DRC Update VII: DRC Peace Deal: Prospects and Difficulties

casper4871
Aug 5
6 min read

Date: 04/08/2025 15:00 UTC+2

Location: Goma, North Kivu Province, DRC; Nyabibwe, South Kivu Province, DRC; Kalehe, South Kivu Province, DRC; Bukavu, South Kivu Province, DRC. Kinshasa, Kinshasa Province, DRC. Bunia, Ituri, DRC.

Historic context:

On 28/01/2025, the M23 rebel group seized Goma — one of eastern Congo’s largest cities — and large parts of North and South Kivu in a rapid offensive that left thousands dead and displaced many more. This renewed violence is part of a 30-year conflict rooted in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, which saw millions of Hutus flee to Congo, forming militias like the FDLR.
The Congolese government has consistently accused Rwanda of supporting the M23 rebel group. Kigali denies these claims, despite UN experts saying that Rwanda exercises direct control over the rebels. In response to the offensive, Congo severed diplomatic ties with Rwanda. Although Rwanda has 7,000–12,000 troops stationed in the DRC, it claims they are there solely to defend against Hutu militias linked to the genocide.
On 26/05/2025, it was reported that Joseph Kabila, Congolese president from 2001 until 2019, returned to the country after years of self-imposed exile, a move that has intensified political tensions, given his fractured relationship with President Tshisekedi and his recent presence in rebel-held Goma after arriving via Rwanda.
On 27/06/2025, the DRC and Rwanda signed a US-mediated peace deal aimed at ending hostilities and laying the groundwork for long-term stability. The agreement included a ceasefire, withdrawal of foreign troops, a neutral monitoring force, and frameworks for regional economic integration and the disarmament of armed groups like the FDLR. It also committed both countries to cooperate on demobilization, reintegration, and border security.
A couple of weeks later, on 19/07/2025, the DRC signed a separate Qatar-brokered peace deal in Doha with the M23 rebel group and its political wing, the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC). The agreement called for M23’s phased withdrawal, reintegration of fighters into the national army, the safe return of displaced civilians, and local governance reforms in eastern Congo. Qatar pledged $300 million in reconstruction aid and will help oversee implementation alongside the UN and the African Union.

What happened:

Despite two peace deals, fighting in the eastern DRC between M23 and Wazalendo (Swahili for ‘patriot’) militias aligned to the regime in Kinshasa has not stopped at the time of writing. There is a significant distrust on both sides. M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka also accused the DRC of deploying extra troops and heavy weapons to the region, in violation of the ceasefire.
On 01/07/2025, the armed forces of the DRC (FARDC) shot down an airplane in the Kivu province. They later claimed it entered Congolese airspace illegally and refused to identify itself. M23 claimed the plane was carrying food and medical supplies for locals.
On 05/07/2025, Rwandan President Paul Kagame publicly expressed doubt over the DRC-Rwanda peace deal, stating that he does not believe that the DRC will be able to effectively deal with the FDLR, Rwanda’s biggest security concern within the DRC.
On 07/07/2025, it was reported that the U.S. company HYDRO-LINK will construct a $1.5 billion power line connecting hydro-rich Angola to southeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The project aims to deliver a stable electricity supply to the region, potentially supporting U.S. access to the critical minerals found there.
On 09/07/2025, large M23 troop movements southwards were reported by observers.
On 19/07/2025, the DRC and M23 signed a declaration to end hostilities, outlining an immediate ceasefire and a commitment to begin talks.
On 01/08/2025, the DRC and Rwanda held their first meeting of a joint oversight committee, an actual first step in implementing the decisions made during the peace deal weeks earlier.
On 02/08/2025, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo agreed on a draft economic framework under a US-brokered peace deal. The agreement includes cooperation on energy, infrastructure, and mineral supply chains. They also committed to linking new infrastructure to the U.S.-built Lobito Corridor—a major transport route connecting the interior of Africa to the Atlantic Ocean via Angola, designed to boost regional trade and export critical minerals.

Analysis

Pitfalls

The two parallel peace deals in the DRC - one between Rwanda and the DRC, and one directly between M23/AFC and the DRC - are a step in the right direction. They also overcame an important hurdle, which was outlined in our previous intel brief, where it was concluded that a deal at the state level only might not suffice in bringing peace to Kivu. The declaration signed on 19/07/2025 directly addressed that concern by engaging both the state and rebel actors.

However, challenges remain. Despite these agreements, it is still uncertain whether they will effectively end the decades-long cycle of conflict in the region. The deal between M23 and the DRC, which includes commitments to a ceasefire, a suspension of hostilities and further peacebuilding, is a step in the right direction, especially given Kinshasa’s initial refusal to have direct talks with M23. Experts have, however, called the agreements ‘vague,’ which, combined with the fact that the parties seriously distrust each other, results in a difficult implementation.

The deal between the DRC and Rwanda also faces major obstacles. Previous attempts to secure the Rwandan withdrawal from DRC territory failed. This means that a Rwandan withdrawal from Congolese territory - a non-negotiable demand for lasting peace from Kinshasa’s side - will likely be dependent on Rwanda’s most important demand: the ‘neutralization’ of the FDLR. However, the agreement lacks clear criteria as to what ‘neutralization’ means in this regard, and even if this was the case, eliminating the group will likely be challenging as it is deeply entrenched in Congolese society.

Internal Congolese politics complicate the situation even further, mostly due to the problematic relationship between current president Felix Tshisekedi and former president Joseph Kabila. Kabila returned to the DRC this year after a period of self-imposed exile. Following his controversial reluctant departure from power in 2019. While the two initially had a power-sharing agreement, their alliance ultimately broke down, and their relationship severely deteriorated. Tshisekedi has since moved to sideline Kabila, who is likely trying to reclaim political influence by aligning himself with powerful actors such as M23 and Rwanda. This remains a hypothesis, but Kabila’s appearance in rebel-held Goma and his arrival in the DRC via Rwanda gives reason to suspect it. This further complicates peace efforts as it ‘fractures’ the Congolese response to the crisis.

Prospects

Despite the ongoing difficulties in achieving lasting peace in Kivu, the economic aspect of the DRC-Rwanda peace deal holds some promise.. Part of the Washington Accord signed last June is the US-brokered regional economic framework, which aims to integrate the region’s economic infrastructure and includes elements of cooperation on energy, infrastructure, mineral supply chains, national parks and public health.

This is a clear attempt to ‘bank’ on economic ties to promote stability in the region. It essentially gives Rwanda precisely what they want: Kigali secured formal recognition and a key role in regional economic integration with the DRC, which is rich in resources such as tantalum, gold, copper, cobalt and lithium. This way, the country could participate in joint industrial ventures, which means it can benefit the DRC’s mineral resources. For Kinshasa, the deal promises regulated, conflict-free trade and much-needed infrastructure, such as the Ruzizi III hydropower project in Rwanda, which can also deliver power to the DRC.

The US, which brokered the peace agreement between Kigali and Kinshasa, benefits too for two reasons. First, it provides the US with access to critical minerals it desperately needs. The country is notoriously dependent on China for certain minerals, which in recent years is increasingly choking off supply to Western companies. The regional economic framework encompasses joint mining operations, customs coordination, and industrial investment, particularly through the US-backed Lobito Corridor, which provides Washington with a more sustainable source of these minerals. Secondly, by securing alternative sources of critical minerals, the U.S. also challenges China's growing dominance in Africa, particularly in the DRC, where Beijing has established a firm foothold. This initiative could serve as a strategic counterbalance to Chinese influence in the region.

Conclusion

The peace deals made between the DRC and M23 on one side and Rwanda on the other still have significant difficulties, which is why it remains hard to gauge the extent to which they will achieve a durable peace. Deep-rooted mistrust, vague conditions and the rift between Kabila and Tshisekedi are the most complicating factors.

That being said, the economic framework does give reasons to be optimistic by aligning the two former rivals around a goal of shared development. The fact that they agreed on the outline for the economic framework on 02/08/2025, as promised during the peace deal, is an indicator that both parties are willing to make it work. Furthermore, with backing from the United States, which has strong strategic and economic incentives to see the framework succeed, both nations have added motivation to adhere to its terms.