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Date: 17/01/2024 Who’s involved: Iran, Israel, intelligence assets What happened? The Israeli intelligence agencies Mossad and Shin Bet released information on Iranian attempts to gather sensitive information from Israeli soldiers and civilians via fake social media accounts and profiles. Iranian intelligence agents created a string of profiles and accounts on popular social media sites like TikTok, Telegram, Instagram, LinkedIn, and others. Through these profiles, they sent friend requests to Israeli soldiers and family members of people who were taken hostage by Hamas during the attack on 07/10/2023. Through these channels, Israeli citizens were asked to take pictures of the homes of security chiefs and politicians, set up protests in favor of exchanging terrorists for hostages, fill out surveys with personal information and Iranian agents would even send bouquets of flowers to family members of hostages. Channels and sites used had names like Tears of War, BringHomeNow, Kan +, Agrof, Powerless, Israel the Second and the Avengers. Several concerned civilians notified the security services about anomalies found in the profiles and websites. Mostly, people noticed poor grammar, strange questions, and the inability to read Hebrew. In response, the Israeli security services blocked dozens of profiles, accounts and websites. Israel has warned other countries that Iran is actively trying to build a source network through online recruiting. In total, 27 plans to attack Israeli or Jewish institutions around the world were uncovered in 2023, all linked to Iranian intelligence services and mostly done through digital channels. Analysis: In a separate incident, the Microsoft security team reported that they had discovered Iranian government-linked hacking and phishing attempts dating back to November 2023. The targets of the hackers were mainly journalists and experts in Middle Eastern affairs. Attempts were made to influence them with propaganda and their computers were compromised by malware. Microsoft, who named the hacking group Mint Sandstorm, gave examples of sophisticated hacking attempts that can only be ascribed to a state actor. Iran is increasingly focusing on cyber intelligence gathering through the use of the common method of phishing. Whereas this was once used mainly to scam or extort individuals for money, phishing is now used by state-affiliated groups and intelligence agencies to contact individuals and gather strategic information. Professional job websites like LinkedIn, reveal a lot of information on people’s backgrounds like job, education, work history, and interests. Sites like Instagram and Facebook are useful for gathering information on someone’s political and personal opinions as well as their network. Social media is increasingly becoming a useful and important tool for state actors. Most people are aware of cyber criminality and would guard their financial information online,  but there is not yet enough awareness of espionage through social media by state actors. This puts civilians and government workers at risk of being targeted by intelligence agencies. Conclusion: Iran is engaged in cyber warfare against Israel and other countries. Intelligence agencies are forced to create digital counter-attack divisions to thwart these attacks from enemy state actors. The digital battleground will likely be an integral part of conventional warfare and will challenge governments to address the safety and security of their citizens and interests off as well as online.

Date: 19/01/2024 Location: Warsaw, Poland Who’s involved: Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and his government Polish President Andrzej Duda National Law and Justice Party (PiS) TVP public television, Polish Radio, Polish Press Agency (PAP) Former Polish ministers Mariusz Kamiński and Maciej Wąsik The Events: On 13/12/2023 Polish President Andzej Duda sworn in the Tusk led coalition government, marking the end of the right-wing populist National Law and Justice Party (PiS) administration. The government changes within Poland were well received by most EU countries, as Tusk’s government is pursuing a pro-European course. However, decisions made by Tusk’s government in December 2023 and January 2024 have led to an increase of tensions within Polish society. On 11/01/2024 thousands of opposition supporters gathered outside Poland’s parliament in Warsaw to protest against recent changes implemented by Tusk’s  government. The protests took place in the aftermath of government changes to state media and the arrest of two former ministers convicted of abuse of power, after which the PiS party on 09/01/2024 called for huge anti-government protests. On 19/12/2023 the Parliament of Poland passed a resolution calling on the Ministry of Culture to restore “citizens’ access to reliable information, the functioning of public media, as well as ensuring [their] independence, objectivity, and pluralism.” On 20/12/2023 Culture Minister Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz fired the heads of TVP public television, Polish Radio, and Polish Press Agency (PAP). Besides, Sienkiewicz appointed new supervisory boards which will appoint new management boards for the companies. Since PiS took power in 2015, TVP, Polish Radio, and PAP became subject to tight PiS control that swiftly ousted management and reporters seen as unfavorable for the PiS government. The power of PiS over these news outlets led to international worries over Polish freedom of press and likely favored the PiS party during Polish Parliamentary elections in October 2023. The recent government changes to the news outlets led to fury by PiS members and supporters, who took residence in the TVP headquarters in Warsaw on 20/12/2023 in an attempt to prevent the government changes. The TVP headquarters in Warsaw are currently surrounded by metal barriers and police officers for protection. On 09/01/2024 the police arrested former ministers Mariusz Kamiński and Maciej Wąsik, who both have been lawmakers for PiS. They were convicted of abuse of power and sentenced to three years in prison in 2015, as they allowed agents to use entrapment in an investigation. However, when PiS came to power that same year, Polish President Andrzej Duda pardoned both ministers. Polish Lawyers questioned in 2023 whether Duda was entitled to pardon Kamiński and Wąsik back in 2015, after which the Supreme Court decided to reopen the case. In December 2023 Kamiński and Wąsik were sentenced once again, this time to two years in prison. In January 2024, the Court issued the arrest of both men. On 09/01/2024 both former ministers took refuge at the Presidential Palace in Warsaw on invitation by President Duda, where they were eventually arrested. According to Prime Minister Tusk, Duda hindered the arrest and obstructed justice by giving Kamiński and Wąsik refuge. PiS immediately condemned the arrest of Kamiński and Wąsik as “an illegal kidnapping and violation of all democratic rules”. In addition, the PiS party called for the huge anti-government protest in Warsaw, leading to thousands of opposition supporters on the streets on 11/01/2024. Duda also announced that he will pardon both ministers once again. Analysis: Whereas the former PiS-led government took an anti-European approach, the installation of the pro-European Tusk government is perceived as positive development by most EU countries. Tusk promised his voters to prioritize Poland’s security while restoring the rule of law, addressing the climate crisis, and improving women’s rights. Tusk stated that this focus could secure billions of euros for Poland that were frozen by the EU over concerns on the rule of law. However, Tusk’s government has had a difficult start so far, as most of its first attempts to work on the election promises mentioned above have been faced with strong resistance from the PiS opposition and its supporters. PiS still has a strong supporter base and received over 35% of the votes during the 2023 parliamentary elections in Poland, making it the party with the most votes in total. Besides, PiS politicians have used hostile rhetoric towards Tusk and his government. Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of PiS, even described Tusk in the run-up to the 2023 elections as “the personification of evil in Poland, pure evil”. During the anti-government protests on 11/01/2024, Kaczyński portrayed the recent disagreements between the Tusk government and the PiS opposition as “a great battle for a sovereign, independent Poland” that should be won by PiS. The anti-government protest of 11/01/2024 might just be the start of a series of protests that could happen in the future. The strong support for PiS among Polish citizens as well as its use of anti-Tusk rhetoric will likely fuel resistance against future policy changes by Tusk’s government. Whereas EU countries heaved a sigh of relief after Tusk and his government were sworn in, Poland’s road fully acting in line with EU principles will not be an easy one. In an already highly polarized Polish society, more unrest in the form of protests against government reforms should be expected. Conclusion: It is likely that the protest in Warsaw on 11/01/2024 won’t be the last protest against the actions of the Tusk pro-European government. Tusk’s coalition and the PiS opposition are diametrically opposed to each other and it seems that PiS will do anything to stop Tusk’s government from reverting their legacy. Especially with Polish President Anrzej Duda being a PiS ally, it is likely that unrest in Poland will increase and that the country’s way to becoming a pro-EU state will be a long one.

Date: 16/01/2024 Location: Myanmar Who’s involved: Tatmadaw (Myanmar military), Chinese government, Three Brotherhood Alliance (TBA) consisting of Arakan Army (AA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TLNA). The Events: On 16/01/2024, the Arakan Army, an armed ethnic group in the west of Myanmar claimed full control of Paletwa, a city on the border of India and Bangladesh. On 12/01/2024, the Chinese government negotiated a ceasefire agreement between the Tatmadaw and the TBA, an alliance between three well-armed ethnic groups who gained considerable gains against the Tatmadaw. The so-called “Operation 1027” began on October 27 2023, and has made several advances in the eastern Chin state on the border with China. The Beijing-led talks in the Chinese city of Kunming said representatives from the Myanmar military and the TBA had committed to a “temporary ceasefire and withdrawal of military personnel”. The Chinese government said that the de-escalation of the situation in Myanmar conforms to all parties’ interests and will help maintain peace and stability at the China-Myanmar border. On 05/01/2024, the main strategic objective of the TBA was achieved. The city of Laukkaing fell to the TBA forces after a months-long assault on the city and the surrounding area. The regional Myanmar military command surrendered along with 1,000 personnel. The Tatmadaw admitted that the coordinated assault is the most serious challenge to its rule since February 2021. On 04/01/2024 a shell fired from Myanmar landed on the Chinese side of the border. The Chinese foreign ministry voiced “strong dissatisfaction” with the action. On 01/01/2024, an MNDAA commander said that the military operation had secured 250 military targets, border crossings with China and fulfilled an objective of the operation to stop widespread online gambling fraud along the China-Myanmar border, taking out 300 cyber scam centers and returning 40,000 Chinese nationals involved in cyber crimes. Analysis The TBA offensive delivered the worst set back to the military regime in Myanmar in decades. The capture of regional capital Laukkaing and Paletwa is a blow to the regime’s authority. The armed groups were successful because they had prepared in advance of the offensive, utilizing the  conflict economies of the east of the country and conscripting military personnel. They were also partially supported by China through access to Chinese-manufactured weapons, ammunition and commercial aerial vehicles. Whether the ceasefire led by China will hold remains to be seen. Beijing has completed its objective in removing the people smuggling gangs and scamming networks based in Myanmar which posed risks to Chinese nationals. The ethnic armed groups in the Chin state are attempting to restart trade and may be working toward consolidating their territorial gains instead of overthrowing the Myanmar military regime entirely. However, the last ceasefire negotiated in late December by China lasted barely two days. The ceasefire agreement has been acknowledged by the military and TBA, but there is no precise mention of the specific areas where hostilities will cease. While the ceasefire is important, the resilience of the Tatmadaw has been put in question. The Tatmadaw has been unable to take territory from other groups yet continues to use aircraft, artillery and scorched earth tactics to terrorize ethnic groups. However, the fall of multiple towns, the surrender of military personnel, and the Tatmadaw’s failure to address attacks on multiple fronts could lead other armed groups to capitalize and start further attacks across the country. For elites within the regime, a failure of leadership to address threats to the military could also lead to further in-fighting among elites. In the medium term, the ceasefire could play into Beijing’s strategy to gain leverage over individual armed groups by allowing limited gains in specific territories and keep the Tatmadaw in power, as well as assuring all groups dependence on Beijing to maximize its leverage over the country. Beijing prioritizes stability in Myanmar above all, and has suggested a push toward the electoral process if it conforms to stability. Conclusion: The success of the AA on the border of India and Bangladesh reveals the continuing challenges the Tatmadaw faces since the beginning of Operation 1027. The disparate groups fighting in Myanmar may cause the regime split into smaller fractions, with still significant air power and artillery. Given the economic and military weight of China in the country, both the TBA and the Tatmadaw are deeply dependent on China’s interests. Even if the ceasefire holds, both the Tatmadaw and ethnic groups are likely to attempt to regain territory. The civil war in Myanmar is therefore likely to continue. The escalating violence has added to the refugees fleeing from the conflict, with 1.35 million leaving the country and a further 2.3 million people internally displaced, according to the United Nations.

(GPSjam.org map indicating areas of GPS interference in the region) Date: Since December 2023 Location: Baltic Sea Who’s involved: Russia, Poland, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Finland,  Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia What happened? A severe increase in GPS jamming and spoofing was reported in the area of the Baltic sea. While GPS jamming and spoofing are not a new phenomenon, the intensity of it over and around the Baltic sea has spiked on several days in the past weeks. The source of the GPS interference has been geolocated to origin from Kaliningrad, Russia’s exclave between Lithuania, Poland and the Baltic sea. Analysis: The GPS interference in the Baltic sea region is likely to continue in the near future. As relations between Russia and the European nations are not improving, this is another way for Russia to interfere in day-to-day aviation (and shipping) operations in Europe. The consequences of the GPS interference varies, as GPS jamming and spoofing are different methods of disruption. Whereas GPS jamming will produce a clearly faulty GPS signal in the aircraft, GPS spoofing is able to fake an aircraft’s systems into believing it is somewhere it is not, without recognising the issue. Comparable GPS spoofing attacks have recently been observed over Iraq, which consequently prompted aircraft manufacturers, as well as operators, to find mitigating methods for these attacks. GPS spoofing especially calls for air crew to be informed and aware of spoofing areas, and how to recognize and deal with it in a safe manner. Spoofing can certainly pose a significant threat to an unprepared and unaware aircrew in low visibility conditions. Conclusion: The new trend of intensity spikes in GPS interference over and around the Baltic sea is likely to continue. Air crews operating in the area should be made aware of the activity and be prepared to deal with the effects of these attacks.

Date: 12/01/2024 Where:  Ethiopia - Somaliland - Somalia Who’s involved:  Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, Somaliland leader Muse Bihi Abdi, Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud What happened? On 01/01/2024, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somaliland leader Muse Bihi Abdi signed an agreement granting Ethiopia access to 20 kilometers of Somaliland coast for naval and commercial operations and a 50-year lease for the Ethiopian navy to access the port of Berbera, in Somaliland. No information is publicly available on the start date of the lease, nor are there more in-depth details on the terms. Ethiopia committed to providing an “in-depth assessment” of the petition for official recognition of the self-governing territory of Somaliland as an independent nation. Should this occur, Ethiopia would be the first state to recognize Somaliland. Somaliland will also receive a stake in the state-owned Ethiopian Airlines as part of the agreement. The Somali government called the agreement an “act of aggression,” as it considers Somaliland part of its territory. Somaliland has considered itself autonomous since the end of the 1991 civil war. On 02/01/2024, following an emergency cabinet meeting, Somalia rejected a signed agreement between its “separatist” region of Somaliland and Ethiopia. Mogadishu also recalled its ambassador to Ethiopia and reportedly initiated consultations with Qatar and Egypt, historically unsympathetic to Ethiopia. Later, on 06/01/2024, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud signed a law nullifying the agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland. Somali authorities claimed that the port deal is outrageous as the recognition of Somaliland constitutes a direct attack on Somalia’s ”sovereignty and territorial independence.” The deal received wide international condemnation. Regional actors, such as the African Union, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), as well as the governments of Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey, expressed support for Somalia's claim to sovereignty. Moreover, the EU and the U.S. also condemned the deal. Analysis: With a population of 120 million, Ethiopia is one of the most populous countries in Africa. However, the country argues that its economy is severely affected by its lack of access to the sea. Since the 1991 Eritrean War of Independence, which left Ethiopia landlocked, Addis Ababa has relied on the Djibouti port despite seeking alternatives through failed negotiations with Kenya, Sudan, and Somaliland. Already in October 2023, Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed indicated his intention to secure a new Red Sea port and access to international trade. Access to the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea through the Port of Berbera could be considered a milestone for Ethiopia. As for Somaliland, the agreement with Ethiopia could mean achieving the long-awaited recognition of its statehood. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has clarified that the deal signed on 01/01/2024 does not automatically recognize Somaliland but rather represents “the starting point for negotiations.” The recognition process will need in-depth assessment and parliamentary deliberations. Relations between Ethiopia and Somalia have long been strained. The two nations have a longstanding history of territorial disputes, accompanied by a pattern of supporting opposing rebel groups through proxies. Each government has provided backing to rebel factions opposed to the other, further intensifying the conflict. Therefore, the Ethiopian-Somaliland agreement will likely spark widespread turmoil and increase the risk of conflict in the Horn of Africa. However, despite growing diplomatic friction, neither side has talked about armed conflict, nor does Somalia possess the capabilities to launch an attack against Ethiopia and Somaliland, partly because of the domestic conflict against the al-Shabab armed group. If Ethiopia should recognize Somaliland as a state, it would set a precedent for the recognition of separatist territories and could incentivize other regions to follow. Some believe that the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has long supported Ethiopia’s plan to negotiate access to Somaliland's ports, may be next in line to recognize the disputed self-governing territory of Somaliland. In recent years, the UAE has increasingly expanded its influence in the Horn of Africa. Conclusion: With the ongoing Houthi threat in the Red Sea, the Berbera port and military agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland will likely create more instability. While the agreement reached by the Ethiopian PM is economically motivated to advance the country's development and gain much-needed maritime access, negotiations with Somaliland could create an unintended ripple effect. First, the talks between Ethiopia and the autonomous self-proclaimed Somaliland region challenge the Somali state's sovereignty and set a precedent legitimizing non-state actors in the region. Secondly, the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea area have critical relevance in international maritime trade. Rising tensions and the risk of further conflict in the region could affect global trade routes, prompting rising prices and disruptions in trade chains. Finally, the situation remains volatile, and while it does not seem likely at the moment, an escalation of violence between the parties cannot be ruled out. An outbreak of conflict could further deteriorate the already precarious humanitarian condition of the region, requiring the intervention and mediation of the international community, which is already engaged in the conflicts between Israel and Hamas and Russia and Ukraine.

Date: 12/01/2024 Where: Iran Who’s involved: Irleaks (threat actor), Major Iranian insurance companies, SnappFood (Iran’s largest food delivery platform). What happened: On 20/12/2023, a seemingly novel threat actor, identified as “Irleaks”, claimed to have stolen over 160 million personal records from 23 leading insurance companies in Iran in one of the largest data breaches ever recorded. Irleaks struck again on 30/12. This time, it was a major cyberattack on SnappFood, with 3 terabytes of data stolen, including sensitive information of 20 million users. On 2/1/2024, Researchers from threat intelligence group, Hudson Rock, identified a potentially compromised employee at SnappFood as part of their initial reporting on Irleaks, which might have been the initial attack vector. The SnappFood employee was a victim of the StealC malware. StealC is a type of infostealer. Infostealers are malicious programs designed to collect and exfiltrate sensitive information from an infected system. Analysis: While these two incidents have been investigated extensively by Hudson Rock, there is a longer timeline of Irleaks’ history as a threat actor. Massive amounts of personal identifiable information (PII) have been put up for sale on the darkweb and various breach forums by Irleaks, impacting a majority of Iran’s population if the claims are all true. Irleaks has been active since at least early 2022, initially maintaining a low profile with significant operations, including data leaks and website defacements. On 10/7/2023, a similar data breach of multiple insurance firms was claimed by Irleaks. This event allegedly pulled client PII from four major companies, totalling 43 million files. An even larger breach that occurred on 9/8/2023 and was claimed by Irleaks released 115 million files from 19 different organizations. On 2/9/2023, Irleaks leaked the data of more than 27 million customers of Iranian rideshare app, Tapsi. This included full names, mobile phone numbers, and various account and social security numbers. Iran’s National Information Network (NIN) development, intended for controlling internal communication, has not necessarily translated into robust defense for private industries. Irleaks’ operations demonstrate a potential  exploitation of these vulnerabilities. It could also be that these attacks have had an increased impact because of data required by Iranian structures to be held onto by these targeted companies. Iran has enhanced its offensive cyber capabilities for peer threats such as Israel, but private industries may remain vulnerable. The detailed nature and large volume of records suggest that the claims are genuine. Research by Hudson Rock confirms this. High level of capability indicates organized, advanced threat actor involvement. Potential motivations include financial gain or political/strategic motives. The coordinated nature of Irleaks’ attacks, coupled with Iran's geopolitical situation, raises speculation of nation-state involvement or sanction. Possible use of social engineering or spear-phishing tactics, indicated by the compromise of an employee at SnappFood. Conclusion: Irleaks' significant and sophisticated cyber activities mark a notable shift in Iran's cybersecurity landscape. The scale of their breaches suggests the potential involvement of nation-state actors, adding complexity to an already intricate geopolitical context. While the precise motives of Irleaks are unclear, the depth of their penetration into Iran’s internet infrastructure indicates a highly capable threat actor. Considering their long-term operational preparation, Irleaks could be an independent entity, though the possibility of state-backing cannot be discounted. Thorough and ongoing analysis is essential to fully comprehend the extent and ramifications of their actions. Also of concern is the fact that so much data was retained by the various private entities in Iran. While this may have been a requirement of the government for surveillance purposes, similar situations have been identified in app-based services around the world. Data leaks and breach events remain one of the top cyber threats to organizations, as well as private citizens.

Date: 11/01/2024 Where: Europe Who’s involved: US, Germany, Sweden, The Netherlands, Belgium, Russia, Ukraine What has been said? Over the course of December 2023 and January 2024, multiple actors within Europe have emphasized the threat of a war between Europe and Russia. On 14/12/2023 NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg stated that if Russia would win the war with Ukraine, there is a risk that it would continue to wage war elsewhere. On 18/12/2023 German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said that Europe needs to expect threats from Russia. He stated ​​​​"[Putin's] threats against the Baltic states, Georgia, and Moldova must be taken very seriously. This is not just saber-rattling. We could be facing dangers by the end of this decade". On 19/12/2023 Admiral Michel Hofman, Chief of Defense of the Belgian Armed Forces, warned of a possible war with Russia and specifically stressed that Russia poses a threat to the Baltic states. Hofman also mentioned that Russia has switched to a war economy. Former Commander in Chief of the Dutch Army, Mart de Kruif, agreed with Hofman and added that “Putin is now producing tanks, ammunition and drones 24 hours a day, and that is only going to increase; [and] they are modern tanks”. On 28/12/2023 the now former Commander in Chief of the Dutch Army, Martin Wijnen, stated that chances of an armed conflict with Russia are low, but they are absolutely not zero. He added that the Netherlands should prepare itself better by taking precautionary measures. On 09/01/2024 Swedish Civil Defense Minister Carl-Oskar Bohlin as well as Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces Micael Bydén emphasized that Swedish citizens should mentally prepare themselves for war. Bydén said that Swedish citizens should ask themselves the basic question: if what is happening in Ukraine today happens in Sweden tomorrow, am I prepared for it and what should I do? Bydén also mentioned that the Swedish government wants to have a robust and resilient society that will function normally for as long as possible in a war scenario. According to Bydén, preparations need to be made as Sweden is not ready yet. On 06/12/2023 discussions were held in the US Congress regarding military support for Ukraine. However, Republicans insisted on a stricter border policy for the US in exchange for new aid to Ukraine. US President Biden expressed concerns about this as no new support to Ukraine could result in a Russian advance. “If Putin takes Ukraine, he won’t stop there,” Biden said. Analysis: In light of the war in Ukraine, most European countries have worked to improve their defense capabilities. Besides, multiple European countries aim to decrease Europe’s dependency on the U.S. within NATO. However, European defense cooperation and coordination is lacking and European firms are having trouble to match new defense demands. As a result, Europe has been unable to provide Ukraine with enough weapons and other military means. Right-wing parties are gaining ground in Europe, which could mean less support for Ukraine. For example, the PVV, which emerged as the largest party in the Netherlands in the November 2023 elections, has not always supported arms supplies to Ukraine and disapproved of sanctioning Russia. Although the PVV will not be the sole ruler, their political influence could possibly hinder future Dutch support for Ukraine. Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán, leader of the right-wing Fidesz party, has blocked multiple EU support packages for Ukraine. Another example is Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, reelected in 2023, who stated in the past that Serbia would not sanction Russia as the majority of the Serbian population loves and supports Russia. Russia can take advantage of the decreasing support for Ukraine and the stalling of the US Congress to make significant advances in the war. According to President Biden, “Putin is banking on the United States failing to deliver for Ukraine”. Russia has suffered major losses in Ukraine in the last months, however according to former Commander in Chief of the Dutch Army De Kruif this does not mean it will weaken the Russian army in the long run. Belgian admiral Hofman added “Russia will eventually generate the war machine and rebuild its armed forces”. Furthermore, De Kruif warned that Russia is learning from its losses and mistakes during the war with Ukraine, and they will take this experience with them during future actions. This ensures that the quality of the Russian army only increases, De Kruif mentioned. Conclusion Multiple actors have expressed concern on how the situation between Russia and Ukraine will evolve, providing an alternative perspective to European citizens who don’t perceive a war between Europe and Russia to be possible. As mentioned by those actors, it is difficult to predict what will eventually happen. However, the lack of awareness in European societies, difficulties in European and U.S. weapon deliveries, and difficulties in European defense cooperation bolsters Russia’s determination and confidence, both in Ukraine as well as beyond. According to the actors mentioned in this intelbrief, citizen awareness in European countries is needed to take effective precautionary measures for the worst case scenario.

Date: 11/01/2024 Location: Ecuador Who’s involved: Ecuadorian President Noboa, Los Choneros gang, Narcotraffic cartels The Events: On Sunday 07/01/2024, Adolfo Macias, known as Fito, leader of the Ecuadorian Los Choneros gang, escaped from prison before he was set to be transported to another highly secure facility. His escape prompted the Ecuadorian government to call for a 60-day national state of emergency and include a curfew from 23:00 until 5:00. A man-hunt has also begun. In response to the state of emergency, drug gangs attacked several police officers, rioted in prisons and took guards hostage, set off explosive devices around the country, and invaded a national TV station during a live broadcast. The Ecuadorian security forces ultimately arrested all the hostage-takers at the TV station. President Noboa then called the situation in Ecuador an “internal armed conflict” and enlisted 22 gangs as terrorist organizations, ordering their neutralization through a massive mobilization of security forces. President Noboa, who took office in November 2023 after winning the election on 15/10/2023, gained widespread popular support for his policy agenda focused on significant security sector and justice system reforms, including high-security prison vessels to mitigate prison overcrowding and massacres and expansion of military authority, reminiscent of El Salvador's President Bukele's "mano dura" security measures. On 03/01/2024, Noba announced a referendum on imposing tighter security measures based on militarization and restrictive anti-crime policies to eradicate gang-related violence in the country. On 04/01/2024, the construction of two "Bukele-like" prisons was announced. In September 2023, a few weeks before the final presidential run-off, gangs attacked several locations around the country, using explosives and taking police officers hostage for a day. Schools in the most affected parts of the country were closed for a few days to reduce exposure to electoral violence. Context: Ecuador has been grappling with an unprecedented rise in violence in the past few years. The country has shifted from being the most peaceful in the region to now registering the fourth-highest homicide rate in Latin America.  Between 2016 and 2022, Ecuador's homicide rate spiked by nearly 500%. The homicide rate in 2023 reached an unprecedented peak. In 2023, the port city of Guayaquil recorded an 80 percent increase in homicides and gang-related violent crimes. The security crisis has been triggered by the rise of gangs and criminal groups taking advantage of Ecuador's increasingly key role in the cocaine trafficking chain to Europe. Colombian, Mexican, Venezuelan, and Albanian drug trafficking networks compete to control Ecuador ports to exploit banana trade routes, of which the country is the world's largest exporter, to smuggle drugs, mainly to Europe. The Covid-19 pandemic has largely contributed to the deterioration of security in the country. The crisis and high unemployment rate facilitated recruitment by drug cartels and criminal organizations. Meanwhile, once fragmented and not very influential, local organized crime has gained much power through drug trafficking. In recent years, Ecuadorian gangs have undergone a process of sophistication and affiliation with foreign cartels and organized crime groups, becoming more structured and violent. The country records numerous prison gangs, which control most detention facilities from which they orchestrate criminal activities and forge relationships with international drug trafficking networks. The most prominent local gangs in Ecuador are Los Choneros and Los Lobos. The prison system in Ecuador is experiencing a major crisis burdened by a lack of state control, corruption, and overpopulation. Gangs control most of the prisons, and government-appointed wardens and guards are forced to pledge allegiance to the drug cartel leaders. New prisoners or prison officers bring in weapons and drugs, and the violence against other inmates has risen sharply since 2018. The spike in prison violence can be connected to President Correa's 2007-2017 administration's crime reduction initiatives based on the construction of mega-prisons, which led to the counterproductive effect of increasing the prison population and facilitating gang organization. Ecuador has recently undergone a violent election. In August 2023, presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio was murdered after he had been vocal about Los Choneros. His murder has been linked to the now escaped drug lord Macias. The six Colombians who were arrested in relation to the assassination have since been murdered in Ecuadorian prisons. In recent years, Ecuador's administrations have frequently resorted to declaring states of emergency to counter the spiraling out-of-control increase in violence in the country and deal with the rapidly deteriorating security and criminal landscape. However, President Noboa's declaration of armed conflict against gangs is an unprecedented event. Analysis: The situation in Ecuador is likely to escalate in the coming days as the military cracks down on organized crime in a counter-terrorism operation. However, the government may be unprepared to handle this sort of offensive. The significant mobilization of armed forces and expected clashes with criminal groups are likely to trigger even more violence and instability in the country, increasing the risk to the civilian population. Indeed, hard-line approaches to crime often have fueled the backlash of gangs rather than appeasing them. Moreover, President Noboa has not provided further details on the conduct of the internal armed conflict nor a strategy to de-escalate the operation. The risk is that should the conflict against the gangs protract longer than expected by the presidency, Ecuador's government and armed forces may lack the capacity and resources to endure and manage the spike in violence. Evidence in countries like Mexico and El Salvador proved that military crackdowns, although they might curb criminality in the short term, have led to more violence and corruption in the long run. Indeed, “mano dura" policies, based on zero tolerance against drug crimes, militarization, and mass incarceration of gangs and criminals, often proved counterproductive in the long run. Conservative policies foster human rights violations, impose restrictions on freedoms, grant forceful authority to the military, erode the rule of law, and reinforce the power of elites. Moreover, mass incarcerations lead to prison overcrowding and facilitate the reorganization and strengthening of criminal groups and gangs. The current strategy of "war on gangs" could, therefore, result in increased power on the part of criminal organizations. It is also possible that criminal gangs will try to gain more influence on national and regional politics, as demonstrated by the assassination of the presidential candidate who vowed to crack down on corruption and the influence of drug cartels in Ecuador. Following Noboa's declaration of internal armed conflict, Peru also declared a state of emergency along its shared border with Ecuador. Colombia, Brazil, Bolivia, Argentina, and Chile have expressed support for Ecuador’s administration and population. On  10/01/2024, the United States condemned the rising violence in Ecuador, while China closed its embassy and consulates in the country. Finally, Ecuador needs increased support and intervention from the international community to address the ongoing security crisis. Specifically, governments in the region, including Colombia and Peru, should coordinate counterinsurgency strategies against the transnational networks of these influential criminal organizations. Finally, should Noboa lose the war against the gangs, Ecuador could, in the worst-case scenario, also convert into a full-fledged narco-state, affecting not only the stability of the region but also altering the routes and patterns of drug trafficking globally. Conclusion: After the assassination of presidential candidate Villavicienco in August 2023, the newly elected president Noboa vowed to smash the drug cartels in Ecuador; however, given the influence and power of gangs, it is proving to be a challenging goal. The escape of Los Choners’ leader Macias from prison and the uncontrollable escalation of violence that has spread through the country demonstrated the actual magnitude of these organizations in Ecuador. Although the announcement of a new national emergency plan to eradicate drug cartels, there is a chance that Ecuador will devolve into a security crisis that can be compared to the ongoing situation in Mexico, where drug cartels are seemingly more powerful than the government. Moreover, Noboa's hard-line counterinsurgency strategy based on militarization and the deployment of extreme measures to curb gang-related violence could backfire and spawn even more instability and violence in the country. Indeed, in the long term, the widespread tendency for Latin American states to turn to mass incarcerations or violent crackdowns by the military could constitute a direct threat to human rights, the rule of law, and democratic institutions. At the moment, there is not enough information to predict the development of the security crisis in Ecuador. Yet, it is arguable that Ecuador cannot face the "war" against gangs without support from the international community. The rise of so-called narco-states and the spread of the "war on drugs" policies will be a major test of the ability of the international community to address the global challenge posed by transnational drug trafficking and drug-related violence without allowing a deterioration of democracies.

Date: 09/01/2024 Location: Taiwan Who’s involved: Taiwan (Republic of China), China, William Lai Ching-te (DPP), Hou Yu-ih (KMT), People’s Republic of China, United States. The Events: On 13/01/2024, Taiwan (Republic of China) will hold elections to elect a new legislature and a new president at a vital juncture in regional geopolitics. The current president Tsai Ing-Wen from the Democratic People’s Party (DPP) is stepping down due to the two term limit on presidential terms in the Republic of China’s constitution. Thus far, polls show that the election could be tightly contested, but the DPP candidate is expected to win albeit with a smaller majority. Political issues have revolved around the correct approach to maintaining cross-strait stability, though it is not the sole concern. The cost of living is a pressing issue on the island, as is the rapid rise in the cost of housing. Nevertheless, the PRC’s growing military and economic power pose existential problems for Taiwan and is an essential part of its political cleavages. The governing Democratic People’s Party (DPP) candidate is William Lai Ching-te, the current Vice President. He is broadly perceived as the ‘continuity’ candidate from president Tsai as well pushing for closer security ties with the US and its allies Japan, South Korea and the Philippines. The main opposition Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang (KMT), is fielding Hou Yu-ih, a former high-ranking police official who is generally in favor of closer ties with the PRC. The more incendiary claim is that he accuses the DPP of provoking cross-strait relations to the point of war with the PRC. There is a third candidate, Ko Wen-je, a member of the new Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), who is focusing on domestic governance issues. Under Xi Jinping, the hardline policies pushed by the PRC include further military exercises around the island, proliferation of disinformation campaigns, and refusing to renounce the use of force. The Chinese Communist Party minister for Taiwan said that this election is a choice between peace and war, clearly pointing to Beijing’s preferred candidate. Analysis: Predictions have suggested that William Lai (DPP) is likely to win given that he is ahead in the polls. However, there are a few days of campaigning left and he is likely to face challenges. No ruling party has won three elections consecutively in Taiwan since its first elections in 1996, and the cost of housing and living remain important sticking points for a continuity candidate. Taiwan’s presidential election is crucial for cross-Strait relations and the regional security situation in the Asia-Pacific. The return of the DPP’s William Lai to Taiwan’s presidency could see more military exercises from China over the coming weeks. It is also likely to raise tensions in the medium term given Xi Jinping’s hardline policies toward the island. William Lai is likely to seek more military support from the US, assurances on economic security and pursue regional partnerships with Japan and South Korea. Whether Taiwan’s military deterrence is sufficient is an open question, but William Lai will continue to push for an external relationship. If the KMT candidate is elected, there could be a short-term reduction in tensions given China’s preference for their party, but even the KMT has ruled out the ‘one country two systems’ model pushed by Beijing. Xi’s aggressive policies to reunify Taiwan with the mainland has prioritized hard military exercises and shows of force to intimidate Taiwan, reflecting the state of US-China relations and China’s domestic politics. China’s acute economic challenges and social tensions suggest that Beijing will maintain high pressure on the island, but will hopefully stop short of an invasion. Xi’s centralization of power in the military since 2015 and his chairmanship of the Central Military Commission demonstrates his accumulation of power in the PLA structure. The latest overhaul of the People Liberation Army’s leadership, including three senior officers and one new Central Committee member to replace dismissed Lin Shang, suggests that despite 12 years in power, Xi’s confidence in the PLA’s ability to fight and win wars is not complete. The US-China war scare between August 2022 and March 2023 is still acute. While most war games have focused on an amphibious invasion of Taiwan, Beijing could take a range of measures that require a response and up the pressure on Taipei’s allies. Blockades of the island, parts of the island, and other provocative actions short of invasion could raise the pressure immensely. There is at least a floor under the US-China relationship with the meeting of Biden and Xi in San Francisco in November 2023, but the longer term trajectory is one of intensifying competition across political, military, economic and security fields. With the US in an election year and Xi’s apparent grip on power in the Chinese Communist Party, this is expected to worsen in the coming years. Conclusion: Taiwan’s upcoming election holds significant implications for security of the Indo-Pacific. A victory from William Lai (DPP) or Hou Yu-ih (KMT) will shape cross-Strait tensions in short and long term, including Taiwan’s society and its delicate relations with an assertive China. While there is little indication of an imminent full-scale invasion of the island, Xi could up the pressure further. The US’ commitment to Taiwan’s security and sovereignty would be tested if the PLA conducted actions short of an invasion. The evolving dynamics in the Indo-Pacific and the crucial role of Taiwan requires attention.

Date: 08/01/2024 Where: Ukraine, Russia Who’s involved: Ukraine: BLACKJACK hacktivist group, SSU operators Russia: Solntsepyok hacktivist group, GRU “Sandworm” operators Kyivstar Telecommunications Rosvodokanal Water What happened: On 12/12/2023, a “hybrid” cyber-exchange between Ukraine and Russia significantly impacted critical infrastructure in both countries. The Russian hacktivist entity, Solntsepyok, allegedly assisted by GRU cyberwarfare unit, Sandworm, targeted Ukraine’s largest mobile communications provider, Kyivstar. Both sides utilized a “frontline” of civilian volunteers while having support from offensive intelligence services. Solntsepyok claimed responsibility through a 13/12/2023 post on the Telegram messaging app, accompanied by screenshots purporting to show their penetration into Kyivstar's servers. The attack cut off over 24 million Ukrainians’ internet access for several days. In some localities, this meant no banking access or payment card services. Ukraine’s SBU investigation found the hackers probably attempted to penetrate Kyivstar in March and had a way into the telecommunications provider’s network since at least May. Kyivstar's CEO, Oleksandr Komarov, said on 20/12/2023 that all the company's services had been fully restored throughout the country. During this time period, water utilities in parts of Russia started suffering from their own similar service outages. It was revealed on 20/12/2023, that a pro-Ukrainian threat actor BLACKJACK, with alleged help from agents of Ukraine’s Security Service, had attacked Rosvodokanal, the largest private water company in Russia providing water to over 7 million Russian citizens, in retaliation for the attack on Kyivstar. Analysis: This exchange is remarkable for both the impact of the cyber attack on critical infrastructure, and the tactics utilized. This is one of the most public uses of both civilian and military assets within a cyber operation. The method of the attack on Kyivstar was through a compromised employee account, a significant detail, as it indicates potential for either an insider threat or possible social engineering attempts. More details will need to be revealed. The swift response from BLACKJACK is indicative of both an incredibly skilled operation, and either intelligence or direct access provided by Ukrainian intelligence. Solntsepyok, while ostensibly a hacktivist organization working for Russian interests similar to groups like KillNet and Anonymous Sudan, has been tied to units of the Russian GRU before. Ukrainian authorities have accused the group of effectively being a deniability screen for Sandworm. BLACKJACK is a pro-Ukrainian threat actor that specializes in data theft and wiping. The attack against Rosvodokanal impacted over 6000 devices in a critical sector, and allegedly provided 1.5 terabytes of data to Ukrainian authorities for analysis. The attack by BLACKJACK on Rosvodokanal was particularly extensive, resulting in the erasure of over 50 terabytes of data. Conclusion: The involvement of both state-sponsored units like GRU's Sandworm and non-state hacktivist groups like Solntsepyok and BLACKJACK in these cyber exchanges highlights a blurring line between state and non-state actors in cyber warfare. The method of attack on Kyivstar through a compromised employee account underscores the critical need for robust insider threat management programs. Security professionals must focus not only on external threats but also on potential vulnerabilities from within their organizations, including rigorous employee vetting, continuous monitoring, and comprehensive security awareness training. The attacks on both Kyivstar and Rosvodokanal demonstrate that critical infrastructure sectors are prime targets in cyber warfare with the intention capability to cause significant disruptions to civilians. This calls for heightened security measures in such sectors, including regular security audits, adoption of robust cybersecurity frameworks, and emergency response planning.

Date: 03/01/2024 Location: Yemen Who’s involved: Houthi, Israel, Saudi Arabia, United States and Allies, Iran. What happened? On 07/10/2023, Palestinian terrorist organization, Hamas, attacked Israel and killed over 1200 people. In retaliation, Israel invaded Gaza in an attempt to eradicate Hamas. On 19/10/2023, the Yemen rebel group called the Ansar Allah, more commonly known as the Houthi, started a military campaign against Israel and Israeli interests. Missiles and drones were fired at Israel and merchant vessels were attacked and seized. The Houthi threatened to destroy Israel and its allies: the US and other Western countries. The Houthi movement originated in Yemen in 2003 as a radical Shia rebel group that advocated against the Sunni Yemen government. The Houthi copied the infrastructure of the Shia Lebanese terrorist organization, Hezbollah. When in 2004 the Yemen government killed the leader and founder of the Houthi movement, Hussein Al-Houthi, a full-scale Houthi insurgency erupted against the government. A tense ceasefire was announced in 2010, but the Houthi joined the broader Yemen Revolution against the government in 2011. The Yemen government received military and financial support from Saudi-Arabia and the UAE, while the Houthi received similar support from Iran. Military clashes across the country were followed by a one-sided presidential election and failed government reforms. The conflict turned into a full-scale civil war in 2014. The civil war became a regional conflict when Saudi-Arabia and the UAE sent troops and aircraft to Yemen in support of the government. Iran in the meantime supported the Houthi with weapons and advice. In March 2023, Iran officially retracted its support for the Houthi movement and made a peace-deal with Saudi-Arabia. This did not end the civil war but significantly cooled down the situation. The Houthi control 80% of the country and the two warring sides are in constant talks that so far are leading nowhere. In December 2023 the US and its allies formed a naval deterrence force to deal with the Houthi threat. There have been several incidents in the Red Sea between the US Navy and the Houthi. Missiles, rockets, and drones have been fired at Israel and merchant ships, with all having been intercepted by the US and Israel. Analysis: The Houthi rebel movement plays an important role in the Israel-Gaza conflict even though the movement is still struggling with domestic problems, as the civil war in Yemen is far from over. It is likely that the Houthi received a pressing request, if not order, from Iran to join the so-called "Axis of Resistance" against Israel in support of Hamas and Hezbollah. The Houthi are still in debt to Iran and their military strength and tactical intelligence gathering largely depends on what they receive from Iran. The Houthi attacks on merchant vessels have involved the US and its allies in the Red Sea in such a way that they cannot deploy all their assets in support of Israel. And by making the Red Sea a dangerous shipping route, there is pressure coming from the West on Israel to make a ceasefire deal with Hamas in hope that this will entice the Houthi to stop their attacks. This strategy is likely devised by Iran and not by the Houthi themselves. The US and allied naval deployment is likely to have some effect on Houthi activities but will not fully stop them from being able to threaten Red Sea shipping routes. This will affect the world economy because it will slow down delivery times for products coming and going from Asia to Europe, especially if the Suez Canal is avoided and ships must sail around South-Africa. It is likely that the Houthi will continue to harass ships and Israel by launching missiles and drones as long as they have the capability to do so. International military responses to the Houthi threat are likely to involve destroying Houthi assets on the ground in Yemen with aerial bombardments. The radical Islamic ideas of the Houthi movement seem to be of less importance at this time, considering that the group is mainly used as a proxy for Iran to fight its war against Israel. This is keeping the Houthi from fully taking over Yemen and spreading their ideology across the Gulf region. Inviting the US and its allies to start a military campaign against them will likely turn out to be detrimental to the Houthi. If Houthi infrastructure is attacked and its military capabilities are largely neutralized there is a chance that the Yemen government can recover some of its lost territory. Summary: The Houthi will continue to harass Israel and merchant ships in the Red Sea by launching missiles and drones for as long as they have the capability to do so. It is likely that the Houthi are being used as a proxy by Iran against Israel, especially given that they are largely dependent on Iranian military and intelligence support. However, the US and allied naval deployment is likely to have a negative impact on Houthi activities. Considering the crisis created by the Houthi in the Red Sea, the West is likely to increase pressure on Israel to settle a ceasefire deal with Hamas in order to secure global economic interests.

Date: 05/01/2024 Where: Argentina Who’s involved:  Newly elected President of Argentina Javier Milei, Argentinian Congress Security Minister Patricia Bullrich, Argentinian civil society, workers unions and activists What happened? On 20/12/2023, Argentina’s new President Javier Milei, who officially took office only in December 2023 after being elected on 19/11/2023, issued a 366-article Decree of “Necessity and Urgency” (DNU) to radically deregulate Argentina’s economy. He claims that this will boost the country’s exports,  investment, and international trade. The DNU technically took effect on 28/12/2023. However, the measures are currently under review by the Argentinian Congress. The revision, which started on 26/12/2023, will last until the end of January 2024. The DNU must be approved by at least one of the two chambers to remain in force. The DNU is the first step of the "shock therapy" to revive the Argentine economy promised by Milei in his electoral campaign. The DNU proposes lowering income tax for high earners, eliminating dozens of state regulations, devaluing the national currency - already devalued by 50 percent since Milei took office - to open the door to the dollarization, and the privatization of several state-owned companies, including Aerolíneas Argentinas, the oil company YFP, and the country's largest bank, Banco de la Nación. Moreover, the decree announces the establishment of a "state of public emergency in economic, financial, fiscal, pension, defense, tariff, energy, health, administrative and social matters until December 31, 2025." President Milei’s DNU provides about $20 million in cuts to public expenses and services, like education, transport, and healthcare. It also abolishes fixed prices for essential goods and the price ceilings of the Tenancy Law, which are expected to severely affect the lower-income working class. A key section of the DNU is dedicated to regressive labor reforms which would result in substantial restrictions on workers' protections, benefits, and rights. Also, the decree provides for a ban on the right to strike in the sectors of "essential services," including health care, education, banking, energy, transportation, exports, industries, and hospitality. The decree also reinforces the new anti-protest protocol issued by Security Minister Patricia Bullrich, which authorizes security forces to shut down protests that block the streets and increases detention penalties for protesters. Additionally, Milei threatened to reduce the social benefits for anyone who violated the new anti-protest measures. From 22/12/2023, thousands took to the streets of Buenos Aires and major cities to demonstrate against the DNU, perceived to be unconstitutional and undemocratic.  The General Confederation of Workers (CGT) has announced that protests will continue until the repeal of the decree and has called a general strike for 24/01/2023. The DNU is spawning strong opposition nationwide, so much so that even more moderate members of Milei's coalition have expressed concerns about the mega-decree. Analysis: Decrees of necessity and urgency (DNUs) are exceptional mechanisms under the Argentine Constitution that allow the executive to enact or amend laws in a situation of emergency, without prior debate by Congress. Milei declared that the economic crisis and inflation in Argentina justify using the measure. In deference, the opposition objected that the DNU does not meet the requirements of the Constitution. The DNU is currently in force, but to remain in law, it needs to pass several legislative hurdles. The DNU must first be evaluated by a permanent bilateral committee of Parliament to assess the requirements of "necessity and urgency." Next, the DNU will be examined in the Chamber of Deputies and Senate plenary sessions. However, the two chambers of Parliament can only reject or accept the DNU but cannot amend or modify it. The DNU will finally enter into force if only one of the chambers approves it by an absolute majority. Given Milei's party's lack of a majority in the chambers -40 out of 257 seats in the Chamber and 7 out of 72 votes in the Senate - it is likely that the decision will be postponed until 01/03/2024, which will guarantee sufficient time to create a majority consensus. Milei’s DNU 70/2023 represents an unprecedented use of executive power by Argentine administrations, as there has never been a decree of this kind containing as many measures. Also, the DNU presents several critical and controversial aspects. First, if approved, this DNU declares the extension of the two-year emergency period, implying that the Milei government could introduce extraordinary measures, holding both legislative and executive power until the end of 2025, bypassing the legislature even on issues usually entrusted to Congress. This would jeopardize the rule of law and the functioning of Argentina's democracy. The DNU includes substantial restrictions on the civil rights of minorities and workers. Particular attention should be paid to the heavy restrictions on the right to strike and the new repressive capabilities envisioned by the state apparatus. In addition, the DNU includes restrictions on forming and operating social organizations, thus altering the social democratic framework and affecting the Argentine population's freedom of expression,  participation, and opposition. Not surprisingly, the DNU measures, which directly impact the working class, are fomenting fervent protests. Despite the deterrent of the new anti-protest laws, it is very likely that the resistance from the opposition will persist at least until Congress decides on the validity of the decree. The core of Miles's DNU is the deregulation of trade, industries, and services to revitalize Argentina's economy, based on the dubious idea of the creation of a system of free competition that allows and values private free decision and the initiative of individuals. Currently, Argentina's economy is experiencing a deep crisis, with inflation exceeding 160% and 40% of the population living in a condition of poverty. Whatever the economic effect in the long-term, the implications of this measure will likely be destructive for the Argentinian people, especially for the working class. Not only could deregulation create greater disarray instead of boosting the country's economy, but the drastic cuts in government subsidies and services could push more of the population into poverty. Conclusion: Milei's DNU appears to be the first step in Latin America’s most radical economic reform in recent decades. The outcome of such radical reforms is likely to cause major disruptions to Argentine politics and society. Despite the tightening of anti-protest laws, the decree will likely continue to foment strong opposition and resistance from Argentinian civil society organizations. The protesters consider the decree unconstitutional and directed at demolishing the democratic foundations of the Argentine state, and is likely to cause considerable unrest in the coming weeks.