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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Geneva, 21 May 2025 Axturis Flight Services and Dyami Security Intelligence are proud to announce a strategic agreement signed today during EBACE 2025 in Geneva. The partnership will enhance Axturis’ client offering by integrating Dyami’s cutting-edge aviation risk intelligence into its flight support services. Under the agreement, Axturis will leverage Dyami’s bespoke threat assessments, geopolitical monitoring, and aviation-specific intelligence to provide clients with real-time insights into emerging risks. This collaboration aims to ensure that flight operations remain safe, secure, and well-informed—no matter the region or complexity of the mission. “Our clients expect us to stay ahead of developments and ensure their safety at all times,” said Katharina Reinisch , Managing Director of Axturis Flight Services. “By partnering with Dyami, we’re taking a major step forward in how we assess and mitigate risks in global aviation.” Eric Schouten , CEO of Dyami Security Intelligence, added: “We’re excited to work with Axturis, a company known for its high standards and commitment to operational excellence. This partnership reflects our shared mission: to turn intelligence into action and support flight operators with timely, tailored security insights.” The agreement was formalized at EBACE 2025, the premier event for the European business aviation community. For more information, please contact: Dyami Security Intelligence info@dyami.services www.dyami.services/ebace Axturis Flight Services info@axturis.com www.axturis.flightservices.com In the accompanying photo: Dyami CEO Eric Schouten ., Axturis Managing Director Katharina Reinisch and Axturis CEO Ludwig Reiter.

Date:  21/05/2025 Where:  Israel, Ben Gurion Airport (TLV/LLBG), Iran, Strait of Hormuz Who’s involved: Israel, Houthis (Yemen), Iran, US Context: On 17/03/2025, Israel resumed its airstrikes on Gaza, violating the ceasefire, which triggered retaliatory airstrikes from both the Houthis and Hamas. This escalation has worsened the airspace security in the region, particularly in the LLLL/Tel Aviv FIR.  Due to the renewed fighting and expanding Israeli operations in Gaza, the conflict between Israel and the Houthis also flared up. Between 04/05/2025 and 18/05/2025, the Israelis and the Houthis have exchanged missiles, as a result of a missile hit near Ben Gurion Airport (TLV/LLBG) on 04/05/2025.   Following the strike on 04/05/2025 , the Houthis declared its intent to enforce a total aerial blockade on Israel , primarily through the deployment of missiles directed at Israeli airports, Flights to Tel Aviv were cancelled by international airlines the same day. Subsequently, Israel launched  retaliatory airstrikes on Sanaa International Airport (SAH/OYSN) on 06/05/2025.  These were followed by more strikes on different locations in Hodeidah, Yemen, in the days following. On  15/05/2025 , Israel closed TLV/LLBG after a missile launch from Yemen was detected, underscoring the heightened tensions amid continued missile exchanges between the two sides. What happened:  On 19/05/2025 , Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthis announced a maritime blockade on Israel’s Haifa Port , in response to Israel’s ongoing conflict in Gaza. At the same time, the Houthis continue to  fire missiles at Ben Gurion Airport  (TLV/LLBG), with its most recent strikes targeting the airport on 18/05/2025 .  The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that several vessels experienced Global Positioning System (GPS) interference in the Strait of Hormuz for several hours on  18/05/2025 . This incident suggests that Iran may be engaging in electronic jamming of navigation systems, potentially marking the early stages of a broader threat or escalation campaign targeting international shipping. In addition, on 21/05/2025, unverified reports by CNN highlight US intelligence indicating that Israel may be preparing strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.  CNN cited US officials and reported that the new intelligence was derived from both public and private communications involving senior Israeli officials, intercepted Israeli messages, and observations of Israeli military movements that may indicate a potential strike. Analysis :  Reports of a possible Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities — though still unconfirmed — are concerning and warrant close monitoring. The likelihood of a strike may be tied to whether the US-Iran deal proceeds without requiring the complete removal of Iran’s uranium stockpile. Amid a shift in US foreign policy priorities away from Israel - illustrated by the successful negotiation for the release of Hamas-held hostage Edan Alexander, which involved direct US-Hamas dialogue without notifying Israel- Israel may be more willing to pursue its own strategic objectives, even if they diverge from Washington’s focus on maintaining regional stability.  That being said, it is also possible that Israel purposefully ‘leaked’ this threat as a strategic move  to prompt renewed engagement with the US, potentially encouraging Washington to make concessions in exchange for de-escalation.  However, if Israel does proceed with an attack on Iran, a strong response from Tehran is highly likely , especially considering Iran’s prior retaliatory missile strikes following the Israeli airstrike on its consulate in Damascus in April 2024 and the assassination of Hamas leader Haniyeh in Tehran in October 2024. Retaliation concerns furthermore exist over Iran blocking oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, which it has threatened to do during times of heightened tensions in the past. Regional tensions, as well as the credibility of Iran’s leadership, hinge on its hardline position toward Israel.   The regime is unlikely to remain unresponsive or inactive in the face of such aggression, as doing so could undermine its perceived strength.

Date:  12/05/2025  - update of previous version posted on 09/05/2025 Where:  Jammu and Kashmir Region, Anantnag District, Indian-Pakistani border area. Who’s involved: India Pakistan General overview of the latest developments:  On 10/05/2025,  India and Pakistan agreed to a U.S.-brokered ceasefire to halt escalating hostilities. However, the truce was fragile; reports of artillery fire and drone incursions emerged shortly after its implementation, with both sides accusing each other of violations. As of today, 12/05/2025 , reports indicated a relative calm along the India-Pakistan border, with no overnight firing in the heavily militarized regions, including Jammu and Kashmir. Both nations are scheduled to hold talks between top military leaders about the next steps. Both nations began to ease airspace restrictions. On 12/05/2025 , India reopened 32 airports   that were temporarily shut due to security concerns, allowing civil aviation operations to resume.  However, airports warn that changing airspace dynamics and newly mandated security protocols from India’s Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS) could lead to potential schedule changes and longer wait times at checkpoints. Pakistan reopened its airspace on 10/05/2025  following a closure implemented earlier that morning. On 07/05/2025, India launched ‘Operation Sindoor’, striking multiple coordinated airstrikes against ‘terrorist camps’ in Pakistan in retaliation for a deadly terrorist attack on Hindu tourists in India-administered Kashmir on 22/04/2025. Since then, tensions between the two South Asian neighbours have been escalating, and the conflict has led to the worst fighting between India and Pakistan in nearly 3 decades . Both countries have exchanged cross-border fire and shelling, and fired missiles and drones at each other. For the first time since the full-scale war of 1971 between India and Pakistan, India has attacked places in Pakistan outside of Kashmir.  Historic Context: The Kashmir conflict, a territorial dispute between India and Pakistan, dates back to 1947, following the partition of British India.  Both nations claim Jammu and Kashmir in full. The Line of Control (LoC) became the border between the Indian- and Pakistani-controlled parts of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. An uneasy peace followed, with frequent skirmishes between the neighbours over the years. On 22/04/2025, militants attacked Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir, killing 26 people. The Resistance Front (linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba) claimed responsibility.  Retaliatory measures followed suit. On 23/04/2025, India suspended the Indus Waters Treaty, endangering Pakistan’s crucial water supply. India also closed the Attari trade checkpoint, banned travel under the SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme, and expelled Pakistani diplomats. Both countries are barred from entering each other’s airspace. Latest updates:  On 09/05/2025 , fighting intensified along the Line of Control (LoC) and parts of the international border. Both sides engaged in heavy artillery shelling, with exchanges reported in Poonch, Rajouri, and Kupwara sectors.  Cross-border infiltration attempts were also reported, with India claiming it intercepted several armed militants attempting to cross into Jammu and Kashmir. Civilian areas on both sides came under fire, resulting in multiple casualties and the continued displacement of local populations. Indian Air Force jets were seen conducting low-altitude flights near the LoC, while Pakistan reportedly moved additional air defense assets closer to the border. On 09/05/2025,  India issued a series of Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) announcing the temporary closure of 32 airports across northern and western regions, effective from 5:29 AM local time on 15/05/2025 .  On 10/05/2025 , the Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority (PCAA) announced a complete closure of Pakistani airspace at 3:15 AM local time, initially set to remain in effect until at least 12:00 PM local time on 11/05/2025 .  Later that same day, a U.S.-brokered ceasefire was announced  following high-level diplomatic efforts. In response to the ceasefire, the PCAA reopened Pakistani airspace at 5:05 PM local time. However, artillery exchanges and drone activity continued overnight, casting doubt on the truce’s effectiveness. Civilian areas near the LoC and in Punjab were hit by shelling, with casualties reported on both sides.  On 11/05/2025 , India claimed that its airstrikes had eliminated over 100 militants in precision attacks on Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) sites deep inside Pakistan-administered territory. Pakistan denied the casualty figures and insisted that civilian and military infrastructure was targeted. Simultaneously, Pakistan reported retaliatory strikes on 26 Indian military sites. The death toll continued to rise, with close to 70 confirmed dead by evening. On  12/05/2025 , both countries began showing signs of de-escalation. India reopened 32 airports previously closed, and commercial flights resumed with caution. No new cross-border attacks were reported overnight. Military officials from both sides held initial talks via secure channels, with plans for further discussions. However, border villages remain evacuated due to fears of unexploded ordnance and renewed conflict. Since the attack on 22/04/2025, airlines are still avoiding overflying the border between the two countries, and most international carriers are avoiding flying over Pakistan (OPLR/Lahore and OPKR/Karachi FIRs) altogether.

Date:   07/05/2025 - update of previous version posted on 25/04/2025 Where:  Jammu and Kashmir Region, Anantnag District Who’s involved: India, Pakistan What happened:  On 07/05/2025 , India started ‘Operation Sindoor’, conducting several coordinated airstrikes against Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) militant camps in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. India claims only terrorist infrastructure was hit and India’s Ministry of Defense described the operation as ‘focused, measured, and non-escalatory.’ Pakistan denies that the attacks only hit terrorist infrastructure, claiming that they hit civilian infrastructure, and stated it considers this an ‘act of war’. In retaliation, Pakistan claims it shot down five Indian Air Force jets and one drone. As of now, reports state that three Indian fighter jets were shot down (possibly 1x Su-30, 1x Mirage 2000 and 1x Rafale). The confirmation of the lost aircrafts comes from the Indian authorities, which state that three jets have ‘crashed’. Another unnamed Indian official has mentioned that an additional unknown aircraft crashed in Punjab (likely another IAF aircraft, for a total of four fighters lost). Unconfirmed reports state that Pakistan lost one aircraft (likely a JF-17). Cross-border shelling continues along the Line of Control (LoC). Pakistan reports 26 fatalities and over 46 injuries after the airstrikes. Indian authorities claim at least 10 deaths and numerous injuries in Indian-administered Kashmir resulting from alleged Pakistani firing. Airlines are avoiding overflying the border between the two countries, and most are avoiding flying over Pakistan (OPLR/Lahore and OPKR/Karachi FIRs) altogether, such as KLM, Air France, Thai Airways, Korean Air and Lufthansa and its subsidiaries. Flight operations were suspended at Islamabad, Lahore, and Karachi, but were restored shortly after. Air India has cancelled flights to and from Jammu, Srinagar, Leh, Jodhpur, Amritsar, Bhuj, Jamnagar, Chandigarh and Rajkot. The U.N. Secretary General urged India and Pakistan to ‘avoid a military confrontation,’ while Qatar, the UAE, the US, China, Turkey and the EU called for restraint and to avoid further escalation. Israel’s ambassador to India expressed support for ‘India’s right to self-defence.’ On 07/05/2025, the Pakistani Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif, announced that the Pakistani Armed Forces have been authorized to undertake "corresponding actions” against India. On X (formerly Twitter) , he also stated that “a resolute response is already underway”. Context: On 22/04/2025 , a group of armed militants conducted a terrorist attack in the town of Pahalgam, Anantnag district, Jammu and Kashmir region. The attack resulted in 26 deaths (25 Indian nationals and 1 Nepalese national). The Resistance Front (TRF), likely a Lashkar-e-Taiba-affiliated organization, has since claimed responsibility for the attack. Lashkar-e-Taiba is a Pakistani Islamic terrorist organization and a designated terrorist group by a number of countries, including the EU. On 23/04/2025 , India suspended the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960, the treaty allows for the sharing of the waters of the Indus River system, which is especially important for Pakistan’s agricultural sector. India also closed the Integrated Check Post Attari, one of the critical checkpoints along the Pakistani-Indian border in the Punjab region, and the main (and only) hub for cross-border land trade between the two countries. On 23/04/2025 , India banned Pakistani nationals from travelling to India under the SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) Visa Exemption Scheme visas (SVAS). Moreover, all the previously issued visas are now invalid. All Pakistani nationals residing or otherwise located in India under SVAS visas were given 48 hours to leave the country. India also scaled down the contingent of Pakistani diplomats and reduced the Pakistani High Commission staff from 55 to 30 members.  On 23/04/2025 , India declared the Defence/Military, Naval and Air advisors in the Pakistani High Commission persona non grata. They were given a week to leave India. India will also withdraw its advisors from the Indian High Commission in Islamabad. On 24/04/2025 , a brief exchange of gunfire between Pakistani and Indian forces took place on the border between India-administered Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistani-administered Azad Kashmir. The United Nations has called for maximum restraint from both countries, emphasizing the importance of resolving issues peacefully through meaningful engagement.  Analysis :  The Kashmir conflict is a long-standing territorial dispute between India and Pakistan, over the region of Jammu and Kashmir. Both countries claim the regions in full but only control parts of it. The conflict traces back to 1947, when British India was partitioned into India and Pakistan, with both nations claiming the entirety of the former state. This led to the first war, followed by additional wars and military skirmishes over the years.  The current tensions are reminiscent of the 2019 escalation that followed the Pulwama attack of 2019, in which 40 Indian Central Reserve personnel were killed. However, the Pahalgam attack carries a higher diplomatic and socio-political weight, as in this case, the victims were civilians . The timing of the attack is also crucial; Indian Prime Minister Modi was visiting Saudi Arabia and U.S. Vice President Vance was visiting India. Moreover, the attack occurred less than a week after a speech by the Pakistani Army Chief, General Asim Munir, which, among other things, focused on the need for Kashmir to be Pakistani.  The Indian response to the attacks also differs.  After the Pulwama attack, India launched a single airstrike towards a JeM camp. In response, Pakistan shot down an Indian Air Force jet. Both India and Pakistan’s current attacks and retaliations are more severe, driving tensions and heightened sentiments on both sides. However, India avoided Pakistani military targets and stayed out of its airspace, echoing previous limited strikes and suggesting a strategy of measured retaliation. Historical precedents also show capacity for de-escalation after limited attacks, and international pressure to avoid a conflict should incentivize the two countries to contain the crisis.

Date: 14/03/2025 Location:   Goma, North Kivu Province, DRC; Nyabibwe, South Kivu Province, DRC; Kalehe, South Kivu Province, DRC; Bukavu, South Kivu Province, DRC. Kinshasa, Kinshasa Province, DRC. Bunia, Ituri, DRC. Ground Security: For those in North and South Kivu, as well as Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), exercise extreme caution and leave the country as soon as possible. If leaving is not an option, stay indoors as much as possible and closely monitor local media for updates. A ceasefire may or may not be declared next week following talks between M23 and the DRC, but do not take any announcement at face value—especially unilateral ones. If a ceasefire is declared, remain vigilant and continue monitoring the situation. Note: The Dutch embassy in Kinshasa is temporarily closed to the public. If in need of help, contact the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at  +31 247 247 247. Airport/Overflight Security: Goma International Airport (GOM/FZNA) and Bukavu Kuvumu Airport (BKY/FZMA) have been  seized by M23, rendering Air Traffic Control (ATC) and Airfield Services unavailable.  It is NOT  possible to land/takeoff or divert to Goma International Airport. The airport and runways were damaged during the fighting. Avoid landing in Goma Airport and Bukavu Kavumu Airport, even in emergencies. There are two NOTAMS issued related to FIR KINSHASA (FZZA): United Kingdom: it is recommended not to enter FIR KINSHASA (FZZA) within 100 NM of the eastern boundary, between the 1st parallel north and the 2nd parallel south, below FL250. Canada: it is recommended not to enter FIR KINSHASA (FZZA) below FL260. This means that overflying traffic at higher altitudes is generally not at risk under normal operations. However, those descending or diverting below FL260 within FIR KINSHASA face significant exposure to small-arms fire and MANPADS. Therefore, it is recommended to take precautionary measures by planning the route, avoiding alternate airports in the DRC in case of an emergency, and maintaining an altitude above FL260 in FIR KINSHASA (FZZA) .  On 11/02/2025, the DRC prohibited any aircraft registered in Rwanda from overflying, landing or otherwise utilising Congolese airspace.  What happened: On 28/01/2025, the March 23 Movement ( Mouvement du 23 Mars, hereafter M23) fighters captured the eastern city of Goma , North Kivu Province, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), marking a significant escalation of the decades-long conflict which reignited in 2022.  On 04/02/2025, Uganda sent soldiers to the DRC north of Goma. Uganda has deployed an estimated 4,000–5,000 troops in eastern DRC, primarily to combat the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an Islamist militant group, rather than solely engaging M23. The UN has earlier accused Rwanda of supporting M23.  On 17/02/2025 Eastern Congo’s second largest city, Bukavu, fell to M23 . They also gained control over Kavumu Airport in the north of the city. On 08/03/2025,  Group Kabido, an armed group previously allied with the DRC government, announced its alignment with M23. This appears to be part of a broader pattern: several other armed groups, including the 2,000-strong Force des Patriotes pour la Paix/Armée du Peuple (FPP-AP), abandoned their support for Forces d'Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo (hereafter FARDC) and joined M23. In  March, M23’s advance continued in all directions. On 09/03/2025  M23 captured Nyabyiondo, and began advancing toward the strategically located town of Walikale, which contains an important industrial tin mine (Alphamin) crucial to DRC government finances. On  09/03/2025, the DRC government offered a $5 million bounty for assistance in arresting one of the M23 leaders, Corneille Nangaa, Bertrand Bisimwa and Sultani Makenga. All three leaders had been tried in absentia and sentenced to death in August 2024. On 10/03/2025,  Reports emerged that the US and DRC were in talks for a potential deal: DRC would provide the US with access to minerals and strategic benefits in Africa, while the US would help the FARDC combat M23. On 11/03/2025 , Angolan President João Lourenço announced that peace talks will begin next week in Luanda. This marks a historic shift, as the DRC government had previously refused direct negotiations with M23, labeling it a terrorist group, and instead sought talks with Rwanda, which consistently declined. On 12/03/2025 , M23 captured Idjwi Island, the largest island in Lake Kivu bordering Rwanda.  On 12/03/2025, FARDC raided Nangaa's family home in Isiro as part of a broader crackdown amid the ongoing M23 conflict. On 13/03/2025:   The South African Development Community Mission to the Congo, mainly consisting of soldiers from South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania, announced a decision for a "phased withdrawal" from the DRC after suffering heavy losses, including at least 19 casualties and reportedly hundreds wounded. The mission had been present in the DRC since December 2023. On 18/03/2025, direct peace talks between M23 and the DRC scheduled to begin in Luanda, Angola.

Date:  14/03/2025 Where:  Syria, Kiswah - city south of Damascus Syria, Quneitra and Dara’a Province Syria, Tartous and Latakia Province Syria, Aleppo, Raqqa and Hassakah Province Who’s involved: Syria, Israel, Turkey, Pro-Assad insurgency cells What happened? Following the fall of Assad’s regime on 08/12/2024 and   Al-Sharaa's assumption of office on 29/01/2025 , Al-Sharaa and the Syrian transitional government have been working to unify Syria , establish state institutions, and revive the struggling economy. As part of these efforts, the Syrian administration has been rebuilding the country's armed forces and security agencies, while also engaging with foreign nations, such as Russia and the EU. On 27/01/2025 , the EU approved to lift sanctions and unfreeze assets of entities like banks and Syrian Arab Airlines, whilst Russian oil export tankers arrived at the coast of Syria on 06/03/2025  following new economic arrangements between Syria and Russia.   On 12/02/2025 , Al-Sharaa declared the formation of the Preparatory Committee for the National Dialogue Conference. The committee held consultations across Syria, leading to the quick organization of the National Dialogue Conference on 24/02/2025 . The conference concluded with a final statement outlining the foundation for a new constitution .  On 24/02/2025 , Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu demanded  the complete demilitarization of southern Syria  and affirmed that Israel would not permit any Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) or Syrian forces to enter the area south of Damascus. Following this, Israel conducted a new wave of airstrikes  in Kiswah, south of Damascus, and in the southern province of Deraa on 25/02/2025 . In response, protests erupted across multiple regions in Syria from 24-02-2025  to 25-02-2025 . Meanwhile, Israeli forces remain active in the Southern Quneitra  in the Golan Heights and continue to establish logistical infrastructure whilst also conducting more airstrikes on military bases in the Tartous region in Northern Syria ( 03/03/2025 ), emphasizing Israel’s ongoing strategic presence. During a meeting in Amman on 26/02/2025 , Jordan's King Abdullah and Syria's President Al-Sharaa agreed to work together to secure their common border against arms and drug trafficking. On 06/03/2025 , pro-Assad insurgent cells carried out coordinated attacks on Syrian military checkpoints and patrols in Jableh, Beit Ana, and Daliyah in Latakia Province . After several smaller clashes from pro-assad insurgents, this marked the first major instance of their open armed rebellion against the new regime, signaling lingering resistance from loyalists of the former government. The newly formed Syrian army deployed armored units, helicopters, and drones between  07/03/2025  and 10/03/2025 . Syrian government forces have secured most of the region’s larger towns, but still have not fully eliminated insurgent cells in the provinces of Tartous and Latakia . Despite the conclusion of clearing operations on 10/03/2025 ,  insurgents remain active in western Syria.  Their ability to operate without uniforms and blend with the population makes them difficult to eradicate in single operations.  In addition to the separate insurgency cell attacks, the Syrian Popular Resistance (SPR), a pro-Assad insurgent group formed in December 2024, announced on 07/03/2025  that it had seized control of several villages in Jabal al-Alawiyin and expanded its operations to Masyaf in the Hama countryside, highlighting the ongoing fighting and instability in different regions. On 09/03/2025 , reports of massacres in coastal Alawite communities , allegedly due to poorly executed counter-insurgency operations by transitional government forces, prompted President Sharaa's office to announce the formation of an independent committee to investigate the clashes and killings by both sides. The committee’s aim is to identify the perpetrators and alleviate the growing fear among Syria’s ethnic minorities , specifically Alawites. In the aftermath of the killings, many minority group members attempted to flee the country, and by 13/03/2025 , approximately 9,000 people sought refuge from the sectarian violence at the Russian air base in Hmeimim, Syria. In Northern Syria, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) have been clashing with the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)  positions since before the toppling of Assad’s regime. However, the conflict intensified after the fall of Assad and has seen both sides exchange heavy artillery fire, with Turkey and SNA forces also launching significant strikes on SDF positions in the provinces Aleppo, Raqqa and Hassakah. However, a potential turning point emerged when an agreement was reached between the Syrian transitional government and the SDF on   10/03/2025 , outlining the integration of SDF forces into the national army. Although the SNA temporarily halted its attacks following the ceasefire, the SNA resumed attacks on SDF positions along the M4 highway in Aleppo and Hasakah  provinces on 11/03/2025  and 12/03/2025.  Turkish President Erdogan expressed cautious support for the ceasefire on 11/03/2025  but reiterated Turkey's commitment to fighting terrorism, evidenced by continued Turkish strikes on SDF positions  from 10/03/2025  to 12/03/2025 . Furthermore, the SNA's ongoing attacks on the SDF suggest that the Syrian transitional government has limited control over the SNA , which began integrating its forces into the Syrian transitional Defense Ministry on   29/12/2024 after talks between Al- Sharaa and SNA leaders. On 12/03/2025 , Al-Sharaa issued a decree establishing the country's National Security Council. The council, which was absent during the rule of Assad, will be responsible for making decisions concerning national security and addressing the challenges facing the state. On 13/03/2025 , Al-Sharaa signed a draft constitution that initiates a five-year transition period and ensures a separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.

Date: 13/03/2025 Location:   South Sudan; Uganda South Sudan - context: South Sudan achieved independence in 2011, becoming the world's newest country after years of struggle with Sudan. Yet its early years as a nation have been troubled by civil conflict, government instability, and economic challenges. The political scene  revolves around President Salva Kiir and his former vice president Riek Machar . Their power struggle has intensified ethnic tensions, particularly between Dinka and Nuer communities. Kiir is from the Dinka community, while Machar is a Nuer. From 2013 to 2020, civil war claimed over 400,000 lives and forced millions to flee their homes. Though a peace agreement in 2020 created a unity government, the relationship between Kiir and Machar remains strained, putting the peace process at risk.  Recent developments have heightened tensions across the young nation, suggesting the civil war might not be over yet. Latest developments: On 14/02/2025 , tensions between Kiir and Machar escalated as clashes broke out between the South Sudanese army and an "armed youth militia," as described by Human Rights Watch in the Upper Nile province of South Sudan On 04/03/2025, the defense forces of Sudan liquidated Tor Gile Thoan Meen, commander of the ‘Nuer White Army’ militia. On 04/03/2025 , the ‘White Army Militia’, composed of the Nuer people, claimed control of Nasir, a town in South Sudan’s Upper Nile province close to Ethiopia, after clashing with government forces. That same day , Machar’s top allies were arrested in Juba, the capital, as a response to the developments in Nasir, threatening the fragile unity government. On 06/03/2025, Kenyan President William Ruto engaged with both Kiir and Machar, expressing his support for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. On 07/03/2025, a UN-helicopter evacuating government soldiers, Russian crew and civilians was shot down by the White Army Militia close to Nasir, killing more than 20, including a general and UN crew member. Reportedly, this was a retaliation for the killing of Tor Gile Thoan Meen. On 08/03/2025, the US ordered its non-essential personnel to leave the country, citing the deteriorating security situation. On 11/03/2025, Uganda deployed its special forces to South Sudan. Kampala’s military chief announced on Tuesday that the troops had been sent to help ‘secure’ Juba. In a  post on X ,  he mentioned: “We only recognize ONE President of South Sudan, H.E. Salva Kiir [...] Any move against him is a declaration of war against Uganda!”. On  12/03/2025 , the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a bloc of eight East African nations, called for the South Sudanese government to release the officials who were detained at the beginning of March and restore “standard security arrangements”  to prevent escalating factional tensions. Analysis South Sudan continues to struggle with severe interethnic conflict , primarily between the Dinka and Nuer, two of the country's largest ethnic groups. In 2018, the Revitalised Agreement on Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) was signed , marking the end of a 5-year civil war between the factions of Kiir and Machar. The peace deal aimed to unify armies, draft a new constitution, hold elections, conduct a census, and disarm armed groups, but none of these reforms have been implemented . The peace in South Sudan has been fragile since its inception and as fighting erupted in Upper Nile province on 14/02/2025, worries of another civil war increased.  Sudan’s conflict has deepened South Sudan’s crisis by cutting off its main revenue source —oil exports—after fighting damaged the pipeline near Khartoum in 2024. This fiscal strain has weakened Kiir’s patronage network, fueling unrest and making South Sudan more vulnerable to external interference.  Burhan’s military is suspected of arming Nuer militias to destabilize Kiir and reclaim border regions, while the RSF, backed by the UAE, has drawn Juba closer, worsening tensions.  At the moment, hostilities are confined to the north-eastern province, but violence is likely to escalate. The Nuer White Army appears to be poorly trained and lightly armed , primarily equipped with Kalashnikov rifles, a few light machine guns, and a limited number of technicals, such as pick-ups with mounted machine guns. In contrast, the  South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF) are better equipped , possessing more advanced weaponry and limited air support. However, despite their advantage, the SSPDF is limited by the UN Security Council’s ongoing arms embargo on South Sudan , which prohibits the import of weapons. This embargo, aimed at curbing violence and ensuring stability, has impacted the country’s military capabilities, preventing both the government and opposition forces from acquiring new weapons. Uganda has significant interests in the South Sudan conflict.  President Museveni maintains a close alliance with South Sudan and a personal relationship with President Kiir, providing support to South Sudan's government during the civil war. The Ugandan government has experienced recurring tensions with Sudan, with both countries seemingly using South Sudan as a battleground for proxy conflicts,  evidenced by their support of opposing factions during the civil war. Additionally, South Sudan represents one of Uganda's most important trading partners . As Uganda has reinstated support for President Kiir, it is highly likely that a conflict in South Sudan would include a number of Ugandan troops.  Conclusion The escalating tensions in South Sudan represent a dangerous deterioration of an already fragile peace agreement. With Uganda's recent military deployment to support President Kiir, the conflict risks expanding into a regional conflict involving Sudan, Uganda, and potentially other neighboring states. The arrest of Machar's allies, combined with the Nuer White Army's territorial gains, suggests the unity government may be collapsing. International stakeholders including the UN and regional powers like Kenya are attempting diplomatic interventions, but with limited success thus far. The situation threatens not only South Sudan's stability but potentially regional security across East Africa, especially given Uganda's explicit military commitment to Kiir's government and the ongoing parallel conflict in Sudan. Airport/Overflight Security: The situation in South Sudan is unstable and can escalate at any moment. Juba airport (HJJJ) may be closed at short notice. The UK, France and Germany advise against overflying South Sudan below FL250 due to the risk by anti-aircraft weaponry. Air navigation services are suspended above FL245.  We advise against overflying South Sudan. Ground Security: The security situation in South Sudan is becoming increasingly unstable, with rising tensions and localised violence in several regions. While the situation has not reached the severity of a full-scale conflict, it is essential to remain vigilant. Avoid travel to South Sudan For those in South Sudan: exercise extreme caution, avoid unnecessary travel, and stay indoors as much as possible, especially in high-risk areas . Monitor local media and official sources for updates on the security situation and stay informed about any developments. Prioritise personal safety and be prepared for potential evacuations .

Date:  28/02/2025 Where: South-Eastern Australia, off the coast of Tasmania and New South Wales. Who's involved: China, Australia, New Zealand What happened: On 21/02/2025, the Task Group conducted a live-fire exercise . The exercise was criticized by both Australian and New Zealand officials. Canberra and Wellington, while recognizing that China is entitled to do so under international law, were concerned with the lack of advanced notification of the firing, which also lacked a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM), that caused "several commercial aircraft to divert course" , a New Zealand Defence Force report stated. Another live-fire exercise was conducted on 22/02/2025. On 19/02/2025, a Chinese Navy (hereafter PLAN; People's Liberation Army Navy ) task force first entered Australia's Exclusive Economic Zone  (EEZ). The flotilla, referred to as Task Group 107,  consists of Renhai -class cruiser Zunyi (107), Jiangkai -class frigate Hengyang  (568) and Fuchi -class replenishment oiler Weishanhu  (887). The Australian Defence Force (ADF) was first alerted to the Chinese live-firing exercise at 10:08  (UTC+10) on 21/02/2025, 38 minutes after China's exercise had started at 9:30.  This was after a Virgin pilot transmitted mid-flight warnings to Airservices Australia, Australia's civil aviation authority.  Analysis : This is the most recent example of China's ambitions in the Pacific. China often violates the EEZ of Taiwan and The Philippines and the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) of the former. In the past few weeks, both the Philippine and Australian navies have reported dangerous incidents involving Chinese aircraft. On 18/02/2025, a PLAN Z-9 helicopter flew deliberately close (within 3 meters) of a Philippine government aircraft.  For years, these two countries have been locked in an escalating series of confrontations over disputed waters in the South China Sea. On 11/02/2025, a Chinese Air Force (PLAAF; People's Liberation Army Air Force ) J-16 fighter released flares 30 metres in front of an Australian Air Force (RAAF; Royal Australian Air Force ) P-8 Poseidon surveillance aircraft. The deployment of Task Group 107 came as Australia was receiving Admiral Samuel Paparo, the head of the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). China justified the deployment by saying its actions were "entirely in accordance with international law." In line with the latter, Australia, unlike China, is limited to the 12 (nautical) mile line where it can exercise its sovereignty. With its nine-dash line, China claims much larger territorial waters.  These are not recognized by international law, but China often uses them to justify deployments and grey zone actions.  As it already did with Taiwan and the Philippines, China could try to normalize these kinds of actions around Australia , especially insofar as the Australian government has lacked a proper response, at least publicly.  China may also use these deployments to test the Australian Navy's  (RAN; Royal Australian Navy ) response and try to keep it closer to home to limit the help it could provide to its allies in the Pacific, such as Taiwan, Japan and the United States. In the case of Taiwan, the previously mentioned head of INDOPACOM, Adm. Samuel Paparo, has already mentioned the Chinese escalation in demonstrations of force toward Taiwan, which are "not exercises, they are rehearsals". According to Paparo, China is showing "clear intent and capability" to attack Taiwan. Recent satellite imagery showing a flotilla of specially-built barges, eerily suitable for a Taiwan landing, also points to real intent on China's side.  Conclusion:  The recent PLAN deployment near Australia and New Zealand shows the PLAN's rapidly growing power and reach . It is likely meant to normalize the Chinese Navy's presence in the region. During the deployment, the PLAN likely monitored Canberra's and Wellington's response and their naval response regarding readiness, tactics and resolve. After cementing its reach and presence in the South China Sea, a body of water China has long claimed as its own, Beijing appears to be projecting its power further away from its coasts. Since the helicopter event of 18/02/2025 was highly likely aimed at the Philippine government, no similar actions against commercial flights are anticipated during the Chinese deployments .

Date:  21/02/2025 Where:  Israel Who’s involved: Israel, Gaza, West Bank, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria What happened? Israel-Palestine: Israel and Hamas reached a Gaza ceasefire deal that took effect on 19/01/2025. The agreement is aimed at increasing humanitarian aid, the gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces, and the release of Israeli captives in exchange for Palestinian prisoners. On the first day of the ceasefire, Hamas released the first three Israeli hostages as part of the agreement, while Israel freed 90 Palestinian prisoners. By 22/01/2025 , more than 2,400 aid trucks had entered Gaza.  On 21/01/2025 , Israeli security forces raided the West Bank city of Jenin,  killing at least nine Palestinians. Additionally, thousands of Palestinians waited at roadblocks to return home to northern Gaza on 26/01/2025 , following a refusal to open crossing points by Israel.  Hamas agreed to hand over three Israeli hostages, and Israel opened roadblocks the following day. On 09/02/2025 ,  the Israeli military completed its withdrawal from Gaza’s Netzarim Corridor  as part of the ceasefire deal. On  10/02/2025,  the Israeli military continued attacks on Jenin , in the West Bank, resulting in the deaths of three Palestinians, including a pregnant woman. On the same day, Hamas temporarily suspended the release of 76 hostages , citing Israeli violations of the ceasefire by allowing heavy machinery back into Gaza.  On  13/02/2025, Hamas announced   that it would proceed with the planned releases, after threats from Trump and Netanyahu to escalate violence if hostages were not freed by 15/02/2025. On 17/02/2025, Netanyahu instructed Israeli negotiators to travel to Cairo to discuss the stalled second phase of the ceasefire . The delegation will be led by Secretary of Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer, replacing Mossad chief David Barnea, who led the January negotiations that resulted in the current deal. Whether Barnea will continue as part of the Israeli negotiating team remains unclear. So far, no progress has been reported , and  Israel continues to block the entry of tens of thousands of mobile homes and tents  into Gaza, despite this being a condition of the truce. On 17/02/2025, threats of a direct attack on Israel were revived  by senior commanders from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), also known as the Iranian Revolutionary Guards , likely in an attempt to deter a potential Israeli strike on Iran and influence Israeli decision-making. On 18/02/2025 , Hamas proposed releasing all Israeli captives at once in exchange for a complete end to the war.  Israel has not yet issued an official response to this permanent truce. Syria: Since the fall of Assad’s regime on 08/12/2024, Al-Sharaa has been named Syria’s interim president  on 29/01/2025. Since then, Al-Sharaa has met with Saudi-Arabian crown prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud ( 02/02/2025 ), Turkey’s president Erdoğan ( 04/02/2025 ) and had  a phone conversation with Russian president Putin to establish support (12/02/2025). Additionally, the EU has agreed to lift some of the sanctions against Syria  to help stabilize Damascus  ( 27/01/2025). As of 18/02/2025,  the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) , the last major armed group not to have integrated with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) forces, appears  willing to do so soon. However, there are still several unresolved issues in the negotiations between the SDF and the Syrian interim government, especially regarding the scope of the SDF dissolution.  On 24/01/2025 , satellite imagery showing a new construction   by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the demilitarised buffer zone with Syria was released. It is also reported three Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) brigades are set to remain indefinitely in southern Syria  near the Golan Heights-Jordan border. Lebanon: On 9/01/2025 , Joseph Anon was elected as Lebanon’s president, ending a three-year power vacuum. On 02/02/2025,  Israel announced plans to establish  permanent military outposts adjacent to each northern community along the Lebanon border , as part of a new defense strategy against Hezbollah. Despite a renewed withdrawal deadline for  18/02/2025 , the IDF has announced it will keep soldiers stationed in 5 locations in southern Lebanon . On 02/02/2025, Hezbollah’s leader Naim Qassem announced that a funeral for former Hezbollah leaders Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safiedine will be held in Beirut on   23/02/2025 . The high-profile funeral is expected to draw officials from Hezbollah’s allies, including Iran, Hamas, and the Houthis, as well as Hezbollah fighters and civilian supporters. The first visitors attending the funeral have been documented, and many Baghdad-Beirut flights are fully booked ahead of the Hezbollah leader's funeral, prompting MEA to schedule additional flights. As previously advised, avoid Beirut and southern Lebanon on the days around the funeral for precautionary measures. If possible, temporarily relocate to northern Lebanon until 25/02/2025. On 13/02/2025 , Lebanon denied an Iranian plane permission to land at Rafic Hariri International Airport following Israeli accusations that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was using civilian flights to funnel funds to Hezbollah. This decision led to pro-Hezbollah protests on 15/02/2025 . On  21/02/2025 ,  the Israeli army launched air strikes on sites along the Syria-Lebanon border, claiming that Hezbollah was using them to transfer weapons into Lebanon. Egypt: On 27/01/2025 , President Trump suggested that Jordan and Egypt take in large numbers of Palestinians from besieged Gaza. Both countries have rejected this idea.  The Egyptian government is formulating a plan to rebuild Gaza while ensuring the Palestinian population remains in place, offering an alternative to U.S. President Donald Trump’s proposal to forcibly relocate its residents and take over the territory. The leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Jordan, the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and the Palestinian Authority will gather in Saudi Arabia on 04/03/2025  to discuss the proposal.

Date: 14/02/2025 Location:   Goma, North Kivu Province, DRC; Nyabibwe, South Kivu Province, DRC; Kalehe, South Kivu Province, DRC; Bukavu, South Kivu Province, DRC. Kinshasa, Kinshasa Province, DRC.  Ground Security: For those in Goma  and the Kivu Lake regions  (North and South Kivu) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): pay extreme caution and try to relocate outside the country as soon as possible . The same applies to those in Kinshasa; pay extreme caution and leave the country as soon as possible. If you are unable to leave or have to stay in-country, stay indoors as much as possible and monitor local media for updates. Do not trust ceasefires at face value, especially unilaterally announced ones. If one is announced, monitor the news for updates and keep a cautious approach.  Note: The Dutch embassy in Kinshasa is temporarily closed to the public. If in need of help, contact the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at  +31 247 247 247. Airport/Overflight Security: Goma International Airport (GOM; FZNA) has been  seized by M23, rendering Air Traffic Control (ATC) and Airfield Services unavailable.  It is NOT  possible to land/takeoff or divert to Goma International Airport. The airport and runways were damaged during the fighting. Thus, landing on Goma Airport runways should be avoided even in emergencies. There are two NOTAMS issued related to FIR KINSHASA (FZZA): United Kingdom (NOTAM EGTT V0046/24): it is recommended not to enter FIR KINSHASA (FZZA) within 100 NM of the eastern boundary, between the 1st parallel north and the 2nd parallel south, below FL250. Canada (NOTAM CZUL H0401/25): it is recommended not to enter FIR KINSHASA (FZZA) below FL260. This means that overflying traffic at higher altitudes is generally not at risk under normal operations. However, those descending or diverting below FL260 within FIR KINSHASA face significant exposure to small-arms fire and MANPADS. Therefore, it is recommended to take precautionary measures by planning the route, avoiding alternate airports in the DRC in case of an emergency, and maintaining an altitude above FL260 in FIR KINSHASA .  On 11/02/2025, the DRC prohibited any aircraft registered in Rwanda from overflying, landing or otherwise utilising Congolese airspace.  What happened? On 25/01/2025, The DRC Armed Forces ( Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo, hereafter FARDC) announced that the governor of North Kivu province, Maj. Gen. Peter Cirimwami Nkuba, was killed by an M23 sniper in Sake, close to the local frontline.  On Monday, 27/01/2025 , March 23 Movement ( Mouvement du 23 Mars, hereafter M23) fighters captured the eastern city of Goma , North Kivu Province, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), marking a significant escalation of the decades-long conflict which reignited in 2022.  M23 is one of several armed groups operating in eastern DRC , seeking control over mineral mines. The UN accused both Rwanda and Uganda of supporting M23 with claims of Rwandan and Ugandan troops present in eastern DRC.  On 28/01/2025 , protesters demanding action against M23 attacked several embassies in Kinshasa , the DRC’s capital. The affected embassies are those of the United States, France, Belgium, Uganda, Rwanda, and Kenya, as well as the UN’s Permanent Mission of the DRC.  On Monday, 03/02/2025 , M23 announced a unilateral ceasefire to start on Tuesday, 04/02/2025 , citing "humanitarian reasons." However, on Wednesday, 05/02/2025 , M23 violated the ceasefire   and captured the town of Nyabibwe.  On 04/02/2025 , Reuters reported that Uganda had sent 1,000 more soldiers to the east Congo , north of Goma. This deployment brings the total number of Ugandan soldiers in the region to an estimated 4,000 to 5,000. However, Uganda’s involvement extends beyond confronting the M23 rebel group. The troops are mainly supporting the Congolese government in addressing a separate security threat by pursuing militants of Ugandan origin with ties to the Islamic State group , suggesting that not all of these forces will be directly engaged in the fight against M23. On 07/02/2025, The Guardian reported, citing diplomatic and high-ranking intelligence sources, that the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) have suffered hundreds of casualties since they began actively supporting M23 in 2022.  The same report, citing UN experts, states that the RDF is in “de-facto control” of M23 . Rwanda keeps denying that its forces have crossed into the DRC.  On 08/02/2025, the DRC and Rwanda signed an “immediate and unconditional ceasefire” agreement.  The DRC also agreed to begin direct negotiations with M23. The DRC has previously refused to directly negotiate with M23 after designating them a terrorist group in January 2025. On 09/02/2025, Reuters reported that at least 75 FARDC soldiers are to stand trial for desertion, looting and violence against civilians, including murder and rape. This incident points to   On 10/02/2025, Reuters reported that South Africa had added 700-800 soldiers to the garrison already present in DRC. South African troops in DRC are now believed to be around 2000 personnel strong.  On 11/02/2025, the DRC prohibited any aircraft registered in Rwanda from overflying, landing or otherwise utilising Congolese airspace.  On 12/02/2025 , M23 captured Ihusi and Kalehe. M23 is swiftly approaching the capital of South Kivu province, Bukavu .  Conclusion The situation in eastern DRC is dire. Rwanda’s support of M23 is resilient, and the group’s advance does not appear to be slowing down. The group’s advance is getting dangerously close to the Burundian border. If the Tutsi-led M23 were to violate the Burundian border - a state with a social and political Hutu majority -  the risk of reviving the ethnic-based conflict between Hutu and Tutsi would reach levels not seen in 30 years. Despite the DRC-Rwanda agreement on a ceasefire, M23 has kept its advance going, further undermining the swift and stable crisis resolution.

Date: 19/02/2025 Location:   Goma, North Kivu Province, DRC; Nyabibwe, South Kivu Province, DRC; Kalehe, South Kivu Province, DRC; Bukavu, South Kivu Province, DRC. Kinshasa, Kinshasa Province, DRC. Bunia, Ituri, DRC. Ground Security: For those in North and South Kivu  in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): pay extreme caution and try to relocate outside the country as soon as possible . The same applies to those in Kinshasa; pay extreme caution and leave the country as soon as possible. If you are unable to leave or have to stay in-country, stay indoors as much as possible and monitor local media for updates. Do not trust ceasefires at face value, especially unilaterally announced ones. If one is announced, monitor the news for updates and keep a cautious approach.  Note: The Dutch embassy in Kinshasa is temporarily closed to the public. If in need of help, contact the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at  +31 247 247 247. Airport/Overflight Security: Goma International Airport (GOM/FZNA) and Bukavu Kuvumu Airport (BKY/FZMA) have been  seized by M23, rendering Air Traffic Control (ATC) and Airfield Services unavailable.  It is NOT  possible to land/takeoff or divert to Goma International Airport. The airport and runways were damaged during the fighting. Avoid landing in Goma Airport and Bukavu Kavumu Airport, even in emergencies. There are two NOTAMS issued related to FIR KINSHASA (FZZA): United Kingdom: it is recommended not to enter FIR KINSHASA (FZZA) within 100 NM of the eastern boundary, between the 1st parallel north and the 2nd parallel south, below FL250. Canada: it is recommended not to enter FIR KINSHASA (FZZA) below FL260. This means that overflying traffic at higher altitudes is generally not at risk under normal operations. However, those descending or diverting below FL260 within FIR KINSHASA face significant exposure to small-arms fire and MANPADS. Therefore, it is recommended to take precautionary measures by planning the route, avoiding alternate airports in the DRC in case of an emergency, and maintaining an altitude above FL260 in FIR KINSHASA (FZZA) .  On 11/02/2025, the DRC prohibited any aircraft registered in Rwanda from overflying, landing or otherwise utilizing Congolese airspace.  Latest update: On 17/02/2025 Eastern Congo’s second largest city, Bukavu, fell to M23 . They also gained control over Kavumu Airport in the north of the city. On 18/02/2025, in response to growing instability along their border, Ugandan forces entered Bunia, the capital of Ituri province , north of the Kivu region, citing growing border instability as a reason. At the same time, M23 appears to be regaining momentum in its northward advance, an offensive that had previously seemed to stall.  Meanwhile, in the south, reports suggest that the Burundian army is retreating from the DRC following M23’s continued advance  in that direction. Its official spokesman denies these claims at the time of writing. Conclusion The situation in eastern DRC is growing increasingly dire, with Rwanda’s support for M23 remaining unwavering and the group’s advance continuing unchecked. Reports indicate that M23 is nearing the Burundian border, likely escalating tensions with Burundian authorities, as Bujumbura—the country’s economic powerhouse and former capital—lies in close proximity. Meanwhile, Uganda is also feeling the strain of the conflict and has deployed troops to the Congolese city of Bunia, north of Goma. To access more updates and our analysis of the situation, please contact info@dyami.services or peter@dyami.services .

Date: 07/02/2025 Where: Lebanon, Beirut - Sports City Stadium Lebanon, Beirut, near the Imam Khomeini Center (33° 50’ 45” N, 35° 29’ 45” E) Lebanon, Deir Qanoun En Nahr Who’s involved: Lebanon, Hezbollah, Israel, Iran, Hamas,  Houthis What happened: On 02/02/2025, Hezbollah announced that it would hold the funeral of Hassan Nasrallah  on 23/02/2025 in Beirut . Beirut will also be Nasrallah's burial location. The former leader of Hezbollah was killed by an Israeli airstrike on 27/09/2024, but a formal funeral was delayed due to the extent of the hostilities at the time. Hezbollah had, until now, only resorted to a temporary burial due to security concerns. The planned funeral procession will be held for both Nasrallah and Hashem Safieddine , another senior Hezbollah official who replaced Nasrallah after his death. Safieddine was himself killed by an Israeli airstrike on 03/10/2024.  Saffieddine will instead be buried in his hometown, Deir Qanoun En Nahr . This was also announced on 02/02/2025. A previously agreed-upon ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel is supposed to begin on 18/02/2025. Analysis : Given the high profile of the funeral, several officials from Hezbollah’s allies are to be expected . The speech given by current Hezbollah leader Nair Qassem  suggests that the group expects a large gathering of “political forces, parties, officials and other concerned parties”. Iran  has announced it will send a delegation to the funeral , but it has yet to disclose who is going to be a part of the delegation. Hamas and Houthis officials are also expected to attend . Given past Hezbollah funerals, it is also expected that the procession will be attended by Hezbollah fighters as well as civilian supporters. The likely presence of a large number of armed Hezbollah fighters and the magnitude of this funeral could make for a particularly volatile situation . Unconfirmed images place the burial location in southern Beirut , near the Imam Khomeini Center (33° 50’ 45” N, 35° 29’ 45” E). The most recent ceasefire deadline between Israel and Hezbollah is 18/02/2025,  meaning that the procession will take place five days after the truce is to commence. This delay could likely serve as a buffer period to see if the ceasefire holds. Crucially, the ceasefire deal requires  Hezbollah to surrender its weapons . This is unlikely to happen, meaning that the ceasefire’s observance is already at risk.  Given the expected significant presence of senior officials  from Hezbollah’s state and non-state allies, Israel will likely hold off from attacking the procession. The risk of killing state officials  is significantly high  and could lead to an escalation that Israel is unprepared and/or unwilling to explore. Nevertheless, Israel will likely observe and follow  the procession closely. There could be a strategic reason behind Hezbollah’s information disclosure regarding the funeral as well as the disclosure occurring so far in advance. Hezbollah’s aim could be to create enough media coverage and attention so as to nullify any Israeli covert attempt to strike or otherwise interfere with the procession. Moreover, the disclosure and its timing could serve as a way of making sure that the event is as big as possible. The funeral marks a crucial opportunity for Hezbollah’s leadership to rally support for the group and make sure that they will retain political and military relevance. Since the death of Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s power has progressively waned. This power vacuum has opened the opportunity for the Lebanese Armed Forces and Parliament to properly challenge Hezbollah’s dominance for the first time in years. The recent appointment of President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam is a testament to the Lebanese Parliament's will to challenge Hezbollah.  It is likely that if Hezbollah does not prevent this from happening now, it may not gain back its power. Conclusion:  The funerals of former long-standing Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and his immediate successor, Hashem Safieddine , will be held on  23/02/2025 in Beirut. For precautionary measures, it is advisable to avoid Beirut and southern Lebanon on the days around the funeral. If possible,  temporarily relocate to northern Lebanon until 25/02/2025. Given the alleged burial location’s vicinity to the airport, it is also advised to  avoid flying to and from Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY/OLBA) on the days around the funeral.