Intel Brief: Renewed Israeli-Iran conflict likely: what can we expect?

casper4871
Aug 13
6 min read

Date: 13/08/2025 (15:00 GMT+2)

Where? Israel; Iran; broader Middle East could also be affected.

What happened?

On 12/08/2025, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu uploaded a video on his X-account (formerly Twitter), in which he directly addressed the Iranian population.
The video, which is full of veiled messages (verbal and non-verbal), is a clear attempt at shaping the Iranian public opinion and turning it against Iran’s current government. The country is currently facing a ‘triple crisis’ - power and water outages combined with record-breaking heat. Netanyahu clearly frames the first two crises as the direct result of bad governance, while the “descendants of Cyrus the Great deserve so much more”.
However, the video is more than an attempt to shape public opinion - it is a call to action. The Israeli PM is actively calling for people to stand up and ends with a note which sounds like an indirect warning, stating that “soon your country will be free. Do not let these Mullahs ruin your lives any longer. I stand with you. Israel stands with you!”.
Netanyahu has sent videos directly addressed to the Iranian public several times before. In May 2018, Netanyahu’s office began airing short YouTube videos in which he emphasized Israel’s admiration for Iranian culture and its people. The central message was consistent: Israel views the regime, not its people, as a threat.
In a similar video from September 2024, Netanyahu appeared to lay the causes of internal issues in Iran on the country’s leadership.
Recently, as tensions between Israel and Iran escalated into the 12-day war in June 2025, Netanyahu asked Iranians to “stand up against an evil and oppressive regime” amidst a military standoff between the two nations.
This latest video presents what appears to be a next step toward another Israeli offensive against Iran. Reports and our own human sources suggest that Iran is already preparing for a potential strike.
As a response, it was allegedly reported - though unconfirmed - that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had started large-scale military readiness exercises directly after the video was published involving the launching of ballistic missiles and fighter jets.

Analysis

Following previous video messages, military action did not follow suit. However, Netanyahu’s latest video may signal the beginning of a new round of tensions between Israel and Iran, with reports already indicating that both nations are preparing for potential escalation. This information is likely to be plausible for several reasons.

An initial analysis of the 12-day confrontation in June 2025 between the two countries makes clear that Israel’s strategic objectives were not fully achieved, despite Iran’s nuclear facilities sustaining damage and the assasination of around 30 senior commanders and 19 nuclear scientists. However, most officials were quickly replaced, and instead of a popular uprising, a rally-around-the-flag-effect took place. These developments may well have fortified the Iranian government’s narrative that the country needs nuclear capabilities to effectively deter enemies.

More broadly, aside from the ‘nuclear factor’, Israel simply was not able to topple the current Iranian government amid the last conflict. Through its ‘forward defense doctrine’, Tehran, via its proxies such as the Houthis and Hezbollah, forms what the Israeli government perceives as possibly the biggest national security threat to Israel. Having been unable to neutralize this threat previously, Israel may now be seeking another opportunity to achieve that goal.

Another reason for Israel to start another offensive, is that Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu might be willing to start another offensive against Iran to shift the political narrative surrounding his leadership. The Israeli leader is currently facing three major corruption trials and an ICC arrest warrant on the charge of war crimes. A new conflict with Iran could offer him a way to reassess his image as leader, divert national attention from these woes to a unifying external threat. But more importantly, it could allow the Israeli Knesset to extend the state of emergency which, in a similar manner to the June confrontation, may serve to further delay Netanyahu’s trial. Given the dominance of Netanyahu over Israeli politics and military operations, once again proven by his deeply controversial decision to occupy Gaza city, it is reasonable to conclude that his personal preferences carry significant weight in shaping Israel’s military decisions.

Looking forward

For mentioned reasons it is plausible that Israel is planning another operation against Iran. The question therefore is not necessarily when, but rather how such an action will occur. It could manifest as a military campaign - just like in June - but it could also unfold as an operation aimed at destabilizing Iran from within.

Scenario A: a military offensive

Assuming Israel is planning to start another military offensive, it is likely that, in order to achieve its strategic objectives, Israel may seek to strike Iran again sooner rather than later. Iran is currently already in the process of rebuilding its military resources after the 12-day war in June. The longer Israel waits with another offensive, the more facilities the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was able to destroy during the last campaign might be operational again. This would align with Israel’s “mowing the grass” strategy, which encompasses conducting preventive and repeated (smaller) strikes to stop adversaries from developing capabilities that could challenge Israel’s military dominance.

It’s likely that the IDF will once again leverage its technological edge to reestablish aerial dominance, target key IRGC figures, and strike critical military infrastructure. Considering the strong intelligence capabilities Israel demonstrated during the previous offensive, it’s reasonable to assume those advantages remain in place - and that they will be used to maximum effect. While it is uncertain how much Iran has been able to replenish its stockpile,, it is likely it will respond with military measures and actions as well, similar to its actions in June, in order to project strength and avoid perceptions of vulnerability.

However, regime change may require boots on the ground, outside of Israel’s capabilities due to numerous technical reasons. Iran, unlike Gaza, is not in Israel’s background, and the strategic implications of any plan to attack Iran via land would be a momentous task that the IDF is arguably incapable of undertaking. Instead of turning the tide of public opinion, the June confrontation appeared to create certain support for the Iranian government. What can be said, though, is that yet another Israeli-Iran war can destabilize the wider Middle East again, and that it will carry serious consequences for both local and overflight security. As observed in June, closing the corridor between Iraq and the other Gulf countries creates significantly more complex operational routing, with detours potentially adding two or more hours to flight time. In any case, we are monitoring indicators of changes in overflight security assessments and will report on these developments accordingly.

Scenario B: destabilizing Iran from within

Given the aforementioned difficulties in achieving regime change through military means, Israel could instead choose to intensify operations aimed at destabilizing Iran from within and turn the tide of public opinion in Iran. Iran is already grappling with major internal crises: recurring power outages, water shortages during a period of drought, and the lingering shock of the largest protests in decades, which erupted in 2022 after the death of Mahsa Amini. Amini died under mysterious circumstances while in police custody, following her arrest for allegedly wearing her hijab improperly. Those demonstrations were widely described as “unlike any the country had seen before” - Israel might be aiming to ‘light the spark’ on this widespread resentment.

Such operations would aim to weaken the Iranian leadership’s grip on power and divert resources toward maintaining internal stability and security. This will indirectly slow down strategic programs like missile development and nuclear enrichment. In addition, this approach aligns with Netanyahu’s message in the video published on 12/08/2025 on X, where he encourages the Iranian people to protest and reclaim their power from the regime.

Conclusion

Considering both Netanyahu’s latest video message and the broader geopolitical context, it seems plausible that Israel and Iran are preparing for another round of hostilities. This intelligence brief indicates that Israel - and prime minister Netanyahu himself - have ample motivation to engage in renewed conflict.

Building on that assumption, two scenarios were outlined for how a new Israeli offensive on Iran might unfold. The IDF could launch another military campaign, likely following a trajectory similar to the outbreak of hostilities last June. Israel would aim to leverage its technological superiority, while Iran would respond with military actions. However, history has shown that achieving regime change through military means is virtually impossible without ground forces - a step Israel is unlikely to take, not least because of the significant logistical challenges involved.

Another scenario outlined in here, which would also make sense in light of Netanyahu’s video message in which he called on the Iranians to stand up to their leadership. This could potentially be more fruitful, given the outburst of widespread resentment in 2022, the current ‘triple crises’ and general frustration about Iran’s isolation in the world.

Looking ahead, the region is likely to remain highly unstable. Any renewed Israeli-Iranian confrontation could escalate unpredictably, fueling cycles of retaliation and heightening tensions across the Middle East. Without a clear path to resolution, political, economic, and security uncertainties are expected to persist, keeping the region on edge for the foreseeable future.