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Written by Sietske Moshuldayev This June 2022 report highlights ten prominent conflicts selected following the close monitoring of news sources and open-source intelligence gathering over the past month. As fighting between Ukrainian and Russian forces continued in Ukraine, nuclear testing threats from North Korea intensified and a potential new Turkish military operation in northern Syria sharpened international concerns. Meanwhile, the governments of Tunisia and Ecuador saw increased public protests demanding political and economic change. Militant groups continued to destabilize the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burkina Faso, with government forces increasing their counterattacks. El Salvador’s government prolonged its fight to control drug gangs, while citizens in Sri Lanka and Nepal protested amidst worsening political and economic conditions. It is useful to continue monitoring developments in these counties in the upcoming weeks to remain aware and vigilant of potential escalations and subsequent ripple effects. World Conflicts - June 2022 a. The Russia-Ukraine War As the end of this month marks the 127th day since the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, most of the fighting now continues in the eastern Donbas region. Some renewed Russian attacks in the north and south continue to occur as well. This month, Ukrainian military was forced to retreat from Severodonetsk, their last major foothold in Luhansk. Other cities, including Kyiv, endured several bombardments. Russia continues to hold on to its objectives as it blames its foreign debt default and the general global food crisis on Western states. Meanwhile, Ukraine continues to receive financial and military support as several Western leaders visited Kyiv this month and the EU accepted its bid to join the union. NATO is reinforcing its Eastern and Baltic defenses as Finland’s and Sweden’s accession has been accepted by Turkey. As the ongoing conflict continues to impact millions of Ukrainians, Russians and communities abroad that face worsening fuel and food shortages, this conflict requires continued monitoring. b. North Korean Nuclear Test Threats With North Korea’s nuclear facilities expanding, increased threatening rhetoric and enhanced North Korean defense plans, tension has risen this month with worries of a nuclear weapons test by North Korea. Since 2006, North Korea has tested six nuclear weapons but halted its nuclear program in 2017. Since the beginning of this year, however, it has alarmed other states with increased missile tests. This saw US efforts to toughen UN sanctions in May but the motion was vetoed by Russia and China - noteworthily the first disagreement since the sanction regime on North Korea started in 2006. With the regional security balance on the line, the US has already ramped up its military cooperation with South Korea and Japan in recent weeks to deter North Korea. What the impact of such enhanced regional relations will be - as North Korea perceives this as a growing threat - remains to be seen. c. Tension over a New Turkish Offensive in Syria As new Turkish military operations targeting northern areas of Syria may commence soon, international worries arose this month over a potential re-escalation of conflict in Syria. Turkey aims to establish a 30km safe zone along Turkey’s southern border with Syria where it perceives the Syria Kurdish People’s Protection Unit (YPG) as a serious national security threat. Turkey has long seen the YPG as a terrorist organization and aims to destabilize them. The YPG, however, presents the largest faction of the US-backed Syrian Democracy Forces. The US has pressured Turkey to cancel its plans and Russia, Syria’s traditional ally, has also warned Turkey of unwanted tension. Iran, on the other hand, voiced comprehension of Turkey’s ambitions. With a UN mandate for aid supplies to Syria ending on July 10th and an extension likely to be vetoed by Russia, an escalation will gravely impact Syrian citizens and overall regional stability. It remains to be seen what these pressures will bring. D. Public Unrest over Government Changes in Tunisia Tunisian citizens and opponents of the incumbent president continued protesting moves that strengthen the executive role of President Kais Saied. Along with the sacking of 57 judges at the beginning of the month - which has seen judges on strike ever since - President Saied is drafting a new constitution that strengthens presidential powers and allegedly excludes the mentioning of Islam. The constitution will be subject to a referendum on July 25th and opposition parties have already indicated they will boycott it. These moves come after the suspension of the supreme judicial court and parliament earlier this year along with other actions further consolidating Saied’s position. Many opposition groups and citizens view these alterations as the untangling of the democratic changes implemented following the 2011 turmoil. With protests likely to continue as the referendum date comes closer, in addition to ongoing disputes over economic pressures, this conflict should be monitored in upcoming weeks. E. Deadly Protests in Ecuador Ecuador has seen a series of violent mass protests since June 13th amidst demands for economic policy changes and improved costs of living. Protestors, primarily members of various indigenous groups, have blocked roads and attacked oil fields leading to food supply shortages in cities and reducing the country’s oil output by half. Sources report at least five civilian deaths and one soldier. President Guillermo Lasso entered talks with the protestors following a short state of emergency but these have halted due to the soldier’s unexpected death. In the meantime, right-wing President Lasso passed a vote of impeachment, indicating both government support for and opposition to his handling of the situation thus far. These events present a larger version of less violent protests and talks held last October, where similar demands were made. With both the government and the protestors adhering to their stances and talks halted, it remains to be seen how the situation will evolve next. Brief Alerts - June 2022 a. Intensified Rebel Militancy in The Democratic Republic of Congo Following a resurgence of M23 militant activity in eastern DRC since May, relations between the DRC and Rwanda worsened this month as the former accuses the latter of backing the rebels. Despite Rwanda rejecting this claim, previous invasions of the DRC by Rwanda in the 1990s place extra tension on stability in the region. b. Planned Attacks by Burkina Faso’s Military Forces After several deadly attacks in Burkina Faso this month, the government now plans to actively counter jihadist groups in northern and southeastern regions. It has provided a 14-day ultimatum for citizens to evacuate designated regions but without much guidance. With operations yet to start, it remains to be seen how this will develop. c. Prolonged ‘State of Emergency’ in El Salvador The third renewal of El Salvador’s state of emergency has human rights organizations alarmed about the dire circumstances in which detainees are being captured and held. With over 41,300 people detained thus far, the government is set on eliminating the gangs and allegations of human rights violations are likely to continue. d. Sri Lanka’s Deepening Economic and Political Crisis Prolonged fuel and food shortages continue to spur public protests in Sri Lanka despite the new cabinet attempting to appease the protestors. With fuel now only sold for essential services, further unrest is likely to continue as citizens demand further policy changes and the long-awaited resignation of the president. e. Fuel Price Protests in Nepal A rise in fuel costs caused clashes between citizens and the police in Kathmandu late this month. With Nepal’s economic conditions similar to that of Sri Lanka prior to its full-scale crisis, developments in Nepal may require closer monitoring in the upcoming weeks. Conclusion While the conflict in Ukraine is highly likely to continue in the upcoming weeks, it remains to be seen whether actual escalations - and to what extent - will occur regarding the North Korean and Syrian conflicts. As North Korea pursues its national agenda, it is likely to face international repercussions should it conduct a nuclear weapons test. Turkey frames its new military operation as necessary for its national security, but its international standing is simultaneously impacted daily by other events, such as the war in Ukraine. Meanwhile, with a concrete deadline set for a potentially new constitution in Tunisia, it is likely that protests will continue, perhaps even escalate. Ecuador has seen talks between the government and the protestors in the past, which may indicate that this can happen again. As for the brief alerts, more violence can be expected in the cases of the DRC, Burkina Faso and El Salvador, with protests likely to continue in Sri Lanka and Nepal. Needless to say, all these conflicts, in addition to conflicts not covered in this report, will require close monitoring in the upcoming month. About the author: Sietske Moshuldayev Sietske Moshuldayev has an international background and is inherently intrigued by the causes and consequences of geopolitical events. She has completed two bachelors at the University of Leiden (International Studies, BA & Political Science, BSc) and currently pursues a masters in International Security at Sciences Po, Paris. Having specialized in East Asian affairs for her undergraduate studies, she now focuses on global risks and risk management.

Written by Sytske Post A few months ago, a manipulated video of Ukrainian President Zelensky circulated on social media. In the video, Zelensky was telling his soldiers to lay down their arms and surrender the fight against Russia. The message also aired on Ukrainian television after hackers had managed to disseminate the fake message on the website of a news organization. Viewers quickly pointed out that Zelensky's accent was strange, and that his head and voice did not appear realistic upon closer observation, prompting the video to be refuted and withdrawn. This type of video manipulation is also known as a ‘deepfake’. The editing of the video was not particularly sophisticated. However, the evolution of deepfakes is perceived as one of the most worrying technological trends for the future. If these images become more sophisticated, they can lead to intensifying existing conflicts and debates, undermine trust in state-run institutions and legal processes, and manipulate financial markets. It is therefore important to analyze different scenarios where this emerging technology could potentially impact our society. What are Deepfakes? Deepfakes - a term that first emerged in 2017 - are a new type of audiovisual manipulation that allows users to create lifelike simulations of another person's face, voice, or action, or even create realistic looking people who never existed. This technology is categorized as synthetic media, referring to content created or modified with the use of artificial intelligence (AI). It applies the capabilities of deep learning, which is a kind of machine learning where a computer analyzes datasets to learn (through the analysis of patterns) what a result has to look like. In addition, these technologies also often use generative adversarial networks (GAN). Here, a person starts by gathering photographs or source a video of the person or object they wish to imitate. The fake is created by a GAN employing two networks. The first network creates believable re-creations of the original images, while the second network looks for forgeries. This detection information is passed back to the forgery network, allowing it to improve and generate a better fake version of the source, such as the face of the person you're impersonating. In both instances, the technologies used require datasets to learn or create the image. The larger the datasets the easier to create a sophisticated (audio)visual image. In today's society such datasets are freely available on the internet. This creates an environment where these deepfakes are easier to create, and are less time-consuming for the creator, thereby increasing the likelihood of deepfakes emerging more frequently in the future. The possibility of media manipulation is not a new phenomenon, and has been commonly known for a long time. However, the growing use of AI to create deepfakes is a cause for concern as the imagery is increasingly realistic, rapidly created and cheaply made. This will make it increasingly difficult to detect a forgery in the future. In 2018, director Jordan Peele and BuzzFeed CEO Jordan Peretti collaborated on a deepfake video to warn the public about disinformation, specifically affecting the people's impression of political leaders. Peele and Peretti overlaid Peele's voice and mouth over a pre-existing footage of Barack Obama using free tools and the expertise of editing experts. In the video, the image of Obama says “we are entering an era in which our enemies can make it look like anyone is saying anything, at any point in time. Even if they would never say those things.” This example, as well as Zelensky’s deepfake video, illustrate how this technology has the potential to be used for nefarious purposes. Therefore, it is important to consider and try and identify the potential threats this new technology can generate and what type of countermeasures can be implemented. Threat Assessment of Deepfakes Deepfakes are powerful tools for the dissemination of disinformation, exploitation and sabotage. This emerging technology, therefore, can potentially create harmful situations. Sabotage and exploitation Deepfakes can be used to generate misleading information that can fool the public. This can be extremely damaging for a company's or individual's reputation. Consider, for example, a deepfake video being created displaying a firm's CEO, elected official or ordinary citizen saying or behaving in an inappropriate manner. Such a deepfake can potentially go viral on social media within minutes. Companies or public figures would have to spend important resources discovering, eliminating, and refuting fraudulent content, as well as covering legal fees and crisis management costs. Additionally, even if one can later prove they were the victim of a deepfake, the reputation’s damage has already occurred. Such damage can potentially result in revenue loss (e.g. impact the stock market), reduced credibility and trust, it can affect election results, but also simply ruin friendships or family relations. Deepfakes can also be used for exploitative purposes. The attacker can use this type of content to gain financial resources or confidential information. The technology can also be used for sexual exploitation purposes or to facilitate criminal activity, such as online child exploitation. Currently, the vast majority of deepfakes applications are sexual in nature, with women being the primary victims. Deepfake sex videos can be created diplaying someone being forced to do violent, humiliating sex actions. These types of videos can be used for financial and sexual exploitation. However, they can also be used as weapons designed to frighten and inflict suffering. When victims learn they've been exploited in deepfake sex tape, the psychological consequences can be severe. This demonstrates that not all of these forgeries are created primarily, if at all, for the creator's sexual or financial gain. (Identity) Fraud Deepfake technology also contributes in creating sophisticated tools for fraud. This potential became reality in 2019, when a deepfake audio was used to imitate the voice of a CEO to assist the fraudulent transfer of funds. Due to the ability of this technology to replicate biometric data, it can also be used to deceive systems that rely on face, voice, vein, or gait identification. Furthermore, this characteristic can also help facilitate espionage. The most recent instance occurred on June 25, 2022, when various European mayors were tricked into holding video calls with a deepfake of Kyiv mayor, Vitali Klitschko. As of yet it is unclear who is behind the action or what their aims were. Decision-making processes Deepfakes have the potential to erode trust in information analysis and outputs offered by digital security platforms, which can complicate decision-making processes. During decisional chokepoints, when there are limited windows of opportunity during which irrevocable decisions must be made. The dissemination of incorrect information may have irreversible consequences. Imagine this scenario; a deepfake video is created depicting a politician saying racial slurs. This video is then released on social media just ahead of elections, giving it enough time to circulate but does not provide the victim enough time to debunk the false information. Voters might take this video into consideration when choosing who to vote for. Even if the politician, eventually, is able to debunk the video the impact could be irreversible as the polls have already closed. In the case of law enforcement, sophisticated (audio)visuals can be used to deceive officers. This may then push officers to take the wrong course of action (e.g. unnecessary, inappropriate, wrong suspect). For businesses, deepfakes can persuade or refrain companies into/from taking on certain investment opportunities or partnerships. Undermine safety, trust and democratic processes Deepfakes increase the chances that someone can induce a public panic. False emergency alerts in the form of deepfakes could go viral due to social media distribution capabilities, and these alerts can forge hyper-realistic evidence thereby increasing their persuasiveness. Deepfakes can reinforce and exacerbate the underlying social division, but they can also trick communities into certain actions (for example, a fake video of a community leader calling for civil unrest and riots could lead to violent action). The technology can be used to create inflammatory content - such as convincing video footage of military forces committing war crimes - with the goal of radicalizing communities, recruiting, or inciting violence. Or it can be used to falsely represent police officers committing crimes in order to discredit them or even provoke violence against them. Legal processes Auditory and visual recordings are vital intelligence for police work and often used as evidence in court, since such recordings are viewed as a truthful account of an event. Despite the fact that picture and audio alteration have been known methods for a long time, these manipulations are typically detectable. Deepfakes provide the ability to create extremely sophisticated auditory and visual material that is difficult to distinguish from real audio and video recordings. If all evidence has to be verified for authenticity, this could lead to a huge increase in costs and time for lawsuits. Furthermore, it could also result in limiting the use of video as proof of human rights violations and crimes, thereby obstructing accountability and justice. Future outlook and possible countermeasures As a result of the combination of deepfakes and disinformation, trust in official facts and authorities is undermined. Experts believe that this may lead to a situation where citizens no longer share a common reality, or confusion about whether certain sources are reliable. This could be known as the “information apocalypse” or “reality indifference.” In the absence of a shared reality, efforts to solve national and global problems become entangled in meaningless first-order questions. People will be able to live in their own subjective realities, and simple empirical insights may spark heated contestation. Threat actors will almost certainly utilize deepfake technology to assist various criminal acts and undertake misinformation campaigns to manipulate or skew public opinion in the months and years ahead. Therefore, it is important to assess these risks and find possible ways to counter the rise of such technologies. There are certain procedures in place to assess the value of information, as false information has always existed. However, these procedures will have to be updated with the rise of deepfakes, for example by investing in new technical capabilities or upskilling workforces, and creating and requiring new capabilities. Currently, it is still possible for the vast majority of deepfake content to be manually detected by looking for inconsistencies. A few examples of these imperfections are: Blurring around the edges of the face Lack of blinking Inconsistencies in the hair, vein patterns, scars etc. Light reflection in the eyes. However, machine learning and artificial intelligence advancements will continue to improve the software used to make deep fakes and the imperfections will disappear over time. Technological solutions have also been hailed as ways to solve this future threat. There have already been efforts to create technological detectors by various actors, such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency of the United States. Microsoft also released the Microsoft Video Authenticator, which analyzes a still photo or video to determine whether it has been intentionally edited. However, these new technical solutions that identify deepfakes can also lead to increased surveillance and exclusion. It is therefore critical to implement regulatory and human rights frameworks that keep up with technological advancements. Additionally, deepfake detection abilities also drive the increased quality of deepfakes. The AI technology's learning capability can be used to create a deepfake that will eventually learn how to deceive the detector. Therefore, we need to develop a better understanding of existing practices of OSINT and combine this with new media forensic tools that are being developed. In addition, it is also important to think of preventative measures. For society at large it will be important to focus on understanding deep fakes within a broader media literacy frame, such as the SIFT framework. Or avoid face or voice biometrics for authorization purposes. The risks can also differ amongst various sectors, countries and/or individuals. Therefore, strategic foresight and scenario methods can offer ways of understanding and preparing for the potential impact of these technologies in specific cases. About the author: Sytske Post Sytske is a graduate of International Studies and is currently enrolled in the Master's degree Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University. This educational background has provided her with an interdisciplinary understanding of violent conflict and security. Currently, she is particularly interested in the intersection of technology and conflict, ranging from digital disinformation to the shifting nature of warfare powered by artificial intelligence.

Written by Jacob Dickinson On 30 June 2022, Ferdinand Marcos Junior, son of a former corrupt dictator, will be inaugurated as the 17th president of the Philippines. Otherwise known as Bongbong, his election marks a trend of democratic backsliding across Southeast Asia and comes at a time of escalating tensions in the South China Sea (SCS). The military Junta’s seizure of power and civil war in Myanmar and Hun Sen’s persecution of opposition parties in Cambodia, points to a wider trend of growing authoritarianism in Southeast Asia. On the frontline of the SCS dispute, the Philippines is a US treaty ally while China occupies the Scarborough Shoal. How does the return to dynastic politics for the Philippines affect democracy and what does the Marcos presidency mean for security in the South China Sea? Authoritarian Predecessor Bongbong Marcos is the son of Ferdinand Marcos Senior (Sr.), a former dictator of the Philippines. The Marcos’ rise as a political dynasty began in the 1965 presidential election. Back then, Senator Ferdinand Marcos Sr. and his wife, Ismelda, presented themselves as the nation’s prospective saviors. With a collapsing economy and an unpopular incumbent, Marcos Sr. was elected president in 1965. Popular for his first term, he manipulated a growing economy as a result of the Vietnam War boom and elevated the military within his administration. Ferdinand Marcos Sr. dominated political life and began to centralize power in the presidency. In 1969, he was elected for a second term with 74% of the vote and all but 24 out of 120 House candidates supported him. When he tried to overturn the presidential two term limits, widespread protests began against his government. Playing up to middle class fears against violent demonstrations, on 22 September 1972 he declared martial law. He violently repressed political opposition, jailed and controlled all media outlets, and arrested and detained up to 8,000 individuals. During this time Marcos Jr. played a part in his father’s regime. He ran as the Vice Governor of Ilocos Norte and was appointed to the head of a telecommunications company, the Philippines Communications Satellite Corp which was sold off to closely connected cronies. For 15 years, the Marcos dictatorship committed human atrocities and plundered over $10 billion through rampant corruption. Marcos Sr. was eventually deposed in 1986 after a massive demonstration of civil disobedience following a fixed election and the rest of the Marcos family fled to Hawaii in 1986. Yet the legacy of dictatorship outlasted his presidency. The military attempted seven coups against the elected government between 1986 and 2007. The regime left the Philippines in over $70 billion in debt which was used to build luxury hotels rather than invest in industry. While he fled to Hawaii in 1986 with vast amounts of wealth, 44.7% of Filipinos lived in poverty. Democratic Decline The election of Bongbong Marcos to the presidency marks a continuity of popularly elected ‘strongman’ rule in which the population votes for a ‘strong’ leader with little respect for democratic norms and values. Despite the Philippines’ relatively free and fair elections, there is evidence that Bongbong Marcos employed disinformation campaigns and adopted some of the political tactics of the outgoing president, Rodrigo Duterte. The Marcos family attempted to return to public life after coming back from Hawaii in 1991. Their reemergence in Filipino frontline politics has been a long time in the making. During the 2022 election campaign, online disinformation campaigns painted the Marcos dynasty period as a golden age for the Philippines, with investments in building world renowned bridges, roads and economic development. At the same time, Facebook groups ignored Ferdinand Marcos Sr. and his family’s pervasive corruption, high levels of debt, and the extensive crimes against humanity during the 15 years of his brutal dictatorship. In a playbook previously seen across the world, when challenged over the source of wealth by the media, Bongbong Marcos decried it as ‘fake news’ and portrayed himself as a victim of a witch hunt by the mainstream media. Bongbong Marcos has politically positioned himself closely to Rodrigo Duterte, the outgoing president of the Philippines. During his tenure as president, Duterte was one of the world’s most popular leaders, even as he carries out a brutal ‘war on drugs’, which has led to extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrest and detention. Up to 12,000 Filipinos have been killed, with at least 2,555 carried out by the Philippines’ national police, The campaign has mostly affected the urban poor. Duterte’s daughter, Sara, ran on the same ticket with Bongbong Marcos during the 2022 elections. This is unusual as the president and vice president are usually elected on a separate ticket. By running with his Duterte’s daughter, Bongbong Marcos has cultivated a strong affinity with Duterte’s hardline approach. Bongbong Marcos has also adopted Duterte’s anti-elite rhetoric, despite belonging to that same elite himself. The Philippines has high levels of income inequality and wealthy families and politically connected business people have continued to plan the Philippines economy in their own interest. Over 18 wealthy Filipino families have at least two seats in Congress. There has been a gradual reduction in poverty over the past 6 years, but economic inequality within the Philippines remains entrenched. 43% of Filipinos consider themselves to be poor. Bongbong Marcos’ adoption of Duterte’s methods of rewriting his family’s history, presenting himself as a continuity candidate, and railing against an elite demonstrates that political life in the Philippines remains embedded in protecting vast inequalities in wealth. Philippines’ foreign policy How will Bongbong Marcos' rule differ from his predecessor in foreign policy? Southeast Asia remains a key area of intense competition between the US and China. Like every other ASEAN state, the Philippines faces structural challenges of traditional relationships with the US, as well as growing economic links with China. Nevertheless, Marcos could become a pillar of US foreign policy in the region. In the 2022 election, Marcos could take a more hawkish approach to China than his predecessor. Duterte only acknowledged the landmark 2016 International Court ruling against China’s occupation of the Scarborough Shoal after four years. He was silent on China’s occupation to promote continued trade with the country. However, following widespread protests against China’s actions, Bongbong Marcos said that the Philippines will uphold the 2016 ruling and made clear that he contested China’s continued occupation. Of course, China’s military capabilities and economic clout cannot be ignored by Bongbong. However, Marcos' return to the presidency does not entail a smooth ride in US bilateral relations. The Philippines is a US treaty ally and remains a strategically important partner in the SCS. In comparison to Duterte, who threatened to expel US troops from the country, the election of Bongbong Marcos could heal the relationship. He has stated he would improve ties, and given the popularity of the US among the electorate, as well as the strong military support for the US, suggest that this will be the case. Yet his election could also alert the US to worsening democracy and human rights in the country. Strongman rule and disregard for democratic norms could strain the US-Philippines relationship. Marcos' family has faced a class action lawsuit in the US since 1995, that theoretically could lead to his arrest in the US. The structural realities facing the US suggest that the US will be unlikely to make democratic backsliding a cornerstone of US foreign policy. Forecast The return of the Marcos political dynasty to the presidency of the Philippines demonstrates a wider trend of democratic backsliding in Southeast Asia, with acute challenges for human rights and security in the region. In a weakening context of democracy in Southeast Asia, where elites manipulate the political process to maintain their hold on power, the rule of law and human rights are not likely to improve soon. In terms of security in the tense SCS, Marcos will seek to balance the US-China alliance to retain national autonomy. In contrast to Duterte, Marcos could be firm in his relationship with the US in light of China’s assertiveness in the SCS. About the author: Jacob Dickinson Jacob studies Global Political Economy at Leiden University. He is passionate about international development and is looking to expand his expertise in geopolitics and crisis management. Curious about other cultures, he has travelled in Europe and Asia for both academic study and professional purposes. His expertise includes subjects like the geopolitics of energy, China’s international political economy, and the implications of globalized supply chains for industrial policy. He is particularly interested in the evolving political and economic relationships between China and ASEAN, and the consequences for regional development and security.

By Sytske Post

We are proud to announce that Dyami | strategic security services has become a member of the European Business Aviation Association (EBAA) This membership enables us to join a group of more than 700 aircraft operators and operational aviation experts. With our security & intelligence expertise, we will be sharing best practices and offering unique safety and security experiences to EBAA members to the highest standards required by the highly dynamic and challenging business aviation industry. Dyami provides support to your dispatcher, operations centre or risk manager. To help them anticipate properly and make better critical decisions. Our mission is to enable safe and secure aviation operations. We also look forward to joining high-profile industry events hosted by the EBAA, that started with our booth at #ebace2022 in Geneva. Visit our route & destination risk assessment page or contact us at info@dyami.services Many thanks to Robert Baltus and Athar Husain Khan from EBAA. #aviationtraining #avsec #aviationsecurity #aviationconsulting #EBAAmember #businessaviation #aviation #security #intelligence #czib #airspace #flightoperations

By Sytske Post

By Oussama Kebir Once the cradle of the Arab Spring movements across the Middle East, Tunisia has recently been witnessing a political upheaval. On 25 July 2021, President Kais Saied suspended Tunisia’s parliament, banned opposition parties amid widespread public protests against the government, and announced to draft a new constitution. Though President Saied’s promises to oust corruption from the political system, the profound economic challenges which drove the 2011 revolution remain unresolved and tensions have increased as a consequence of the democratic erosion. Political Situation Since the 2011 revolution that sparked a wave of democratic movements across the Middle East, Tunisia’s politics have remained in flux. Tunisia has experienced twelve changes in government dominated by wealthy businessmen, and as a result, public confidence in political institutions has collapsed. In the 2019 presidential election, Kais Saied, an independent constitutional lawyer who campaigned against corruption won the second round of the presidential election with 72.7% of the vote. Tunisian society was put under severe pressure as the government attempted to handle the COVID-19 pandemic. Tunisia’s shrinking economy worsened economic hardship, overwhelmed doctors, and accompanied low vaccination rates. Protests began demanding the resignation of the government for its handling of the pandemic response. In the midst of the turmoil, on 25 July 2021 President Saied suspended Tunisia’s parliament, lifted legal immunity for its members, and dismissed the prime minister Hichem Mechichi. Without a Supreme Constitutional Court to challenge the legality of this ruling, Kais Saied seized wide-ranging powers based on his interpretation of the constitution. Opposition groups, such as the Ennahda Movement, labeled the suspension of the constitution a coup. Constitutional situation Tunisia’s 2014 constitution contained strict separations of powers between the executive, the judiciary, and the legislature. Until 25 July 2021, the President’s powers lay mainly in diplomatic affairs and international relations. Yet Saied has managed to concentrate power at the expense of other branches of government through several moves. On assuming the role of the prime minister without a parliament until the referendum, Saeid has allowed the executive to act without legislative oversight. This paved the way for measures that effectively changed the relationship between the executive and the judiciary powers and ended by reducing the powers of the latter and its impact on the Tunisian administration. According to the roadmap that the President has set out, the country will hold a referendum on a revised constitution on 25 July 2022. To include ‘the people's’ opinions, President Saied announced a national consultation to draft a new constitution that took place on 20 March 2022, Tunisia’s independence day. The consultation, carried out online, received 500,000 responses out of the 3 million expected. However, the consultation raised various concerns, from digital security and possible leading questions. Additionally, even after the consultation, the content of this referendum remains ambiguous. Although there are less than two months before the date of the referendum, Tunisian people still do not know the contents of the potential new constitution. This problem is highlighted in the Report of the Venice Commission, on 27 May 2022, “[...]such short delays for public discussion of a new constitution (less than one month between the publication of the draft of the new constitution and the referendum) can confer democratic legitimacy to the process.” President Saied continues to overwrite the constitutional authority of the judicial system, as the recent sacking of 57 judges shows, leading to an overall erosion of democracy in Tunisia. The last three months have been marked by persistent political instability and strikes due to divisions between supporters and opponents of Saied’s seizure of power. Economic situation After the 2011 revolution, Tunisia’s economy has struggled to create a prosperous and fair economy despite a change in the political system. The unemployment rate has remained high at 15% and GDP per capita has declined. Social indicators demonstrate the extent of the crisis facing Tunisian society; the poverty rate trebled from 14% to 21% in one year since the start of the pandemic. The direct dependence on international trade for food and oil products prevents, to a certain extent, the adaptation and the search for sustainable solutions to these upheavals. In 2020, the already precarious situation was worsened by the economic crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. GDP contracted by an astonishing -8.6% in 2020. According to IMF estimates, growth has rebounded to 3% in 2021 and is expected to increase further to 3.3% in 2022 before slowing to 2.5% in 2023. However, with the rise in interest rates in the US, and staggering fuel and food prices around the world, Tunisia’s economy is in considerable flux, and the country’s heavy dependence on energy imports jeopardizes its energy security. The Government is counting on the loan from the International Monetary Fund to finance the budget for the year, but currently, the state of the negotiations is unclear. On the other side, the main industry sectors, like agriculture counts for 10.1% of the GDP and employs 14% of the workforce, Industry represents 21.7% of the GDP, and employs 33% of the active population are living an improvement in production. Outlook The referendum on the revised constitution is unlikely to produce the political changes needed to address the social and economic problems facing Tunisia. Especially since President Saied and his Cabinet, including the government, will be involved by providing their advice and technical knowledge, there is little hope for change. Overall, the strengthening hold on power and democratic erosion of President Saied, the war in Ukraine, and the subsequent price increase and food shortages are likely to worsen the social divisions in Tunisia. For these reasons, tensions in the country remain high and various strikes will continue to occur, but large-scale uprisings are unlikely. About the author: Oussama Kebir Oussama is a weapons systems engineer, PhD in computer science applied to counter-terrorism, and a Master student in human rights and international humanitarian law. He has proven experience in analytical skills, crisis intervention, geopolitical analysis, strategic planning, research, and management. He has also several publications related to counter-terrorism in international conferences and journals.

Written by Annette Bross The Amazon is the largest tropical rainforest in the world. Not only does it regulate temperature outside the Americas and provide the oxygen we need to breathe, the Amazon rainforest also carries water to a substantial part of the South American continent, in turn considered one of the breadbaskets of the world. In the last 40 years, the Amazon has lost an area equivalent to 8.4 million soccer fields, and according to a study by the Climate Observatory published in April 2022, deforestation reached a new monthly peak of 1,012.5 square kilometers. The deforestation has been the result of both legal and illicit mining, as well as the expanding agricultural industry, which is safeguarded by Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s policies. As Brazil holds approximately 60% of the Amazon rainforest, a conflict between economic development and environmental concerns is currently taking place in the region. Due to climate change, deforestation, and wheat shortages as a result of the war in Ukraine, it is crucial for the world to reconsider the importance of such a vital ecosystem and closely watch President Bolsonaro’s policies. The Bolsonaro Regime Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro came into power in January 2019. During his election campaign the nationalist politician promised to greatly boost the country's economy. He has done so, but at the cost of one of the world's largest and most vital ecosystems. Bolsonaro has publicly stated that his government aims to stop or slow down the deforestation of the rainforest, but behind the scenes there has instead been an active engagement in a campaign to privatize and boost economic development in the Amazon. Not only that but Brazil’s environmental agencies’ budgets also got slashed as their mission of protecting the biggest oxygen producing area of the world is incompatible with Bolsonaro’s economic policies directed toward industrial development inside the rainforest. At the COP26 climate summit in Glasgow, Brazilian representatives committed to end illegal deforestation by 2028. However, the government has yet to present adequate plans and concrete results toward this goal. The Bolsonaro regime is not the first one to turn a blind eye to actions that harm the Amazon, but it is the first one to encourage land grabs like never before. The Bolsonaro government has actively accelerated the course of the Amazon rainforest’s destruction. Corruption is one of the most prominent contributing factors to this problem. In 2019 penalties for cutting down trees in protected areas were around 17 billion dollars, but only less than 4% were actually ever collected. This means there is currently a severe lack of implementation of Brazil’s forest protection laws. Deforestation rates on lands securely held by Indigenous peoples tend to be significantly lower than in other comparable areas, yet Bolsonaro and his allies in Congress have promoted a bill to prevent Indigenous peoples from obtaining legal recognition of their traditional lands. A good example of this are the plans to construct infrastructure along the Tapajos River basin, where several dams are planned to be built. This would deprive indigenous populations, and the flora and fauna of the rainforest, of their access to water. Mining in the Amazon Mining is one of Brazil’s most important economic activities as it contributes an estimated gross value of USD 43.7 billion or 2.4% of its GDP. With one of the world's largest iron ore mines in Carajás, Pará, and reserves of 7.2 billion metric tons of iron ore, Vale S.A. is Brazil's largest mining firm and the world’s second-largest iron producer. Iron ore makes up almost 74% of the country’s mining sector based on 2020 tax figures. Brazil is also a significant gold, nickel, tin, and zinc producer. Due to rising gold prices, local gold miners in the Amazon rainforest have recently expanded their operations. These miners are thought to account for around a third of Brazil's total gold production. At the same time, illegal mining accounts for about 15% of gold production. Local miners and global companies have prioritized their economic needs over environmental protection, despite the fact that this behavior has already resulted in mercury pollution in the water. In the state of Pará, Brazilian authorities estimate that 30 metric tons of illegal gold worth around 1.1 billion USD have been excavated - this is six times more than the legal gold excavated in Brazil. On top of that, 2,300 illegal mining sites have been found in protected areas. Local Impact In an effort to extend mining in the Amazon even further, the government introduced bill PL191/2020 in 2020 to regulate commercial mining on protected Indigenous lands. According to InfoAmazonia, almost 2,500 requests have been submitted, encompassing a total area of 5.6 million km2. This includes more than half of Brazil. If the bill is passed, mining might damage 17.6 million hectares (176,000 square kilometers) or 15% of total Indigenous lands in the Amazon. About 97% of these mining demands are concentrated on the territory of 21 isolated tribes, which tend to be the most vulnerable to the consequences of these kinds of operations. The deforestation of the Amazon rainforest has led to the displacement of hundreds of indigenous communities despite said territories having a protected status. Permanently evicting indigenous people from their land is forbidden under article 231 of the Brazilian constitution. As a rippling effect of the displacement of hundreds of people, violence has increased due to the fight for land and natural resources. In addition, Brazil’s indigenous peoples are more likely to assist in illicit mining and be exploited as a result of it. Given the increasing need for mining activity as a result of the shortages caused by the war between Russia and Ukraine, this could eventually lead to the potential extinction of many of Brazil’s indigenous’ peoples and their rich cultures and ways of life. The Russian-Ukrainian War and Fertilizer Demands Brazil is the largest importer of potash, a powder that is obtained from the ashes of burned wood and sometimes used as fertilizer. For the largest part, the country relies on imports of this fertilizer for its grain crops. A quarter of Brazil’s demand for potash has usually been met by Russia, which halted exports due to sanctions following the country’s invasion of Ukraine. President Bolsonaro has used the conflict in Ukraine as the motivation for his newest attempt to gain further access to indigenous lands. During a radio interview, he stated: “This crisis between Ukraine and Russia is a good opportunity for us. We have a bill in Congress that will allow us to exploit those indigenous lands.” Due to the suspension of Russian exports, Brazil will be forced to meet the demand for potash through different methods, and members of Congress will likely vote in favor of the exploitation of indigenous territories. It's crucial to remember that this discourse about potash is, of course, extremely political, especially with elections coming up in October. Bolsonaro needs to find a solid approach to continue to appeal to a fraction of the Brazilian population, especially since former President Lula da Silva launched his candidacy and became the man leading in the polls to win the October election. There is now an increase in the demand for Brazil’s agricultural industry as a result of the worldwide wheat shortages due to the war in Ukraine. This increases the internal demand for more potash and fertilizers in order to meet the world's needs and possibly take advantage of this opportunity to grow its economy. The Amazon Rainforest’s Future Enhanced mining operations would impact the entire world. In addition to this already critical scenario in which we only have until 2025 to halt irreparable environmental harm, the war in Ukraine has exacerbated the issue. Rising demand for wheat and minerals is shifting production to other parts of the globe which may be at greater risk of violence, criminal activities, and corruption. This will impact the supply chain, the livelihoods of the inhabitants, and the environment. About the author: Annette Bross Annette holds a bachelor's degree in History from Universidad Iberoamericana in Mexico City. She has now moved to the Netherlands to pursue a master’s at Leiden University in International Relations and Diplomacy. She is passionate about development, climate action, public policy, and security challenges with a strong commitment to social justice. She has experience in researching topics like the influence of soft power in Latin America and the Middle East. The article was edited by Ruben Pfeijffer

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Written by Sietske Moshuldayev This May 2022 report highlights conflicts with diverse causes, threats and consequences. As the Russia-Ukraine war develops in Europe, the economic situation in Sri Lanka deteriorates amidst political challenges. Meanwhile, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mali face jihadist insurgencies, both causing international commotion. Costa Rica is experiencing increased cyber security threats, carrying lessons for other states. As for brief alerts: Israel and Palestine may continue to see deadly attacks, just as regional violence in Tajikistan may escalate. Additionally, challenges to the legitimacy of Pakistan’s central government will likely persist - much like in Somalia, but under very different circumstances. Finally, diplomatic spats in the Taiwan Strait are likely to continue. The conflicts described in more detail below - selected based on open-source intelligence gathering - do not intend to cover all ongoing crises around the globe but merely call attention to some of the most pertinent and interesting developments in the past weeks. 1. World Conflicts - May 2022 a. The Ongoing Russia-Ukraine War With Mariupol and Kherson captured by Russian forces, Russian attacks in the Donbas are now at their most intense point, according to Ukrainian officials. Peace talks are largely stalled and Russia continues to publicly justify its ‘special military operation’, while Ukraine reiterates it will not accept territorial losses. Meanwhile, foreign companies continue to exit Russia as its citizens feel the impacts of Western sanctions. The EU will halt the import of Russian oil supplies via sea routes by the end of 2022, albeit the deal has shown rifts in EU unanimity. The US supports Ukraine financially and militarily and Finland and Sweden have applied for NATO membership this month. The next steps, however, are on halt due to objections from Turkey. As the war goes on, UN figures indicate approximately 6.8 million people have fled Ukraine, with some 2.2 million people having (re-)entered Ukraine and casualty figures rising. Simultaneously, the ripple effects of the war are still felt across the globe, especially worsening humanitarian conditions and food shortages. b. Worsening Political and Economic Crises in Sri Lanka Political and economic conditions continue to deteriorate in Sri Lanka as opposition demands for President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to resign are not met and citizens face pressing shortages of energy, food and medical supplies. Following turmoil that started months ago , the country's contested Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa - the Presidents’ brother - finally resigned and was replaced by Ranil Wickremesinghe. Wickremesinghe, who has already held the PM post five times and is now also Minister of Finance, intends to limit the Presidential powers and secure deals with the International Monetary Fund, Japan and China to support the country’s failing economy. These moves, however, do not yet seem to appease the disgruntled opposition and citizens as calls for the removal of the president remain. As an important warning for countries that face similar economic woes, such as Nepal , Sri Lanka’s crises are likely to see further escalations and require a close watch in the upcoming weeks. c. Intensified Fighting in The Democratic Republic of Congo Instability in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) worsened this month as militant groups intensified their attacks on local targets, then to be countered by government forces. On May 25th, M23 attacked an important military base in Rumangabo, signalling their most intense offensive since 2013. DRC’s army has reclaimed some lost territories but UN statistics indicate that the fighting in the meantime forced over 72,000 people to flee in just one week. With a total of 5.6 million people already internally displaced throughout the country and at least 120 active militant groups in the east, reignited attacks are troubling signs. These events have also further complicated ties between the DRC and Rwanda, the former accusing the latter of supporting M23. Various international actors have expressed their concern over the conflict yet it is likely that the ongoing conflict will see more violence and challenges in the upcoming weeks. d. Shifting International Cooperation Efforts in Mali Following heightened concerns last month , international efforts to bring stability to Mali have disintegrated even further. Mali has called off its defence accords with France and is also pulling away from the G5 Sahel, with which it was countering jihadist insurgencies in the wider area. Claiming it has seen no progress, this isolates the government from its neighbours as it has also accused the West of supporting an attempted coup this month. Meanwhile, the European Union has reaffirmed the suspension of its military training in the country, with Germany reducing its EU commitments but sending more support to the UN mission. Militant activity simultaneously continues to cause casualties and challenge the central government, with reports indicating at least 500 civilian deaths since the beginning of this year. As worsening instability in Mali is likely, neighbouring countries such as Burkina Faso, Togo and Benin are also likely to see further increases in spillover militant attacks. e. Threatening Cyber Attacks in Costa Rica Costa Rica’s President Rodrigo Chavez declared a national state of emergency on May 8th following cyber-attacks on at least 27 government institutions. The actions have been claimed by Conti, a Russia-based hacker group known for targeting Western states and businesses for money. Newly elected President Chavez, however, refuses to pay the 20 million USD ransom despite taxation systems, export services, health care institutions and other services being impacted since April 12th. Claiming to work with insiders, Conti has also threatened the overthrow of the government and has already released some stolen data. Even though Costa Rica is now collaborating with the US, Spain and Israel to ramp up their cyber defences, threats and impacts are likely to persist. Notably, states of emergency have not previously been declared following cyber-attacks and the ongoing cyber threat looms for other countries too, where hackers may similarly operate for ransoms or demand more politically-laden outcomes. 2. Brief Alerts - May 2022 a. Ongoing Israel-Palestine Tensions Rifts between Israel and Palestine persisted this month as attacks and clashes led to deaths on both sides once again - including the sudden shooting of an Aljazeera reporter. Like last month, violent confrontations at the Al-Aqsa Mosque indicate that the conflict may see tensions rise further. b. Regional Tension Escalates in Tajikistan Disputes intensified in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast this month as local protestors demanding political change were brutally met by government forces. On different occasions, over 40 people died and (officially) 46 have been arrested. With tensions at their highest since Tajikistan’s 1992-1997 civil war and heated since events in November 2021 , the Oblast may see further escalations . c. Political and Economic Uncertainty in Pakistan Violent clashes ensued in Islamabad on May 26th between government forces and supporters of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, who was ousted from office in April. Having set an ultimatum for new elections in June, Khan is likely to continue to challenge the legitimacy of the incumbent government. This comes as the country faces a growing economic crisis . d. Insecurity Remains in Somalia Despite appointing a new president and thereby securing an extension of International Monetary Fund loans, much remains uncertain in Somalia. Al-Shabaab militants continue to attack government and African Union peacekeeping forces, while critics are wary of the impacts of US troop redeployments . Instability is likely to persist. e. Diplomatic Spats Concerning Taiwan Sino-US relations were tested this month as US President Joe Biden indicated he would be prepared to use force to defend Taiwan, angering China. With pressure on Taiwan heightened since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine - due to fears of China doing the same - global and regional relations may see further intensifications, if not mixed signalling . Conclusion This past month has primarily seen a continuation of conflicts where armed confrontations were already ongoing, such as in Ukraine, Mali, Somalia and Israel and Palestine, or where tensions had already been brewing, such as in Sri Lanka, Costa Rica, Pakistan and Taiwan. Others have seen intensifications in violence in recent weeks, such as in the DRC and Tajikistan. What will happen in these locations over the next weeks remains uncertain but it is likely that most situations will deteriorate. This may, too, be true for conflicts not considered in this report. As events play out in all conflicts, implications will undoubtedly fall upon both local and foreign groups, intentionally or unintentionally. In order to increase awareness and be well-prepared should escalations arise, these conflicts call for close monitoring in the upcoming weeks. About the author: Sietske Moshuldayev Sietske has an international background and is inherently intrigued by the causes and consequences of geopolitical events. She has completed two bachelors at the University of Leiden (International Studies, BA & Political Science, BSc) and currently pursues a masters in International Security at Sciences Po, Paris. Having specialized in East Asian affairs for her undergraduate studies, she now focuses on global risks and risk management. This article was edited by Ruben Pfeijffer

Written by Facundo E. Saponara As NATO members continue to concentrate on the ongoing events in Eastern Europe, the situation in the Middle East, particularly in Syria, has been remarkably dynamic in the last couple of weeks. ISIS has been capable of exploiting the current security situation and may probably continue to do so at a larger scale in the following months. What is needed to put a stop to the groups revived growth? Attack on Ghuwaryan prison Since the fall of the physical caliphate in 2019, thousands of Islamic State combatants have been placed in Kurdish-run prisons to temporarily limit the possibility of the group's resurgence in the region. However, thousands of the arrested suspects linked to the Islamic State have been released due to the perceived 'low threat' they pose. Kurdish authorities informed their prisons currently hold over 12,000 ISIS-linked detainees. According to the UN, Kurdish prisons appear to be overpopulated and undermanned. Which has made these installations very likely targets for ISIS activity either from within (indoctrination and radicalization of other inmates, facilitated by the poor living conditions and the lack of control) or from outside (assaults on the structure itself). On 20 January, 2022, over 100 fighters linked with Daesh attacked the Ghuwayran prison in Hassakeh, northern Syria. At the time, Ghuwayran held an estimated 3,500 ISIL-linked prisoners and approximately 5,000 detainees total, consequently making the prison an important target for the group. The scale of the attack is exemplary of ISIL’s expansionist pursuit in the Syrian Arab Republic and the Middle East. Daesh was capable of mobilizing over 100 of its fighters for a single attack (in the largest operation in almost three years) which should be considered a sign that the group has slowly but surely been securing limited gains in the country. Such victories have materialized in renewed control over areas of the Syrian desert, where the security apparatus of the Syrian Arab Armed Forces is not capable of projecting power in a permanent manner. ISIL used this critical factor to expand its presence further north and exploit security gaps in the areas between Kurdish-controlled and Syrian-controlled territories. The limited pressure suffered by the group has increased its operational margin, as local, regional and global actors continue to pursue objectives not necessarily aligned with a continued military effort against the Islamic State. From the Syrian perspective, the biggest threat continues to lay in the Turkish presence in Northern Syria and the Turkish-backed rebel groups in the Northwest of the country. These circumstances have created a context where the Islamic State is capable of exploiting power vacuums that are existent in the country after a decade of war, the partial withdrawal of the US from Syria, and the limited control of the majority of the country's territory by the Syrian Arab Armed Forces. U.S. response The attack on Ghuwayran was considered critical enough for the US to provide air support for the Kurdish forces holding back the terrorist militants. Additionally, Washington put in motion a raid in Syrian territory that liquidated Daesh's leader Abu Ibrahim al-Qurayshi in February 2022. The death of an ISIS Caliph is not a minor occurrence. The loyalty sworn by the group's cells is not to Daesh itself but to the specific Caliph leading the organization at a particular moment. Every time a leader of ISIS is eliminated, all cell leaders need to pledge loyalty to the new Caliph. A very political process that might not always lead to an actual pledge. However, alarmingly, ISIS has recently been gaining ground in Syria and Iraq, and the outer provinces. This, in addition to ISIL's demonstrated ability to adapt to new circumstances, has probably simplified the decision-making process for most cell leaders. In the past weeks, there have been numerous pledges of loyalty by the group's external leaders that were to be expected as a result of the victories the organization has been securing as of late. How the global context could benefit ISIL Even as the group still finds itself limited in its capabilities and reach, ISIL has regained strength in Syria and the region. The global, regional, and local contexts continue to benefit the growth of Daesh. The events at a global level are worrying as they could potentially worsen the security scenario in a matter of months. The direct or indirect involvement of the two major players in Syria, Russia and the United States, in the Ukrainian conflict might greatly benefit Daesh's activity in the country in the short term. Unconfirmed reports of Russian withdrawal from some areas of Syria and their replacement by Iranian troops have also been circulating as of late. Analysts have considered this might be a prelude to a possible partial Russian withdrawal. Up until this point, the Russian invasion of Ukraine hasn't been costly enough to demand the relocation of the Russian units deployed in Syria. That being said, the dawn of new threats may force Russia into making such a move. The possible inclusion of Finland and Sweden in NATO, the ever-growing number of NATO troops deployed to the alliance's 'eastern flank', and the indefinite continuation of the conflict in Ukraine could potentially alter the balance of power in Syria. If reports on Iranian forces replacing Russian military units are correct, the ingress of a new flux of Iranian fighters may fuel sectarian tensions in the near future, straining the Syrian society even further and opening the gates for Daesh's exploitation of the country's historical sectarian conflict. Facing China's expansion and a possible war with Russia, Washington will likely continue to focus their efforts on their near-peer adversaries. Thus, limiting their actions in the Middle East and possibly withdrawing troops as the context in the region continues to become more unfavorable for maintaining a military presence. If the United States were to continue its current course of action in the Middle East, US forces will be restricted to reactionary military operations. Such an approach would facilitate the growth of Daesh in Syria as long as they continue to maintain a low operational profile. State of ISIL and policy recommendations The current operational status of the Islamic State (low-level insurgency) makes them incapable of exploiting sectarian tensions at the national level. But ISIL has proven its ability to make use of sectarian and social tensions in the areas where the group is present. Thus, recruiting more militants into their lines and weakening their local adversaries. The potential for ISIS to grow in Syria is considerable, especially if the aforementioned scenarios were to materialize. Very recently, the new leader of ISIL, Abu Hasan al-Hashemi al-Qurashi, has vowed to take revenge on the death of the group's previous leader and is urging its supporters to take advantage of the situation in Ukraine and attack Europe from within. If the context continues to facilitate it, ISIL will probably continue to augment its operations in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere (mainly in Africa and Central Asia). If Daesh is allowed to grow at a sustained rate in Africa or Central Asia, the outer cells may be able to function as sponsors of terrorist activity in the Levant. Similarly to how ISIL sponsored the growth of its cells at a global level in the previous decade. The Islamic State continues to grow in Syria as a consequence of the limited threat that they currently pose to local, regional and global actors. If ISIL considerably expanded and established a permanent presence over a particular area (unlikely as they continue to benefit from small-scale operations), this would turn their operatives, capabilities, and facilities into more vulnerable targets, damaging their activities in the region. Additionally, IS cannot currently sponsor terrorist attacks in Europe. The Islamic State is heavily dependent on sleeper cells -as well as "lone wolves"- that are spread all over the continent to take action and acquire the means to do so by themselves. Turkish officials announced the capture of a member of ISIL on May 26th, 2022, after a raid in Istanbul. National authorities claim this is the Islamic State's new leader as of February 2022. If ISIL's leader is truly detained in Turkey, this would be a historical event as a Caliph of the Islamic State has never been captured alive before. Consequently, this could alter the current trend of the group's operational expansion in the region through a method of leadership decapitation that the Islamic State has never previously experienced, namely imprisonment. The capture of Öcalan, leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), is exemplary of the fact that capturing alive the leadership of a terrorist organization could prove to be much more destabilizing than eliminating them (at least in the short term). Lamentably, the Islamic State has proven itself capable of adapting to new circumstances rather rapidly and efficiently. And, although the capture of Öcalan was a bargaining chip for the Turkish government and forced the PKK into reducing its lethality, this was just a momentary solution as PKK has become more and more lethal as time went by. This could very much be the case for the Islamic State as even if the group wasn't able to fully adjust to these new set of circumstances in the short term, ISIL's senior leadership could continue operating at a local scale. At least, until communications with the group's Caliph can be reestablished. Which, considering Öcalan is still capable of leading the PKK from within a Turkish prison (not a minor detail since the PKK presents a much more of a threat to the Turkish State than the Islamic State does), ISIL may very well replicate this strategy. Security forces all over the European Union should continue to hunt down as many of the group's sleeper cells as possible to limit the threat of a new wave of terrorist attacks and reduce the number of individuals that may fall under the indoctrination program of IS. Security measures are to be put in motion to limit the growth of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, in particular through military cooperation with all parties that have a considerable military presence in the region. In order to accomplish this, intermediaries, such as the Kurds or the Iraqi government, would play a crucial role in facilitating cooperation between adversaries and achieving the shared goal of limiting the growth of the Islamic State. Furthermore, Humanitarian support is to be provided to Kurdish forces in northern Syria as a prerequisite to limit the success of ISIL's indoctrination programs in refugee camps by bettering the living conditions of those residing inside them. Military and technical support should be directed towards Kurdish forces in order to increment the security inside al-Hol and other refugee camps, properly man and equip Kurdish prisons and increment the security on the border between the Kurdish-controlled and Syrian-controlled territories. And lastly, in the light of a new set of Turkish offensives on northern Syria, NATO members should instigate both Kurdish and Turkish actors into making compromises, such as the usage of ISIS prisons and the recognition of their direct vicinity as defensive zones protected by Kurdish forces. These zones should be left unharmed by the Turkish army and Turkey-aligned militias. About the author: Facundo E. Saponara Facundo E. Saponara holds a BA in Government and International Relations from the Universidad Argentina de la Empresa and is currently enrolled in the Master’s degree in Strategy and Geopolitics at the Escuela Superior de Guerra. He has been assigned as the Area Coordinator of the Middle East Investigation Team at the Center for International Policy Studies from the University of Buenos Aires. Facundo has dedicated most of his professional and academic career to the study of international security and asymmetric warfare in particular, with a special interest in terrorism. The article was edited by Ruben Pfeijffer

Written by Jacob Dickinson After two years of canceled meetings due to COVID-19, on 15 May 2022, China’s Deputy Director of the Foreign Ministry of Information Zhao Lijian called for face-to-face consultations on a renewed code of conduct between the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Considering that the PRC is currently experiencing severe lockdowns due to the rapid spread of COVID-19, why has Beijing called for these negotiations to go ahead? The PRC’s use of coercive force in the SCS adds to escalating regional tensions in the Asia-Pacific. The prospect of an invasion of Taiwan, Sri Lanka’s escalating social and political crisis, and North Korea’s test-firing of ballistic missiles pose dire challenges to stability in the wider region. Whether a code of conduct can ease escalating tensions and accommodate the interests of all claimants in the SCS remains an open question. Competing Claims The South China Sea (SCS) covers an area of over 3,000 square kilometers and includes a wide range of resources and strategic routes. As well as comprising land and islands, the SCS consists of significant oil and gas deposits. The SCS is also vital for fishing communities in the region as an important source of income and food. Located at the center of the most economically dynamic region in the world, up to 40% of maritime trade between the EU and Asia is conducted through the SCS. The strategic value of the SCS has also been met with competing claims which go back decades. In 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) claimed the ‘nine-dash line’ encompassing around 90% of the SCS as an area of historic exclusive sovereignty. This line was meant to demarcate a maritime claim to the reefs and rocks of the South China Sea, yet Beijing has interpreted the line as an area of exclusive sovereignty. This is by far the largest claim on the SCS, but other states in the region also have disputed claims. According to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), signed in 1982, signatory states have the right to develop resources within 400km of their coasts. As a result, disputes have frequently arisen through diplomatic, force and direct coercion between claimant states. Changing Security Environment The code of conduct was first conceived by ASEAN member states as a response to the PRC’s military occupation of the Mischief Reef over 25 years ago. A multilateral agreement was reached in 2002 in Phnom Penh, with both Beijing and ASEAN seeking to avoid US involvement in regional affairs. Since then, progress on a new code of conduct has been slow. There is little agreement on fundamental issues; the code’s geographic scope, outright bans on the seizure of land and whether the agreement will be binding on all signatory states. Beijing is reluctant to agree to a code of conduct that could constrain its future actions in the SCS. ASEAN member states such as Laos, Cambodia and Thailand, have little direct interest in the SCS and prefer to keep security issues away from deepening economic relations with the PRC. This came to the surface when, in 2016, a prepared communique between the PRC and ASEAN member states was resolutely retracted due to objections from Beijing and member states. The SCS faces a vastly different security situation when compared with that of 2002. Since 2007, Beijing’s assertiveness through coercion to control the SCS has risen dramatically. The People’s Liberation Army Navy has built military complexes with airstrips and ports on constructed islands. Chinese State-Owned Enterprises regularly drill for oil and gas within other claimant’s Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). This trend has only worsened during the COVID-19 pandemic. The PRC unilaterally claims two administrative districts covering the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands, both of which are claimed by Vietnam. The PLA Navy launches regular patrol boats and military exercises with the PRC’s most advanced destroyer. Toward Consensus? While the PRC has often exploited divisions within ASEAN member states to enhance its own interests, there are indications of ASEAN taking a more unified stance. The PRC has begun to provoke other actors in the region through drilling and land seizures. Beijing demanded in 2021 that Indonesia stop drilling for oil and gas in the Natuna Islands. In response, Indonesia invited counterparts from Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore and Vietnam to ‘foster brotherhood’ against Beijing’s assertiveness in the SCS. Indonesia’s size and political weight could provide a basis for more consensus among ASEAN states to counter China’s aggression. Analysts have also pointed to the use of legal and diplomatic means to resolve tensions in the region. In 2012, Chinese fishing vessels entered the Scarborough Shoal and the Philippines reacted by sending Coast Guards. After a month-long stand-off between the PLA Navy and the Philippine Navy, the PRC coerced the Philippines through informal sanctions on agricultural products. In response, the Philippines brought a case against the PRC for violating the UNCLOS treaty. The arbitrary tribunal ruled that the ‘nine-dash line’ had no historical basis and no basis in international law. However, the Philippines' former president, Rodrigo Duterte has refused to attempt to enforce the ruling and the PLA navy has remained on the Shoal. However, the 2016 ruling has dealt a blow to the legal legitimacy of the PRC’s maritime claims to the ‘nine-dash line’ and could set a precedent for other claimant states. Vietnam is the most vulnerable to Beijing’s military pressure. The PRC’s invasion of Vietnam in 1978 and frequently coercive exchanges have led to deteriorating relations between the two countries. After China sent a ship for months-long seismic survey in Vietnam’s internationally designated EEZ, Hanoi issued a warning on bringing legal proceedings against the PRC in 2019. Other actors such as the EU and the US have supported it and other claimant states could take similar actions. Why is Beijing Pushing for a Code of Conduct? The call for a code of conduct has been looming since 2019, but COVID-19 has delayed further negotiations. However, Zhao Lijian's call for the finalization of a code of conduct comes at an important time for three reasons. First, the yearly rotating ASEAN chair is held by Cambodia. Hun Sen, the country's authoritarian leader, seeks to promote economic ties with China and has little interest in the SCS. It is far from certain that the PRC has complete diplomatic support from Burma, Laos and Thailand, but Beijing could gain additional support for a new code of conduct in line with its own interests. Second, the newly elected president of the Philippines and son of former dictator Ferdinand Marcos Jr pledged during the 2022 general election campaign to work closely with China. Although every leader in Southeast Asia acknowledges the PRC’s economic and diplomatic influence, Marcos has argued that the 2016 ruling was ineffective and Manila will seek a bilateral code of conduct instead of at a regional level. Yet this should not overcompensate for the strategic realities facing the Philippines. There have been protests against China’s aggression and the PRC is far more unpopular when compared with the US. Up to 42% of the Philippines have a favorable view of China compared to 80% of the US. Should Marcos be seen to deliberately play to Beijing’s interests, he could see his popularity fall dramatically. It is uncertain whether Marcos’ entrance to Malacanang Palace could result in an agreement more conducive to Beijing’s interests. Lastly, the US-ASEAN meeting on 15 May 2022 reinforced Beijing’s worries of encirclement in its perceived sphere of influence. The US provided military commitments to the region. Japan has reiterated its concerns over Beijing’s assertiveness and offered new patrol boats to Indonesia and other allies. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently stated that, despite Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Biden administration's long-term aim is to shape the strategic environment to counter the PRC’s aggressive actions. Beijing is aware of the relative cohesion of the West against Russia as a result of Russia’s war against Ukraine. In this context, the code of conduct could recalibrate the PRC’s foreign policy toward the SCS as a partner for ASEAN countries, presenting itself as a collaborative partner to ASEAN. Future outlook As General Secretary Xi Jinping continues the zero-COVID policy, the PRC’s collapse in economic growth and its ensuing global economic slowdown could potentially lead to further escalation in the region. While the code of conduct negotiations could lead to better management of tense relationships, it could also entrench the asymmetry between ASEAN and the PRC. The code of conduct will have immediate effects on the sovereignty and security of the region. Without accountability, the next two decades could resemble the previous two decades; rising tensions, a breach of national sovereignty and further instability in a region with acute security challenges. About the author: Jacob Dickinson Jacob studies Global Political Economy at Leiden University. He is passionate about international development and is looking to expand his expertise in geopolitics and crisis management. Curious about other cultures, he has traveled to Europe and Asia for both academic study and professional purposes. His expertise includes subjects like the geopolitics of energy, China’s international political economy, and the implications of globalized supply chains for industrial policy. He is particularly interested in the evolving political and economic relationships between China and ASEAN, and the consequences for regional development and security. The article was edited by Alessia Cappelletti.