Intel Brief: Lebanese Cabinet Approves Hezbollah's Disarmament Plan
- gregorio46
- Aug 8
- 3 min read
Date: 08/08/2025 (17:00 UTC+2)
Where?
Lebanon

What happened?
On 19/06/2025, after months of pressure for the disarmament of Hezbollah following the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire deal, signed on 18/11/2024, US special envoy Thomas Barrack delivered a plan to the Lebanese government officials. The plan entailed the full disarmament of Hezbollah within four months in exchange for a halt to Israeli air strikes and withdrawal of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) from southern Lebanon. The IDF has maintained a presence in five posts in southern Lebanon since first establishing a presence during the Israel-Hezbollah conflict of 2024, namely in Jabal al-Labouneh, Jabal Blat, Talat al Awida, Tallet al-Hamamamis, and Tallet Aaziyyeh.
On 07/07/2025, the Lebanese government delivered a response to US envoy Barrack, which was so well received it even prompted Barrack to state he was “unbelievably satisfied” with Lebanon’s reply. This was, however, not a final agreement, and negotiations were to continue in order to finalize the deal.
Fast forward a few weeks, on 21/07/2025, during a press conference after a meeting with Lebanon’s PM, Nawaf Salam, when asked about the extent to which the US could act as a security guarantor for Lebanon and push Israel to respect its end of the deal, Barrack casted doubt over the US’ mediating power, stating that the US “has no business in trying to compel Israel to do anything”.
On 29/07/2025, the US publicly pressured Lebanon to formalize its commitment to Hezbollah’s disarmament, pushing for the Lebanese cabinet to approve the disarmament of Hezbollah.
On 30/07/2025, Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem scorned calls to disarmament, stating that the group will “not submit to Israel” and that weapons are “an internal Lebanese affair”.
On 31/07/2025, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun urged Hezbollah to disarm, arguing that avoiding doing so would only result in the continuation of Israeli air strikes in Lebanon.
On 05/08/2025, the Lebanese Cabinet tasked the army to draw up a plan to establish a state monopoly on arms by the end of the year. As a response, Hezbollah supporters began protesting, especially in Beirut, where they had first gathered on Monday, 04/08/2025. The plan is to be presented to the Lebanese government by 31/08/2025. During the cabinet meeting that led to this decision, Hezbollah’s Qassem repeated his refusal to disarm while threatening Israel that Hezbollah would retaliate if Israel were to re-intensify its air campaign on Lebanon.
On 06/08/2025, Hezbollah leader Qassem repeated his disdain for the cabinet decision the previous day, stating that the Lebanese government was committing a “grave sin” by directing the Army to establish a monopoly on arms.
On 07/08/2025, the Lebanese Cabinet approved the US-proposed plan to disarm Hezbollah.
Conclusion
The recent Lebanese Cabinet decision to formalize the disarmament of Hezbollah represents a major change in the government’s stance towards the Iran-backed group that has essentially ruled the country for the past two decades. The decision comes after Hezbollah suffered heavy losses during the recent Israel-Hezbollah war, which resulted in the death of most of its leadership and a significant part of its fighters. Weakened both militarily and politically, Hezbollah could not avoid the appointment of Lebanon’s new President, Joseph Aoun, who was elected by a vast majority in parliament after more than two years since the last election.
Aoun, a former Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), has vowed to rebuild the country and has identified the State’s monopoly on arms as a crucial factor in the rebuilding process. On 07/08/2025, the Lebanese Cabinet approved plans for the LAF to conduct Hezbollah’s disarmament and deliver a result by year’s end. The plan, heavily pushed by the US, is likely not in line with what Aoun’s government, wary of fostering more dissent (Hezbollah still enjoys some popular support) by rushing the group’s dismantlement, would have preferred. Nevertheless, the plan is now in motion, and the LAF, following years of neglect and under-funding, faces a monumental task that warrants continued monitoring.
This is a shortened version of a more elaborate report.
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