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Date: 05/08/2025  Countries of flotilla departures (yellow) and destination Israel/Gaza strip (orange)   Where: East Mediterranean Sea, coastal   waters off Gaza strip.  Who’s involved: Israeli government,   Israeli military, pro-Palestine sympathy   groups from Algeria, Australia, Austria,   Bahrein, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil,   Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France,   Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland,   Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia,   Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New   Zealand, Norway, Oman, Philippines,   Poland, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sri   Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand,   Tunisia, Turkey, the UK and US. What is happening?  ● Largest civilian flotilla destined to Gaza to date named the Global Sumud Flotilla,  including over 6,000 participants, dozens of vessels from over 44 countries to depart  from three different locations towards Gaza.   ● Departure points and dates are staggered : initial group departing on 23/08/2025 from  Malaysia, 31/08/2025 from Spain and 04/09/2025 from Tunisia. Routes are expected to  converge in international waters in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea.  ● The flotilla’s objective is to establish a maritime humanitarian corridor to Gaza ,  bypassing Israeli restrictions, challenging the current blockade of the territory by Israeli  authorities.   ● Participants include a wide range of individuals (lawyers, doctors, journalists) and  human rights defenders, as well as national delegations from over 30 countries , and  nationals from even more countries.   ● This flotilla is an effort from four different pro-Palestine initiatives: the Maghreb Sumud  Flotilla, the Freedom Flotilla Coalition, the Global Movement to Gaza, and Sumud  Nusantara. It also has the direct backing of the Malaysian Prime Minister who will see  the flotilla depart from Malaysia himself.   ● Training sessions for flotilla participants are being held at different departure points  to prepare crews and passengers for potential confrontation or media engagement,  also solidarity encampments at departure points will be organised for public  awareness efforts. Participants will undergo vetting, nonviolence training and safety  preparation according to the initiative.  Analysis  The Global Sumud Flotilla represents both a humanitarian initiative and a geopolitical point of  tension. Its scale, diversity of participation and high profile backing (Malaysian Prime Minister)  increase its symbolic and strategic importance. The flotilla constitutes a high-visibility act and  challenge to widely perceived international complacency for the ongoing blockade of Gaza  amid the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict.   Historically, the Freedom Flotilla Coalition has been actively challenging the Israeli blockade  since 2010, building on efforts that began in 2008. Past flotillas, most notably the 2010 Gaza  Freedom Flotilla (Mavi Marmara incident), have resulted in deadly confrontations when Israeli  commandos raided the ships in international waters.   From Israel’s standpoint, the flotilla will be viewed as a direct threat to national security and  territorial control. Interceptions are almost guaranteed, as seen with the The Conscience ,  attacked by Israeli drones in Malta in May of this year as it prepared to depart, followed by the  interception and detention of crews on the Madleen on 09 June and the Handala on 26 July, all  three vessels part of the international campaign Freedom Flotilla. Israel will likely intercept  vessels well before they reach territorial waters, a tactic that invites legal and diplomatic  pushback, especially if it occurs in international waters, an act organisers say would amount  to piracy under international law.   The situation may put pressure on air travel and maritime routes into and out of Israel,  particularly if a militarisation of the country’s coastal waters increases. Israeli airport  authorities, particularly at Ben Gurion International Airport, are likely to apply stricter screening  procedures, flag passengers from flotilla-supporting countries and possibly expedite  deportations or prohibit the entry of individuals of concern into the country. Civil society actors  onboard the flotilla (journalists, doctors, human rights defenders), add further complexity,  increasing reputational risks for Israel if confrontations occur or detentions are made.   Complicating matters further, the exact number of vessels expected to participate remains  unspecified, though organisers and an independent assessment suggests it may involve  hundreds of small and mid-size boats. According to the Sumud Flotilla Initiative , each vessel  will carry its own delegation equipped with legal, nautical and logistical support. The use of  smaller boats, reportedly harder to obstruct and less bureaucratic in documentation,  combined with a decentralised departure model and undisclosed launch locations, poses  operational challenges for Israeli forces attempting to intercept vessels before they reach Israeli waters. This fragmented and mobile structure could test Israel’s naval and intelligence  capacity, increasing the risk for miscalculation or inconsistent responses at sea.  Official map of the origin of participating delegations (orange), departure countries  (yellow) and flotilla convergence location (pink). Source: Global Sumud Flotilla (accessed 06 August 2025) Looking ahead  In the weeks leading up to the and following the flotilla’s convergence, increased scrutiny at  Israeli borders, particularly air and maritime can be expected. Airport authorities are likely to  continue flagging passengers from identified flotilla departure points (Malaysia, Spain, Tunisia)  and may restrict or deny entry to those suspected of affiliation. Maritime advisories and naval  presence in the Eastern Mediterranean adjacent to Israeli territorial waters will most likely  intensify, prompting the need for extra caution from commercial vessels navigating in the area. Internationally, the response will hinge on the outcome of the flotilla’s interception. A peaceful  resolution with minimal confrontation may pass with limited fallout, but any escalation  involving violence or legal violations could trigger reactions from governments and  international bodies. Protests and solidarity actions in various capitals are also likely to take  place, with increased mobilisation by pro-Palestine networks and groups.  The Global Sumud Flotilla is likely to face detention by Israeli authorities, as was the case with  vessels and crew of the Freedom Flotilla between May and July of this year, with Israeli forces  employing chemical sprays and detaining nationals from France, Spain, Turkey, Netherlands,  Germany, Brazil, and Sweden. With this flotilla expected to be much larger, potentially involving  hundreds of small vessels, it will present logistical challenges for the Israeli navy. A high number  of vessels will stretch Israeli interception capabilities, leading to the possible use of drones to  disable ships from a distance. Such actions carry risks, including injury, death or leaving crews  stranded at sea on disabled vessels. NGOs and human rights groups are expected to closely  monitor the situation and amplify any harm or mistreatment, increasing the likelihood of  international scrutiny depending on the outcome at sea or during detentions.  Finally, a large number of detained individuals by Israeli authorities could create challenges in  ensuring their welfare and whereabouts, as well as organising their eventual repatriation if  deported. Diplomatic missions in Israel, whose citizens may be detained, will face logistical and  legal challenges in providing assistance. Citizens of countries lacking diplomatic  representation or ties with Israel will face greater difficulties, with communication with family  back home and access to consular support severely limited, raising the risk of delays in  identification and increasing the number of potential missing persons due to the lack of  diplomatic channels able to assist them.

Date: 04/08/2025 15:00 UTC+2 Location:   Goma, North Kivu Province, DRC; Nyabibwe, South Kivu Province, DRC; Kalehe, South Kivu Province, DRC; Bukavu, South Kivu Province, DRC. Kinshasa, Kinshasa Province, DRC. Bunia, Ituri, DRC. Historic context: On 28/01/2025, the M23 rebel group seized Goma — one of eastern Congo’s largest cities — and large parts of North and South Kivu in a rapid offensive that left thousands dead and displaced many more. This renewed violence is part of a 30-year conflict rooted in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, which saw millions of Hutus flee to Congo, forming militias like the FDLR. The Congolese government has consistently accused Rwanda of supporting the M23 rebel group.  Kigali denies these claims, despite UN experts saying  that Rwanda exercises direct control over the rebels. In response to the offensive, Congo severed diplomatic ties with Rwanda. Although Rwanda has 7,000–12,000 troops stationed in the DRC, it claims they are there solely to defend against Hutu militias linked to the genocide. On 26/05/2025 , it was reported that Joseph Kabila, Congolese president from 2001 until 2019, returned to the country after years of self-imposed exile, a move that has intensified political tensions, given his fractured relationship with President Tshisekedi and his recent presence in rebel-held Goma after arriving via Rwanda. On 27/06/2025 , the DRC and Rwanda signed a US-mediated peace deal aimed at ending hostilities and laying the groundwork for long-term stability. The agreement included a ceasefire, withdrawal of foreign troops, a neutral monitoring force, and frameworks for regional economic integration and the disarmament of armed groups like the FDLR. It also committed both countries to cooperate on demobilization, reintegration, and border security. A couple of weeks later, on 19/07/2025 , the DRC signed a separate Qatar-brokered peace deal in Doha with the M23 rebel group and its political wing, the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC). The agreement called for M23’s phased withdrawal, reintegration of fighters into the national army, the safe return of displaced civilians, and local governance reforms in eastern Congo. Qatar pledged $300 million in reconstruction aid and will help oversee implementation alongside the UN and the African Union. What happened:  Despite two peace deals, fighting in the eastern DRC between M23 and Wazalendo (Swahili for ‘patriot’) militias aligned to the regime in Kinshasa has not stopped at the time of writing. There is a significant distrust on both sides. M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka also accused  the DRC of deploying extra troops and heavy weapons to the region, in violation of the ceasefire.  On 01/07/2025,  the armed forces of the DRC (FARDC) shot down an airplane in the Kivu province. They later claimed it entered Congolese airspace illegally and refused to identify itself. M23 claimed the plane was carrying food and medical supplies for locals.   On 05/07/2025, Rwandan President Paul Kagame publicly expressed doubt  over the DRC-Rwanda peace deal, stating that he does not believe that the DRC will be able to effectively deal with the FDLR, Rwanda’s biggest security concern within the DRC.  On 07/07/2025,   it was reported that  the U.S. company HYDRO-LINK will construct a $1.5 billion power line connecting hydro-rich Angola to southeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The project aims to deliver a stable electricity supply to the region, potentially supporting U.S. access to the critical minerals found there. On 09/07/2025 , large M23 troop movements southwards were reported by observers.  On 19/07/2025,  the DRC and M23 signed a declaration to end hostilities, outlining an immediate ceasefire and a commitment to begin talks.  On 01/08/2025 , the DRC and Rwanda held their first meeting of a joint oversight committee, an actual first step in implementing the decisions made during the peace deal weeks earlier.  On 02/08/2025 , Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo agreed on a draft economic framework under a US-brokered peace deal. The agreement includes cooperation on energy, infrastructure, and mineral supply chains. They also committed to linking new infrastructure to the U.S.-built Lobito Corridor—a major transport route connecting the interior of Africa to the Atlantic Ocean via Angola, designed to boost regional trade and export critical minerals. Analysis Pitfalls   The two parallel peace deals in the DRC - one between Rwanda and the DRC, and one directly between M23/AFC and the DRC - are a step in the right direction. They also overcame an important hurdle, which was outlined in our previous intel brief,  where it was concluded that a deal at the state level only might not suffice in bringing peace to Kivu. The declaration signed on 19/07/2025 directly addressed that concern by engaging both the state and rebel actors. However, challenges remain. Despite these agreements, it is still uncertain whether they will effectively end the decades-long cycle of conflict in the region. The deal between M23 and the DRC, which includes commitments to a ceasefire, a suspension of hostilities and further peacebuilding, is a step in the right direction, especially given Kinshasa’s initial refusal to have direct talks with M23. Experts have, however, called the agreements ‘vague ,’ which, combined with the fact that the parties seriously distrust each other, results in a difficult implementation. The deal between the DRC and Rwanda also faces major obstacles. Previous attempts to secure the Rwandan withdrawal from DRC territory failed. This means that a Rwandan withdrawal from Congolese territory - a non-negotiable demand for lasting peace from Kinshasa’s side - will likely be dependent on Rwanda’s most important demand: the ‘neutralization’ of the FDLR. However, the agreement lacks clear criteria as to what ‘neutralization’ means in this regard, and even if this was the case, eliminating the group will likely be challenging as it is deeply entrenched in Congolese society. Internal Congolese politics complicate the situation even further, mostly due to the problematic relationship between current president Felix Tshisekedi and former president Joseph Kabila. Kabila returned to the DRC this year after a period of self-imposed exile. Following his controversial reluctant departure from power in 2019. While the two initially had a power-sharing agreement, their alliance ultimately broke down, and their relationship severely deteriorated. Tshisekedi has since moved to sideline Kabila, who is likely trying to reclaim political influence by aligning himself with powerful actors such as M23 and Rwanda. This remains a hypothesis, but Kabila’s appearance in rebel-held Goma  and his arrival in the DRC via Rwanda gives reason to suspect it. This further complicates peace efforts as it ‘fractures’ the Congolese response to the crisis.   Prospects  Despite the ongoing difficulties in achieving lasting peace in Kivu, the economic aspect of the DRC-Rwanda peace deal holds some promise.. Part of the Washington Accord signed last June is the US-brokered regional economic framework, which aims to integrate the region’s economic infrastructure and includes elements of cooperation on energy, infrastructure, mineral supply chains, national parks and public health.  This is a clear attempt to ‘bank’ on economic ties to promote stability in the region. It essentially gives Rwanda precisely what they want: Kigali secured formal recognition and a key role in regional economic integration with the DRC, which is rich in resources such as tantalum, gold, copper, cobalt and lithium.  This way, the country could participate in joint industrial ventures, which means it can benefit the DRC’s mineral resources. For Kinshasa, the deal promises regulated, conflict-free trade and much-needed infrastructure, such as the Ruzizi III hydropower project  in Rwanda, which can also deliver power to the DRC. The US, which brokered the peace agreement between Kigali and Kinshasa, benefits too for two reasons. First, it provides the US with access to critical minerals it desperately needs. The country is notoriously dependent on China for certain minerals, which in recent years is increasingly choking off supply to Western companies . The regional economic framework encompasses joint mining operations, customs coordination, and industrial investment, particularly through the US-backed Lobito Corridor , which provides Washington with a more sustainable source of these minerals. Secondly, by securing alternative sources of critical minerals, the U.S. also challenges China's growing dominance in Africa, particularly in the DRC, where Beijing has established a firm foothold. This initiative could serve as a strategic counterbalance to Chinese influence in the region. Conclusion The peace deals made between the DRC and M23 on one side and Rwanda on the other still have significant difficulties, which is why it remains hard to gauge the extent to which they will achieve a durable peace. Deep-rooted mistrust, vague conditions and the rift between Kabila and Tshisekedi are the most complicating factors.  That being said, the economic framework does give reasons to be optimistic by aligning the two former rivals around a goal of shared development. The fact that they agreed on the outline for the economic framework on 02/08/2025,  as promised during the peace deal, is an indicator that both parties are willing to make it work. Furthermore, with backing from the United States, which has strong strategic and economic incentives to see the framework succeed, both nations have added motivation to adhere to its terms.

Date:   31/07/2025 (12:00 GMT+2) Where?  Angola; Luanda; Icolo e Bengo; Huambo What happened?  On 04/07/2025, Angolan authorities announced a 33% increase in the price of diesel, the most commonly used fuel for vehicles in Angola - the third price increase of 2025. The price will rise from 300 to around 400 kwanzas per liter. The new price amounts to €0,38 per liter. For context, the average salary in Angola equals €66,50 monthly. (€1=1050 kwanza per 31/07/2025).  This decision prompted minibus taxis, a common method of transportation for Angolans, to increase their prices by as much as 50%. This price hike also increased the price of staple ingredients, which need to be transported by road. The protests initially began as a three-day strike by taxi drivers on 28/07/2025  against rising petrol prices. However, by 29/07/2025 , the protests had grown  into one of the most widespread waves of protest the country has seen in recent history.  The protests mostly took place in the capital, Luanda. Shops were looted , and people set up roadblocks in the city. The provinces of Icolo e Bengo and Huambo reported similar disturbances. Reportedly, people chanted “down with the dictatorship” , as they complained about hunger, oppression and poverty.  President João Lourenço dismissed the protesters’ concerns, saying that protesters are using petrol prices as a pretext to undermine the government.  Reportedly, the police responded with force. In videos  circulating on the internet, police can be seen en masse, in riot gear, firing rubber bullets but struggling to contain the uprising. On 29/07/2025 , at least four deaths were reported. On 30/07/2025, protests continued. The Angolan government later reported that the total number of victims killed had risen to at least 22 . More than 1200 have reportedly been arrested.  As of 31/07/2025,  most major shops, banks and other businesses remain closed. Analysis What began as a three-day strike by taxi drivers quickly escalated into one of the largest popular uprisings Angola experienced in recent years. The 33% increase in the price of diesel, the most widely used fuel in Angola, not only affected transportation costs but also drove up the prices of basic goods delivered by road. With an average monthly wage of around 70,000 kwanzas (€66.50 per 31/07/2025), many Angolans are unable to deal with such price hikes, especially for essential items like food and transport. However, the protests reflect more than just frustration over this specific price hike. They quickly broadened to encompass a range of grievances and evolved into a wider critique of the Angolan government. Many took to the streets not only over economic hardship, but also out of growing discontent with the ruling MPLA party, which has held power for nearly five decades. The very nature of the fuel price hike is emblematic of this: Angola is one of Africa’s largest oil producers, yet lacks refineries to match domestic demand and therefore remains dependent on imported diesel.  The situation in Angola reflects a broader trend across several mid-tier African economies, where the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, global inflation, and domestic crackdowns on dissent have created a more difficult political climate and made everyday life increasingly challenging for ordinary citizens. This led to unrest, not just in Angola. Earlier this year, in June and July, Kenya saw massive protests  following the death of a popular blogger in police custody. However, these protests reflected a widespread frustration related to police brutality, economic inequality, corruption, and a perceived erosion of democratic freedoms. Ghana and Nigeria have likewise faced protests, each shaped by their own mix of political discontent coupled with economic troubles. Conclusion The current wave of protests in Angola started relatively small but grew into one of the biggest waves of civil unrest the country has faced in recent years. While a fuel price hike was the direct cause of the protests, this period of unrest is symbolic of more than just that: it reflects widespread grievances about proper governance in the country and frustration with stagnating living conditions.  For now, the situation in the country remains unpredictable. President Lourenço’s response that protesters are using petrol prices as a pretext to undermine the government signals that he might not be willing to make any concessions. If the government refuses to address the concerns behind the protests, the unrest is likely to continue, further challenging Angola’s stability.

Date:  31/07/2025 12:00 GMT+2 Where :  Oslo, Norway Who’s involved : Mohamed Orahhou Russian and Iranian Intelligence Services Norwegian Authorities US Embassy in Oslo What happened: On 23/07/2025,  Mohamed Orahhou, a Norwegian national in his twenties and former security guard at the US embassy in Oslo, was charged with espionage by Norwegian authorities. Allegedly, he was spying for Iran and the Russian foreign intelligence service, the SVR. The charges come after an eight-month investigation into claims that Orahhou shared private information about American diplomats and Norwegian intelligence officers. He is suspected of providing Russian and Iranian foreign intelligence officials with names, contact information, and evacuation plans for the embassy between March and November 2024 . Allegedly, the information was shared at classified meetings in Norway, Turkey, and Serbia. Norwegian authorities claim that in exchange for his collaboration, Orahhou received €10,000 from Russia and 0.17 Bitcoin (at the time worth around €10,000) from Iran. The indictment also alleges that Orahhou took deliberate measures to avoid detection, including transferring part of the money he received to bank accounts belonging to family members to prevent his employers from noticing a sudden spike in his own account, and later asking them to return the funds to him. Orahhou faces up to 21 years in prison. Analysis : The espionage case is one of the most serious diplomatic and national security breaches in Norway in recent years. The defendant’s access to embassy infrastructure and sensitive information once again underlines the vulnerability to foreign intelligence operations. Orahhou's cooperation with both Russian and Iranian intelligence suggests a coordinated joint operation, signalling emerging strategic cooperation between Moscow and Tehran in targeting Western diplomatic assets. The use of cash and cryptocurrency payments shows efforts to obscure financial trails, which have not been too prevalent in previous espionage cases. Internal security audits at NATO-aligned diplomatic locations throughout Europe may be triggered by the case, especially with reference to low-clearance employees and third-party contractors.  Despite the defense's claim that the leaked material was not classified, the presence of personal information and evacuation preparations raises concerns regarding the embassy staff's physical security. Advice and Mitigation: This case highlights the renewed threat of espionage and sabotage in today’s world. To reduce the risk of becoming the next target, there are some straightforward steps your organization should take: Limit access to sensitive information:  Ensure that only personnel with a legitimate need-to-know have access to classified or operationally critical data. Regularly review and update access permissions. Strengthen personnel screening and oversight:  Conduct thorough background checks, periodic re-evaluations, and monitor for behavioral red flags—especially among employees in sensitive roles or those with access to sensitive information. Practice discretion:  Avoid discussing sensitive work-related matters in public or semi-public settings, including cafes, transit, or online forums. Protect personal data:  Be cautious with sharing professional affiliations, job details, or travel patterns on social media or networking platforms. Secure communications:  Use encrypted messaging apps for sensitive communication, especially if operating in security, defense, or diplomatic sectors. Exercise caution during travel:  Be aware of risks when traveling through countries known to host intelligence operatives or serve as neutral grounds for clandestine activity. Report suspicious contact:  Immediately report any unsolicited approaches, requests for information, or unusual interest in your professional role to your organization’s security lead or local authorities.

Casper Huurdeman Introduction On 18 August 2020, soldiers of the Malian Armed Forces stormed the Soundiata military base near the capital Bamako and arrested senior officers. Shortly after, they headed towards the city and detained several government officials, including President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. The government was dissolved, and Keïta - under significant pressure - resigned. The coup d’état  had succeeded. Thousands flocked the streets of Bamako to celebrate. A new interim president, Bah Ndaw, was later appointed. Nine months later however, in May 2021, history repeated itself as Bah N’daw was taken into custody. Colonel Assimi Goïta issued a public statement, announcing that N’daw and other officials were stripped of their powers because they had tried to ‘sabotage the transition’  to democracy in Mali. New elections were promised to be held in 2022 while the military would ‘temporarily’ take over control. Two months prior to that, in March 2021, a coup attempt failed in neighbouring Niger. That same month, Mahamat Deby of Chad staged a coup in which he took over control of the country after his father’s, the former president, unexpected battlefield death. Guinea also experienced a coup in September of 2021. In January of 2022, President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré of Burkina Faso was ousted by the military; Colonel Paul-Henri Damiba took over power. Not for long though, because 8 months later, Damiba was ousted in yet another coup, and captain Ibrahim Traoré took over control. In July 2023, Nigerien President Mohamed Bazoum was also ousted in a coup by general Adbourahamane Thiani.  The world looked on as one African leader after another was overthrown in just a few years, some of them having been in power for decades. Across Africa, thousands took to the streets in celebration, fed up with corruption, economic mismanagement, and the persistent challenges that have plagued many nations. This wave of political unrest swept through Africa with surprising momentum and little resistance, forming a ‘coup belt’ stretching across the continent from west to central Africa. The rapid succession of coups across several African countries suggests they weren’t entirely isolated events. This report analyzes the coup d’états in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Gabon, Mali, and Niger between 2020 and 2023. While each coup had its own local dynamics, there are clear overarching themes between the coups during this ‘wave’, which offer valuable insights into Africa’s shifting position in a changing world—one where old alliances can no longer be taken for granted. Although other African nations, like Sudan, have also experienced military takeovers in recent years, this analysis focuses specifically on the former French colonies of West and Central Africa listed above. Their shared colonial legacy, regional proximity, and the prominent role of anti-French sentiment make for a good basis for analysis.  Ultimately, the coups that took place in Africa between 2020 and 2023 can be attributed to widespread resentment towards rulers perceived as corrupt, a failure of French policies to address certain challenges and a successful Russian disinformation offensive. That said, the bigger picture also is important here. The wave of coups reveals a recalibration in Africa’s geopolitical alignments. In a world where multiple powers compete for influence, African nations can now leverage that rivalry to shape their own partnerships, instead of Western influence being a given. Coups in Africa Mali (August 2020; May 2021) For the past decades, Mali has been gripped by instability and coups. In 2012, an alliance between a Tuareg rebellion led by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and islamist factions quickly seized control of key northern cities in the country.. The Malian government proved unfit to deal with the crisis, which led to a military coup against the president at that time, Amadou Toumani Touré, in March 2012.  Following said coup, the MNLA declared the independence of Azawad, though the declaration was not internationally recognized. As a response, France launched its military operation in Mali in early 2013 at the request of Bamako. Initially, the operation was successful to some extent: the French forces succeeded in pushing the insurgents out of key cities. However, the French-backed government never fully regained control over the north. The years that followed were marked by fragile governance, persistent insecurity and growing public frustration over the situation. Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta came to power in 2013, and soon faced similar issues as his predecessor: deteriorating security, corruption, economic stagnation, and collapsing public services. In August 2020, amid nationwide protests, a group of military officers led by Colonel Assimi Goïta staged a coup and forced Keïta to resign. An interim government was formed under Bah Ndaw, though de facto control remained in the hands of the military. When two prominent military figures were removed from their positions less than a year later, the military led by Goïta felt compelled to carry out yet another coup. Goïta accused the interim leadership of failing to live up to its promises and took control as transitional president. Since then, Goïta has gradually consolidated power. He banned political parties, sidelined civilian voices, and approved legislation that allows him to stay in power “ until the country is pacified ” - which in reality, could mean indefinitely.  Relations with Western partners, particularly France, rapidly deteriorated afterwards. Paris withdrew its security forces in 2022, citing a breakdown in trust and the junta’s refusal to return to civilian rule. Mali instead turned to other security partners. Russia’s Wagner Group   began operations in Mali in late 2021 , providing military support to the junta in its fight against insurgents and separatists. Although Wagner formally left in 2025, it was replaced by the Afrika Korps —a Kremlin-aligned group with a similar mandate. Niger (March 2021; July 2023) Niger, located in the Sahel as well, also has a history with coups. In February 2021, presidential elections were held to determine who would succeed Mahamadou Issoufou, set to step down after two terms in office (he himself came to power in elections held in the wake of a 2010 coup). Former interior minister Mohamed Bazoum won the elections widely considered democratic.  Bazoum’s inauguration on 2 April 2021, which followed a failed coup attempt just days earlier, marked the first transfer of power between democratically elected presidents since Niger’s independence from France in 1960. However, his presidency was marked by the same persistent issues as Mali, as explained earlier in this report. Niger was suffering from a deadly jihadist insurgency, particularly in the regions bordering Mali and Burkina Faso. Many were killed and many more displaced, and Bazoum’s administration appeared unable to properly deal with this threat despite the presence of French and international security forces.  The breaking point came on 26 July 2023, when President Mohamed Bazoum attempted to dismiss General Abdourahamane Tchiani, the influential head of the presidential guard. Although no official explanation was given, reports suggested that Bazoum was concerned about Tchiani’s growing power  within the Nigerien state apparatus. In response, Tchiani’s forces detained the president and declared a coup. Citing poor governance and a worsening security situation, the military junta announced it had taken control, suspended the constitution, dissolved all state institutions, and declared a transitional period. In the following days, pro-coup demonstrations erupted in the capital Niamey. Crowds were seen waving Russian flags , chanting slogans in support of the Wagner Group, and calling for the departure of French forces. This showed the growing disenchantment with Western partners—especially France—and the emerging regional trend of embracing Russia as an alternative security ally. The junta was quick to expel French diplomats and later its military forces in December 2023, which meant the end of the long diplomatic and military ties between France and Niger. Although Niger’s military government initially announced a three-year transition to return to civilian constitutional rule, little progress has been made as of writing in July 2025. On the contrary, Niger has drawn closer to the military regimes in Mali and Burkina Faso, forming the mutual defense pact AES . Like its neighbors, Niger’s junta increasingly positions itself as the defender of national sovereignty against foreign interference—framing the coup not so much as a break with democratic order, but rather as a reclaiming of it from ineffective governance and neocolonial influence. Chad (April 2021) On 20 April 2021, Chad’s long-time leader Idriss Déby was unexpectedly killed in action during a battle between Chadian army soldiers and rebels from the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT) north of the capital, N’Djamena. The military, an influential player in Chadian politics, feared a power vacuum and moved quickly to install his son, the 37-year old Mahamat Déby, as interim president. The military suspended the constitution, dissolved parliament and formed a council which promised elections within 18 months. Protests against this undemocratic transfer of power were violently suppressed. The 18-month transfer period that was promised was later extended, and Mahamat Déby remained in power beyond the original timeline. Elections were later held in May 2024, in which Déby won amidst allegations of fraud . Despite real concerns about the democracy in the country, France and Chad initially retained cordial relations  during the first years of Mahamat Déby’s presidency. However, the cooperation came to an abrupt end in November 2024, when the Chadian government unexpectedly announced it would terminate its military partnership with France. The official justification centered on national sovereignty and a reassessment of strategic interests. Chad’s foreign minister stated that the arrangement no longer aligned with “the political and geostrategic realities of our time”. Unofficially, analysts pointed to growing frustration within the Déby administration over what it perceived as French interference over its internal affairs. Chad later signed agreements  granting Turkish military advisors and drone technicians access to former French airbases in Abéché and Faya-Largeau. Turkish drones were deployed to improve reconnaissance and counterterrorism operations. N’Djamena also deepened its relationship with Beijing. A high-level visit by China’s foreign minister in January 2025  is evidence of the growing ties between the two nations. China also became Chad’s top trading partner. While Türkiye and China were expanding their presence in Chad, the French did the opposite - the last soldiers left Chad just before Christmas 2024. Guinea (September 2021) Alpha Condé was democratically elected as president of Guinea in 2010. During his second term however, Condé began consolidating his power, as he amended the constitution to permit him to seek more than two presidential terms. He controversially won a third term in October 2020 in an election marked by violence. This third term severely undermined both his popularity and the legitimacy of his government.  On 5 September 2021, members of the Guinean special forces stormed the presidential palace in Conakry, detained the president and announced the dissolution of government institutions. The coup was led by Colonel Mamady Doumbouya, head of the special forces, who declared that Guinea’s era of "personalised politics" was over  and that power would be returned to the people. Doumbouya became the head of a new junta and he was sworn in as interim president on 1 October 2021. There were no immediate post-coup protests. Rather, some crowds in Conakry shouted Doumbaya’s name, hoping that this could be an opportunity for change in a country where almost two thirds of the population was dealing with persistent poverty . In May 2022, Guinea’s junta announced a 39-month transition to constitutional, civilian rule. Doumbouya promised that no one in the interim government, including himself, would stand in the promised elections. Political protests were however banned soon after. A new election was planned in December 2024, which was later extended for 2025. As of this writing in July 2025, Doumbouya remains in power and whether promises to restore civilian rule are kept remain to be seen. Burkina Faso (January 2022; September 2022) The situation in Burkina Faso largely mirrored that of other countries in the Sahel: it is landlocked and one of the poorest countries in the world. On top of that, the Burkinabé military was fighting a jihadist insurgency which had gotten progressively worse since 2015. Tensions between the military and the democratically elected president of the country, Roch Kaboré, had been building for months. The military was spread thin and did not receive enough supplies, while being blamed for the deterioration of the security situation and losing many men. On 23 January 2022, these tensions erupted into a mutiny. Soldiers detained President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, dissolved the government and national assembly, suspended the constitution, and sealed the nation's borders. Declaring Kaboré unfit to lead, the coup leaders installed 41-year-old Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba as the head of a new military junta. The junta pledged a 36-month transition to constitutional civilian rule, during which Damiba would not run in future elections. Some pre-coup officials were reinstated, and regional governments seemed to accept the proposed roadmap to stability.  Stability was short-lived. Eight months after the coup, Burkina Faso experienced a ‘coup within a coup’ as the military turned against its own former leader Paul-Henri Damiba. Citing worsening security and the failure to curb extremist violence, the new coup leaders echoed January’s reasoning. Under Damiba’s brief rule, the situation deteriorated: over 620 terrorist attacks killed 567 people in his first 100 days , and by September 2022, the government controlled only about 60% of the country. A devastating attack on 26 September 2022 in Soum province, which destroyed part of a humanitarian convoy and left dozens dead or missing, proved to be a breaking point. On 30 September, the 34 year-old Captain Ibrahim Traoré announced on national television that Damiba had been deposed, the interim government dissolved, and the borders closed.  The junta again promised a gradual return to democratic governance.  Damiba’s downfall was not just the result of the worsening security crisis—it was also shaped by internal divisions within the junta itself. One member later admitted anonymously  that Damiba had resisted calls to diversify Burkina Faso’s security partnerships, particularly by reaching out to Russia. His reluctance to embrace this shift, alongside the continued surge in extremist violence, led to the second coup in 2022. In the days that followed, Traoré accused the French army of sheltering Damiba at one of its bases in Burkina Faso, after Damiba’s whereabouts were unknown. France denied the claim, but the accusation triggered violent protests at French diplomatic and military installations. Demonstrators waved Russian flags and attacked the French embassy, reflecting growing public hostility toward France’s continued presence. Damiba resigned and fled to Togo, and on 5 October 2022, Traoré was officially declared president. That same day, an ECOWAS delegation that arrived in Ouagadougou for a fact-finding mission was met with large pro-coup demonstrations, where protesters denounced the organization, waved Russian flags, chanted pro-Russian slogans, and demanded the withdrawal of French forces. This hostile reception reflected growing resentment toward what many in Burkina Faso perceive as ECOWAS’s alignment with French and broader Western interests, especially given its frequent sanctions and pressure on military governments in the region. While Traoré’s junta initially pledged to hold elections by 2024, that promise was abandoned in May 2024 when the transitional period was extended by five years, with the government citing ongoing insecurity. Relations with the West, particularly France, continued to worsen. The junta expelled French military forces, suspended French media outlets, and accused Paris of interference and neocolonial attitudes. In their place, Burkina Faso deepened its ties with Russia. Later in 2024, the Russian Afrika Korps arrived in the country and established a military base in Loumbila, northeast of the capital. Putin and Traoré shaking hands. The sign reads: “support the transition”. Gabon (August 2023)  On 26 August 2023, Ali Bongo Ondimba won Gabon’s presidential election, this third term and also another extension of the Bongo family’s 56-year dynastic rule. The election however was plagued by widespread allegations of fraud and irregularities, sparking outrage among opposition groups and drawing condemnation from the military itself. Just hours after the official results were announced on 30 August 2023, Gabonese soldiers led by General Brice Oligui Nguema announced that they had seized power and that Ali Bongo was placed under house arrest. They cited the “irresponsible and unpredictable governance”  of the regime as the reason for their coup. General Oligui Nguema became interim president following the coup. He promised a transition to civilian rule and pledged to restore institutional integrity. Yet, like the cases analyzed before, the junta only tightened control over Gabon’s political institutions. In November 2024, a national referendum  approved a new constitution that extended presidential terms to seven years, a change which many saw as a power grab by the military. While some in Gabon celebrated the fall of the Bongo dynasty and viewed the coup as an opportunity for renewal, others labeled it a ‘palace coup’, warning that one autocracy had simply replaced another. Unlike in Mali or Burkina Faso, where anti-French sentiment played a central role in post-coup politics, Gabon’s case was more ambiguous. In Libreville, anti-French sentiment was not as dominant as it was in, for instance, Burkina Faso. As a response, France also voiced a more balanced response to the coup, likely hoping to maintain relations with the new junta. There were no widespread anti-French protests, and General Oligui—himself trained in France—did not lean into anti-Western rhetoric. Instead, this coup fit within a different regional pattern: growing military impatience with entrenched elites and a growing appetite to reform. As with other recent juntas, Gabon’s leadership justified its continued rule by prioritizing stability and reform over immediate elections. When democracy fails to deliver Starting off, it needs to be reiterated that each of the aforementioned coups is unique, and shaped by its own internal dynamics. However, as stated in the introduction, some common themes can be identified, and these offer us valuable insights in the political future of Africa and the potential role of international actors on the continent.  Democratic disillusionment All countries analyzed in this report have faced public disillusionment with their democracies, which means that people have grown increasingly disconnected from political institutions, processes, and leaders, feeling that these systems no longer represent them or respond to their needs. This general distrust fuels frustration and a feeling of political powerlessness, which severely undermines the confidence people have in a democracy’s ability to bring about meaningful change.  To substantiate that, consider this: the countries considered rank among the poorest and least developed in the world. The Human Development Index (HDI), which measures a nation’s average achievements in health, education, and standard of living, consistently ranks Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, and Niger near the bottom globally . Only Gabon performs moderately better due to oil wealth. Economic stagnation, worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic, further contributed to stagnating living standards in said countries. These regimes are also ranked among the most corrupt in the world. In transparency International’s 2020 Corruption Perceptions Index , which mentions how corrupt citizens of countries perceive  their counties to be, all countries analyzed rank among the worst in the world. Despite an abundance of natural resources—such as oil in Chad and Gabon, uranium in Niger and Mali, and gold and other minerals in Guinea and Burkina Faso—this wealth failed to benefit the broader population. The case of Guinea serves as a good case in point. President Alpha Condé's controversial third term in 2020 seriously eroded the legitimacy of his administration. Following the successful coup, Mamady Doumbouya, who assumed power as interim leader, quoted the words of the former Ghanaian coup leader Jerry Rawlings : “if the people are crushed by their elites, it is up to the army to give the people their freedom”. This statement captures the core of this concept—the growing perception that political elites and institutions are no longer working for the good of the people. A troubled security landscape Another overarching theme is that most of these countries, especially Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, are dealing with persistent security threats. The Sahel region was designated by the 2020 Global Terrorism Index  as one of the most terrorism-impacted regions worldwide. The key threats stem from violent extremist organizations, including the Al-Qaeda linked Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), which exploit the region’s weak state presence and weak borders. Burkina Faso  ranks among the countries most affected by terrorism in the world. As described before, the country experienced two military coups in 2022, driven in part by deep frustration within the armed forces over the government's failure to counter the growing insurgency. Following the second coup, Captain Ibrahim Traoré gave a statement on national television , citing how Burkinabe soldiers keep dying while the insurgency only appears to worsen. Niger followed a similar pattern, as President Mohamed Bazoum’s government struggled to contain the jihadist threat, despite extensive French support. Same goes for Mali: patience ran out with presidential administrations which appeared to be unable to address the crises the country was facing.  In these cases, the mounting frustration over the inability of governments to contain escalating security threats created fertile ground for the military to take over. Coup leaders framed these failures as justification for ‘necessary’ takeovers and responses to national crises, which resonated with parts of the public and security forces alike. France’s eroding influence Another common theme linking the coups discussed is a strong anti-colonial—specifically anti-French—sentiment. Most coup leaders consistently framed their actions not only as responses to governance failures but also as a rejection of the regimes’ strong ties with France. Region most commonly referred to as Françafrique (Also includes former Belgian colonies) France was the colonial ruler of all the countries in question and, despite decolonization in the 1960s, it retained significant influence, consisting of political, economic, and military ties with— a system often referred to as Françafrique . This concept encompasses both formal mechanisms, such as continued military cooperation and monetary control through the CFA franc (a currency zone still overseen by France), and informal dynamics, including networks between French and African elites. Central to the grievances in the African nations discussed is the perception that France’s continued presence has been exploitative rather than supportive. French multinational companies maintain(ed) a dominant role in extractive industries in the region, with limited local re-investment. For many Africans, this dynamic is viewed and experienced as neocolonialism.  French President Emmanuel Macron stirred widespread frustration across several African governments when he remarked that African leaders had failed to ‘thank’ France  for its role in combating insurgents in the Sahel—particularly after being expelled by newly installed military juntas. Many saw it as tone-deaf, and emblemantic of precisely that that caused so much resentment in Africa: the lack of understanding about France’s controversial history with the continent.  Another problem for many of the deposed regimes in question was that they were being perceived as being too close to France. Gabon’s Ali Bongo maintained deep ties with Paris and the West generally; Chad’s Idriss Déby was a key French ally in the Sahel; Niger’s Mohamed Bazoum was on very good terms with Macron; Burkina Faso’s Roch Kaboré relied on France for military support; Mali’s Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta and Guinea’s Alpha Condé also had strong ties with the French government. Given France’s extensive presence in some of these countries while at the same time little changed, people felt like France was there not for cooperation but rather for extraction, and they began to see their regimes as complicit in this system. The coups therefore had a certain anticolonial element to them, which explains thousands flocking the streets of Bamako, Niamey and Libreville to celebrate afterwards.  Adding to that argument is France’s failure to effectively counter the deepening security crisis in the Sahel. Its operations were increasingly viewed by local populations and governments as ineffective, self-serving, and disconnected from the realities on the ground. This growing disillusionment extended to international partners more broadly, including the United Nations’ MINUSMA mission , which many Malians saw as overly bureaucratic and, most importantly, as an instrument of the West. As violence continued and dissatisfaction with traditional Western security partners grew, Mali's military leaders turned to alternative alliances—most prominently with the Russian Wagner Group, a private military company closely aligned with Russian state interests. They also sought closer ties with countries like China and Turkey, viewing them as better equipped to meet Mali's security challenges. A Russian narrative offensive One party that was able to capitalize on this growing resentment against France and perceived neocolonialism in general was Russia. Through political communication and disinformation campaigns on social media, Russian actors were able to destabilize western-aligned governments and ‘detach’ France from its international partners in the region. These influence operations, repeating tactics used previously in Syria, Sudan, and the Central African Republic, employ AI-generated content , fake polls, and local influencers  to shape public opinion and to undermine support for Western presence. The aforementioned Wagner Group plays a crucial role in this process. Though the organization is a separate corporate entity on paper, the company works for the foreign policy aims of the Kremlin with a degree of plausible deniability.  The narrative spread on social media usually revolves around casting pro-Western regimes as puppet governments, while presenting Russia as a trustworthy and effective security partner in the region, a narrative that found especially fertile ground in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. In Mali, following the two coups in 2020 and 2021, the military government under Assimi Goïta distanced itself from France and welcomed Russia's Wagner Group as a security partner, employing anti-French rhetoric to justify this transition . Burkina Faso followed a similar trajectory when Captain Ibrahim Traoré's junta accused France of sheltering the ousted leader Paul-Henri Damiba and embraced pro-Russian messaging; protests in the capital featured Russian flags  and slogans demanding French withdrawal. The government expelled French forces and partnered with the Russian Afrika Korps. In Niger in 2023, supporters of General Abdourahamane Tchiani's junta displayed Russian flags and praised the Wagner Group during mass rallies in Niamey. Russia did not have to invent any sort of discontent - they merely amplified and channeled sentiments that were already simmering. There were enough reasons for people in Françafrique to feel a certain degree of hostility towards the French. Russia, in this case, was there at the right time to guide the resentment to the party responsible. Through a carefully coordinated discursive strategy, they managed in a way to spread the rhetoric that France was the root of the issues at stake. Conclusion The wave of coups that swept through Francophone Africa between 2020 and 2023 radically changed the region’s political landscape and geopolitical alignment. Within just a few years, France—for long one of the most influential external powers on the continent— lost key strategic partners and experienced a dramatic retreat from a region once considered its stronghold.  While each coup considered—Mali, Niger, Chad, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Gabon—had its own unique drivers, overarching themes emerged that help understanding regional trajectories and thinking ahead for the future development of the region. The countries examined are among the poorest and least developed in the world, in which citizens increasingly saw their governments as corrupt, self-interested, and disconnected from public needs. This widespread frustration, coupled with persistent and severe security threats—especially across the Sahel—created a climate of instability fertile for unrest and military takeovers.  Another key factor is the enduring influence of France. French diplomacy and companies are perceived as advancing Paris’s interests more than contributing to local development. Anti-French sentiment, rooted in the horrors of colonialism and the perceived neocolonialism of Françafrique, became an important justification for the coups discussed in this report. Russian disinformation campaigns have effectively leveraged this longstanding resentment, amplifying anti-French and anti-Western narratives to further their own influence. France’s future in Africa As France’s influence in Africa continues to decline, it is critical to not only look at what has happened, but also what comes next; how will France respond, and what are the implications for Africa’s future? When Emmanuel Macron assumed the presidency in 2017, he was regarded as one of France’s most foreign policy-driven leaders in recent decades. Yet, under his administration, France has suffered its most significant geopolitical retreat on the continent since the decolonization era of the 1950s and ’60s. Across Africa, long-standing allies of Paris have been ousted from power, not only in the countries discussed in this report but elsewhere too. The symbolic end of this era came on 17 July 2025, when France handed over its last two military bases in Senegal —leaving it without a permanent military presence in either West or Central Africa. First, France is likely to double down on its remaining partnerships in the region while actively seeking to establish new ones. In Gabon, where the Bongo family had long maintained close ties with Paris, pragmatism will likely guide France’s approach to the current junta. Given that Gabon hosts two of France’s last military bases in Africa—alongside another in Djibouti—Paris has strong incentives to remain accommodating. France is also actively attempting to improve its relationship with Madagascar, exemplified by President Macron’s 2025 state visit  to the island and the symbolic return of historical artifacts . In light of their ongoing territorial dispute  over the Scattered Islands  (Îles Éparses), Paris may be willing to make concessions in order to keep Antananarivo on their side. Côte d’Ivoire also provides opportunities: although relations under President Alassane Ouattara are not necessarily pro-France, there remains room for strategic cooperation. Lastly, France is expected to make efforts to strengthen its historically close ties with Morocco, a longstanding regional partner.  As for new partnerships, Nigeria appears to be a strong contender. In November 2024, President Bola Tinubu conducted a two-day state visit to Paris , in which Macron welcomed him with warmth, emphasizing cultural and economic ties. Throughout 2025, Tinubu returned to France on multiple occasions , both in official and unofficial capacities. France is actively trying to sustain high-level engagement with Ghanaian officials, too. In April 2025, French officials conducted an official mission  to the African nation focused on strengthening cooperation across several sectors.  In the countries where ties remain intact, France is likely to adopt a pragmatic—rather than idealistic—approach in dealing with their respective governments, aiming to preserve what remains of its influence on the continent. To this end, Paris may choose to overlook practices that do not fully align with its professed democratic values, prioritizing strategic interests over principles. Offering targeted investments or economic incentives may also become a tool to maintain goodwill and strengthen bilateral ties where possible. A good case in point here is Mozambique. Despite the country also being notoriously warm with Russia - the two countries reaffirmed their commitment to defense cooperation  in July, 2025 - France plans to deepen cooperation relations  and increase trade with the country five-fold.  France also has a significant interest in keeping relations with Maputo stable, as its energy giant TotalEnergies is constructing a $20 billion LNG plant  in the north of Mozambique. As for the countries discussed, it is likely that for the foreseeable future they will not restore relations with France—and more broadly, with the West. In particular, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, and to a lesser extent Chad, are ruled by juntas that derive much of their legitimacy from anti-Western rhetoric. As a result, a meaningful thaw in diplomatic ties is unlikely in the near term. These countries are expected to pursue increasingly independent foreign policies, aligning with Russia and other non-Western powers when it serves their strategic objectives. Western engagement, diplomatic, commercial, and humanitarian, is expected to become increasingly difficult. Embassies may scale back their presence, international NGOs could encounter tighter restrictions, and the operating environment for Western companies is likely to become more constrained. This is already happening at the time of writing: Niger ordered the International Committee of the Red Cross earlier this year to close its offices , citing an alleged collusion with armed groups. A changing global context The core issue here is what the emergence of these juntas represents. These coups, the speed at which they took place in different countries and the public support they received, signal deep structural failures and a rejection of the old political order. It reflects a growing demand in Africa, at least in the countries analyzed, for government accountability and that they serve the interests of their people. This shift is unfolding within a completely different global context than the post-independence era of the 20th century. Western dominance in Africa is a thing of the past, and new powers such as Russia, China and Turkey are competing for influence. Influence in Africa is beneficial for a multitude of reasons: the continent is rich in critical minerals, which are essential for advanced weapon systems and the green transition. Africa offers strategic military footholds, diplomatic influence and access to expanding consumer markets.  People waving Russian flags in Niamey, enormous Chinese investment in Africa and the expanding military role of Turkey on the continent is evidence of the shift toward multipolarity on the continent. African nations are no longer locked into historical allegiances. Instead, they are actively reshaping the terms of engagement on their own terms. They are diversifying their partnerships and seek arrangements that better serve national priorities.  An example of that is the alignment of some African nations such as the ones examined in this report but also others, such as Mozambique  and the Central African Republic , with the Russian Wagner Group and Afrika Korps. In Mali, for instance, the Goïta-led junta not only expelled French forces but also invited Wagner to take over France’s role. Similarly, Burkina Faso under Captain Ibrahim Traoré turned away from Western military assistance and embraced Russian cooperation. Therefore, the wave of coups analyzed in this report should not necessarily be seen as a regional crisis but rather as a ‘symptom’, meaning it represents a change in Africa’s geopolitical alignment. The military juntas that took power present themselves as the agents of this change, tapping into longstanding resentment to justify their rule. It is still unclear to what extent they can actually live up to that promise. Looking forward This changing landscape requires the West to rethink its relationship with Africa, which can no longer rely on historical privilege or assumptions of automatic alignment. What happened in Françafrique is not just an uprising against African leaders - it is a broader call for sovereignty and genuine agency in international affairs. In order to retain cordial relations with modern Africa, Western countries have to acknowledge that and adapt to this new reality. It is not just a moral question - it is a strategic necessity.  When Ibrahim Traoré, junta leader of Burkina Faso, conducted a visit to Moscow in early May 2025 to commemorate the 80th May 9th parade, celebrating the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany, Putin sent a private jet to Ouagadougou to pick Traoré up and his delegation, which he had escorted by fighter jets once in Russian airspace. People on X (formerly Twitter ) were quick to comment on the gesture, most of them being from African nations applauding the gesture. One user wrote :  “Russia didn’t just invite President Ibrahim Traoré to Moscow — they sent a state aircraft to personally pick him up from Burkina Faso. That’s not diplomacy. That’s respect. That’s symbolism. In a world where African leaders are often summoned like subordinates, this moment flips the script. It tells a new story: of African sovereignty being recognized, of alliances built on mutual interest — not colonial residue.”  Symbolic acts like this can carry significant diplomatic weight. Perceptions shape alliances, and this reminds us that equal treatment can matter just as much as actual material support - especially in a region long denied both.

Date:  18/07/2025   (16:30 UTC+2) Where?  Somalia. Hiran; Galgadud; Middle Shabelle; Lower Shabelle; Mogadishu; Lower Juba What happened?  Since launching a renewed offensive in February 2025, the jihadist group Al Shabaab has made unprecedented gains across central and southern Somalia. On 18/03/2025, an IED was detonated near Ceel-Gaabta, targeting Somalian President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s convoy shortly after it left the presidential palace Villa Somalia. The explosion destroyed several vehicles and wounded presidential escorts; however, the president was unharmed.  On 16/04/2025, Al Shabaab captured Adan Yabaal in the Middle Shabelle region. This is a symbolic loss for the Somali national government, as the town used to be under Al Shabaab control until it was liberated by the Somalia National Army (SNA) in its 2022 offensive. On 22/04/2025, it was reported that Turkey, an important security partner for the Somali government, was sending another 500 troops to the country amidst Al Shabaab advances. On 18/05/2025, a suicide bomb attack killed at least 10 people in the capital, Mogadishu. On  16/06/2025  Al Shabaab carried out an attack with an explosives-laden vehicle against an AUSSOM convoy, followed by an assault, killing around 20 Ugandan troops, injuring over 40 others according to reports, in one of the deadliest attacks on AUSSOM to date.  On 17/06/2025, Abas Mohamed Hool, a senior Al Shabaab commander, was killed by a SNA attack.  On 30/06/2025, the Somali government announced plans to build a new airport south of Mogadishu in the Middle Shabelle region. The official reason given for this is to ‘decongest’ Aden Adde International Airport (MGQ/HCMM), but another likely reason could be that a new location could be better defendable.  That same day, a SNA offensive killed at least 35 Al Shabaab fighters in the Lower Juba region of the country.  On 03/07/2025, Al Shabaab captured Xagare and Gumare from pro-SNA militias,  less than 10km from the strategic town of Moqokori. On 07/07/2025, Al Shabaab captured Moqokori in the Hiiraan region after several months of clashes using explosives-laden vehicles to initiate the final assault. Dozens were killed, with local government-aligned Macawisley militias fleeing the area. The town is situated along a major roadway connecting the northern and southern areas of the country.  On 09/07/2025, the  Jale Siyad military base in Mogadishu suffered a suicide bomber attack, for which Al Shabaab claimed responsibility.  Between 13/07/2025 and 14/07/2025, Al Shabaab captured the town of (Gal) Tardo in Somalia’s Hiiraan region, a key crossroads linking several major urban centers. A Somali Armed Forces spokesperson stated that the fall of Tardo marks part of a broader push toward the capital, Mogadishu, and added that government forces and pro-government militias are preparing a counteroffensive. Tardo is located 170 km away from the Somali capital, Mogadishu.  Also on 14/07/2025, Al Shabaab carried out a bomb attack on Afgoye, west of the capital.  This is a small version of a more elaborate report. To access the full version, contact info@dyami.services

Date:  10 July 2025 Rafale Fighter Jet - Hellenic Air Force Incident summary On 9 July 2025 , four Chinese nationals were detained by Greek authorities  after being caught photographing military infrastructure near Tanagra Air Base  in central Greece. The individuals; two men, one woman, and a younger male, were seen documenting Rafale fighter jets  of the 114th Combat Wing  and facilities of the Hellenic Aerospace Industry (HAI) . Despite warnings from HAI security personnel, the group reportedly moved to a nearby bridge and continued photographing  sensitive military assets. They also attempted to upload the images to secure folders. They were subsequently intercepted by the Air Force Police  and transferred to the local police station. Strategic context Tanagra Air Base is home to Greece’s advanced Rafale fleet , central to Hellenic Air Force modernization and deterrence strategy. The adjacent Hellenic Aerospace Industry is involved in defense manufacturing, MRO, and co-development  of sensitive technologies. Both facilities are strategic targets for foreign intelligence gathering . This incident comes amid: Heightened NATO–China tensions over dual-use technologies Growing concerns across Europe about Chinese espionage  and intelligence-gathering near military or critical infrastructure Greece’s expanding defense cooperation with France  and Israel , and its participation in NATO missions Key intelligence points Photographic evidence:  Authorities seized a significant volume of photo material from the suspects. Evaluation is ongoing. Cover story unknown:  No information released about whether the individuals posed as tourists, researchers, or operated under diplomatic cover. Motives under investigation:  While espionage has not officially been confirmed, Greek counterintelligence units have launched a full review. Location of interest:  Suspects were observed photographing military aircraft , HAI facilities , and access routes  around the base. PRC Connection Not Ruled Out:  No formal link to China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) has been disclosed, but the pattern matches known PRC intelligence activity elsewhere in Europe. Implications for Europe & NATO Growing concern over non-traditional intelligence collection tactics  used by foreign nationals in open-source environments. Potential use of civilian travelers, students, or businesspeople  for intelligence-gathering roles. Risk to countries with understaffed or underprepared base security  in peacetime locations. Dyami risk insights For Aerospace, Defence & Critical Infrastructure Operators : Ensure awareness training  for employees and subcontractors on suspicious behavior near facilities Conduct regular physical and technical surveillance countermeasures  (TSCM) Tighten access control policies , including signage, patrols, and monitoring of public vantage points Consider periodic red teaming or scenario-based exercises involving foreign nationals posing as civilians Dyami Services Dyami offers specialized support for: Counter-Espionage Awareness Training Facility Threat Assessments Security Intelligence Subscriptions tailored to Defence & Aerospace Red Team / Insider Threat Simulations Crisis & Media Response Planning Contact us for tailored briefings or support: info@dyami.services  | www.dyami.services “The lines between tourism, business travel, and intelligence collection are increasingly blurred. Organizations must treat ‘benign’ behavior near sensitive facilities with a new level of strategic vigilance.” - Eric Schouten, CEO, Dyami Security Intelligence

Date:   25/06/2025 Where?  Kenya; Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Nakuru, Nyahururu, Kisii and more.  UPDATE: 26/06/2025 As of this morning, 16 deaths have been reported since protests erupted across Kenya yesterday. Amnesty Kenya, along with the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), confirmed that most fatalities were caused by police action. At least five victims were fatally shot. Additionally, over 400 individuals have been reported injured. The KNHCR on their official X -account , mentions heavy police deployment and "excessive use of force, including rubber bullets, live ammunition and water cannons, resulting in numerous injuries". The rising death toll signals escalating tensions and raises concerns about further instability if grievances are not urgently addressed. What happened?  On 25/06/2025 , Kenyans took to the streets to commemorate the one-year anniversary of the deadly 2024 ‘Gen Z’ protests against the widely unpopular tax bill , which culminated in the storming of the Kenyan parliament. Protesters on the streets demand the resignation of Kenyan President William Ruto , like a year ago. A trending hashtag on X is #OccupyStateHouse, a call for protesters to march to the official residence of the president. #RutoMustGo is also trending on Kenyan social media. On the internet, such as on X and on Telegram, videos can be found showing serious unrest. In multiple Kenyan cities, riot police are present in big numbers, using tear gas, water cannons, and firing rubber bullets in an attempt to disperse protesters.  Also on 25/06/2025, the Kenyan Communications Authority banned live broadcasts  of the countrywide protests  on the basis that it ‘incites to violence’. Some TV stations, like the privately owned KTN TV appear to ignore the live broadcast ban. Fears also exist of a wider internet shutdown. Currently, protests have spread to at least 20 of the 47 counties. Analysis These events unfold against the backdrop of the mysterious death of Albert Ojwang,  a famous Kenyan blogger who exposed the country’s security forces, accused for years of extrajudicial killings and disappearances. On 06/06/2025,  Ojwang was arrested for allegedly defaming Kenya’s Deputy Inspector General of Police, Eliud Lagat, on social media. He was then transported over 350 kilometers to Nairobi, where he died in police custody. Following his death, massive protests erupted across Kenyan cities, leading to violent clashes between protesters and security forces on  17/06/2025, on which one person   died after reportedly being struck in the head  at point-blank range by a rubber bullet fired by police, further intensifying unrest on the streets.  The planned protests on 25/06/2025 therefore only intensified an already volatile situation, making the escalation that followed inevitable . The police appear to be employing increasingly forceful tactics to suppress protests, utilizing tear gas and aggressive crowd control measures. Videos shared on platforms such as Telegram and X reveal chaotic scenes in downtown Nairobi, Mombasa and other major cities, where mostly young protesters face heavily armed security forces. The protests in Kenya, which came to be known as the ‘Gen Z protests’, are intensifying.  Demonstrators demand the resignation of President William Ruto, and calls to march to his residency go around on social media. They reflect a deep frustration, mainly among young Kenyans (hence the name) with their country’s governance . They highlight police brutality going unpunished, rampant corruption,  and people’s fear that President Ruto is dismantling Kenyan democracy. Ruto’s decision to prohibit live broadcasting of the protests fuelled such allegations. Aside from that, Kenya’s economy is struggling, partially due to IMF demands, which adds to the widespread frustration about the situation in the country.  Conclusion Kenya’s Gen Z-protests reflect a widespread frustration under the Kenyan population about systemic issues in their country. A harsh police response, meant to quell the dissent, appears to only escalate the situation further. How the government chooses to respond further will significantly influence the future of civic engagement and governance in the country. The situation remains fluid, with both the authorities and protesters showing no signs of backing down. For travellers, keep in mind that the situation in Kenya is very volatile right now, not just in Nairobi. It is advised to proceed with caution, if a decision is made to travel to the country. Expect delays and a heavy police presence in urban centers. Make your presence known with your embassy, and stay up-to-date on the latest news. There are currently no disruptions in aviation, nor are they expected.  Dyami Services Security is not a luxury but a necessity. With Dyami Security Intelligence as a Service, you gain a proactive, flexible, and affordable solution to manage risks, monitor geopolitical threats, and respond immediately to crises. Want to know more? Visit our security-as-a-service page!

Date:   17/07/2025 (15:00 CEST) Where?  Suwayda, Damascus; Syria What happened?  On 12/07/2025,  tensions escalated into heavy fighting between armed Bedouin tribal fighters and Druze militias in Syria's southern governorate of Suwayda, resulting in at least 30 victims the first day. The escalation was triggered by a series of abductions, including the kidnapping of a Druze vegetable truck driver, and the seizure of vehicles from both factions.  In the morning of 14/07/2025 , the Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) and Ministry of Defense (MoD) dispersed its forces to help battle the clashes , however the convoy was attacked by Druze fighters resulting in more victims and a seized government vehicle. This prompted Damascus to make the decision to take control of Suwayda and attempt to disarm local militias. Syrian security forces reached Suwayda city by the afternoon, reporting intense clashes with Druze militias and the temporary capture of several villages in the Suwayda governorate during their advance. On 14/07/2025 , Israeli warplanes also reportedly dropped flares over Daraa and Suwayda province, likely to be interpreted as a warning for the MoD and MoI troops that were dispersed to Suwayda. Early on  15/07/2025 , the Druze spiritual leadership called for armed militias to surrender their weapons  and cooperate with government authorities as they entered the city, which led to the announcement of a ‘ceasefire’  between the Syrian Security Forces and the Druze militias. However, around the same time as the ceasefire announcement influential Druze leader Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, who has been opposed to the new government in Damascus, released a video message saying that the minority's previous statement had been "imposed" on them by Damascus and to continue fighting . On 15/07/2025 , Israel launched strikes on Syrian Security Forces in and around Suwayda to support the Druze militias , enabling them to regain some ground. Consequently leading to the deployment of additional Syrian Security Forces to Suwayda. On 15/07/2025 , the US urged Israel to halt its attacks in Syria, but the appeal had no tangible effect. On  16/07/2025 , Israeli Defense Minister Katz announced the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) would continue to attack Syrian security forces, demanding the regime to withdraw its forces.  Since 15/07/2025 , Druze civilians from Israel have been crossing the border into Syria  near Majdal Shams. This movement, which significantly increased on 16/07/2025 , aimed to support the Druze militias engaged in conflict   with the Syrian Security Forces. The IDF then stated its efforts to prevent the crossings and facilitate the return of these civilians to Israel. The IDF announced on 16/07/2025  that it had “struck and continues to strike tanks, rocket launchers, weapons, and pickup trucks loaded with heavy machine guns on their way to the As Suwayda area in southern Syria. Additionally, routes were struck in order to block access to the area.” This announcement was followed by the Israeli military striking the entrance gate of the Syrian Ministry of Defense headquarters in Damascus, resulting in three casualties, and areas near the presidential palace, as it continued to launch further strikes on Syrian forces in the Suwayda governate.  On 16/07/2025 , reports of Pro Druze military council and anti Syrian government protests taking place in the Druze town of Jaramana in Damascus' countryside surfaced. In the late afternoon on 16/06/2025 , the Syrian Ministry of Interior announced a ceasefire had been reached in Suwayda.  The agreement announced the withdrawal of the army to its barracks and the activation of internal security and checkpoints, together with the full integration of Suwayda within the state and its affirmation of sovereignty over the entire governorate.  While the internal security forces were being deployed, as part of the agreement, the MoD convoys were seen withdrawing from Suwayda. However, the Israeli military   continued launching strikes on MoD convoys leaving Suwayda , whilst also targeting other locations in Syria like the Damascus Mezzeh airport (DAM/OSDI) and the 4th Division barracks in southern Damascus outskirts.  Protests erupted in several towns throughout Syria against the Israeli intervention and in support of the government on 16/07/2025 .  On 17/07/2025 , Syria's President Ahmed al-Sharaa announced in a televised statement that “protecting the Druze citizens and their rights is their priority. In the early morning of 17/07/2025 , our sources based in Syria reported temporary stability in both Suwayda and Damascus , with Druze factions having taken control of Suwayda after withdrawal of the Syrian Security Forces. However, unconfirmed reports speculate about the presence of Syrian Security Forces snipers backed by local tribes in several neighborhoods of Suwayda.  Following the announcement of the ceasefire, Al-Hijri renewed his call to continue the armed struggle on 17/07/2025 , while also demanding the establishment of a corridor linking the Druze in Suwayda to their “Kurdish brothers” in the al-Jazeera region of northeastern Syria. His rejection of any agreement, further inflamed by Israeli involvement, has triggered an unprecedented situation, fueling growing resentment across Syria . This has led to calls for the isolation of Suwayda, trade boycotts, and the closure of key roads in Daraa province. Consequently, tensions with local tribal groups are steadily worsening. At approximately 14:00 GMT+3 the same day , escalating tensions in Suwayda peaked as Bedouin tribes affiliated with the Arab Tribal Army mobilized in response to perceived threats from Druze groups. Concurrently, reports emerged of Bedouin families departing the city with personal belongings, suggesting an intention to leave for an extended period. Not long after,  at around 14:30 GMT+3,  Daraa Bedouin tribes reportedly began artillery and rocket shelling Druze separatist positions in Suwayda. Analysis The intensifying conflict in Syria underscores the country's persistent instability and deep-rooted divisions. A central trigger of the recent escalation has been the frequent abductions, particularly targeting individuals from minority communities—a clear reflection of the ongoing sectarian violence across various regions.  This violence has prompted Kurdish calls for a decentralized system in recent months, an initiative rejected by the Al-Sharaa administration. Meanwhile, pro-Assad insurgents and other militias opposed to the current 'interim government' continue to carry out attacks and fuel clashes across multiple governorates. Efforts to integrate various armed groups, including the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the People’s Defense Units (YPG), into the official Syrian military framework are still ongoing. On several occasions c lashes have broken out between Syrian Security Forces and Druze fighters since the fall of President Bashar al-Assad in early December. However, Israel's increasing involvement, with airstrikes supporting Druze militias and targeting Syrian forces during the most recent escalation, further complicates the situation in Syria. Although many Druze in Syria have expressed opposition to Israeli intervention on their behalf, there remains deep mistrust within the community towards the new authorities in Damascus. In light of recent developments, fear is mounting among the Druze population regarding the potential consequences of Israel’s involvement. The broader Syrian populace, including non-jihadist groups, largely perceives cooperation with Israel as an act of betrayal. If Israel's recent airstrikes are isolated events and lack a clear, long-term commitment to Druze protection, the Druze population might fear reprisal attacks.  These concerns are amplified by recent sectarian killings of Alawites, leading to fears of similar violence against those labeled "Druze traitors." It remains to be seen whether President Al-Sharaa’s stated promise to safeguard Druze citizens reflects a genuine effort to honor the ceasefire agreement and uphold Druze autonomy, or merely a calculated move to consolidate power amid mounting internal and external challenges. Moreover, the escalating conflict in Syria not only signals a national destabilization, it also marks a significant escalation in the growing dispute between Israel and Syria. Israel's actions in Syria, while publicly framed as protecting Druze communities, are fundamentally driven by a long-term strategy to shape a post-Assad Syria that aligns with Israeli security and strategic interests. What the exact strategy is remains unclear to the public: it could be focussed towards building alliances with minority groups, such as the Druze, to establish buffer zones and diminish the Syrian regime's influence in the south. Another explanation for Israel’s actions could be a classic ‘divide and conquer’-strategy.  Since the Assad regime's collapse, Israel has actively pursued the demilitarization of southern Syrian governorates near the Golan Heights, aiming to restrict hostile forces from projecting power close to its borders. By targeting Syrian government convoys near Suwayda and bombing two important government buildings, Israel sent the clear message that it will do what it takes to enforce limitations on military presence in this strategically sensitive area to contain Damascus’s influence near the Golan.  It further also reflects Israel's broader strategic aim to assert control over parts of Syria and perpetuate instability. Rather than engaging in formal security arrangements with Syria, Israel has repeatedly resorted to airstrikes throughout the year, signaling a preference for maintaining a fragmented and weakened Syrian state. Its recent efforts to exploit Syria’s instability suggest that this latest episode is unlikely to be the last, ultimately undermining the new Syrian government’s attempts to restore national unity and casting uncertainty over the country’s future. Conclusion The recent clashes in Syria highlight the nation's persistent instability and growing divisions. The al-Sharaa government's capacity to pursue a centralised Syria remains uncertain. Triggered by sectarian violence and abductions, the clashes between Bedouin fighters and Druze escalated with the direct intervention from both Syrian Security Forces and Israel. Israel's external interference, coupled with internal dissent, continues to undermine attempts at national unity and casts significant uncertainty over Syria's future. Despite the announcement of a ceasefire, continued violence and mixed signals from Druze leadership indicate that the truce may be fragile and short-lived.

Gregorio Albini Introduction For decades, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has maintained its claim over the Republic of China (Taiwan), vowing to take control of the island. During the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises, in 1954 and 1958, Chinese forces shelled the Taiwanese island territories, with the two confrontations ending essentially due to the threat of direct US intervention. In the 1996 crisis, China again escalated tensions by launching several missiles in the waters surrounding Taiwan, before eventually backing down and de-escalating the situation. In recent years, China's stance toward Taiwan has become markedly more assertive, particularly following the election of incumbent President Lai Ching-te, a staunch advocate for Taiwanese independence. This increasing pressure, marked by harassment and destabilization campaigns through gray zone tactics, culminates in a pressing question: Will China invade Taiwan?  While important, this question falls beyond the scope of this document. To avoid excessive speculation, this report does not aim to predict whether an invasion will occur. Instead, it provides an overview of current China-Taiwan tensions and examines the various indicators suggesting that China may be preparing for an invasion of Taiwan. This report will also briefly explore how an invasion of Taiwan may affect global trade. In particular, it will focus on the extent to which Taiwanese exports, especially within its semiconductor industry,  are crucial to high-tech industries in the developed and developing world.  Indicators Political Discourse and ADIZ Violations China has long been vocal about its will for “reunification” or “Liberation of Taiwan”: effectively, the takeover of Taiwan by any means necessary, peaceful or otherwise. On March 5, 2025, during the opening meeting of the National People's Congress, Li Qiang, China’s Premier, said  that China “would firmly advance the push for reunification with Taiwan while opposing external interference”. On a separate occasion, Victor Gao, a former diplomat that Foreign Policy  once regarded as an influential US-China interlocutor and vice-president of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG) think-tank, stated  that “No one. . .will be able to block the peaceful reunification of China, or the non-peaceful reunification of China”. A similar statement  was made in 2021 by the then-Chinese Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Le Yucheng, who stated that the “reunification” will “not be stopped by anyone or any force”, adding that while peaceful unification is the preferred option, “no option is excluded”. These talking points were confirmed by Xi Jinping in his 2025 New Year’s address to the nation, in which he reiterates  that the “complete reunification of our motherland is an unshakable mission”.  China’s actions extend well beyond rhetoric, and in recent years, Beijing has resorted to increasingly aggressive gray zone tactics. In this regard, the Chinese violations of Taiwan’s de facto Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) are so frequent that they can be considered the status quo. Regarding the ADIZ, in May 2025, the total number of violations recorded in the de facto ADIZ (Fig. 1) reached  339, averaging approximately 11 violations per day. Although the record high remains August 2022, with 437 incursions, the 2025 monthly average has exceeded previous years. From March 1 to May 31, 2024, Taiwan experienced an average of 195 monthly violations; during the same period in 2025, that figure rose to 338, a 73% increase. This upward trend has been regularly observed since September 2020 (Fig. 2). These gray zone tactics may also be a way to provoke a military response, such as an attempt to intercept Chinese aircraft, providing Beijing with a pretext to escalate further. Overall, the incursions show that, unlike the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, China is now much more confident in its military capabilities.  This confidence is not unfounded; the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), which would be conducting most of the heavy lifting in a hypothetical invasion, has surpassed  the US Navy (USN) as the largest Navy in the world, with 370 battle force ships compared to the USN’s 296. By 2030, the USN projects a force of 294 vessels to China’s expected fleet of 435 vessels. Nevertheless, navies should not be measured solely by their fleet size. The PLAN is still distant from the force Xi Jinping wants  it to be, with major deficiencies  in sectors such as combat  experience, time-at-sea, command, decision-making and other human factors.  However, it must also be noted that the development of the PLA  in recent decades is astounding, with US wargames showing  that, in several scenarios, China would win a war in Taiwan (even with US and Japanese support). While factors such as strategic prowess, leadership, technological reliability and chance are as important to a navy as their fleet size (if not more so), we know that the PLAN (and the PLA as a whole) is aware  of its deficiencies, and is actively trying to overcome them.  ( Fig. 1 ) An illustrative map showing the difference between the theoretical Taiwan ADIZ (dotted line) and the de facto ADIZ (blue inside dotted line). Source: CIGeography/PLATracker. (Fig. 2)PLA’s violations of Taiwan's de facto ADIZ.  Source: Gerald C. Brown, Benjamin, Lewis, Taiwan ADIZ Violations, PLATracker, Taiwan ADIZ Violations Tracker 2025/Taiwan MOD. Sabotage While the violations of Taiwan’s ADIZ may be the most well-known instance of China’s gray zone tactics against Taipei, there are several other intimidatory tactics that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) resorts to.  In two separate instances at the beginning of this year, on January 3rd and February 25th, respectively, two undersea cables ( TPE  and TPMK3 ) were severed  by Chinese-owned vessels MV Xingshun 39 (IMO: 8358427) and MV Hongtai 58 (IMO: 8357069). The vessels severed the cables by dragging their anchors on the sea floor, a tactic also widely employed by Russia in Europe. These instances are only the latest examples of a sabotage campaign that China has been perpetrating since at least 2018. In 2023 alone, a particular set of cables ( TPMK2 and TPMK3 ) connecting Taiwan to the Matsu Islands, a Taiwanese archipelago located 10 NM West of the Chinese coast, was severed 12 times .  Taiwan depends significantly on these cables, as they are the only large-scale way to access the internet, and China is well aware of this pressure point. Taiwan’s connectivity depends on 15 undersea cables that connect it to the world . As an example, the previously mentioned TPE (Trans-Pacific Express), last damaged in January 2025, is a cable that runs between Taiwan, China, South Korea, Japan, and the US’s west coast. Each of these incidents hinders the operations of multiple sectors, from banking to emergency services, and costs Taiwan a significant amount of money in repairs and disruption of critical services.  Barges & Co.  On January 8th, 2025, a seemingly normal satellite image (Fig . 3) of the port of Guangzhou emerged online. The image depicted a shipyard on Longxue Island, with a few unusual-looking vessels scattered among the piers and dry docks. Western naval analysts quickly nicknamed  these vessels “Invasion Barges” due to their similarity to the Mulberry Harbors, a set of portable harbors built by the British to support the post-D-Day logistical effort.   ( Fig. 3 ) Satellite Image showing the barges at Guangzhou Shipyard International in Longxue Island, Guangdong Province, China. Source: AllSourceAnalysis/Planet Labs PBC. Naval analyst H.I. Sutton, who first authored an article  discussing the design and possible use of the barges, including for an invasion of Taiwan, was proven correct once the first close-up footage of the invasion barges surfaced. The footage in question, filmed from a beach on Nansan Island, a few kilometres from a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) amphibious naval facility (Fig. 4), shows the barges linked together to form a pier-like structure (Figs. 5 and   6).  ( Fig. 4 ) SAR imagery showing an exercise involving the barges in Nansan Island, near a PLAN Naval Facility. Source: Covert Shores - H.I. Sutton/ESA Sentinel-1. ( Fig. 5 ) Satellite imagery showing the barges positioned in a pier-like structure, and demonstrating the use of the cantilevered aft ramp as a docking and unloading spot for RORO (Roll On/Roll Off) and other cargo vessels. Source: Planet Labs PBC. ( Fig. 6 ) A photo showing the inline (pier-like) configuration of the barges from a human’s perspective. Source: Chinese Social Media/Weibo. Before the exercise footage emerged, based on the initial image (Fig. 3), multiple   defence   experts  reached a consensus  — later confirmed by the exercise — that the barges were designed for military use. This initial theory was based on their design, overly complicated, redundant, and financially unsuitable for commercial use, as well as the fact that too many were already being built or had been built for such a niche task. Information Warfare Gray zone tactics also expand to the information sphere. In April 2025, before major PLA exercise Strait Thunder 2025, the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command posted a video on Chinese social media which depicted current Taiwanese President, Lai Ching-te, as a parasite who poisons and harms Taiwan. The video ends with Lai being grilled over a burning Taiwan, suggesting that his policies will lead to the “ultimate destruction” (Fig. 7, 8 and 9). (Fig. 7) (Fig. 8) (Fig. 9) The above pictures were originally posted on the Chinese social media app Weibo by the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command official account. Source: Chinese Social Media/Weibo. This video, although likely primarily meant for an internal audience, reiterates China’s discontent with the current Taiwan administration and reaffirms Beijing’s stance regarding a sovereign Taiwan. Lai, since the beginning of his tenure, has demonstrated a strong focus on enhancing Taiwan’s resilience against China and reaffirming Taipei’s sovereignty. Recently, his 17 strategies against Chinese infiltration, espionage and overall threats to Taiwan’s sovereignty have garnered quite some discontent in China, with a Chinese official quoted by Xinhua, the official state-run news agency, saying that “Ching-te's 17 strategies lay bare his vile character, which is against peace, dialogue, democracy and humanity”.  This is not the first time China has directed harsh comments at Taiwan’s president. During the tenure of former Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian, following his refusal to accept Beijing’s “One-China” policy, a senior military source was quoted by China Daily  as stating  that “peace will have to be safeguarded and won through the use of force.” Beijing labelled Chen as a “die-hard separatist” who “is riding near the edge of the cliff, and there is no sign he is going to rein in his horse ”. China’s posture towards Chen reflects the current posture against Lai Ching-te, which China clearly perceives as too radical and vocal regarding Taiwan’s relationship with China. While this posture is not new and was last observed with Chen, the difference now is that China has been developing and expanding its military since, and can arguably be considered the only real peer to the US Armed Forces.  Civilian Lift Fleet China’s military exercises have become more frequent, with an increase in the quantity of assets deployed. Moreover, the PLAN has, in recent years, increased its focus on its ability to successfully conduct large-scale amphibious operations by increasing the number of amphibious landing ships, especially LPDs (Landing Platform Dock) and LHDs (Landing Helicopter Dock), and ramping up amphibious operations exercises. The lack of landing crafts and smaller landing ships, which many analysts believe are crucial to an invasion of Taiwan, may be because the PLAN assesses that its civilian lift fleet can remedy the lack of landing crafts. On several occasions, the PLAN has demonstrated the use of civilian vessels, particularly RORO (Roll-Off/Roll-On), in amphibious exercises  (Figs . 10 and 11). ( Fig. 10 ) A Chinese Type 99 MBT driving in the cargo hold of RORO vessel Zhong Hua Fu Xing  (IMO: 9849875) during an exercise. Source: CCTV. ( Fig. 11 ) Chinese RORO vessel Bang Chui Dao  (IMO: 9110781) recovering a PLAN ZTD-05 amphibious fighting vehicle during an exercise. Source: Marine Executive/CCTV. Notably, the stern ramp visible in the above image is not the original ramp the vessel was equipped with. Below is an image from 2014 (Fig . 12), showing  Bang Chui Dao ’s original stern ramp. This modification was likely made solely to support military operations, as the commercial use of such ramps is limited at best. ( Fig. 12 ) Bang Chui Dao ’s stern ramp in its original configuration (left ramp) during an exercise in 2014. Note that the large overhead pistons visible in fig. 11 are missing. Source: Jamestown Foundation/China Military Online. Bang Chui Dao ’s transformation suggests that the PLAN’s strategy to compensate for a lack of landing craft and smaller amphibious assault ships is to rely on its civilian fleet instead. The ability to deploy and recover amphibious assault vehicles classifies vessels such as the Bang Chui Dao as assets that can be utilised in the initial stage of a Taiwan invasion. Prior to the introduction of such ramps, many discussions around China’s decision to use civilian ships to compensate for the lack of landing crafts centred on the ship's inability to conduct amphibious assaults , as it cannot reach the shore and unload vehicles or troops. They are too large and their draughts are too deep to allow them to get to shore; they require a pier in which to dock and unload from there, similarly to what can be seen in fig . 12. Due to such shortcomings, the ships could only serve as logistical support after an initial wave is conducted, a (significant) beachhead established and a temporary harbour/pier structure built. Modifications such as the ramp seen on Bang Chui Dao overcome this limitation. Similar ships can now serve  as large landing crafts. These ships may still be unable to reach the shore, but they are not required to, as the modified ramp enables the deployment of amphibious vehicles, which can then reach the shore independently. This fleet was, in 2023, visually confirmed  to include at least 12 RORO ferries, ranging from 3.457 DWT to 11.288 DWT, and between 835 to 2.700 lane meters. This number of ferries is likely too low for a full-scale invasion of Taiwan, as it would put too much pressure on the individual ships, which would each provide Taiwan with a few high-value targets to focus on. Surely, in the event of an invasion with only these 12 ships, they will be heavily defended. Still, Taiwan would only need to hit a few for the first wave to suffer significant casualties without having even touched Taiwan’s territory. Nevertheless, Chinese ferry companies, such as the ferry division of state-owned giant COSCO Shipping, possess many more vessels, which, if needed, could likely be modified in a short period of time.  Consequences and Impact on the Global Economy Taiwan is home to around 24 million people, in an area (36.000 km²) smaller than the continental Netherlands (41.000 km²). With an urbanisation level of around 84%, the human cost of a potential invasion would be catastrophic. An invasion of Taiwan would also likely lead to a global economic recession. Maritime trade is by far the most essential transport sector; according to the World Trade Organization (WTO), shipping accounts  for more than 80% of the world's trade volume ( according  to EMSA, the European Maritime Safety Agency, this number is closer to 90%). Each year, maritime trade transports  more than $12 trillion in goods and energy. As with other forms of transport, any shipping company aims to use the shortest way to reach its destination to maximise profits. This, in turn, means that virtually all shipping companies will use the same routes, which will eventually pass through chokepoints such as the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal, the Strait of Hormuz, and a few others. The accessibility of these chokepoints is crucial for maintaining shipping profitability, and without them, the shipping sector would face significant cost increases and delays, which would heavily disrupt global trade.  In this group of chokepoints, the Taiwan Strait stands as one of the most crucial ones. In 2022 alone, the Taiwan Strait had an approximate $2,45 trillion in goods transit through it, accounting  for more than 20% of the global maritime trade. This transit would be disrupted to varying degrees by all the methods by which China aims to “reunify” Taiwan; these are conventionally divided into four separate plans . The first is a missile barrage on Taiwanese military, government and civilian targets, aiming to force Taipei to hand over power to Beijing. The second is a blockade of the Island, which would seek to block access to food and medicines until the humanitarian cost is deemed too high by Taipei, and power handed over to Beijing. The third campaign would be a direct attack on US forces stationed near Taiwan, aiming to temporarily hinder the US’ capability to come to Taiwan’s aid (should it choose to do so) in the initial stage of the conflict, thus improving the campaign’s success. The fourth campaign is the most destructive and entails a full-scale invasion of Taiwan with large-scale combined arms operations that would aim to subjugate Taiwan by force.  In all of these cases, maritime traffic in the Taiwan Strait would come to a standstill. Even a single stray missile landing close to -let alone hitting- a ship would be enough to skyrocket insurance premiums, making transit through the Strait unprofitable and temporarily halting trade through the Strait. The ease with which such chokepoints can be targeted, and traffic disrupted, has already been demonstrated by the Houthis from November 2023 through December 2024, and, most recently, in July 2025. In early 2024, following the hijack of MV Galaxy Leader (IMO: 9237307) and the subsequent Houthi attacks on shipping between November 2023 and December 2023,   traffic through the Suez Canal (and by extension the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait) decreased by 40%, with trade volume decreasing by 60% (Figs . 13 and 14) . ( Fig. 13 ) Traffic through the Suez Canal from January 2019 to July 2025. Notice the significant (±40%) drop in early 2024, following the first Houthi attacks against merchant vessels. Source: UN Global Platform/IMF Portwatch. ( Fig. 14 ) Trade volume levels that passed through the Suez Canal from January 2019 to July 2025. Notice the substantial (±60%) drop in early 2024, following the first Houthi attacks against merchant vessels. Source: UN Global Platform/IMF Portwatch. If the situation is particularly dire, as would be the case in a full-scale invasion, the Luzon Strait may also be deemed unsafe, meaning that vessels would have to reroute their navigation by thousands of miles (Fig . 15), which would drive up prices and put further strain on crews, vessels, and global logistics. This would put significant strain on countries such as Japan or South Korea. In the case of South Korea, 30% of imports and 23% of exports transited through the Strait, while for Japan, these numbers are even higher, with 32% and 25%, respectively. However, Taiwan will of course suffer the most. Trade in and out of Taiwanese ports will cease completely, halting the export of crucial goods, particularly integrated circuits (ICs), and the import of vital goods, ranging from agricultural products to pharmaceuticals.  (Fig. 16) Map showing how routes from Singapore (SG) to Busan (SK) would change if both the Taiwan Strait and the Luzon Strait were deemed unsafe, notice how the route goes around the Philippines, adding thousands of miles to the trip. Source: CSIS. Furthermore, the world will suffer with it; Taiwan’s IC industry is crucial to various end markets, including  smartphones, digital consumer electronics, high-performance computing, AI, and defence . As of Q1 2025, TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company), the largest contract IC foundry in the world, controlled 67% of market share by revenue (Fig . 16) . During the same period, the second largest foundry (Samsung) had a mere 8% of market share by revenue.  ( Fig. 16 ) Market Share of Global Top 10 Foundries by Revenue: 2022 Q1 - 2025 Q1. Note the dominance of TSMC growing over time. Source: Trendforce/Republic of China (Taiwan). Most notably, out of the 10 foundries shown in Fig. 15, four are Taiwanese, representing a combined market share of approximately 74% by revenue . Without Taiwanese ICs, many high-tech industries around the world would collapse unless a stopgap solution is found momentarily, as no other country can produce sub-10nm advanced ICs (7, 5, and 3nm) at scale—if at all—the same way Taiwanese foundries (especially TSMC) do . This solution is unlikely to be found in a timely manner. TSMC has a near monopoly on these chips because it has consistently invested the time, money, and expertise required over decades of development and production. Finding a replacement could take years, at best.  The shortage of ICs and advanced ICs on the market would have massive ripple effects in the global economy. Not to mention, during a hypothetical invasion of Taiwan, Chinese imports and exports will also likely suffer a significant decrease either due to sanctions on China (although the extent and efficacy of these sanctions depends on the willpower of the states imposing them, which, given China’s worldwide importance for trade, will be highly tested) and lack of logistical routes; the Taiwan Strait would still be a warzone and air and land trade originating from China simply cannot make up for the lack of shipping. War in Taiwan would be catastrophic, with some estimates  suggesting that it would wipe 10% off the global gross domestic product (GDP). Conclusion This report has examined the different factors that suggest China is preparing for a potential invasion of Taiwan. It has highlighted the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) rapid and unexpected development, while also noting its deficiencies, and laid out several ‘gray zone’ tactics implemented by Beijing. Although the report does not seek to predict a timeline or assign a likelihood to such an event, it emphasises the importance of closely monitoring these warning signs, especially in the context of political discourse, information warfare activities, ADIZ invasions, acts of sabotage, and recent military developments. Finally, the report discusses the importance of the Taiwanese economy and the Taiwan Strait for the global trade and economy, concluding that any conflict would have catastrophic consequences in both human and economic terms.  Sources Bloomberg. J. Welch, J. Leonard, M. Cousin, G. DiPippo, T. Orlik. “Xi, Biden and the $10 Trillion Cost of War Over Taiwan”. January 9, 2024. Link Center for Strategic & International Studies. M. P. Funaiole, B. Hart, D. Peng, B. Lin, J. 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Anthony. “China: Taiwan could face ‘use of force’ if independence-minded forces keep pushing”. August 7, 2002. Link State Council of the People’s Republic of China . State Council Information Office. “China’s National Defense in the New Era”. July 24, 2019. Link The Conversation. D. Murphy. “Is the United States overestimating China’s power?”.  The Jamestown Foundation. C. Kennedy. “Ramping the Strait: Quick and Dirty Solutions to Boost Amphibious Lift”. July 16, 2021. Link The Maritime Executive . Maritime Executive Staff. “China's 'Invasion Barge' Piers Can Receive Five Ro/Ros at a Time”. May 15, 2025. Link .  The Maritime Executive. C. Kennedy. “China is Preparing Merchant Ro-Ro Ferries for Amphibious Warfare”. March 30, 2023.  TrendForce.  TrendForce Staff. “Global Top 10 Foundries Set New Revenue Record, TSMC Leads in Advanced Process Nodes”. March 10, 2025. Link United Nations Trade and Development. “Review of Maritime Transport 2024”. 2024. 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Date:   09/07/2025 Where?  Red Sea; 51 NM off the coast of Hodeidah, Yemeni coast. What happened?  On 06/07/2025 , the MV Magic Seas   (IMO:9736169), a Greek-owned Liberian-flagged bulk carrier, was attacked by the Houthis,  marking the  first attack by Houthi militants on a commercial vessel this year . The ship suffered an attack 51 NM SW of Hodeidah, Yemen (approximately 14°20'59.8" N 42°20'04.9" E). The vessel was attacked by  small arms fire, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and Unmanned Surface Vessels (USVs) . According to the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), the vessel's Armed Security Team (AST) returned fire. The Company Security Officer confirmed to the UKMTO at 16:01 UTC+2 on 06/07/2025  that the vessel had been struck, resulting in a fire on board.  The Houthis claimed to have sunk MV Magic Seas , with Joshua Hutchinson, managing director of the maritime security firm Ambrey, confirming the sinking to Reuters after having received reports from a nearby vessel.  All MV   Magic Seas  crew members were reported safe by UKMTO and were rescued by a merchant vessel, arriving in Djibouti on the same day, as confirmed by Djibouti authorities. On 07/07/2025 , another bulk carrier, the Greek-operated Liberian-flagged Eternity C (IMO:9588249) , was attacked by the Houthis around the same area, 51 NM W of Hodeidah at 19:03 UTC+2. The initial attack was carried out with RPGs fired from speedboats, followed by explosive-laden (kamikaze) USVs. A subsequent attack at 09:10 UTC+2 on 08/07/2025 forced all 22 crew members to abandon ship and enter the water. A rescue mission commenced on 09/07/2025 , successfully recovering four crew members and one armed guard who had been in the water for over 24 hours as their lifeboat had been struck by gunfire and was inoperable. T he MV Eternity C  is also reported to have sunk. The vessel attack on MV Magic Seas  was followed almost immediately by Israeli strikes  on the cities of Hodeidah, Ras Isa, Salif and Ras Khatib power plant. Following these retaliatory attacks by Israel, the Houthis claimed missile and drone attacks on several sites inside Israel on 07/07/2025 , in response to Israeli airstrikes on the country. In a televised statement, Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree announced hypersonic ballistic missiles were launched at Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv, Ashdod Port, a power plant in the southern city of Ashkelon and eight drones were also launched at Eilat Port in southern Israel. Looking ahead The recent attacks by the Houthis on the MV Magic Seas and MV Eternity C , following a period of relative calm, suggest a resumption of their targeting campaign against vessels perceived to have Israeli affiliations. While it remains uncertain whether these incidents are isolated or mark the beginning of a renewed, wider campaign, recent Houthi statements have identified the Magic Seas vessel as fitting the profile of their intended targets, “belonging to a company that violated the entry ban to the ports of the occupied Palestine”.  The Houthis most recent statement on implementing a naval blockade on Israel’s Haifa was put forward on May 19 and the Houthis have not made any renewed threats particularly concerning the attack of Israeli-affiliated vessels since.  While Houthi activity in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait has paused since December 2024, this does not indicate a shift in their underlying intent.  As long as the conflict in Gaza continues, vessels with any perceived or actual links to Israel will remain at elevated risk in the Red Sea. Vessels transiting the Red Sea are therefore strongly advised to proceed with extreme caution and it is advised to monitor the situation closely. The consistent unpredictability of the security situation in the Red Sea has already led to a significant decline in shipping traffic, with around a 50% reduction from normal levels since the initial Houthi attacks in 2023. These latest attacks are unlikely to substantially alter existing shipping patterns, as operators have already adjusted to the heightened risk environment. However, the resumption of attacks suggests that the Red Sea will remain a high-risk area for the foreseeable future. If attacks persist, there could be long-term shifts in shipping routes and strategies, as companies seek to minimize exposure to the region.

Date: 08/07/2025 (13:00 GMT+2) Where?  Kenya; Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Nakuru, Kakamega and many more. The protests were reported in 17 of 47 counties. What happened?  On 07/07/2025 , Kenyans took to the streets in protest to commemorate the 35th anniversary of the historic Saba Saba — meaning "7/7" in Swahili — demonstrations of 07/07/1990, which sparked Kenya’s movement toward multiparty democracy under the authoritarian rule of President Daniel arap Moi. In anticipation of the protests,  the Kenyan police shut down major roads across the capital , Nairobi, and established checkpoints throughout the city and surrounding areas in the early hours of the day. Roads leading to key government sites — including the president's official residence, State House, and the Kenyan parliament — were sealed off with razor wire barricades. However, clashes still broke out in parts of Nairobi  as demonstrators lit fires and attempted to breach police cordons. Officers responded with tear gas and water cannons. Clashes also broke out in different parts of the country. Reports indicate that police used excessive force, including opening fire on demonstrators. At least 11 people were killed  during yesterday’s protests, with the death toll potentially rising. More than 550 others have been arrested.  Earlier, on 06/07/2025 , an armed gang attacked Kenya’s Human Rights Commission, just as it hosted a press conference organized by Kenya’s women's collective calling for an end to arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial killings. This attack was recorded on video . All of this is unfolding amid heightened tensions in Kenya. On 25/06/2025,  similar protests broke out following national outrage over the death of blogger Albert Ojwang in police custody, an incident that amplified public anger over police brutality, corruption, and growing authoritarianism under President Ruto. Led largely by young Kenyans, the Gen Z -protests reflect widespread frustration with systemic abuse, economic struggles, and fears about the erosion of Kenyan democracy. At least 19 people died that day. Conclusion In conclusion, the Saba Saba protests in Kenya are not an isolated phenomenon but rather a manifestation of deeper, long-standing frustrations  related to police brutality, economic inequality, corruption, and a perceived erosion of democratic freedoms. While the current wave of protests appears to have subsided for now, this calm is likely temporary. Previous protests erupted and spread quickly, and only needed a specific 'trigger'. These recent events highlight the increasing mistrust between citizens in Kenya and the state . Unless the government takes steps to address the root causes of discontent, Kenya risks entering a cycle of recurring unrest and social fragmentation.  Sustainable peace and stability will depend not on silencing dissent, but on solving the issues that fuel it. This is a small version of a more elaborate report. Want to read the full version? Contact info@dyami.services