Beijing’s Reach: How China Prepares for War

Gregorio Albini

Introduction

For decades, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has maintained its claim over the Republic of China (Taiwan), vowing to take control of the island. During the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises, in 1954 and 1958, Chinese forces shelled the Taiwanese island territories, with the two confrontations ending essentially due to the threat of direct US intervention. In the 1996 crisis, China again escalated tensions by launching several missiles in the waters surrounding Taiwan, before eventually backing down and de-escalating the situation. In recent years, China's stance toward Taiwan has become markedly more assertive, particularly following the election of incumbent President Lai Ching-te, a staunch advocate for Taiwanese independence. This increasing pressure, marked by harassment and destabilization campaigns through gray zone tactics, culminates in a pressing question: Will China invade Taiwan? 

While important, this question falls beyond the scope of this document. To avoid excessive speculation, this report does not aim to predict whether an invasion will occur. Instead, it provides an overview of current China-Taiwan tensions and examines the various indicators suggesting that China may be preparing for an invasion of Taiwan. This report will also briefly explore how an invasion of Taiwan may affect global trade. In particular, it will focus on the extent to which Taiwanese exports, especially within its semiconductor industry,  are crucial to high-tech industries in the developed and developing world. 

Indicators

Political Discourse and ADIZ Violations

China has long been vocal about its will for “reunification” or “Liberation of Taiwan”: effectively, the takeover of Taiwan by any means necessary, peaceful or otherwise. On March 5, 2025, during the opening meeting of the National People's Congress, Li Qiang, China’s Premier, said that China “would firmly advance the push for reunification with Taiwan while opposing external interference”. On a separate occasion, Victor Gao, a former diplomat that Foreign Policy once regarded as an influential US-China interlocutor and vice-president of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG) think-tank, stated that “No one. . .will be able to block the peaceful reunification of China, or the non-peaceful reunification of China”. A similar statement was made in 2021 by the then-Chinese Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Le Yucheng, who stated that the “reunification” will “not be stopped by anyone or any force”, adding that while peaceful unification is the preferred option, “no option is excluded”. These talking points were confirmed by Xi Jinping in his 2025 New Year’s address to the nation, in which he reiterates that the “complete reunification of our motherland is an unshakable mission”. 

China’s actions extend well beyond rhetoric, and in recent years, Beijing has resorted to increasingly aggressive gray zone tactics. In this regard, the Chinese violations of Taiwan’s de facto Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) are so frequent that they can be considered the status quo. Regarding the ADIZ, in May 2025, the total number of violations recorded in the de facto ADIZ (Fig. 1) reached 339, averaging approximately 11 violations per day. Although the record high remains August 2022, with 437 incursions, the 2025 monthly average has exceeded previous years. From March 1 to May 31, 2024, Taiwan experienced an average of 195 monthly violations; during the same period in 2025, that figure rose to 338, a 73% increase. This upward trend has been regularly observed since September 2020 (Fig. 2). These gray zone tactics may also be a way to provoke a military response, such as an attempt to intercept Chinese aircraft, providing Beijing with a pretext to escalate further. Overall, the incursions show that, unlike the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, China is now much more confident in its military capabilities. 

This confidence is not unfounded; the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), which would be conducting most of the heavy lifting in a hypothetical invasion, has surpassed the US Navy (USN) as the largest Navy in the world, with 370 battle force ships compared to the USN’s 296. By 2030, the USN projects a force of 294 vessels to China’s expected fleet of 435 vessels. Nevertheless, navies should not be measured solely by their fleet size. The PLAN is still distant from the force Xi Jinping wants it to be, with major deficiencies in sectors such as combat experience, time-at-sea, command, decision-making and other human factors.  However, it must also be noted that the development of the PLA  in recent decades is astounding, with US wargames showing that, in several scenarios, China would win a war in Taiwan (even with US and Japanese support). While factors such as strategic prowess, leadership, technological reliability and chance are as important to a navy as their fleet size (if not more so), we know that the PLAN (and the PLA as a whole) is aware of its deficiencies, and is actively trying to overcome them. 

(Fig. 1) An illustrative map showing the difference between the theoretical Taiwan ADIZ (dotted line) and the de facto ADIZ (blue inside dotted line). Source: CIGeography/PLATracker.

(Fig. 2)PLA’s violations of Taiwan's de facto ADIZ.  Source: Gerald C. Brown, Benjamin, Lewis, Taiwan ADIZ Violations, PLATracker, Taiwan ADIZ Violations Tracker 2025/Taiwan MOD.

Sabotage

While the violations of Taiwan’s ADIZ may be the most well-known instance of China’s gray zone tactics against Taipei, there are several other intimidatory tactics that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) resorts to.  In two separate instances at the beginning of this year, on January 3rd and February 25th, respectively, two undersea cables (TPE and TPMK3) were severed by Chinese-owned vessels MV Xingshun 39 (IMO: 8358427) and MV Hongtai 58 (IMO: 8357069). The vessels severed the cables by dragging their anchors on the sea floor, a tactic also widely employed by Russia in Europe. These instances are only the latest examples of a sabotage campaign that China has been perpetrating since at least 2018. In 2023 alone, a particular set of cables (TPMK2 and TPMK3) connecting Taiwan to the Matsu Islands, a Taiwanese archipelago located 10 NM West of the Chinese coast, was severed 12 times. 

Taiwan depends significantly on these cables, as they are the only large-scale way to access the internet, and China is well aware of this pressure point. Taiwan’s connectivity depends on 15 undersea cables that connect it to the world. As an example, the previously mentioned TPE (Trans-Pacific Express), last damaged in January 2025, is a cable that runs between Taiwan, China, South Korea, Japan, and the US’s west coast. Each of these incidents hinders the operations of multiple sectors, from banking to emergency services, and costs Taiwan a significant amount of money in repairs and disruption of critical services. 

Barges & Co. 

On January 8th, 2025, a seemingly normal satellite image (Fig. 3) of the port of Guangzhou emerged online. The image depicted a shipyard on Longxue Island, with a few unusual-looking vessels scattered among the piers and dry docks. Western naval analysts quickly nicknamed these vessels “Invasion Barges” due to their similarity to the Mulberry Harbors, a set of portable harbors built by the British to support the post-D-Day logistical effort.  

(Fig. 3) Satellite Image showing the barges at Guangzhou Shipyard International in Longxue Island, Guangdong Province, China. Source: AllSourceAnalysis/Planet Labs PBC.

Naval analyst H.I. Sutton, who first authored an article discussing the design and possible use of the barges, including for an invasion of Taiwan, was proven correct once the first close-up footage of the invasion barges surfaced. The footage in question, filmed from a beach on Nansan Island, a few kilometres from a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) amphibious naval facility (Fig. 4), shows the barges linked together to form a pier-like structure (Figs. 5 and 6). 

(Fig. 4) SAR imagery showing an exercise involving the barges in Nansan Island, near a PLAN Naval Facility. Source: Covert Shores - H.I. Sutton/ESA Sentinel-1.

(Fig. 5) Satellite imagery showing the barges positioned in a pier-like structure, and demonstrating the use of the cantilevered aft ramp as a docking and unloading spot for RORO (Roll On/Roll Off) and other cargo vessels. Source: Planet Labs PBC.

(Fig. 6) A photo showing the inline (pier-like) configuration of the barges from a human’s perspective. Source: Chinese Social Media/Weibo.

Before the exercise footage emerged, based on the initial image (Fig. 3), multiple defence experts reached a consensus — later confirmed by the exercise — that the barges were designed for military use. This initial theory was based on their design, overly complicated, redundant, and financially unsuitable for commercial use, as well as the fact that too many were already being built or had been built for such a niche task.

Information Warfare

Gray zone tactics also expand to the information sphere. In April 2025, before major PLA exercise Strait Thunder 2025, the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command posted a video on Chinese social media which depicted current Taiwanese President, Lai Ching-te, as a parasite who poisons and harms Taiwan. The video ends with Lai being grilled over a burning Taiwan, suggesting that his policies will lead to the “ultimate destruction” (Fig. 7, 8 and 9).

(Fig. 7)

(Fig. 8)

(Fig. 9)The above pictures were originally posted on the Chinese social media app Weibo by the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command official account. Source: Chinese Social Media/Weibo.

This video, although likely primarily meant for an internal audience, reiterates China’s discontent with the current Taiwan administration and reaffirms Beijing’s stance regarding a sovereign Taiwan. Lai, since the beginning of his tenure, has demonstrated a strong focus on enhancing Taiwan’s resilience against China and reaffirming Taipei’s sovereignty. Recently, his 17 strategies against Chinese infiltration, espionage and overall threats to Taiwan’s sovereignty have garnered quite some discontent in China, with a Chinese official quoted by Xinhua, the official state-run news agency, saying that “Ching-te's 17 strategies lay bare his vile character, which is against peace, dialogue, democracy and humanity”. 

This is not the first time China has directed harsh comments at Taiwan’s president. During the tenure of former Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian, following his refusal to accept Beijing’s “One-China” policy, a senior military source was quoted by China Daily as stating that “peace will have to be safeguarded and won through the use of force.” Beijing labelled Chen as a “die-hard separatist” who “is riding near the edge of the cliff, and there is no sign he is going to rein in his horse”. China’s posture towards Chen reflects the current posture against Lai Ching-te, which China clearly perceives as too radical and vocal regarding Taiwan’s relationship with China. While this posture is not new and was last observed with Chen, the difference now is that China has been developing and expanding its military since, and can arguably be considered the only real peer to the US Armed Forces. 

Civilian Lift Fleet

China’s military exercises have become more frequent, with an increase in the quantity of assets deployed. Moreover, the PLAN has, in recent years, increased its focus on its ability to successfully conduct large-scale amphibious operations by increasing the number of amphibious landing ships, especially LPDs (Landing Platform Dock) and LHDs (Landing Helicopter Dock), and ramping up amphibious operations exercises. The lack of landing crafts and smaller landing ships, which many analysts believe are crucial to an invasion of Taiwan, may be because the PLAN assesses that its civilian lift fleet can remedy the lack of landing crafts. On several occasions, the PLAN has demonstrated the use of civilian vessels, particularly RORO (Roll-Off/Roll-On), in amphibious exercises (Figs. 10 and 11).

(Fig. 10) A Chinese Type 99 MBT driving in the cargo hold of RORO vessel Zhong Hua Fu Xing (IMO: 9849875) during an exercise. Source: CCTV.

(Fig. 11) Chinese RORO vessel Bang Chui Dao (IMO: 9110781) recovering a PLAN ZTD-05 amphibious fighting vehicle during an exercise. Source: Marine Executive/CCTV.

Notably, the stern ramp visible in the above image is not the original ramp the vessel was equipped with. Below is an image from 2014 (Fig. 12), showing Bang Chui Dao’s original stern ramp. This modification was likely made solely to support military operations, as the commercial use of such ramps is limited at best.

(Fig. 12) Bang Chui Dao’s stern ramp in its original configuration (left ramp) during an exercise in 2014. Note that the large overhead pistons visible in fig. 11 are missing. Source: Jamestown Foundation/China Military Online.

Bang Chui Dao’s transformation suggests that the PLAN’s strategy to compensate for a lack of landing craft and smaller amphibious assault ships is to rely on its civilian fleet instead. The ability to deploy and recover amphibious assault vehicles classifies vessels such as the Bang Chui Dao as assets that can be utilised in the initial stage of a Taiwan invasion. Prior to the introduction of such ramps, many discussions around China’s decision to use civilian ships to compensate for the lack of landing crafts centred on the ship's inability to conduct amphibious assaults, as it cannot reach the shore and unload vehicles or troops. They are too large and their draughts are too deep to allow them to get to shore; they require a pier in which to dock and unload from there, similarly to what can be seen in fig. 12. Due to such shortcomings, the ships could only serve as logistical support after an initial wave is conducted, a (significant) beachhead established and a temporary harbour/pier structure built. Modifications such as the ramp seen on Bang Chui Dao overcome this limitation. Similar ships can now serve as large landing crafts. These ships may still be unable to reach the shore, but they are not required to, as the modified ramp enables the deployment of amphibious vehicles, which can then reach the shore independently.

This fleet was, in 2023, visually confirmed to include at least 12 RORO ferries, ranging from 3.457 DWT to 11.288 DWT, and between 835 to 2.700 lane meters. This number of ferries is likely too low for a full-scale invasion of Taiwan, as it would put too much pressure on the individual ships, which would each provide Taiwan with a few high-value targets to focus on. Surely, in the event of an invasion with only these 12 ships, they will be heavily defended. Still, Taiwan would only need to hit a few for the first wave to suffer significant casualties without having even touched Taiwan’s territory. Nevertheless, Chinese ferry companies, such as the ferry division of state-owned giant COSCO Shipping, possess many more vessels, which, if needed, could likely be modified in a short period of time. 

Consequences and Impact on the Global Economy

Taiwan is home to around 24 million people, in an area (36.000 km²) smaller than the continental Netherlands (41.000 km²). With an urbanisation level of around 84%, the human cost of a potential invasion would be catastrophic. An invasion of Taiwan would also likely lead to a global economic recession. Maritime trade is by far the most essential transport sector; according to the World Trade Organization (WTO), shipping accounts for more than 80% of the world's trade volume (according to EMSA, the European Maritime Safety Agency, this number is closer to 90%). Each year, maritime trade transports more than $12 trillion in goods and energy. As with other forms of transport, any shipping company aims to use the shortest way to reach its destination to maximise profits. This, in turn, means that virtually all shipping companies will use the same routes, which will eventually pass through chokepoints such as the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal, the Strait of Hormuz, and a few others. The accessibility of these chokepoints is crucial for maintaining shipping profitability, and without them, the shipping sector would face significant cost increases and delays, which would heavily disrupt global trade. 

In this group of chokepoints, the Taiwan Strait stands as one of the most crucial ones. In 2022 alone, the Taiwan Strait had an approximate $2,45 trillion in goods transit through it, accounting for more than 20% of the global maritime trade. This transit would be disrupted to varying degrees by all the methods by which China aims to “reunify” Taiwan; these are conventionally divided into four separate plans. The first is a missile barrage on Taiwanese military, government and civilian targets, aiming to force Taipei to hand over power to Beijing. The second is a blockade of the Island, which would seek to block access to food and medicines until the humanitarian cost is deemed too high by Taipei, and power handed over to Beijing. The third campaign would be a direct attack on US forces stationed near Taiwan, aiming to temporarily hinder the US’ capability to come to Taiwan’s aid (should it choose to do so) in the initial stage of the conflict, thus improving the campaign’s success. The fourth campaign is the most destructive and entails a full-scale invasion of Taiwan with large-scale combined arms operations that would aim to subjugate Taiwan by force. 

In all of these cases, maritime traffic in the Taiwan Strait would come to a standstill. Even a single stray missile landing close to -let alone hitting- a ship would be enough to skyrocket insurance premiums, making transit through the Strait unprofitable and temporarily halting trade through the Strait. The ease with which such chokepoints can be targeted, and traffic disrupted, has already been demonstrated by the Houthis from November 2023 through December 2024, and, most recently, in July 2025. In early 2024, following the hijack of MV Galaxy Leader (IMO: 9237307) and the subsequent Houthi attacks on shipping between November 2023 and December 2023, traffic through the Suez Canal (and by extension the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait) decreased by 40%, with trade volume decreasing by 60% (Figs. 13 and 14).

(Fig. 13) Traffic through the Suez Canal from January 2019 to July 2025. Notice the significant (±40%) drop in early 2024, following the first Houthi attacks against merchant vessels. Source: UN Global Platform/IMF Portwatch.

(Fig. 14) Trade volume levels that passed through the Suez Canal from January 2019 to July 2025. Notice the substantial (±60%) drop in early 2024, following the first Houthi attacks against merchant vessels. Source: UN Global Platform/IMF Portwatch.

If the situation is particularly dire, as would be the case in a full-scale invasion, the Luzon Strait may also be deemed unsafe, meaning that vessels would have to reroute their navigation by thousands of miles (Fig. 15), which would drive up prices and put further strain on crews, vessels, and global logistics. This would put significant strain on countries such as Japan or South Korea. In the case of South Korea, 30% of imports and 23% of exports transited through the Strait, while for Japan, these numbers are even higher, with 32% and 25%, respectively. However, Taiwan will of course suffer the most. Trade in and out of Taiwanese ports will cease completely, halting the export of crucial goods, particularly integrated circuits (ICs), and the import of vital goods, ranging from agricultural products to pharmaceuticals. 

(Fig. 16) Map showing how routes from Singapore (SG) to Busan (SK) would change if both the Taiwan Strait and the Luzon Strait were deemed unsafe, notice how the route goes around the Philippines, adding thousands of miles to the trip. Source: CSIS.

Furthermore, the world will suffer with it; Taiwan’s IC industry is crucial to various end markets, including smartphones, digital consumer electronics, high-performance computing, AI, and defence. As of Q1 2025, TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company), the largest contract IC foundry in the world, controlled 67% of market share by revenue (Fig. 16). During the same period, the second largest foundry (Samsung) had a mere 8% of market share by revenue. 

(Fig. 16) Market Share of Global Top 10 Foundries by Revenue: 2022 Q1 - 2025 Q1. Note the dominance of TSMC growing over time. Source: Trendforce/Republic of China (Taiwan).

Most notably, out of the 10 foundries shown in Fig. 15, four are Taiwanese, representing a combined market share of approximately 74% by revenue. Without Taiwanese ICs, many high-tech industries around the world would collapse unless a stopgap solution is found momentarily, as no other country can produce sub-10nm advanced ICs (7, 5, and 3nm) at scale—if at all—the same way Taiwanese foundries (especially TSMC) do. This solution is unlikely to be found in a timely manner. TSMC has a near monopoly on these chips because it has consistently invested the time, money, and expertise required over decades of development and production. Finding a replacement could take years, at best. 

The shortage of ICs and advanced ICs on the market would have massive ripple effects in the global economy. Not to mention, during a hypothetical invasion of Taiwan, Chinese imports and exports will also likely suffer a significant decrease either due to sanctions on China (although the extent and efficacy of these sanctions depends on the willpower of the states imposing them, which, given China’s worldwide importance for trade, will be highly tested) and lack of logistical routes; the Taiwan Strait would still be a warzone and air and land trade originating from China simply cannot make up for the lack of shipping. War in Taiwan would be catastrophic, with some estimates suggesting that it would wipe 10% off the global gross domestic product (GDP).

Conclusion

This report has examined the different factors that suggest China is preparing for a potential invasion of Taiwan. It has highlighted the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) rapid and unexpected development, while also noting its deficiencies, and laid out several ‘gray zone’ tactics implemented by Beijing. Although the report does not seek to predict a timeline or assign a likelihood to such an event, it emphasises the importance of closely monitoring these warning signs, especially in the context of political discourse, information warfare activities, ADIZ invasions, acts of sabotage, and recent military developments. Finally, the report discusses the importance of the Taiwanese economy and the Taiwan Strait for the global trade and economy, concluding that any conflict would have catastrophic consequences in both human and economic terms. 

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