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Total MPOX cases from 01/01/2022, as of 31/03/2024. Source: WHO  (2024) Date:   15/08/2024 Who’s involved? The African center for disease control and prevention, World Health Organisation, the Democratic Republic of Congo, pharmaceutical companies and Western governments. What happened? On  13/08/2024,  the African Center for Disease Control and Prevention  declared a public health emergency on the African continent pertaining to a new strain of MPOX that has been found to spread fast in certain parts of West Africa and is targeting women and children. On  14/08/2024,  the World Health Organization called the MPOX outbreak a global health emergency  making it easier for countries and emergency services to obtain adequate amounts of vaccines and reduce paperwork to effectively control the outbreak. In 2022, the WHO also called another outbreak of MPOX a global health emergency but this referred to another strain of the virus which was transmitted through sexual contact. The newer strain seems to spread easier and affects also women and children whereas the former strain was more prevalent among men as it was spread mostly in the gay community through sexual encounters.  This 2022 strain of MPOX spread across the world and there were numerous cases in the United States, Germany, France, Denmark and other countries. MPOX is a version of smallpox and can cause fever, very painful lesions, chills and body aches. Lesions are usually seen across the face, hands and chest but the new strain shows less obvious lesions and mostly in the genital area.  People, mainly children, can die from MPOX. The new outbreak seems to center on the DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo) and has been responsible for dozens of deaths of children in crowded and unsanitary refugee camps. The East of the DRC has been an unstable region for decades and the government has little to no control over the region which is rich in minerals and is fought over by dozens of terrorist and guerilla groups.  The mineral mining in the area is supported by foreign governments and organizations that profit from extracting the minerals and are willing to pay armed groups to protect their interests from being seized by the government.  Vaccines are readily available for Western countries and outbreaks are easily managed which reduces the mortality rate severely.  In West-Africa however vaccines are not readily available and pharmaceutical companies and Western governments seem reluctant to provide vaccines. The WHO declaration of a global health emergency has been issued to tackle this problem by circumventing bureaucracy and red tape, but it is not a guarantee that enough vaccines will be available. It is hard for NGOs to get correct numbers and information on the MPOX outbreak  in DRC as the outbreaks occur in contested and dangerous areas where there is no government oversight and armed groups control the flow of people and products.   Analysis: With the new strain of MPOX spreading fast throughout the DRC and other countries it is likely that hundreds of people will be infected in the coming weeks and months.  The number of deaths will rise exponentially and without a well regulated vaccination programme there is the chance the virus will spread to other countries in the region. Countries bordering the DRC like Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and South-Sudan house large numbers of refugees and displaced people in camps that are not very sanitary. MPOX can easily spread through these camps and it could force people to leave these camps out of fear for their children’s lives. Such an event will spread the virus to places it has not been before, like the refugee camps in Sudan, and it can quickly turn into a very large health emergency.  The past has shown that the outbreak of a disease in poor regions of the world can wreak havoc amongst the population, especially when they live in refugee or displacement camps that are not very hygienic. Armed groups and terrorist organizations can take advantage of this situation by getting their hands on vaccines and being the ones that distribute them in regions under their control.  This will likely make people feel more favorable towards these groups as their resentment towards their own government or the West grows. A large outbreak across the African continent can destabilize entire regions that are already on the brink of falling over. This effect can become exponentially worse if the virus spreads to the West and other rich countries and vaccines for Africa will be even less in supply. Resentment over the unbalanced distribution of the COVID vaccines can be fertile ground for extremism.  If groups like ISIS or Al Qaeda, or countries like Russia, jump in the gap and help distribute vaccines it is likely that alliances in these regions will shift. The handing out of vaccines is imperative and will likely help stop the virus from spreading. The willingness of Western countries and pharmaceutical companies to distribute the vaccines free of charge to poorer countries and regions will be the main driving force behind stopping the spread or by letting it run its course. During the COVID pandemic in the early 2020’s the lack of availability of vaccines for poor countries across the globe was the main factor in the rise of the number of deaths in these countries. This also made the pandemic last longer than necessary.  It has long been a contentious point on the global scale that Western countries and pharmaceutical companies tend to keep vaccines for themselves.  There is an overproduction and storage of vaccines in the West that at certain times needs to be disposed of because the vaccines have passed their expiration date. During the COVID pandemic in 2022 several pharmaceutical companies pledged to open factories and laboratories in Africa to serve the vaccine market there. But recently most companies have retracted their investments stating that it is not economically viable.  Western companies cannot compete with countries like India that produce generic vaccines.  Another problem the pharmaceutical companies have come across was that qualified people who could work in their laboratories usually leave Africa to find work in Europe or the United States. High salaries and a higher standard of living makes moving more attractive. Conclusion With the WHO and the African CDC declaring a global health emergency on the outbreak of MPOX in West-Africa there is still a chance that the spread of the disease can be halted if enough vaccines are distributed in these regions. However, it seems that the West and pharmaceutical companies are again reluctant, as they were during the COVID pandemic, to produce more vaccines and supply them to NGOs and emergency health organizations . This reluctancy can lead to a wider spread of the virus and will be responsible for the deaths of dozens of people, mostly children. MPOX is a treatable virus but the new strain is harder to recognize if not looked at by medical professionals. It is therefore likely that the virus will infect more people as they do not know that they are infected by MPOX.  This does not help with curbing the spread of the virus. The African CDC and the WHO are likely to lobby for more grants and vaccines to be made available to tackle the outbreak before it becomes a true global problem as COVID turned out to be.

The security situation in Bangladesh is worsening. Mohammed Yunus now leads the interim government but the protests are unlikely to stop. There are several reported attacks against Hindu minorities in the country, with rioters also targeting the apartments of members of the Awami League. Rival political factions, as well as students calling for the immediate release of prisoners held by the authorities, will hold demonstrations in the coming weeks. Police presence has resumed somewhat but remain scarce, with the military refusing to act to prevent further rioting. While international flights are open and train links have resumed their services, it is possible that they will become targeted as gathering centers for protests. Protesters have also targeted banks, public buildings and hotels around the country, with several clashes resulting in the shooting of civilians. Several countries have advised against all but necessary travel to Bangladesh. International travelers must consider rethink any travel plans to Bangladesh for the time being, unless the situation improves. Dyami will continue to monitor the unrest and are ready to assist.

Written by Arianna Lucà, Jacob Dickinson, Iris de Boer, Kevin Heller, Sara Frisan

Date:   08/08/2024 Where:   Country: United Kingdom  Who’s involved: English Defense League, football hooligans, Tommy Robinson, Civil Newsgroups, disinformation campaigners and others. What happened? On 29/07/2024 , a tragic stabbing attack  at a Taylor Swift-themed holiday club in Southport resulted in the deaths of three young girls. Eight other children and two adults were injured, with some still in critical condition. The perpetrator, identified as 17-year-old Axel Rudakubana, is now in custody until October 2024. Rudakubana, born and raised in the UK, and of Christian Rwandan heritage, had his identity initially withheld due to his age.  In the aftermath of the knife attack, social media accounts speculated that the attacker was a Muslim asylum seeker that recently arrived in the UK . This story is false, but was quickly picked up by rightwing groups, generating a stream of anti-immigrant and Islamophobic posts on social media, calling for the organization of anti-migrant riots . Plans of engaging in violent gatherings, including the locations and times for the riots, were spread on social media and messaging apps in advance to the riots.  One such riot took place on 30/07/2024 ,   when a large crowd clashed with the police  in Sunderland, resulting in more than 50 officers injured. Rioters threw bricks, fireworks, and rocks at a mosque, set a police car and a building on fire, and chanted "we want our country back." The unrest spread to several towns and cities  across England, like Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds, Nottingham, Bristol, and London. Rioters attacked migration centers  and hotels housing asylum seekers too.  To date, far-right riots have impacted around 20 towns and cities across the UK. On 02/08/2024 ,   Prime Minister Keir Starmer met with local leaders in Southport to discuss support for the local community, a day after he announced a new “ national capability ” to tackle disorder . The new measures will allow the sharing of intelligence, improved facial recognition technology and criminal behavior orders to restrict travel to troublemakers.  After chairing a second meeting of the emergency response committee on 05/08/2024 , Starmer reassured the public saying that perpetrators will be dealt with the “ full force of the law ”. Over 400 people have been arrested  since the riots started and around 100 people have already been charged  over the violent unrest.  On 07/08/2024,  after police warned of unrest from planned far-right rallies at 100 locations, thousands of counter-protesters   peacefully took to the streets  in over a dozen cities, in solidarity with immigrants and ethnic minorities. Forming human shields around asylum centers, they held  “refugees welcome”  signs and chanted “ there are many more of us than you ”. However, in most areas they found no far-right supporters to oppose. This was not the first such demonstration. Violent clashes between far-right rioters and  Muslim counter-protesters had already taken place a few days earlier in Bolton. Analysis: After a week of widespread unrest, the UK is facing the worst anti-immigrant violence since 2011 , when a deadly police shooting of a black British man in North London led to lengthy riots in the capital. Back then, it was again Keir Starmer, then Director of Public Prosecutions, who led the prosecutions of offenders. He is now facing a similar crisis just one month after his election, and he is responding in the same way, possibly allowing courts to be open for 24 hours. Disinformation campaigns focussing on immigration also played a key role during the time of the Brexit vote in 2016. Misinformation on the UK’s future as an economic success, dictatorial EU laws, immigration and crime were coupled with a surge of national pride. This has put a focus on the importance of English pride and resulted in the perception that immigrants would endanger English culture and traditions.   Prominent politicians within right wing groups in the UK have reacted to the riots in different ways. Many elected officials have completely condemned the anti-immigrant riots. However, while condemning the riots, some right wing politicians stated that the riots were evidence of the way in which migration was affecting UK society. It's mainly the head figures within far right groups and extreme right groups organized through online platforms that have been supportive of the riots and don’t refrain from the use of violence.  However, the majority of the society in the UK is not supporting the violent riots, with many people stressing that the rioters are not representative of the UK as a whole. The UK is currently experiencing the biggest increase in poverty since 30 years . People are facing rises in the costs of living, with healthy affordable food becoming less accessible. People feel stuck in a difficult situation and those negative feelings are acknowledged within the anti-immigrant rhetoric by projecting them onto the ‘other’ . Especially the leader of the far-right English Defence League , Stephen Yaxley-Lennon operating under the alias Tommy Robinson , has played a key role in spreading Islamophobic and anti-immigrant disinformation, calling for the deportation of immigrants and provoking violent riots. It is believed that Robinson has close links to the Kremlin.   The situation might develop in different ways. One scenario is of a heavy judicial response, and that the loose organizational structure of the riots may dissipate.  Hundreds of people have been arrested so far. Starmer has vowed to “ take all necessary measures ” to end the chaos. The UK's former head of counter-terrorism suggested treating the attacks as acts of terrorism. At present, police presence has been reinforced, thousands of specialist officers have already been deployed as a “standing army” to deal with more potential riots, and trouble hotspots.  However, challenges are likely to persist. UK prisons are facing an overcrowding problem. The UK Ministry of Justice reported on 02/08/2024  that only slightly more than a thousand spaces were available across prisons in England and Wales, following the Secretary of State for Justice announcement  that the UK prisons were on the point of collapse, and operating at 99% capacity, last July 2024. Underfunding of the UK's public services is an additional challenge for Starmer. Another possible scenario is that unrest will continue, evolve into mass rallies and riots against prosecuting demonstrators , as people who take part in acts of hatred form strong group identities. Large scale counter protests are taking place and rioters have already clashed with the counter protesters in various locations across the UK. As the counter protests are growing in size, there is a possibility that clashes between rioters and counter protesters will escalate in the near future.

Date:   06/08/2024 Location:   Bangladesh  Parties involved:   Students in Bangladesh, the Government of Bangladesh, Bangladesh National Party (BNP), Bangladesh Armed Forces What happened? On 05/08/2024 , Sheikh Hasina, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, announced her resignation and is residing in the Hindon Air Force station near Delhi.  This came after a month of protests in which security forces and members of the Awami League violently repressed demonstrators. The tipping point was her decision to crackdown on thousands of people protesting outside of her residence on 05/06/2024 . This prompted her powerful backers, the military and the garment industry tycoons to turn against her. Following talks with her family and her advisors, she handed in her resignation.    There are reports of extensive clashes between protesters and the authorities in Dhaka, particularly Bakshi Bazar, Banasree and Basundhara.  Attacks have also targeted cultural venues, television offices and parliament, as well as the former Awami League party offices in Dhaka. Without balancing the need for order and preventing further reprisals from the authorities, further violence could also occur in the coming days.  The July protesters began with demands to reform a quota for civil services jobs for the ruling party, the Awami League. After weeks of peaceful protest however, they became violent as authorities cracked down on protesters. The clashes with the authorities and demonstrators have led to over the deaths of 300 people, the worst bloodshed in Bangladesh’s recent history.  The demands turned to regime change as more than 20,000 protesters were injured. The protesters are demanding accountability for the violent suppression of the protests.  The EU and India have said that they are very concerned about the reports of attacks on minorities, places of worship and members of religious and ethnic minorities.  The situation remains volatile as the protests have picked up. The army and police are unwilling to act to repair basic order around the country.  The organization of the army is also in flux; the military has been reshuffled and five generals were put into retirement.  Analysis: The mass protests have produced a profound and historic political change in Bangladesh. While the country has often been touted as a success story of economic growth and export manufacturing, inequality is rampant and corruption between garment tycoons and political elites has been rampant. The Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina had maintained power through cracking down violently on protesters, extrajudicial killings and rigged elections.  Previous attempts at protests, such as after the opposition-boycotted elections in January 2024, resulted in widespread repression on opponents and human rights violations.   The question remains about who will lead the country after she has left.  The current president of Bangladesh, Mohammed Shahbuddin ordered the release of opposition leader Khaleda Zia, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and said that all political parties had agreed to dissolve parliament and form a transitional government. It is notable that the BNP and the Jamaat-e-Islami party were in talks, without the former ruling Awami League politicians. The students who played an instrumental role announced that they will not accept a candidate supported by the military, and have instead announced their own list of eligible candidates. One suggestion is the Nobel laureate Mohammah Yunus, the head of a development bank, as the chief advisor to the interim government.  The students also remain wary of relying too much on the military for the restoration of order, citing the military’s role in suppressing democratic processes in the past. On the other hand, there are some reports that there are divisions in the military elite over how to handle the ensuing protests, with some calling for a further crackdown, while others are calling for the demands of the protests to be recognised.   Sheikh Hasina’s future is an important factor for the future of Bangladesh's relationship with India. She initially fled to New Delhi and there are reports that she is trying to seek asylum in the UK, though the UK government has not so far accepted her argument. If she stays in India, it will be difficult for India to build ties with the new Bangladeshi government that may come to power after ousting her . PM Hasina has forged closer relations with India, due to its support for Bangladesh’s independence in 1971. She also received support from India due to her hard position toward anti-Indian armed groups operating the country.

Date:  02/08/2024 Where :  Malaysia Who’s involved : Malaysian  Prime Minister's Department of Law and Institutional Reform Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) Social media and Internet messaging platforms What happened? On July 27th , the Malaysian government announced several plans for new regulatory frameworks in new legislation proposals. The proposals are controversial, particularly a plan to implement an  internet "killswitch" . The proposals will be brought to a vote in October 2024 . A government memo entitled, “New Regulatory Framework For A Safer Internet For Children And Families”, was distributed by the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission on Saturday.  The memo states that, effective August 1st , all social media services with at least eight million registered users in Malaysia to apply for a license under its current censorship regulations, required by January 1st . Previously, these services were exempted from licensing requirements. A conference to discuss online harms relevant to the legislation is scheduled for September 2024. Analysis Malaysia would join Egypt, India, Iran, Turkey, Russia, Ethiopia, and others in the short list of nations with verified “internet killswitch” mechanisms. The presented reasoning behind the new law, particularly the need for the “killswitch” , is a response to the increasing prevalence of cybercrime in Malaysia . A government Minister stated on Sunday that the “digital killswitch” is necessary to improve security. The government is also reviewing proposals to amend the Penal Code to classify and define cyberbullying offenses. Additional reforms are being proposed to Malaysia’s Anti-Money Laundering , Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act , and the Criminal Procedure Code. While there could be room for government overreach and abuse in these expanding definitions, it also will allegedly empower victims to pursue greater punishment against cybercriminals  that act against them, restoring lost property. Current laws and the powers invested in the MCMC are considered outdated, having been in place since 1998 . These dated institutional powers allegedly struggle to address the current digital landscape.  By implementing these measures, Malaysia aims to align itself with global standards on digital safety, yet this move has sparked concerns over  potential censorship and the impact on freedom of speech . The killswitch could be activated under certain conditions such as the spread of false information, cyberattacks, or threats to national security . The specifics of these conditions have not been fully detailed. The actual mechanism would involve cooperation with internet service providers (ISPs) and social media platforms. The government would have the authority to direct these entities to restrict or shut down specific internet services or platforms during critical situations. In comparison to countries like China and Iran, which are known for more stringent control over civil liberties, Malaysia's issues regarding human rights are somewhat less severe but still significant, particularly in the areas of freedom of expression, judicial fairness, and minority rights . According to digital rights advocates, 2024 is following in a trend of increasing politically-motivated internet outages , with India  being the leader in 2023 and Q1 2024. Conclusion Recently, Malaysia's political direction has shown signs of becoming more repressive, despite initial moves toward liberalization following the Pakatan Harapan coalition's victory in the 2018 elections. The current government, under Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, initially rolled back some repressive measures, such as the Anti-Fake News Act. However, it has maintained other restrictive laws like the Sedition Act and the Communications and Multimedia Act, which have been used to curb media freedoms and restrict public discourse. The proposed regulatory measures, including the implementation of an internet "killswitch" could significantly impact online freedom and the operation of digital platforms in Malaysia, potentially leading to stricter content controls and enforcement actions. While these steps claim to enhance cybersecurity and protect citizens from cybercrime, they also raise concerns about potential overreach and the impact on freedom of expression.  The legislation's vague criteria for activating the killswitch and the broad authority granted to the government could lead to unintended consequences, such as censorship and restrictions on digital platforms. As Malaysia aligns itself with global practices seen in countries like China and India, it is crucial to monitor the development and implementation of these laws to ensure that they balance security needs with the protection of civil liberties. This situation warrants close observation, particularly in light of increasing global trends toward politically motivated internet restrictions.

Written by Chris Dalby, Director of World of Crime The Kingdom of the Netherlands seems perpetually locked in a rivalry with its neighbor. This neighbor is accused of being more corrupt, more violent, and full of drug trafficking. Oh, no, this is not about Belgium. That would be too easy. This is about Venezuela. The coastline of South America’s most corrupt country lies just 65 kilometers from the island of Curaçao, a constituent country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Drugs , migrants , gold , weapons, and contraband  have flowed across this narrow strait, relying on the well-established criminal collusion within the government of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and security weaknesses in the Dutch Caribbean.   But the threats posed by Venezuela to the Netherlands have evolved. Venezuela’s largest gang, Tren de Aragua, saw its base of operations, the Tocorón prison, raided and its leadership scattered in 2023. But that has only multiplied the drug trafficking threat. The islands also provide traffickers with a plethora of options. A rise in violence in small islands across the Caribbean can be correlated with an increase of cocaine trafficking through the likes of Turks and Caicos, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and St. Lucia. These countries are destinations along “island hopping” routes, where drugs are moved by go-fast boats through different islands where they are temporarily stored before moving on. Many of these routes begin their journey through Aruba and Curaçao. Expansion of Venezuelan Gangs to Curaçao Venezuela’s transnational criminal presence does not begin and end with Tren de Aragua . But it may seem that way. Since starting inside one of Venezuela’s main prisons, in the state of Aragua, the gang has expanded its criminal tentacles by following the flow of migrants leaving the beleaguered country. Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru have all felt the presence of the gang, bringing with it homicides, human trafficking, and sex trafficking. Curaçao has not escaped this. Tren de Aragua has been connected to regular shipments of illegal migrants to Aruba and Curaçao. Millions of migrants have fled Venezuela over the last decade, but the small number fleeing to the Dutch islands has proven so profitable that Tren de Aragua is willing to fight to keep it. One route, from the town of La Vela de Coro in Venezuela to Curaçao, was dominated by a different gang until Tren de Aragua muscled in and took over, according to an investigation  by Invisibles. These migrants are charged exorbitant fees, with the chance of reaching a destination so closely connected to a European nation being all the more attractive. Policing this requires close cooperation between Dutch authorities as well as strong information-gathering in Venezuela, which is a tough task. Tren de Aragua may be the biggest name ferrying these migrants across, but they are not the only gang to do so. Plenty of small outfits operate across Venezuela’s Caribbean coast, often with the backing of local political elites, making it difficult to investigate and crack down on them.  Furthermore, in September 2023, thousands of Venezuelan police and soldiers raided Tren de Aragua’s base at Tocorón prison. This caused the group’s leadership to scatter, and there is little evidence they have regrouped in just one location.  Prisoners gathered during the raid at Tocorón prison. Source: Venezuelan Government Instead of a top-down hierarchy, reports of smaller cells have emerged, indicating a more scattered operation. However, it remains a real threat. In July 2024, the United States labelled Tren de Aragua as a transnational criminal organization, and it is one of the principal criminal threats in Chile. The Dutch Caribbean would be an obvious area for Tren de Aragua cells to maintain their presence. Beyond the easy money to be made from ferrying migrants, the existing Venezuelan diaspora, which makes up over 10% of the population of Curaçao, provides fertile ground to find new victims.  Vulnerabilities in Curaçao's Institutions and Defense Curaçao's institutions and defense mechanisms are vulnerable to corruption and require ongoing vigilance. The Royal Netherlands Navy frequently deploys vessels to the Caribbean to monitor and counteract drug trafficking and other illicit activities. These have proven crucial to seizing drugs and following go-fast boats. Seizures of cocaine by Dutch ships  such as the Zr.Ms . Groningen  are regularly among the most significant in the Caribbean and are an obvious way to show the Netherlands’ collaboration with American, British, French and Latin American partners. However, beyond the statistics, the impact of these patrols are limited.  Source: Koninklijke Marine For example, periods of increased criminal activity have been observed during the absence of these patrols. When a ship is rotating out of the Dutch Caribbean area, and replacements can need several months to be in place, a noticeable increase in drug-related crimes and smuggling activities, showing how this prevention does not actually harm long-term criminal abilities. And a March 2024 report stated  that “ the port of Curaçao is increasingly being chosen by international drug cartels as a starting point for shipping large quantities of cocaine to the Netherlands and other European destinations.” A major reason for this was that the Dutch Coast Guard had not had a patrol vessel assigned to the island for almost a year, allowing go-fast boats to operate with more impunity. Corruption has also long been a challenge, with prosecutors seeking prison sentences of up to 15 years now for corrupt port personnel. There have been several reports of law enforcement officials colluding with drug traffickers. Beyond drugs, the handling of Venezuelan crude oil stored  on Curaçao has also presented opportunities for graft. Worse, the treatment of migrants has come in for sharp criticism. An April 2024 investigation  by Dutch media, Pointer, found that Venezuelan migrants were abused, families were separated, and were not provided with legal protection. Instead of helping these migrants and sheltering them from criminal influence, this lack of support only enhances the chance they will fall into the clutches of Tren de Aragua or other Venezuelan gangs. Phenomenon of Island Hopping Island hopping has become a critical tactic for criminal organizations operating in the Caribbean, significantly impacting Dutch territories like Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao. This method involves using the geographic proximity of islands to Venezuela to facilitate the movement of drugs, arms, and human trafficking victims, making law enforcement efforts exceedingly challenging. Criminals exploit the close distances between these islands, allowing them to quickly transfer illegal goods and evade detection. One longstanding tactic is for traffickers to use high-speed boats to move cocaine from Venezuela to the Dutch Caribbean islands, where the drugs are then further distributed to Europe and North America. These small, fast vessels can easily navigate the archipelago, making it difficult for authorities to intercept them. And when they do, the crews don’t hesitate to use violence. On June 4, 2024, two Dutch craft responded  to a go-fast boat near Curaçao, suspected of carrying cocaine. Three men on board opened fire on the Dutch soldiers who defended themselves and sunk the ship and alleged traffickers. The quantities on board can be eye-watering, with around one ton of cocaine found on one vesse l in November 2023 and 1,600 kilograms dumped off  another last July.  This is nothing new, the cat-and-mouse game between traffickers and Dutch law enforcement has lasted for years. But the additional complexity of island hopping complicates the state response. While the Zr.Ms . Groningen  and other naval assets are a major strength for the Netherlands, integrated surveillance, data-sharing and other forms of cooperation with smaller Caribbean nations are weak. Crises to do with homicide, arms trafficking, and cybercrime in the region have triggered efforts to curb this lack of cooperation. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) began a cybercrime initiative  in 2022 and a “war on guns”  in 2023. Much of CARICOM’s work in the criminal and security sphere is focused on the threat from Venezuela.  However, the Netherlands-CARICOM collaboration is not yet fully exploited, since Curaçao only became  an associate member in June 2024. It is the only Dutch Caribbean island to have this status.  There is much for the Netherlands to offer, including the use of radar systems and aerial drones to warn other nations of suspicious ships and planes. Additionally, fostering stronger legal frameworks and joint task forces among Caribbean nations can ensure swift action to disrupt these sophisticated networks and secure the region more effectively​.

Written by Sara Frisan, Arianna Lucà, and Alessia Cappelletti   Following the 2024 Venezuelan Presidential election, protests have escalated in major cities nationwide. While the situation is still evolving, international reactions have been mixed.  A clear divide is visible. China, Iran, and Russia have rushed to congratulate President Maduro on his victory, while the U.S. and the E.U. have said  they would not recognize the election results until all votes were counted and records provided. U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken said the ‘result announced [did] not reflect the will of the voters’. The E.U.’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell stressed the importance to ‘ensure full transparency’ and respect the will of Venezuelans. Other countries  in Latin America have also expressed doubts about the outcome, and called  for an emergency meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS) permanent council on 31 July. Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Peru, and Panama have rejected the result or called for more transparency. In response, the Foreign Minister Yvan Gil has expelled  all diplomatic staff from these states to leave Venezuela with immediate effect.  Instead, other regional partners of Venezuela such as Cuba, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Bolivia have all congratulated President Maduro.  The international response so far is in line with Venezuela’s foreign ties under Maduro, which for the past decade have thrown him and his regime a lifeline. Over the years, Maduro's administration has strengthened ties with Russia and China, while distancing itself from the U.S.. This alignment has been exacerbated by sanctions that exclude Venezuela from the U.S. market. Venezuela has also become increasingly isolated, withdrawing from regional bodies like the Organization of American States and Mercosur, Latin America's largest economic union.  Caracas and Washington  The U.S. has imposed sanctions on Venezuela since 2005, targeting individuals and entities associated with the government. The sanctions intensified after Maduro's controversial re-election in 2018, which was marred by allegations of voter suppression and human rights abuses. The Trump administration, along with a coalition of Latin American countries, implemented "maximum pressure" sanctions aimed at ousting Maduro. These measures severely restricted Venezuela's access to U.S. financial markets and froze the assets of the state oil company, PDVSA. In 2023, a potential thaw between the US and Venezuela emerged with the Barbados Agreement, which sought to promote dialogue between the Maduro government and the opposition in return for allowing U.S. companies like Chevron to resume oil operations in Venezuela. However, following violations of the agreement, sanctions were reimposed in April 2024. As of July 2024, there were indications that Maduro sought to resume negotiations with the U.S. Following the National Electoral Council’s announcement of the election result, the US said  the results had been manipulated and did not reflect the will of the Venezuelan people. On July 30,  after a call between US President Joe Biden and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio da Silva, they issued a joint statement  on “the need for immediate release of full, transparent and detailed voting data”.  Caracas and Moscow   Russian President Vladimir Putin is among the few world leaders who congratulated Venezuelan President Maduro on his proclaimed victory in the Presidential election. Russia has been a pivotal ally for Venezuela since the early 2000s under Hugo Chávez, and the two countries enjoy a strategic partnership and robust political, military ties  and economic relations. They are also profoundly opposed to US foreign policy.  Venezuela has generally always supported Russia's actions, including Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and opposed NATO's defensive measures. In exchange, Russian oil companies are engaged in major exploration projects for oil and mineral resources in Venezuela, and they have recently agreed to increase the pace and volume of their cooperation in the field of nuclear energy and oil production. Russia has also provided Venezuela with military hardware, including advanced weapons systems, and has supported Venezuela's military elite.  Russia has consistently provided diplomatic support to Venezuela, voicing concerns about external interference of the West and blocking sanctions and embargoes on the Latin American country. By maintaining relations with Venezuela, Russia is also able to prevent US interests in Latin America generally, as well as claiming to have a more substantial role in international security. For example, in February 2024, Russia’s foreign minister Sergey Lavrov claimed to have arranged a meeting between Venezuela and Guyana to settle the territorial dispute over the Essequibo territory to form the basis for a constructive dialogue. Caracas and Beijing   The ties between China and Venezuela are long-standing and significant. On  July 29 , Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian congratulated  Maduro, saying China will strengthen relations with Venezuela.  China has opposed the re-imposition of US sanctions on Venezuela, and remains one of the most important buyers of Venezuelan crude oil. Despite criticism, with the reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Venezuela, China’s interest in Venezuelan oil is likely to increase. The sanctions make Venezuelan oil less expensive and reduce competition, presenting a more attractive opportunity for China. As the world’s largest importer of oil, China could benefit significantly from the lower prices and increased availability of Venezuelan crude oil. China has provided Venezuela massive investments and loans through state-owned banks in exchange for oil, making it Caracas’ largest creditor and bilateral lender. In September 2023, President Maduro visited China and the two countries upgraded their relationship by signing an “all-weather strategic partnership”  covering various sectors such as economy, trade, development, agriculture, and tourism. President Maduro expressed strong support for Chinese initiatives and international frameworks like the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, and the Global Security Initiative. Venezuela is also the top purchaser of Chinese military hardware in Latin America, a relationship that deepened after the U.S. prohibited arms sales to Venezuela in 2006. Between 2006 and 2022, China exported  around $629 million worth of weapons to Venezuela. Caracas and Tehran Iran and Venezuela, both under heavy U.S. sanctions, have forged a closer partnership, particularly in the oil sector. Iran has recently supplied Venezuela with gasoline and technical assistance to develop its oil industry, helping Venezuela circumvent some of the impacts of U.S. sanctions. However, economic challenges persist and Venezuela has had difficulties in meeting payment obligations to Iran. Why the Netherlands should observe this election The international community closely watched Venezuelan presidential elections, as the outcome could impact regional stability and global geopolitical dynamics. But with Maduro at the helm, at least for the foreseeable future, Venezuela’s stance in the world is unlikely to change.  The Dutch government warned  about the interference of the geopolitical interests of third parties (U.S., China, Russia) on its border with the country. The Kingdom of the Netherlands shares its longest border with Venezuela, through the Dutch Caribbean islands—Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao. The recurring socio-economic, political and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela has led to a mass exodus of Venezuelans to other countries in the region and the US. This has acutely affected the Dutch ABC island too. Aruba, in particular, has become a significant destination for Venezuelan refugees, with Venezuelans making up about 15% of its population. With the maintenance of US sanctions on the country, the economic situation could become worse in the future. In 2023, Venezuela and the Netherlands began to restore diplomatic ties, aiming to gradually reopen the borders that Maduro closed in February 2019. This closure was initially implemented to block humanitarian aid, which Maduro claimed was part of a plot to overthrow his government. Without a change of government, the tense relationship is likely to continue while Maduro is in power. While the likelihood of a conflict between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and Venezuela is low, Maduro has shown he is willing to use conflict as a means to try and shore up support from the military. Maduro’s threats  to annex Essequibo’s territory from Guyana in October 2023 demonstrates he is willing to restart territorial disputes with Venezuela’s neighbors. The Venezuelan elections are therefore important for the security of the Dutch Caribbean islands.  Edited by Chris Dalby, Director of World of Crime

Written by Sara Frisan, Arianna Luc à and Alessia Cappelletti The Security Strategy for the Kingdom of the Netherlands published in April 2023 highlights that the complex and evolving situation in Venezuela holds significant implications for the Netherlands. Venezuela's political instability, economic crises, extensive criminal networks, and growing alliances with non-Western powers like Russia, China, and Iran pose potential security and economic challenges that could ripple across the Caribbean and beyond. The Dutch Caribbean, particularly the ABC islands (Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao), which share maritime borders with Venezuela, are directly impacted by flows of illicit drugs and weapons, displacement, and regional security concerns.  In this three-part series, Dyami collaborates with World of Crime  to delve into the political, international, and criminal challenges facing Venezuela, and why these developments matter for the Netherlands. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for Dutch policymakers, businesses, and citizens in navigating the complexities of an interconnected world. In the first article of the series, we look at the Venezuelan elections held on Sunday July 28 and possible spill-overs.  Venezuelan election sparks hope for change  Venezuela  held its Presidential elections on July 28 and the situation is still evolving at the time of publication. For the first time in over a decade of growing autocracy, mismanagement, and economic crisis, hopes for political change are high – Venezuela could emerge from political and economic isolation and an eventual democratic transition. But challenging times lie ahead, whoever is confirmed the winner. President Nicolás Maduro, who first came to power in 2013, has consolidated his power by securing control over the military and institutions like the National Electoral Council, the Supreme Court, and the judiciary through political repression, censorship, and rampant corruption. Under Maduro's rule, Venezuela, home to the largest world's oil reserves, suffered economic collapse, hyperinflation, and chronic shortages of essential goods.  Compounded by plummeting global oil prices and U.S. sanctions against the Venezuelan government and oil apparatus, the country tumbled rapidly into a tight economic recession that forced nearly 8 million people to leave the country. According to a UN Human Rights Council report , today over 80% of Venezuelans live in poverty and 53% are unable to afford food.  Recent polls had predicted a victory for the opposition, showing that most Venezuelans  were eager for change and willing to exercise their right to vote. The favorite was opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia, the replacement for opposition leader Maria Corina Machado, who has been barred from running by the government. Despite efforts to disadvantage the opposition, most polls  predicted Maduro and his United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) wo uld lose by 20 to 40 points. However, in the early hours of Monday 29th July the National Electoral Council (CNE), controlled by Maduro allies, said Maduro had won with 51.2% of votes, against 44.2% for González Urrutia.   The result –and whether it is accepted– will be consequential for Venezuela, for its diaspora abroad, and the country’s foreign relations.  Contested results  On July 29th The National Electoral Council declared President Nicolas Maduro the winner of the presidential election, with Maduro claiming 51% of the vote against the opposition’s 44%. The result has been disputed by the opposition and many countries who observed the elections in the Americas and Europe. Leading opposition figure Maria Corina Machado claims González won 70% of the vote.  Opposition leaders claimed the election was rigged, saying that their witnesses were denied access to the CNE headquarters as the votes were counted, and that some votes were prevented from being processed. Instead, Maduro claimed  elections were fair and that outsiders tried to interfere.  Large protests will lead to a crackdown by security forces supporting Maduro, who warned the opposition of a ‘ fratricidal civil war ’ if he lost the election. Maduro has expressed no intention to step aside, while more countries are joining the widespread international community's lack of trust in the results. The OAS will hold a meeting on Wednesday, 31st of July, to discuss the results.  Despite the opposition leader calling for calm, protests took place in Caracas, and several other main cities, as well as other countries, including Argentina, against the election results on Monday evening.  Thousands of people took the streets of Caracas, chanting  “Freedom, freedom” and “This government is going to fall”. Protesters around the country took down at least two statutes of Hugo Chavez, Maduro’s predecessor. Security forces fired tear gas and rubber bullets at protesters, some responded by throwing molotov cocktails and rocks.  Maduro’s government is not new to protests and demonstrations. In 2014, 2017 and 2019 protests against the government have become increasingly violent. Maduro’s  government has been notoriously repressing dissent in the past, through violent crackdowns on street protests, jailing opponents, and prosecuting civilians in military courts, for the act of protesting, causing the human rights crisis that contributed to the Venezuelan exodus.  An important role is also played by the military and law enforcement authorities, as they enjoy a privileged position in Venezuela, which historically has a constructed militarized state apparatus. By giving the military money, prestige and power, Maduro has bought their political backing and their support, which Juan Guaidó, Maduro’s opponent in 2018, lacked . Currently, there are no signs that the military is breaking from the government.  Fraud and Electoral Manipulation  Venezuela has not held free and fair elections since 2013, and the opposition has been largely absent from elections since 2015 due to the government’s tested and proven repression and manipulation tactics.  In 2015, Leopoldo López, a prominent opposition leader, was sentenced to 14 years in prison, on charges of inciting violence during anti-government protests which the European Union defined as politically motivated. This followed a six-year ban from holding public office which began in 2008. In 2017, Henrique Capriles, another opposition figure, was barred from running for public office for 15 years, for alleged administrative irregularities. In 2023, the Maduro administration charged his most famous opponent, Juan Guaidó, with money laundering, treason, and usurping public functions, after years of intimidating him and his staff.  There are many more such examples. Most recently, the opposition's initial candidate, Maria Corina Machado, was banned from running in January 2024 over alleged fraud and tax violations, which caused the U.S. to reinstate sectoral sanctions lifted in October 2023. Machado has already faced criminal charges for her participation in anti-government protests 2014, when she also was stripped of her parliamentary seat. Maduro, however, still has a challenger. González, a less well-known career diplomat of Machado’s party, was leading in the polls  in the run up to the election. He has promised to revive the economy, restore independent institutions and free expression, and release political prisoners.  A free and fair election was far from guaranteed. Maduro has been manipulating both the campaign and the electoral process. Despite pledging to hold competitive elections, the regime holds power over key political institutions, including the National Assembly and the National Electoral Council (CNE). In mid-June 2024, six CNE members were forced to resign without explanation and the National Assembly immediately appointed a new CNE commission whose members have close ties to the ruling party.  Maduro has attempted to undermine the chances and credibility of the opposition through intimidation, deliberate arrests of opposition coalition members, journalists, and anti-government activists, and arbitrary disqualification of several opposition figures and electoral candidates, including Machado, from taking office. It is estimated that approximately fifty of the latest arrests among opposition ranks are linked to Machado and González.  In late June, the government banned  ten sitting mayors from holding offices, after González and Machado held rallies in their cities. On July 18, 2024, the head of security for Machado was arrested by authorities on charges of gender violence. Both Machado and González condemned this as a deliberate provocation to weaken their security just before the election.  The government is also taking advantage of the state-owned media and social media to prevent coverage of opposition candidates and pushing the narratives of the ruling party.  Despite the Venezuelan Constitution guaranteeing the right to vote for citizens abroad, the government is imposing bureaucratic obstacles to prevent the Venezuelan diaspora from voting. Currently, only a few  of the nearly 8 million Venezuelans living abroad have managed to register. The borders with Colombia were also closed  on the 27th and 28th of July for ‘security reasons, preventing citizens living on the border from traveling back to vote.  The E.U. was not allowed to observe the elections, but the U.N. and the Carter Center provided limited election monitoring and kept their findings confidential. The Carter Center has mentioned  they “will not conduct a comprehensive assessment of the voting counting, and tabulation process,” due to its limited presence.  Venezuela after the elections These elections are crucial for stability in Latin America. Maduro’s alleged victory has lead to increased tensions throughout the region. Any rapprochement with the U.S. and lifting of sanctions will now be far harder and he  will probably forge stronger economic ties with China, Russia and Cuba.  The alleged electoral defeat of the opposition and Maduro’s firm rejection of protesters' demands has closed the door to more cooperative relations with the international community. González was expected to pivot toward democratic governments in the region and with Washington, and work to rebuild international ties. He had announced plans to rebuild international ties with multilateral organizations, such as the IMF, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. With Maduro’s clinging to power, these options have been taken away. The contested election is far from over, and more civil unrest and protests are expected to happen. Even minor institutional victories at lower levels of government, these elections show the hold of the PSUV over Venezuela’s political institutions. Dismantling those institutions built over years of PSUV rule will not be easy to clean up. Maduro’s party still controls the military establishment and is likely to crack down on opposition protests. Any transition to a new government would take place six months from now, giving plenty of time for Maduro to derail the democratic process.  Edited by Chris Dalby

Date:   24/07/2024 Location:   Bangladesh  Parties involved:   Students in Bangladesh, the Government of Bangladesh, Bangladesh National Party (BNP) What happened? Bangladesh has been faced with large student protests   since early July . The protests demand a change to a quota system  which requires 30% of well-paid civil service jobs to go to veterans from the Bangladesh war of independence in 1971. Protesters argue that the quota system is biased in favor of the ruling Awami League party members. The protests in early July started peacefully, but became violent on 15/07/2024 . The authorities launched a harsh crackdown on demonstrators  with security forces targeting unarmed students, imposing a curfew in major cities and shutting down internet services around the country. PM Sheikh Hasina has claimed that the measures were necessary as political opponents were behind the protests and accused them of being ‘internal enemies’.  As of 23/07/2024 , various news outlets reported that the death toll had reached 160 and that over 2,500 people have been arrested. The United Nations and Human Rights Watch have condemned the crackdown on the protests by the authorities of Bangladesh. The protests took place in Chittagong , Natore , Rajshahi and the capital city of Dhaka . The protests mainly focused on university campuses, but in Dhaka also spread to other districts with protesters calling for a complete ‘shutdown’ of the capital. On 21/07/2024  Bangladesh Supreme Court decided to scale the job quota back to 5% for family members of 1971 independence war veterans and 2% for members of ethnic minorities, transgenders, and disabled people.  While the Supreme Court scrapped most of the job quota, the protesters gave the government a 48-hour deadline to meet new demands  on 22/07/2024 . The demands call for justice for the killed protesters and their families and call for Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to take responsibility. In addition, the protesters want the home minister and the road, transport and bridges minister to resign from cabinet and the Awami League party. Another demand is the resignation of the Vice Chancellors of multiple universities and the arrest of police officers that are responsible for the killings.  Analysis: Bangladesh became independent in 1971 following a brutal war of independence from West Pakistan. Originally a part of East and West Pakistan, the then ruling military junta began Operation Searchlight to target Bengali nationalists through a mass insurgency campaign culminating in the Bengali genocide. The secular Awami League, supported by India, drove the military junta’s troops out of the country and declared its independence as Bangladesh. The Awami League has been in power since 1971 . The current PM Sheikh Hasina is the daughter of the leader of the independence movement.  The violent response and crackdown on the protesters poses a serious challenge to the ruling Awami League . After winning the election on a low turnout with low voter participation and banning the main opposition party in January 2024, the grievances over inequality and corruption  are continuing to be key concerns. The resurgence of a coordinated student movement and support for the opposition Bangladesh National Party (BNP) could lead to a more violence response from the authorities, as they have cracked down harshly on opposition movements using live ammunition in extensive anti-government protests in 2018 and 2023.   The court ruling in favor of overturning the quota system on 23/07/2024  may calm the situation in the short-term. However there are still unmet demands by student protesters  who have posted further demands arguing for a public apology to the families of students who were killed from the PM Sheikh Hasina and the resignation of several government ministers. It is still unclear how many protesters have been killed or tortured, with conservative estimates stating at least 150 people have died. India has thus far remained neutral on the crackdown and curfew , calling it a matter of internal affairs. New Delhi has formed a close relationship with the ruling Awami League and may prioritize regime stability above accommodation. India is looking to maintain border stability with Bangladesh and prevent large inflows of refugees which could destabilize the delicate security situation in Manipur and Assam.  The UAE, India and Malaysia have evacuated citizens from major airports in Dhaka and Chittagong . Major airports are unlikely to be targeted but some protestors have called for airports which transport members of the ruling Awami League party to be blocked.

Written by Mark Bruno On July 9th, the U.S. Department of Justice, aided by Dutch and Canadian intelligence, disrupted an AI-driven Russian disinformation campaign. This operation involved seizing domains and social media accounts used to create fake personas and spread propaganda. The campaign, linked to Russian state media, and utilizing a proprietary AI software "Meliorator," aimed at influencing the U.S. elections and other international audiences. The Dutch General and Military Intelligence agencies also identified the misuse of Dutch infrastructure for these cyber activities. The seizure significantly hindered the campaign's capabilities, but it’s only one step in combating the massive narrative webs being laid out by Kremlin-backed actors.  ‘Troll Farms’, ‘Deepfakes’ and the Threat to Digital Truth Russia has long been recognized as a significant threat in hybrid warfare, particularly through its information operations . This capability was most notably demonstrated during the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the support for separatist factions in Donbas. Russian disinformation efforts aimed to justify the annexation  and undermine the Ukrainian government by using state-sponsored groups, social media bots, and social media trolls to amplify pro-Russian narratives and spread false information about the Ukrainian government and military actions. The confusion throughout the earliest days of the conflict empowered more kinetic, “irregular” operations on the ground, often involving Russian soldiers posing as separatist militants as they moved to occupy vast areas of Eastern Ukraine. It wasn’t until the 2022 full-scale invasion  began that Russia’s dominance of the narrative was largely unchallenged in popular culture.  This capacity for seeming to alter reality has only grown in the decade since, as Russian disinformation efforts spread across numerous platforms with fake or re-contextualized news, video, and written content. As well, the rise of Generative AI models (such as ChatGPT) has made both creating this content and spreading it far easier, possibly stifling consequences among the international community. This is why much attention has been focused on influencing elections in countries of strategic importance to Ukraine. The Recent Investigations and Takedowns Disruption of AI-Enhanced Bot Farms In July 2024 , the U.S. Department of Justice, in collaboration with international partners, disrupted a sophisticated AI-enhanced social media bot farm operated by a cooperation of Russian state entities such as the RT (Russia Today) media network, and the FSB (Russia’s Federal Security Service). This operation involved seizing domain names and finding 968 social media accounts used to disseminate disinformation . These bot farms created realistic fake personas to promote pro-Russian narratives and sow discord, targeting audiences in the United States and other Western countries. Other Recent Instances of Countering Disinformation In 2022, a report by the RAND Corporation  circulated, focusing on Russia’s persistent social media efforts and election interference as an additional avenue for its strategic gains in Ukraine. The conclusion of this report emphasized a dire need for international cooperation, and projected the need to address these concerns in NATO and EU-aligned countries  as 2024 approached–a year wherein, famously, over 50 countries would be going to the polls. In the time since, Chinese disinformation tactics have also been exposed  through international partnerships in other theaters. In 2023, pro-Chinese narratives featuring AI-generated content were circulating in an operation dubbed “Shadow Play” across YouTube and Facebook. The narratives targeted sensitive topics in the U.S. and Australia. It eventually resulted in a takedown of thousands of accounts across several of Google and Meta’s products .  Earlier this year, Moldova ’s upcoming elections came into the spotlight. A joint statement in June by the U.S., Canada, and the UK condemned Russia’s alleged electoral interference in Moldova . In response to the individual governments’ findings, representatives from the Five Eyes intelligence alliance have promised greater cooperation and offered assistance to Moldova’s government. Moldova, despite not being a part of NATO, has its own issues with Russian interference, particularly in the separatist region of Transnistria, recognized by the Russian government and a base for an estimated 1500 Russian soldiers. Moldova has become a target of interest for the Kremlin, due to its strategic position relative to Ukraine, and its recent ascendency to EU Candidate status. The Threat Actors and Campaigns  Involved in Current Russian Operations Russia’s network for generating and spreading disinformation involves a web of threat actors, deniable assets, and campaigns variably related to more “traditional” state-run media (such as Sputnik and RT), as well as military and foreign intelligence services. While there is no confirmation as to whether or not any of the following entities have been neutralized through recent operations, it’s suspected that they’ve been seriously impacted. CopyCop CopyCop is a network of disinformation creators that utilize AI to manipulate and spread politically charged content, targeting divisive issues in the US and Europe. This operation creates fake news by scraping and rewriting articles from conservative-leaning and state-affiliated media, amplifying pro-Russian narratives and aiming to influence election outcomes and public opinion. The infrastructure supporting CopyCop has ties to disinformation outlets like DCWeekly  and The Boston Times . DoppelGanger The Doppelganger operation clones legitimate media and government websites to distribute pro-Russian disinformation. Outlets they’ve attempted to clone have included Le Monde , The Guardian , Der Spiegel , and Fox News. By creating fake articles and videos, Doppelganger targets various countries, including the US and EU, spreading narratives that depict Ukraine negatively and undermine support for sanctions against Russia. Recent Reliable News (RRN) Recent Reliable News (RRN) is part of the Doppelganger operation, creating cloned versions of legitimate media websites to disseminate pro-Russian narratives. By mimicking trusted news sources, RRN spreads misinformation about the Ukraine conflict and undermines Western support, focusing on manipulating public opinion through realistic fake news. Project Kylo Project Kylo, managed by Russia’s SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service), focuses on spreading fear and uncertainty to destabilize Western governments and diminish support for Ukraine. This operation uses fake NGOs to organize anti-establishment demonstrations and leverages advanced technologies to bypass traditional media channels, thereby directly influencing Western audiences with disinformation campaigns. The link to the Russian SVR has been established through an SVR officer named Mikhail Kolesov. John Mark Dougan John Mark Dougan, a former U.S. Marine and police officer now in Russia, is accused of operating a disinformation network that produces and distributes fake news in association with DCWeekly  and RNN. His network generates content that appears to come from credible sources, significantly impacting public perception by leveraging advanced AI technologies to spread pro-Russian propaganda. (above) Pages from The Boston Times, a Russian disinformation conduit. Note that it shows relatively normal US conservative-leaning headlines in its recent posts next to obvious fake stories about Ukraine . The Role of Generative AI and Large Language Models Russian disinformation campaigns have increasingly harnessed Generative AI and Large Language Models (LLMs) to enhance their operations. Generative AI facilitates the creation of deepfakes—realistic yet fabricated images, audio, and video—that blur the lines between reality and falsehood. These technologies enable the production of highly persuasive and coherent text, mimicking human writing to generate misleading articles, social media posts, and comments that seamlessly integrate with legitimate content. Meliorator - The Kremlin’s Generative AI Model Proprietary AI models are another critical component of these campaigns. Deepfakes can be used to fabricate speeches by public figures or events that never happened, making it challenging for audiences to discern truth from falsehood. Advanced language models are used to create persuasive and coherent text that mimics human writing, which can generate misleading articles, social media posts, and comments. Meliorator  is an AI-enhanced software package developed under the direction of the Russian state news outlet, RT. It was designed to create and manage a social media bot farm, generating fictitious profiles to disseminate pro-Russian narratives and influence public opinion, particularly targeting the United States and other Western countries. LLMs and AI-generated content have advanced social media manipulation, allowing bots and trolls to generate personalized, contextually relevant responses, making interactions appear genuine. This sophistication enhances the spread of disinformation, with AI tools adapting to real-time events and conversations, providing disinformation actors agility in steering public discourse. The strategic use of these technologies allows for precision targeting of specific demographics, exploiting biases and deepening social divisions. The global reach of these advanced technologies has been suspected of significantly impacting elections and public opinion across multiple countries. The international community has responded with countermeasures like the EU’s East StratCom Task Force  and NATO’s StratCom Centre of Excellence  to combat AI-driven disinformation. However, the sophistication of Generative AI and LLMs poses significant challenges for detection and verification, necessitating the development of new technologies and methodologies to effectively counter these threats. Broader Impacts and Strategic Importance These operations will likely escalate, given the ongoing and evolving nature of the threat posed by Russian information warfare. By leveraging AI and other advanced technologies, disinformation campaigns have become more sophisticated, necessitating equally advanced countermeasures. The success of these efforts highlight the importance of international cooperation, advanced technological capabilities, and proactive measures in protecting democratic processes and public opinion from foreign interference.

July 2024 Violent clashes in the South China Sea are raising tensions in the region. On 20th June, photos emerged of China Coast Guard personnel threatening Filipino crew with knives and spears and attempting to board resupply vessels at the contested Second Thomas Shoal, a reef in the South China Sea.  Later that month, the Philippines ambassador to the US warned of the risks of a regional war. As the Philippines has a mutual defense treaty with the US, the provocations raise the potential of a new flashpoint between the US and China. The Second Thomas Shoal lies in the South China Sea, one of the world’s busiest waterways, with over $3 trillion in world trade passing through to China’s mega ports every year. Over the past decade, China has sought greater control over the waterway and kicked off territorial disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines to assert control. However, the new approach adopted by the Philippines to improve its naval defense capabilities in the South China Sea is a turning point in the security of the region. The Philippines is pursuing various security relationships with states other than the US to improve its position.  Repeated Clashes in the South China Sea The Second Thomas Shoal is a submerged reef in the Spratly Islands to the southeast of the South China Sea. China, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam all claim sovereignty over the island. Located 200 km west of the Palawan island of the Philippines, it is around 20 km in length and is largely submerged at high tide. There are no permanent features or infrastructure. However, a small contingent of Philippine Navy personnel have been stationed there on a rusting WW2-era warship, the Sierra Madre since 1999. They have been resupplied every year to maintain the territorial claim for the Philippines.   Beijing is determined to prevent the resupply missions from happening. China’s Coast Guard has used military-grade lasers aimed at Filipino ships, almost blinding one Filipino fishermen, ramming and water cannons. On June 15, 2024, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) implemented a new policy authorizing the Chinese coast guard to detain foreigners crossing into waters claimed by China, potentially arresting Filipino citizens.  China’s actions against the Philippines have raised the risks of a US-China confrontation over the Second Thomas Shoal. The US is obliged to come to the defense of the Philippines in the 1951 mutual defense treaty, which is frequently supported by the Biden administration. While Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos said  that China’s actions do not yet warrant invoking the pact, he stated  that the death of a Filipino in SCS clashes would be ‘very close’ to an act of war.  Significance of the Second Thomas Shoal   The Second Thomas Shoal lies in the SCS, a key strategic waterway in Asia’s geopolitics. Beijing has claimed sovereignty over the SCS based on the “nine-dash line”, a claim which puts it at odds with other states in the region. There are vast untapped oil and gas reserves in the SCS, estimated at over 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 billion cubic feet of gas. It is vital for international commerce as over one-third of all maritime traffic passes to the largest ports in the world. China’s Navy has built and maintained several island reefs with air bases and a host of missile arsenals, aircraft hangers and surveillance systems to project power into the SCS.  The Philippines sees the Second Thomas Shoal as key to its own sovereignty claims, given that it lies within its Exclusive Economic Zone. Following years of the dispute, the Philippines took the contested claim to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea which ruled in favor of the Philippines in 2016. The Philippines sees defending the Second Thomas Shoal as its territorial claim and standing up for international law. There are also concerns  that Beijing will aim to take the shoal and put air bases and surveillance systems as the Chinese Navy did with the Mischief Reef, located 40 miles away.  Washington sees defending territorial claims of the Philippines as key to maintaining its security role in Asia, especially as other claimant states are looking to the US to hedge against China’s actions in the SCS. The Biden administration wants to maintain the idea of a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’, where ships are free to travel in the SCS. At the same time, the US is seeking to avoid confrontation that would invoke military support for the Philippines.  Why the Philippines? Vietnam has been fast developing  new islands in its SCS claims, though there are no notable outposts or infrastructure as yet. Malaysia and Indonesia have also been developing offshore oil and gas resources in China’s claimed territory, with Beijing largely not offering  a response as harsh as toward the Philippines. However, China has decided to target the Philippines, who is a US treaty ally, and potentially send a signal to other states to undermine the US as a security provider in the region. China’s blockade of Philippine reinforcements may be an attempt to prevent the Philippines from becoming closer to the US. China’s defense ministry and People’s Daily regularly condemn the stationing of US military troops and missile deployments to the northern Philippine island Luzon, which lies 500 km from Taiwan. In April 2024, the US sent  new missile launchers capable of targeting ships at sea to Luzon. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. said  that the country could be pulled into a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. China’s view is that the Philippines is merely a part of a broader geopolitical strategy to contain China. China has repeatedly stated that it objects to US security arrangements near its territorial waters. Chinese diplomats have accused the US of establishing a series of alliance systems aimed at introducing an Asia-Pacific version of NATO, claiming that this is an attempt to encircle China. Beijing also views the Aukus alliance between the US, Australia and Britain as an organization to confront China. The Philippines increasing cooperation with US allies in the region is therefore seen as another geopolitical move to confront China’s interests in the region.  New regional security ties The imbalance between China’s and the Philippines’ naval capabilities has led the Philippines to pursue better relations with the US. Marcos has allowed  the US to double the number of Philippine bases American soldiers. He has to some extent supported US priorities in the Taiwan Strait, saying the Philippines will be involved in the event of a Taiwan Crisis because it is too close to the Philippines. With the onset of a Trump presidency however, US security ties are far from guaranteed. The Philippines has also started to develop ties outside of the US partnership to conduct security arrangements with other regional powers. Japan and the Philippines will soon announce  a reciprocal access agreement allowing their troops to enter each other’s territory for joint exercises. Japan has already supplied patrol ships to the Philippines Coast Guard to defend its territorial sovereignty. Japanese prime minister, Fumio Kishida, has agreed to provide new coastal surveillance radar systems through grants. Japan’s patrol vessels, defense equipment and radar to strengthen Philippines’ law enforcement capability.  The Philippines has also developed closer ties with Australia and India. Australia shares the Philippines concerns over China’s growing military assertiveness in SCS and has become a significant military partner in the Philippines naval capabilities. They regularly conduct joint amphibious landings. India’s growing geopolitical competition with China has prompted India to forge closer ties with the Philippines and Taiwan. While their collaboration is not as significant compared with other powers, their combined naval exercises through the South China Sea indicate their growing cooperation in the maritime field.  Risks of escalation While it is unlikely that there will be open conflict between the Philippines and China, there is a chance of a crisis if a red line is crossed. Even with low-level conflict this raises the risk that the mutual defense treaty with the US will be invoked. US president Biden states that the treaty also covers Filipino ships and personnel. China has increased the number of ships around the Second Thomas Shoal and is monitoring other states in the SCS. There are some signs that Beijing and Manila are willing to talk with each other to resolve the crisis through dialogue, perhaps through a shared cooperation agreement on oil exploration. Yet the low-level conflict is remaking security ties in Asia and offering new regional security arrangements against China’s growing assertiveness.