Beyond the Coup Belt: The Decline of Western Influence in Africa and the Continent’s Turn Toward New Partners
- casper4871
- Jul 28
- 22 min read
Casper Huurdeman
Introduction
On 18 August 2020, soldiers of the Malian Armed Forces stormed the Soundiata military base near the capital Bamako and arrested senior officers. Shortly after, they headed towards the city and detained several government officials, including President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. The government was dissolved, and Keïta - under significant pressure - resigned. The coup d’état had succeeded. Thousands flocked the streets of Bamako to celebrate. A new interim president, Bah Ndaw, was later appointed.
Nine months later however, in May 2021, history repeated itself as Bah N’daw was taken into custody. Colonel Assimi Goïta issued a public statement, announcing that N’daw and other officials were stripped of their powers because they had tried to ‘sabotage the transition’ to democracy in Mali. New elections were promised to be held in 2022 while the military would ‘temporarily’ take over control.
Two months prior to that, in March 2021, a coup attempt failed in neighbouring Niger. That same month, Mahamat Deby of Chad staged a coup in which he took over control of the country after his father’s, the former president, unexpected battlefield death. Guinea also experienced a coup in September of 2021. In January of 2022, President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré of Burkina Faso was ousted by the military; Colonel Paul-Henri Damiba took over power. Not for long though, because 8 months later, Damiba was ousted in yet another coup, and captain Ibrahim Traoré took over control. In July 2023, Nigerien President Mohamed Bazoum was also ousted in a coup by general Adbourahamane Thiani.
The world looked on as one African leader after another was overthrown in just a few years, some of them having been in power for decades. Across Africa, thousands took to the streets in celebration, fed up with corruption, economic mismanagement, and the persistent challenges that have plagued many nations. This wave of political unrest swept through Africa with surprising momentum and little resistance, forming a ‘coup belt’ stretching across the continent from west to central Africa.
The rapid succession of coups across several African countries suggests they weren’t entirely isolated events. This report analyzes the coup d’états in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Gabon, Mali, and Niger between 2020 and 2023. While each coup had its own local dynamics, there are clear overarching themes between the coups during this ‘wave’, which offer valuable insights into Africa’s shifting position in a changing world—one where old alliances can no longer be taken for granted.
Although other African nations, like Sudan, have also experienced military takeovers in recent years, this analysis focuses specifically on the former French colonies of West and Central Africa listed above. Their shared colonial legacy, regional proximity, and the prominent role of anti-French sentiment make for a good basis for analysis.
Ultimately, the coups that took place in Africa between 2020 and 2023 can be attributed to widespread resentment towards rulers perceived as corrupt, a failure of French policies to address certain challenges and a successful Russian disinformation offensive. That said, the bigger picture also is important here. The wave of coups reveals a recalibration in Africa’s geopolitical alignments. In a world where multiple powers compete for influence, African nations can now leverage that rivalry to shape their own partnerships, instead of Western influence being a given.
Coups in Africa
Mali (August 2020; May 2021)
For the past decades, Mali has been gripped by instability and coups. In 2012, an alliance between a Tuareg rebellion led by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and islamist factions quickly seized control of key northern cities in the country.. The Malian government proved unfit to deal with the crisis, which led to a military coup against the president at that time, Amadou Toumani Touré, in March 2012.
Following said coup, the MNLA declared the independence of Azawad, though the declaration was not internationally recognized. As a response, France launched its military operation in Mali in early 2013 at the request of Bamako. Initially, the operation was successful to some extent: the French forces succeeded in pushing the insurgents out of key cities. However, the French-backed government never fully regained control over the north. The years that followed were marked by fragile governance, persistent insecurity and growing public frustration over the situation.
Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta came to power in 2013, and soon faced similar issues as his predecessor: deteriorating security, corruption, economic stagnation, and collapsing public services. In August 2020, amid nationwide protests, a group of military officers led by Colonel Assimi Goïta staged a coup and forced Keïta to resign. An interim government was formed under Bah Ndaw, though de facto control remained in the hands of the military.
When two prominent military figures were removed from their positions less than a year later, the military led by Goïta felt compelled to carry out yet another coup. Goïta accused the interim leadership of failing to live up to its promises and took control as transitional president. Since then, Goïta has gradually consolidated power. He banned political parties, sidelined civilian voices, and approved legislation that allows him to stay in power “until the country is pacified” - which in reality, could mean indefinitely.
Relations with Western partners, particularly France, rapidly deteriorated afterwards. Paris withdrew its security forces in 2022, citing a breakdown in trust and the junta’s refusal to return to civilian rule. Mali instead turned to other security partners. Russia’s Wagner Group began operations in Mali in late 2021, providing military support to the junta in its fight against insurgents and separatists. Although Wagner formally left in 2025, it was replaced by the Afrika Korps—a Kremlin-aligned group with a similar mandate.
Niger (March 2021; July 2023)
Niger, located in the Sahel as well, also has a history with coups. In February 2021, presidential elections were held to determine who would succeed Mahamadou Issoufou, set to step down after two terms in office (he himself came to power in elections held in the wake of a 2010 coup). Former interior minister Mohamed Bazoum won the elections widely considered democratic.
Bazoum’s inauguration on 2 April 2021, which followed a failed coup attempt just days earlier, marked the first transfer of power between democratically elected presidents since Niger’s independence from France in 1960. However, his presidency was marked by the same persistent issues as Mali, as explained earlier in this report. Niger was suffering from a deadly jihadist insurgency, particularly in the regions bordering Mali and Burkina Faso. Many were killed and many more displaced, and Bazoum’s administration appeared unable to properly deal with this threat despite the presence of French and international security forces.
The breaking point came on 26 July 2023, when President Mohamed Bazoum attempted to dismiss General Abdourahamane Tchiani, the influential head of the presidential guard. Although no official explanation was given, reports suggested that Bazoum was concerned about Tchiani’s growing power within the Nigerien state apparatus. In response, Tchiani’s forces detained the president and declared a coup. Citing poor governance and a worsening security situation, the military junta announced it had taken control, suspended the constitution, dissolved all state institutions, and declared a transitional period.
In the following days, pro-coup demonstrations erupted in the capital Niamey. Crowds were seen waving Russian flags, chanting slogans in support of the Wagner Group, and calling for the departure of French forces. This showed the growing disenchantment with Western partners—especially France—and the emerging regional trend of embracing Russia as an alternative security ally. The junta was quick to expel French diplomats and later its military forces in December 2023, which meant the end of the long diplomatic and military ties between France and Niger.
Although Niger’s military government initially announced a three-year transition to return to civilian constitutional rule, little progress has been made as of writing in July 2025. On the contrary, Niger has drawn closer to the military regimes in Mali and Burkina Faso, forming the mutual defense pact AES. Like its neighbors, Niger’s junta increasingly positions itself as the defender of national sovereignty against foreign interference—framing the coup not so much as a break with democratic order, but rather as a reclaiming of it from ineffective governance and neocolonial influence.
Chad (April 2021)
On 20 April 2021, Chad’s long-time leader Idriss Déby was unexpectedly killed in action during a battle between Chadian army soldiers and rebels from the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT) north of the capital, N’Djamena. The military, an influential player in Chadian politics, feared a power vacuum and moved quickly to install his son, the 37-year old Mahamat Déby, as interim president. The military suspended the constitution, dissolved parliament and formed a council which promised elections within 18 months. Protests against this undemocratic transfer of power were violently suppressed. The 18-month transfer period that was promised was later extended, and Mahamat Déby remained in power beyond the original timeline. Elections were later held in May 2024, in which Déby won amidst allegations of fraud.
Despite real concerns about the democracy in the country, France and Chad initially retained cordial relations during the first years of Mahamat Déby’s presidency. However, the cooperation came to an abrupt end in November 2024, when the Chadian government unexpectedly announced it would terminate its military partnership with France. The official justification centered on national sovereignty and a reassessment of strategic interests. Chad’s foreign minister stated that the arrangement no longer aligned with “the political and geostrategic realities of our time”. Unofficially, analysts pointed to growing frustration within the Déby administration over what it perceived as French interference over its internal affairs.
Chad later signed agreements granting Turkish military advisors and drone technicians access to former French airbases in Abéché and Faya-Largeau. Turkish drones were deployed to improve reconnaissance and counterterrorism operations. N’Djamena also deepened its relationship with Beijing. A high-level visit by China’s foreign minister in January 2025 is evidence of the growing ties between the two nations. China also became Chad’s top trading partner. While Türkiye and China were expanding their presence in Chad, the French did the opposite - the last soldiers left Chad just before Christmas 2024.
Guinea (September 2021)
Alpha Condé was democratically elected as president of Guinea in 2010. During his second term however, Condé began consolidating his power, as he amended the constitution to permit him to seek more than two presidential terms. He controversially won a third term in October 2020 in an election marked by violence. This third term severely undermined both his popularity and the legitimacy of his government.
On 5 September 2021, members of the Guinean special forces stormed the presidential palace in Conakry, detained the president and announced the dissolution of government institutions. The coup was led by Colonel Mamady Doumbouya, head of the special forces, who declared that Guinea’s era of "personalised politics" was over and that power would be returned to the people. Doumbouya became the head of a new junta and he was sworn in as interim president on 1 October 2021. There were no immediate post-coup protests. Rather, some crowds in Conakry shouted Doumbaya’s name, hoping that this could be an opportunity for change in a country where almost two thirds of the population was dealing with persistent poverty.
In May 2022, Guinea’s junta announced a 39-month transition to constitutional, civilian rule. Doumbouya promised that no one in the interim government, including himself, would stand in the promised elections. Political protests were however banned soon after. A new election was planned in December 2024, which was later extended for 2025. As of this writing in July 2025, Doumbouya remains in power and whether promises to restore civilian rule are kept remain to be seen.
Burkina Faso (January 2022; September 2022)
The situation in Burkina Faso largely mirrored that of other countries in the Sahel: it is landlocked and one of the poorest countries in the world. On top of that, the Burkinabé military was fighting a jihadist insurgency which had gotten progressively worse since 2015. Tensions between the military and the democratically elected president of the country, Roch Kaboré, had been building for months. The military was spread thin and did not receive enough supplies, while being blamed for the deterioration of the security situation and losing many men.
On 23 January 2022, these tensions erupted into a mutiny. Soldiers detained President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, dissolved the government and national assembly, suspended the constitution, and sealed the nation's borders. Declaring Kaboré unfit to lead, the coup leaders installed 41-year-old Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba as the head of a new military junta. The junta pledged a 36-month transition to constitutional civilian rule, during which Damiba would not run in future elections. Some pre-coup officials were reinstated, and regional governments seemed to accept the proposed roadmap to stability.
Stability was short-lived. Eight months after the coup, Burkina Faso experienced a ‘coup within a coup’ as the military turned against its own former leader Paul-Henri Damiba. Citing worsening security and the failure to curb extremist violence, the new coup leaders echoed January’s reasoning. Under Damiba’s brief rule, the situation deteriorated: over 620 terrorist attacks killed 567 people in his first 100 days, and by September 2022, the government controlled only about 60% of the country. A devastating attack on 26 September 2022 in Soum province, which destroyed part of a humanitarian convoy and left dozens dead or missing, proved to be a breaking point. On 30 September, the 34 year-old Captain Ibrahim Traoré announced on national television that Damiba had been deposed, the interim government dissolved, and the borders closed. The junta again promised a gradual return to democratic governance.
Damiba’s downfall was not just the result of the worsening security crisis—it was also shaped by internal divisions within the junta itself. One member later admitted anonymously that Damiba had resisted calls to diversify Burkina Faso’s security partnerships, particularly by reaching out to Russia. His reluctance to embrace this shift, alongside the continued surge in extremist violence, led to the second coup in 2022.
In the days that followed, Traoré accused the French army of sheltering Damiba at one of its bases in Burkina Faso, after Damiba’s whereabouts were unknown. France denied the claim, but the accusation triggered violent protests at French diplomatic and military installations. Demonstrators waved Russian flags and attacked the French embassy, reflecting growing public hostility toward France’s continued presence.
Damiba resigned and fled to Togo, and on 5 October 2022, Traoré was officially declared president. That same day, an ECOWAS delegation that arrived in Ouagadougou for a fact-finding mission was met with large pro-coup demonstrations, where protesters denounced the organization, waved Russian flags, chanted pro-Russian slogans, and demanded the withdrawal of French forces. This hostile reception reflected growing resentment toward what many in Burkina Faso perceive as ECOWAS’s alignment with French and broader Western interests, especially given its frequent sanctions and pressure on military governments in the region.
While Traoré’s junta initially pledged to hold elections by 2024, that promise was abandoned in May 2024 when the transitional period was extended by five years, with the government citing ongoing insecurity. Relations with the West, particularly France, continued to worsen. The junta expelled French military forces, suspended French media outlets, and accused Paris of interference and neocolonial attitudes. In their place, Burkina Faso deepened its ties with Russia. Later in 2024, the Russian Afrika Korps arrived in the country and established a military base in Loumbila, northeast of the capital.
Gabon (August 2023)
On 26 August 2023, Ali Bongo Ondimba won Gabon’s presidential election, this third term and also another extension of the Bongo family’s 56-year dynastic rule. The election however was plagued by widespread allegations of fraud and irregularities, sparking outrage among opposition groups and drawing condemnation from the military itself. Just hours after the official results were announced on 30 August 2023, Gabonese soldiers led by General Brice Oligui Nguema announced that they had seized power and that Ali Bongo was placed under house arrest. They cited the “irresponsible and unpredictable governance” of the regime as the reason for their coup.
General Oligui Nguema became interim president following the coup. He promised a transition to civilian rule and pledged to restore institutional integrity. Yet, like the cases analyzed before, the junta only tightened control over Gabon’s political institutions.
In November 2024, a national referendum approved a new constitution that extended presidential terms to seven years, a change which many saw as a power grab by the military. While some in Gabon celebrated the fall of the Bongo dynasty and viewed the coup as an opportunity for renewal, others labeled it a ‘palace coup’, warning that one autocracy had simply replaced another.
Unlike in Mali or Burkina Faso, where anti-French sentiment played a central role in post-coup politics, Gabon’s case was more ambiguous. In Libreville, anti-French sentiment was not as dominant as it was in, for instance, Burkina Faso. As a response, France also voiced a more balanced response to the coup, likely hoping to maintain relations with the new junta. There were no widespread anti-French protests, and General Oligui—himself trained in France—did not lean into anti-Western rhetoric. Instead, this coup fit within a different regional pattern: growing military impatience with entrenched elites and a growing appetite to reform. As with other recent juntas, Gabon’s leadership justified its continued rule by prioritizing stability and reform over immediate elections.
When democracy fails to deliver
Starting off, it needs to be reiterated that each of the aforementioned coups is unique, and shaped by its own internal dynamics. However, as stated in the introduction, some common themes can be identified, and these offer us valuable insights in the political future of Africa and the potential role of international actors on the continent.
Democratic disillusionment
All countries analyzed in this report have faced public disillusionment with their democracies, which means that people have grown increasingly disconnected from political institutions, processes, and leaders, feeling that these systems no longer represent them or respond to their needs. This general distrust fuels frustration and a feeling of political powerlessness, which severely undermines the confidence people have in a democracy’s ability to bring about meaningful change.
To substantiate that, consider this: the countries considered rank among the poorest and least developed in the world. The Human Development Index (HDI), which measures a nation’s average achievements in health, education, and standard of living, consistently ranks Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, and Niger near the bottom globally. Only Gabon performs moderately better due to oil wealth. Economic stagnation, worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic, further contributed to stagnating living standards in said countries.
These regimes are also ranked among the most corrupt in the world. In transparency International’s 2020 Corruption Perceptions Index, which mentions how corrupt citizens of countries perceive their counties to be, all countries analyzed rank among the worst in the world. Despite an abundance of natural resources—such as oil in Chad and Gabon, uranium in Niger and Mali, and gold and other minerals in Guinea and Burkina Faso—this wealth failed to benefit the broader population.
The case of Guinea serves as a good case in point. President Alpha Condé's controversial third term in 2020 seriously eroded the legitimacy of his administration. Following the successful coup, Mamady Doumbouya, who assumed power as interim leader, quoted the words of the former Ghanaian coup leader Jerry Rawlings: “if the people are crushed by their elites, it is up to the army to give the people their freedom”. This statement captures the core of this concept—the growing perception that political elites and institutions are no longer working for the good of the people.
A troubled security landscape
Another overarching theme is that most of these countries, especially Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, are dealing with persistent security threats. The Sahel region was designated by the 2020 Global Terrorism Index as one of the most terrorism-impacted regions worldwide. The key threats stem from violent extremist organizations, including the Al-Qaeda linked Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), which exploit the region’s weak state presence and weak borders.
Burkina Faso ranks among the countries most affected by terrorism in the world. As described before, the country experienced two military coups in 2022, driven in part by deep frustration within the armed forces over the government's failure to counter the growing insurgency. Following the second coup, Captain Ibrahim Traoré gave a statement on national television, citing how Burkinabe soldiers keep dying while the insurgency only appears to worsen. Niger followed a similar pattern, as President Mohamed Bazoum’s government struggled to contain the jihadist threat, despite extensive French support. Same goes for Mali: patience ran out with presidential administrations which appeared to be unable to address the crises the country was facing.
In these cases, the mounting frustration over the inability of governments to contain escalating security threats created fertile ground for the military to take over. Coup leaders framed these failures as justification for ‘necessary’ takeovers and responses to national crises, which resonated with parts of the public and security forces alike.
France’s eroding influence
Another common theme linking the coups discussed is a strong anti-colonial—specifically anti-French—sentiment. Most coup leaders consistently framed their actions not only as responses to governance failures but also as a rejection of the regimes’ strong ties with France.
France was the colonial ruler of all the countries in question and, despite decolonization in the 1960s, it retained significant influence, consisting of political, economic, and military ties with— a system often referred to as Françafrique. This concept encompasses both formal mechanisms, such as continued military cooperation and monetary control through the CFA franc (a currency zone still overseen by France), and informal dynamics, including networks between French and African elites.
Central to the grievances in the African nations discussed is the perception that France’s continued presence has been exploitative rather than supportive. French multinational companies maintain(ed) a dominant role in extractive industries in the region, with limited local re-investment. For many Africans, this dynamic is viewed and experienced as neocolonialism.
French President Emmanuel Macron stirred widespread frustration across several African governments when he remarked that African leaders had failed to ‘thank’ France for its role in combating insurgents in the Sahel—particularly after being expelled by newly installed military juntas. Many saw it as tone-deaf, and emblemantic of precisely that that caused so much resentment in Africa: the lack of understanding about France’s controversial history with the continent.
Another problem for many of the deposed regimes in question was that they were being perceived as being too close to France. Gabon’s Ali Bongo maintained deep ties with Paris and the West generally; Chad’s Idriss Déby was a key French ally in the Sahel; Niger’s Mohamed Bazoum was on very good terms with Macron; Burkina Faso’s Roch Kaboré relied on France for military support; Mali’s Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta and Guinea’s Alpha Condé also had strong ties with the French government. Given France’s extensive presence in some of these countries while at the same time little changed, people felt like France was there not for cooperation but rather for extraction, and they began to see their regimes as complicit in this system. The coups therefore had a certain anticolonial element to them, which explains thousands flocking the streets of Bamako, Niamey and Libreville to celebrate afterwards.
Adding to that argument is France’s failure to effectively counter the deepening security crisis in the Sahel. Its operations were increasingly viewed by local populations and governments as ineffective, self-serving, and disconnected from the realities on the ground. This growing disillusionment extended to international partners more broadly, including the United Nations’ MINUSMA mission, which many Malians saw as overly bureaucratic and, most importantly, as an instrument of the West. As violence continued and dissatisfaction with traditional Western security partners grew, Mali's military leaders turned to alternative alliances—most prominently with the Russian Wagner Group, a private military company closely aligned with Russian state interests. They also sought closer ties with countries like China and Turkey, viewing them as better equipped to meet Mali's security challenges.
A Russian narrative offensive
One party that was able to capitalize on this growing resentment against France and perceived neocolonialism in general was Russia. Through political communication and disinformation campaigns on social media, Russian actors were able to destabilize western-aligned governments and ‘detach’ France from its international partners in the region. These influence operations, repeating tactics used previously in Syria, Sudan, and the Central African Republic, employ AI-generated content, fake polls, and local influencers to shape public opinion and to undermine support for Western presence. The aforementioned Wagner Group plays a crucial role in this process. Though the organization is a separate corporate entity on paper, the company works for the foreign policy aims of the Kremlin with a degree of plausible deniability.
The narrative spread on social media usually revolves around casting pro-Western regimes as puppet governments, while presenting Russia as a trustworthy and effective security partner in the region, a narrative that found especially fertile ground in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. In Mali, following the two coups in 2020 and 2021, the military government under Assimi Goïta distanced itself from France and welcomed Russia's Wagner Group as a security partner, employing anti-French rhetoric to justify this transition. Burkina Faso followed a similar trajectory when Captain Ibrahim Traoré's junta accused France of sheltering the ousted leader Paul-Henri Damiba and embraced pro-Russian messaging; protests in the capital featured Russian flags and slogans demanding French withdrawal. The government expelled French forces and partnered with the Russian Afrika Korps. In Niger in 2023, supporters of General Abdourahamane Tchiani's junta displayed Russian flags and praised the Wagner Group during mass rallies in Niamey.
Russia did not have to invent any sort of discontent - they merely amplified and channeled sentiments that were already simmering. There were enough reasons for people in Françafrique to feel a certain degree of hostility towards the French. Russia, in this case, was there at the right time to guide the resentment to the party responsible. Through a carefully coordinated discursive strategy, they managed in a way to spread the rhetoric that France was the root of the issues at stake.
Conclusion
The wave of coups that swept through Francophone Africa between 2020 and 2023 radically changed the region’s political landscape and geopolitical alignment. Within just a few years, France—for long one of the most influential external powers on the continent— lost key strategic partners and experienced a dramatic retreat from a region once considered its stronghold.
While each coup considered—Mali, Niger, Chad, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Gabon—had its own unique drivers, overarching themes emerged that help understanding regional trajectories and thinking ahead for the future development of the region. The countries examined are among the poorest and least developed in the world, in which citizens increasingly saw their governments as corrupt, self-interested, and disconnected from public needs. This widespread frustration, coupled with persistent and severe security threats—especially across the Sahel—created a climate of instability fertile for unrest and military takeovers.
Another key factor is the enduring influence of France. French diplomacy and companies are perceived as advancing Paris’s interests more than contributing to local development. Anti-French sentiment, rooted in the horrors of colonialism and the perceived neocolonialism of Françafrique, became an important justification for the coups discussed in this report. Russian disinformation campaigns have effectively leveraged this longstanding resentment, amplifying anti-French and anti-Western narratives to further their own influence.
France’s future in Africa
As France’s influence in Africa continues to decline, it is critical to not only look at what has happened, but also what comes next; how will France respond, and what are the implications for Africa’s future? When Emmanuel Macron assumed the presidency in 2017, he was regarded as one of France’s most foreign policy-driven leaders in recent decades. Yet, under his administration, France has suffered its most significant geopolitical retreat on the continent since the decolonization era of the 1950s and ’60s. Across Africa, long-standing allies of Paris have been ousted from power, not only in the countries discussed in this report but elsewhere too. The symbolic end of this era came on 17 July 2025, when France handed over its last two military bases in Senegal—leaving it without a permanent military presence in either West or Central Africa.
First, France is likely to double down on its remaining partnerships in the region while actively seeking to establish new ones. In Gabon, where the Bongo family had long maintained close ties with Paris, pragmatism will likely guide France’s approach to the current junta. Given that Gabon hosts two of France’s last military bases in Africa—alongside another in Djibouti—Paris has strong incentives to remain accommodating. France is also actively attempting to improve its relationship with Madagascar, exemplified by President Macron’s 2025 state visit to the island and the symbolic return of historical artifacts. In light of their ongoing territorial dispute over the Scattered Islands (Îles Éparses), Paris may be willing to make concessions in order to keep Antananarivo on their side. Côte d’Ivoire also provides opportunities: although relations under President Alassane Ouattara are not necessarily pro-France, there remains room for strategic cooperation. Lastly, France is expected to make efforts to strengthen its historically close ties with Morocco, a longstanding regional partner.
As for new partnerships, Nigeria appears to be a strong contender. In November 2024, President Bola Tinubu conducted a two-day state visit to Paris, in which Macron welcomed him with warmth, emphasizing cultural and economic ties. Throughout 2025, Tinubu returned to France on multiple occasions, both in official and unofficial capacities. France is actively trying to sustain high-level engagement with Ghanaian officials, too. In April 2025, French officials conducted an official mission to the African nation focused on strengthening cooperation across several sectors.
In the countries where ties remain intact, France is likely to adopt a pragmatic—rather than idealistic—approach in dealing with their respective governments, aiming to preserve what remains of its influence on the continent. To this end, Paris may choose to overlook practices that do not fully align with its professed democratic values, prioritizing strategic interests over principles. Offering targeted investments or economic incentives may also become a tool to maintain goodwill and strengthen bilateral ties where possible. A good case in point here is Mozambique. Despite the country also being notoriously warm with Russia - the two countries reaffirmed their commitment to defense cooperation in July, 2025 - France plans to deepen cooperation relations and increase trade with the country five-fold. France also has a significant interest in keeping relations with Maputo stable, as its energy giant TotalEnergies is constructing a $20 billion LNG plant in the north of Mozambique.
As for the countries discussed, it is likely that for the foreseeable future they will not restore relations with France—and more broadly, with the West. In particular, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, and to a lesser extent Chad, are ruled by juntas that derive much of their legitimacy from anti-Western rhetoric. As a result, a meaningful thaw in diplomatic ties is unlikely in the near term. These countries are expected to pursue increasingly independent foreign policies, aligning with Russia and other non-Western powers when it serves their strategic objectives. Western engagement, diplomatic, commercial, and humanitarian, is expected to become increasingly difficult. Embassies may scale back their presence, international NGOs could encounter tighter restrictions, and the operating environment for Western companies is likely to become more constrained. This is already happening at the time of writing: Niger ordered the International Committee of the Red Cross earlier this year to close its offices, citing an alleged collusion with armed groups.
A changing global context
The core issue here is what the emergence of these juntas represents. These coups, the speed at which they took place in different countries and the public support they received, signal deep structural failures and a rejection of the old political order. It reflects a growing demand in Africa, at least in the countries analyzed, for government accountability and that they serve the interests of their people.
This shift is unfolding within a completely different global context than the post-independence era of the 20th century. Western dominance in Africa is a thing of the past, and new powers such as Russia, China and Turkey are competing for influence. Influence in Africa is beneficial for a multitude of reasons: the continent is rich in critical minerals, which are essential for advanced weapon systems and the green transition. Africa offers strategic military footholds, diplomatic influence and access to expanding consumer markets.
People waving Russian flags in Niamey, enormous Chinese investment in Africa and the expanding military role of Turkey on the continent is evidence of the shift toward multipolarity on the continent. African nations are no longer locked into historical allegiances. Instead, they are actively reshaping the terms of engagement on their own terms. They are diversifying their partnerships and seek arrangements that better serve national priorities.
An example of that is the alignment of some African nations such as the ones examined in this report but also others, such as Mozambique and the Central African Republic, with the Russian Wagner Group and Afrika Korps. In Mali, for instance, the Goïta-led junta not only expelled French forces but also invited Wagner to take over France’s role. Similarly, Burkina Faso under Captain Ibrahim Traoré turned away from Western military assistance and embraced Russian cooperation.
Therefore, the wave of coups analyzed in this report should not necessarily be seen as a regional crisis but rather as a ‘symptom’, meaning it represents a change in Africa’s geopolitical alignment. The military juntas that took power present themselves as the agents of this change, tapping into longstanding resentment to justify their rule. It is still unclear to what extent they can actually live up to that promise.
Looking forward
This changing landscape requires the West to rethink its relationship with Africa, which can no longer rely on historical privilege or assumptions of automatic alignment. What happened in Françafrique is not just an uprising against African leaders - it is a broader call for sovereignty and genuine agency in international affairs. In order to retain cordial relations with modern Africa, Western countries have to acknowledge that and adapt to this new reality. It is not just a moral question - it is a strategic necessity.
When Ibrahim Traoré, junta leader of Burkina Faso, conducted a visit to Moscow in early May 2025 to commemorate the 80th May 9th parade, celebrating the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany, Putin sent a private jet to Ouagadougou to pick Traoré up and his delegation, which he had escorted by fighter jets once in Russian airspace. People on X (formerly Twitter) were quick to comment on the gesture, most of them being from African nations applauding the gesture. One user wrote:
“Russia didn’t just invite President Ibrahim Traoré to Moscow — they sent a state aircraft to personally pick him up from Burkina Faso. That’s not diplomacy. That’s respect. That’s symbolism. In a world where African leaders are often summoned like subordinates, this moment flips the script. It tells a new story: of African sovereignty being recognized, of alliances built on mutual interest — not colonial residue.”
Symbolic acts like this can carry significant diplomatic weight. Perceptions shape alliances, and this reminds us that equal treatment can matter just as much as actual material support - especially in a region long denied both.
