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Date :   28/10/2024 Where :  Ukraine, Russia Who’s involved : Parties: Russia, North Korea, Ukraine What happened?   On 28/10/2024 , NATO confirmed that North Korea has sent troops to Russia to join the war against Ukraine and that they have been deployed in the Kursk region. The exact number of North Korean troops in Russia is still not yet determined. U.S. and South Korean intelligence have now claimed there are 3,000 North Korean troops training in Russia. Ukrainian intelligence claims the figure is closer to 12,000 troops. On 28/10/2024 , South Korea began diplomatic talks with the U.S. and NATO to discuss the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia. On 25/10/2024 , the Dutch Intelligence services joined Ukraine, the U.S. and South Korea in confirming that up to 1,500 North Korean troops have been sent to fight in Russia’s war against Ukraine on the battlefield, though their specific role is uncertain. The North Korean special forces units are expected to be deployed against the Ukrainian military within Russia’s Kursk region. On 25/10/2024 , South Korea and Poland are close to signing a deal that would send K2 tanks to Poland which would aid in their support in backing Ukraine in the war. On 24/10/2024 , South Korea warned that it might send weapons to Ukraine after North Korea deployed troops to Russia. The presidential office said it may upgrade its aid to Ukraine from purely defensive weapons to offensive weapons, depending on North Korea’s involvement in the war. On 18/10/2024 , South Korean National Intelligence services released satellite images which they claim show North Korean personnel in a training ground at Russia’s Ussuriysk military facility. More satellite images were released showing a Russia naval vessel which is suspected of transporting North Korean troops to a Russian port. Analysis : North Korea has shifted in importance to Russia from being just an arms supplier to now being an active participant in their fight against Ukraine. North Korea’s support for Russia in the Ukraine conflict has also proved m utually advantageous; it has earned North Korea approximately $540 million from arms sales to Russia. Russia and North Korea signed a landmark defense pact in June 2024 which would mean both countries would provide immediate military assistance to each other in the case of an attack. With North Korean troops possibly used for combat purposes, it offers a unique opportunity to test its military capabilities in real combat conditions. North Korea currently has 1.3 million active soldiers and 7.5 million soldiers on reserve with 8 to 10 years mandatory years of military service making them experienced but lacking exposure to real-life combat conditions. Russia’s training and deployment of North Korean troops in its conflict with Ukraine suggests that the war is not unfolding as Russia had planned.  Their reliance on foreign forces highlights a growing strain on Russia’s military, in which an estimated 600,000 troops have been killed or wounded since the full-scale war started in 2022. Moreover, the Kremlin’s increasing dependence on weapons deliveries from countries like Iran and North Korea point to a depletion in Russia’s own weapon stockpile. Despite Russia’s initial expectation of an expeditious campaign, recent development demonstrates they have faced challenges in maintaining a strong front in the war.  The participation of North Korea taking a more direct role in the Russia-Ukraine war could destabilize Ukraine's defenses. The additional North Korean troops will add more pressure to the Ukrainians’ defensive lines and maintain their positions in the Kursk region. However, it is not clear yet if they will make a difference to Russia’s war effort.  South Korea has stated that they are considering sending offensive weapons to Ukraine to aid in the war following intelligence on the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia.  South Korea is profoundly concerned that the deal includes assistance to raise Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear programme, or that Russian soldiers could be deployed to North Korea in the future. Russia’s reliance on North Korea enables North Korea to obtain more missile and nuclear capability technology.  Conclusion: Intelligence reports from western governments suggest that North Korean troops are being trained in Russian military facilities; the exact number of troops are still to be determined. Although it is not yet clear on the role of North Korean troops for the conflict, the strategic partnership and recent deployments have raised significant alarms for the international community. Whilst alliance mutually benefits Russia and North Korea, Europe and the Indo-Pacific should be fully prepared for an escalation in the conflict that could reach beyond the borders of Ukraine and exacerbate the already dire humanitarian crisis and mass displacement of people.

Date: 24/10/2024 Who’s involved :  Israel, Hezbollah, Hamas, Iran, United States. What happened? The Israeli Defense Force’s ground invasion of Lebanon and the Israeli Air Forces’ bombing campaign in the south of Lebanon aimed at crippling Hezbollah’s forces is ongoing. On 16/10/2024  an Israeli airstrike destroyed the municipal headquarters in a major town in south Lebanon, killing 16 people including the mayor. On the same day, the UN mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) said its peacekeepers observed an Israeli tank firing at their watchtower near southern Lebanon's Kfar Kila. On 21/10/2024  UNIFIL was accused of accepting money from Hezbollah in exchange for access for this latter to UNIFIL bases for conducting operations. UNIFIL denied the accusations, but the investigation is still ongoing. On  20/10/2024  the Israeli Air Force conducted a series of targeted, intelligence-based strikes against dozens of facilities and sites used by Hezbollah to finance its terrorist activities against Israel.   On 21/10/2024  seven Israelis were arrested by the Israeli security services on suspicion of espionage for Iran. Prosecutors alleged they had completed around 600 missions on behalf of Iran, including gathering intelligence on sensitive military and infrastructure sites, and identifying potential human targets for Iran.  On 21/10/2024  an Israeli official stated that two of Israel’s conditions for a ceasefire with Lebanon include allowing the IDF to engage in active enforcement to prevent Hezbollah from rearming and rebuilding its military infrastructure in the areas of southern Lebanon, and freedom for operations of the IDF in Lebanese airspace. The US Department of Defense deployed a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery (THAAD) and an associated crew of US military personnel to Israel. On 21/10/2024  a classified document regarding Israel’s plans to attack Iran was leaked without authorization on Telegram. The document assessed Israeli’s readiness to conduct the attack and its possible weaknesses. It also describes the possible use of long-range missiles to conduct a long distance aerial attack. On 18/10/2024  the Islamic resistance in Iraq, a coalition of armed groups based in Iraq, targeted two key military sites in the city of Eilat and in southern Israel. Over the past two weeks, Iran-linked militias in Iraq have launched about 40 aerial attacks involving missiles, drones or rockets on Israel.  On  17/10/2024  the Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was killed by IDF forces in an operation in Rafah, Gaza. Yahya was one of the masterminds behind the 7th October attack. His death is significant for the existence of the Hamas group, and many western countries hope that this event could lead to the signing of a ceasefire and the release of the hostages held captive by Hamas. The US has urged Israel to end the war in the Middle East and bring peace to Gaza, stating that the death of Sinwar has fulfilled Israel’s objectives in Gaza.  Analysis : After the Iranian ballistic missile attack on 01/10/2024 , Israel has vowed a response in retaliation for the attack. There is speculation that  Israel could lead to aerial bombing and targeting of Iranian oil fields or nuclear sites.  The US has deployed an anti-missile system to Israel and Iran’s air defenses are on high alert in anticipation of expecting Israeli retaliatory airstrikes. The conflict between Hezbollah and Israel is intensifying. Israel is attempting to destabilize and destroy Hezbollah by revealing how Iran funds Hezbollah's terrorism using civilian institutions, associations, and charities as cover for their operations, and how any other illicit financing and supporting activities have been used by the Iran-backed group. Israel seems to be considering accepting a ceasefire with Hezbollah, but on the condition that Hezbollah does not maintain its position close to Israel's northern border. Hezbollah had initially said it would only consider a ceasefire with Israel if a ceasefire was reached in Gaza. The death of Yahya Sinwar as the head of Hamas may be a turning point after a year of hostilities in the Israel-Hamas conflict. His death dealt a blow to the organization, and could potentially accelerate a hostage deal, or lead to the group’s disintegration. The leader that will replace Sinwar could play a role in a possible ceasefire. Other candidates include Yahya Sinwar brother Mohammad Sinwar or Khaled Mashaa. It is likely that the latter will take the role of leader from outside Gaza, whereas Mohammad Sinwar is expected to assume a bigger role within Gaza.  Conclusion: The situation in the Middle East is highly tense and unpredictable. The Israeli targeting of Hezbollah and Hamas on all the open fronts are weakening both organizations. This limits Iran’s assets, leaving the country to rely on its other minor proxies. The US intervention to mediate for a ceasefire in both Lebanon and Gaza offers a possibility for a ceasefire, though previous attempts have not led to concrete results. The US anti-missile system deployed in Israel might hinder the effectiveness of a US mediation. Iran’s air defenses are on high alert in anticipation of expecting Israeli retaliatory airstrikes, though the scale and targets of the IAF is yet to be seen.

Written by Jacob Dickinson, Iris de Boer, Alessia Cappelletti Sudan : power struggle between military factions broke into open conflict. Russia-Ukraine : heavy fighting on the Ukrainian frontline, particularly in Donetsk. Myanmar : military junta targeted civilian camps and committed human rights abuses. Ethiopia : Amhara region on the border with Tigray has seen extensive protests. Armenia-Azerbaijan : increased tensions after the establishment of Azerbaijani checkpoint. Democratic Republic of Congo : continuation of the conflict on the border with Uganda. Israel : judicial reforms in Israel postponed and worsening security situation in Israel-Palestine. Burkina Faso : over 150 civilians killed in attack in Northern Yatenga province. Mali : unrest continues as multiple attacks take place within the country. Yemen : progress in peace talks by opposing sides. Colombia : reshuffle of cabinet to reinvigorate reform plan and planned negotiations between the government and guerilla’s Chile : Chile nationalized its lithium industry amidst growing competition for critical minerals used in green technologies.

Date: 09/10/2024 Who’s involved?   Maia Sandu and the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) Alexandr Stoianoglo supported by the Party of Socialists (PSRM) Nine other election candidates The Russian Federation The European Union What happened? Presidential elections in Moldova will take place on   20/10/2024 . On the same day, Moldova will hold an EU membership referendum  in which voters will answer the question “are you for the accession of the Republic of Moldova to the European Union?”. Eleven candidates are participating in the Presidential elections, which will be held according to a two-round system. Election polls suggest that current President Maia Sandu will compete with former Prosecutor General Alexandr Stoianoglo during the second round of the elections.  Maia Sandu is a pro-European election candidate  and leads the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS). Critics have mentioned that her party is exploiting the EU referendum to guarantee a second presidential term. Alexandr Stoianoglo has been put forward by the Party of Socialists (PSRM)  as a candidate that seeks to represent a unified opposition. The PSRM is a pro-Russian party and it is believed to have close ties with the Kremlin . The outcome of the EU referendum will determine whether Moldova will amend its constitution by adding two new paragraphs that reaffirm the European identity of Moldova as well as its European course, and that declare Moldova’s integration into the EU as a strategic objective.  Moldovan officials have warned of Russia’s interference in the Presidential elections and the EU referendum . They reported that pro-Russian groups that are directly paid by the Kremlin are behind a wave of vandalizations of state buildings in Chișinău , try to convince voters to choose for pro-Russian election candidates and a ‘no’ vote during the referendum by paying them money, and are planning to seize government buildings.  Context: Moldova’s current government, led by Maia Sandu, has worked to enable the country’s accession into the European Union and officially applied in 2022. Moldova is now holding an EU candidate status  and has moved to the second stage of accession negotiations in 2024.  While Russia worked together with the US and EU in order to bring down the regime of Vladimir Plahotniuc in Moldova in 2019, the Kremlin is currently conducting a destabilization campaign in order to increase its influence and hinder Moldova’s EU accession process . Russia mainly focuses on the Moldovan break-away regions Transnistria and Gagauzia, where it spreads disinformation, financially supports residents, and helped to install pro-Russian governors. In addition, there are Russian troops stationed in Transnistria. These troops have already been here since 1992 and stayed as part of a peacekeeping mission in 1995. However, the current government of Moldova sees the continuation of Russian military presence in Transnistria as illegitimate. It is believed that the final goal of the Kremlin is to bring down the current pro-European government of Moldova and to replace it with a pro-Russian puppet government . The upcoming Presidential elections and EU referendum are thus the perfect occasion for Russia to pursue this goal. An increase in destabilizing actions performed by pro-Russian groups, believed to be paid by the Kremlin, is expected in the run-up to the elections.  Recent polls still suggest that Maia Sandu is going to win the elections and that the majority of the voters will be in favor of the EU referendum. However, polls are not completely trustworthy and it is still unclear what the effect of the Russian destabilization campaign will be on the election results .  Scenarios: If Sandu wins the elections and the referendum will pass , Moldova’s pro-European course is reaffirmed by the public and the amendment of the constitution will be a solid signal towards the EU that the country won’t wander from the path to EU accession. The amendment of the constitution will give Sandu’s government legitimacy to change certain laws and regulations to align with the EU accession requirements .  There is also an option that  Sandu wins the elections, but that people will vote against the EU referendum. This will make it more difficult for Sandu’s government to change laws and regulations in order to meet the EU accession criteria, as the constitution won’t necessarily support such changes. The latter is a solid argument for the opposition to fight the pro-European course of  Sandu’s government. If Stoianoglo wins the elections and the referendum won’t pass,   it is likely that Moldova will increase its ties with Russia and that the government abstains from continuing the path to EU accession. This will be fought by the opposition, but as Moldova’s aim for EU accession is not implemented in its constitution, the opposition won’t have many tools in place to secure the continuation of the EU accession process. In this case, it is expected that the accession process will stagnate. Protests by pro-European citizens might take place. When Stoianoglo wins the elections and people will vote in favor of the EU referendum , it is likely that Stoianoglo will still not change the constitution as Russia will pressure Stoianoglo’s government and the referendum is not binding . In this case, it is likely that ties with the EU will erode and that Russia increases its influence over Moldova to make it align with the objectives of the Kremlin. Conclusion: The Moldovan presidential election as well as the EU referendum will highly influence   Moldova’s alignment with the European Union as well as its alignment with the Russian Federation . Multiple scenarios are possible and 20/10/2024 will be an important day for many Moldovan citizens. However, it is sure that the election results and the results of the EU referendum will be closely followed in Brussels as well as in the Kremlin.  An increase in destabilizing actions by Russia as well as a close monitoring of the election process by the EU is expected.  There is a possibility of protests against the results of the presidential election and the EU referendum in the aftermath of 20/10/2024.

Date:  10/10/2024 Where :  USA China Who’s involved : US Federal authorities US Telecoms AT&T Lumen Verizon Chinese Threat Actor Salt Typhoon What happened? Chinese threat actors infiltrated the wiretap systems of several major US telecom and internet providers . The wiretap systems targeted were mandated  by the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), a US federal law that requires telecoms to provide technical support to law enforcement for lawful surveillance–enacted in 1994. These compromised systems may have granted hackers access to vast amounts of internet traffic and customer data, potentially allowing them to gather intelligence on Americans. The breach is considered “potentially catastrophic”  by national security sources, given the sensitive nature of wiretaps. Analysis The breach of wiretap systems is a clear exploitation of the legal backdoors that were designed for lawful interception by law enforcement. This indicates that these systems can be high-value targets for state-sponsored actors. The hackers reportedly accessed systems that law enforcement uses to intercept traffic for criminal investigations . This implies that the attackers gained entry through vulnerabilities or misconfigurations in these systems. The breach likely involved reconnaissance techniques to identify and exploit specific targets within the telecoms' infrastructure that support the lawful interception of communications. This indicates that the threat actors have also developed an intimate knowledge of these systems , regardless of any operational success. The attack could have multiple objectives, including intelligence gathering and reconnaissance in preparation for more destructive cyberattacks in the event of a conflict between China and the US, potentially over Taiwan. The breach has been contextualized within a further debate over the use of backdoors and the inherent security risks. Backdoors, even those created for lawful purposes, are fundamentally insecure and prone to abuse by malicious actors. This incident is expected to renew discussions around encryption policies and push for stronger encryption measures by companies to protect user data. It’s worth noting that European infrastructure is typically better in this regard when compared to that in the US, but a lot of European infrastructure is still reliant on US-based tech giants such as Microsoft . The EU Council is scheduled to debate related issues to encryption backdoors at its session on 10/10 . Conclusion The breach by a Chinese state-sponsored threat actor is a significant national security concern that may have long-term implications for both US and European intelligence and law enforcement operations. It comes at a time where Chinese cyber operations are continuing to escalate. It also shows the dangers of mandated backdoors in communication systems which can be exploited by adversaries. Moving forward, there will likely be increased pressure on the US government and telecom providers to strengthen encryption and reconsider the use of backdoors in lawful surveillance systems. Hopefully, the outcome of this event will shape future US policies in favor of encryption, make careful choices regarding surveillance, and cybersecurity strategies, with implications for US allies.

Date:   08/10/2024 Who’s involved : European Commission, European Member States, China, automotive industry. What happened? On 04/10/2024 , EU member states voted to implement tariffs up to 50% on imports of electrical vehicles made in China . After a year of the opening of the EU’s Commission investigations into China’s automotive industries after the surge in low prices in the electric vehicle market, EU member states voted to raise import tariffs by up to 54% on China’s imported electric vehicles. The vote divided EU member states; France, Poland and Italy voted for the raise in import tariffs to protect domestic industries, while Germany and Hungary voted against. China’s Commerce Ministry said it opposed the planned tariffs  and called them ‘unfair, non-compliant and unreasonable’. In a retaliatory measure to import tariffs, China on the same day launched investigations into the import of European pork and dairy , which are aimed at EU member states who support battery electric vehicles (BEV)   tariffs against China. On  26/08/2024 , Canada followed the lead of the United States and the European Union  said that it would impose 100% tariff on imports of Chinese electric vehicles and 25% tariff on imported steel and aluminum from China.  On  04/10/2023 , the European Commission launched an anti-subsidy investigation into the imports of BEV from China . Ursula Von Der Leyen said that the electric vehicle holds potential for the future of Europe’s competitiveness. Evidence of market distortions and unfair competition in China’s BEV sector will be investigated. The EU Commission investigated whether China’s benefits from ‘illegal’ subsidization and whether this threatens or harms EU BEV producers.  Analysis : The EU member states' split vote on BEV tariffs comes as China churns out steel, cars and solar panels more than its economy can consume domestically, forcing cheaper exports to the rest of the world. This is a part of Xi Jinping’s economic strategy to focus on “high quality productive forces” and to make China a world leader in high-tech industries by plowing billions into strategically important sectors .  The EU’s investigation into China’s electric car subsidies is due to accusations of “unfair trade practices” . The EU is concerned that the far cheaper prices offered by Chinese companies such as BYD and SAIC will be unable to compete with its own profoundly China-dependent automotive industry. The move intends to protect the European car industry from being undermined by what EU politicians say are unfair Chinese-state subsidies. Despite the political pressure to act, the European car industry has strongly objected to imposing tariffs for fear of China’s retaliation. China is the world’s largest market for Europe’s car manufacturers and many have built supply chain relationships over years.  The surge in China's electric vehicle exports is not restricted to Europe. China’s electric cars are cheap and are common throughout the world. Subsidies have played a role in the development of new Chinese car brands such as BYD and SAIC. Yet the combination of China’s slowing demand for more expensive cars and an aggressive price war between 40 companies throughout 2024 in China’s domestic market has led Chinese electric car brands to aggressively expand abroad. China’s transition from an exporter of low-value exports to higher-value exports, like industries important for the green transition such as solar panels and wind turbines is only just beginning .  China is likely to target European products which are sold well in China or that China controls such as dairy, pork, brandy, luxury goods, and critical minerals. China's previously curbed exports of germanium and gallium in response to the US export restrictions on semiconductors. China’s dominance in the production of several critical minerals has led to China using export controls to retaliate over US and EU technology export controls against China.  Conclusion: EU-China trade tensions are growing partly due to Beijing’s close relationship with Moscow after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the EU’s push to ‘de-risk’ from the world’s second largest economy, including materials and products in the green transition. The idea of a looming trade war between EU and China is now commonplace. Both blocs could easily slide into raising tariffs across a whole range of goods and services.  While the EU remains divided over how to improve competitiveness against both the US and China, Chinese companies will continue to bypass import tariffs by building auto plants in Hungary, Turkey and Morocco. As the EU has discovered in its barrage of sanctions against Russia, trade restrictions can easily be diverted to third countries yet still be imported across the continent.

This publication is part of a larger report on the Horn of Africa region . The report expands on the contentions surrounding Ethiopia’s desired access to ports and the construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam, followed by insights into the most recent developments and emerging security issues related to the aforementioned. To access the full report please email alessia@dyami.services   Date: 07/10/2024 Location:   Horn of Africa Who is involved:   Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia,  Somalia, Turkey What happened? Ethiopia’s pursuit to Red Sea Access  On 02/01/2024  Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a "New Year's Day Deal": Ethiopia gained access to a port through leasing 20km of Somaliland’s coastline. Additionally, Ethiopia secured a 50-year lease on a naval base. In exchange, Ethiopia promised to, at some point, officially recognize Somaliland as a sovereign state.  Prior to the agreement: Ethiopia has actively sought access to a port, which it lost in 1993 when Eritrea gained independence. Ethiopia relied on Djibouti for 90% of its trade through ports. This cost Ethiopia approximately $1.5 billion annually. The agreement would significantly impact Djibouti's port-dependent economy. Following the agreement: Somalia protests Ethiopia's recognition of Somaliland. Somalia demands withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Somalia by the end of 2024. Removal of Ethiopian forces weakens Ethiopia's defense against regional threats. Escalating Tensions and Regional Rivalries In August 2024, Somali and Ethiopian foreign ministers met twice in Ankara, Turkey to discuss disagreements over the port deal Ethiopia signed with Somaliland in January. Turkey maintains economic ties with both Ethiopia and Somalia, providing a foundation for its mediation efforts. On 08/02/2024  Turkey signed a “Defence and Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement” with Somalia, a 10-year defense deal that will see Ankara helping Mogadishu with security cooperation and building the capacity of its naval forces, further solidifying Turkey’s influence in the area. On 13/08/2024  Turkey proposed an arrangement allowing Ethiopia sea access via Somalia which is contingent on Ethiopia recognizing Somalia's territorial sovereignty. On 14/08/2024  Egypt signed a defense pact with Somalia. The agreement replaces departing Ethiopian troops with 10,000 Egyptian troops. Half of the troops join “Africa Transition Mission In Somalia”, while the other half is stationed in Mogadishu. Egyptian troops will also train the Somali army to combat terrorist groups. On 27/08/2024  Egypt strengthened its military alliance with Somalia by sending two C-130 military aircraft filled with weapons. This event marks the first military aid from Egypt to Somalia in decades. On 19/09/2024  Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated that Turkey aims to meet with Somalia and Ethiopia separately to resolve the dispute. On 23/09/2024  Egypt reinforced their security pact with Somalia by sending an Egyptian warship to the Mogadishu port, carrying anti-aircraft guns and artillery. Egypt pledges continued support for Somalia's security, stability, and development. At the same time, Egypt issued a statement urging citizens in Somaliland to leave immediately via Hargeisa Airport. Advisory warns against travel to the region due to escalating security concerns. Analysis The situation in the Horn of Africa is precarious, with Ethiopia and Egypt supplying arms to different groups in Somalia, there is a significant risk of a proxy war. To prevent military escalation, a binding agreement is crucial. If agreements on the port deal fails, Ethiopia might ratify the recognition of Somaliland as a sovereign state in exchange for the use of the port and naval base. This could lead to increased tensions and political conflict in the region.  Tensions between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia over the region’s precarious water supply might also escalate. Regional destabilization could occur involving neighboring countries and regional actors, likely backing Egypt due to shared water security concerns, into a conflict. Civilian casualties, mass migration, and strained regional resources would draw in neighboring countries and international intervention for aid and support. This would lead to a severe humanitarian crisis that would be detrimental to the region and beyond. Conclusion The escalating issues—rooted in water insecurity, port access, and shifting military alliances—have naturally raised fears of an inter-state conflict. It is crucial for negotiations to continue and an agreement be drafted so as to not allow the region to turn to military escalation. To access the full report on the tensions in the Horn of Africa and the broader region please contact Alessia@dyami.services

Date: 20/09/2024 Who’s involved : Tunisian government, civil society  Context: After the Jasmine revolution and the Arab Spring in 2011, Tunisia seemed to move toward a democratic future, and Ennahda, a self-defined Islamic democratic political party, emerged as the strongest party. In 2014, Beji Caid Essebsi  was elected as president, becoming the first directly elected head of State after the Arab Spring  uprising. The president helped draft a democratic constitution , which guaranteed fundamental rights such as freedom of speech, and co-brokered a  power-sharing deal between his Nidaa Tounes movement and Islamist party Ennahda , which helped to steady the country under a unified government. However, after Kais Saïed was elected in 2019 , the country has descended into a form of autocracy. During Covid-19 crisis, through a unilateral executive decree, Saïed took control of the country , dismissing the elected parliament and since then tried to hold on to power by arresting opposition leaders, journalists and other perceived dissent.  On 20/07/ 2024  the Tunisian President expressed his willingness to seek a new five-year term, and Tunisians will be able to cast their vote in the presidential elections on 06/10/2024 . What has happened recently? In May 2024,   Tunisian authorities intensified their repression on media and freedom of expression across the country. On 22/05/2024 , the Tunis First Instance Court sentenced two journalists to a year of prison. The two journalists, Borhane Bsaies, a talk show host on private TV and radio channels and Mourad Zeghidi, a political commentator, were charged for nine video clips of statements made between February and April 2024. Zeghidi was additionally sentenced for his Facebook post supporting an investigative journalist who was already serving a six-month sentence for publicly questioning a government ministry’s public spending. On 26/05/2024,  president Saïed replaced the interior and social affairs ministers following a series of arrests targeting human rights activists, lawyers, and journalists. In August, the electoral commission eliminated three prominent candidates from the race, citing alleged irregularities in their candidacy filings, and on 05/08/2024 , president Saïed denied that his government was using judicial intimidation against the opposition and the media. On  02/09/2024 , the police arrested politician Ayachi Zammel, one of the two challengers to Saïed in the polls. He is the head of the opposition Azmoun Party, and was arrested with charges of falsifying voter signatures on the candidacy paperwork. He later called the charges manufactured by Saïed. On  13/09/2024, thousands of Tunisians marched in the streets to protest against the President Kais Saïed, whom they accuse of trying to rig the upcoming elections by detaining and intimidating his rivals. On  14/09/2024,  at least eighty members of Tunisia’s largest opposition party Ennahda were arrested, as thousands took to the streets to protest against the current President.  On  18/09/2024,  presidential candidate Ayachi Zammel was sentenced to 20 months in prison. On 22/09/2024 , a draft law by Tunisian lawmakers sparked a new wave of protests. The proposed law limits the powers of the administrative court and would threaten the role of the judiciary to preserve elections’ integrity, according to Tunisian Network for Rights and Freedoms. Analysis : The current president's repression of the media and the opposition, the dismantling of the democratically elected municipal councils, and the recent arrest of the opposition leader Zammel, indicate that there will likely be unfair elections. In the previous months, the authorities have been arresting or prosecuting several candidates that would have run for office, and the Independent Higher Election Authority has banned fourteen of them from running on procedural grounds. Ultimately, the only candidate running for elections and confronting the current President is Zouhair Magzhaoui, who is part of People’s Movement, one of the parties supporting the exceptional measures imposed by Saïed since 2021. Since the only other candidate running is part of a political party that supports Saïed centralization of power, it is probable that Saïed will either win or make sure the government will still have the same policies and type of regime. Therefore, the political environment in which the election will take place will probably be characterized by repression and opacity. However, given the recent turmoil in the country, the elections are likely to lead to a new series of protests, stronger than the current ones. The anti-government protests and political tension might lead the situation to escalate into a revolution and regime change.  Conclusion Tunisia is turning towards an authoritarian regime. The coming presidential election has unleashed turmoil in the country, and the population has begun to protest against the current government, which has been arresting and preventing candidates from the opposition from running for elections. The situation is tense, and the coming elections on October 6th will be a test for Tunisian democracy and civil society, and may have an impact on the neighboring countries as well.

Date : 24/09/2024 Where : Sahel Region, West Africa Who’s involved : Sahel Region, AES (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso)  ECOWAS (Benin, Nigeria, Togo) Russia, U.S., France, Italy, Germany Al-Qaeda-linked JNIM, Islamic State What happened? On 15/09/2024 , the US completed its removal of their roughly 1000 troops located in the Sahel region  thus marking the end of nearly all Western influence in the area. Italy is an exception given that they still have around 300 troops that remain in the region. This removal also finalizes the end of the previous agreement between Niger's government and the US, preventing them from continuing their counter-terrorism efforts. On 16/09/2024 , the AES announced the introduction of new biometric passports , which will be implemented in the next few days. According to the Malian Junta Leader, this will facilitate seamless travel for all citizens within the AES in addition to standardizing travel documents across the alliance . There are also plans to implement a shared information channel to foster the exchange of information among the alliance. On 16/09/2024 , two police officers were ambushed in northern Benin near the border with Niger. This incident follows a similar attack in June 2024, in which  seven soldiers were killed  in Pendjari National Park, on the border with Burkina Faso. The rise in cross-border attacks  underscores the growing security concerns in northern Benin. On  17/09/2024, a major jihadist attack  occurred in the Malian capital Bamako . The Al-Qaeda-linked group JNIM has since claimed responsibility. The attack began at 5.30 a.m, targeting the  gendarmerie training center  in Falidie district and Modibo Keita International Airport.   The attack resulted in significant human and material loss,  fire was set to several military, government and UN aircraft. This is the first major attack on the capital since 2015, when Mali was ruled by a civilian government and assisted by French troops.  Islamist armed groups  in the Centre-Nord region of Burkina Faso  have significantly increased attacks on civilians . Between January and September 2024, jihadist attacks resulted in at least 2,000 civilian deaths . Large portions are now controlled by jihadist groups, leaving the government in control of roughly half of the country’s territory. Analysis  Since the withdrawal of western and UN troops,   there has been a noticeable increase in attacks  from groups in the AES area. According to ACLED, civilian targeting has increased in the first half of 2024, with 3064 reported fatalities compared to the previous six months which had 2520 civilian fatalities. JNIM is the most active rebel group in the Sahel with data showing that violent events conducted by them occurred three times more from 2022 to 2023. There is a strong indication that violence, in particular towards the civilian population, is only going to continue and potentially worsen without Western aid.  Most recently,  attacks have taken place in Bamako, Burkina Faso and on the border with Benin.  With Western troops departing the region, the AES countries' ability to tackle the threat of jihadist groups linked to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State have significantly reduced. With growing anti-western sentiment and the desire for non-western alliances, the AES has turned to an alliance with Russia . Mali hosts around 2000 Russian soldiers, while only an estimated 100 are present in Burkina Faso. Niger also received Russian units, but the number is unknown. However, the aid of Russia’s Africa Corps (former Wagner group) has until now been limited in scope, with questions arising regarding their ability to aid in the counterterrorism efforts while also protecting civilians. Therefore,  there is the concern for an escalation of significant threats across the AES and potentially beyond.  With the potential for escalation, the number of displaced persons might also rise, thus putting a strain on bordering countries. The ECOWAS has been established for 49 years between 15 West African nations . Its aim is to promote regional peace, stability and foster security and growth across the region through integration and cooperation amongst its members. Following the departure of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso , the already faulty integrity and credibility of the ECOWAS was diminished further. With the introduction of the biometric passports, the previous coordination and collaboration between the nations is further fragmented  in various ways. The prior protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment across the ECOWAS allowed citizens of its member states to travel using a standardized passport, which enhanced the ease of travel and trade across its borders. The introduction of the AES biometric passport will disrupt this movement  and is exacerbated by the standardization of AES travel documents. Beyond this, it could signal that the Sahel countries are simply prioritizing their own security threats rather than focusing on threats to the entire West African region. Overall, this will likely weaken the efforts of the ECOWAS to coordinate and integrate security measures, trade and movement across the region that have taken 49 years to attain. Conclusion The increase in attacks and the potential spread of conflict is crucial to observe because the violence can expand into bordering ECOWAS countries, such as Benin and Togo. The protection that the AES-countries had from Western troops against the Islamic State and JNIM groups is also no longer present and will have significant repercussions on the rest of the wider region and continent. Increased displacement, disruption of movement, and a strain on trade across borders would affect the countries within the AES and the nations within the ECOWAS.

Date:   23/09/2024 Where :  Turkey Who’s involved :  Turkey, BRICS Nations What happened? On 04/09/2024,  Yuri Ushakov, President Vladimir Putin’s foreign affairs aide told reporters that Turkey formally applied to join the BRICS economic forum  (Brazil, Russia, India and China). On 01/01/2024,  BRICS admitted Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, United Arab Emirates, signaling a desire for further growth and influence. On 20/08/2024, Azerbaijan formally applied to join BRICS, this will make it easier for Turkey to align with BRICS policies as Azerbaijan is Turkey’s main partner in the Caucasus region. The 2024 BRICS Summit will be held in Kazab, Russia, from 22/10/2024  to 24/10/2024 .  Analysis : BRICS is a block of emerging major economies founded on 16/06/2009 that seeks to reshape the global order and challenge western dominance . BRICS aims to promote multipolarity, reform international institutions, and enhance cooperation in area’s like trade, finance, and development. The move marks another step in Turkey and Azerbaijan’s deepening alignment on foreign policy . This is one of Turkey’s biggest steps since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, during which Turkish armed forces were involved in training and arming the Azerbaijani forces. Turkey’s bid indicates a potential shift in its foreign orientation. Turkey’s motivations include economic diversification, geopolitical leverage and regional leadership aspirations .  First, the Turkish economy is experiencing numerous obstacles, including a continuous currency crisis and excessive inflation. Ankara's post-2023 economic model is mainly reliant on getting investment from Western countries. However, these expectations have not been met, with new investments predominantly focused on short-term financial benefits rather than long-term growth. The BRICS grouping, particularly China and the New Development Bank, represents an alternate source of investment and funding.  By joining with the BRICS economies, Turkey seeks to gain access to new trade opportunities, alternative investment sources , and improved integration into global supply networks. Turkey's desire for BRICS membership suggests its desire to play a larger role in global governance and demonstrate its strategic autonomy. The move reflects growing discontent with the stalled EU accession process and perceived neglect of its security issues within NATO.  Turkey aspires to diversify its alliances  and lessen its reliance on traditional Western partners, particularly in light of continued differences over critical issues including defense procurement, regional security, and political alignment. By joining BRICS, Turkey hopes to get a voice in global economic policy changes and engage more directly with major global actors such as China, India, and Russia. Moreover, Turkey's BRICS bid could have consequences for the bloc's dynamics, as well as Ankara's regional and global status. It emphasizes Turkey's vision of a multipolar international order and willingness to serve as a bridge between the East and the West. Turkey's potential participation in BRICS would provide strategic depth, allowing the bloc to enhance its influence in the Balkans, Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus.   President Erdoğan's anticipated presence at the 2024 BRICS meeting in Russia will offer significant perspectives on the bloc's openness to accepting Turkey's bid for membership. It is expected that the meeting would cover BRICS expansion, paving the way for future talks on Turkey's accession.  Turkey's potential BRICS membership carries significant implications for a range of actors: Turkey: Economic diversification: Gaining access to BRICS' markets and development money might help Turkey's economy and reduce its reliance on Western investment. Geopolitical leverage: Turkey's membership in both NATO and BRICS would provide it power and maneuverability in global affairs. Regional leadership: Turkey may strengthen its position in the Middle East and Central Asia, potentially managing crises and boosting economic cooperation. BRICS Nations: Expanded influence:  Gaining a NATO member would enhance BRICS' global reach and legitimacy, challenging Western-centric institutions like the EU. Economic benefits:  Turkey's strategic location and economic potential could boost intra-BRICS trade and investment and help China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Internal dynamics:  Turkey's membership could shift the power balance within the bloc, requiring adjustments in existing member states' strategies. EU and US: Strained relations:  Turkey's closer alignment with BRICS could further strain its ties with the West, potentially impacting trade, security cooperation, and even its NATO membership. Geopolitical challenges:  The West might face increased difficulty navigating a multipolar world with a more assertive Turkey aligned with BRICS. Regional Actors: Middle East & Central Asia:  Turkey's growing influence within BRICS could impact its relations with regional rivals and allies, particularly those with conflicting ties to BRICS members. Conclusion:  The conclusion of this bid has big implications, affecting Turkey's relations with both Western and non-Western states. The changing geopolitical landscape emphasizes the importance of constant assessment and change as Ankara navigates its complex relationships with many global entities.  Acceptance: The BRICS may admit Turkey under specific circumstances. These could include policy changes concerning trade, investment, currency, or even foreign policy alignment. China, as a significant BRICS actor, may use its influence to guarantee that Turkey remains impartial on matters involving Taiwan, the South China Sea And the persecution of Uyghurs. Russia, which is increasingly isolated, may see Turkey's admission as a diplomatic win and an opportunity to enhance ties. India, concerned about Turkey's connections with Pakistan, may seek assurances of regional stability. Rejection of the Bid:  In an unlikely scenario, BRICS could reject Turkey's application, citing concerns about its geopolitical alignment with the West or internal disagreements among existing members. However, given the bloc's expansion plans and Turkey's strategic importance, this outcome appears less likely.

Date:  20/09/2024 Where : Beijing, China  Who’s involved : China, CCP, African continent, FOCAC participants What happened? On 04-06/09/2024 , the 9th summit of the 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation  ( F OCAC) was held in Beijing. 53 African leaders attended the summit this year. As a result of the summit, China has pledged more than US$50 billion , of which US$140 million in military assistance grants, for the next three years to the African nations, largely to invest in sustainable projects to help the continent develop.  Countries that have made  bilateral agreements  during FOCAC 2024 regarding security and defense cooperation are Liberia, Mali, Togo, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan and Mozambique . These agreements include joint military exercises and training, Chinese support in strengthening national defense and the armed forces, and combating terrorism. During FOCAC 2024, Senegal, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Gabon, Republic of the Congo,   the   Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Namibia  have agreed to significantly expand their relationship and cooperation with China, elevating their status to the highest level of ‘Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partner’ to China. However, of these countries only Mozambique has made new defense agreements with China during this year’s summit. The most common new agreements China made with these countries include developing their soft infrastructure  (agriculture, education, health, local economic development in Africa, technology and telecommunications proje​​cts), (sustainable) energy , trade  (currency swap and export agreements), and public relations  (cultural exchanges and media sharing agreements).  However, the lack of transparency around the consequential debt owed to China by the recipient countries leads to concerns surrounding the possible ‘debt-trap’ African countries may be subjected to. During the FOCAC 2024 summit, China did not announce the much sought after debt relief by African countries. Eswatini is the only African country that does not participate in FOCAC, as it has explicitly stated that it recognizes Taiwan as an independent and autonomous country. Analysis : China is among the top largest developing countries in the world and the African continent has the most developing countries. Due to this shared status, China and Africa established FOCAC in 2000  and hold a summit every three years. During the FOCAC summits, China and partnering African countries strategize for mutually beneficial milestones that elevate the two parties’ development, decreasing dependency on predominantly the US and Europe. An example of this is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), aimed at developing the hard-infrastructure of many African countries, increasing trade and diplomatic ties between Africa and China, and allowing China to position itself as a leader of the global South. China has significant interest in the African continent for various reasons. China seeks mutually beneficial and profitable cooperation with Africa, while also presenting itself as an alternative to the US and Europe to help African countries develop further. This reinforces  China’s aspiration to challenge the U.S. as the current international major power holder , and instead push towards a multi-polar world. An example of this is China’s plan to fund the FOCAC agreements using the China yuan instead of the dollar. So far, China has been seemingly successful, as U.S. FDI in Africa was less than half of China’s in between 2015 and 2022, and that Chinese aid to the African continent is more in line with Africa’s hopes for a multi polar world. China’s increasing presence in Africa also further increases existing political and economic tension between China, Europe and the US. For example,  China’s greater access to African natural resources leads to China’s ability to upscale production of renewable energy technologies . This positions China as a strong competitor for EU manufacturers of products such as solar panels and electric vehicles.  Militarily, China is seeking to be  a stronger  military competitor than the United States and Europe . A s U.S. troops completely withdrew from their bases in Niger on 16/09/2024, China has announced additional fundings and training commitments. The recent expansion of military cooperation is in line with China’s ambition to strengthen and expand its military presence into the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Guinea . The US government has in the past attempted to counter China’s ambitions for military presence in this region, as this would mean the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is coming increasingly closer to US shores. Despite the withdrawals from their Nigerien bases, the U.S. Africa Command has stated on 12/09/2024 they will ‘pivot’ their military resources to West African countries of Ghana, Benin, and Cote d’Ivoire. For the African continent, Chinese investments meant significant development in areas such as infrastructure and sustainable energy, but also led to additional financial problems. Africa owes $1.152 trillion in external debt as of 2023, of which around 14% is owed to China, and is struggling to pay it off. China has been often accused of purposefully subjecting Africa to ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ , as the Trump administration described it in 2018. In this system, borrowing countries are subjected to excessive loans they will likely fail to pay back, leaving the borrowing country under the lender’s influence and, to some extent, control. This contradicts  China’s  foreign relations ambitions of good relations, mutually beneficial cooperation, and non-interventionism . A Chatham House study  of 2022 indicated that economic factors were indeed the primary driver of BRI projects. ‘Debt-traps’ accusations are also in part based on the assumption that borrowing countries are incapable of estimating their ability to pay back the loans and dismiss the behavior and sometimes poor governance of such states. This, however, does not discount that billions in Chinese loans come with significant strategic leverage, whether Beijing planned for it or not.     Conclusion : The FOCAC is a multi-faceted undertaking, helping both China and 53 African countries develop economically, militarily and politically. The emphasis the FOCAC places on mutual collaboration between China and the African nations involved, allows room for developments in all these areas and reach the individual and shared goals through a south-south cooperation. By funding the African countries and developing their hard- and soft infrastructure, military capabilities and economic competition, China is showing the (developing) world it could be an alternative to the US as the global leader, or at least play a vital role in a multi-polar world. However, the increasing debt Africa is facing as a consequence is a point of contention.

Date:   19/09/2024 Location:   Venezuela  Who’s involved : Venezuelan government, Venezuelan President Maduro, Spain, United States, UN, international community  What happened:  Following the contested re-election of Nicolas Maduro as Venezuela President, which was widely criticized for the lack of transparency, the government intensified the crackdown on the opposition, protests, and civil society to suppress dissent.  On 18/09/2024 , Venezuela opposition leader  Edmundo González Urrutia  stated he was forced to sign a letter of acceptance of Maduro’s victory at the 28 July elections by Venezuela’s top court. Following the ratification of Maduro’s victory by the country’s National Electoral Council (CNE) and Supreme Justice Court, arrest warrants over accusation of conspiracy and other crimes, including attempted electoral fraud and incitation of violence, were issued for opposition figures including González and the former opposition leader Machado. González is currently in Spain, where he was granted asylum.  On 17/09/2024 , the UN reported a sharp deterioration of the repression  in Venezuela, including crime against humanity of politically motivated persecution, following the elections of July 2024. The report described Maduro's government strategy to silence the opposition as “one of the most acute human rights crises in recent history”. Reportedly, in the past two months, at  least 25 protestors were killed and nearly 2500 arbitrarily detained  with the accusation of terrorism.  On 15/09/2024 , the Venezuelan Interior Minister announced the arrests of six foreign nationals from the US, Spain and Czech Republic over an alleged plot to overthrow President Maduro and “destabilize” the country. Upon requests from foreign governments for information on the arrests, Venezuela reported that two Spanish nationals were arrested for allegedly being linked to Spanish intelligence services and engaged in a plot to assassinate prominent political figures and officials. Also, a Czech citizen and three US nationals, including a Navy member, were arrested for alleged involvement in terrorist acts. Venezuelan authorities stated that the US nationals were part of a CIA-led plot to kill President Maduro. The US State department rejected the allegations. A few days later, on 17/09/2024 , the detention of a fourth US citizen was confirmed by the Venezuelan Ministry of the Interior. While the man's identity has not been confirmed, it was reported that he was arrested for photographing military installations, state entities, and electrical and oil infrastructure.  The arrests came a few days after the souring of diplomatic relations between Venezuela and Spain . The  Venezuelan government recalled its ambassador to Spain , following the meeting between exiled Venezuelan opposition leader González and the Spanish PM Pedro Sanchez, the Spanish parliament's recognition of González as the winner of the presidential election, and a remark by the Spanish Defense Minister calling the Maduro government a dictatorship.  On  12/09/2024 , the  US Biden administration announced the imposition of sanctions on sixteen allies of Venezuelan President Maduro government in response to the electoral fraud, human rights abuses and violent crackdown of the opposition, including the President of Venezuela’s Supreme Court, the director of the electoral council, and several military and intelligence officials.  Analysis : The recent presidential elections in Venezuela have triggered a deep domestic political crisis and international controversy. Although the Maduro regime claims victory in the polls, opposition forces and several Western nations dispute the results and denounce the manipulation, lack of transparency, and credibility of the electoral process. Available data from polling centers reportedly record an estimated 67% of the votes for the leading opposition candidate González Urrutia . Nonetheless, the regime of President Maduro, who has been in office since 2013, is increasing its grip on power, demonstrating complete control of the country's electoral, judicial, and military bodies. Recent developments suggest an irreparable deterioration of democracy, the rule of law, and civil and political liberties in the country.  Venezuela is experiencing a period of unprecedented political violence and repression . To halt protests and rampant dissent against Maduro's re-election, the government is carrying out systematic repression and persecution of actual or alleged opponents of the regime, such as opposition members, civil society activists, journalists, ordinary citizens, and foreign nationals.  Along with the alarming levels of violent repression against the Venezuelan population, the political crisis and souring diplomatic relations raise concerns about the country’s international standing. The UN, the US, Spain, other EU members, and some Latin American countries recognized González as the winner of the Venezuelan presidential elections . Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico have asked Venezuela to release the results to be independently validated. The firm reaction of the US administration to back the Venezuelan opposition and the imposition of new sanctions against Venezuelan officials could also have dire implications for the local population, regional actors, and US interests. In the past, US sanctions have aggravated Venezuela's economic crisis that forced over 7.7 million people to flee the country. So far international pressure and sanctions have proven to be ineffective against the Maduro regime .  Despite international pressure for democratic electoral transition, it seems unlikely that Maduro, bolstered by the support of military elites and judicial bodies, will not retain power after the end of his term, on 10/01/2025. The inauguration of the new administration is scheduled for January 2025 , and municipal, regional, and parliamentary elections are also planned for next year.  Conclusion : The Maduro government's violent crackdown on post-election protests, including human rights abuses and crimes against humanity, raises concerns for the liberties and security of the Venezuelan people. In response to the systematic repression of dissent and the authorities' rejection of the democratic transition, the international community is responding with diplomatic and economic pressure through the imposition of new sanctions and backing of the Venezuelan opposition. So far, though, the international community's strategy is not producing positive change and instead risks exacerbating current issues . While the restoration of democratic institutions and addressing the economic crisis are priorities, the international community, especially the US, should evaluate a  thoughtful use of sanctions and of exit strategies for Maduro  and government officials to encourage regime change.