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Today (01 April 2022) we released our latest Situational Report for Western and Central Asia. The next scheduled update is 9 P.M. UTC, 11 April 2022. Additional updates will be made as to the situation warrants, with more frequent updates at higher alert levels. Our West and Central Asia Situational Report covers the following countries; #Turkey, #Syria, #Iraq, #Iran, #Kuwait, #SaudiArabia, #Qatar, #Bahrain, #Oman, #UAE, #Afghanistan, #Caucasus, #Pakistan , #Kyrgyzstan, #Uzbekistan, #Yemen#egypt As usual, a closer look at the effect of the conflict in #Ukraine on #Aviation. Other sectors might also benefit from the information provided. Please feel free to download, use and share this SitRep. (mobile browser versions do not always show download) 01/04/2022 Western and Central Asia Sitrep Version 1.3 PDF 08/03/2022 Western and Central Asia Sitrep Version 1.2 PDF 08/03/2022 Western and Central Asia Sitrep Version 1.1 PDF 02/03/2022 Western and Central Asia Sitrep Version 1.0 PDF

Sitrep in response to the recent missile attack on Erbil, Iraq Incumbent of Iraq, Iran, and Israel. Version 1.1 (16-03-2022): - Updated the Current situation - Introduced a brief history of Israeli-Iranian military actions - Updated the Conclusion Current situation On Saturday 12/03/2022 Iran fired up to a dozen missiles near the city of Erbil, which is the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan. Early reports speculated that the intended targets were the newly built United States Consulate in the city, US forces stationed at Erbil International Airport [ORER], and/or the United States Special Operations airbase adjacent to the town of Harir, North-West of Erbil. However, the Iranian government claimed that the intended target was an Israeli Mossad (Israeli Intelligence Services) base. Iran has also claimed these strikes to be retaliatory, as they have claimed that in recent months Israel has carried out multiple attacks against their military infrastructure. Of these, the most recent one occurred on 09/03/2022, when Israel killed two Iranian Quds (Iranian Republican Guard) officers in Syria via airstrike. Read more in PDF>> 16-03-2022 Sitrep Erbil v.1.1 (download as PDF) 13-03-2022 Sitrep Erbil v.1.0 (download as PDF)

Written by Sytske Post It has been two years since the COVID-19 pandemic triggered supply chain turmoil around the world. Restricted access to markets and labor posed significant challenges for the global economy. Currently, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has yet again put the world's supply chains to the test. Agricultural commodities are among the chains feeling the most ripple effect of the war as Russia and Ukraine are two of the biggest wheat suppliers, producing about a quarter of the world's exports. The current conflict has, therefore, heavily disrupted the global wheat market. The effects of this disruption will most severely be felt by countries in the Middle East and North Africa, who are highly dependent on wheat supplies from both Russia and Ukraine. These new developments are a cause for security concern, as certain countries in this region are already in dire economic, political, and social conditions. Increases in food prices and food shortages are thus likely to exacerbate humanitarian conditions in the region. Disruptions in agricultural supply chains Food insecurity is a growing challenge for countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Conflicts and protracted crises are amongst the main drivers behind the increased food insecurity. Today, the situation is additionally exacerbated by disruptions in supply chains. The MENA region, in particular, is the world's largest cereal importer. As a result of this dependency, the region is extremely vulnerable to supply chain disruptions. This import dependency is often linked to environmental constraints and growing populations, and the growth of urban areas. But also influxes of migration movements, both internal and across countries, resulting from instability and conflict put strains on local food systems. However, weather instability and climate change, which are linked to rising temperatures and more severe and frequent extreme weather events, as well as changing agro-ecological conditions, are thought to be the most detrimental to agricultural production in the region. The most prominent effect of climate change in the MENA region is ​​water scarcity, with experts routinely describing the region as "the world's most water-stressed." Lower rainfall and higher temperatures are expected to shorten growing periods, diminish crop yields and productivity, and negatively affect animal output through changes in the length of the grazing season and less drinking water. Climate change-induced warmer and drier climates are, therefore, expected to have a significant impact on agricultural patterns and, by extension, food security. These unfavorable conditions are among the reasons this region is dependent on food imports. However, also major producers of wheat supplies are affected by these weather conditions. Worldwide stockpiles plummeted in the fourth quarter of 2021, as a result of crop damage caused by droughts, frost, and heavy rain in the United States, Canada, Russia, Ukraine, and the remainder of the Black Sea region. A report by the World Food Programme stated that "2021 was the third-costliest year on record for climate-related disasters. More frequent droughts, floods, and storms were reported across the globe leading to widespread food insecurity". These external disruptions are one of the factors driving the rise in wheat prices, which had already increased by 49% above their 2017-2021 average. The COVID-19 outbreak was also linked to initial increases in prices. Multiple national lockdowns resulted in the delay and disruption of global supply chains, as the pandemic restricted access to transportation, markets, and labor. Other factors included decreased food demand, as well as panic buying at the start of the pandemic. The MENA region was heavily impacted by these disruptions, due to the region's high dependency on food imports. Climate change and COVID-19 related disruptions had already placed the MENA region in a vulnerable state. Today, they are faced with yet another additional challenge: the war in Ukraine. Wheat shortages’ impact on the MENA region The war in Ukraine is currently the biggest threat to the global wheat supply. Russia is the top global exporter of wheat and Ukraine is amongst the top five in the world. The war has halted its production, and the impact on wheat prices is already significant. Since the invasion of Ukraine, wheat prices rose by another 62%. The total of their production accounts for about a quarter of the world's exported wheat. The disruption and delay in their agricultural exports exacerbate food insecurity in regions highly dependent on their supplies. These disruptions in the supply chain will most acutely be felt in the MENA region, where countries strongly rely on Ukrainian and Russian wheat supplies. Military action in the Black Sea has caused a standstill in export transportation from both Ukraine and Russia to the MENA region. Ukraine also announced, on March 9, 2022, that it will stop grain and other food exports to avoid a domestic humanitarian crisis. In addition to these disruptions, other challenges are still prevalent. Farmers are fleeing the violence, and the conflict is damaging infrastructure and equipment. Therefore, the disruptions are likely to endure. The fighting can also have a negative impact on the upcoming harvest, especially if it persists until April, when the planting season begins. Russia has some of its wheat and other commodities moving by land, however, the complexity of navigating sanctions and financial measures has still hindered its trade. For example, in reaction to these economic sanctions, Russia's trade and industry Minister suggested a halt in fertilizer exports on March 4. The supply of wheat in the MENA region was already in dire condition due to the effects of climate change (e.g. water scarcity, droughts) and fragile political and economic conditions (e.g regional conflict, COVID-19). The war in Ukraine adds fuel to the already existing food insecurity in the region. The last time the price was this high was during a global food crisis in 2008, which prompted political upheaval around the world. Therefore, these circumstances can enhance the possibility of social unrest erupting in a region already facing numerous grievances. Egypt One of the countries most affected by the disrupted wheat supply chain is Egypt, which imports over 80% of its wheat from Russia and Ukraine. The current conflict, therefore, has thrown Egypt's administration into disarray, as concerns grow about whether the national food rationing system can be maintained. More than 88% of the population is registered with this system. To maintain a constant supply of bread for them the government has to gather roughly 10 million tonnes of wheat. The government already issued a three-month embargo on the export of wheat, flour, and other staples on March 10. There are currently 4 million tonnes of wheat reserves, but the government will need to come up with another 6 million tonnes to ensure that the food rationing system continues. To do so, the government intends to purchase the remaining wheat from local farmers, setting incentives and regulations in place. Furthermore, the government intends to provide fertilizer subsidies to encourage domestic wheat producers to sell their crops to the state. These strategic measures, as claimed by the government, will generate enough reserves to supply the population until the end of 2022. However, even if the regime is able to generate the needed wheat supplies for its population, the capacity needed to store these amounts is limited and can cause a massive loss of crop. Additionally, water scarcity and unfavorable weather conditions still pose a challenge to self-sufficiency. Water scarcity concerns have recently been exacerbated by the operation of the Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam. These effects are already being felt, with drastic spikes in the price of unsubsidized bread, which jumped by as much as 25%. This forces the government to set fixed prices for unsubsidized bread. The Egyptian government has also had a discussion on raising the prices for subsidized bread. These adjustments could have a huge impact on the economic and social stability of the country, as the subsidized bread programme is at the core of Egypt's social protection system. This topic has been highly sensitive since the 1977 bread riots, caused by the announcement of former president Anwar Sada to lift subsidies on flour, rice, and cooking oil. Successive regimes have been wary of increasing the price of bread for the fear of creating social unrest. Food insecurity in combination with other contributing factors also triggered protests in 2008, 2011, and 2017. Lebanon Lebanon is likewise concerned about the humanitarian effects of rising food prices in the country. Ukraine and Russia account for up to 75% of Lebanon's wheat imports. Local and regional socio-economic and political dynamics resulted in the collapse of the financial and banking sectors in the country. The current war in Ukraine is likely to exacerbate Lebanon's economic issues, which have already pushed roughly three-quarters of the people into poverty. Certain measures have been taken to regulate these shortages. On March 5, Lebanon's industry minister tweeted that the country will begin limiting wheat, allowing it to be used just for bread production until alternative supplies could be secured. Also, on March 14, the government began transferring funds to 150,000 extremely poor households as part of the Emergency Social Safety Net. However, the government currently possesses only one month's worth of wheat reserves, and there is, therefore, a dire need to secure alternatives through other suppliers. Tunisia Tunisia relies on Ukraine and Russia for about 45% of its wheat supply, and the recent developments in Ukraine have sent wheat prices to a 14-year high. The country's economy is already in a fragile state, battered by inflation and rising unemployment, as well as a considerable amount of public debt. These increased prices can exacerbate the humanitarian conditions in the country. The government has remained rather silent on the shortages, albeit the evidence is apparent. Reports indicate that the Tunisian government has already been unable to pay for inbound wheat shipments, and that grain items such as pasta and couscous, which make up a large part of the Tunisian diet, have been in limited supply. Recent protests against President Kais Saied, who is accused of monopolizing power, have placed the country in a deepening political turmoil. The increase in wheat prices and shortages are likely to add fuel to the brewing storm. The security threats of food uncertainty in the MENA region With the ongoing war in Ukraine affecting wheat supplies, the delays, shortages, and insecure prospects of summer harvests, countries in the MENA region are on high alert. These countries are extremely dependent on the wheat supplies coming from both Ukraine and Russia, and the recent spikes in prices as well as supply shortages are likely to exacerbate already existing humanitarian conditions and famine in the region. Governments have already taken certain measures to minimize the impact. However, water scarcity, unfavorable climate conditions, shortage in storage, and political turmoil are providing great challenges for these countries to secure the needed wheat supply for their populations. Furthermore, the food shortage and price increase can potentially cause social unrest in the region. Whereas food insecurity does not directly lead to social unrest, when combined with other grievances, sudden spikes in food prices can be used to mobilize and bring people together for effective political movements. In the past, rising bread prices have been catalysts for political change in the MENA region, such as the 1977 Egyptian bread riots, but also similar movements in 2008 and 2011. Social uprisings are complex phenomena and can't be linked to one specific factor or circumstance. However, with current political dissent (e.g. anti-Saied protests in Tunisia), high unemployment, and inflation already prevalent in the region, the inaccessibility of food can aid in the mobilization of people and promote social instability. About the author: Sytske Post Sytske is a graduate of International Studies and is currently enrolled in the Master's degree in Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University. This educational background has provided her with an interdisciplinary understanding of violent conflict and security. Currently, she is particularly interested in the intersection of technology and conflict, ranging from digital disinformation to the shifting nature of warfare powered by artificial intelligence. The article was written with help from Jacob Dickinson and edited by Ruben Pfeijffer and Alessia Cappelletti.

Utrecht, 2022-03-25 Dyami | strategic security solutions - reisvoorbereid.nl announced today that European Pilot Selection & Training (EPST) has added the security firm as their safe & secure travel solutions provider. This partnership will make safety & security - once again - a top priority to the EPST employees and cadet pilots working all over the world. (text continues below image) Eric Duijkers and Eric Schouten at EPST Headquarters in Utrecht. The evolving impacts of international instability, the war in Ukraine and other regions in the world brought dramatic changes to the world of travel and put business travellers at an increased risk of harm. There are more risks to business travellers than meet the eye, putting organizations in a more difficult position when it comes to ensuring duty of care. Eric Duijkers, CEO for EPST: "EPST understands that they are morally or legally obligated to fulfil a duty of care to their employees and pilot cadets regardless of location." Eric Schouten, CEO for Dyami: "This duty of care requires them to make decisions that benefit the company while preserving the health, safety, security and wellbeing of employees and students – in office or while travelling." Dyami will provide #EPST with risk alerts and information across the globe, combined with access to 24/7 security support. Next to that, Dyami will design and implement secure travel policy/procedures and if required; provide emergency response and local evacuation. Both companies are based in Utrecht, The Netherlands. For additional information, visit: https://www.dyami.services/safe-and-secure-travel (EN) https://www.reisvoorbereid.nl (Dutch) https://www.epst.nl or contact Eric Schouten

As of the 24th of February 2022, Russian troops have been conducting offensive military operations within Ukrainian sovereign territory. Non-stop attacks and counter-attacks have impacted multiple cities, infrastructure, and military bases within Ukraine. These recent geopolitical developments have severely alarmed the states immediately neighbouring Ukraine’s western border. For the NATO member states of #Hungary, #Poland, #Romania, and #Slovakia, military support is being routed to their eastern borders as a deterrent for future escalations. In a similar fashion, #Serbia and #Moldova have also put their militaries on high alert for possible overt/covert Russian aggression. This will have an effect on the countries surrounding Ukraine. That is why we publish this Situational Report for the Greater Balkan Area. We consider that due to the continued confrontations between Russian and Ukrainian forces, all flights crossing through Balkan airspace remain at risk. Please read and share our Sitrep below. (mobile browser versions do not always show download) 25/03/2022 Greater Balkan Sitrep Version 1.5 PDF 16/03/2022 Greater Balkan Sitrep Version 1.4 PDF 05/03/2022 Greater Balkan Sitrep Version 1.3 PDF 01/03/2022 Greater Balkan Sitrep Version 1.2 PDF 27/02/2022 Greater Balkan Sitrep Version 1.1 PDF 24/02/2022 Greater Balkan Sitrep Version 1.0 PDF

Written by Annette Bross As the world’s population increases, so does the demand for resources. Water scarcity is becoming a greater danger and with global rivers drying, water security poses a unique and difficult dilemma for global governance. In North-East Africa, the Nile represents both a precious resource and a point of contestation. On Sunday the 20th of February, the Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam (GERD), a 4 million dollar hydropower project, started operating in Ethiopia’s border with Sudan. Although currently only using one-third of its turbines, the activation has been enough to elevate the already rising tensions in the region. The GERD had been almost a decade in the making and it is said to be a key piece in ‘Ethiopia’s transformation.’ The dam is located on the Blue Nile, the main tributary of the Nile river that flows downstream to Sudan and Egypt. The two countries have openly raised concerns regarding the GERD, repeatedly claiming it is a potential threat to their water supplies. Due to competing interests, the negotiations over the dam have been extremely difficult and no consensus has been reached. Whether this represents a potential threat of international conflict remains to be seen. Lake Tana, Ethiopia, by schizoform licensed under CC BY 2.0 National pride regarding the Nile The GERD project has rekindled a long-running controversy about who ‘owns’ the Nile. In 1906, a Tripartite Agreement was signed between Great Britain, France and Italy, ensuring the former that no work that considerably changed the water flow would be undertaken upstream. Ethiopia opposed the agreement and notified the Italian and British governments of its disagreement. Later, the Nile Waters Agreement, signed in 1929 when Britain was still a colonial power in the region, gave Cairo the ability to veto projects farther up the Nile that would damage its water allocation. In 1959, without involving Ethiopia,the Sudan-Egypt agreement was signed, allocating Egypt 55 billion cubic meters of Nile water per year and Sudan 18.5 billion cubic meters. This decision, in combination with past agreements signed between colonial powers, exacerbated Ethiopia’s sense of historical injustice which clashes with Egypt’s rooted cultural ties to the Nile. The Nile has held an important position in Egypt’s history and national identity. Ancient Egyptians referred to it as ‘a gift from the Gods’ by the ancient Egyptians and it is interwoven in Egyptian history and identity, despite only 23% of the river is within its borders. Today, Egypt tends to claim sole cultural identity on the waterbody. On the other hand, the Nile’s main tributary holds a prevalent role in Ethiopian history and culture. The country is likely to consider the GERD as redressing the historic exclusion from Nile’s water exploitation for development, as past treaties had outlined Egyptian hegemony over them. Competing parties mean competing interests The GERD project brings many opportunities to Ethiopia. The East African country sees the dam as an opportunity to grow its economy since it will offer enough power for future investments. Specifically, Ethiopia has been keen to expand in manufacturing due to its low labor and power costs; even so that the Dam is owned and partly built by local Ethiopian companies. The GERD holds 74 million cubic meters of water with a surface of 1680 km2 - for some perspective, the Greater London Area is 1,569 km2. The project is owned by the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCO) which is working closely with Alstom, a French manufacturer, and the Metals & Engineering Corporation (METEC), an Ethiopian arms and machinery company that supplies the turbines, generators and all electromechanical equipment. This project will be a game changer for Ethiopia since nearly 65% of the country’s population is not linked to the electrical grid. The country currently produces roughly 4000 megawatts of energy, but with the activation of the GERD it is expected to increase to around 6000 megawatts, allowing it to meet its needs while also potentially becoming an exporter. The initiation of electricity generation, according to Sudan and Egypt, is a violation of the Declaration of Principles agreed by the three countries in 2015, which prevents the signatories from adopting unilateral actions regarding the Nile River’s water use. Egypt has a population of about 100 million people, 90% of whom rely on the Nile for their freshwater supply. Their greatest fear is that during droughts, Ethiopia will hold too much water in its reservoirs, jeopardizing the flow downstream. This would leave Egypt’s farmers unable to irrigate their crops, resulting in significant food losses. All of this comes while Egypt’s agriculture is already being squeezed by the consequences of climate change. “Each drop of 2% water protects a million people.” warns UNDP's Randa Aboul Hosn regarding Egypt’s crucial relationship to the waterbody. Sudan is stuck in the middle. It initially was in favor of the dam but since Egypt opposed it, the Sudanese government raised concerns as well. The impact on Sudan appears to be mixed, as the GERD’s operations may imperil Sudan’s own Nile dams. The country, however, sees Ethiopia as a source of inexpensive energy and as a possible regulator of water flows that have caused severe flooding in the past. Why is it so hard to settle the dispute? Ethiopia justifies the construction of the dam as it was not consulted on the 1929 veto agreement between Sudan and Egypt. However, in 2015, a new deal was established to settle the Nile issue, since GERD fears were on the rise. By joining a multilateral treaty, all countries have the same right and control over what is spoken, yet Ethiopia continued to build the dam under the flag of it being beneficial for the entire region. The importance of the world’s longest river can hardly be overstated since it is essential for over 280 million people’s livelihoods living along its banks. The Blue Nile’s waters flow from Lake Tana towards Sudan and joins the river’s other tributary at Sudan’s capital, Khartoum, before heading to Egypt. As stated before, the GERD gives Ethiopia considerable control on how much water flows downstream, making the stakes really high for all parties involved. Even the African Union had been involved in the negotiation process, but since no consensus was reached, Ethiopia took action by continuing with the dam’s construction. The talks have been stuck in a stalemate defined by mistrust. In a televised conference between then-Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi and political advisors in 2013. One of the advisors, Ayman Nour, suggested fomenting domestic unrest to divert Ethiopia's attention away from the dam project. “We should engage in their internal issues, we should influence Ethiopian decision-making,” Nour said. “To a considerable extent, their civilization is worn out.” Ethiopia accused Egypt in June 2020 of supporting cyberattacks to derail the project, prompting Ethiopia to take unilateral steps to treat GERD. For years, negotiations over the dam’s operations have dragged on. Egypt and Ethiopia have hinted at probable military action over the project, with Sudan trapped in the middle. Efforts to establish a final comprehensive agreement have come to a halt. Egypt and Sudan seek a legally binding pact, whereas Ethiopia is against it. Despite this, the issue has been raised before the United Nations Security Council. Here, Egypt and Sudan expressed their concerns about the effects of a drought, while Ethiopia rejected third-party arbitration in the event of a drought fueling the other parties' unsettlement regarding the dam, leaving the issue still unresolved. Future outlook The dispute arising from the Grand Ethiopia Reinassance Dam activation comes as the ripple effect of the conflict against Tigrayian forces in the north of Ethiopia is having a devastating impact on human security. Researchers from Ghent University estimate that the conflict and its subsequent famine have killed as many as 500,000 people. The Ethiopian government is therefore in need of an effective and productive win to counterbalance the situation. The GERD project has clear benefits for the country but its opening has raised tensions with its northern neighbors. Despite a more inclusive agreement since 2015, Egypt and Sudan clearly feel threatened and to some extent, strong-armed by the GERD’s implementation. The longer the impasse remains unresolved, the more confrontational and polarizing the countries appear to be getting along the length of the Nile. About the author: Annette Bross Annette holds a bachelor's degree in History from Universidad Iberoamericana in Mexico City. She has now moved to the Netherlands to pursue a master’s at Leiden University in International Relations and Diplomacy. She is passionate about development, climate action, public policy and security challenges with a strong commitment to social justice. She has experience in researching topics like the influence of Soft Power in Latin America and the Middle East. The article was edited by Alessia Cappelletti.

Written by Sietske Moshuldayev This report outlines the most serious threats to international security that took place over the past month and their possible future spillovers. The stability of European geopolitics severely aggravated in past weeks as Russia invaded Ukraine on the 24th of February, 2022. As the situation continues to escalate, this months’ DEWIS Conflict Monitoring Report provides an exclusive focus on this crisis. Additionally, three new or escalating situations are discussed. Challenges to finalising the Iran nuclear deal, as well as recent increases in political violence in Zimbabwe and Libya, require close monitoring in order to identify risks in advance. 1. Russia-Ukraine Crisis Tensions in Ukraine intensify daily as both Russian and Ukrainian forces continue to vie for control over the latter's territory. Three rounds of negotiations between Ukraine and Russia have thus far been held but have not indicated possible scenarios of de-escalation. Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure are being demolished, with an estimated 1.506 civilian casualties as of March 9th. Exact figures are expected to be higher. Additional pressure is felt internationally with attacks endangering the safety and security of nuclear power plants located in Ukraine. In the meantime, reports indicate that more than 2.5 million Ukrainian refugees have fled their home country. Western actors are implementing retaliatory measures against Russian entities. Initially targeting the functioning of the Russian aviation industry, new sanctions are predominantly economic in nature. Russian banks have been restricted in their access to international payment methods and Russia’s Central Bank can no longer access its foreign reserves. The United States banned the import and export of Russian oil, while an increasing number of commodity, commercial and service-oriented multinational companies have halted or withdrawn their activities in Russia. Meanwhile, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is bolstering up its defences around the Ukrainian, Russian and Belarusian borders. With no intent of engaging militarily as that would result in a conflict of a much larger scale, the member states are forced to balance their responses amidst perpetual Russian threats. 1.1 Conflict in Context The main driver behind this conflict has been discontentment by Russia over the eastward enlargement of NATO, a US-led organisation set up in 1948 as a collective defence alliance against the former Soviet Union. NATO expansion has been persistently scrutinised by Russia as it brought the alliance closer to its Western borders and traditional Soviet sphere of influence. In a balancing act, Russia set up its own defensive alliance in 1992 with some former Soviet states, known as the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Though the accession of Ukraine to NATO was not imminent prior to Russia’s invasion, the country was increasingly set on becoming a member. Ukraine’s shift to the West has led to previous tensions with Russia, including the annexation of Crimea by Russia (2014) and fighting following claims for independence by the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) in Ukraine’s Donbas region (2014 - present). After months of concerns by Western powers about increased Russian military mobilization along its borders with Ukraine, an important turning point came as President Putin officially recognized the independence of the DPR and LPR on February 21st, 2022. He subsequently sent in ‘peacekeeping’ forces into the pro-Russian region in a bid to provide support. However, President Putin quickly portrayed Ukraine as a threat and called for a demilitarization of its neighbour. This culminated in Russian troops deploying further into Ukraine on the 24th of February under the auspices of conducting a ‘special military operation’. 1.2 Upcoming Challenges The ongoing conflict is expected to have far-reaching humanitarian, economic and geopolitical impacts. With more than 2 million refugees and dire basic provisions in Ukraine, the conflict has led to a humanitarian disaster. Ukraine’s neighbouring countries have seen a surge in refugees, calling for increased resource allocation and adequate action. For those who remain in Ukraine, the security of water, food and energy supplies is threatened as fights continue. It remains unclear how this humanitarian crisis will evolve and what will be required to lessen its severity. Simultaneously, the conflict affects soaring global oil and gas prices and disrupts global food supply chains. Directly impacting energy costs for transportation and heating, increased oil and gas prices will furthermore be felt through higher commodity prices and inflation levels - among other things. Interrupted Russian and Ukrainian grain and oilseed exports signify increased threats to food supplies for the importing countries. This will likely negatively impact the malnourishment levels of lower-class populations, especially in North Africa and the Middle East. With additional sanctions against Russia to come, further disruptive economic impacts are to be expected. The conflict in Ukraine concurrently pressurises global and regional geopolitical relations. As Russia continues to be isolated from Western economic and financial institutions, it may seek to enhance its relationship with other partners, such as China. In the meantime, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have applied for European Union membership and Finland and Sweden have strengthened their cooperation with NATO. Even though nothing is concretized, these new forms of cooperation see the West encroaching even closer to Russia’s borders. It remains to be seen how, and together with whom, Russia reacts. 2. Iran - Nuclear Deal Complications Progress in ongoing talks between Iran and various global powers concerning regulations on the former’s nuclear program remains uncertain. A nuclear nonproliferation deal - the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action - was claimed to be in its final stages after months of negotiations. However, Russia has recently demanded an explicit assurance that its economic trade with Iran will be exempt from US sanctions imposed on Russia since the invasion of Ukraine. Western negotiators warned Russia, claiming the crisis in Ukraine is not related to the nuclear deal and should not be used for external purposes. These developments provide new challenges in reaching a consensus on the deal, further postponing the finalisation. 3. Libya - Contested Political Handover Political tension amongst opposing factions in Libya has recently increased. Following the indefinite postponement of elections that were planned for December 2021, the House of Representatives has sworn in Fathi Bashagha as the new Prime Minister to lead a new government. This directly challenges the incumbent interim Prime Minister, Abdulhamid al-Dabaiba, who claims he will not cede power until elections are held. Mobilization of armed troops around Libya’s capital Tripoli has been observed, followed by UN warnings for potential clashes. With the possibility of the re-establishment of two opposite governments in the country, these developments carry further repercussions for Libya’s oil exports, as well as regional involvement in the conflict. 4. Zimbabwe - Electoral Violence With upcoming legislative and municipal by-elections scheduled for March 26th, political violence has erupted in Zimbabwe. The main opposition party Citizens Coalition for Change led by Nelson Chamisa has accused ruling party ZANU-PF and the police of instigating and carrying out attacks against their supporters. As these allegations have been denounced by ZANU-PF, an increase in political violence amongst these different parties is likely as the elections approach. 5. Conclusions This past month, the Russia-Ukraine crisis has captivated the attention of a global audience. As further Russian aggression is expected and the full impacts of West-imposed sanctions are yet to play out, this remains a crisis to watch. As humanitarian, economic and geopolitical consequences mount up, regions beyond merely Ukraine and Europe are impacted. What occurs in Ukraine, for instance, may come to further impact progress on Iran’s nuclear talks. Likewise, the domestic instabilities in Libya and Zimbabwe are (internal) conflicts with the potential of further escalation and, therefore, require close monitoring in the upcoming weeks. About the author: Sietske Moshuldayev Sietske Moshuldayev has an international background and is inherently intrigued by the causes and consequences of geopolitical events. She has completed two bachelors at the University of Leiden (International Studies, BA & Political Science, BSc) and currently pursues a masters in International Security at Sciences Po, Paris. Having specialized in East Asian affairs for her undergraduate studies, she now focuses on global risks and risk management. The article was written with help from Sytske Post and edited by Alessia Cappelletti.

With a special focus on the effects of #Russian influence in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba on the #aviation sector in Aruba, Bonaire, Curaçao, and Saint-Maarten. With the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, businesses around the world are curious to find out how the conflict will affect their operations. For the Caribbean and central Latin American region, the geographic distance involved means that the effects of what happens in the war-torn streets of Kyiv, Lviv, and similar Ukrainian cities are not direct. Instead, the ripple effect from this war materialised within the Caribbean region through their links to Russia, which has been widely sanctioned by countries and multinational corporations the world over. Download as PDF For more in-depth Sitreps, analyses, or bespoke advice on the aviation security and safety concerns regarding this region, or other areas across the globe, please contact us.

As we encounter a changing world. Businesses conducting operations in the global economy require more insights to survive and thrive successfully. To support our clients in this complex environment, Dyami Strategic Security and Pro-Intell are combining their capabilities and resources. Both companies are based in The Netherlands, however, their combined network of sources have a global reach. The partnership delivers a diverse set of security solutions ranging from Geopolitical Analyses, Emergency Evacuations to Security Consultancy & Training. The Dyami and Pro-Intell partnership deliver human-centric security solutions that give you the actionable insight you need to ensure your operations can survive and thrive in this uncertain and challenging world. For organisations that want to protect their people, property and performance against risks, The Dyami - Pro-Intell partnership delivers experienced human-led resilience solutions which identify relevant threats, warn those affected and prescribe what action to take. For more information contact us or visit www.dyami.services www.pro-intell.eu

The British, United States and Dutch governments have advised all their citizens to leave Russia immediately. This is following the mass censorship bill that the Russian government has passed which will allow its authorities to imprison people for up to 15 years if they “misreport” on the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. While under peacetime conditions air travel would be the obvious route out of the country, the recent closure of airspaces, banning of airlines, and poor relations between immigration authorities have all caused this method to become a no-go. Land crossings are the implied alternative, however there is considerable evidence to suggest that the Russian government is planning on implementing a state of emergency to limit the ability of westerners to leave the Russian border. So if you have no urgent reason to stay in the country or are already planning on leaving, time is of the essence.

The long-term consequences of Russian aggression on air cargo transport Written by Jacob Dickinson and Alessia Cappelletti In the last decades, the advancement of technology created an interconnected, globalized world. Transportation and communication costs reduced dramatically, and building anything from cars to computers requires combining materials, technology, and manufacturing capacity from several different countries. Aviation has been the key driver of such a globalized economy, with shipping costs shrinking 78% from 1970 to 2019. In the age of great power competition, the US and China are already questioning the benefits of extensive global supply chains, viewing critical infrastructure as a matter of national security. However, in a highly interconnected and globalized world, a hindrance in global supply chains brings major consequences for businesses, workers and consumers everywhere. As the world has witnessed in the past week, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has convulsed the security order, bringing short and long-term social and economic repercussions. According to Lars van Abs, an expert aviation cargo supervisor, the war between the two countries could derail global aerospace. Adding to the humanitarian disaster brought about by the war and the increased geopolitical tensions between NATO and Russia, the disruption of commercial aerospace will cause issues with maintaining and manufacturing aircraft, products sourcing, leases and flight reroutes, which are likely to create further price instability and product shortages in European economies. Escalation and Targeted Sanctions on the Aircraft Industry Western countries have responded to the Russian invasion of Ukraine by isolating the country’s economy from international flows of goods and finance. Russia has been banned from SWIFT Interbanking Communications, making international payments and transactions almost impossible. The European Commission has placed sanctions on aircraft equipment and key technology exports to Russia. In addition to economic sanctions, Western states have upped military support to Ukraine. NATO allies have sent aircraft, weapons and assistance. With immediate effect, airspace bans for both European and Russian aircraft have been enforced, resulting in carriers rerouting or canceling their flights. The low transportation costs for European businesses achieved in the last five decades cannot continue with the package of sanctions announced by the EU and the United States, and prices will surge for cargo shipments and commodities. These developments hold important implications not only for the air transport industry and cargo transport but also for European businesses trading with East Asia, as Russia serves as a key route for long cargo flights between the continents. Maintaining: Issues with Antonov and Volga-Dnepr Group On the 25th of February, heavy fighting throughout Ukraine has led to the destruction of Hostomel airport, a key production facility owned by Antonov Airlines. The Ukrainian airline operates and manufactures two models of the largest cargo carriers in the airfreight industry with unique capabilities, the An-174 and the An-225 Mriya. The An-174 specializes in transporting large cargo such as jet engines and satellites, while the An-225, capable of carrying 250 tons, played a crucial role in delivering humanitarian assistance to disaster zones and shipping COVID-related supplies, making Antonov’s aircrafts a critical node in international cargo freight. Ukrainian officials confirmed that Russian troops destroyed the An-225 located at Hostomel airport on the 27th of February. For the still intact aircraft, Antonov will face difficulties maintaining flights because repairs and maintenance are located in production facilities within Ukraine. The destruction of Antonov aircraft is exacerbated by the cancellation of Russian cargo airliners flying through Ukraine and Russia. Russian airspace is vital for connections between Europe and Asia. Due to Russian airspace bans, European airlines are canceling flights to China, Japan and Korea, and vice versa. Rerouted flights go through the Middle East and potentially high-risk areas, adding additional fuel pressures with an average of 1,5-2 extra hours flight time and insurances concerns, van Abs says. Volga-Dnepr Group, which includes AirBridgeCargo, the largest Russian freight airliner and one of the largest in the world, stopped all operations to Europe. Outside of the specialist cargo and freight, according to Flexport supply chain services, both Antonov and Volga-Dnepr Group represented less than 0.5% of global airfreight carried in 2019. However, there are few substitutes for shipping large, specialized cargo and airfreight. Without Antonov and key Russian airliners transporting specialized goods, heavy-lift cargo around the world will become increasingly difficult in an industry already in distress. Aircraft leases, flight routes and insurances The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced sanctions restricting the ability of Russian companies to purchase aircraft, spare parts and equipment for Russian airlines. Western leasing companies will not be able to sign new leasing contracts and existing one need to be terminated within 30 days. Russian airlines lease the majority of their fleet from Western leasing companies, which in turn acquire planes from Airbus and Boeing. It is estimated that there are 515 lessor-owned aircraft operating with Russian airliners, with a market value of $10bn. EU sanctions on key technologies and spare parts have led European lessors to recall aircraft from Russia but leased planes cannot be returned over EU and Russian airspace. This effectively shuts off key sources of revenue for lessor firms and leading European manufacturers. Financially, the collapse of the value of the Russian Ruble and the exclusion of Russian banks from SWIFT payments adds considerable uncertainty to payment schedules for leased aircraft. Moreover, Moscow could refuse calls for returns of leased aircraft in retaliation for Western sanctions. Without maintenance, EU lessors face degradation of aircraft assets and declining revenues, expert Lars van Abs says. This will cause severe financial problems for lessors in Europe and the US and effectively shut off important assets for EU airliners and manufacturers. Lastly, EU-wide airspace bans restrict the options for returning lessor planes to non-Russian companies. For now, European companies are finding ways around this problem as they seize leased aircraft from outside of Russia, such as Istanbul. The problem will not end quickly, however. The usual and crucial routes are unlikely to become available soon, as overflight problems usually last beyond ceasefires. In the case of Libya, even after its airspace ceased being a no-fly zone, insurance premiums remained considerably high. For key cargo airliners, insurance premiums will be almost unaffordable and companies face a risk of losing aircraft and revenues. Manufacturing and products sourcing The escalation in Ukraine had dramatic consequences for oil and gas prices. On the first day of the Russian invasion, headlines had already reported oil prices rising above $100 barrel for the first time since 2014. Even without explicit sanctions to the energy sector, oil, gas and coal exports will be curtailed as a result of the existing sanctions, since companies fear association with Russia and subsequent Western retaliation. Similarly, the price of LNG will further increase as more countries are looking for alternatives. The hiking of energy prices, especially oil, will add to the costs of longer-haul flights caused by Russian and EU member states airspace bans, as flights between Asia and Europe reroute. The Ukraine crisis also leads to an acute shortage of several key minerals for the aviation industry. Titanium, a chemical element used for aircraft structures and landing gears, has been one of the first alarm bells rang by aviation experts. Boeing and Airbus are heavily reliant on Russian supplies of titanium, sourcing up to 35% and 65% respectively from Russian defense company VSPMO. Embraer is 100% reliant on VSMPO’s titanium. While Boeing and Airbus have approached other suppliers of titanium in Japan and the US, these airliners will find it difficult to find alternatives, and once they do, it will potentially take years to certify other suppliers. A fragile global economic recovery Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has upended the European security order underpinning economic globalization. Aviation will face severe challenges both in recovering from the COVID pandemic and the immense political and economic instability set in motion by Russia’s actions. Globalization is underpinned by low transportation costs that allow businesses, ideas and people to move anywhere in the world. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Western response to it have severely disrupted its mantra, and this will have serious consequences in the medium, and possibly longer, term. About the authors: Jacob Dickinson Jacob studies Global Political Economy at Leiden University. He is passionate about international development and is looking to expand his expertise in geopolitics and crisis management. Curious about other cultures, he has travelled in Europe and Asia for both academic study and professional purposes. His expertise includes subjects like the geopolitics of energy, China’s international political economy, and the implications of globalised supply chains for industrial policy. He is particularly interested in the evolving political and economic relationships between China and ASEAN, and the consequences for regional development and security. Alessia Cappelletti Alessia is Intelligence Analyst and Project Manager of DEWIS. She has field experience in South America, Colombia especially, and has experience in researching organized crime and illicit flows. Her academic background includes conflict analysis, international humanitarian law, human rights protection, and criminology.

Written by Sytske Post Since the Russian meddling in the American presidential elections and the Brexit referendum in 2016, worry over disinformation campaigns has gained increased attention and its threats to democracy and stability have been widely discussed. Disinformation can be used as a strategic tool by states and non-state actors alike to create division, weaken trust in governing institutions, and instil fear amongst populations. According to the European Commission, Russia is behind most disinformation campaigns interfering in foreign affairs. This has prompted several nations to adopt and develop counter-disinformation measures, Sweden being one of the latest. The Scandinavian country established a new government body which will be a ‘psychological defence’ agency and will provide tools to help counter (the effects of) disinformation in the long run. The agency was installed shortly after tensions between Russia and Ukraine built up and in light of the upcoming general elections scheduled for September 2022. As Russia invaded Ukraine on the morning of the 24th of February citing dubious arguments that have been dismissed as propaganda, it is clearer than ever that disinformation is a tactic not to underestimate when it comes to preserving European stability and security. Disinformation campaigns In the context of international relations, disinformation is defined as the deliberate dissemination of false or distorted information by foreign and domestic actors with the primary goal of confusing and misinforming people and fostering disagreement and instability. Disinformation or information manipulation is not a new phenomenon and can be traced as far back as Roman times. However, today’s technology has provided a cheaper, faster, and less risky way to spread untrustworthy information, with algorithms encouraging and automating the distribution of media content. In addition, our global and interconnected society provides malicious actors with a wider and more accessible network of potential victims. After repeated foreign interferences in countries' domestic affairs, particularly during election campaigns, public awareness of the dangers of media manipulation increased in recent years. Such manipulation is perceived as especially dangerous in today's contemporary status of democracy, as political polarization, a loss of faith in representative democracy's institutions, and the growth of strongmen politics increase the potential influence of disinformation campaigns and their effect on liberal democracy. However, the actual effects and impacts of disinformation campaigns are still under-researched. It is difficult to argue whether these campaigns are creating divisions or are merely exploiting existing tensions and concerns. Regardless, the potential disruptiveness of disinformation on democratic practices has encouraged various countries to adopt counter-disinformation campaigns and effectively treat the issue as a national security threat. The challenges of countering disinformation European countries responded to the threat of disinformation with various strategies, as an analysis by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace illustrates. One of the most popular and widespread approaches is regulating online platforms. The Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA) proposed by the European Commission offer new regulations to improve platform openness and accountability, as well as researchers' access to their data. If tech companies fail to comply with these regulations, fines can apply. However, Carnegie Endowment mentions, these rules spark debate on the potential infringements of individual rights, such as freedom of expression, they might bring if state-enforced. However, a recent press release by the European Parliament acknowledges countries still lack efficient measures and sanctions to effectively combat disinformation campaigns. Solely focusing on regulating companies responsible for the distribution of false information overlooks the main cause of the problem – a widespread lack of trust in the mainstream media and the government. In order to maintain one’s identity and political activism, individuals actively seek content that confirms their ideological beliefs. Therefore, governments’ media campaigns and other (semi-)official institutions’ initiatives may be ineffective. It is reasonable to assume that those populations prone to foreign disinformation are difficult to reach and persuade by their national governments, and even less so by international organizations such as the European Union. As foreign influence campaigns are mainly aimed at increasing tensions and polarization in the targeted countries, the most efficient counter-strategy would be investing resources into identifying and taking away the causes of these problems. In this context, counter-disinformation strategies should invest in identifying why individuals seek disinformation content in the first place. At the other end of the spectrum, counter-disinformation strategies should also provide insights into the aims of the foreign states interfering in domestic affairs. Identifying both receivers' and culprits’ motives to engage in disinformation campaigns might provide insightful knowledge on ways to combat this threat. An example of such a bilateral approach is the Swedish 'psychological defence' agency. The Swedish ‘psychological defence’ agency On the 1st of January 2022, Sweden launched their ‘psychological defence’ agency aimed at combating disinformation and strengthening the population's resilience in the face of potential ‘information influence.’ With upcoming general elections in September 2022, Magnus Hjort, deputy director of the agency, mentions that the decision to establish this new government agency gained renewed attention as the tensions between Russia and Ukraine have put Sweden on alert, the Guardian reports. As Hjort mentions, polarization in the region could bring security and defence at the centre stage of the election, attracting more interest from foreign powers “to make sure that Sweden takes the ‘right measures’ in the way [they] see it.” The agency will work preventively and operationally both in peacetime and war. Psychology can provide insightful data for a country’s defence (e.g., information-processing biases, attitudes, and interpersonal and intergroup connections) to explain why people think, feel, and act the way they do. Strengthening personal connections, sustaining self-worth, accomplishment, and agency, and building meaningful worldviews are all protective strategies that could influence the effectiveness of disinformation. However, the most important role in psychological defence is to educate the public by providing tools against trusting disinformation. This awareness-raising practice tries to address counter disinformation with long-term strategies offering support to agencies, municipalities, regions, companies, and organizations and educating the general population on how to verify facts. In the Swedish approach, cooperation between public and private actors at the national, regional, and local level is strongly encouraged. This collaboration is essential because direct government involvement might be counter-productive as mistrust of institutions is a contributing factor to the prevalence of disinformation. For example, local civil society networks often have more credibility in the eyes of the citizens but lack the resources and data the government enjoys. Therefore, involving them can help better identify the communities most prone to disinformation and try to understand the reasons behind their susceptibility. Then, with help of trusted members, discussion and awareness on the topic can take place. Risk-assessment and a way forward Disinformation continues to pose a security threat to democracies as it fuels instability, fosters fear, and can increase violence and hate crimes. As it was shown by Russia’s attack on Ukraine, disinformation campaigns can also be used as a powerful tool to escalate tensions and even mobilize populations. In addition, new technologies are constantly being developed providing more advanced means of disseminating disinformation. However, counter-disinformation campaigns are often still narrow-focused, whereby little attention and insight is being paid to addressing the root causes of the issue. Governments should reassess what role they play in creating distrust in institutions and context-specific approaches should be investigated. ‘Psychological defence’ could provide insightful knowledge to fill these gaps. About the author: Sytske Post Sytske is a graduate of International Studies and is currently enrolled in the Master's degree Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University. This educational background has provided her with an interdisciplinary understanding of violent conflict and security. Currently, she is particularly interested in the intersection of technology and conflict, ranging from digital disinformation to the shifting nature of warfare powered by artificial intelligence. The article was written with help from Annette Bross and edited by Alessia Cappelletti.