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Report date:  01/10/2025 What happened?  On 15/08/2025, Mali’s junta announced it had detained a French national accused of spying for the French intelligence services. Colonel Assimi Goïta's government claimed “foreign states” were supporting a plot to destabilise Mali’s institutions, allegedly involving a small group within the Malian armed forces.  France rejected the charges as baseless and demanded the immediate release of its staff member, stressing he was a duly accredited diplomat. On 14/09/2025 , five French diplomats were declared persona non grata   by the Malian junta and left the country. This incident was a direct result of the aforementioned diplomatic clash between the two governments. In a corresponding move, the French ordered two Malian diplomats to leave the country on 19/09/2025  and suspended all bilateral counter-terrorism operations with Bamako. The suspension of intelligence sharing between Paris and Bamako can carry serious consequences for the nation that is fighting security threats on multiple fronts. That said, this incident follows a pattern of steady deterioration of relations between the two countries. Historical context The latest rift between Bamako and Paris can only be understood when put in the proper historical context. The deterioration of French-Malian relations follows a steady pattern since its peak in 2013, when French President François Hollande visited French troops stationed  in the country and was met by cheering crowds in downtown Bamako. That year, the French military launched Operation Serval to fight back an alliance of jihadist and Tuareg nationalist rebels who threatened to overrun the Malian capital, deploying not only troops but also intelligence officers. France’s DGSE (foreign intelligence) and DRM (military intelligence) worked closely with local forces, using drones and surveillance aircraft from local airbases, and deploying SIGINT (intelligence-gathering discipline that involves intercepting and analyzing electronic signals and communications) capabilities to support counterterrorism operations under Operation Barkhane. Despite initial successes, the collaboration with the French also had its downsides. While not always publicized, local accusations of espionage occasionally surfaced, with mostly Mali and Burkina Faso claiming Western agents operated beyond agreed frameworks. In August 2020 Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta was overthrown by Colonel Assimi Goïta in a coup that came in the wake of mass protests against corruption, poor governance, and insecurity in northern Mali. In May 2021, Goïta staged a second coup, removing transitional president Bah N’Daw, thus consolidating power under the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP). After the military junta expelled French forces and welcomed Russian military contractors, pro-government media accused French soldiers of “espionage” and even staging massacres (notably around Gossi, 2022, when France released drone footage to counter Malian claims). Not just in Mali: similar accusations were made against French diplomats and NGOs in Burkina Faso in 2023 and 2024, alleging interference and intelligence gathering. Some French and European staff were expelled under that pretext. After the coup that overthrew President Bazoum in 2023, Niger’s junta accused France of clandestine operations and claimed to have dismantled a French spy network. Paris denied this. As the accusations of espionage against Paris piled up and the French troops gradually left Africa, ending France’s centuries-long presence in Central and West-Africa, the Russians gradually filled the gap the French left behind. Since 2021, the Russian PMCs Wagner Group  and Afrika Corps  have been active in Mali and, to a lesser extent, Burkina Faso. The Russian paramilitaries have been accused of running counter-espionage operations, monitoring NGOs and suspected Western operatives. Multiple reports in 2023 and 2024 indicate that Russian advisers have encouraged Sahelian military governments to crack down on Western intelligence networks, thereby shifting regional intelligence dynamics in favor of Russian-aligned operations. Analysis  The suspension of intelligence sharing between Paris and Bamako marks a significant rupture in Mali’s ability to track and respond to jihadist threats. For years, France supplied SIGINT, satellite imagery, and drone surveillance that Malian forces could never have obtained on their own. In return, Mali contributed valuable on-the-ground insights, drawing its own military networks. With this exchange now cut off, both sides are left weaker. Mali faces a dangerous intelligence gap against jihadist groups active in its territory, while France loses situational awareness that Malian forces could once provide from the ground. The breakdown of cooperation extends beyond intelligence. Although Operation Barkhane formally ended, France continued to support Malian forces through logistics, staff-level training, and joint planning. This coordination provided a degree of cohesion in the fight against Al-Qaeda–linked  Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin  (JNIM) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). Without it, the Malian army must rely almost entirely on its own overstretched capabilities and on Russian support, particularly from Wagner’s successor formations such as the Africa Corps. This shift risks producing more fragmented and less effective military operations. France, meanwhile, maintains partnerships with Niger and Chad, but Mali is in danger of becoming a blind spot within the regional counterterrorism architecture. The timing is particularly perilous. Jihadist groups are expanding their reach in central and northern Mali and may seize the opportunity created by the diplomatic rift. Civilians, aid workers, and local officials already face severe risks, and the absence of coordinated counterterrorism efforts could embolden militants to push closer to Bamako. The weakening of Mali’s defenses also threatens to spill across borders, with neighboring states such as Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, and Ghana potentially exposed to an intensification of cross-border raids and insurgent expansion. Beyond the security consequences, the diplomatic fallout signals a deeper geopolitical realignment. By severing ties with France, Mali is doubling down on its strategic turn toward Russia. Moscow provides weapons, training, and paramilitary forces, but this support emphasizes raw military power over intelligence-driven operations. The result is a counterterrorism posture that risks becoming more militarized, less integrated with regional and Western partners, and increasingly isolated from international donors such as ECOWAS and the African Union. The espionage dispute has thus accelerated Mali’s drift into a new security orbit—one in which Russian influence rises while traditional Western alliances erode. Conclusion In sum, the latest espionage dispute is less an isolated incident than the culmination of a long decline in Franco-Malian relations since their 2013 peak. The rupture in intelligence cooperation leaves Mali exposed to jihadist threats, which only seem to increase, and pushes Bamako further into Moscow’s orbit. A more fragile and militarized security situation is what remains, one that risks isolating and destabilizing Mali diplomatically and weakening regional counterterrorism efforts at a moment when the threat environment is worsening across the Sahel.

Report date:   01/10/2025  Where: EU, Mediterranean and Middle Eastern airspace Who is involved: US military, US government, NATO militaries, Turkey Locations of military exercises involving the United States in September 2025 (yellow circles) What is happening?  Unverified online reports and posts on social media have claimed that the United States is preparing airstrikes on Iran, citing screenshots and data from flight tracking platforms. However, a thorough review shows no evidence of planned large-scale military operations against Iran.  Information on US military cargo flights over European, Mediterranean and Middle Eastern airspace suggests there has been little change in numbers between the last two weeks of September and August, with around 109 flights in September compared with 97 in August. The slight increase in cargo flights appears linked to several military exercises in Europe, including the week-long Decisive North 25 in Belgium, a large multinational NATO-related exercise in Germany and the Neptune Strike exercises in the Adriatic Sea, as well as two additional exercises, all of which involved US forces.  No significant rhetoric from either Iran or the United States during September has indicated an increased likelihood of confrontation, suggesting that tensions have remained unchanged from previous months. In the 13 days leading up to the US airstrikes on Iran on 22 June, at least 160 US military transport aircraft were identified flying through European, Mediterranean and Middle Eastern airspace. This compares with 109 flights recorded in the final 13 days of September, and 97 in the final 13 days of August, suggesting a significantly lower movement of assets compared to June.  Analysis The higher number of US military flights in September is consistent with scheduled exercises and routine rotations rather than preparation for operations against Iran. While open source data indicates about 565 US military flights in September compared with about 450 in August and 412 in July, 109 cargo movements were logged in the final 13 days of September versus 97 in the same August window, while the 13 days before the 22 June strikes on Iran saw at least 160 transports, through to be transporting air-defence assets (e.g. Patriot batteries) and other armament types to support the airstrikes. Additionally, September saw five military exercises in Europe compared to only two major ones in August. Taken together the pattern points to support and recovery of exercise forces rather than a pre-strike surge. Source: ADS-B Exchange, 20 June 2025, 11:32 hours UTC  The exercise schedule provides the operational context for this traffic and explains the additional lift and tanker tasking observed. US military exercises in Europe during September included the following: Neptune Strike 2025 : Large-scale multilateral exercises were held in the Adriatic Sea between 22 and 26 September, involving more than 10,000 personnel from the naval, air and land forces of 13 countries. The exercise featured the USS Gerald R. Ford and the command-and-control ship USS Mount Whitney, alongside vessels from Turkey, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Poland, Italy and others. Assets included amphibious assault ships, submarines, frigates and reconnaissance aircraft, with the focus on combined operations across multiple domains. Decisive North 25: Smaller in scale than the other two military exercises, this drill was held at Kleine-Brogel Air Base in Belgium with the participation of the US 701st Munitions Support Squadron and the Belgian Air Force’s 10th Tactical Wing. It was designed to prepare aircrews for high-stakes scenarios and included handling unexploded ordnance as well as rapid-response exercises for specific situations. Saber Junction 25 : A NATO-related exercise in Germany ran from 14 August to 21 September, bringing together more than 7,000 participants and around 1,000 vehicles from 15 countries, including the United States. The exercises involved infantry and other ground forces and required extensive supply and transport routes both within Europe and across the Atlantic from the United States. Quadriga 2025 : Germany led multinational naval exercises in the Baltic Sea from 29 August to 12 September, focusing on countering threats from the air, sea and land and on improving coordination between forces. The United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and other allies also took part. MASCAL 2025 : Chaplain and religious affairs teams from the United States military based in Italy, Germany and Belgium carried out exercises at Ramstein Air Base in Germany, practising mass casualty scenarios. Between 15 and 19 September, around 120 US Army and Air Force chaplains took part alongside 45 counterparts from other NATO members. Additional training was also conducted at the nearby Sembach Kaserne military base. Tanker activity supports the same interpretation. Coronet transits present as grouped KC-135 and KC-46 sorties escorting fighter elements across the Atlantic into established hubs for exercise participation and rotations. There is no sustained rise in tanker loitering near contested airspace, no unusual forward dispersal of fighters identified and no change in activity such as persistent AWACS coverage or electronic warfare platforms. Routing and timing appear to follow routine tracks and established airspace arrangements. A modest increase in tankers and reconnaissance platforms may also reflect ongoing support to NATO allies along the Baltic region and in Poland, including air policing, deterrence patrols and reinforcement exercises. A  Lakenheath-based US F-15 Eagle flying near Mildenhall-based KC-135 tankers engaged in regular air-to-air refuelling exercises over the UK on 28 September Source: ADS-B Exchange, 25 September 2025, 11:28 hours UTC  Daily number of US military flights in the Mediterranean, UK, EU and Middle Eastern airspace between May and September 2025 A review of cargo mix and routing is consistent with deployment and redeployment cycles. Movements concentrate on Ramstein, Moron, Rota, Aviano, Lakenheath, Spangdahlem, Sigonella and Souda Bay with return flights that match exercise schedules. Loads align with personnel rotation, spares, munitions resupply and exercise support rather than forward staging for combat. There is no parallel surge of specialist enablers such as Rivet Joint, stand off strike fleets or a bomber task force and no unusual basing activity that would indicate an impending operation. Additionally, only one Carrier Strike Group, the USS Nimitz  is currently operating in Middle Eastern waters, compared to at least two during the June confrontation leading up to the US airstrikes on Iran.  US military cargo flights towards the Middle East on 20 June 2025 during the height of the Israel-Iran confrontation Source: ADS-B Exchange, 20 June 2025, 11:32 hours UTC  Looking ahead A United States confrontation with Iran cannot be ruled out, but current indicators point away from an imminent move. September saw no material escalation in public rhetoric from Washington or Tehran and US strategic attention remains focused on Ukraine and developments around Venezuela. The air picture is best explained by support to scheduled training and routine posture management in Europe. An increase in cargo sorties on its own does not imply preparations for operations. Historic build ups feature a marked rise in tankers and fighters, the forward movement of specialised enablers and munitions, visible command and control activity and political signalling that frames intent. Those elements are not present. The prudent assessment is that current US air movements reflect the support and return of assets for planned exercises and readiness cycles rather than the opening phase of a new operation. Dyami Services Security is not a luxury but a necessity. With Dyami Security Intelligence as a Service, you gain a proactive, flexible, and affordable solution to manage risks, monitor geopolitical threats, and respond immediately to crises. Why subscribe to security? ✅ Resilient business operations in today’s world✅ We act as your security department and Geopolitical Risk Officer✅ Direct access to security expertise without high costs✅ Prevent crises with up-to-date threat intelligence✅ Scalable subscription plans✅ Access to our unique global network Want to know how this protects your organization? Request a free consultation! Subscription options Dyami Security as a Service: a flexible security subscription that keeps your organization protected at all times—without the need for costly internal capacity.

October 02, 2025 – New York – MD ONBOARD , a global leader in remote aviation medical advisory and health risk management, and Dyami , a renowned specialist in aviation security intelligence and training, are proud to announce a new strategic partnership. Together, the companies will provide the aviation industry with a comprehensive, end-to-end health and security ecosystem that raises the standard of care, preparedness, and resilience across commercial and business aviation. This collaboration unites MD ONBOARD’s aviation-trained emergency medical expertise and risk advisory services with Dyami’s world-class aviation security intelligence, AVIATION SECURITY training, and risk consultancy. The result is an unparalleled offering that addresses the intertwined health and security challenges facing airlines, airports, and business aviation operators worldwide. “At MD ONBOARD, we know that safety in aviation extends far beyond the aircraft cabin—it is about protecting crew, passengers, and operations at every stage,” said Wehda El Aridi Chief Growth Officer of MD ONBOARD. “By joining forces with Dyami, we are bringing airlines and business aviation stakeholders a unified solution that combines world-leading medical advisory with cutting-edge security intelligence and training.” Through this partnership, aviation stakeholders will benefit from: ● 24/7 Remote Aviation Medical Advisory Services – real-time inflight medical guidance, pre-flight clearances, and crew health management. ● Risk Intelligence, Overflight & Destination Assessments – tailored overflight and destination risk assessments. These assessments are grounded in our continuous monitoring and analysis of human-based intelligence, and other trusted sources. ● Aviation Security Awareness Training – equipping managers and operators with regulatory knowledge, risk awareness, and geopolitical leadership skills. ● Disaster Preparedness & Simulation Exercises – integrated medical and security scenarios designed to strengthen response and resilience. ● Medical & Security Infrastructure Support – from WHO-compliant medical kits and infection control protocols to scalable security programs for major events and global operations. “The aviation sector is navigating an era of unprecedented complexity, where medical, operational, and security risks are increasingly interlinked,” said Eric Schouten , CEO of Dyami. “Our partnership with MD ONBOARD ensures that airlines and business aviation operators have access to holistic, PEOPLE-CENTRIC and intelligence-driven solutions that safeguard both people and operations and enable business.” The partnership arrives at a pivotal moment for the aviation industry, as global carriers, business aviation providers, and event organizers seek to strengthen resilience against health crises, evolving security threats, and operational disruptions. Together, MD ONBOARD and Dyami will deliver solutions that are innovative, scalable , and aligned with international best practices, ensuring that aviation stakeholders are better equipped to protect passengers, empower crews, and enhance operational confidence. About MD ONBOARD MD ONBOARD is a leader in aviation medical solutions, dedicated to enhancing inflight safety and healthcare for both commercial and business aviation worldwide. Specializing in remote medical support, first aid training, and regulatory compliance, MD ONBOARD provides aviation-specific medical guidance and comprehensive training to equip crew members with the information needed to manage inflight medical emergencies. With a commitment to quality and innovation, MD ONBOARD partners with airlines, aviation organizations and industry partners to improve passenger safety and crew readiness globally. MD ONBOARD is a fully owned subsidiary of Northwell Health. For more information, visit www.mdonboard.com, and follow us on LinkedIn. About Dyami Dyami is an internationally recognized security intelligence and aviation risk management company. With expertise in people-centric aviation risk intelligence solutions, analysis and forward looking reporting, including risk consultancy, Dyami empowers aviation stakeholders to anticipate threats, improve resilience, and meet international security standards. This forward-looking intelligence ensures that clients are not only aware of risks but also prepared to act on them - turning uncertainty into informed decisions. Dyami Academy delivers practical, scenario-driven training programs that instil a “security mindset” across industries. For more information, visit www.dyami.services, and follow us on LinkedIn. Media Contact: Sandy Dell sandy.dell@mdonboard.com

Areas of reported drone sightings in Denmark between 22 and 24  September 2025.  Report date:   26/09/2025  Where:  Denmark, Jutland peninsula.  Who is involved: Airport authorities, Danish National Police, unknown drone operator(s), Danish government.  What happened?  Between 22 and 23 September over 30 flights  to Copenhagen Airport were delayed or diverted to Billund and Aarhus in Denmark as well as Malmo and Gothenburg in Sweden due to two to three large drones spotted flying in the airfield vicinity during nocturnal hours. Starting 21:44 hours local time on 24/09/2025 , drone sightings were reported in the vicinity of Aalborg Airport,  used for both commercial and military flights, resulting in the diversion of at least two flights to Copenhagen and one to Karup. North Jutland police reported the final drone sighting at 00:54 . On 25/09/2025 at 04:21 hours local time , reports indicated drone activity in the vicinity of Billund Airport , prompting authorities to close the airspace for one hour as a precautionary measure, although local authorities were unable to confirm any sightings at the time of writing  Unconfirmed drone sightings were also reported at multiple critical locations in Southern Jutland, including Sønderborg Airport , as well as Esbjerg, Holstebro (noted for critical military infrastructure), and Danish airforce base Skrydstrup.   Authorities chose not to neutralise the drones to avoid collateral damage such as injuring passengers or damaging fuel depots or aircraft.  On 26/09/2025 , Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen announced that Denmark faced sustained hybrid threats that have shown vulnerabilities enabling better counter hybrid attacks, raising alert levels and preparing for different scenarios, including a mandate to shoot down enemy drones in the future.  No perpetrator, drone-type, origin or destination have been definitively identified by Danish authorities for any of the incidents.  Areas of reported drone sightings in Denmark between 23 and 24 September 2025 Flights diverted and in holding patterns as Copenhagen airport halted operations due to drones in the vicinity on 22/09/2025 Source: FlightRadar24 (accessed 24/09/2025) Analysis In the past couple of weeks, there has been a notable increase in airspace-violating related incidents reported in eastern Europe and Denmark. The recent reports indicate drone flights in Aalborg, Billund and Southern Jutland, all operating with visible indicator lights, similar to the incidents reported in Copenhagen  earlier in the week, suggest that the perpetrator seeks to disrupt, sow public turmoil and show capability rather than attacking assets.  In the broader European context, similar incidents possibly indicate the beginning of a trend: airport drone disruptions offer organized actors high impact at relatively low cost , undermining public confidence and straining security resources. While some observers have raised questions about potential external involvement, official investigations have not yet attributed the sightings to any particular actor or country. These developments illustrate the growing complexity of the regional security environment, especially in the aviation and critical infrastructure sectors, and the heightened vigilance required by Denmark and Europe. In this context, Denmark also recently announced two military commitments. On 14 September, Denmark approved a temporary law that will allow the country to host Ukraine’s missile fuel production near the F-35 base in Skrydstrup. While on 18 September, Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen announced the decision to acquire European-made long-range precision weapons. This signalled a significant shift in national security policy, showing the government’s anticipation of regional instability and the need for enhanced defence capabilities. Recent disruptions may be deliberate attempts to test defence capacity and response, similar to the events in Poland and Estonia.   In a statement given on 26 September, following the recent events, Frederiksen emphasized that Denmark has been subjected to hybrid attacks in recent days and that drones have been seen near several critical infrastructure both military and civilian considering it as a new reality for Europe and Denmark. This marks a shift from ad‑hoc crisis handling to a proactive attitude towards threats posed by drones and aviation disruptions. Expect tighter rules of engagement around airports/bases, with authorities raising alert levels and preparing for multiple scenarios and obtaining a mandate to shoot down enemy drones.  Looking ahead European governments and airport operators are expected to implement faster response protocols to drone sightings and invest in advanced detection systems integrated with clear handover procedures for police and military authorities. Pressure is likely to increase for tighter regulation, including mandatory registration, expanded geofencing and defined legal authority to neutralise drones where this can be done without endangering passengers or infrastructure, especially after the mandate to shoot down enemy drones announced by PM Frederiksen. Airlines may be required to refine diversion strategies and passenger management processes to mitigate operational disruption. At the strategic level, a continuation of drone incidents combined with uncertainty over US security commitments may drive EU and NATO members to seek greater American support to accelerate their own security measures airspace protection, which is increasingly perceived as vulnerable. Incidents involving drones causing flight disruptions are expected to continue in the upcoming weeks given recent patterns, requiring stakeholders in the aviation field to make contingency plans and expect situational changes on short notice.

Date:   23/09/2025 What happened?  On 22/09/2025 , NATO allies convened to discuss a significant incident involving the violation of Estonian airspace by Russian military jets . Estonia had invoked Article 4 of the NATO treaty. Article 4 was invoked earlier this month as well. On 10/09/2025, Poland’s government also invoked the article after several drones violated its airspace and had to be shot down by NATO fighter jets.  Article 4 of the NATO treaty  allows member states to consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, their territorial integrity, political independence, or security is threatened. This marked the first time since the war in Ukraine began that Article 4 was activated in response to a direct military incursion by Russia into a NATO member's airspace. During the summit, NATO allies expressed strong concern  over the incident, emphasizing the potential risks of escalation  and the importance of maintaining the alliance's collective defense posture .  While the summit did not result in immediate public declarations or actions, the consultations reaffirmed NATO's consensus-based decision-making process and its readiness to address emerging threats collectively. The alliance's response to this incident is expected to influence its future strategic posture and defense planning, particularly concerning the protection of its eastern borders. In a UN emergency meeting on 22/09/2025 , European allies also warned that they would shoot down Russian jets or drones involved in any further violations of NATO airspace.  Regardless of the outcome, the risk for aviation is trending upwards. While the immediate risk of full-scale war remains low , we caution that continued violations could lead to unintended escalation. Analysis Current analysis is divided on whether the Estonian airspace violation was a deliberate provocation or a miscalculation . The incident's timing, following similar breaches in Poland and Romania , suggests a pattern that could be aimed at probing NATO's defenses and unity. “This event, following on the heels of the Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace, creates the impression that Russia either wants to escalate and pull more countries into this conflict with Ukraine, or doesn’t have full control of those who operate its fighter planes and drones,” US Ambassador to the United Nations Waltz said. NATO's swift and unified response, including the invocation of Article 4 and condemnation of the violation, underscores the alliance's commitment to collective defense . This collective stance is seen as a deterrent against further provocations  and a signal to Russia of NATO's readiness to defend its members. This willingness to escalate when confronted with these events could also be perceived as a weak point by an adversary that is merely probing for capabilities and response patterns . While the immediate risk of full-scale war remains low , we caution that continued violations could lead to unintended escalation. Repeated breaches may erode the threshold for military engagement  and increase the likelihood of miscalculations leading to broader conflict . “Our commitment to Article 5 is ironclad” is what was stated by NATO in a climate where Polish prime minister Donald Tusk, working with a Defense budget nearing 5% of its GDP, claims all flying objects in violation of Polish airspace will be shot. The incident has prompted NATO to reassess its defense posture , particularly in the Baltic region . Strengthening air patrols and enhancing rapid response capabilities are among the measures being considered to bolster deterrence and ensure swift action in case of future violations. On 12 September, NATO launched “Eastern Sentry” to bolster its posture along the entire Eastern flank. Aside from military considerations, these violations have serious consequences for civil and business aviation in central and eastern Europe. Airlines operating in this region face heightened risks due to increased military activity, increased GNSS interference, and potential unpredictable air defense responses. The result of this will be higher operating costs for airlines and growing pressure in European regulators to adapt to an increasingly volatile security environment.  Conclusion The violation of Estonian airspace serves as a critical juncture in NATO-Russia relations. While the immediate threat of escalation is contained, the situation remains fluid. Ongoing diplomatic efforts and military preparedness will be essential in managing tensions and preventing further provocations. From a security perspective, it remains crucial to keep a close eye on current developments that could trigger further escalation towards Article 5 scenarios. Article 5 in the NATO Charter states that an armed attack against one or more NATO members is considered an attack against all members. Future events will play out between the two, namely Article 4 and Article 5. Regardless of the outcome, the risk for aviation is trending upwards with risks including but not limited to heightened military activity, increased GNSS interference and potential unpredictable air defense responses. Historical incidents, like the MH17 shootdown over Ukraine, show this is a real danger.

Date:   23/09/2025 What happened?  On 22/09/2025 , a treason trial began against the Vice President of South Sudan, Riek Machar. Machar is charged with murder, treason and crimes against humanity in relation to an attack by a militia earlier this year. Alongside him, seven others are also charged, including petroleum minister Puot Kang Chol. The trial, however, is crucial for the future of South Sudan. The latest break between Machar and the South Sudanese President Salva Kiir is not just interpersonal friction but represents an interethnic clash too, as both men belong to different ethnic groups. Kiir, the president, is a Dinka (around 35.8% of the country), while Machar belongs to the Nuer people (+-15.6%). Puot Kang Chol also belongs to the Nuer group. Shortly after independence in 2011, South Sudan got engulfed in a devastating civil war which spanned from 2013 to 2020 and was largely the result of unresolved ethnic tensions. South Sudan is home to 60 different ethnic groups. The civil war ended in 2020 and the peace agreement encompassed a power-sharing agreement in which the most dominant ethnic groups (Dinka and Nuer) would both occupy important state positions to maintain balance. The composition between Dinka Kiir and Nuer Machar was a result of that agreement. While good in theory, the power-sharing relationship always remained fragile, partially also due to personal differences between the two most important political figures in the world’s youngest nation.  Aside from this week’s trial, tensions were already mounting for months. In March, of 2025 heavy fighting took place between the White Army, an ethnically Nuer militia, and the South Sudanese army (SSPDF). A UN helicopter was shot down and dozens were killed on both sides.  As a response to the Nasir clashes, the SSPDF increased their pressure on the White Army, with significant collateral damage. On 18/03/2025 , an army airstrike killed 21 civilians in the same town where earlier clashes took place, Nasir. Around 26/03/2025 , it was reported that Vice President Riek Machar was put under house arrest, adding significantly to pre-existing tensions in the country.  On 27/03/2025 , the SPLM-IO, Riek Machar’s political party, stated that his arrest cancelled the pre-existing peace deal.  Several months of the uneasy status quo followed, until renewed tensions in September. On 02/09/2025 , renewed fighting in South Sudan led to 14 killed, also in the Nasir area.  On 11/09/2025 , in an escalating turn of events, Riek Machar was charged with murder, treason and crimes against humanity for his alleged involvement in the fighting in Nasir earlier in March.  Slowly, the fragile power sharing in South Sudan appeared to break down. On 12/09/2025 , the SLPM-IO publicly stated that the government is trying to enforce ‘one tribe rule’. Not long after, on 17/09/2025 , the same party called for regime change.  Analysis The trial of Vice President Riek Machar of South Sudan is much more than just a legal proceeding: it is a turning point in South Sudan’s post-civil war fragile political experiment. By putting Machar, the most influential Nuer political figure in the country, on trial for crimes against humanity, Kiir’s government is effectively dismantling the power-sharing structure that has held South Sudan together since 2020, designed to balance power among South Sudan’s patchwork of ethnic groups. The fact that Petroleum Minister Puot Kang Chol is also on trial signifies that it is not just about Machar - it appears to be a wider effort to sideline the Nuer in South Sudan’s political structure.  The consequences are already visible. The SPLM-IO, Riek Machar’s political party, a predominantly Nuer political party and important player in South Sudanese politics has already called for a regime change, which means that in essence, the power-sharing agreement has failed. Looking forward, the situation in South Sudan warrants close monitoring as violence could re-escalate at a moment’s notice. If Machar is convicted, the likelihood that the situation might escalate is high, as several Nuer hardliners might see the South Sudanese state as being an opponent to Nuer interests. Backing down from the charges would mean that Kiir could be perceived as weak by giving in to the pressure. The only other viable option would be mediation by the African Union or any other mediating third-party. A complete failure of mediation would mean that South Sudan could slip back into civil war. Conclusion  The trial of South Sudan’s Vice President Riek Machar threatens to destabilize the country at its core, as it signals not only a political struggle but also the marginalization of one of its key ethnic communities from a power-sharing framework crafted after the 2020 peace deal. With tensions already rising and the balance of representation unraveling, the outlook for the world’s youngest nation remains uncertain. Without mediation, South Sudan risks sliding back into the interethnic violence that has defined much of its history since independence in 2011.

Date:   19/09/2025, 17:00 UTC+2  Where?  Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, Mexico Timeline   On 12/09/2025 , the Ecuadorian government  announced the immediate removal of the diesel subsidy, aiming to redirect funds to social programs. The announcement triggered widespread protests across seven provinces, including the capital city Quito.  On 14/09/2025 , hundreds protested against gentrification and rising rents in Mexico City’s  centro historico, demanding housing access and an end to evictions. The U.S. embassy issued a security alert advising caution near demonstrations. On 14/09/2025 , the demonstrations in Peru  began following the expiration of the tourist bus operator Consettur's 30-year concession. On  16/09/2025  President Daniel Noboa declared a 60-day state of emergency in Ecuador , aiming to reduce disruptive gatherings in affected provinces.  On 16/09/2025 , residents in Peru blocked train tracks to Machu Picchu, stranding about 900 tourists, to protest the bus service contract for the site. On 17/09/2025 , tens of thousands of Argentines filled the streets of downtown Buenos Aires  to demand increased funding for universities and pediatric care, which have suffered cuts under libertarian President Javier Milei's austerity measures. Scheduled  On 20/09/2025 , a pro-Palestine protest is scheduled in Mexico City . The United Workers Front (FUT) has announced a nationwide protest in Ecuador scheduled for 23/09/2025 . Mexico city, Mexico   On 14/09/2025 , hundreds gathered in Mexico City’s centro historico to protest gentrification and rising rents. Similar protests have taken place in the capital since July 2025. Demonstrators demanded housing access and an end to forced evictions, blaming luxury developments and short-term rentals for displacing long-term residents. Some protests involved vandalism and anti-foreigner slogans against tourists and expatriates, as the sharp rise in property value has been partially driven by an influx of foreign residents. The U.S. embassy issued a security alert warning to avoid demonstrations, highlighting risks of property damage and possible arrests for political involvement under Mexican law. For years, residents, especially in popular neighborhoods like Roma and Condesa, have been priced out of their homes. Rent in some areas has more than doubled, while the average local monthly wage remains significantly lower than the cost of a two-bedroom apartment. The protests are expressing growing inequality and community frustration with urban policies favoring real estate speculation over affordable housing. These tensions complicate Mexico City's social cohesion and urban planning. What happens now? City officials have proposed regulations to limit rent increases and control short term rentals to address housing affordability. However, protestors remain skeptical of these measures. Protests are likely to continue as community groups push for more comprehensive policies to prevent displacement and ensure affordable housing access. Authorities are closely monitoring  demonstrations to manage public safety.  Ecuador On 12/09/2025 , President Daniel Noboa’s government announced the immediate removal of the diesel subsidy, aiming to redirect funds to social programs. This decision triggered widespread protests across 7 of the 24 provinces, including Quito, where fuel prices surged from $1.80 to $2.80 per gallon. Clashes erupted between security forces and civil society, with police deploying tear gas and riot control tactics to disperse demonstrators. In response to escalating unrest, President Noboa declared a 60-day state of exception on 16/09/2025 , later updated to a state of emergency, granting security forces expanded powers to suppress disruptive gatherings while maintaining general movement. Simultaneously, in Cuenca, around 90,000 people marched against the environmental license for the Loma Larga gold mining project, fearing threats to the city’s main water source. The diesel subsidy, instituted in the 1970s after the discovery of Amazonian oil reserves, was designed to share national wealth and keep automotive fuel prices low, especially for sectors reliant on fuel like agriculture and transport. While it provided economic relief, the subsidy placed a $1.1 billion annual burden on fiscal accounts and was divided among Super, Extra, and Ecopais fuels. Past attempts to reduce subsidies have repeatedly led to unrest: the Moreno government’s 2019 reforms triggered  nationwide riots and lockdowns, while the Lasso administration faced an 18-day strike in 2022.   ​​ What happens now?   Historical precedents show that subsidy cuts and fuel price hikes have often led to large-scale protests and forced government reversals most notably in 2019 and 2022. If the subsidy cuts are not addressed or revoked, the protests are likely to continue in the upcoming days. Travellers may experience disruptions and should exercise caution, especially in provinces currently under state of emergency: Carchi, Imbabura, Pinchincha, Azuay, Bolívar, Cotopaxi and Santo Domingo.  Machupicchu, Peru On 16/09/2025 , Machu Picchu faced major operational disruptions due to protests by local residents in Aguas Calientes. Demonstrators blocked railway tracks that connect the town to the UNESCO World Heritage Site, halting passenger train services operated by Perurail. The protests arose from dissatisfaction with the government's selection of new bus operators to replace the previous company whose 30-year concession had expired. Residents demanded a transparent bidding process to ensure local business participation. As a result, approximately 900 tourists were stranded at the site and 1400 tourists were evacuated overnight in a coordinated effort by Peruvian authorities. Protestors also caused physical damage to railway infrastructure, complicating transportation logistics and evacuation efforts. The protests significantly interrupted tourism, one of Peru's critical economic sectors, causing strain on emergency services and transportation infrastructure. The U.S. embassy issued travel warnings due to risks of being stranded or caught in further unrest. A global heritage group  warned that ongoing conflict threatens the site's reputation. This highlights systemic governance and tourist management challenges in Peru, including opaque concession processes and lack of local community inclusion factors that drive unrest and threaten long-term stability. What happens now? Authorities and local stakeholders agreed on a temporary halt to resume transit services and began discussions to resolve the bus operator dispute. Travelers should anticipate possible disruptions in the near term, prepare carefully and stay updated through official channels. Buenos Aires, Argentina  On 17/09/2025 , tens of thousands of Argentines marched near the national congress and through the downtown of Buenos Aires to protest President Milei’s vetoes of bills that would increase funding for public universities and healthcare. Demonstrators, including students, teachers and healthcare workers called for rejecting the vetoes and restoring funding cuts that have severely impacted education and health services. The demonstrations coincided with significant political challenges for Milei, including declining approval ratings and upcoming midterm elections. The protest, which have occurred at various times and locations in the past two years, highlights widespread dissatisfaction with austerity policies that threaten essential social services, including public education, healthcare, and pensions. Milei’s government has also devalued the Argentine peso and privatized state-owned companies. The sustained unrest reflects risks further destabilizing the country's governance amid economic pressures. What happens now?  In response, the lower house of Congress overturned the vetoes, although the Senate’s approval is still needed. Continued political negotiations and potential protests are expected to continue, especially in the capital, as discontent with President Milei’s policies continues. Travelers should monitor official websites for strikes and demonstrations announcements and avoid protest areas. For more information about our services or subscription options, contact info@dyami.services

Date: 18/09/2025  (12:00 UTC+2) Where?  South China Sea: Scarborough Shoal Who’s involved?  China, Philippines What happened?  On 07/08/2025, three Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) Zhaoyu-class  cutters, Hailing (3301), Dahao (3304)   and Zhongjian (4304), were spotted in the Luzon Strait, approaching the Batanes island group. Batanes is the northernmost Philippine province, located just south of Taiwan. The vessels reportedly did not respond to Philippine radio challenges (requests/demands). This was the first publicly known instance in which the CCG had deployed vessels this far east in Philippine waters. On 11/08/2025,  CCG  Jiangdao-class cutter (3104) collided with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Type 052D destroyer Guilin (164) while the former was chasing   Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) Parola-class patrol vessel BRP Suluan  (MRRV-4406) ,  which was reportedly delivering supplies to Philippine fishermen near Scarborough Shoal. On 12/08/2025, China deployed several CCG vessels, as well as some Chinese Maritime Militia (CMM) vessels. The latter is a mix of actual fishing vessels whose crew can occasionally be used in quasi-military operations and purpose-built CMM vessels. These look like fishing vessels, but are usually larger and always much better equipped. These deployments are often referred to as “swarms” due to the sheer number of vessels that approach a given position or asset (i.e. a Philippine vessel). These deployments usually aim to block Philippine vessels from entering a certain area and force them back.  On 13/08/2025, the US carried out a Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) near Scarborough Shoal with US Navy (USN) Arleigh Burke- class destroyer USS Higgins (DDG-76). Independence-class USS Cincinnati (LCS-20) was also spotted nearby, although it was not officially named as being part of the FONOP.  On 13/08/2025, the PLA’s Southern Theater Command spokesperson, Senior Capt. He Tiecheng, stated it had “sent its naval troops to track, monitor, warn and expel the US Navy vessel”. The PCG reported two PLAN Type 054A frigates shadowing and issuing radio challenges to Higgins. The USN refuted the claim that it had been “expelled”, or otherwise halted Higgins’ FONOP due to PLAN actions. On 10/09/2025, China announced its plans to create a national nature reserve in Scarborough Shoal. The reserve will occupy around 3.523 hectares (35 km²). On 11/09/2025, the Philippines protested the plan, arguing it serves as a “pretext to eventual occupation”. On 16/09/2025, the PCG released footage showing two CCG vessels, a likely Zhongtao-class patrol craft (21562) and a Zhaojun-class  cutter (5201), harassing Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) ship BRP Datu Gumbay (MMOV-3014) (Appendix A; A1, A2, A3) . The latter was conducting a resupply mission to provide Philippine fishermen in the area with ice and fuel. The CCG used water cannons to harass Datu Gumbay , which resulted in an injured crew member and significant damage to the ship. On 18/09/2025, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs filed a formal diplomatic protest against China’s actions in the 16/09/2025 incident.  Analysis The contention of Scarborough Shoal dates back to 2012, when China first restricted access to the Shoal, which is within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The Philippines expected the US to intervene, as the two countries share a mutual defence treaty and Manila had made clear it saw the blockade of the island as a violation of its sovereignty. The US, however, did not recognise anyone’s sovereignty over the island, Philippines included, and did not intervene. Subsequent Philippine efforts to solve the issue via the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) were, although the court ruled in Manila’s favour, unsuccessful, as China essentially ignored the ruling.  China has since maintained a presence around the Shoal using CCG and CMM assets. Despite this, the Philippines always sought to contest the Chinese presence. China had, from 2013 to 2016 embarked in constructing the so-called “Wall of Sand”, a large-scale land reclamation in the Spratly Islands archipelago which resulted in China effectively taking control over several reefs within the contested archipelago. Manila’s will to maintain presence and pressure over the Shoal was to avoid a similar occurrence.  On 17/07/2024, the CCG interfered with a Philippine resupply mission to BRP Sierra Madre , a deliberately grounded ship that the Philippines has, since 1999, used as an outpost in Second Thomas Shoal, within the Spratly Islands. Although tensions never really de-escalated since 2012 — and Chinese interference on rotation and reprovision missions (RORE) was commonplace — this incident was particularly heated and resulted in both parties almost using deadly force on each other. Since then, tensions in both Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal had calmed, especially compared to recent years.  However, the collision on 11/08/2025 reignited China’s anger, arguably due to the public humiliation it had suffered. The plan to create a national reserve around Scarborough Shoal gives China an excuse to unilaterally formalize its claims on the shoal and does so without the need to construct a structure of any sort, at least not immediately. Moreover, it directly challenges the use of the water around the shoal, a known fish-rich area, for fishing. The Philippines, joined by its allies, has already criticized the plan. Still, if the latter goes through, criticism will have a negligible impact on China’s willingness to defend its newly created reserve against “...all types of illegal and irregular activities”, supposedly by any means it deems necessary. Conclusion The national nature reserve plan may be only a threat, but the situation remains fragile. A national nature reserve will give China the opportunity to justify harsher harassment against Philippine fishing vessels and their supporting fleet; it will also give China an excuse to erect some sort of construction in the shoal, cementing, literally, Beijing’s claim over it.  If the plan were to materialize, it would also become another way in which Beijing can test Manila’s resolve. It is unlikely that either country wants to deliberately use lethal force, but, if that were the case, Manila’s resolve, and by extension Washington’s, would be thoroughly tested. Philippine President Marcos has already indicated that if Chinese harassment against Philippine vessels were to result in a fatality, the Philippine government would regard it as an act of war. In this regard, the death of a Philippine national at the hands of China is a plausible occurrence, exemplified by the use of high-pressure water cannons against Philippine vessels, which already cause significant damage to the watercraft they target (Appendix A; A4). In an already heated environment in the South China Sea, such an event could result in unpredictable developments. Appendix A A1 A CCG patrol craft, likely Zhongtao-class,  (21562) using one of its water cannons against BRP Datu Gumbay (MMOV-3014) A2   Zhaojun-class  cutter (5201) navigating close to BRP Datu Gumbay (MMOV-3014) A3 CCG patrol craft, likely Zhongtao-class,  (21562) using one of its water cannons against BRP Datu Gumbay . Filmed from the CCG vessel.  Zhaojun-class  cutter (5201) can be seen in the background. A4 Damage sustained by BRP Datu Gumbay (MMOV-3014) due to a water cannon. A5 Damage sustained by BRP Datu Gumbay (MMOV-3014) due to a water cannon.. It appears that the windows in the aft section of the upper deck shattered.

Date:   12/09/2025 (15:00 UTC+3) Where?  Syria The Run-Up to Syria’s Election On 29/05/2025 , Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, was named Syria’s Transitional President, after the ousting of former regime leader Bashar al-Assad on 08/12/2024. On 13/03/2025 , al-Sharaa signed a draft constitution establishing a five-year transitional period leading up to the next presidential elections, while also formalizing the separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. In March 2025, a surge in pro-Assad insurgent attacks against Syrian government forces led to heavy clashes  in the Syrian western provinces of Tartous and Latakia, resulting in significant casualties and further deepening the country’s internal divisions.  On 10/03/2025 , the Syrian transitional government reached an agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who had been engaged in conflict with the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) prior to the fall of Assad’s regime. However, poor implementation of the deal, combined with recent clashes between the SDF and Syrian government forces, underscores its failure to take effect thus far and highlights the division in the north.  On 07/04/2025 , the brother of al-Sharaa, Maher, was reported to have been appointed Secretary-General of the Presidency of the Syrian Republic, transitioning from his previous role as health minister. On 22/08/2025 , al-Sharaa issued Presidential Decree No. 143/2025, establishing a temporary electoral system for the new parliament, which increased seats from the originally announced 150 to 210, and forming the parliamentary elections committee (the People’s Assembly Election Committee). During June and July 2025, US and European sanctions on Syria were lifted, aiding the country's rebuilding efforts. On 12/07/2025 , violent clashes  erupted between armed Bedouin tribal fighters and Druze militias in the southern governorate of Suwayda, resulting in heavy casualties and forcing many residents to flee. Syrian government forces intervened to provide support, followed by direct involvement from Israel, underscoring its intent to exert influence over parts of Syria while fueling further instability.  Syria’s Electoral Commission initially announced the postponement of parliamentary elections in Suwayda, Hasakah, and Raqqa on 23/08/205 , due to ‘security concerns’ following the recent clashes and ongoing tensions in the regions. However, on 12/09/2025,  the spokesperson of the People's Assembly Elections Committee announced that citizens in Raqqa and Hasakah provinces will be allowed to vote as they "are under the control of the legitimate government in Damascus". Between  15/09/2025  and 20/09/2025 , the Syrian elections are to take place, during which 140 of the 210 parliamentary members will be chosen, for a transitional term of approximately five years. How will the elections work? The election system does not follow the format of a traditional popular vote or general election. Rather, it uses a mixed approach: representatives for each district are chosen through voting by pre-selected electoral colleges, while additional seats are filled through direct appointments made by the president. As depicted in the image below, President Al-Sharaa personally chooses one-third of the parliament, which is 70 out of the 210 total parliamentary seats, and has also established the Higher Committee for People’s Assembly Elections. This committee oversees the entire process and selects members of roughly 62 sub-committees. Each of the sub-committees have selected candidates for the ‘electoral bodies,’ which have compiled the list of nominees for next week’s elections. These nominees will fill the remaining 140 seats, effectively denying most Syrians any meaningful role in choosing their representatives. Source  : @gargaristan on X, August 24, 2025. Analysis The upcoming Syrian parliamentary elections are pivotal. They are the first under the new transitional government following the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in December 2024. On the positive side, these elections represent a crucial democratic milestone, a foundational step in rebuilding state institutions and establishing a more representative government after decades of authoritarian rule. The formation of a new government through this process could also contribute to greater stability, attracting much-needed foreign investment for economic recovery and infrastructure reconstruction, with Gulf states having already pledged substantial investments providing energy, as well as Turkey, which has also played an important role in rebuilding the country’s security infrastructure.  However, while economic support from foreign powers is crucial for rebuilding, it is not a guarantee for stability on its own. There is a tangible danger that financial aid might merely paper over deep-seated resentments and divisions, which could reignite future conflicts if people's grievances are not genuinely addressed. Moreover, external intervention, as well as internal problems like the recent clashes in Suwayda, ongoing fighting in Aleppo, and pro-Assad insurgent attacks throughout the country, and the severe drought leading to a national water crisis continue to challenge the long hoped-for stability in Syria. Furthermore, concerns exist that the parliamentary elections may solidify the central government's authority rather than facilitating genuine representation.   Although Al-Sharaa’s appointed People’s Assembly Elections committee has set requirements for electoral bodies—including at least 20 per cent women, as well as representatives of displaced communities, families of those killed or wounded in the conflict, people with disabilities, and survivors of detention—the legitimacy of the elections is undermined by the exclusion of the Druze-majority Suwayda and previously the Kurdish-dominated regions of Hassakeh and Raqqa. The exclusion of Suwayda still might lead to the sidelining of an important minority group and deprives them of political representation, while power remains concentrated in the hands of al-Sharaa. Moreover, if the elections are ultimately perceived as unfair, or exclusive, they could further erode public trust in the new government and prolong the cycle of conflict and instability.  Conclusion The upcoming Syrian parliamentary elections, while a momentous occasion with the potential to usher in a new era of stability, face significant challenges. The ongoing national division,  exemplified by ongoing violent outbreaks together with the lack of representation during the election process, which is mainly in the hands of al-Sharaa, threatens to undermine the transition's success and could exacerbate existing divisions. Without addressing critical concerns regarding minority exclusion and deep-seated grievances, these elections risk becoming a mere administrative milestone or a catalyst for further violence, rather than a genuine stride toward a stable and pluralistic Syria.

Locations  of reported drone downings in Poland (yellow circles) between 09/09/2025 and 10/09/2025 and restricted airspace in Poland and Latvia following the incident (blue areas eastern border). Report date:   11/09/2025 (10:00 UTC+2) Where:  Eastern, central and northern Poland Who’s involved: Polish Government and Armed Forces, Armed Forces of the US, Italy, Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and the Royal Dutch Air Force UPDATED INFORMATION (11/09/2025) On 10/09/2025, Polish authorities announced airspace restrictions along their eastern border with Belarus and Ukraine, banning unauthorised civilian flights that must file a flight plan and carry an operational Mode A, C or S transponder, as well as a total ban on civilian drone flights with certain exceptions, in place until 23:59 on 09/12/2025. Latvian authorities announced airspace closures up to an altitude of 6,000 metres within 50 km of the country’s border with Russia and Belarus, in force until 18/09/2025 and possibly subject to extension. Russia’s Defence Ministry stated that the maximum range of the Gerbera-type drones found in Poland is 700 km, confirmed that Ukrainian arms production facilities in the west of the country were targeted that night, and said it was ready to hold consultations with its Polish counterparts if required. The presidential spokesman declined to comment, referring questions to the defence authorities, but dismissed the reports. Belarus’ Chief of the General Staff said it had warned the Polish side about incoming drones, noting that Russian and Ukrainian drones were active in the area and that some, affected by electronic warfare measures, strayed into Belarus, where they were also brought down. Polish authorities have also requested formal consultations with NATO partners by invoking Article 4 of the treaty, which foresees consultations amid the perception of serious threats by a member state.  Polish authorities released the names of several locations where drone wreckage was found, including Olesno, Mniszkow, Czosnowka, Wohyn, Krzywowierzba-Kolonia, Czesniki, Wyryki-Wola and Wyhalew. None of the drones were reported to have carried explosive material. US President Donald Trump appeared to limit comments on the incident stating “What’s with Russia violating Poland’s airspace with drones? Here we go!” on his Truth Social social media account, while the US ambassador to NATO affirmed the US “stands by” their NATO allies in the face of airspace violations, ready to defend the territory of the organisation.  Between 12 and 16 September, Russia and Belarus will conduct the yearly “Zapad-2025” large-scale military drills with around 13,000 participants in Barisov, central Belarus. India will also be participating this year with a contingent. Images of drone wreckages at unspecified locations provided by Polish authorities  Source: Various Polish media, 10/09/2025 What happened? On the night of 9 September, Polish authorities reported tracking more than ten unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in their airspace during a Russian strike campaign in western Ukraine. Polish F-16s were reported to have engaged the UAVs, later stated to be of Russian origin.  The Polish Operational Command announced the activation of full air defence procedures, placing allied aircraft and radar systems on their highest state of readiness to respond to airspace violations. Polish airports such as Warsaw’s Chopin (WAW/EPWA) and Modlin (WMI/EPMO) airports, and Lublin (LUZ/EPLB) and Rzeszów (RZE/EPRZ) temporarily halted operations between the night of 9 and 10 September due to increased risks over their airspace. Operations were resumed as of 07:00 hours local time on 10 September.  At 05:40 hours local time, a drone wreckage was discovered in Cznosnowka village, 28 km west of the border with Belarus. The drone was able to be identified according to local authorities, although no country was mentioned in official notifications ( source , source 2 ,) At 05:48 hours, the Polish military reported that operations were underway to identify and counter UAVs of then-unknown origin. At 07:29, the Polish authorities reported an “unprecedented violation of Polish airspace by drones” and confirmed that only those deemed a threat had been downed. The origin of the drones was not specified, but the command stated that operations were conducted with allied forces. As of 09:42 hours, all operations related to airspace violations had ended, with searches continuing to locate and identify the UAVs. Ground radar and air defence systems had reverted to standard operational status. Reports of another drone wreckage found in Wyryki, slightly damaging a roof.  No deaths, injuries or significant damage to infrastructure were reported as a result of the UAV downings at the time of writing.  Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk called an emergency government meeting to discuss the developments as of 08:00 hours on 10 September, subsequently stating that the origin of the UAVs was Russian.  At the time of writing, Russian authorities had not yet released any statements on the incident, but did report heavy targeting of Ukrainian logistical hubs in the Odessa area, further away from Poland.  Image of the damaged damage in Wyryki as a result of a drone downing Source: Nowy Tydzien, 10 September 2025 Analysis The incident appears to mark the first time that Russian UAVs have been downed over NATO territory, representing a notable escalation in the conflict’s spillover risks. Polish authorities reported tracking over ten drones during Russian airstrikes in Ukraine, with air defence procedures fully activated and allied forces, such as F-35s from the Royal Dutch Air Force, involved in countering the threats. The closure of Poland’s biggest airport in Warsaw (WAW/EPWA), as well as several other smaller ones, highlights the seriousness of the situation.  An F-35 from the Royal Netherlands Air Force similar to the ones involved in the incident Source: Royal Netherlands Air and Space Force   Debris from the downed drones was later recovered in Czosnowka and Wyrywki. Although Polish authorities did not initially announce the origin of the aircraft, Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated they were of Russian origin after an emergency meeting held with the security ministries of the country on the morning of 10 September. The event echoes earlier incidents such as a presumed Iranian-designed Shahed drone entering Polish airspace in 2024, a Russian missile briefly crossing into Polish airspace in 2023 and a missile linked to Ukrainian air defences crashing in Polish territory in 2022. Prime Minister Tusk described the incident as an act of aggression. If Russia’s responsibility is taken as definitive, the incident may represent a premeditated test of NATO’s resolve and US willingness to respond to repeated violations of allied airspace.  Looking ahead The downing of Russian drones over Poland may or may not prove to be a turning point in how NATO addresses the spillover of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Similar incidents have occurred before without significantly altering the alliance’s involvement and support for Ukraine, and with the new administration in Washington seemingly focused on de-escalating rather than expanding the conflict, this incident may be downplayed. Although the incident prompted heightened readiness from the Polish military, the temporary suspension of civilian aviation at some airports, the intrusion did not involve a ground incursion, resulted in no casualties and was carried out with relatively small, low-cost UAVs with limited capabilities. Consequently, the operational risk calculus for NATO may continue unaltered. Nonetheless, repeated violations could create a precedent whereby allied airspace is challenged without reciprocal escalation, eroding deterrence capabilities and forcing NATO to eventually clarify a threshold for defensive action along its eastern flank.

By Dyami Intelligence Analysis Center Intel cut-off time: 09/09/2025 17:00 UTC+2 What is happening in the Caribbean? A land invasion of Venezuela appears improbable given the low number of assets and a lack of military forces in the country’s vicinity, compared to similar actions by the US in  Granada (1983) and Panama (1989).  According to available information, there is no indication that eight US warships are deployed in Venezuelan territorial waters or its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Four vessels, three guided missile destroyers and a cruiser, appeared to be deployed near waters between eastern Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago. An additional three are part of an amphibious assault group involved in military exercises in Puerto Rico.  On 7–8 September, US Secretary of War Peter Hegseth visited troops in Puerto Rico and aboard the USS Iwo Jima, where he instructed the vessel to be prepared for counter-narcotics operations. On the night of August 29, 2025 the USS Lake Erie  was spotted crossing the Panama canal towards the Caribbean. By August 29, 2025 US officials and media confirmed seven US warships, along with one nuclear powered submarine had either arrived or were on the verge of arriving in the region, not specifying any locations.  On August 19, 2025, the United States stated that it would deploy warships to the Venezuelan coast to conduct an anti-narcotics operation. The specific anti-narcotics mission objectives include drug interdiction operations targeting Latin American drug cartels and affiliated criminal groups. On 2 September 2025 United States forces struck a speedboat that had departed San Juan de Unare, Venezuela, bound for an unidentified port in Trinidad and Tobago, allegedly transporting narcotics and resulting in 11 reported fatalities. President Donald Trump released video of the incident, describing the occupants as terrorists moving drugs through international waters, while Venezuela’s Communications Minister claimed the footage was fabricated using artificial intelligence. At the time of reporting President Maduro had not issued a statement. Analysis of the imagery raises doubts over the reported casualty figure, as fewer individuals appear on board than the 11 stated officially. The vessel’s size and configuration are consistent with fishing boats commonly used in the Peninsula de Paria, Sucre State, a region long associated with narcotics and human trafficking. According to reports, two drug-laden boats had departed San Juan de Unare shortly before the targeted boat, supporting the likelihood of narcotics trafficking activity. Further credible assessments suggest the strike may have occurred on the Atlantic Ocean side of the area rather than in the Caribbean as initially assumed. In the early August of 2025, US officials intensified rhetoric against the Venezuelan president, accusing his government of running large scale drug trafficking operations through a network known as the ‘’Cartel de los Soles’’ and designating it as a terrorist organization in July 2025.  President Trump appears to be continuing his first-term approach to Venezuela, maintaining maximum pressure on its leadership through measures linked to organised crime and terrorism; the August 2025 authorisation of military force against drug cartels seems to have been applied for the first time in or near Venezuela’s EEZ. More broadly, US policy towards Venezuela has evolved across administrations, with the country designated a national security concern under Obama and sanctions imposed on senior officials during both the Chávez and Maduro governments. On Monday September 1, Maduro responded with a rare press conference stating that the United States are seeking a regime change through military threat and that his country is peaceful but will not bow to threats. The Venezuelan President said ‘’Venezuela’s military is super prepared’’ and added that if the U.S. forces attack Venezuela, the country would  declare a state of armed resistance and military mobilization. The possibility of a US military intervention in Venezuela Despite President Maduro’s claims of a ‘US military threat,’ there is no evidence at present that the United States is preparing for a land invasion of Venezuela. The 1983 invasion of Grenada involved between 6,000 and 7,000 troops on an island of 344 km², while the 1989 operation in Panama required around 26,000 personnel in a country of about 75,000 km². By contrast, the stretch of coastline in Venezuela 100 km deep is about 65,000 km², while the country itself covers 915,000 km². A military invasion into Venezuela would require more than double the assets currently deployed in the southern Caribbean, along with an increase in troop numbers and hardware from US military bases in neighbouring countries. Such an effort would necessitate a surge in military transport flights, something not observed in open sources. Additionally, major powers such as China, Russia and Iran are expected to act as a deterrence against either a change in government in Venezuela or direct military intervention by the US. At different moments over the past two decades, these countries have invested in Venezuela’s security and energy sector:  China channelled roughly €52–55 billion to Venezuela in 2007–2016 through oil-backed loans and joint funds focused on energy and infrastructure and in May 2024 both sides signed a bilateral investment-protection treaty that underpins future projects. Russia supplied around $9 billion in arms by 2013 and invested roughly $8 billion in Venezuelan oil ventures that were later moved from Rosneft to the state company Roszarubezhneft. In July 2025 Rostec opened an ammunition plant in Maracay aimed at producing up to 70 million 7.62×39 cartridges a year. Iran has concentrated on the energy sector with a €110 million contract to repair the El Palito refinery plus a €460 million revamp agreement for the Paraguaná complex alongside a 20-year cooperation roadmap and defence-industrial ties such as assembly of Arpía/Mohajer-2 UAV, preceded by a €23 million contract for Iranian Mohajer-2 UAVs and an overall UAV programme for reconnaissance and loitering munition drones.  Given these countries’ involvement and investments in Venezuela they are expected to provide political and security support as a means of deterrence against any possible US intervention. The extent of their involvement in military terms should a US intervention take place remains undetermined, particularly should the US only carry out aerial strikes on Venezuela.  Given the information available, a US land invasion into Venezuela is not probable at the time of writing. Energy security, however, appears to be a major factor in the continued pressure, as Venezuelan heavy crude remains well suited for US Gulf Coast refineries despite the shift in export flows towards China. Reports of US warships deployed in the Caribbean sea near Venezuela  The breakdown of United States military deployments in the southern Caribbean shows guided missile destroyers USS Gravely , USS Jason Dunham and USS Sampson , as well as the guided missile cruiser USS Lake Erie , operating somewhere in the region of Venezuela’s exclusive economic zone. Their location is more likely than not off the eastern Venezuelan coast near Trinidad and Tobago, based on the inference that a Hellfire missile was used against a motor boat on 2 September. This missile is deployed from an SH-60 Seahawk helicopter and has an operational range of approximately 350 kilometres, thereby situating the probable launch zone within that radius. It is anticipated that additional United States aircraft may be deployed to Curaçao in support of this mission, in which event Venezuela is expected to heighten its surveillance of the islands. Venezuelan spotters are known to operate there, monitoring the United States Forward Operating Location (FOL) and other sites, reporting every inbound and outbound movement directly to Caracas. Activity on the islands cannot be concealed and this has long constituted the established modus operandi, employing a variety of tactics and manoeuvres designed to obscure operations. At the same time there are strong indications that three navy vessels, the transport dock ships USS San Antonio  and USS   Fort Lauderdale and the assault ship USS Iwo Jima , that were off the coast of Guayana, Puerto Rico may now be deployed either near Trinidad and Tobago, or Guyana. These were taking part in amphibious landing exercises which began on 31 August involving around 4,500 troops of the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit. The Iwo Jima, essentially a small aircraft carrier, carries Osprey, Chinook, Huey, Blackhawk and Cobra helicopters as well as vertical take off aircraft such as the Harrier and possibly F-35s. Although the F-35 is capable of both intelligence-gathering and combat tasks, the USS Iwo Jima  does not yet appear cleared to operate the aircraft. For the exercise in Puerto Rico, a more plausible configuration involves AV-8B Harrier IIs in multi-role capacity, MV-22 Ospreys, AH-1Z Vipers, CH-53E Super Stallions and UH-1Y Venoms, covering both light and heavy lift requirements. The subsequent deployment between Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana appears intended as a deterrent with movements not directly indicative of operations against Venezuela, while the location of the transport dock ships remains unknown. However, the troop levels involved fall short of what would be required for any credible deployment scenario in Venezuela. Military flights in the region also point to a connection with the ongoing military drills in Puerto Rico. A P-8 Poseidon reconnaissance aircraft has also been observed flying between Puerto Rico and Florida, but not southward towards Venezuelan waters. A series of military flights involving mainly C-17 Globemaster and C-130 Hercules transport aircraft were tracked between 27 August and 2 September, all flying between Puerto Rico and the United States, Trinidad and Tobago or the neighbouring US Virgin Islands. This initially suggested that flights in the region were focused on supplies to Puerto Rico and the ongoing military drills, but now  point to a deployment beyond the US island territory in light of official footage of Harrier aircraft flying above Georgetown, Guyana between 7 and 8 September during the country’s presidential inauguration.  An amphibious ready group is normally made up of an amphibious assault vessel, a dock landing ship, amphibious transport docks and a contingent of marines. The Puerto Rico deployment features two transport dock vessels but no dock landing ship, diverging from the standard structure of such a group. This makes it more likely that the presence of USS San Antonio , USS Fort Lauderdale , USS Iwo Jima and the Marine Expeditionary Unit represents a demonstration of force rather than a direct preparation for operations inside Venezuela. Trump’s policies towards Venezuela Recent developments suggest a shift in United States policy under President Trump towards Venezuela, with greater emphasis on security and organised crime. In March, the White House stated that President Maduro had facilitated the infiltration of the Tren de Aragua group, designated by Washington as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation, into the United States. The statement also linked Venezuela’s internal conditions to wider regional pressures through migration and instability. In July, the US Treasury sanctioned the Cartel de los Soles, alleging involvement by senior Venezuelan figures in narcotics trafficking. Together these actions reflect a hardening of tone, portraying Venezuela not only in terms of governance concerns but also in connection with transnational criminal activity. In August, this approach was reinforced through a broader directive. On 7 August, President Trump signed an order authorising US military action against drug-smuggling cartels and criminal groups if national security was considered at risk, a step initially met with concern in Mexico. While the directive was not specific to Venezuela, it provides Washington with greater latitude to apply pressure in the region. The combination of sanctions, accusations of organised crime and the authorisation of military measures points to an evolving US policy that increasingly links Venezuelan actors to hemispheric security challenges. Energy security: Venezuela’s shift to China instead of the US, US presence in Guyana Venezuela’s trade relationships have shifted significantly, particularly with the United States. Although the share of Venezuelan crude sent to US refineries has declined, the country’s heavy crude oil remains well suited for Gulf Coast facilities. In 2019, about 41% of Venezuela’s crude exports went to the United States but by 2023 this had dropped to 23% while China’s share rose from 25% to 69%. Over this six year period exports to the United States were cut in half while exports to China almost tripled, underlining the impact of sanctions and the central role of economic considerations in US policy. Even with the US administration’s decision in July 2025 to renew Chevron’s licence for limited operations in Venezuela, American investment and activity in the country remain restricted. US crude oil imports from Venezuela between 1980 and 2023 Source: US Energy Information Administration US energy investment in Venezuela has largely dried up while capital has flowed into neighbouring Guyana. After major offshore hydrocarbon discoveries in 2015, Guyana began producing oil in 2019 and has since become central to US energy security, with US firms investing about €12.3 billion, roughly 96% of the country’s total foreign direct investment between 2020 and 2024. In parallel Washington is strengthening its military posture in the Caribbean; at Guyana’s presidential inauguration on 8 September the US Embassy in Georgetown reaffirmed support for the country’s defence, signalling a remit that extends beyond counter-narcotics to protecting Guyana as it contests a decades-long territorial dispute with Venezuela that includes offshore reserves. Official notification from the US Embassy in Guyana  on support for the country’s territorial integrity amid an ongoing territorial dispute with Venezuela In the longer term, the steady increase of Venezuelan crude exports to China, driven by rising energy demand, could solidify a durable partnership between both countries. This would come at Washington’s expense, as it risks not only losing access to a decades-long supplier but also seeing an increasing presence of China in areas perceived as its traditional zone of influence. From a strategic perspective, the United States has an interest in keeping Venezuela within its energy orbit, as well as reducing the growing Chinese influence in its side of the hemisphere. Venezuela’s reserves of hydrocarbons, discovered to be the largest in the world in the late 2000s, are an essential strategic interest that the current US leadership appears very focused on pursuing, in addition to Guyana’s, determined to be one of the largest reserves in the world found since 2015.  Following this logic, in March 2025, US President Trump signed an Executive Order imposing 25% tariffs on all goods from countries that import oil from Venezuela. Both Trump administrations issued rewards for information leading to the arrest or conviction of Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro, officially offering a $15 million reward in 2020, increased to $25 million in January 2025, and $50 million in August of the same year. The deployment of military assets in the region and narcotics trafficking charges against Venezuela’s leadership, combined with unilateral strikes on vessels departing or near its exclusive economic zone, serve as instruments of pressure designed to push Caracas towards a negotiated arrangement by President Trump as “making a deal,” bringing its government policies more in line with US interests.  Official bounty increases issued by the US Government against of Nicolas Maduro in January (below left) and August (below right) 2025  Source: US Department of State (accessed 04 September 2025) Looking ahead The prospect of a United States military intervention in Venezuela remains limited at present. Force levels in the southern Caribbean including guided missile destroyers, an amphibious group exercising in Puerto Rico or a deployment of the USS Iwo Jima  near Guyana or Trinidad and Tobago  do not match what would be required for a land operation. Historical precedents in Grenada and Panama point to far larger commitments than are currently visible. Any campaign against Venezuela would require a much greater build up of personnel logistics and transport capacity, none of which appears in open source reporting. Instead Washington is pursuing a calibrated strategy of coercion short of invasion that uses sanctions, legal designations, tying Venezuelan actors to narcotics trafficking and terrorism, and selective strikes such as the 2 September action against a Venezuelan vessel. This approach signals capability and intent while avoiding the burdens of a protracted conflict. The current US force posture in the Caribbean does not indicate preparations for a land invasion of Venezuela or a large-scale, sustained air campaign. The composition and size of deployed assets appear disproportionate to counter-narcotics missions and insufficient for a rapid invasion scenario akin to Panama in 1989, suggesting the posture is intended primarily as strategic pressure. A limited, high-risk contingency such as a targeted raid against Venezuelan leadership cannot be ruled out, though it would require extensive diversionary and electronic warfare measures beyond a special task group. Regional dynamics further reduce the likelihood of direct intervention. China is Venezuela’s dominant buyer of crude and Russia provides diplomatic and limited military technical support, which raises the cost of escalation for Washington. Sustained US naval and air activity and the absence of Venezuelan deescalation measures keep uncertainty high. A video that purported to show Venezuelan F-16s over a US warship has been assessed as misleading by some experts, with the ship identified as Venezuela’s own Guaiqueri class patrol vessel. A direct engagement by Caracas with US naval assets would be a serious escalation. The exact disposition of US destroyers whether inside Venezuela’s EEZ or just outside near Trinidad and Tobago remains unclear, but it is unlikely that President Maduro would court confrontation given Venezuela’s limited capacity to withstand escalation against superior US forces. Regional stability and civilian sectors are also at stake. Ongoing operations and the prospect of further incidents may depress European and US travel to the ABC islands of Aruba Bonaire and Curaçao. Dutch defence and state ministers have advised parliament that commercial flight risk has not increased and that authorities are monitoring developments while treating the activity as a US national operation. Taken together the indicators point to sustained pressure rather than invasion with sanctions, military signalling, and reputational tools used to constrain Caracas and shape its behaviour short of a direct campaign.

Date of Report:   10/09/2025 (10:00 UTC+2) Where:  Eastern Poland Who’s involved: Polish Government and Armed Forces, US Armed Forces, Russian Armed Forces, Royal Dutch Air Force, Italian Air Force What is happening? On the night of 9 September, Polish authorities reported tracking more than ten unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in their airspace during a Russian strike campaign in western Ukraine. Polish F-16s were reported to have engaged the UAVs, later stated to be of Russian origin.  The Polish Operational Command announced the activation of full air defence procedures, placing allied aircraft and radar systems on their highest state of readiness to respond to airspace violations. Polish airports such as Warsaw’s Chopin and Modlin airports, and Lublin and Rzeszów temporarily halted operations between the night of 9 and 10 September due to increased risks over their airspace. Operations were resumed as of 07:00 hours local time on 10 September.  At 05:40 hours local time, a drone wreckage was discovered in Cznosnowka village, 28 km west of the border with Belarus. The drone was able to be identified according to local authorities, although no country was mentioned in official notifications ( source , source 2 ,) At 05:48 hours, the Polish military reported that operations were underway to identify and counter UAVs of then-unknown origin. At 07:29, the Polish authorities reported an “unprecedented violation of Polish airspace by drones” and confirmed that only those deemed a threat had been downed. The origin of the drones was not specified, but the command stated that operations were conducted with allied forces. As of 09:42 hours, all operations related to airspace violations had ended, with searches continuing to locate and identify the UAVs. Ground radar and air defence systems had reverted to standard operational status. Reports of another drone wreckage found in Wyryki, slightly damaging a roof.  No deaths, injuries or significant damage to infrastructure were reported as a result of the UAV downings at the time of writing.  Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk called an emergency government meeting to discuss the developments as of 08:00 hours on 10 September, subsequently stating that the origin of the UAVs was Russian.  At the time of writing, Russian authorities had not yet released any statements on the incident, but did report heavy targeting of Ukrainian logistical hubs in the Odessa area, further away from Poland.  Image of the home damage in Wyryki as a result of a drone downing Source: Nowy Tydzien, 10 September 2025 Analysis The incident appears to mark the first time that Russian UAVs have been downed over NATO territory, representing a notable escalation in the conflict’s spillover risks. Polish authorities reported tracking over ten drones during Russian airstrikes in Ukraine, with air defence procedures fully activated and allied forces, such as F-35s from the Royal Dutch Air Force, involved in countering the threats. The closure of Poland’s biggest airport in Warsaw (WAW/EPWA), as well as several other smaller ones, highlights the seriousness of the situation.  Debris from the downed drones was later recovered in Czosnowka and Wyrywki. Although Polish authorities did not initially announce the origin of the aircraft, Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated they were of Russian origin after an emergency meeting held with the security ministries of the country on the morning of 10 September. The event echoes earlier incidents such as a presumed Iranian-designed Shahed drone entering Polish airspace in 2024, a Russian missile briefly crossing into Polish airspace in 2023 and a missile linked to Ukrainian air defences crashing in Polish territory in 2022. Prime Minister Tusk described the incident as an act of aggression. If Russia’s responsibility is taken as definitive, the incident may represent a premeditated test of NATO’s resolve and US willingness to respond to repeated violations of allied airspace.  Looking ahead The downing of Russian drones over Poland may or may not prove to be a turning point in how NATO addresses the spillover of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Similar incidents have occurred before without significantly altering the alliance’s involvement and support for Ukraine, and with the new administration in Washington seemingly focused on de-escalating rather than expanding the conflict, this incident may be downplayed. Although the incident prompted heightened readiness from the Polish military, the temporary suspension of civilian aviation at some airports, the intrusion did not involve a ground incursion, resulted in no casualties and was carried out with relatively small, low-cost UAVs with limited capabilities. Consequently, the operational risk calculus for NATO may continue unaltered. Nonetheless, repeated violations could create a precedent whereby allied airspace is challenged without reciprocal escalation, eroding deterrence capabilities and forcing NATO to eventually clarify a threshold for defensive action along its eastern flank.  Dyami is actively monitoring the situation. Dyami Services Security is not a luxury but a necessity. With Dyami Security Intelligence as a Service, you gain a proactive, flexible, and affordable solution to manage risks, monitor geopolitical threats, and respond immediately to crises. Why subscribe to security? ✅ Resilient business operations in today’s world ✅ We act as your security department and Geopolitical Risk Officer ✅ Direct access to security expertise without high costs ✅ Prevent crises with up-to-date threat intelligence ✅ Scalable subscription plans ✅ Access to our unique global network Want to know how this protects your organization? 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