Search dyami insights

Date:   12/09/2025 (15:00 UTC+3) Where?  Syria The Run-Up to Syria’s Election On 29/05/2025 , Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, was named Syria’s Transitional President, after the ousting of former regime leader Bashar al-Assad on 08/12/2024. On 13/03/2025 , al-Sharaa signed a draft constitution establishing a five-year transitional period leading up to the next presidential elections, while also formalizing the separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. In March 2025, a surge in pro-Assad insurgent attacks against Syrian government forces led to heavy clashes  in the Syrian western provinces of Tartous and Latakia, resulting in significant casualties and further deepening the country’s internal divisions.  On 10/03/2025 , the Syrian transitional government reached an agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who had been engaged in conflict with the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) prior to the fall of Assad’s regime. However, poor implementation of the deal, combined with recent clashes between the SDF and Syrian government forces, underscores its failure to take effect thus far and highlights the division in the north.  On 07/04/2025 , the brother of al-Sharaa, Maher, was reported to have been appointed Secretary-General of the Presidency of the Syrian Republic, transitioning from his previous role as health minister. On 22/08/2025 , al-Sharaa issued Presidential Decree No. 143/2025, establishing a temporary electoral system for the new parliament, which increased seats from the originally announced 150 to 210, and forming the parliamentary elections committee (the People’s Assembly Election Committee). During June and July 2025, US and European sanctions on Syria were lifted, aiding the country's rebuilding efforts. On 12/07/2025 , violent clashes  erupted between armed Bedouin tribal fighters and Druze militias in the southern governorate of Suwayda, resulting in heavy casualties and forcing many residents to flee. Syrian government forces intervened to provide support, followed by direct involvement from Israel, underscoring its intent to exert influence over parts of Syria while fueling further instability.  Syria’s Electoral Commission initially announced the postponement of parliamentary elections in Suwayda, Hasakah, and Raqqa on 23/08/205 , due to ‘security concerns’ following the recent clashes and ongoing tensions in the regions. However, on 12/09/2025,  the spokesperson of the People's Assembly Elections Committee announced that citizens in Raqqa and Hasakah provinces will be allowed to vote as they "are under the control of the legitimate government in Damascus". Between  15/09/2025  and 20/09/2025 , the Syrian elections are to take place, during which 140 of the 210 parliamentary members will be chosen, for a transitional term of approximately five years. How will the elections work? The election system does not follow the format of a traditional popular vote or general election. Rather, it uses a mixed approach: representatives for each district are chosen through voting by pre-selected electoral colleges, while additional seats are filled through direct appointments made by the president. As depicted in the image below, President Al-Sharaa personally chooses one-third of the parliament, which is 70 out of the 210 total parliamentary seats, and has also established the Higher Committee for People’s Assembly Elections. This committee oversees the entire process and selects members of roughly 62 sub-committees. Each of the sub-committees have selected candidates for the ‘electoral bodies,’ which have compiled the list of nominees for next week’s elections. These nominees will fill the remaining 140 seats, effectively denying most Syrians any meaningful role in choosing their representatives. Source  : @gargaristan on X, August 24, 2025. Analysis The upcoming Syrian parliamentary elections are pivotal. They are the first under the new transitional government following the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in December 2024. On the positive side, these elections represent a crucial democratic milestone, a foundational step in rebuilding state institutions and establishing a more representative government after decades of authoritarian rule. The formation of a new government through this process could also contribute to greater stability, attracting much-needed foreign investment for economic recovery and infrastructure reconstruction, with Gulf states having already pledged substantial investments providing energy, as well as Turkey, which has also played an important role in rebuilding the country’s security infrastructure.  However, while economic support from foreign powers is crucial for rebuilding, it is not a guarantee for stability on its own. There is a tangible danger that financial aid might merely paper over deep-seated resentments and divisions, which could reignite future conflicts if people's grievances are not genuinely addressed. Moreover, external intervention, as well as internal problems like the recent clashes in Suwayda, ongoing fighting in Aleppo, and pro-Assad insurgent attacks throughout the country, and the severe drought leading to a national water crisis continue to challenge the long hoped-for stability in Syria. Furthermore, concerns exist that the parliamentary elections may solidify the central government's authority rather than facilitating genuine representation.   Although Al-Sharaa’s appointed People’s Assembly Elections committee has set requirements for electoral bodies—including at least 20 per cent women, as well as representatives of displaced communities, families of those killed or wounded in the conflict, people with disabilities, and survivors of detention—the legitimacy of the elections is undermined by the exclusion of the Druze-majority Suwayda and previously the Kurdish-dominated regions of Hassakeh and Raqqa. The exclusion of Suwayda still might lead to the sidelining of an important minority group and deprives them of political representation, while power remains concentrated in the hands of al-Sharaa. Moreover, if the elections are ultimately perceived as unfair, or exclusive, they could further erode public trust in the new government and prolong the cycle of conflict and instability.  Conclusion The upcoming Syrian parliamentary elections, while a momentous occasion with the potential to usher in a new era of stability, face significant challenges. The ongoing national division,  exemplified by ongoing violent outbreaks together with the lack of representation during the election process, which is mainly in the hands of al-Sharaa, threatens to undermine the transition's success and could exacerbate existing divisions. Without addressing critical concerns regarding minority exclusion and deep-seated grievances, these elections risk becoming a mere administrative milestone or a catalyst for further violence, rather than a genuine stride toward a stable and pluralistic Syria.

Locations  of reported drone downings in Poland (yellow circles) between 09/09/2025 and 10/09/2025 and restricted airspace in Poland and Latvia following the incident (blue areas eastern border). Report date:   11/09/2025 (10:00 UTC+2) Where:  Eastern, central and northern Poland Who’s involved: Polish Government and Armed Forces, Armed Forces of the US, Italy, Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and the Royal Dutch Air Force UPDATED INFORMATION (11/09/2025) On 10/09/2025, Polish authorities announced airspace restrictions along their eastern border with Belarus and Ukraine, banning unauthorised civilian flights that must file a flight plan and carry an operational Mode A, C or S transponder, as well as a total ban on civilian drone flights with certain exceptions, in place until 23:59 on 09/12/2025. Latvian authorities announced airspace closures up to an altitude of 6,000 metres within 50 km of the country’s border with Russia and Belarus, in force until 18/09/2025 and possibly subject to extension. Russia’s Defence Ministry stated that the maximum range of the Gerbera-type drones found in Poland is 700 km, confirmed that Ukrainian arms production facilities in the west of the country were targeted that night, and said it was ready to hold consultations with its Polish counterparts if required. The presidential spokesman declined to comment, referring questions to the defence authorities, but dismissed the reports. Belarus’ Chief of the General Staff said it had warned the Polish side about incoming drones, noting that Russian and Ukrainian drones were active in the area and that some, affected by electronic warfare measures, strayed into Belarus, where they were also brought down. Polish authorities have also requested formal consultations with NATO partners by invoking Article 4 of the treaty, which foresees consultations amid the perception of serious threats by a member state.  Polish authorities released the names of several locations where drone wreckage was found, including Olesno, Mniszkow, Czosnowka, Wohyn, Krzywowierzba-Kolonia, Czesniki, Wyryki-Wola and Wyhalew. None of the drones were reported to have carried explosive material. US President Donald Trump appeared to limit comments on the incident stating “What’s with Russia violating Poland’s airspace with drones? Here we go!” on his Truth Social social media account, while the US ambassador to NATO affirmed the US “stands by” their NATO allies in the face of airspace violations, ready to defend the territory of the organisation.  Between 12 and 16 September, Russia and Belarus will conduct the yearly “Zapad-2025” large-scale military drills with around 13,000 participants in Barisov, central Belarus. India will also be participating this year with a contingent. Images of drone wreckages at unspecified locations provided by Polish authorities  Source: Various Polish media, 10/09/2025 What happened? On the night of 9 September, Polish authorities reported tracking more than ten unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in their airspace during a Russian strike campaign in western Ukraine. Polish F-16s were reported to have engaged the UAVs, later stated to be of Russian origin.  The Polish Operational Command announced the activation of full air defence procedures, placing allied aircraft and radar systems on their highest state of readiness to respond to airspace violations. Polish airports such as Warsaw’s Chopin (WAW/EPWA) and Modlin (WMI/EPMO) airports, and Lublin (LUZ/EPLB) and Rzeszów (RZE/EPRZ) temporarily halted operations between the night of 9 and 10 September due to increased risks over their airspace. Operations were resumed as of 07:00 hours local time on 10 September.  At 05:40 hours local time, a drone wreckage was discovered in Cznosnowka village, 28 km west of the border with Belarus. The drone was able to be identified according to local authorities, although no country was mentioned in official notifications ( source , source 2 ,) At 05:48 hours, the Polish military reported that operations were underway to identify and counter UAVs of then-unknown origin. At 07:29, the Polish authorities reported an “unprecedented violation of Polish airspace by drones” and confirmed that only those deemed a threat had been downed. The origin of the drones was not specified, but the command stated that operations were conducted with allied forces. As of 09:42 hours, all operations related to airspace violations had ended, with searches continuing to locate and identify the UAVs. Ground radar and air defence systems had reverted to standard operational status. Reports of another drone wreckage found in Wyryki, slightly damaging a roof.  No deaths, injuries or significant damage to infrastructure were reported as a result of the UAV downings at the time of writing.  Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk called an emergency government meeting to discuss the developments as of 08:00 hours on 10 September, subsequently stating that the origin of the UAVs was Russian.  At the time of writing, Russian authorities had not yet released any statements on the incident, but did report heavy targeting of Ukrainian logistical hubs in the Odessa area, further away from Poland.  Image of the damaged damage in Wyryki as a result of a drone downing Source: Nowy Tydzien, 10 September 2025 Analysis The incident appears to mark the first time that Russian UAVs have been downed over NATO territory, representing a notable escalation in the conflict’s spillover risks. Polish authorities reported tracking over ten drones during Russian airstrikes in Ukraine, with air defence procedures fully activated and allied forces, such as F-35s from the Royal Dutch Air Force, involved in countering the threats. The closure of Poland’s biggest airport in Warsaw (WAW/EPWA), as well as several other smaller ones, highlights the seriousness of the situation.  An F-35 from the Royal Netherlands Air Force similar to the ones involved in the incident Source: Royal Netherlands Air and Space Force   Debris from the downed drones was later recovered in Czosnowka and Wyrywki. Although Polish authorities did not initially announce the origin of the aircraft, Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated they were of Russian origin after an emergency meeting held with the security ministries of the country on the morning of 10 September. The event echoes earlier incidents such as a presumed Iranian-designed Shahed drone entering Polish airspace in 2024, a Russian missile briefly crossing into Polish airspace in 2023 and a missile linked to Ukrainian air defences crashing in Polish territory in 2022. Prime Minister Tusk described the incident as an act of aggression. If Russia’s responsibility is taken as definitive, the incident may represent a premeditated test of NATO’s resolve and US willingness to respond to repeated violations of allied airspace.  Looking ahead The downing of Russian drones over Poland may or may not prove to be a turning point in how NATO addresses the spillover of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Similar incidents have occurred before without significantly altering the alliance’s involvement and support for Ukraine, and with the new administration in Washington seemingly focused on de-escalating rather than expanding the conflict, this incident may be downplayed. Although the incident prompted heightened readiness from the Polish military, the temporary suspension of civilian aviation at some airports, the intrusion did not involve a ground incursion, resulted in no casualties and was carried out with relatively small, low-cost UAVs with limited capabilities. Consequently, the operational risk calculus for NATO may continue unaltered. Nonetheless, repeated violations could create a precedent whereby allied airspace is challenged without reciprocal escalation, eroding deterrence capabilities and forcing NATO to eventually clarify a threshold for defensive action along its eastern flank.

By Dyami Intelligence Analysis Center Intel cut-off time: 09/09/2025 17:00 UTC+2 What is happening in the Caribbean? A land invasion of Venezuela appears improbable given the low number of assets and a lack of military forces in the country’s vicinity, compared to similar actions by the US in  Granada (1983) and Panama (1989).  According to available information, there is no indication that eight US warships are deployed in Venezuelan territorial waters or its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Four vessels, three guided missile destroyers and a cruiser, appeared to be deployed near waters between eastern Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago. An additional three are part of an amphibious assault group involved in military exercises in Puerto Rico.  On 7–8 September, US Secretary of War Peter Hegseth visited troops in Puerto Rico and aboard the USS Iwo Jima, where he instructed the vessel to be prepared for counter-narcotics operations. On the night of August 29, 2025 the USS Lake Erie  was spotted crossing the Panama canal towards the Caribbean. By August 29, 2025 US officials and media confirmed seven US warships, along with one nuclear powered submarine had either arrived or were on the verge of arriving in the region, not specifying any locations.  On August 19, 2025, the United States stated that it would deploy warships to the Venezuelan coast to conduct an anti-narcotics operation. The specific anti-narcotics mission objectives include drug interdiction operations targeting Latin American drug cartels and affiliated criminal groups. On 2 September 2025 United States forces struck a speedboat that had departed San Juan de Unare, Venezuela, bound for an unidentified port in Trinidad and Tobago, allegedly transporting narcotics and resulting in 11 reported fatalities. President Donald Trump released video of the incident, describing the occupants as terrorists moving drugs through international waters, while Venezuela’s Communications Minister claimed the footage was fabricated using artificial intelligence. At the time of reporting President Maduro had not issued a statement. Analysis of the imagery raises doubts over the reported casualty figure, as fewer individuals appear on board than the 11 stated officially. The vessel’s size and configuration are consistent with fishing boats commonly used in the Peninsula de Paria, Sucre State, a region long associated with narcotics and human trafficking. According to reports, two drug-laden boats had departed San Juan de Unare shortly before the targeted boat, supporting the likelihood of narcotics trafficking activity. Further credible assessments suggest the strike may have occurred on the Atlantic Ocean side of the area rather than in the Caribbean as initially assumed. In the early August of 2025, US officials intensified rhetoric against the Venezuelan president, accusing his government of running large scale drug trafficking operations through a network known as the ‘’Cartel de los Soles’’ and designating it as a terrorist organization in July 2025.  President Trump appears to be continuing his first-term approach to Venezuela, maintaining maximum pressure on its leadership through measures linked to organised crime and terrorism; the August 2025 authorisation of military force against drug cartels seems to have been applied for the first time in or near Venezuela’s EEZ. More broadly, US policy towards Venezuela has evolved across administrations, with the country designated a national security concern under Obama and sanctions imposed on senior officials during both the Chávez and Maduro governments. On Monday September 1, Maduro responded with a rare press conference stating that the United States are seeking a regime change through military threat and that his country is peaceful but will not bow to threats. The Venezuelan President said ‘’Venezuela’s military is super prepared’’ and added that if the U.S. forces attack Venezuela, the country would  declare a state of armed resistance and military mobilization. The possibility of a US military intervention in Venezuela Despite President Maduro’s claims of a ‘US military threat,’ there is no evidence at present that the United States is preparing for a land invasion of Venezuela. The 1983 invasion of Grenada involved between 6,000 and 7,000 troops on an island of 344 km², while the 1989 operation in Panama required around 26,000 personnel in a country of about 75,000 km². By contrast, the stretch of coastline in Venezuela 100 km deep is about 65,000 km², while the country itself covers 915,000 km². A military invasion into Venezuela would require more than double the assets currently deployed in the southern Caribbean, along with an increase in troop numbers and hardware from US military bases in neighbouring countries. Such an effort would necessitate a surge in military transport flights, something not observed in open sources. Additionally, major powers such as China, Russia and Iran are expected to act as a deterrence against either a change in government in Venezuela or direct military intervention by the US. At different moments over the past two decades, these countries have invested in Venezuela’s security and energy sector:  China channelled roughly €52–55 billion to Venezuela in 2007–2016 through oil-backed loans and joint funds focused on energy and infrastructure and in May 2024 both sides signed a bilateral investment-protection treaty that underpins future projects. Russia supplied around $9 billion in arms by 2013 and invested roughly $8 billion in Venezuelan oil ventures that were later moved from Rosneft to the state company Roszarubezhneft. In July 2025 Rostec opened an ammunition plant in Maracay aimed at producing up to 70 million 7.62×39 cartridges a year. Iran has concentrated on the energy sector with a €110 million contract to repair the El Palito refinery plus a €460 million revamp agreement for the Paraguaná complex alongside a 20-year cooperation roadmap and defence-industrial ties such as assembly of Arpía/Mohajer-2 UAV, preceded by a €23 million contract for Iranian Mohajer-2 UAVs and an overall UAV programme for reconnaissance and loitering munition drones.  Given these countries’ involvement and investments in Venezuela they are expected to provide political and security support as a means of deterrence against any possible US intervention. The extent of their involvement in military terms should a US intervention take place remains undetermined, particularly should the US only carry out aerial strikes on Venezuela.  Given the information available, a US land invasion into Venezuela is not probable at the time of writing. Energy security, however, appears to be a major factor in the continued pressure, as Venezuelan heavy crude remains well suited for US Gulf Coast refineries despite the shift in export flows towards China. Reports of US warships deployed in the Caribbean sea near Venezuela  The breakdown of United States military deployments in the southern Caribbean shows guided missile destroyers USS Gravely , USS Jason Dunham and USS Sampson , as well as the guided missile cruiser USS Lake Erie , operating somewhere in the region of Venezuela’s exclusive economic zone. Their location is more likely than not off the eastern Venezuelan coast near Trinidad and Tobago, based on the inference that a Hellfire missile was used against a motor boat on 2 September. This missile is deployed from an SH-60 Seahawk helicopter and has an operational range of approximately 350 kilometres, thereby situating the probable launch zone within that radius. It is anticipated that additional United States aircraft may be deployed to Curaçao in support of this mission, in which event Venezuela is expected to heighten its surveillance of the islands. Venezuelan spotters are known to operate there, monitoring the United States Forward Operating Location (FOL) and other sites, reporting every inbound and outbound movement directly to Caracas. Activity on the islands cannot be concealed and this has long constituted the established modus operandi, employing a variety of tactics and manoeuvres designed to obscure operations. At the same time there are strong indications that three navy vessels, the transport dock ships USS San Antonio  and USS   Fort Lauderdale and the assault ship USS Iwo Jima , that were off the coast of Guayana, Puerto Rico may now be deployed either near Trinidad and Tobago, or Guyana. These were taking part in amphibious landing exercises which began on 31 August involving around 4,500 troops of the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit. The Iwo Jima, essentially a small aircraft carrier, carries Osprey, Chinook, Huey, Blackhawk and Cobra helicopters as well as vertical take off aircraft such as the Harrier and possibly F-35s. Although the F-35 is capable of both intelligence-gathering and combat tasks, the USS Iwo Jima  does not yet appear cleared to operate the aircraft. For the exercise in Puerto Rico, a more plausible configuration involves AV-8B Harrier IIs in multi-role capacity, MV-22 Ospreys, AH-1Z Vipers, CH-53E Super Stallions and UH-1Y Venoms, covering both light and heavy lift requirements. The subsequent deployment between Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana appears intended as a deterrent with movements not directly indicative of operations against Venezuela, while the location of the transport dock ships remains unknown. However, the troop levels involved fall short of what would be required for any credible deployment scenario in Venezuela. Military flights in the region also point to a connection with the ongoing military drills in Puerto Rico. A P-8 Poseidon reconnaissance aircraft has also been observed flying between Puerto Rico and Florida, but not southward towards Venezuelan waters. A series of military flights involving mainly C-17 Globemaster and C-130 Hercules transport aircraft were tracked between 27 August and 2 September, all flying between Puerto Rico and the United States, Trinidad and Tobago or the neighbouring US Virgin Islands. This initially suggested that flights in the region were focused on supplies to Puerto Rico and the ongoing military drills, but now  point to a deployment beyond the US island territory in light of official footage of Harrier aircraft flying above Georgetown, Guyana between 7 and 8 September during the country’s presidential inauguration.  An amphibious ready group is normally made up of an amphibious assault vessel, a dock landing ship, amphibious transport docks and a contingent of marines. The Puerto Rico deployment features two transport dock vessels but no dock landing ship, diverging from the standard structure of such a group. This makes it more likely that the presence of USS San Antonio , USS Fort Lauderdale , USS Iwo Jima and the Marine Expeditionary Unit represents a demonstration of force rather than a direct preparation for operations inside Venezuela. Trump’s policies towards Venezuela Recent developments suggest a shift in United States policy under President Trump towards Venezuela, with greater emphasis on security and organised crime. In March, the White House stated that President Maduro had facilitated the infiltration of the Tren de Aragua group, designated by Washington as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation, into the United States. The statement also linked Venezuela’s internal conditions to wider regional pressures through migration and instability. In July, the US Treasury sanctioned the Cartel de los Soles, alleging involvement by senior Venezuelan figures in narcotics trafficking. Together these actions reflect a hardening of tone, portraying Venezuela not only in terms of governance concerns but also in connection with transnational criminal activity. In August, this approach was reinforced through a broader directive. On 7 August, President Trump signed an order authorising US military action against drug-smuggling cartels and criminal groups if national security was considered at risk, a step initially met with concern in Mexico. While the directive was not specific to Venezuela, it provides Washington with greater latitude to apply pressure in the region. The combination of sanctions, accusations of organised crime and the authorisation of military measures points to an evolving US policy that increasingly links Venezuelan actors to hemispheric security challenges. Energy security: Venezuela’s shift to China instead of the US, US presence in Guyana Venezuela’s trade relationships have shifted significantly, particularly with the United States. Although the share of Venezuelan crude sent to US refineries has declined, the country’s heavy crude oil remains well suited for Gulf Coast facilities. In 2019, about 41% of Venezuela’s crude exports went to the United States but by 2023 this had dropped to 23% while China’s share rose from 25% to 69%. Over this six year period exports to the United States were cut in half while exports to China almost tripled, underlining the impact of sanctions and the central role of economic considerations in US policy. Even with the US administration’s decision in July 2025 to renew Chevron’s licence for limited operations in Venezuela, American investment and activity in the country remain restricted. US crude oil imports from Venezuela between 1980 and 2023 Source: US Energy Information Administration US energy investment in Venezuela has largely dried up while capital has flowed into neighbouring Guyana. After major offshore hydrocarbon discoveries in 2015, Guyana began producing oil in 2019 and has since become central to US energy security, with US firms investing about €12.3 billion, roughly 96% of the country’s total foreign direct investment between 2020 and 2024. In parallel Washington is strengthening its military posture in the Caribbean; at Guyana’s presidential inauguration on 8 September the US Embassy in Georgetown reaffirmed support for the country’s defence, signalling a remit that extends beyond counter-narcotics to protecting Guyana as it contests a decades-long territorial dispute with Venezuela that includes offshore reserves. Official notification from the US Embassy in Guyana  on support for the country’s territorial integrity amid an ongoing territorial dispute with Venezuela In the longer term, the steady increase of Venezuelan crude exports to China, driven by rising energy demand, could solidify a durable partnership between both countries. This would come at Washington’s expense, as it risks not only losing access to a decades-long supplier but also seeing an increasing presence of China in areas perceived as its traditional zone of influence. From a strategic perspective, the United States has an interest in keeping Venezuela within its energy orbit, as well as reducing the growing Chinese influence in its side of the hemisphere. Venezuela’s reserves of hydrocarbons, discovered to be the largest in the world in the late 2000s, are an essential strategic interest that the current US leadership appears very focused on pursuing, in addition to Guyana’s, determined to be one of the largest reserves in the world found since 2015.  Following this logic, in March 2025, US President Trump signed an Executive Order imposing 25% tariffs on all goods from countries that import oil from Venezuela. Both Trump administrations issued rewards for information leading to the arrest or conviction of Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro, officially offering a $15 million reward in 2020, increased to $25 million in January 2025, and $50 million in August of the same year. The deployment of military assets in the region and narcotics trafficking charges against Venezuela’s leadership, combined with unilateral strikes on vessels departing or near its exclusive economic zone, serve as instruments of pressure designed to push Caracas towards a negotiated arrangement by President Trump as “making a deal,” bringing its government policies more in line with US interests.  Official bounty increases issued by the US Government against of Nicolas Maduro in January (below left) and August (below right) 2025  Source: US Department of State (accessed 04 September 2025) Looking ahead The prospect of a United States military intervention in Venezuela remains limited at present. Force levels in the southern Caribbean including guided missile destroyers, an amphibious group exercising in Puerto Rico or a deployment of the USS Iwo Jima  near Guyana or Trinidad and Tobago  do not match what would be required for a land operation. Historical precedents in Grenada and Panama point to far larger commitments than are currently visible. Any campaign against Venezuela would require a much greater build up of personnel logistics and transport capacity, none of which appears in open source reporting. Instead Washington is pursuing a calibrated strategy of coercion short of invasion that uses sanctions, legal designations, tying Venezuelan actors to narcotics trafficking and terrorism, and selective strikes such as the 2 September action against a Venezuelan vessel. This approach signals capability and intent while avoiding the burdens of a protracted conflict. The current US force posture in the Caribbean does not indicate preparations for a land invasion of Venezuela or a large-scale, sustained air campaign. The composition and size of deployed assets appear disproportionate to counter-narcotics missions and insufficient for a rapid invasion scenario akin to Panama in 1989, suggesting the posture is intended primarily as strategic pressure. A limited, high-risk contingency such as a targeted raid against Venezuelan leadership cannot be ruled out, though it would require extensive diversionary and electronic warfare measures beyond a special task group. Regional dynamics further reduce the likelihood of direct intervention. China is Venezuela’s dominant buyer of crude and Russia provides diplomatic and limited military technical support, which raises the cost of escalation for Washington. Sustained US naval and air activity and the absence of Venezuelan deescalation measures keep uncertainty high. A video that purported to show Venezuelan F-16s over a US warship has been assessed as misleading by some experts, with the ship identified as Venezuela’s own Guaiqueri class patrol vessel. A direct engagement by Caracas with US naval assets would be a serious escalation. The exact disposition of US destroyers whether inside Venezuela’s EEZ or just outside near Trinidad and Tobago remains unclear, but it is unlikely that President Maduro would court confrontation given Venezuela’s limited capacity to withstand escalation against superior US forces. Regional stability and civilian sectors are also at stake. Ongoing operations and the prospect of further incidents may depress European and US travel to the ABC islands of Aruba Bonaire and Curaçao. Dutch defence and state ministers have advised parliament that commercial flight risk has not increased and that authorities are monitoring developments while treating the activity as a US national operation. Taken together the indicators point to sustained pressure rather than invasion with sanctions, military signalling, and reputational tools used to constrain Caracas and shape its behaviour short of a direct campaign.

Date of Report:   10/09/2025 (10:00 UTC+2) Where:  Eastern Poland Who’s involved: Polish Government and Armed Forces, US Armed Forces, Russian Armed Forces, Royal Dutch Air Force, Italian Air Force What is happening? On the night of 9 September, Polish authorities reported tracking more than ten unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in their airspace during a Russian strike campaign in western Ukraine. Polish F-16s were reported to have engaged the UAVs, later stated to be of Russian origin.  The Polish Operational Command announced the activation of full air defence procedures, placing allied aircraft and radar systems on their highest state of readiness to respond to airspace violations. Polish airports such as Warsaw’s Chopin and Modlin airports, and Lublin and Rzeszów temporarily halted operations between the night of 9 and 10 September due to increased risks over their airspace. Operations were resumed as of 07:00 hours local time on 10 September.  At 05:40 hours local time, a drone wreckage was discovered in Cznosnowka village, 28 km west of the border with Belarus. The drone was able to be identified according to local authorities, although no country was mentioned in official notifications ( source , source 2 ,) At 05:48 hours, the Polish military reported that operations were underway to identify and counter UAVs of then-unknown origin. At 07:29, the Polish authorities reported an “unprecedented violation of Polish airspace by drones” and confirmed that only those deemed a threat had been downed. The origin of the drones was not specified, but the command stated that operations were conducted with allied forces. As of 09:42 hours, all operations related to airspace violations had ended, with searches continuing to locate and identify the UAVs. Ground radar and air defence systems had reverted to standard operational status. Reports of another drone wreckage found in Wyryki, slightly damaging a roof.  No deaths, injuries or significant damage to infrastructure were reported as a result of the UAV downings at the time of writing.  Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk called an emergency government meeting to discuss the developments as of 08:00 hours on 10 September, subsequently stating that the origin of the UAVs was Russian.  At the time of writing, Russian authorities had not yet released any statements on the incident, but did report heavy targeting of Ukrainian logistical hubs in the Odessa area, further away from Poland.  Image of the home damage in Wyryki as a result of a drone downing Source: Nowy Tydzien, 10 September 2025 Analysis The incident appears to mark the first time that Russian UAVs have been downed over NATO territory, representing a notable escalation in the conflict’s spillover risks. Polish authorities reported tracking over ten drones during Russian airstrikes in Ukraine, with air defence procedures fully activated and allied forces, such as F-35s from the Royal Dutch Air Force, involved in countering the threats. The closure of Poland’s biggest airport in Warsaw (WAW/EPWA), as well as several other smaller ones, highlights the seriousness of the situation.  Debris from the downed drones was later recovered in Czosnowka and Wyrywki. Although Polish authorities did not initially announce the origin of the aircraft, Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated they were of Russian origin after an emergency meeting held with the security ministries of the country on the morning of 10 September. The event echoes earlier incidents such as a presumed Iranian-designed Shahed drone entering Polish airspace in 2024, a Russian missile briefly crossing into Polish airspace in 2023 and a missile linked to Ukrainian air defences crashing in Polish territory in 2022. Prime Minister Tusk described the incident as an act of aggression. If Russia’s responsibility is taken as definitive, the incident may represent a premeditated test of NATO’s resolve and US willingness to respond to repeated violations of allied airspace.  Looking ahead The downing of Russian drones over Poland may or may not prove to be a turning point in how NATO addresses the spillover of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Similar incidents have occurred before without significantly altering the alliance’s involvement and support for Ukraine, and with the new administration in Washington seemingly focused on de-escalating rather than expanding the conflict, this incident may be downplayed. Although the incident prompted heightened readiness from the Polish military, the temporary suspension of civilian aviation at some airports, the intrusion did not involve a ground incursion, resulted in no casualties and was carried out with relatively small, low-cost UAVs with limited capabilities. Consequently, the operational risk calculus for NATO may continue unaltered. Nonetheless, repeated violations could create a precedent whereby allied airspace is challenged without reciprocal escalation, eroding deterrence capabilities and forcing NATO to eventually clarify a threshold for defensive action along its eastern flank.  Dyami is actively monitoring the situation. Dyami Services Security is not a luxury but a necessity. With Dyami Security Intelligence as a Service, you gain a proactive, flexible, and affordable solution to manage risks, monitor geopolitical threats, and respond immediately to crises. Why subscribe to security? ✅ Resilient business operations in today’s world ✅ We act as your security department and Geopolitical Risk Officer ✅ Direct access to security expertise without high costs ✅ Prevent crises with up-to-date threat intelligence ✅ Scalable subscription plans ✅ Access to our unique global network Want to know how this protects your organization? Request a free consultation! Subscription options Dyami Security as a Service: a flexible security subscription that keeps your organization protected at all times—without the need for costly internal capacity.

Date:   09/09/2025 (17:00 UTC+2) Where?  Doha, Qatar What happened?  On 09/09/2025 around 15:00, it was reported that several blasts were heard in the Katara district of the Qatari capital Doha. In several photos and videos circulating online,  the smoke and damage to buildings is visible.  Around 15:10, it was reported that an Israeli official told Axios correspondent Barak Ravid that the explosion in Doha was an assasination attempt targeting senior Hamas officials.  At 15:11, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and Israeli Security Agency (ISA) announced that a ‘ precise strike targeting the senior leadership of the Hamas terrorist organization ’ had been conducted. This attack came as the negotiators were meeting to consider the latest ceasefire proposal put forth by the US.  That Israel is targeting Hamas abroad does not come as a surprise. Last week, on 31/08/2025, IDF chief Eyal Zamir warned that  Israel “would reach them  [Hamas leaders abroad] too”. At 15:30, Majed Al Ansari, spokesman for Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said in a statement that the country "condemns [the attack] in the strongest terms”.  At 15:52, it was reported that the US declined to comment on the attack. At 15:57, a Hamas source reported to Al Jazeera  that no Hamas official was killed in the attack. Several other sources however claim the opposite, and state that Khalil al-Hayya and Zaher Jabarin were killed. Neither statement has been confirmed at the time of publication. At 16:12, in a social media post , Netanyahu’s office said that Israel acted alone in the attack and takes full responsibility.  One of the strikes was geolocated and confirmed through our analysis to have targeted a building in the vicinity of 25°21'25.1" N, 51°30'34.6" E  in the West Bay Lagoon area of Doha. Analysis The Israeli strike on Hamas leadership in Doha represents a major escalation in the broader conflict between Israel and its adversaries. By conducting such an operation on Qatari soil, Israel has openly violated international law and Qatar’s sovereignty. The action is unlikely to be received positively by the international community, specifically with the recent tensions surrounding certain European countries taking a harder stance against Israel on the eve of the UN General Assembly. The key question is what comes next. Qatar is expected to limit its response to strong diplomatic condemnation. The country has always sought to balance its regional relationships and avoid direct confrontation, as exemplified by its reaction to the recent Iranian missile strikes on the US’ Al Udeid Air Base, which prompted solely formal condemnations and a deterioration in Qatar-Iran relations. Hamas may be inclined to retaliate, but its operational capacity to do so remains limited at most. A further consequence of the attack is that Hamas leadership abroad will likely be forced underground even further, at least partially. What remains to be seen is how this will play out in other nations where Hamas has a presence, such as Turkey. It is improbable that Israel would extend similar operations in the country: Ankara is a powerful regional actor and Israel has little to gain and much to lose in a direct clash with the country.  This attack likely serves as a demonstration of power by Israel, signaling to Hamas and other adversaries that they are vulnerable anywhere. In that sense, this strike serves not only as a tactical operation but also as a strategic signal of deterrence, underlining the willingness of Israel to pursue its enemies across the border, even at the expense of diplomatic fallout.  If the situation escalates further in the Middle East, this could cause serious disruption for aviation. At the time of publication, Doha International Airport (DIA/OTBD) remains open and there have been no reported disruptions to air traffic.  Dyami is actively monitoring the situation.

Date:  01/09/2025  Where:  The Gambia and coastal waters Who’s involved: Gambian Government, local fishermen and fishing communities, Chinese, Egyptian, Greece, Italy, Portugal Spain and other EU or foreign-owned fishing companies. What is happening? The Gambia’s fishing sector and artisanal fishermen are under severe strain from foreign trawlers engaged in illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) practices , driving overfishing, pollution, violent confrontations, and the loss of livelihoods for many locals. According to 2018 official reports, there were 52 registered fishing vessels operating in Gambian seas, 90% are foreign owned. Subsequent data remains limited but is presumed to have increased , particularly with the 2019 European Union-Gambia sustainable fisheries partnership agreement.  Foreign-owned fishing trawlers sometimes operate close to the country’s coastal waters without permission , overfishing and leaving very little catch for local fishermen who rely on fishing for their livelihood. The majority of the country’s 2.5 million people live along a 20 km stretch of coastline and consume more than three times as many fish, 29 kg per year, compared with 9 kg for those living inland, who may eventually face a food crisis .  Industrial fishmeal factories process hundreds of tonnes of fish daily for export, competing directly with artisanal fishermen and accelerating depletion of fish stocks , while contributing to coastal pollution, taking a toll on the health of locals.  Local fishermen have reported their nets damaged and destroyed  by foreign-owned trawlers giving way to grievances that have resulted in attacks on larger vessels, and vice-versa. Foreign trawlers reportedly operate as close as 5 nautical miles  from the coast, in breach of the 9-mile artisanal zone  reserved for locals. As fishing collapses, some fishermen abandon the trade, turning to human smuggling or selling boats to traffickers. Migrants pay between €600–€1,000 per person, with boats carrying over 200 passengers and generating up to €200,000 per voyage. Analysis After the ousting of former authoritarian leader Yahya Jamme in 2017, the succeeding government opened their coasts to foreign fishing vessels in 2018. While initially welcomed as a means of foreign investment, risks to maritime vessels in Gambian waters are escalating as overfishing, encroachment and weak enforcement fuel hostility towards foreign trawlers. Attacks such as the arson on the Egyptian-owned trawler Abu Islam , which left at least one Gambian sailor aboard severely burned, highlight how confrontations have already crossed into violence. With at least 11 local fishermen killed in the past 15 years and foreign vessels repeatedly violating the 9-nautical-mile boundary into areas exclusively for local fishermen, both local and foreign operators face growing exposure to sabotage, arson or hijackings. Enforcement actions such as the detention of around eight vessels in 2023, remain rare and ineffective, as most offenders have been known to quickly return to sea, resuming their previous activities. If grievances continue unchecked and weapons enter circulation, Gambia risks sliding into Somalia-style dynamics, where unchecked foreign fishing directly contributed to piracy and systemic maritime insecurity. At the societal level, the serious challenges to the artisanal fishing economy is transforming the country’s economic and social structure, with dangerous consequences. Fishing equipment from artisanal fishermen is destroyed, often unable to be replaced, while fishmeal factories divert hundreds of tonnes of fish daily to foreign companies for export, pushing prices beyond local reach. Disenfranchised fishermen unable to sustain their families, are increasingly selling boats to traffickers or trafficking people themselves for between €600 to €1000, enabling smuggling voyages that can earn up to €200,000 per trip. This fusion of economic despair, corruption in licensing (reportedly as low as $275 per tonne) and perceptions of state complicity creates fertile ground for unrest, organised crime and militia formation. An extreme case was seen in Somalia starting the 2000s, with serious grievances from local fishing communities against foreign-operated trawlers and overfishing, resulting in widespread piracy and violence against not only foreign, but local fishing vessels. While The Gambia has more stable political institutions, grievances less widespread and far less weapons in the hands of locals, an overall transformation of the lives of fishing communities compromising their livelihoods has the potential to result in serious social unrest.  Looking ahead Looking ahead, the persistence of weak enforcement, and IUU fishing activities by foreign trawlers could entrench a cycle of violence at sea and deepen instability ashore. If left unresolved, tensions may escalate into organised piracy, militia activity and greater reliance on illicit smuggling networks. The social costs are equally severe, with declining food security, the erosion of traditional livelihoods and migration pressures that risk hollowing out coastal communities. Without targeted action, the Gambia’s fisheries sector may not only eventually collapse ecologically, but also generate a wider security crisis in the region, although the risk at the time of writing appears low, in part due to the political stability of state institutions in the country.  Mitigating these risks will require a multi-layered approach. Strengthening maritime enforcement through better-resourced patrols, regional cooperation and transparent licensing will be essential to curb IUU fishing and rebuild trust in fishing communities. Parallel to that, investment in alternative livelihoods, fair compensation schemes and sustainable management of fisheries can contribute to reducing social grievances and restore economic stability. Also, international actors, including governments and NGOs, have a role in supporting surveillance, enforcing sanctions on repeat offenders and ensuring global seafood supply chains do not fuel local instability. By combining maritime security with social investment programmes, The Gambia may be able to prevent a dangerous drift towards serious structural and social unrest. In January 2025, for example, the government distributed over 20 artisanal fishing boats to local fishermen, an initiative aimed at supporting livelihoods and easing grievances. Without such measures, the country risks following a trajectory similar to Somalia, where overfishing and grievances against foreign fishing vessels in the early 2000s severely undermined local livelihoods, creating instability that persists to this day. Dyami Services Security is not a luxury but a necessity. With Dyami Security Intelligence as a Service, you gain a proactive, flexible, and affordable solution to manage risks, monitor geopolitical threats, and respond immediately to crises. Why subscribe to security? ✅ Resilient business operations in today’s world ✅ We act as your security department and Geopolitical Risk Officer ✅ Direct access to security expertise without high costs ✅ Prevent crises with up-to-date threat intelligence ✅ Scalable subscription plans ✅ Access to our unique global network Want to know how this protects your organization? Request a free consultation! Subscription options Dyami Security as a Service: a flexible security subscription that keeps your organization protected at all times—without the need for costly internal capacity.

On August 11, 2025 , the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld a landmark trial ruling that has profound consequences for global aviation. In N.S. v. Ukraine International Airlines  (2025 ONCA 587), the court unanimously confirmed that Ukraine International Airlines (UIA) was negligent  in allowing Flight PS752 to depart Tehran on January 8, 2020 , when two Iranian missiles brought the aircraft down, killing all 176 passengers and crew . The Court emphasized a fundamental point: airlines carry a duty to conduct thorough conflict-zone risk assessments  before departure or overflight. UIA failed this duty, and as a result, the carrier was found fully liable under the Montreal Convention. The core finding: negligence in risk assessment Justice Akbarali’s trial decision, and now the Court of Appeal’s confirmation, makes clear that: Airlines cannot rely solely on airspace being “open” ; regulatory permissions do not replace operator due diligence. A thorough, timely risk assessment  was expected before allowing PS752 to depart. Even a short delay to gather intelligence on the volatile situation in Tehran could have prevented tragedy. This ruling sets a new precedent: if airlines fail to perform conflict-zone or overflight risk assessments, liability may be unlimited . This goes beyond flight PS752 Aviation operates in a world where geopolitical tensions, conflicts, and state-based threats evolve rapidly. In recent years we have seen: Surface-to-air missile incidents  not only in Iran but also in Ukraine (MH17) and other regions. Regional conflicts  where sudden escalations threaten civil aviation—examples include the Red Sea, Iraq, Sudan, and Syria. Airspace restrictions  that are inconsistently applied, leaving operators with gaps in official guidance. This means that every operator, commercial airlines, business aviation, and cargo carriers, must actively assess risks  when planning routes or departures. The broader lesson: safety and duty of care For operators, the PS752 case reinforces several key principles: Regulators alone cannot guarantee safety.   Operators must take responsibility for assessing real-time intelligence. Duty of care extends beyond compliance.   Families, clients, and insurers expect proactive safety measures, not reactive excuses. Risk assessments protect business continuity.   A single catastrophic incident can destroy not only lives but also reputations, partnerships, and financial stability. What proper risk assessment looks like A robust risk assessment process should include: Monitoring geopolitical intelligence  and real-time developments. Consulting with aviation security experts  who understand state threats and conflict dynamics. Evaluating airspace overflight risks  based on weapon ranges, military activity, and recent incidents. Documenting the decision-making process, demonstrating why a flight was routed, delayed, or cancelled. In short: airlines must be able to show their work . Conclusion: a turning point for aviation security The Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision sends a clear message: aviation safety cannot rely on luck, nor on minimal compliance.  Operators have a legal, moral, and operational obligation to perform conflict-zone and destination risk assessments. At Dyami Security Intelligence, we see this daily: proactive intelligence and structured assessments not only protect passengers and crew, they protect the very viability of aviation businesses. The PS752 tragedy reminds us all that failure to act can have irreversible consequences. About the author Eric Schouten  is the Founder & CEO of Dyami Security Intelligence , a Netherlands-based firm specializing in travel risk management, aviation security, and geopolitical intelligence. With a background in the Dutch intelligence services and extensive aviation security experience, Eric has been directly involved in high-impact crises such as the MH17 disaster , and played a role in founding the Dutch expert group on information sharing for airlines , which enhanced cooperation between carriers and government agencies. He is also actively involved with IBAC (International Business Aviation Council)  and other aviation organisations like the European Business Aviation Association , where he regularly teaches and advises on conflict-zone risk management and overflight security. As a recognized subject matter expert and international speaker  on overflight risks, Eric supports airlines, business jet operators, and global corporations in navigating today’s volatile security environment. His mission is to make world-class intelligence and risk management accessible, proactive, and people-centric.

Date:   13/08/2025 (15:00 GMT+2) Where?  Israel; Iran; broader Middle East could also be affected. What happened?  On 12/08/2025 , Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu uploaded a video  on his X- account (formerly Twitter ), in which he directly addressed the Iranian population.  The video, which is full of veiled messages (verbal and non-verbal), is a clear attempt at shaping the Iranian public opinion and turning it against Iran’s current government. The country is currently facing a ‘ triple crisis ’ - power and water outages combined with record-breaking heat. Netanyahu clearly frames the first two crises as the direct result of bad governance, while the “descendants of Cyrus the Great deserve so much more”. However, the video is more than an attempt to shape public opinion - it is a call to action. The Israeli PM is actively calling for people to stand up and ends with a note which sounds like an indirect warning, stating that “soon your country will be free. Do not let these Mullahs ruin your lives any longer. I stand with you. Israel stands with you!”.  Netanyahu has sent videos directly addressed to the Iranian public several times before. In May 2018, Netanyahu’s office began airing short YouTube videos  in which he emphasized Israel’s admiration for Iranian culture and its people. The central message was consistent: Israel views the regime, not its people, as a threat. In a similar video from September 2024, Netanyahu appeared to lay the causes of internal issues in Iran on the country’s leadership.  Recently, as tensions between Israel and Iran escalated into the 12-day war in June 2025,  Netanyahu asked Iranians to “ stand up against an evil and oppressive regime ” amidst a military standoff between the two nations.   This latest video presents what appears to be a next step toward another Israeli offensive against Iran. Reports  and our own human sources suggest that Iran is already preparing for a potential strike. As a response, it was allegedly reported - though unconfirmed - that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had started large-scale military readiness exercises  directly after the video was published involving the launching of ballistic missiles and fighter jets. Analysis Following previous video messages, military action did not follow suit. However, Netanyahu’s latest video may signal the beginning of a new round of tensions between Israel and Iran, with reports already indicating that both nations are preparing for potential escalation. This information is likely to be plausible for several reasons. An initial analysis of the 12-day confrontation in June 2025 between the two countries makes clear that Israel’s strategic objectives were not fully achieved, despite Iran’s nuclear facilities sustaining damage and the assasination of around 30 senior commanders and 19 nuclear scientists. However, most officials were quickly replaced, and instead of a popular uprising, a rally-around-the-flag-effect took place. These developments may well have fortified the Iranian government’s narrative that the country needs nuclear capabilities to effectively deter enemies.  More broadly, aside from the ‘nuclear factor’, Israel simply was not able to topple the current Iranian government amid the last conflict. Through its ‘forward defense doctrine’, Tehran, via its proxies such as the Houthis and Hezbollah,  forms what the Israeli government perceives as possibly the biggest national security threat to Israel. Having been unable to neutralize this threat previously, Israel may now be seeking another opportunity to achieve that goal. Another reason for Israel to start another offensive, is that Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu might be willing to start another offensive against Iran to shift the political narrative surrounding his leadership. The Israeli leader is currently facing three major corruption trials  and an ICC arrest warrant on the charge of war crimes. A new conflict with Iran could offer him a way to reassess his image as leader, divert national attention from these woes to a unifying external threat. But more importantly, it could allow the Israeli Knesset to extend the state of emergency which, in a similar manner to the June confrontation, may serve to further delay Netanyahu’s trial. Given the dominance of Netanyahu over Israeli politics and military operations, once again proven by his deeply controversial decision to occupy Gaza city , it is reasonable to conclude that his personal preferences carry significant weight in shaping Israel’s military decisions. Looking forward For mentioned reasons it is plausible that Israel is planning another operation against Iran. The question therefore is not necessarily when, but rather how such an action will occur. It could manifest as a military campaign - just like in June - but it could also unfold as an operation aimed at destabilizing Iran from within. Scenario  A: a military offensive Assuming Israel is planning to start another military offensive, it is likely that, in order to achieve its strategic objectives, Israel may seek to strike Iran again sooner rather than later. Iran is currently already in the process of rebuilding its military resources after the 12-day war in June. The longer Israel waits with another offensive, the more facilities the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was able to destroy during the last campaign might be operational again. This would align with Israel’s “mowing the grass” strategy, which encompasses conducting preventive and repeated (smaller) strikes to stop adversaries from developing capabilities that could challenge Israel’s military dominance.  It’s likely that the IDF will once again leverage its technological edge to reestablish aerial dominance, target key IRGC figures, and strike critical military infrastructure. Considering the strong intelligence capabilities Israel demonstrated during the previous offensive, it’s reasonable to assume those advantages remain in place - and that they will be used to maximum effect. While it is uncertain how much Iran has been able to replenish its stockpile,, it is likely it will respond with military measures and actions as well, similar to its actions in June, in order to project  strength and avoid perceptions of vulnerability.  However, regime change may require boots on the ground, outside of Israel’s capabilities due to numerous technical reasons. Iran, unlike Gaza, is not in Israel’s background, and the strategic implications of any plan to attack Iran via land would be a momentous task that the IDF is arguably incapable of undertaking. Instead of turning the tide of public opinion, the June confrontation appeared to create certain support for the Iranian government. What can be said, though, is that yet another Israeli-Iran war can destabilize the wider Middle East again, and that it will carry serious consequences for both local and overflight security.  As observed in June, closing the corridor between Iraq and the other Gulf countries creates significantly more complex operational routing, with detours potentially adding two or more hours to flight time. In any case, we are monitoring indicators of changes in overflight security assessments and will report on these developments accordingly.  Scenario  B: destabilizing Iran from within Given the aforementioned difficulties in achieving regime change through military means, Israel could instead choose to intensify operations aimed at destabilizing Iran from within and turn the tide of public opinion in Iran. Iran is already grappling with major internal crises: recurring power outages, water shortages during a period of drought, and the lingering shock of the largest protests in decades, which erupted in 2022 after the death of Mahsa Amini. Amini died under mysterious circumstances while in police custody, following her arrest for allegedly wearing her hijab improperly. Those demonstrations were widely described as “ unlike any the country had seen before ” - Israel might be aiming to ‘light the spark’ on this widespread resentment.   Such operations would aim to weaken the Iranian leadership’s grip on power and divert resources toward maintaining internal stability and security. This will indirectly slow down strategic programs like missile development and nuclear enrichment. In addition, this approach aligns with Netanyahu’s message in the video published on 12/08/2025 on X, where he encourages the Iranian people to protest and reclaim their power from the regime.  Conclusion Considering both Netanyahu’s latest video message and the broader geopolitical context, it seems plausible that Israel and Iran are preparing for another round of hostilities. This intelligence brief indicates that Israel - and prime minister Netanyahu himself - have ample motivation to engage in renewed conflict.  Building on that assumption, two scenarios were outlined for how a new Israeli offensive on Iran might unfold. The IDF could launch another military campaign, likely following a trajectory similar to the outbreak of hostilities last June. Israel would aim to leverage its technological superiority, while Iran would respond with military actions.  However, history has shown that achieving regime change through military means is virtually impossible without ground forces - a step Israel is unlikely to take, not least because of the significant logistical challenges involved. Another scenario outlined in here, which would also make sense in light of Netanyahu’s video message in which he called on the Iranians to stand up to their leadership. This could potentially be more fruitful, given the outburst of widespread resentment in 2022, the current ‘triple crises’ and general frustration about Iran’s isolation in the world. Looking ahead, the region is likely to remain highly unstable. Any renewed Israeli-Iranian confrontation could escalate unpredictably, fueling cycles of retaliation and heightening tensions across the Middle East. Without a clear path to resolution, political, economic, and security uncertainties are expected to persist, keeping the region on edge for the foreseeable future.

Date:   12/08/2025 (14:00 GMT+2) Where?  Mali What happened?  On 11/08/2025 , it was reported that Malian authorities had arrested two dozen soldiers accused of plotting to overthrow the ruling junta. The arrests include several high-ranking officials, such as General Abass Dembélé, former governor of the Mopti region of the country and a respected military officer and General Nema Sagara, one of the few high-ranking female officers in the armed forces. The suspected coup attempt comes amid an increasingly oppressive political climate. On 10/07/2025 , a bill was signed into law granting General Assimi Goïta, who leads Mali’s junta, a new five-year presidential mandate, renewable “ as many times as necessary until the country is pacified ”, which essentially created the legal basis for Goïta to rule for life.  This followed an unprecedented political crackdown in the country. On 13/05/2025 , Mali’s military leadership formally dissolved all the political parties. Just one week earlier, on 07/05/2025 , the junta suspended all political activities across the country as a response to a protest planned  on 09/05/2025  calling for the return to constitutional rule and demanding presidential elections. Amidst the political turmoil, Mali continued to face grave security challenges, mostly coming from an insurgency which has gripped the country since 2012 by Islamist groups such as Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and also by Touareg rebels, who united under a group named the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA).   On 01/06/2025 , JNIM carried out an attack on a Malian army base, with reports estimating the number of casualties between 30 and 100. On 02/06/2025 , the same group attacked the Malian city of Timbuktu, with reports stating “ dozens of soldiers killed ”. On 05/06/2025 , JNIM again attacked two army outposts in Mahou and Tessit, leading to more soldiers killed. On 13/06/2025, FLA fighters clashed with the Malian army and Russian forces supporting them between Aguelhok and Kidal, leading to dozens killed. On 01/07/2025,  the city of Kidal was attacked and ransacked by JNIM. Conclusion After Assimi Goïta took over power in May 2021, his own regime now finds itself in an increasingly difficult position as it is struggling to contain the rampant security threats in his country’s territory, all while relying on repression to maintain control, much like his predecessors. Many actors who once supported his rise to power now find themselves considering alternative options - this thwarted coup was merely a symptom of those underlying shortcomings . Taken together, these things paint a bleak picture for a country whose regime needs military cohesion to maintain control.  Moreover, there appear to be two main scenarios for the current situation. The first one is that Mali will face enduring destabilization as military cohesion and the legitimacy of the junta continue to erode, creating fertile ground for possibly another coup. The other scenario involves ruling leader Goïta tightening his grip on power even further and centralizing it through repression, purges and loyalty-based promotions to secure his position after this latest foiled coup attempt. This might buy him time, but risks exacerbating the problems that initially led to this failed coup. This will only accelerate the instability in Mali - the instability that his rule meant to stop.  This is a shortened version of a more elaborate report. To access the full version, contact info@dyami.services

Date: 08/08/2025  (17:00 UTC+2) Where?  Lebanon What happened?  On 19/06/2025 , after months of pressure for the disarmament of Hezbollah following the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire deal, signed on 18/11/2024 , US special envoy Thomas Barrack delivered a plan to the Lebanese government officials. The plan entailed the full disarmament of Hezbollah within four months in exchange for a halt to Israeli air strikes and withdrawal of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) from southern Lebanon. The IDF has maintained a presence in five posts in southern Lebanon since first establishing a presence during the Israel-Hezbollah conflict of 2024, namely in Jabal al-Labouneh, Jabal Blat, Talat al Awida, Tallet al-Hamamamis, and Tallet Aaziyyeh. On 07/07/2025, the Lebanese government delivered a response to US envoy Barrack, which was so well received it even prompted Barrack to state he was “unbelievably satisfied” with Lebanon’s reply. This was, however, not a final agreement, and negotiations were to continue in order to finalize the deal.  Fast forward a few weeks, on 21/07/2025, during a press conference after a meeting with Lebanon’s PM, Nawaf Salam, when asked about the extent to which the US could act as a security guarantor for Lebanon and push Israel to respect its end of the deal, Barrack casted doubt over the US’ mediating power, stating that the US “has no business in trying to compel Israel to do anything”. On 29/07/2025, the US publicly pressured Lebanon to formalize its commitment to Hezbollah’s disarmament, pushing for the Lebanese cabinet to approve the disarmament of Hezbollah.   On 30/07/2025, Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem scorned calls to disarmament, stating that the group will “not submit to Israel” and that weapons are “an internal Lebanese affair”. On 31/07/2025, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun urged Hezbollah to disarm, arguing that avoiding doing so would only result in the continuation of Israeli air strikes in Lebanon. On 05/08/2025, the Lebanese Cabinet tasked the army to draw up a plan to establish a state monopoly on arms by the end of the year. As a response, Hezbollah supporters began protesting, especially in Beirut, where they had first gathered on Monday, 04/08/2025 . The plan is to be presented to the Lebanese government by 31/08/2025. During the cabinet meeting that led to this decision, Hezbollah’s Qassem repeated his refusal to disarm while threatening Israel that Hezbollah would retaliate if Israel were to re-intensify its air campaign on Lebanon. On 06/08/2025, Hezbollah leader Qassem repeated his disdain for the cabinet decision the previous day, stating that the Lebanese government was committing a “grave sin” by directing the Army to establish a monopoly on arms.  On 07/08/2025, the Lebanese Cabinet approved the US-proposed plan to disarm Hezbollah. Conclusion The recent Lebanese Cabinet decision to formalize the disarmament of Hezbollah represents a major change in the government’s stance towards the Iran-backed group that has essentially ruled the country for the past two decades. The decision comes after Hezbollah suffered heavy losses during the recent Israel-Hezbollah war, which resulted in the death of most of its leadership and a significant part of its fighters. Weakened both militarily and politically, Hezbollah could not avoid the appointment of Lebanon’s new President, Joseph Aoun, who was elected by a vast majority in parliament after more than two years since the last election.  Aoun, a former Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), has vowed to rebuild the country and has identified the State’s monopoly on arms as a crucial factor in the rebuilding process. On 07/08/2025, the Lebanese Cabinet approved plans for the LAF to conduct Hezbollah’s disarmament and deliver a result by year’s end. The plan, heavily pushed by the US, is likely not in line with what Aoun’s government, wary of fostering more dissent (Hezbollah still enjoys some popular support) by rushing the group’s dismantlement, would have preferred. Nevertheless, the plan is now in motion, and the LAF, following years of neglect and under-funding, faces a monumental task that warrants continued monitoring. This is a shortened version of a more elaborate report. To access the full version, contact info@dyami.services

Date:  08/08/2025  (15:00 UTC+2) Where?  Bosnia and Herzegovina; Republika Srpska Historic context: On 14/12/1995 , the Dayton Accords (officially the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina) was signed between the newly established states of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which at this point in history consisted of modern-day Serbia and Montenegro after the other former Yugoslav republics had declared independence. The Dayton Accords ended the Bosnian War that had raged between 1992 and 1995, and saw the country being divided into two parts: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on one side (gray on the map below), and the Republika Srpska (RS) on the other (red), encompassing areas populated primarily by ethnic Serbs.  Despite the fact that a formal peace was signed between the former Yugoslav republics, tensions persisted, primarily in BiH, between the Bosniaks (Bosnian muslims), ethnic Croats (mostly in the south) and ethnic Serbs. Grievances from the 1992-1995 war continued to fuel political disputes, ethnic segregation and occasional outbursts of unrest. What happened?  On 06/08/2025, Milorad Dodik, leader of RS, was dismissed from office by the  Bosnian election commission. He promptly declared that he would disregard the commission’s ruling and expressed his intention  to hold a referendum on his mandate. However, this latest wave of unrest in the young republic is part of a long-standing pattern of rising tensions  between the country’s ethnic groups, particularly between Serbs and Bosniaks, who largely reside in separate administrative units. The election commission’s decision follows a court order made on 26/02/2025,  which convicted Dodik to a one-year prison sentence and a six-year ban on holding public office.  This verdict was the result of a long-standing conflict between Dodik and the international High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Christian Schmidt. The High Representative’s function is to oversee the civilian implementation of the Dayton Agreement. He or she has the authority to impose laws and sack officials. Dodik was convicted for defying the High Representative by enacting laws in RS that blocked the implementation of the High Representative’s decisions and Bosnia’s constitutional court rulings—an act deemed an assault on the country’s constitutional order. Dodik responded that the verdict was ‘politically motivated’, driven by ‘racial and national hatred [against Serbs]’ and implying an agenda driven by Western actors against him, but also against the Serbs in general. He vowed not to recognize the authority of the judiciary in Sarajevo.  Shortly after, on 26/02/2025 , Dodik announced  that RS would adopt a series of laws aimed at effectively severing the administrative region from Bosnia’s state institutions. Among them was a law prohibiting the Bosnian Prosecutor’s Office from operating within the RS. Decisions made by Bosnian courts would no longer be recognized in the Serb-majority entity, and Bosnian intelligence and security services would also be barred from operating on RS territory.  Amidst the escalating tensions between RS and BiH, RS adopted a new draft constitution on 15/03/2025 , granting the territory expanded decision-making powers. A key provision of the draft is the elimination of the Council of Peoples, a body meant to protect the rights of BiH’s ethnic groups.  On 27/03/2025,  Bosnia issued an international arrest warrant for Dodik. On 23/04/2025 , Bosnian state police (SIPA) attempted to arrest Dodik in East-Sarajevo, which is part of RS. Local police instead prevented  the arrest. Despite the arrest warrant, Dodik made public appearances in Banja Luka, the RS capital, travelled to Serbia and maintained certain allies, such as Serbia’s Aleksandar Vučić, Russia’s Putin and Hungary’s Orban. The latter also stood up  for Dodik after his conviction, calling it a ‘political witch hunt’.  Tensions somewhat eased on 04/07/2025, when, after several failed arrest attempts, Dodik was pressured into appearing for questioning before prosecutors, which led the state court to lift the arrest warrant. Instead, restrictions were imposed, such as mandatory police check-ins. On 01/08/2025, it was reported that the earlier court verdict on 26/02/2025  would be upheld and that Dodik would be stripped of the RS presidency and receive a jail sentence. Analysis The political crisis surrounding Dodik highlights the persistent tensions between the RS and the central government in Sarajevo , with each side backed by its own allies. BiH — a state essentially shaped by the Dayton Accords and still overseen by the High Representative — faces ongoing disputes as RS and Dodik increasingly clash with both the High Representative and Sarajevo over actions taken within RS. Instead, they are turning toward alternative partners (usually those ideologically opposed to the West) such as Hungary, Russia, and Serbia, refusing to recognise the legitimacy of Bosnia’s constitution and portraying efforts at BiH state-building as part of a Western witch hunt driven by hatred against the Serbs. As a response to the clash between RS and Sarajevo, RS has introduced a series of laws creating parallel RS institutions and restricting state-level bodies from operating within its territory, essentially isolating the RS from BiH’s state institutions. These measures, combined with the adoption of a new draft constitution, illustrate an attempt to de facto  break from BiH, either laying the groundwork for a future secession or functioning as a parallel state in all but name. Conclusion The latest round of tensions largely reflects the pattern of unrest which has gripped Bosnia and Herzegovina since its independence , the direct result of the devastating civil war that took place between 1992 and 1995. The ethnic division of the country, as ‘designed’ in the Dayton Accords, may have temporarily eased hostilities, but it was never a sustainable foundation for long-term stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as mutual distrust and ethnonationalism remain widespread. Instead of solving underlying tensions, the Dayton Accords entrenched ethnic divisions within the country’s political architecture The result was a country where - despite being united - ethnic distrust always remained an obstacle to statebuilding.  Instead of compromising, voters in both entities have elected nationalist leaders who prioritize ethnonationalist agendas, perpetuating divisions rather than fostering unity. Milorad Dodik fits this trend, as he consistently uses divisive and nationalist rhetoric. This pattern is mirrored among Bosniak leaders as well, such as Haris Silajdžić, who similarly advocated for positions rooted in ethnic nationalism.  The latest outburst of tensions is a symptom of a much broader problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina, one without a quick or simple solution.  How Milorad Dodik will respond to his sentence remains uncertain, but regardless of his reaction, there is a real risk that it could further deepen internal divisions and spark renewed instability, not only within Bosnia and Herzegovina but across the wider Balkan region as well.

The recent cybersecurity incidents involving Qantas , Hawaiian Airlines , and WestJet  highlight that the threat to the aviation industry remains both severe and immediate. These breaches, often rooted in third-party vulnerabilities and sophisticated social engineering tactics, expose millions of passenger records and disrupt critical services. Additionally, major IT outages such as the one affecting Alaska Airlines  on 21 July 2025 and the widespread disruption at Delta Airlines  last year underscore the aviation sector's deep reliance on interconnected digital systems. Even non-malicious events can cascade into operational paralysis, affecting flights, passengers, and reputations.  The report will outline our understanding of a cybersecurity incident, identify the three most prominent threat actors commonly observed in this domain, and highlight the most essential cybersecurity basic hygiene practices necessary to reduce risk and enhance protection. While insider threats remain a critical concern, they will be considered out of scope for the purposes of this analysis. What is a cybersecurity incident? A cybersecurity incident is an event, often driven by malicious intent, that compromises the confidentiality (C), integrity (I), or availability (A) of information or systems. Examples of cybersecurity incidents in the aviation sector are: A hacker breaches an airline’s passenger database and steals personal information. A ransomware attack encrypts airport operational systems and demands payment. An employee accidentally clicks a phishing link, allowing access to the sensitive data of a company. DDoS attacks flood an airport’s website during geopolitical tensions, making it inaccessible to customers. Each incident carries a distinct type of impact, affecting different aspects of the CIA triad. What these examples demonstrate is that, despite existing security controls and mitigation strategies, threat actors continue to find ways to bypass defenses and cause real disruption. This highlights that organizations should not only focus on preventing cyber incidents (resilience), but must also invest in response readiness when an incident actually occurs. Threat Actor: Cybercriminals Cybercriminals are financially motivated. They target organizations that handle large volumes of data or revenue, like airlines and airports, aiming for quick monetary gain through ransomware, data theft, or fraud. Political or ideological factors are typically irrelevant to their goals.  The aviation industry has become an increasingly attractive target for cybercriminals, largely due to its growing profitability and global reach. As revenues continue to soar, so too does the incentive for malicious actors seeking financial gain. Scattered Spider , also known as UNC3944, Starfraud, Scatter Swine, or Muddled Libra, is a financially motivated cybercriminal group operating mainly from the US and UK.  They have targeted major airlines and airport service providers,  causing significant operational outages, delays, and compromising passenger data. Their modus operandi often involves impersonating employees or contractors to deceive IT help desks, bypass multi-factor authentication controls, and gain initial access to airline networks and third-party vendors. The group’s ability to tailor phishing campaigns with AI-generated deepfake voices or realistic spear-phishing messages has raised the bar on social engineering threats. Ransomware remains one of the most aggressive and damaging forms of cybercrime affecting the aviation sector. These attacks typically involve encrypting critical systems or stealing sensitive data, followed by demands for ransom payments to restore access or prevent public exposure. While the notorious 2023 LockBit ransomware attack  on Boeing's parts and distribution business is a well-known example, the threat has only grown. More recent incidents, such as the ransomware attack on AerCap  and the Rhysida ransomware attack  that crippled operations at Seattle–Tacoma Airport in 2024, demonstrate how both direct aviation operators and supporting infrastructure remain high-value targets. Threat actor: (H)activists Hacktivists, or cyber activists, are driven by ideology. Their attacks are meant to send a political or social message, often in response to specific events or policies. Aviation, as a high-visibility sector, can be a symbolic target to draw global attention to their cause. One of the most notorious hacktivist groups currently active is NoName057(16) , a pro-Russian collective known for launching politically motivated cyberattacks. Among their many operations, they target aviation infrastructure as a form of protest against foreign policies and to demonstrate digital allegiance to national agendas. In 2025, the group claimed responsibility for a DDoS (Distributed Denial-of-Service) attack on Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport . The attack temporarily disrupted online services and public access to key airport systems, aiming to send a geopolitical message amid heightened global tensions. This incident was just one in a series of attacks. However, such attacks are often limited in technical complexity and the impact is much lower than attacks intended by cyber criminals. Nevertheless, it can still result in somewhat of operational disruption, and strained public confidence, especially when timed with geopolitical flashpoints. Threat actor: Nation states Nation-state actors operate with strategic, long-term objectives aligned with national interests. They target aviation through advanced persistent threats (APTs). These attacks are often highly sophisticated and difficult to detect. State-linked cyber actors from Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea each pose distinct threats to the aviation sector, shaped by their strategic priorities.  Russian-affiliated groups are primarily engaged in cyber espionage , aiming to collect intelligence and to potentially disrupt infrastructure in adversarial countries. Chinese APTs   have a long history of industrial espionage, with a focus on stealing intellectual property related to aircraft design, engineering and maintenance processes, avionics software, and advanced materials information  that can accelerate both commercial and military (aerospace) programs. Iranian state-sponsored actors present a unique threat to Western aviation, driven more by political and surveillance objectives than by financial or industrial gain. One of their key interests lies in accessing passenger data from airlines and travel systems to monitor political dissidents  and individuals of strategic interest. North Korean APTs operate largely to sustain the regime’s strategic ambitions , combining cyber espionage with financially motivated attacks and disruptive operations aimed at adversaries. What to do? At a minimum, every organization in the aviation sector must take foundational steps to prepare for and mitigate cyber threats. First, identify the most critical systems, data, and processes that, if compromised, would have the greatest operational, financial, or reputational impact. Effective risk management must be in place to assess vulnerabilities, prioritize assets, and align protective measures accordingly. Organizations should also have crisis response plans and escalation procedures in place, regularly tested through exercises, and clearly communicated to all relevant teams to ensure swift and coordinated action when an incident occurs. In the case of ransomware, it is essential to define policies in advance, including positions on ransom payments.  For organizations without internal cybersecurity expertise, it is vital to outsource to trusted partners. Ask the right questions, demand transparency, and ensure service providers understand the specific risks and requirements of the aviation industry. Proactive preparation today can significantly reduce the impact of tomorrow’s incident.