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Date:   17/07/2025 (15:00 CEST) Where?  Suwayda, Damascus; Syria What happened?  On 12/07/2025,  tensions escalated into heavy fighting between armed Bedouin tribal fighters and Druze militias in Syria's southern governorate of Suwayda, resulting in at least 30 victims the first day. The escalation was triggered by a series of abductions, including the kidnapping of a Druze vegetable truck driver, and the seizure of vehicles from both factions.  In the morning of 14/07/2025 , the Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) and Ministry of Defense (MoD) dispersed its forces to help battle the clashes , however the convoy was attacked by Druze fighters resulting in more victims and a seized government vehicle. This prompted Damascus to make the decision to take control of Suwayda and attempt to disarm local militias. Syrian security forces reached Suwayda city by the afternoon, reporting intense clashes with Druze militias and the temporary capture of several villages in the Suwayda governorate during their advance. On 14/07/2025 , Israeli warplanes also reportedly dropped flares over Daraa and Suwayda province, likely to be interpreted as a warning for the MoD and MoI troops that were dispersed to Suwayda. Early on  15/07/2025 , the Druze spiritual leadership called for armed militias to surrender their weapons  and cooperate with government authorities as they entered the city, which led to the announcement of a ‘ceasefire’  between the Syrian Security Forces and the Druze militias. However, around the same time as the ceasefire announcement influential Druze leader Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, who has been opposed to the new government in Damascus, released a video message saying that the minority's previous statement had been "imposed" on them by Damascus and to continue fighting . On 15/07/2025 , Israel launched strikes on Syrian Security Forces in and around Suwayda to support the Druze militias , enabling them to regain some ground. Consequently leading to the deployment of additional Syrian Security Forces to Suwayda. On 15/07/2025 , the US urged Israel to halt its attacks in Syria, but the appeal had no tangible effect. On  16/07/2025 , Israeli Defense Minister Katz announced the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) would continue to attack Syrian security forces, demanding the regime to withdraw its forces.  Since 15/07/2025 , Druze civilians from Israel have been crossing the border into Syria  near Majdal Shams. This movement, which significantly increased on 16/07/2025 , aimed to support the Druze militias engaged in conflict   with the Syrian Security Forces. The IDF then stated its efforts to prevent the crossings and facilitate the return of these civilians to Israel. The IDF announced on 16/07/2025  that it had “struck and continues to strike tanks, rocket launchers, weapons, and pickup trucks loaded with heavy machine guns on their way to the As Suwayda area in southern Syria. Additionally, routes were struck in order to block access to the area.” This announcement was followed by the Israeli military striking the entrance gate of the Syrian Ministry of Defense headquarters in Damascus, resulting in three casualties, and areas near the presidential palace, as it continued to launch further strikes on Syrian forces in the Suwayda governate.  On 16/07/2025 , reports of Pro Druze military council and anti Syrian government protests taking place in the Druze town of Jaramana in Damascus' countryside surfaced. In the late afternoon on 16/06/2025 , the Syrian Ministry of Interior announced a ceasefire had been reached in Suwayda.  The agreement announced the withdrawal of the army to its barracks and the activation of internal security and checkpoints, together with the full integration of Suwayda within the state and its affirmation of sovereignty over the entire governorate.  While the internal security forces were being deployed, as part of the agreement, the MoD convoys were seen withdrawing from Suwayda. However, the Israeli military   continued launching strikes on MoD convoys leaving Suwayda , whilst also targeting other locations in Syria like the Damascus Mezzeh airport (DAM/OSDI) and the 4th Division barracks in southern Damascus outskirts.  Protests erupted in several towns throughout Syria against the Israeli intervention and in support of the government on 16/07/2025 .  On 17/07/2025 , Syria's President Ahmed al-Sharaa announced in a televised statement that “protecting the Druze citizens and their rights is their priority. In the early morning of 17/07/2025 , our sources based in Syria reported temporary stability in both Suwayda and Damascus , with Druze factions having taken control of Suwayda after withdrawal of the Syrian Security Forces. However, unconfirmed reports speculate about the presence of Syrian Security Forces snipers backed by local tribes in several neighborhoods of Suwayda.  Following the announcement of the ceasefire, Al-Hijri renewed his call to continue the armed struggle on 17/07/2025 , while also demanding the establishment of a corridor linking the Druze in Suwayda to their “Kurdish brothers” in the al-Jazeera region of northeastern Syria. His rejection of any agreement, further inflamed by Israeli involvement, has triggered an unprecedented situation, fueling growing resentment across Syria . This has led to calls for the isolation of Suwayda, trade boycotts, and the closure of key roads in Daraa province. Consequently, tensions with local tribal groups are steadily worsening. At approximately 14:00 GMT+3 the same day , escalating tensions in Suwayda peaked as Bedouin tribes affiliated with the Arab Tribal Army mobilized in response to perceived threats from Druze groups. Concurrently, reports emerged of Bedouin families departing the city with personal belongings, suggesting an intention to leave for an extended period. Not long after,  at around 14:30 GMT+3,  Daraa Bedouin tribes reportedly began artillery and rocket shelling Druze separatist positions in Suwayda. Analysis The intensifying conflict in Syria underscores the country's persistent instability and deep-rooted divisions. A central trigger of the recent escalation has been the frequent abductions, particularly targeting individuals from minority communities—a clear reflection of the ongoing sectarian violence across various regions.  This violence has prompted Kurdish calls for a decentralized system in recent months, an initiative rejected by the Al-Sharaa administration. Meanwhile, pro-Assad insurgents and other militias opposed to the current 'interim government' continue to carry out attacks and fuel clashes across multiple governorates. Efforts to integrate various armed groups, including the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the People’s Defense Units (YPG), into the official Syrian military framework are still ongoing. On several occasions c lashes have broken out between Syrian Security Forces and Druze fighters since the fall of President Bashar al-Assad in early December. However, Israel's increasing involvement, with airstrikes supporting Druze militias and targeting Syrian forces during the most recent escalation, further complicates the situation in Syria. Although many Druze in Syria have expressed opposition to Israeli intervention on their behalf, there remains deep mistrust within the community towards the new authorities in Damascus. In light of recent developments, fear is mounting among the Druze population regarding the potential consequences of Israel’s involvement. The broader Syrian populace, including non-jihadist groups, largely perceives cooperation with Israel as an act of betrayal. If Israel's recent airstrikes are isolated events and lack a clear, long-term commitment to Druze protection, the Druze population might fear reprisal attacks.  These concerns are amplified by recent sectarian killings of Alawites, leading to fears of similar violence against those labeled "Druze traitors." It remains to be seen whether President Al-Sharaa’s stated promise to safeguard Druze citizens reflects a genuine effort to honor the ceasefire agreement and uphold Druze autonomy, or merely a calculated move to consolidate power amid mounting internal and external challenges. Moreover, the escalating conflict in Syria not only signals a national destabilization, it also marks a significant escalation in the growing dispute between Israel and Syria. Israel's actions in Syria, while publicly framed as protecting Druze communities, are fundamentally driven by a long-term strategy to shape a post-Assad Syria that aligns with Israeli security and strategic interests. What the exact strategy is remains unclear to the public: it could be focussed towards building alliances with minority groups, such as the Druze, to establish buffer zones and diminish the Syrian regime's influence in the south. Another explanation for Israel’s actions could be a classic ‘divide and conquer’-strategy.  Since the Assad regime's collapse, Israel has actively pursued the demilitarization of southern Syrian governorates near the Golan Heights, aiming to restrict hostile forces from projecting power close to its borders. By targeting Syrian government convoys near Suwayda and bombing two important government buildings, Israel sent the clear message that it will do what it takes to enforce limitations on military presence in this strategically sensitive area to contain Damascus’s influence near the Golan.  It further also reflects Israel's broader strategic aim to assert control over parts of Syria and perpetuate instability. Rather than engaging in formal security arrangements with Syria, Israel has repeatedly resorted to airstrikes throughout the year, signaling a preference for maintaining a fragmented and weakened Syrian state. Its recent efforts to exploit Syria’s instability suggest that this latest episode is unlikely to be the last, ultimately undermining the new Syrian government’s attempts to restore national unity and casting uncertainty over the country’s future. Conclusion The recent clashes in Syria highlight the nation's persistent instability and growing divisions. The al-Sharaa government's capacity to pursue a centralised Syria remains uncertain. Triggered by sectarian violence and abductions, the clashes between Bedouin fighters and Druze escalated with the direct intervention from both Syrian Security Forces and Israel. Israel's external interference, coupled with internal dissent, continues to undermine attempts at national unity and casts significant uncertainty over Syria's future. Despite the announcement of a ceasefire, continued violence and mixed signals from Druze leadership indicate that the truce may be fragile and short-lived.

Gregorio Albini Introduction For decades, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has maintained its claim over the Republic of China (Taiwan), vowing to take control of the island. During the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises, in 1954 and 1958, Chinese forces shelled the Taiwanese island territories, with the two confrontations ending essentially due to the threat of direct US intervention. In the 1996 crisis, China again escalated tensions by launching several missiles in the waters surrounding Taiwan, before eventually backing down and de-escalating the situation. In recent years, China's stance toward Taiwan has become markedly more assertive, particularly following the election of incumbent President Lai Ching-te, a staunch advocate for Taiwanese independence. This increasing pressure, marked by harassment and destabilization campaigns through gray zone tactics, culminates in a pressing question: Will China invade Taiwan?  While important, this question falls beyond the scope of this document. To avoid excessive speculation, this report does not aim to predict whether an invasion will occur. Instead, it provides an overview of current China-Taiwan tensions and examines the various indicators suggesting that China may be preparing for an invasion of Taiwan. This report will also briefly explore how an invasion of Taiwan may affect global trade. In particular, it will focus on the extent to which Taiwanese exports, especially within its semiconductor industry,  are crucial to high-tech industries in the developed and developing world.  Indicators Political Discourse and ADIZ Violations China has long been vocal about its will for “reunification” or “Liberation of Taiwan”: effectively, the takeover of Taiwan by any means necessary, peaceful or otherwise. On March 5, 2025, during the opening meeting of the National People's Congress, Li Qiang, China’s Premier, said  that China “would firmly advance the push for reunification with Taiwan while opposing external interference”. On a separate occasion, Victor Gao, a former diplomat that Foreign Policy  once regarded as an influential US-China interlocutor and vice-president of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG) think-tank, stated  that “No one. . .will be able to block the peaceful reunification of China, or the non-peaceful reunification of China”. A similar statement  was made in 2021 by the then-Chinese Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Le Yucheng, who stated that the “reunification” will “not be stopped by anyone or any force”, adding that while peaceful unification is the preferred option, “no option is excluded”. These talking points were confirmed by Xi Jinping in his 2025 New Year’s address to the nation, in which he reiterates  that the “complete reunification of our motherland is an unshakable mission”.  China’s actions extend well beyond rhetoric, and in recent years, Beijing has resorted to increasingly aggressive gray zone tactics. In this regard, the Chinese violations of Taiwan’s de facto Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) are so frequent that they can be considered the status quo. Regarding the ADIZ, in May 2025, the total number of violations recorded in the de facto ADIZ (Fig. 1) reached  339, averaging approximately 11 violations per day. Although the record high remains August 2022, with 437 incursions, the 2025 monthly average has exceeded previous years. From March 1 to May 31, 2024, Taiwan experienced an average of 195 monthly violations; during the same period in 2025, that figure rose to 338, a 73% increase. This upward trend has been regularly observed since September 2020 (Fig. 2). These gray zone tactics may also be a way to provoke a military response, such as an attempt to intercept Chinese aircraft, providing Beijing with a pretext to escalate further. Overall, the incursions show that, unlike the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, China is now much more confident in its military capabilities.  This confidence is not unfounded; the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), which would be conducting most of the heavy lifting in a hypothetical invasion, has surpassed  the US Navy (USN) as the largest Navy in the world, with 370 battle force ships compared to the USN’s 296. By 2030, the USN projects a force of 294 vessels to China’s expected fleet of 435 vessels. Nevertheless, navies should not be measured solely by their fleet size. The PLAN is still distant from the force Xi Jinping wants  it to be, with major deficiencies  in sectors such as combat  experience, time-at-sea, command, decision-making and other human factors.  However, it must also be noted that the development of the PLA  in recent decades is astounding, with US wargames showing  that, in several scenarios, China would win a war in Taiwan (even with US and Japanese support). While factors such as strategic prowess, leadership, technological reliability and chance are as important to a navy as their fleet size (if not more so), we know that the PLAN (and the PLA as a whole) is aware  of its deficiencies, and is actively trying to overcome them.  ( Fig. 1 ) An illustrative map showing the difference between the theoretical Taiwan ADIZ (dotted line) and the de facto ADIZ (blue inside dotted line). Source: CIGeography/PLATracker. (Fig. 2)PLA’s violations of Taiwan's de facto ADIZ.  Source: Gerald C. Brown, Benjamin, Lewis, Taiwan ADIZ Violations, PLATracker, Taiwan ADIZ Violations Tracker 2025/Taiwan MOD. Sabotage While the violations of Taiwan’s ADIZ may be the most well-known instance of China’s gray zone tactics against Taipei, there are several other intimidatory tactics that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) resorts to.  In two separate instances at the beginning of this year, on January 3rd and February 25th, respectively, two undersea cables ( TPE  and TPMK3 ) were severed  by Chinese-owned vessels MV Xingshun 39 (IMO: 8358427) and MV Hongtai 58 (IMO: 8357069). The vessels severed the cables by dragging their anchors on the sea floor, a tactic also widely employed by Russia in Europe. These instances are only the latest examples of a sabotage campaign that China has been perpetrating since at least 2018. In 2023 alone, a particular set of cables ( TPMK2 and TPMK3 ) connecting Taiwan to the Matsu Islands, a Taiwanese archipelago located 10 NM West of the Chinese coast, was severed 12 times .  Taiwan depends significantly on these cables, as they are the only large-scale way to access the internet, and China is well aware of this pressure point. Taiwan’s connectivity depends on 15 undersea cables that connect it to the world . As an example, the previously mentioned TPE (Trans-Pacific Express), last damaged in January 2025, is a cable that runs between Taiwan, China, South Korea, Japan, and the US’s west coast. Each of these incidents hinders the operations of multiple sectors, from banking to emergency services, and costs Taiwan a significant amount of money in repairs and disruption of critical services.  Barges & Co.  On January 8th, 2025, a seemingly normal satellite image (Fig . 3) of the port of Guangzhou emerged online. The image depicted a shipyard on Longxue Island, with a few unusual-looking vessels scattered among the piers and dry docks. Western naval analysts quickly nicknamed  these vessels “Invasion Barges” due to their similarity to the Mulberry Harbors, a set of portable harbors built by the British to support the post-D-Day logistical effort.   ( Fig. 3 ) Satellite Image showing the barges at Guangzhou Shipyard International in Longxue Island, Guangdong Province, China. Source: AllSourceAnalysis/Planet Labs PBC. Naval analyst H.I. Sutton, who first authored an article  discussing the design and possible use of the barges, including for an invasion of Taiwan, was proven correct once the first close-up footage of the invasion barges surfaced. The footage in question, filmed from a beach on Nansan Island, a few kilometres from a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) amphibious naval facility (Fig. 4), shows the barges linked together to form a pier-like structure (Figs. 5 and   6).  ( Fig. 4 ) SAR imagery showing an exercise involving the barges in Nansan Island, near a PLAN Naval Facility. Source: Covert Shores - H.I. Sutton/ESA Sentinel-1. ( Fig. 5 ) Satellite imagery showing the barges positioned in a pier-like structure, and demonstrating the use of the cantilevered aft ramp as a docking and unloading spot for RORO (Roll On/Roll Off) and other cargo vessels. Source: Planet Labs PBC. ( Fig. 6 ) A photo showing the inline (pier-like) configuration of the barges from a human’s perspective. Source: Chinese Social Media/Weibo. Before the exercise footage emerged, based on the initial image (Fig. 3), multiple   defence   experts  reached a consensus  — later confirmed by the exercise — that the barges were designed for military use. This initial theory was based on their design, overly complicated, redundant, and financially unsuitable for commercial use, as well as the fact that too many were already being built or had been built for such a niche task. Information Warfare Gray zone tactics also expand to the information sphere. In April 2025, before major PLA exercise Strait Thunder 2025, the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command posted a video on Chinese social media which depicted current Taiwanese President, Lai Ching-te, as a parasite who poisons and harms Taiwan. The video ends with Lai being grilled over a burning Taiwan, suggesting that his policies will lead to the “ultimate destruction” (Fig. 7, 8 and 9). (Fig. 7) (Fig. 8) (Fig. 9) The above pictures were originally posted on the Chinese social media app Weibo by the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command official account. Source: Chinese Social Media/Weibo. This video, although likely primarily meant for an internal audience, reiterates China’s discontent with the current Taiwan administration and reaffirms Beijing’s stance regarding a sovereign Taiwan. Lai, since the beginning of his tenure, has demonstrated a strong focus on enhancing Taiwan’s resilience against China and reaffirming Taipei’s sovereignty. Recently, his 17 strategies against Chinese infiltration, espionage and overall threats to Taiwan’s sovereignty have garnered quite some discontent in China, with a Chinese official quoted by Xinhua, the official state-run news agency, saying that “Ching-te's 17 strategies lay bare his vile character, which is against peace, dialogue, democracy and humanity”.  This is not the first time China has directed harsh comments at Taiwan’s president. During the tenure of former Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian, following his refusal to accept Beijing’s “One-China” policy, a senior military source was quoted by China Daily  as stating  that “peace will have to be safeguarded and won through the use of force.” Beijing labelled Chen as a “die-hard separatist” who “is riding near the edge of the cliff, and there is no sign he is going to rein in his horse ”. China’s posture towards Chen reflects the current posture against Lai Ching-te, which China clearly perceives as too radical and vocal regarding Taiwan’s relationship with China. While this posture is not new and was last observed with Chen, the difference now is that China has been developing and expanding its military since, and can arguably be considered the only real peer to the US Armed Forces.  Civilian Lift Fleet China’s military exercises have become more frequent, with an increase in the quantity of assets deployed. Moreover, the PLAN has, in recent years, increased its focus on its ability to successfully conduct large-scale amphibious operations by increasing the number of amphibious landing ships, especially LPDs (Landing Platform Dock) and LHDs (Landing Helicopter Dock), and ramping up amphibious operations exercises. The lack of landing crafts and smaller landing ships, which many analysts believe are crucial to an invasion of Taiwan, may be because the PLAN assesses that its civilian lift fleet can remedy the lack of landing crafts. On several occasions, the PLAN has demonstrated the use of civilian vessels, particularly RORO (Roll-Off/Roll-On), in amphibious exercises  (Figs . 10 and 11). ( Fig. 10 ) A Chinese Type 99 MBT driving in the cargo hold of RORO vessel Zhong Hua Fu Xing  (IMO: 9849875) during an exercise. Source: CCTV. ( Fig. 11 ) Chinese RORO vessel Bang Chui Dao  (IMO: 9110781) recovering a PLAN ZTD-05 amphibious fighting vehicle during an exercise. Source: Marine Executive/CCTV. Notably, the stern ramp visible in the above image is not the original ramp the vessel was equipped with. Below is an image from 2014 (Fig . 12), showing  Bang Chui Dao ’s original stern ramp. This modification was likely made solely to support military operations, as the commercial use of such ramps is limited at best. ( Fig. 12 ) Bang Chui Dao ’s stern ramp in its original configuration (left ramp) during an exercise in 2014. Note that the large overhead pistons visible in fig. 11 are missing. Source: Jamestown Foundation/China Military Online. Bang Chui Dao ’s transformation suggests that the PLAN’s strategy to compensate for a lack of landing craft and smaller amphibious assault ships is to rely on its civilian fleet instead. The ability to deploy and recover amphibious assault vehicles classifies vessels such as the Bang Chui Dao as assets that can be utilised in the initial stage of a Taiwan invasion. Prior to the introduction of such ramps, many discussions around China’s decision to use civilian ships to compensate for the lack of landing crafts centred on the ship's inability to conduct amphibious assaults , as it cannot reach the shore and unload vehicles or troops. They are too large and their draughts are too deep to allow them to get to shore; they require a pier in which to dock and unload from there, similarly to what can be seen in fig . 12. Due to such shortcomings, the ships could only serve as logistical support after an initial wave is conducted, a (significant) beachhead established and a temporary harbour/pier structure built. Modifications such as the ramp seen on Bang Chui Dao overcome this limitation. Similar ships can now serve  as large landing crafts. These ships may still be unable to reach the shore, but they are not required to, as the modified ramp enables the deployment of amphibious vehicles, which can then reach the shore independently. This fleet was, in 2023, visually confirmed  to include at least 12 RORO ferries, ranging from 3.457 DWT to 11.288 DWT, and between 835 to 2.700 lane meters. This number of ferries is likely too low for a full-scale invasion of Taiwan, as it would put too much pressure on the individual ships, which would each provide Taiwan with a few high-value targets to focus on. Surely, in the event of an invasion with only these 12 ships, they will be heavily defended. Still, Taiwan would only need to hit a few for the first wave to suffer significant casualties without having even touched Taiwan’s territory. Nevertheless, Chinese ferry companies, such as the ferry division of state-owned giant COSCO Shipping, possess many more vessels, which, if needed, could likely be modified in a short period of time.  Consequences and Impact on the Global Economy Taiwan is home to around 24 million people, in an area (36.000 km²) smaller than the continental Netherlands (41.000 km²). With an urbanisation level of around 84%, the human cost of a potential invasion would be catastrophic. An invasion of Taiwan would also likely lead to a global economic recession. Maritime trade is by far the most essential transport sector; according to the World Trade Organization (WTO), shipping accounts  for more than 80% of the world's trade volume ( according  to EMSA, the European Maritime Safety Agency, this number is closer to 90%). Each year, maritime trade transports  more than $12 trillion in goods and energy. As with other forms of transport, any shipping company aims to use the shortest way to reach its destination to maximise profits. This, in turn, means that virtually all shipping companies will use the same routes, which will eventually pass through chokepoints such as the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal, the Strait of Hormuz, and a few others. The accessibility of these chokepoints is crucial for maintaining shipping profitability, and without them, the shipping sector would face significant cost increases and delays, which would heavily disrupt global trade.  In this group of chokepoints, the Taiwan Strait stands as one of the most crucial ones. In 2022 alone, the Taiwan Strait had an approximate $2,45 trillion in goods transit through it, accounting  for more than 20% of the global maritime trade. This transit would be disrupted to varying degrees by all the methods by which China aims to “reunify” Taiwan; these are conventionally divided into four separate plans . The first is a missile barrage on Taiwanese military, government and civilian targets, aiming to force Taipei to hand over power to Beijing. The second is a blockade of the Island, which would seek to block access to food and medicines until the humanitarian cost is deemed too high by Taipei, and power handed over to Beijing. The third campaign would be a direct attack on US forces stationed near Taiwan, aiming to temporarily hinder the US’ capability to come to Taiwan’s aid (should it choose to do so) in the initial stage of the conflict, thus improving the campaign’s success. The fourth campaign is the most destructive and entails a full-scale invasion of Taiwan with large-scale combined arms operations that would aim to subjugate Taiwan by force.  In all of these cases, maritime traffic in the Taiwan Strait would come to a standstill. Even a single stray missile landing close to -let alone hitting- a ship would be enough to skyrocket insurance premiums, making transit through the Strait unprofitable and temporarily halting trade through the Strait. The ease with which such chokepoints can be targeted, and traffic disrupted, has already been demonstrated by the Houthis from November 2023 through December 2024, and, most recently, in July 2025. In early 2024, following the hijack of MV Galaxy Leader (IMO: 9237307) and the subsequent Houthi attacks on shipping between November 2023 and December 2023,   traffic through the Suez Canal (and by extension the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait) decreased by 40%, with trade volume decreasing by 60% (Figs . 13 and 14) . ( Fig. 13 ) Traffic through the Suez Canal from January 2019 to July 2025. Notice the significant (±40%) drop in early 2024, following the first Houthi attacks against merchant vessels. Source: UN Global Platform/IMF Portwatch. ( Fig. 14 ) Trade volume levels that passed through the Suez Canal from January 2019 to July 2025. Notice the substantial (±60%) drop in early 2024, following the first Houthi attacks against merchant vessels. Source: UN Global Platform/IMF Portwatch. If the situation is particularly dire, as would be the case in a full-scale invasion, the Luzon Strait may also be deemed unsafe, meaning that vessels would have to reroute their navigation by thousands of miles (Fig . 15), which would drive up prices and put further strain on crews, vessels, and global logistics. This would put significant strain on countries such as Japan or South Korea. In the case of South Korea, 30% of imports and 23% of exports transited through the Strait, while for Japan, these numbers are even higher, with 32% and 25%, respectively. However, Taiwan will of course suffer the most. Trade in and out of Taiwanese ports will cease completely, halting the export of crucial goods, particularly integrated circuits (ICs), and the import of vital goods, ranging from agricultural products to pharmaceuticals.  (Fig. 16) Map showing how routes from Singapore (SG) to Busan (SK) would change if both the Taiwan Strait and the Luzon Strait were deemed unsafe, notice how the route goes around the Philippines, adding thousands of miles to the trip. Source: CSIS. Furthermore, the world will suffer with it; Taiwan’s IC industry is crucial to various end markets, including  smartphones, digital consumer electronics, high-performance computing, AI, and defence . As of Q1 2025, TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company), the largest contract IC foundry in the world, controlled 67% of market share by revenue (Fig . 16) . During the same period, the second largest foundry (Samsung) had a mere 8% of market share by revenue.  ( Fig. 16 ) Market Share of Global Top 10 Foundries by Revenue: 2022 Q1 - 2025 Q1. Note the dominance of TSMC growing over time. Source: Trendforce/Republic of China (Taiwan). Most notably, out of the 10 foundries shown in Fig. 15, four are Taiwanese, representing a combined market share of approximately 74% by revenue . Without Taiwanese ICs, many high-tech industries around the world would collapse unless a stopgap solution is found momentarily, as no other country can produce sub-10nm advanced ICs (7, 5, and 3nm) at scale—if at all—the same way Taiwanese foundries (especially TSMC) do . This solution is unlikely to be found in a timely manner. TSMC has a near monopoly on these chips because it has consistently invested the time, money, and expertise required over decades of development and production. Finding a replacement could take years, at best.  The shortage of ICs and advanced ICs on the market would have massive ripple effects in the global economy. Not to mention, during a hypothetical invasion of Taiwan, Chinese imports and exports will also likely suffer a significant decrease either due to sanctions on China (although the extent and efficacy of these sanctions depends on the willpower of the states imposing them, which, given China’s worldwide importance for trade, will be highly tested) and lack of logistical routes; the Taiwan Strait would still be a warzone and air and land trade originating from China simply cannot make up for the lack of shipping. War in Taiwan would be catastrophic, with some estimates  suggesting that it would wipe 10% off the global gross domestic product (GDP). Conclusion This report has examined the different factors that suggest China is preparing for a potential invasion of Taiwan. It has highlighted the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) rapid and unexpected development, while also noting its deficiencies, and laid out several ‘gray zone’ tactics implemented by Beijing. Although the report does not seek to predict a timeline or assign a likelihood to such an event, it emphasises the importance of closely monitoring these warning signs, especially in the context of political discourse, information warfare activities, ADIZ invasions, acts of sabotage, and recent military developments. Finally, the report discusses the importance of the Taiwanese economy and the Taiwan Strait for the global trade and economy, concluding that any conflict would have catastrophic consequences in both human and economic terms.  Sources Bloomberg. J. Welch, J. Leonard, M. Cousin, G. DiPippo, T. Orlik. “Xi, Biden and the $10 Trillion Cost of War Over Taiwan”. January 9, 2024. Link Center for Strategic & International Studies. M. P. Funaiole, B. Hart, D. Peng, B. Lin, J. 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Anthony. “China: Taiwan could face ‘use of force’ if independence-minded forces keep pushing”. August 7, 2002. Link State Council of the People’s Republic of China . State Council Information Office. “China’s National Defense in the New Era”. July 24, 2019. Link The Conversation. D. Murphy. “Is the United States overestimating China’s power?”.  The Jamestown Foundation. C. Kennedy. “Ramping the Strait: Quick and Dirty Solutions to Boost Amphibious Lift”. July 16, 2021. Link The Maritime Executive . Maritime Executive Staff. “China's 'Invasion Barge' Piers Can Receive Five Ro/Ros at a Time”. May 15, 2025. Link .  The Maritime Executive. C. Kennedy. “China is Preparing Merchant Ro-Ro Ferries for Amphibious Warfare”. March 30, 2023.  TrendForce.  TrendForce Staff. “Global Top 10 Foundries Set New Revenue Record, TSMC Leads in Advanced Process Nodes”. March 10, 2025. Link United Nations Trade and Development. “Review of Maritime Transport 2024”. 2024. 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Date:   09/07/2025 Where?  Red Sea; 51 NM off the coast of Hodeidah, Yemeni coast. What happened?  On 06/07/2025 , the MV Magic Seas   (IMO:9736169), a Greek-owned Liberian-flagged bulk carrier, was attacked by the Houthis,  marking the  first attack by Houthi militants on a commercial vessel this year . The ship suffered an attack 51 NM SW of Hodeidah, Yemen (approximately 14°20'59.8" N 42°20'04.9" E). The vessel was attacked by  small arms fire, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and Unmanned Surface Vessels (USVs) . According to the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), the vessel's Armed Security Team (AST) returned fire. The Company Security Officer confirmed to the UKMTO at 16:01 UTC+2 on 06/07/2025  that the vessel had been struck, resulting in a fire on board.  The Houthis claimed to have sunk MV Magic Seas , with Joshua Hutchinson, managing director of the maritime security firm Ambrey, confirming the sinking to Reuters after having received reports from a nearby vessel.  All MV   Magic Seas  crew members were reported safe by UKMTO and were rescued by a merchant vessel, arriving in Djibouti on the same day, as confirmed by Djibouti authorities. On 07/07/2025 , another bulk carrier, the Greek-operated Liberian-flagged Eternity C (IMO:9588249) , was attacked by the Houthis around the same area, 51 NM W of Hodeidah at 19:03 UTC+2. The initial attack was carried out with RPGs fired from speedboats, followed by explosive-laden (kamikaze) USVs. A subsequent attack at 09:10 UTC+2 on 08/07/2025 forced all 22 crew members to abandon ship and enter the water. A rescue mission commenced on 09/07/2025 , successfully recovering four crew members and one armed guard who had been in the water for over 24 hours as their lifeboat had been struck by gunfire and was inoperable. T he MV Eternity C  is also reported to have sunk. The vessel attack on MV Magic Seas  was followed almost immediately by Israeli strikes  on the cities of Hodeidah, Ras Isa, Salif and Ras Khatib power plant. Following these retaliatory attacks by Israel, the Houthis claimed missile and drone attacks on several sites inside Israel on 07/07/2025 , in response to Israeli airstrikes on the country. In a televised statement, Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree announced hypersonic ballistic missiles were launched at Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv, Ashdod Port, a power plant in the southern city of Ashkelon and eight drones were also launched at Eilat Port in southern Israel. Looking ahead The recent attacks by the Houthis on the MV Magic Seas and MV Eternity C , following a period of relative calm, suggest a resumption of their targeting campaign against vessels perceived to have Israeli affiliations. While it remains uncertain whether these incidents are isolated or mark the beginning of a renewed, wider campaign, recent Houthi statements have identified the Magic Seas vessel as fitting the profile of their intended targets, “belonging to a company that violated the entry ban to the ports of the occupied Palestine”.  The Houthis most recent statement on implementing a naval blockade on Israel’s Haifa was put forward on May 19 and the Houthis have not made any renewed threats particularly concerning the attack of Israeli-affiliated vessels since.  While Houthi activity in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait has paused since December 2024, this does not indicate a shift in their underlying intent.  As long as the conflict in Gaza continues, vessels with any perceived or actual links to Israel will remain at elevated risk in the Red Sea. Vessels transiting the Red Sea are therefore strongly advised to proceed with extreme caution and it is advised to monitor the situation closely. The consistent unpredictability of the security situation in the Red Sea has already led to a significant decline in shipping traffic, with around a 50% reduction from normal levels since the initial Houthi attacks in 2023. These latest attacks are unlikely to substantially alter existing shipping patterns, as operators have already adjusted to the heightened risk environment. However, the resumption of attacks suggests that the Red Sea will remain a high-risk area for the foreseeable future. If attacks persist, there could be long-term shifts in shipping routes and strategies, as companies seek to minimize exposure to the region.

Date: 08/07/2025 (13:00 GMT+2) Where?  Kenya; Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Nakuru, Kakamega and many more. The protests were reported in 17 of 47 counties. What happened?  On 07/07/2025 , Kenyans took to the streets in protest to commemorate the 35th anniversary of the historic Saba Saba — meaning "7/7" in Swahili — demonstrations of 07/07/1990, which sparked Kenya’s movement toward multiparty democracy under the authoritarian rule of President Daniel arap Moi. In anticipation of the protests,  the Kenyan police shut down major roads across the capital , Nairobi, and established checkpoints throughout the city and surrounding areas in the early hours of the day. Roads leading to key government sites — including the president's official residence, State House, and the Kenyan parliament — were sealed off with razor wire barricades. However, clashes still broke out in parts of Nairobi  as demonstrators lit fires and attempted to breach police cordons. Officers responded with tear gas and water cannons. Clashes also broke out in different parts of the country. Reports indicate that police used excessive force, including opening fire on demonstrators. At least 11 people were killed  during yesterday’s protests, with the death toll potentially rising. More than 550 others have been arrested.  Earlier, on 06/07/2025 , an armed gang attacked Kenya’s Human Rights Commission, just as it hosted a press conference organized by Kenya’s women's collective calling for an end to arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial killings. This attack was recorded on video . All of this is unfolding amid heightened tensions in Kenya. On 25/06/2025,  similar protests broke out following national outrage over the death of blogger Albert Ojwang in police custody, an incident that amplified public anger over police brutality, corruption, and growing authoritarianism under President Ruto. Led largely by young Kenyans, the Gen Z -protests reflect widespread frustration with systemic abuse, economic struggles, and fears about the erosion of Kenyan democracy. At least 19 people died that day. Conclusion In conclusion, the Saba Saba protests in Kenya are not an isolated phenomenon but rather a manifestation of deeper, long-standing frustrations  related to police brutality, economic inequality, corruption, and a perceived erosion of democratic freedoms. While the current wave of protests appears to have subsided for now, this calm is likely temporary. Previous protests erupted and spread quickly, and only needed a specific 'trigger'. These recent events highlight the increasing mistrust between citizens in Kenya and the state . Unless the government takes steps to address the root causes of discontent, Kenya risks entering a cycle of recurring unrest and social fragmentation.  Sustainable peace and stability will depend not on silencing dissent, but on solving the issues that fuel it. This is a small version of a more elaborate report. Want to read the full version? Contact info@dyami.services

Date: 03/07/2025 Location:   United States U.S. Department of Justice disrupts covert operation targeting U.S. Navy Overview On July 3, 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice unsealed charges against two individuals accused of acting as illegal agents of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), specifically working for the Ministry of State Security (MSS). This case represents another serious disruption of PRC covert intelligence operations inside the U.S., with a strong focus on U.S. military infiltration and espionage. Two defendants were charged; Yuance Chen, 38, who arrived in the U.S. on a visa in 2015 and became a lawful permanent resident, and a new arrival past spring, entering Texas; Liren "Ryan" Lai tasked with supervision of the clandestine espionage operation. Key intelligence and operational findings 1. Targeting U.S. Navy personnel The MSS network actively focused on collecting intelligence about U.S. Navy personnel and facilities. Their objectives included: Mapping Navy base structures and operations. Understanding job roles that offer access to classified or sensitive information. Identifying and cultivating potential insider recruits within specific naval occupations: Intelligence Specialists  – with access to classified threat assessments and tactical planning. Information Systems Technicians  – with access to Navy networks, communications, and cybersecurity infrastructure. Mass Communication Specialists  – able to gather internal narratives, media plans, and potentially manipulate messaging. 2. Use of social media for spotting and assessing MSS operatives used open-source intelligence (OSINT) techniques on platforms like LinkedIn, Instagram, Facebook, and potentially Discord or Reddit to: Identify military members with exploitable vulnerabilities. Initiate contact under false identities. Gauge loyalty, financial stress, or personal grievances as leverage for recruitment. 3. Video game platforms as covert communication channels Consistent with a known MSS tactic, online multiplayer video game platforms (e.g., Call of Duty, PUBG, or others with voice/text chat) were used for covert messaging. These environments provide: Anonymity and deniability. End-to-end encrypted communication via in-game chats. A pretext for pseudonymous, informal conversations that are harder to trace. 4. Use of “Dead Drops” for physical communication The suspects were directed to conduct physical dead drops, including: Leaving USB drives in public locations. Dropping off packages containing cash or documents at predetermined spots. Collecting materials from locations to avoid direct interaction. This technique highlights MSS's reliance on traditional spycraft even while using modern digital tools. Implications This indictment underscores the hybrid espionage model  employed by the MSS: combining traditional HUMINT techniques (recruitment, dead drops) with cyber-enabled and open-source targeting. It also: Reveals continued and systematic PRC interest in U.S. military infrastructure . Emphasizes the risk of social engineering and insider threats  from service members with critical roles. Demonstrates that China’s MSS is evolving : blending covert digital engagement with classic espionage tactics. Strategic insight for organizations (especially military, defense contractors, academia) Review social media exposure of personnel. Train employees on foreign recruitment tactics , especially those who travel, game online, or are active on social platforms. Reinforce insider threat detection mechanisms . Monitor suspicious engagement or contact patterns, including unsolicited inquiries related to defense work. At Dyami | Security Intelligence , we work closely with a wide range of partners to raise awareness among businesses and government agencies about these threats, and to help them build resilience against espionage and unwanted interference — including through our subscription-based intelligence briefings . Through Dyami | Academy , we also offer the training course “The World of Espionage”  — an interactive awareness program that immerses professionals in the methods, motives, and risks of intelligence activities, with a focus on the defence, dual-use, and critical infrastructure sectors. Want to bring this topic to the forefront within your organization? Get in touch with us. Count on us to keep you one step ahead.

Written by Arianna Luca While just a few years ago Ecuador was a regular stop in most tourists’ itineraries and considered  to be a “haven for peace and stability in the region”, over the last couple of years an unprecedented wave of gang violence has turned the country into one of the most violent  in Latin America. Ecuador’s recent surge of unrest can be traced back to different causes. A series of internal political choices, and the implementation of stricter measures and controls in the bordering countries have indirectly created a fertile ground for the growth of the drug trade, turning Ecuador into a strategic transit hub for cocaine . A critical economic situation, aggravated by the Covid-19 pandemic, has impacted marginalized communities, increasing the levels of poverty, which has brought many young people closer to criminal activities. Stricter controls and measures implemented in other countries brought a shift in criminal routes and found a fertile ground in Ecuador. In addition, the government lacks a long term strategy to control the economic crisis and current social turmoil, beyond the promise to defeat gangs.   Ecuador's President Daniel Noboa has focused his approach on empowering the military, which has generated high approval among the Ecuadorian population alarmed by violence and instability, in the short-term. Extreme militarization has been a common response to security threats in the history of Latin America. However, whenever governments have responded to organized crime with violence, they have often generated a cycle of violence and repression . The examples of Mexico, Honduras, and El Salvador have shown that militarization is mostly impacting civilians, leading to violence being used against innocent citizens and for easy arrests, not improving security in the long term. Ecuador is likely to follow this path, too. Crime rates are increasing and gangs are still far from defeated, and public support is slowly going down. While the state of emergency ended last April 8, President Noboa maintained a state of “ internal armed conflict ”. The security situation of the country is still critical, and Ecuador's armed forces will continue carrying out joint anti-crime operations with the police.  President Noboa’s government is going through a critical moment, worsened by the recent raid of the Ecuadorian police to the Mexican embassy in Ecuador, which led to a break of diplomatic ties between the two states. On April 21, 2024 the Ecuadorian population will vote in a referendum on tightening security measures , toughening prison sentences, and enshrining the use of the military for domestic security into law. The outcome will be important to understand the support for and influence of Noboa’s presidency in the country and his fight against gang-related crime and violence.  The cocaine market   Ecuador’s crisis is inextricably tied to the cocaine market . Historically, the country has managed to be shielded from the region’s crime and drug-related dynamics, despite its proximity to two leading producers and exporters of cocaine, Colombia and Peru. However, over time, the accumulation of different factors, internal and external, has turned Ecuador into an important actor  in the drug trade.  Internally , a rise of inequality and poverty in 2016, after a strong earthquake, forced the government to cut costs. Several institutions were eliminated, including the Justice Ministry, and the authorities’ control over the country fell drastically. President Correa’s administration (2007-2017) took some crime-reduction initiatives that turned out to have a counterproductive effect, like dismantling an American naval base, leaving ports poorly guarded, and the construction of mega-prisons, the expansion of which is going to be discussed in the coming referendum. This measure led to overcrowding and inmates being housed according to their gang membership, turning prisons into focal points for criminal organizations. Functioning as centers for networking between criminals, they have facilitated gang organization and the forming of alliances with other drug-trafficking organizations, like Mexican cartels and the Albanian mafia. Gang leaders started conducting their businesses from behind bars, and   have infiltrated many organs of the government. Finally, the Covid-19 pandemic left many young people jobless, making them ideal recruits for gangs surging in power and influence. External factors  involved a tightening of policies and controls against drug trafficking in neighboring countries  which turned transnational criminal groups to Ecuador’s poorly controlled ports. As a result, Ecuador’s precarious social and economic situation, its dollarized economy, strategic location, and poor coastline protection made Ecuador the ideal place to work as a   transit point for international drug cartels.  Today, 70%  of the cocaine that arrives in Europe (with the main destination ports being Rotterdam and Antwerp) departs from Ecuador, capitalizing on the scarcity of port controls after Covid, and the start of conflict between Russia and Ukraine.  The current spike of violence  Last January, two events caught global attention. Authorities reported the prison escape  of one of the most powerful narco bosses and leader of Ecuador’s leading drug-trafficking gang Los Choneros. Shortly after, members of a gang, wearing balaclavas and firing shots, took control of a television station  during a live broadcast, helding members of the staff and journalists hostage.  After these events Noboa declared Ecuador to be in a state of war . His announced “Phoenix Plan” to allow the government of “new Ecuador” to combat crime and violence focuses on increased power and authority to the military. As part of this plan, the government has given complete immunity to all police forces, and deployed tens of thousands members to combat the “internal armed conflict”. However, the gangs also declared war when the government announced a state of emergency, and the security forces’ aggressive actions have inspired equally aggressive responses by Ecuadorian gangs, which have escalated to kidnappings of law enforcement offices and attacks to police stations.  Moreover, police repressive counter measures have been criticized by human rights groups, warning that loosening ties to the police authorization to arrest people is mostly affecting innocent civilians . It is also opening the doors to easy profiling and making arrests based on poor evidence, deteriorating the population’s democratic civil liberties , and weakening state  institutions' reliability .  Noboa’s strategy resembles the approach of El Salvador’s president Nayib Bukele . The Ecuadorian President’s admiration is addressed particularly at Bukele’s implementation of a massive prison model. Bukele’s campaign of mass arrests have made him domestically popular, but he was heavily criticized for the widespread human rights abuses . However, unlike El Salvador, Ecuador’s gangs exist within a network of international cartels and ex-Colombian guerrillas that are better armed, richer and more powerful than the gangs in El Salvador, and they are connected to the cocaine trade.  What’s at stake One of the major long-term consequences of this widespread is the risk of deterioration of the country’s democracy . The raid of the Mexican embassy carried out by the Ecuadorian security forces last April 5 was a first instance. Ecuador’s government forced its way into the facility to arrest former Vice President Jorge Glas, who is wanted for corruption charges, and had sought refuge in the embassy since last year. Mexico has now cut diplomatic ties with Ecuador , and asked for the cancellation of Ecuador’s membership from the UN. The Community of Latin American and Caribbean states (Celac) has expressed support for Mexico, together with the Organization of American States (OAS). Moreover, Venezuela has closed its embassy in Ecuador, and Honduras has recalled its senior diplomat in Ecuador. The Colombian government denounced the actions and filed a suit with the International Commission on Human Rights. Despite the widespread criticism of his actions, President Noboa said he had no regrets over his actions.  However, a possible breakdown in relations with key regional partners may have repercussions for Ecuador’s security. Strained ties with Colombia, the source country for the cocaine trade trafficked through Ecuador, could severely hinder Ecuador’s ability to monitor cocaine flows and counter the criminal networks of both countries. In the same way, a rupture with Mexico could have severe repercussions for security cooperation, considering the importance and role of Mexican drug trafficking organizations in Ecuador. For now, Mexican President López Obrador has dismissed Noboa’s invitation to meet for a talk, indicating that a meeting is unlikely going to happen in the near future.  Conclusion  The recent escalation of violence in Ecuador is the outcome of a crisis caused by different intertwined factors. Ecuador’s government has been fighting back, increasing the militarization of Ecuador’s law enforcement forces. However, this might not be enough to address the systemic issues that have allowed the empowering of gangs. Moreover, Noboa’s recent diplomatic crisis with Mexico has alienated key security partners of the country. There is uncertainty over the outcome of the coming referendum to tighten security measures, and Noboa now has to weigh his political moves and decisions, as they will determine his political support and the security and stability of the country.

Areas of major targeting between Israel and Iran from June 12 to June 24, 2025 Date: 02/07/2025 Introduction: A Turning Point for Regional Stability Following Israeli and US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities during the most significant confrontation between the countries to date, from 13 to 24 June 2025, Iran’s legislative body, the Majlis, approved a motion to cease cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The decision was swiftly ratified by the Supreme National Security Council, formally ending the limited international oversight that had remained under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) framework. This development marks a pivotal shift in the region’s security landscape, as it removes a key mechanism for independent verification and transparency. While Iranian officials maintain that the country’s nuclear programme remains peaceful, the absence of even minimal monitoring has raised concern among some observers that, under certain conditions, Iran could acquire the technical capacity to develop nuclear weapons. The end of IAEA access increases the likelihood of strategic misperceptions and significantly limits the international community’s ability to assess Iran’s nuclear trajectory. This growing uncertainty may prompt preemptive or preventive actions by states such as Israel or the United States, both of which have previously responded assertively to suspected proliferation threats. It may also trigger broader regional shifts, encouraging countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey to reconsider their nuclear postures in an evolving security environment. While the long-term consequences will be examined in more detail later in this paper, the immediate concern lies in the potential for renewed conflict, not necessarily triggered by confirmed actions, but by a climate of opacity, mistrust and rising strategic pressure. To read the full report, contact info@dyami.services

Date: 02/07/2025 Location:   Goma, North Kivu Province, DRC; Nyabibwe, South Kivu Province, DRC; Kalehe, South Kivu Province, DRC; Bukavu, South Kivu Province, DRC. Kinshasa, Kinshasa Province, DRC. Bunia, Ituri, DRC. Historic context: On 28/01/2025, the Mouvement du 23 mars (March 23 movement; M23) seized Goma, one of Congo’s biggest cities in the east with a population of more than 2 million, and large swaths of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) North and South Kivu provinces in a lightning offensive.  Since then, M23 has been asserting control in Congo’s east, fighting the Congolese army and allied militias. Thousands were killed, including civilians, and many more were displaced.  This latest outbreak of hostilities is part of a conflict that has persisted for 30 years. Millions of Hutus fled to Congo to escape potential retribution after the Tutsi forces, led by Paul Kagame, seized control of Rwanda following the 1994 Rwandan genocide. In Congo, these Hutu refugees formed new militias, including the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR). The Congolese government has consistently accused Rwanda of supporting the M23 rebel group. Despite UN experts saying that Rwanda exercises direct control over the rebels, Kigali vehemently denies these claims. In response, the Congolese government cut diplomatic ties with Rwanda following M23’s offensive in January. There are official Rwandan soldiers in the DRC, however, Rwanda insists that this contingent, estimated to be between 7.000 and 12.000 men strong, is there for self-defence purposes: to protect the country against Hutu militias with roots in the 1994 genocide.  What happened: Despite decades of hostilities, the DRC and Rwanda signed a US-brokered peace agreement on 28/06/2025 in Washington DC.  The critical parts outline respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity , and sources reported that one of the conditions is that  Rwanda must withdraw its troops from the DRC within 90 days . This will be monitored by an international mechanism. Aside from that, the agreement calls for the disengagement, disarmament and conditional integration of non-state groups, including M23,  operating in the DRC. Both countries also commit to ceasing support for armed groups on each other’s territory. The DRC is also expected to conclude military operations against the FDLR within the same 90-day period in which Rwanda is expected to retreat from Congo.  Another key part of this deal is the economic dimension. The ‘economic integration plan’, intended to formalize and secure mineral trade in the region and, therefore, attract significant Western investment. This plan is still being finalized, however, and exact details are not yet clear.  Analysis The peace agreement between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo is a crucial step in the right direction for a conflict that has been going on since the 1990s, with hundreds of thousands of people displaced as a consequence. Its success, however, remains to be seen. A few factors stand in the way. The biggest hurdle by far is that the peace deal is made on the state level, and it remains to be seen to what extent the non-state groups fighting this conflict will adhere to its terms. There will need to be incentives for them to do so. This, of course, counts for the militias fighting on the DRC’s government’s side, but mostly for the M23 and their aligned smaller militias. M23, and not Rwanda, occupies most of the territory in the eastern DRC, and it was not present at the negotiations; instead, separate negotiations are being conducted between the DRC and M23, mediated by Qatar. At the time of writing, it is not yet clear where that will go, however, it is clear that these two ‘parallel’ peace talks need to be brought to fruition in order to avoid a situation in which one peace deal torpedoes the other.  Moreover, despite the pledge to 'stop supporting armed groups on each other’s territory,' Rwanda has never officially acknowledged its support for M23. There remains a possibility that such support could continue under the cover of plausible deniability. Thus, it can be concluded that this peace deal is a positive development in light of the 30 years of tensions in the region, but the outcome of the parallel DRC-M23 negotiations appears to be just as important . It is still too early to celebrate. If both sides truly uphold the agreement by withdrawing their proxies, ending support for armed groups, and formalizing the mineral trade, whose illicit networks have long fueled regional tensions, this could mark the beginning of reduced violence and better living conditions, potentially driven by increased Western investment. However, without strong monitoring and sustained economic incentives, the deal risks falling apart. A key part of understanding this peace deal is examining the broader geopolitical context.  At its core, the agreement ties into the United States’ broader goal of securing stable access to critical minerals  like cobalt and lithium, essential for high-tech industries. By formalizing the mineral trade and encouraging transparency, the deal aims to create better conditions for US and European companies to operate. At the same time, it reflects Washington’s effort to strengthen its foothold in Africa and counter China’s longstanding dominance in Congo’s mining sector . The hope is that by attracting more Western investment and deepening economic ties, the deal will not only secure vital resources but also shift the regional power dynamics, thereby reducing China’s grip on Africa’s valuable mineral wealth. Conclusion The peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda is a positive development after months of intense fighting, but whether it will actually hold remains uncertain. One of the main challenges is that the deal was struck at the state level,  while the recent flare-ups in eastern DRC haven’t directly involved the states themselves, even though Rwanda is widely accused of backing and influencing the M23 rebels. Separate negotiations between M23 and the Congolese government are still ongoing, and there’s hope that whatever is agreed upon will not undermine the broader deal reached between Kigali and Kinshasa in Washington. A major, though still vaguely defined, component of this deal is its economic aspect.  What’s especially noteworthy is its geopolitical significance. It signals Washington’s strategic use of economic incentives—not just to secure critical minerals like cobalt and lithium, but also to reassert its presence in Africa after years of losing ground to China . The goal is clear: by encouraging Western investment and deeper economic ties, the U.S. hopes to loosen China’s grip on Africa’s mineral wealth. Dyami Services Security is not a luxury but a necessity. With Dyami Security Intelligence as a Service, you gain a proactive, flexible, and affordable solution to manage risks, monitor geopolitical threats, and respond immediately to crises. Why subscribe to security? ✅ Resilient business operations in today’s world✅ We act as your security department and Geopolitical Risk Officer✅ Direct access to security expertise without high costs✅ Prevent crises with up-to-date threat intelligence✅ Scalable subscription plans✅ Access to our unique global network Want to know how this protects your organization? Request a free consultation! Subscription options Dyami Security as a Service: a flexible security subscription that keeps your organization protected at all times, without the need for costly internal capacity.

Date:   27/06/2025 Where?  Togo: Lomé What happened?  On 05/05/2025 , Faure Gnassingbé, previously President of the Republic, was sworn in as President of the Council of Ministers, the country’s de facto most senior role. He received the title without official term limits, enabling him to be re-elected by parliament indefinitely.   On 26/05/2025 , a popular rapper and government critic, Tchala Essowè Narcisse (stage name: Aamron), was arrested after having posted a satirical video on TikTok calling for protest mobilisation ahead of Gnassingbé’s birthday on 6 June. His arrest, which was carried out without a warrant, sparked public outrage.  On 05/06/2025  and 06/06/2025 , large anti-government protests erupted in Lomé following this arrest , despite a ban on protests imposed since 2022 after a deadly market attack in the city. Demonstrators denounced constitutional changes, rising electricity prices implemented at the start of May , and the arrests of dissenters. Security forces used tear gas and batons to disperse crowds, and dozens of protesters were arrested.  Some of the arrested demonstrators were released in the week following the protests, showing signs of torture or other forms of ill-treatment. This was followed by the release of Aamron from a psychiatric facility, where he was sent after his arrest. On 16/06/2025 , Togo’s regulatory High Authority for Audiovisual and Communication (HAAC) suspended Radio France Internationale (RFI) and France 24, restricting independent media coverage of the current situation in Togo . A journalist from the French public broadcaster TV5 was also reportedly detained without charge for several hours at a police station, whilst footage she had filmed at a rally during her detention was deleted. On 26/06/2025 , renewed protests emerged after protest organisation ‘Hands Of My Constitution’ called for three days of gatherings, which were quickly dispersed by soldiers after the first day. Military personnel used tear gas and batons to disperse protesters who blocked the main roads in Lomé. Videos of soldiers severely beating up protesters have emerged online. In the suburbs of the capital, some protesters were seen burning wooden furniture and tyres used for makeshift barricades. Many shops in the city remained closed as clashes continued into the afternoon.  Protesters have been demanding political reforms, an end to police brutality, including the release of all detainees from the previous protest earlier in June, and improvements in living conditions amid worsening economic hardship and rising electricity costs. Analysis Togo's 2024 constitutional reforms sparked more protests in the latter half of last year, following years of protest against the dynastic rule of the Gnassingbes. These reforms eliminated the direct popular vote for President of the Council of Ministers, instead granting parliament the sole power to elect the leader. Consequently, the presidential election on May 3, 2025, through which Gnassingbé secured his new role, was in effect an indirect vote by the National Assembly rather than a popular vote. The President of the Republic, elected by parliament for a four-year term, has become a largely ceremonial figure with limited powers, following the constitutional changes. Real executive authority now lies with the President of the Council of Ministers, who leads both the government and the armed forces. This makes the President of the Council of Ministers effectively the highest power in the state’s executive branch. The role is renewable with a six-year term, dependent on parliamentary support, rather than fixed-term limits. This effectively means there are no term limits.  With Faure Gnassingbé having been in power since 2005, following his father's long rule that began in 1967, the Togolese population is unhappy about the continuation of what many perceive as an entrenched family dynasty, fearing the erosion of democratic principles and the perpetuation of authoritarian rule under the guise of constitutional reform . Demonstrators are therefore calling for Gnassingbé's resignation. Faure Gnassingbé has pledged to strengthen democracy; however, his actions seem to confirm the opposite. The hard suppression of previous protests and the government's refusal to engage or respond to inquiries about the military actions during these protests has further fueled tensions.  Press freedom is also under attack, with the reported detention of a TV5 journalist and the three month suspension of French international broadcasters RFI and France 24 for an alleged lack of impartiality in their coverage of the protests.  The economic grievances behind the current protests in Togo are closely linked to a worsening cost-of-living crisis, with the recent hike in electricity prices acting as a key trigger. Many protesters, especially unemployed youth, express frustration over rising basic expenses that strain already precarious livelihoods The demonstrations against the Gnassingbé family's dynastic rule are expected to persist in Lomé and potentially intensify. While the military has adhered to government directives thus far, these circumstances create a fertile ground for a future coup. The government's forceful tactics—including tear gas, arrests, and alleged detainee mistreatment—have fueled rather than suppressed dissent, especially among unemployed youth struggling with deteriorating economic conditions. Conclusion The constitutional reforms have deepened the political crisis in Togo by institutionalizing indefinite rule under Faure Gnassingbé, provoking sustained youth-led protests and widespread dissatisfaction. The government’s repressive tactics may suppress protests temporarily, but will likely exacerbate tensions. Although an immediate coup seems unlikely given the military’s current stance, the potential for a sudden political rupture remains if the crisis persists without reform. The situation demands close monitoring as Togo navigates a fragile transition marked by contested power and popular unrest. For visitors, heightened vigilance is advised, especially in urban centres where protests are more likely to occur. Avoid large gatherings and demonstrations, as they can quickly turn confrontational. Stay informed on local news and government advisories, and be aware of potential disruptions to transport and services. Consider consulting with your embassy or consulate for specific safety recommendations before and during your stay.

Date:   27/06/2025  Where:  Middle East, particularly Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE Who’s involved: Israel, Iran, United States Key developments No exchange of attacks between Israel and Iran took place between 25 and 26 June,  suggesting armed confrontation between them has subsided.  Airspace over eastern Iran has been officially opened for commercial flights , although the western part of the country remains closed. Iran’s Guardian Council ratified a bill by parliament suspending the country’s cooperation with the IAEA,  stating the reason as US and Israeli attacks on its nuclear facilities.  Israel reopened its airspace on 24 June, and airports continue to operate . Repatriation flights are underway, and travel restrictions have been lifted. National carriers have resumed operations, though most foreign airlines are extending flight suspensions through summer.  Airspace in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Qatar and the broader Middle East remains open. No serious maritime security threats have been identified in the Middle East , and shipping lanes remain operational at standard capacity. GNSS interference over the Persian Gulf, especially near the UAE coastline and around the Strait of Hormuz, appears to have decreased.  Although risks are getting lower with each passing day the ceasefire holds,  the situation still remains uncertain at the time of writing. All non-essential operations (ground and overflight) to the affected areas, including Israel, Iraq, Syria and Iran, should be avoided. Context The Iran-Israel conflict that erupted on 13 June with Israeli strikes on Iranian military and leadership targets quickly escalated into one of the most serious confrontations between the two countries, prompting Iranian retaliation with UAVs, ballistic and hypersonic missiles, drone swarms and energy infrastructure attacks that caused over 500 casualties, including civilians. Israeli airstrikes, conducted with US and some European support, reached deep into Iran, while China, Russia and several Gulf states condemned the attacks. Following a US strike on Iranian nuclear facilities on 22 June and Iran’s retaliatory attack on Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar on 23 June, a ceasefire was announced by President Trump on 24 June. No further exchanges occurred on June 25 or 26, suggesting that hostilities have paused. Israel reopened its airspace on June 24, and airports are fully operational, with repatriation flights ongoing. However, most foreign airlines are maintaining suspensions through the summer. Iranian airspace remains largely closed, except for the east, while airspace over Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Qatar, and the broader region remains open. Iran’s Guardian Council ratified a bill suspending cooperation with the IAEA in response to the strikes, raising the risk of renewed escalation. Maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al Mandab continues at normal capacity, and GNSS interference in the Persian Gulf, particularly near the UAE and the Strait of Hormuz, appears to have decreased. Looking ahead Iran’s Supreme National Security Council recently ratified a decision to halt cooperation with the IAEA, raising the risk of retaliatory strikes by the US or Israel. While a fragile ceasefire between Iran and Israel has enabled the reopening of airspace across much of the Middle East, including over Israel, Iran (excluding parts of the west), Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the UAE, tensions remain high. Airlines are still navigating the aftermath of the 12-day conflict, facing elevated operational costs and complex evacuation planning. Though the US claims to have “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, uncertainty persist on the true efficacy of US strikes, with doubts over the destruction of Iran’s stock of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and reports that the Iranian authorities had moved it to unknown sites before the first strikes by Israel, questions also persist on the damage to nuclear centrifuges which some US intelligence officials believe are still “largely intact”. These reports would suggest that the strikes only delayed the program a few months. If this is the case, the attacks have likely pushed Tehran to accelerate the production of nuclear weapons, with Israeli officials indicating military action could resume. Maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al Mandab remains active but vulnerable to Houthi strikes, Iranian interference and GNSS disruption. Without meaningful diplomatic progress, the region faces a heightened risk of renewed conflict and a broader arms race in the coming weeks.

Date:   26/06/2025  Where:  Armenia Who’s involved: Armenian government, opposition groups, Armenian church What happened? On 25 June , in an unprecedented move, Armenia’s government detained at least 14 opposition figures , adding to around 15 detained on 20 June. Detainees include church officials, businessmen, civic activists, and MPs from the exiled parliament of Nagorno-Karabakh, among them two women. Authorities allege the opposition aimed to launch a coup  through sabotage, arson and bombings, claims many see as politically motivated. The arrested include Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, a growing symbol of popular resistance following years of military defeats and widespread corruption throughout the country. Among those arrested are leaders tied to the Armenian Church and local opposition figures, including ethnic Armenians from Nagorno Karabakh’s political structures, now increasingly marginalized by prime minister Nikol Pashinyan's administration. The arrests coincided with Pashinyan’s first official visit to Turkey on 20 June, seen as part of his strategy to secure Ankara’s backing and satisfy preconditions for peace allegedly tied to Turkish and Azerbaijani demands. Relations with Russia have deteriorated, while the US and EU have remained largely disengaged , offering only symbolic statements amid more pressing global concerns like Ukraine, Israel and Iran, and energy security.  Analysis Since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and the region’s final fall to Azeri troops in 2023, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has implemented a broad realignment of Armenia’s domestic and foreign policy. Viewed as a democratic reformer when coming to power in 2018, he now exercises consolidated control over the security apparatus, judiciary and legislature , enabling the suppression of dissent and further centralization of power. He has publicly indicated direct involvement in judicial and other functions beyond the executive’s traditional remit. Under his leadership, Armenia has distanced itself from historic partners such as Russia and the diaspora, while drawing closer to Ankara and Baku , after attempts to forge strong ties with Washington and the EU.  Both Turkey and Azerbaijan are reportedly pressing for extensive concessions in peace negotiations , including constitutional amendments, the return of 300,000 ethnic Azeris and an unsupervised extraterritorial corridor through Armenia’s south to connect mainland Azerbaijan to the Nakhichevan exclave and Turkey, terms widely regarded as compromising Armenian sovereignty. Analysts assess that such a settlement would signal a major geopolitical shift, prioritizing regime stability and electoral positioning ahead of the 2026 elections, over strategic autonomy. Prime Minister Pashinyan has recently adopted rhetoric and policies that increasingly align with long-standing Turkish and Azerbaijani objectives . These include efforts to marginalize the diaspora, assert control over the Armenian Apostolic Church, moderate official references to the Armenian Genocide, deny entry to pro-Armenian foreign figures, and revoke the citizenship of displaced Karabakhi Armenians following the 2023 loss of Nagorno-Karabakh. Such measures mark a clear shift from prior state policy and have raised concerns about democratic erosion and the consolidation of executive power.  The arrests of opposition figures, clergy and members of the exiled Karabakhi leadership, alongside pressure on the head of the Church, are viewed by some as part of a broader attempt to reconfigure Armenia’s political identity in line with external regional priorities. On 18 June, Armenian-Russian businessman Samvel Karapetyan was detained after expressing support for the Church. Shortly thereafter, Pashinyan announced plans to amend legislation to allow the nationalization of Karapetyan’s company, Electric Networks of Armenia, while issuing indirect warnings to employees reportedly considering protest participation. Approximately 15 opposition figures were arrested on 20 June, followed by at least 14 more on 25 June including another businessman and clergy members, all accused of plotting to overthrow the government, while on 26 June, a court case was opened against another popular archbishop and government critic, with the same charges.  The establishment of a new interior ministry from the former police structure, increased pay for security personnel, relaxed recruitment standards, and a visibly expanded police presence in Yerevan indicate a tightening of domestic security measures. Although demonstrations remain modest in scale, they are regularly met with heavily mobilized police forces tasked with containment and control. Collectively, these developments suggest a broader trend toward increasing domestic authoritarianism . Looking ahead Armenia’s domestic and foreign policy direction appears to be becoming more authoritarian and strategically aligned with Ankara and Baku. With limited institutional oversight, a marginalized opposition and reduced civil society presence, Prime Minister Pashinyan is positioned to further consolidate control ahead of the 2026 elections. Since 20 June, approximately 30 opposition figures have been detained, in addition to around a dozen already political prisoners, according to remaining civil society groups. This is so far the largest crackdown on opposition seen in the country since independence in 1991. The absence of effective institutional checks may contribute to a political environment that is less predictable for both domestic actors and international partners. These developments present growing concerns for foreign businesses operating in Armenia. The arrest of and harassment of prominent business figures and government signals regarding potential nationalization reflect a deteriorating climate in terms of freedom of movement, speech and investment. The gradual expansion of security forces, the appointment of politically loyal figures to senior positions and lowered recruitment standards indicate an increased focus on internal control. At the same time, public discontent appears to be rising, and may be met with harsher government crackdowns, raising further questions about the country’s political stability. The risk of renewed conflict with Azerbaijan remains unresolved, with no clear mechanisms for de-escalation. While Armenia’s limited air corridor is unlikely to face major disruption in the event of renewed hostilities, presumed to be short and geographically confined to the south, persistent uncertainty may affect investor confidence and the broader business environment in the months ahead. 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Date:   26/06/2025  Where:  Middle East, particularly Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE Who’s involved: Israel, Iran, United States Key developments No  exchange of attacks between Israel and Iran took place between 25 and 26 June,  suggesting armed confrontation between them has subsided.  Airspace over eastern Iran has opened for commercial flights , although the west of the country continues to be closed. Israel reopened its airspace on 24 June, with airports now operating at full capacity. Repatriation flights are in progress, and restrictions on inbound and outbound travel have been lifted. While national carriers have resumed operations, most foreign airlines have extended their flight suspensions through the summer. Airspace in Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Qatar and the broader Middle East remains open. No Houthi attacks on maritime vessels have been reported in the past 24 hours. Despite speculation about a possible closure of the Strait of Hormuz, maritime traffic through both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab remains largely unaffected . However, GPS jamming persists in the Persian Gulf, especially near the UAE coastline and around the Strait of Hormuz. The US aircraft carriers USS Nimitz  and USS Carl Vinson  remain deployed in the Middle East, supported by at least two guided-missile destroyers in the Red Sea and five in the eastern Mediterranean. In total, more than a dozen US warships are operating in the region, along with approximately 100 aircraft stationed on the carriers. Although risks are getting lower with each day the ceasefire holds, the situation still remains uncertain at the time of writing. All non-essential operations (ground and overflight) to the affected areas, including Israel, Iraq, Syria and Iran should be avoided. Context The recent Iran-Israel conflict, which erupted on 13 June with Israeli strikes on Iranian military and leadership targets, quickly escalated into one of the most dangerous confrontations between the two countries. Iran responded with UAVs, ballistic and hypersonic missiles, drones and attacks on energy infrastructure, resulting in over 500 casualties, including civilians. Israeli air operations penetrated deep into Iran via regional airspace, drawing support from the US and some European nations, while others, such as China, Russia, and several Gulf states, condemned the attacks. Following a US strike on Iranian nuclear facilities on 22 June, and Iran’s retaliatory attack on Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar on 23 June, a ceasefire was brokered by former President Trump and announced on 24 June. Although Israel reportedly launched a final strike just before the truce took effect, major hostilities have since paused. As of 26 June, airspace over Israel, Jordan, Syria and Iraq has reopened, though many foreign carriers continue with flight suspensions into Israel. Iranian airspace is still mostly restricted, with only eastern regions partially open. Maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab remains active despite ongoing GPS jamming near the Strait. Meanwhile, regional tensions remain high amid a significant military build-up, unresolved questions around Iran’s nuclear program, and continued disruption to civilian air travel. Looking ahead The ceasefire between Iran and Israel has created a narrow opening for de-escalation, prompting the reopening of regional airspace across much of the Middle East, including over Israel, Iran (with the exception of parts of the west), Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE. Airlines are still adjusting to the aftermath of the 10-day conflict, facing elevated operational costs and challenges in coordinating potential evacuation efforts. Although the US claims to have inflicted damage on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, concerns persist that Tehran may continue pursuing a nuclear deterrent. Israeli officials have signaled that military action could resume, putting the fragile ceasefire at risk. Meanwhile, maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab remains active but exposed to potential Houthi attacks and Iranian disruption, with ongoing GPS jamming in the area. In the absence of meaningful diplomatic progress, the region remains at high risk of renewed conflict and a broader arms race in the weeks ahead.