for the attack. There is speculation that  Israel could lead to aerial bombing and targeting of Iranian oil fields or nuclear sites.  The US has deployed an anti-missile system to Israel and Iran’s air defenses are on high alert in anticipation of expecting Israeli retaliatory airstrikes. The conflict between Hezbollah and Israel is intensifying. Israel is attempting to destabilize and destroy Hezbollah by revealing how Iran funds Hezbollah's terrorism using civilian institutions, associations, and charities as cover for their operations, and how any other illicit financing and supporting activities have been used by the Iran-backed group. Israel seems to be considering accepting a ceasefire with Hezbollah, but on the condition that Hezbollah does not maintain its position close to Israel's northern border. Hezbollah had initially said it would only consider a ceasefire with Israel if a ceasefire was reached in Gaza. The death of Yahya Sinwar as the head of Hamas may be a turning point after a year of hostilities in the Israel-Hamas conflict. His death dealt a blow to the organization, and could potentially accelerate a hostage deal, or lead to the group’s disintegration. The leader that will replace Sinwar could play a role in a possible ceasefire. Other candidates include Yahya Sinwar brother Mohammad Sinwar or Khaled Mashaa. It is likely that the latter will take the role of leader from outside Gaza, whereas Mohammad Sinwar is expected to assume a bigger role within Gaza.  Conclusion: The situation in the Middle East is highly tense and unpredictable. The Israeli targeting of Hezbollah and Hamas on all the open fronts are weakening both organizations. This limits Iran’s assets, leaving the country to rely on its other minor proxies. The US intervention to mediate for a ceasefire in both Lebanon and Gaza offers a possibility for a ceasefire, though previous attempts have not led to concrete results. The US anti-missile system deployed in Israel might hinder the effectiveness of a US mediation. Iran’s air defenses are on high alert in anticipation of expecting Israeli retaliatory airstrikes, though the scale and targets of the IAF is yet to be seen.

Written by Jacob Dickinson, Iris de Boer, Alessia Cappelletti Sudan : power struggle between military factions broke into open conflict. Russia-Ukraine : heavy fighting on the Ukrainian frontline, particularly in Donetsk. Myanmar : military junta targeted civilian camps and committed human rights abuses. Ethiopia : Amhara region on the border with Tigray has seen extensive protests. Armenia-Azerbaijan : increased tensions after the establishment of Azerbaijani checkpoint. Democratic Republic of Congo : continuation of the conflict on the border with Uganda. Israel : judicial reforms in Israel postponed and worsening security situation in Israel-Palestine. Burkina Faso : over 150 civilians killed in attack in Northern Yatenga province. Mali : unrest continues as multiple attacks take place within the country. Yemen : progress in peace talks by opposing sides. Colombia : reshuffle of cabinet to reinvigorate reform plan and planned negotiations between the government and guerilla’s Chile : Chile nationalized its lithium industry amidst growing competition for critical minerals used in green technologies. Conflicts April 2023 1. Sudan On April 15, 2023, a crisis emerged in Sudan as violent clashes erupted between competing military factions . The conflict is primarily between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their respective leading generals Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemeti. The immediate cause of the conflict is the disagreement over the absorption of RSF forces in the SAF and the supposed disagreement on a timetable for a transition to democratic government after the coup in 2021. The fighting and airstrikes have intensified in the capital’s international airport and in the gold-rich region Darfur in the southwest of the country. The outbreak of conflict has so far killed 512 people and wounded nearly 4,200, though the death toll is thought to be far higher. Humanitarian aid has struggled to keep up as airstrikes and artillery have destroyed hospitals and cut off critical infrastructure. The United Nations has predicted up to 100,000 people have fled Sudan to neighboring countries, Ethiopia, Chad and towards the Port of Sudan. Outside actors also have significant interests in the outcome of the conflict. Egypt is a supporter of the SAF as they have supported Egypt’s opposition to Ethiopia’s plans for the GERD dam construction. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have cultivated close relationships with the both militaries due to the extensive trade in illegally mined gold in the country. The Russian Wagner Group has cooperated with the RSF to secure gold mines and transport gold back to Russia. For now, most actors seem to be supporting a ceasefire and refusing to openly back one side or the other . The scale of the violence and need for humanitarian aid have fueled concerns of broader instability in the region . Sudan’s geographical position, the ongoing conflict, and the refugee movements fleeing violence, are also likely to put pressure on humanitarian aid delivery. The close ties between Chad and the RSF suggest that there is a chance of the former becoming involved to some degree. Sudan’s conflict risks spilling over to other countries due to the arms trade and rebel groups moving between borders. With ceasefires failing to hold, the conflict is likely to continue in May. 2. Russia-Ukraine Heavy fighting on the Ukrainian frontline , and particularly in Donetsk, is taking place in flashpoints around Bakhmut , and also Kreminna and Marinka. Bakhmut has seen the fiercest fighting along the frontline. Ukrainian forces have managed to maintain logistical lines for the city and retain limited control. The Russian forces and Russian mercenary Wagner Group have fought together against the Ukrainian military and faced significant losses, though the strategic value of the city is questionable. Without gains on either side, analysts have predicted that the war could become a hot frozen conflict. While Russia and the Wagner group remain focused on Bakhmut, Ukraine’s much-discussed counter-offensive against Russia’s hold has not started yet , though it was expected for the last weeks April. Analysts have argued that Ukraine's objective could be to push toward the Sea of Azov and sever the land bridge between Crimea and Russia. The information channels remain extremely limited on the objectives and scope of the counteroffensive. Russian forces are preparing defensive positions against the advance, laying mines and digging defensive positions. On April 11, a US intelligence leak emerged with classified documents , suggesting that Kyiv is not likely to meet its objectives in the spring counteroffensive and its air defenses are weak. The intelligence leak was not intentional and the leak suspect was quickly arrested. However, while the intelligence leak represents what the US intelligence community thinks about the issue, the assessments are not foolproof. The US intelligence extensive reporting on detailed Russian military operations nevertheless demonstrates the weakness of Russia’s counter-intelligence operations and it is also witness to the fact that the US spies on its allies. This is not likely to alter diplomatic relations between the US and Ukraine given Washington’s military support for Kyiv. Behind the frontlines, Russian airstrikes have continued to hit Ukrainian cities and the Ukrainian military. Russian missiles have also targeted critical civilian infrastructure . On April 30, Russia launched missile attacks against Pavlohrad, a logistically important transportation link, wounding 34 people. Another Russian attack killed 23 Ukrainian civilians in the city of Uman. With the arrival of Western arms to Ukraine, the first Ukrainian tanks crews trained in the Leopard 2 and Challenger 2 are expected to be used in the counteroffensive. However, the Ukrainian foreign minister has noted that the coming counteroffensive is likely to be one of many. For now, the timing and scope of the planned counteroffensive could be as late as summer without an improvement in terrain conditions in Ukraine . 3. Myanmar The conflict between the Myanmar military and different opposing factions continued in April, with the military targeting civilian camps and committing multiple human rights abuses. On April 11, the Myanmar military carried out airstrikes on a local village inhabited by opponents of the military in Kanbalu township, killing 168 people. According to analysts, this signals the desperation of the military junta in fighting against the armed resistance. Since the military coup on 1 February 2021, the military has been unable to defeat resistance groups and fighting has moved to previously peaceful big urban centers in the country. Outside diplomatic efforts to act as peace providers or prevent further escalation remains difficult . Indonesia, the new chair for the regional bloc for Southeast Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), condemned the attack in a short announcement and is attempting to construct a more robust regional response to the Myanmar military’s atrocities against civilians. Given the organization’s principle of supposed non-interference in member’s internal affairs, Myanmar remains a member of ASEAN and governments have struggled to come to a consensus on solutions to the crisis . Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand are unlikely to agree on a common response given their accommodating position on Myanmar’s military. The military's considerable capacity for self-reliance, as well as its cultivation of relationships with Russia and China, suggest that outside actors retain little capacity to exert pressure over the Myanmar military. 4. Ethiopia The Amhara region in Ethiopia, on the border of Tigray, has seen political instability during April. On April 6, the Ethiopian government said that it plans to integrate all 11 regional military units into a single centralized army. This provoked a series of protests in the Amhara region against the centralization of military power, in a country with highly decentralized military forces. Protests and gun battles were consistent throughout the month. In a further escalation of tensions, on 27 April, Amhara nationalists assassinated a member of the ruling Prosperity Party, Girma Yeshitila, criticizing his close relationship to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. This is likely to cause further instability. At the same time, Ethiopia’s government has made progress in other peace talks . On April 23, the Ethiopian government accepted the terms of the peace negotiations with the rebel group Oromo Liberation Army ( OLA ). Both parties blame each other for attacks in the Oromiya region, in which air strikes were used against civilians. This rebel group is formally separate from the brutal conflict in Tigray, but the OLA did forge an alliance with the Tigray People’s Liberation (TPLF) in 2021. 5. Armenia-Azerbaijan Tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan have increased after Azerbaijan established a checkpoint on the only land route to the Nagorno-Karabakh region on April 23. After the establishment of the checkpoint, border shootings by soldiers from Armenia as well as soldiers from Azerbaijan were reported. Azerbaijan stated that it had taken “appropriate measures to establish control at the starting point of the road.” Armenia claims the checkpoint is a violation of the Russian brokered ceasefire agreement in 2020 in which Azerbaijan agreed to “guarantee safe movement of citizens, vehicles and cargo in both directions along the Lachin corridor.” As part of this ceasefire agreement, the Lachin corridor has come under the jurisdiction of Russian peacekeeping forces that are present in the region. Nagorno-Karabakh is a region that was claimed by Azerbaijan and Armenia after the Russian Empire fell in 1917 and has been contested ever since. The two sides have gone to war in 1990 and 2020, and clashes continue on a regular basis. The Nagorno-Karabakh region is located within Azerbaijan, but is mostly populated by Armenian citizens. The region has its own government that works closely together with the Government of Armenia but is not officially recognized by UN member states. During the first week of May, the Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia visited the US and met with the US Secretary of State to halt long-standing tensions over the region . On May 2, Russia stated that there is “no alternative” to the Russian-brokered peace agreement signed in 2020. Alerts and developing situations, April 2023 1. Colombia On April 26, President Petro replaced seven ministers in his cabinet , in response to the coalition partner’s refusal to approve a healthcare reform that is pending in Congress. Petro hopes that the reshuffle will reinvigorate his reform plan. Healthcare reform has been a contested key issue by the opposition. In the same month, a group of FARC dissidents who rejected the 2016 agreement announced that their delegates are ready to start negotiations with the government in May 2023. Similarly, peace talks with another guerrilla, the ELN, entered their third round in the first week of May, with both parties advocating for a temporary ceasefire. Despite this, trust between the parties is still very low, as in March a previous ceasefire was broken and 9 Colombian soldiers died. 6. Chile Chilean President Gabriel Boric announced on April 20 his plan to nationalize the country’s lithium industry to increase state revenues. Lithium is essential to produce electric vehicle batteries and Chile is the world’s second largest producer of the metal (behind Australia) but hosts the largest reserve. The plan announced would transfer the operations to a separate state-owned company and away from giants such as SQM and Albemarle – but not immediately as the companies’ current contracts run until 2030 and 2043, respectively. Since the announcements, the two companies lost a collective $8.5 billion. In Boric’s plan, future contracts would be issued as a public-private partnership with at least 51% state stakes. Criticisms from mining executives and industry analysts highlight that Boric’s strategy might have the opposite effect and shift investment towards Australia, Argentina, and several African countries – though Chinese firms may try to fill the gap. In the transition to climate-friendly technologies, mining and procurement of specific natural resources are climbing on the agendas of public as well as private entities and may become the next stage for geopolitical competition . Follow-ups on previous conflict monitoring reports 1. Democratic Republic of Congo The conflict in DRC has continued on the border with Uganda in the province of Ituri. On 15 April, dozens of civilians were killed by an armed militia called the Cooperative for Development of the Congo (CODECO). The competition is based on ethnic tensions and control over the Ituri region’s oil and gas deposits. Throughout April, massacres have occurred in the area as different groups, some with links to Islamic State, have vied for control. The ongoing humanitarian crisis is likely to continue as violence escalates throughout the country. 2. Israel Israel's PM Netanyahu's plans for a controversial judicial reform have been halted to avoid an immediate escalation of protests. On April 16, Netanyahu said he would not immediately resume the reforms after months of protests. Critics of the proposal argue that limiting the court review will lead to authoritarianism in the country. At the same time, tens of thousands of protests supportive of the measure have also marched through Jerusalem. The proposed reforms seem to be temporarily postponed, given the scale of the division over the issue . The security situation has also worsened in Israel-Palestine throughout April . There have been rockets fired from Gaza, the West Bank, the south of Lebanon, and the west of Syria. On April 8, the Israeli Defense Forces retaliated with airstrikes in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria. Israeli settlers have attacked Palestinian villages and left several Palestinian citizens wounded. On April 8, a Palestinian gunman opened fire on a crowded bar in Tel Aviv, killing three people. Palestinian terrorist organizations have also been more active. The intensity of violence between Israel and Palestine has become severe , and the plans to implement judicial reforms are likely to create more political instability in the short term. 3. Sahel Burkina Faso : Killings of civilians in Burkina Faso by Islamist armed groups and Burkina Faso Armed Forces has increased since 2022. On April 20, 156 civilians were killed during an attack on the village of Karma in Northern Yatenga province. The government of Burkina Faso has condemned the killings and stated that it will start an investigation. Islamist armed groups linked to al Qaeda and the Islamic State are known to control territory in the area where Karma is located. According to villagers, the killings in Karma have been a retaliation against people in the village who are suspected of cooperating with Islamist armed groups. It is estimated that over 5.5 million people in Burkina Faso are in need of assistance and nearly 2 million people have been displaced . Mali : The March’s Conflict Monitoring Report focused on the growing influence of the Russia-affiliated Wagner group in the Sahel. On April 20, there was an attack near a military camp that hosts Malian forces, UN peacekeepers, and Wagner fighters. According to Lassane Ouedraogo Wedraogo , a researcher from the Centre for Democracy and Development who focuses on the Sahel, the attack likely targeted the Wagner fighters in the camp. The attack killed at least 10 people and wounded dozens. On the same day, the Malian army stated that it “destroyed a terrorist sanctuary in Mourdiah and neutralized some 60 terrorists in Boni.” The actions by the Malian army followed an attack on April 18, during which the chief of staff for Mali’s interim president and three others were killed in an ambush in the rural area of Nara, a region in which rebels linked to al-Qaeda and Islamic State control territory. 4. Yemen Following an outbreak of fighting in March, Yemen has seen progress in peace talks by opposing sides backed by Saudi Arabia and Iran . Following the thaw in relations between regional rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran, on April 10, Saudi and Iran-backed Houthi leaders met and discussed a peace plan which is scheduled to take place over a period of 8 months. The ceasefire may be the first step to ending Yemen’s deadly civil war, which has lasted for 8 years and killed over 377,000 people. Hopes for holding the ceasefire are likely to continue following the Yemen government’s and Houthi rebels' exchange of over 900 prisoners of war on 15 April. The exchange of prisoners is intended to build on the ceasefire in the diplomatic push to end the war. However, the UN has suggested that prospects for peace remain fragile . The Iran and Saudi Arabia thaw is new for historical arch-rivals, while Yemen’s internal situation remains deeply divided. While April saw progress in peace negotiations, the restart of conflict remains a concern. About the authors Alessia Cappelletti Alessia is Intelligence Analyst and Project Coordinator at Dyami. She has field experience in South America, Colombia especially, and has experience in researching organized crime and conflicts. Her academic background includes conflict analysis, international humanitarian law, and criminology. Iris de Boer Iris has a background in Human Geography and has developed a broad interest in geopolitics and armed conflict during her academic career. She is currently enrolled in the Master’s degree Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University, during which she developed conflict mapping and conflict analyzing skills. Her previous research focused on the polarized display of the United States presidential elections in 2020 within Dutch media. Jacob Dickinson Jacob studied Global Political Economy at Leiden University. He is passionate about international development and is looking to expand his expertise in geopolitics and crisis management. Curious about other cultures, he has traveled in Europe and Asia for both academic study and professional purposes. His expertise includes the geopolitics of oil and industrial upgrading in the electronics global value chain. He is particularly interested in the evolving political and economic relationships between China and ASEAN, and the consequences for regional development and security.

Date: 09/10/2024 Who’s involved?   Maia Sandu and the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) Alexandr Stoianoglo supported by the Party of Socialists (PSRM) Nine other election candidates The Russian Federation The European Union What happened? Presidential elections in Moldova will take place on   20/10/2024 . On the same day, Moldova will hold an EU membership referendum  in which voters will answer the question “are you for the accession of the Republic of Moldova to the European Union?”. Eleven candidates are participating in the Presidential elections, which will be held according to a two-round system. Election polls suggest that current President Maia Sandu will compete with former Prosecutor General Alexandr Stoianoglo during the second round of the elections.  Maia Sandu is a pro-European election candidate  and leads the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS). Critics have mentioned that her party is exploiting the EU referendum to guarantee a second presidential term. Alexandr Stoianoglo has been put forward by the Party of Socialists (PSRM)  as a candidate that seeks to represent a unified opposition. The PSRM is a pro-Russian party and it is believed to have close ties with the Kremlin . The outcome of the EU referendum will determine whether Moldova will amend its constitution by adding two new paragraphs that reaffirm the European identity of Moldova as well as its European course, and that declare Moldova’s integration into the EU as a strategic objective.  Moldovan officials have warned of Russia’s interference in the Presidential elections and the EU referendum . They reported that pro-Russian groups that are directly paid by the Kremlin are behind a wave of vandalizations of state buildings in Chișinău , try to convince voters to choose for pro-Russian election candidates and a ‘no’ vote during the referendum by paying them money, and are planning to seize government buildings.  Context: Moldova’s current government, led by Maia Sandu, has worked to enable the country’s accession into the European Union and officially applied in 2022. Moldova is now holding an EU candidate status  and has moved to the second stage of accession negotiations in 2024.  While Russia worked together with the US and EU in order to bring down the regime of Vladimir Plahotniuc in Moldova in 2019, the Kremlin is currently conducting a destabilization campaign in order to increase its influence and hinder Moldova’s EU accession process . Russia mainly focuses on the Moldovan break-away regions Transnistria and Gagauzia, where it spreads disinformation, financially supports residents, and helped to install pro-Russian governors. In addition, there are Russian troops stationed in Transnistria. These troops have already been here since 1992 and stayed as part of a peacekeeping mission in 1995. However, the current government of Moldova sees the continuation of Russian military presence in Transnistria as illegitimate. It is believed that the final goal of the Kremlin is to bring down the current pro-European government of Moldova and to replace it with a pro-Russian puppet government . The upcoming Presidential elections and EU referendum are thus the perfect occasion for Russia to pursue this goal. An increase in destabilizing actions performed by pro-Russian groups, believed to be paid by the Kremlin, is expected in the run-up to the elections.  Recent polls still suggest that Maia Sandu is going to win the elections and that the majority of the voters will be in favor of the EU referendum. However, polls are not completely trustworthy and it is still unclear what the effect of the Russian destabilization campaign will be on the election results .  Scenarios: If Sandu wins the elections and the referendum will pass , Moldova’s pro-European course is reaffirmed by the public and the amendment of the constitution will be a solid signal towards the EU that the country won’t wander from the path to EU accession. The amendment of the constitution will give Sandu’s government legitimacy to change certain laws and regulations to align with the EU accession requirements .  There is also an option that  Sandu wins the elections, but that people will vote against the EU referendum. This will make it more difficult for Sandu’s government to change laws and regulations in order to meet the EU accession criteria, as the constitution won’t necessarily support such changes. The latter is a solid argument for the opposition to fight the pro-European course of  Sandu’s government. If Stoianoglo wins the elections and the referendum won’t pass,   it is likely that Moldova will increase its ties with Russia and that the government abstains from continuing the path to EU accession. This will be fought by the opposition, but as Moldova’s aim for EU accession is not implemented in its constitution, the opposition won’t have many tools in place to secure the continuation of the EU accession process. In this case, it is expected that the accession process will stagnate. Protests by pro-European citizens might take place. When Stoianoglo wins the elections and people will vote in favor of the EU referendum , it is likely that Stoianoglo will still not change the constitution as Russia will pressure Stoianoglo’s government and the referendum is not binding . In this case, it is likely that ties with the EU will erode and that Russia increases its influence over Moldova to make it align with the objectives of the Kremlin. Conclusion: The Moldovan presidential election as well as the EU referendum will highly influence   Moldova’s alignment with the European Union as well as its alignment with the Russian Federation . Multiple scenarios are possible and 20/10/2024 will be an important day for many Moldovan citizens. However, it is sure that the election results and the results of the EU referendum will be closely followed in Brussels as well as in the Kremlin.  An increase in destabilizing actions by Russia as well as a close monitoring of the election process by the EU is expected.  There is a possibility of protests against the results of the presidential election and the EU referendum in the aftermath of 20/10/2024.

Date:  10/10/2024 Where :  USA China Who’s involved : US Federal authorities US Telecoms AT&T Lumen Verizon Chinese Threat Actor Salt Typhoon What happened? Chinese threat actors infiltrated the wiretap systems of several major US telecom and internet providers . The wiretap systems targeted were mandated  by the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), a US federal law that requires telecoms to provide technical support to law enforcement for lawful surveillance–enacted in 1994. These compromised systems may have granted hackers access to vast amounts of internet traffic and customer data, potentially allowing them to gather intelligence on Americans. The breach is considered “potentially catastrophic”  by national security sources, given the sensitive nature of wiretaps. Analysis The breach of wiretap systems is a clear exploitation of the legal backdoors that were designed for lawful interception by law enforcement. This indicates that these systems can be high-value targets for state-sponsored actors. The hackers reportedly accessed systems that law enforcement uses to intercept traffic for criminal investigations . This implies that the attackers gained entry through vulnerabilities or misconfigurations in these systems. The breach likely involved reconnaissance techniques to identify and exploit specific targets within the telecoms' infrastructure that support the lawful interception of communications. This indicates that the threat actors have also developed an intimate knowledge of these systems , regardless of any operational success. The attack could have multiple objectives, including intelligence gathering and reconnaissance in preparation for more destructive cyberattacks in the event of a conflict between China and the US, potentially over Taiwan. The breach has been contextualized within a further debate over the use of backdoors and the inherent security risks. Backdoors, even those created for lawful purposes, are fundamentally insecure and prone to abuse by malicious actors. This incident is expected to renew discussions around encryption policies and push for stronger encryption measures by companies to protect user data. It’s worth noting that European infrastructure is typically better in this regard when compared to that in the US, but a lot of European infrastructure is still reliant on US-based tech giants such as Microsoft . The EU Council is scheduled to debate related issues to encryption backdoors at its session on 10/10 . Conclusion The breach by a Chinese state-sponsored threat actor is a significant national security concern that may have long-term implications for both US and European intelligence and law enforcement operations. It comes at a time where Chinese cyber operations are continuing to escalate. It also shows the dangers of mandated backdoors in communication systems which can be exploited by adversaries. Moving forward, there will likely be increased pressure on the US government and telecom providers to strengthen encryption and reconsider the use of backdoors in lawful surveillance systems. Hopefully, the outcome of this event will shape future US policies in favor of encryption, make careful choices regarding surveillance, and cybersecurity strategies, with implications for US allies.

Date:   08/10/2024 Who’s involved : European Commission, European Member States, China, automotive industry. What happened? On 04/10/2024 , EU member states voted to implement tariffs up to 50% on imports of electrical vehicles made in China . After a year of the opening of the EU’s Commission investigations into China’s automotive industries after the surge in low prices in the electric vehicle market, EU member states voted to raise import tariffs by up to 54% on China’s imported electric vehicles. The vote divided EU member states; France, Poland and Italy voted for the raise in import tariffs to protect domestic industries, while Germany and Hungary voted against. China’s Commerce Ministry said it opposed the planned tariffs  and called them ‘unfair, non-compliant and unreasonable’. In a retaliatory measure to import tariffs, China on the same day launched investigations into the import of European pork and dairy , which are aimed at EU member states who support battery electric vehicles (BEV)   tariffs against China. On  26/08/2024 , Canada followed the lead of the United States and the European Union  said that it would impose 100% tariff on imports of Chinese electric vehicles and 25% tariff on imported steel and aluminum from China.  On  04/10/2023 , the European Commission launched an anti-subsidy investigation into the imports of BEV from China . Ursula Von Der Leyen said that the electric vehicle holds potential for the future of Europe’s competitiveness. Evidence of market distortions and unfair competition in China’s BEV sector will be investigated. The EU Commission investigated whether China’s benefits from ‘illegal’ subsidization and whether this threatens or harms EU BEV producers.  Analysis : The EU member states' split vote on BEV tariffs comes as China churns out steel, cars and solar panels more than its economy can consume domestically, forcing cheaper exports to the rest of the world. This is a part of Xi Jinping’s economic strategy to focus on “high quality productive forces” and to make China a world leader in high-tech industries by plowing billions into strategically important sectors .  The EU’s investigation into China’s electric car subsidies is due to accusations of “unfair trade practices” . The EU is concerned that the far cheaper prices offered by Chinese companies such as BYD and SAIC will be unable to compete with its own profoundly China-dependent automotive industry. The move intends to protect the European car industry from being undermined by what EU politicians say are unfair Chinese-state subsidies. Despite the political pressure to act, the European car industry has strongly objected to imposing tariffs for fear of China’s retaliation. China is the world’s largest market for Europe’s car manufacturers and many have built supply chain relationships over years.  The surge in China's electric vehicle exports is not restricted to Europe. China’s electric cars are cheap and are common throughout the world. Subsidies have played a role in the development of new Chinese car brands such as BYD and SAIC. Yet the combination of China’s slowing demand for more expensive cars and an aggressive price war between 40 companies throughout 2024 in China’s domestic market has led Chinese electric car brands to aggressively expand abroad. China’s transition from an exporter of low-value exports to higher-value exports, like industries important for the green transition such as solar panels and wind turbines is only just beginning .  China is likely to target European products which are sold well in China or that China controls such as dairy, pork, brandy, luxury goods, and critical minerals. China's previously curbed exports of germanium and gallium in response to the US export restrictions on semiconductors. China’s dominance in the production of several critical minerals has led to China using export controls to retaliate over US and EU technology export controls against China.  Conclusion: EU-China trade tensions are growing partly due to Beijing’s close relationship with Moscow after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the EU’s push to ‘de-risk’ from the world’s second largest economy, including materials and products in the green transition. The idea of a looming trade war between EU and China is now commonplace. Both blocs could easily slide into raising tariffs across a whole range of goods and services.  While the EU remains divided over how to improve competitiveness against both the US and China, Chinese companies will continue to bypass import tariffs by building auto plants in Hungary, Turkey and Morocco. As the EU has discovered in its barrage of sanctions against Russia, trade restrictions can easily be diverted to third countries yet still be imported across the continent.

This publication is part of a larger report on the Horn of Africa region . The report expands on the contentions surrounding Ethiopia’s desired access to ports and the construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam, followed by insights into the most recent developments and emerging security issues related to the aforementioned. To access the full report please email alessia@dyami.services   Date: 07/10/2024 Location:   Horn of Africa Who is involved:   Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia,  Somalia, Turkey What happened? Ethiopia’s pursuit to Red Sea Access  On 02/01/2024  Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a "New Year's Day Deal": Ethiopia gained access to a port through leasing 20km of Somaliland’s coastline. Additionally, Ethiopia secured a 50-year lease on a naval base. In exchange, Ethiopia promised to, at some point, officially recognize Somaliland as a sovereign state.  Prior to the agreement: Ethiopia has actively sought access to a port, which it lost in 1993 when Eritrea gained independence. Ethiopia relied on Djibouti for 90% of its trade through ports. This cost Ethiopia approximately $1.5 billion annually. The agreement would significantly impact Djibouti's port-dependent economy. Following the agreement: Somalia protests Ethiopia's recognition of Somaliland. Somalia demands withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Somalia by the end of 2024. Removal of Ethiopian forces weakens Ethiopia's defense against regional threats. Escalating Tensions and Regional Rivalries In August 2024, Somali and Ethiopian foreign ministers met twice in Ankara, Turkey to discuss disagreements over the port deal Ethiopia signed with Somaliland in January. Turkey maintains economic ties with both Ethiopia and Somalia, providing a foundation for its mediation efforts. On 08/02/2024  Turkey signed a “Defence and Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement” with Somalia, a 10-year defense deal that will see Ankara helping Mogadishu with security cooperation and building the capacity of its naval forces, further solidifying Turkey’s influence in the area. On 13/08/2024  Turkey proposed an arrangement allowing Ethiopia sea access via Somalia which is contingent on Ethiopia recognizing Somalia's territorial sovereignty. On 14/08/2024  Egypt signed a defense pact with Somalia. The agreement replaces departing Ethiopian troops with 10,000 Egyptian troops. Half of the troops join “Africa Transition Mission In Somalia”, while the other half is stationed in Mogadishu. Egyptian troops will also train the Somali army to combat terrorist groups. On 27/08/2024  Egypt strengthened its military alliance with Somalia by sending two C-130 military aircraft filled with weapons. This event marks the first military aid from Egypt to Somalia in decades. On 19/09/2024  Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated that Turkey aims to meet with Somalia and Ethiopia separately to resolve the dispute. On 23/09/2024  Egypt reinforced their security pact with Somalia by sending an Egyptian warship to the Mogadishu port, carrying anti-aircraft guns and artillery. Egypt pledges continued support for Somalia's security, stability, and development. At the same time, Egypt issued a statement urging citizens in Somaliland to leave immediately via Hargeisa Airport. Advisory warns against travel to the region due to escalating security concerns. Analysis The situation in the Horn of Africa is precarious, with Ethiopia and Egypt supplying arms to different groups in Somalia, there is a significant risk of a proxy war. To prevent military escalation, a binding agreement is crucial. If agreements on the port deal fails, Ethiopia might ratify the recognition of Somaliland as a sovereign state in exchange for the use of the port and naval base. This could lead to increased tensions and political conflict in the region.  Tensions between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia over the region’s precarious water supply might also escalate. Regional destabilization could occur involving neighboring countries and regional actors, likely backing Egypt due to shared water security concerns, into a conflict. Civilian casualties, mass migration, and strained regional resources would draw in neighboring countries and international intervention for aid and support. This would lead to a severe humanitarian crisis that would be detrimental to the region and beyond. Conclusion The escalating issues—rooted in water insecurity, port access, and shifting military alliances—have naturally raised fears of an inter-state conflict. It is crucial for negotiations to continue and an agreement be drafted so as to not allow the region to turn to military escalation. To access the full report on the tensions in the Horn of Africa and the broader region please contact Alessia@dyami.services