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Date Published: 28/01/2025 Updated: 29/01/2025 Location:   Goma, North Kivu Province, Eastern DRC; Kinshasa. What happened? On Monday 27/01/2025 , M23 armed group rebels said they had captured the eastern city of Goma, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo . This signals a major escalation of the decades-long conflict which reignited in 2022. Hundreds of thousands of people fled Goma on Monday. Goma is a humanitarian and security hub of the region where several people displaced by fighting elsewhere sought refuge. The M23 is one of several armed groups operating in the east of the DRC in the search for control over mineral mines. The DRC and the United Nations accuse Rwanda of supporting the M23 rebel group and have said Rwandan troops were present in Goma . The Foreign Minister of the DRC said on Sunday 26/01 that the Rwandan troops crossing the border was a ‘declaration of war’ from Rwanda. The Minister also said the DRC was severing all diplomatic ties with Kigali. The M23 intensified the offensive late last year, capturing nearby towns. At the beginning of 2025, they took control of Sake and Minova towns. On Sunday, 26/01/2025, the UN Security Council condemned the advance and confirmed 13 peacekeepers, three Malawian and one Uruguayan soldiers were killed in the attacks. As of 29/01/2025 , the situation is developing. M23 rebels control most of the city. Gunfire can still be heard, electricity is cut off, and hospitals are overwhelmed . Dozens of troops have surrendered but some soldiers and pro-government militias are still holding out. The M23 are gathering DRC troops and allied groups to take their weapons. There are also reports of looting and raping committed by fighters. A medicines warehouse has been looted and one laboratory in which dangerous germs were kept has been hit.  The M23 rebels have declared that FZNA/Goma and its airspace is closed . No flights are departing from the airport at the moment. The roads in and out of the city are blocked. The M23 rebels launched several mortar bombs in the direction of the airport that landed on the nearby SANDF base. Fighting continues near the border with Rwanda. M23 is also reported to be advancing towards the capital of South Kivu, Bukavu. International pressure on Rwanda is increasing. Meanwhile, about 1.600 kilometers away in the capital Kinshasa, protests are taking place . The demonstrators targeted the embassies of the countries they accuse of collaborating with Rwanda . These include France, the United States, Belgium, the Netherlands, Uganda, Kenya and Rwanda itself. Protestors and police also clashed, and authorities fired tear gas to disperse demonstrations. What to do  The situation on the ground is dangerous. If you are in Goma, seek shelter until you can identify how to safely leave the country, be prepared to leave at a short notice, register/notify your embassy of your location and make sure your contact details are up-to-date. If you are in the capital, seek shelter, stay indoors, and monitor local media for information regarding ongoing protests.  For Dutch citizens in Kinshasa, you can contact the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at +31 247 247 247

Nieuwegein, 18 december 2024 – Dyami B.V., specialist in security intelligence en reisveiligheid, maakt een doorstart onder de nieuwe naam Dyami International B.V.  na een recent uitgesproken faillissement. Dit faillissement werd veroorzaakt door een opgebouwde coronabelastingschuld, mede ontstaan vanwege de startdatum van Dyami, vijf jaar geleden, slechts twee maanden voor de wereldwijde lockdowns. Nu de doorstart een feit is kan Dyami International zich weer volledig inzetten voor haar onveranderde missie: klanten ondersteunen om weerbaar en veilig te opereren in een wereld vol geopolitieke onrust en dreigingen. Binnen drie weken na het faillissement bereikte Dyami International overeenstemming met curator Gielen van Splendor Advocaten over de doorstart. Deze snelle doorstart stelt ons in staat onze dienstverlening zonder noemenswaardige onderbreking voort te zetten en verder uit te bouwen.  Een nieuwe strategische investeerder die de missie van Dyami International volledig onderschrijft, zorgt bovendien voor de benodigde financiële ondersteuning. De doorstart wordt verder versterkt door het vertrouwen dat klanten hebben uitgesproken in de toekomst van Dyami International. "Het vertrouwen van onze klanten in onze expertise en dienstverlening is voor ons een enorme drijfveer geweest tijdens dit proces," aldus de directie van Dyami International B.V. "Hun steun onderstreept de waarde van onze missie en ons werk in deze uitdagende tijden." Met deze steun en een vernieuwde basis blijft Dyami International zich richten op het bieden van hoogwaardige diensten en oplossingen. De komende maanden zal het team zich concentreren op het optimaliseren van haar dienstverlening en het uitbreiden van haar netwerk. “Deze periode is enorm uitdagend geweest, maar het vertrouwen en de visie van onze nieuwe investeerder én onze klanten hebben ons de kracht gegeven om opnieuw op te bouwen. Samen blijven we gefocust op het bieden van hoogwaardige oplossingen om onze klanten te helpen omgaan met complexe en veranderende dreigingslandschappen,” aldus de directie van Dyami International B.V. Dyami zal ook blijven opereren onder de handelsnaam Dyami Security Intelligence.  Daarnaast zal via Dyami Academy  een nieuw trainingsprogramma worden aangeboden. Contactinformatie Dyami International B.V. Zoomstede 27-L 3431 HK Nieuwegein The Netherlands T: +31 (0)30 207 2120 E: info@dyami.services W: www.dyami.services Curator mw. mr. A. Gielen Splendor Advocaten Postbus 14188 3508 SG Utrecht T: +31 30 200 11 76 E: agielen@splendoradvocaten.nl W:   www.splendoradvocaten.nl

Date :   21/11/2024 Where :  Lebanon, Israel, Gaza, Turkey, Qatar Who’s   involved : Hamas, Israel, Lebanon, Turkey, Qatar, US  What   happened? Israel-Hamas On 19/11/24  the government of Qatar and a Palestinian official announced that senior Hamas leader Khalil al-Hayya as well as several other leaders are no longer in Doha, Qatar. Their current location is kept secret although some are suspected to have left for Turkey. The US warned Turkey against hosting the Hamas’ organization in light of speculations that Hamas was opening up a new office there.   On 18/11/24 the   Turkish   government   dismissed reports that Hamas had moved its political office to Turkey from Qatar after it was reported that Qatar had agreed to remove Hamas from its territory. Turkish officials explained that Hamas members would merely visit the country occasionally. On 17/11/24  Israeli airstrikes on Beit Lahia   in northern Gaza killed and injured dozens of Palestinians. In the south of Gaza, in Rafah five people were killed by an Israeli drone attack and 15 people were killed by attacks on refugee camps in central Gaza. Israel's ground offensive has displaced roughly 130,000 people in northern Gaza. In the towns of Jabalia, Beit Lahia and Beit Hanoun 75,000 people are under siege according to the UN.     On  14/11/24 a series of agreements concerning trade, military and technical cooperation were signed by Qatar and Turkey in Ankara during a visit of Qatar's Emir to President Erdogan. On 09/11/24  Qatar terminated its role as a mediator between Hamas and Israel after concluding that both sides were no longer engaging ‘constructively’ in the ceasefire negotiations. At the same time Qatar stated that it would be willing to restart mediation efforts if both Israel and Hamas demonstrate readiness to end the war. On 09/11/24  Qatar was reported to have agreed to remove Hamas from its territory, following pressure from the US after Hamas had rejected the latest ceasefire proposal. However, the statement leaves open on whether the office in Doha would be closed. It merely stated that the Hamas office no longer has a reason to be there. Israel-Hezbollah On 20/11/2024  Hezbollah political official Mahmoud Qmati said that any US-brokered ceasefire deal between the group and Israel must end fighting and preserve Lebanon’s sovereignty. The statement comes after Israel's PM stance on 18/11/2024 that the country will keep striking Hezbollah even with a truce in place. On 20/11/2024  Israel’s military struck a Lebanese military vehicle in southern Lebanon, killing a soldier. The Israeli attack follows an attack in the southern town of Sarafand, which killed three Lebanese soldiers. On the same day, the Lebanese National News Agency (NNA) reported that Hezbollah fighters clashed with Israeli troops trying to advance in the South Lebanon governorate. Hezbollah fighters fired rockets and missiles at the invading troops and destroyed a Merkava tank. On 19/11/2024  US envoy Amos Hochstein landed in Beirut for talks on a ceasefire between the Hezbollah group and Israel. The US envoy stated that there is a real opportunity to bring the conflict to an end. On 19/11/2024  Lebanon and Hezbollah agreed to a US proposal for a ceasefire with Israel, which refers to the UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended a previous war between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006. The deal would see Hezbollah withdrawing armed presence in the area between the Lebanese-Israeli border and the Litani River. In addition, the ceasefire agreement states that Israeli forces must withdraw from Lebanese soil, and the Lebanese army should deploy in the south of the country alongside UN peacekeepers. Analysis: Israel-Hamas ceasefire Following the increasingly challenging negotiations of the past months Qatar’s step to resign from its role as mediator demonstrates the lack of willingness of the involved parties to find a solution to this conflict.   At the same time the historically good ties between Qatar and the Hamas, seem to be deteriorating. The announcement that Hamas officials left Qatar poses questions as to what happens with the Hamas office in Doha existing since 2012. Representatives of Hamas continue to deny that they were requested to leave the country and reports that a new office is to be established in Turkey have so far been dismissed by Turkish officials, although the presence of Hamas members in the country is openly admitted. The Qatari foreign ministry spokesman Majed al-Ansari merely stated that the Hamas office had lost its function as the negotiation process had been stopped due to Qatar's retreat as mediator. This action reflects Qatar’s strategy as a country trying to navigate the pressure put on it by the US to expel Hamas leaders, its own frustration with Hamas over their unwillingness to constructively participate in the negotiations as well as its own historical support for and relationship with Hamas.  Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire The past days has seen progress on the ceasefire talks between Israel and Hezbollah. The US ambassador proposed a deal to the Lebanese government together with the Hezbollah group that said it was willing to accept on the condition that Hezbollah’s group retire its forces from southern Lebanon. Nevertheless, there are still profound differences over the future of a ceasefire deal. Israel could ask for additional concessions that the Hezbollah group might not be willing to accept. The Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu is also demanding the ability to act with its military to enforce the deal. However, Hezbollah will likely not accept the ceasefire if the attacks do not stop, nor will it accept freedom of movement for the Israeli military within Lebanon.  The Iranian support to the deal will likely accelerate the process, and might help the Lebanese front being more flexible regarding the possible Israeli requests in the final talks on the ceasefire. However, it might also create a stronger front against Israeli conditions, if those will be too stringent for the Iranian-backed group.  The consequences of the talks that are currently happening in Beirut will likely influence the talks between Israel and Hamas as well, and will impact the future of the region overall. Conclusion The ceasefire talks on the Hezbollah front seemed to be progressing, given the Lebanese government and the Hezbollah group showed positivity regarding the sign of a ceasefire. However, there are still vital unresolved issues concerning the Israeli military’s role in Lebanon and the withdrawal of Hezbollah forces from southern Lebanon.  Negotiations on a ceasefire in Gaza between Israel and Hamas have frozen since Qatar stepped down from its role as a mediator. Whether or not Qatar's incentive for both parties to focus on resolving the conflict will be fruitful remains to be seen. This applies as well for the question of the location of the Hamas office in Qatar. However, the situation is growing increasingly dire without Qatar at the negotiation table since valuable time is lost while the parties may or may not gather their will to engage constructively in the negotiations.

Date :  14/11/2024 Where :  Mozambique  Who’s involved : Frelimo (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique), Podemos (Optimist Party for the Development of Mozambique), Mozambicans, Mozambique security forces What happened?  On 9/10/2024  national elections took place in Mozambique. On 24/10/2024 , the final results were validated by the Supreme Court and led to a landslide victory for Mozambique’s ruling party Frelimo with more than 70% of the vote. The emergent opposition party   Podemos won 20% of the vote and the Renamo party came third with just over 5% of the votes. H owever, this landslide win from the Frelimo party led to a wave of protests, with opposition groups arguing that the elections were unfair and rigged in favor of Frelimo. The leader of Frelimo, Daniel Chapo, will be sworn into office as the new president of Mozambique in January 2025. On 28/10/2024 , the leader of Podemos Venancio Mondlane   called for organized nationwide demonstrations against the final result . This comes after the election campaign was marked by allegations of electoral fraud, voter intimidation, ballot stuffing, staffing polling stations with officials loyal to the Frelimo party and election-related violence, particularly the death of Mondlane’s lawyer and the party official spokesperson, who were shot dead on   19/10/2024 . The Mais Integridade election observer   said that the killings were designed to intimidate anyone demanding transparency in the polls. On 31/10/2024 , the authorities in the country turned off social media access for the population for the second time and internet access was cut across the country amid the escalating unrest. On  6/11/2024   South Africa closed the Lebombo border with Mozambique  as post-election protests escalated and Mozambican authorities threatened to deploy soldiers. South African authorities warned its  citizens to avoid non-essential visits to Mozambique. The border was reopened on 11/11/2024 . On 7/11/2024 , thousands of Mozambican’s gathered in Maputo for the biggest protest yet against the ruling party. Heavily armed police responded with rubber bullets, tear gas and live ammunition which reportedly killed one person. Later that day the army was deployed with the Frelimo claiming that the protests were part of a ‘coup’. On 12/11/2024 , Mondlane urged protesters through social media to target parts of Mozambique’s economy and trade routes with South Africa and Zimbabwe . Analysis : The 2024 elections in Mozambique were marked by widespread allegations of electoral tampering and violent protests. This echoed similar unrest that had occurred a year before in the 2023 local elections . However, the emergence of the Podemos party has added a new dynamic into Mozambique’s politics. The two traditional parties which have dominated Mozambique’s politics since the end of the bloody civil war in 1992, the Frelimo and Renamo, were unable to address the rise of the opposition Podemos party. Mondlane, the leader of the party, was able to capitalize on the grievances of the younger population, who feel the system fails to represent their interests . The Frelimo party, despite being in power now for nearly half a century, has been unable to tackle pressing challenges facing the country such as unemployment rates, corruption, failure to resolve the insurgency in Cabo Delgado and public service infrastructure. As a key figure for further protests, Mondlane fled to South Africa following the election and he continues to call for protests against the contested results . This instability can be predicted to continue in the near future, especially given the support for Mondlane’s party which has a political agenda favored by many young Mozambicans as it aims to eradicate poverty, unemployment, corruption and reduce extremist violence in the country.   There are continuing human rights concerns in the authorities response to the protests. The riots have to lead to the death of at least 20 people  according to Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. The police used rubber bullets and tear gas to quell the riots and in early November, Mozambican authorities deployed the army  as the scale of the riots and social unrest had significantly increased. Such human rights violations are likely to continue in the form of excessive use of force, arbitrary arrests and the repression of their freedom of speech and assembly.  The post-election protests are affecting  foreign and domestic investment  in Mozambique. South Africa’s Border Management Agency closed its side of one of the region’s busiest border crossings after 15 employees from the Mozambican border post crossed over seeking refuge and protection  and the agency had warned South Africans to postpone non-essential travel to Mozambique. South African logistics company, Grindrod, also claimed it had suspended port and terminal operations in Mozambique. The protests may delay projects such as the $20 billion natural gas export project led by Total Energies SE . Detrimental to Mozambique’s economy would be the relocation of such businesses which they heavily rely on due to the disruptions.  The protests have drawn the attention of the international community and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) has called for an emergency meeting to discuss the crisis in Mozambique. The unrest and interruption across Mozambique’s ports is a threat to landlocked countries including Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and the Democratic Republic of Congo who rely on its ports for trade.  Conclusion: The ongoing protests in Mozambique are likely to have far-reaching consequences for the country. Despite Mondlane being in exile, he continues to utilize public dissatisfaction to call on the population for more disruptions to take place. The protests are expected to persist and potentially escalate in intensity. The authorities and the Frelimo party continue to crackdown on protesters. If left unaddressed, the combination of economic challenges and social discontent could lead to prolonged instability, hindering Mozambique's long-term development prospects.

Date: 12/11/2024 Where :  Kazan, Russia Who’s involved : BRICS+ (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Iran, Ethiopia, United Arab Emirates) What happened? From 22-24 October 2024 ,   the 16th BRICS+ summit was held in Kazan, Russia. Following their accession to the BRICS bloc in January 2024, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) attended for the first time. A total of 29 other country leaders and attendees included the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres. Various topics were discussed during the summit, including  the conflict escalation in the Middle East, alternatives to the dominant U.S. dollar, a BRICS payment system, and endorsement of reform of the UN and Security Council. The summit did not result in actionable plans to end the ongoing conflicts in either the Middle East nor Ukraine.   Additionally, thirteen additional countries were added to the list of partners to the BRICS+ bloc, including: Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. China’s president, Xi Jinping, re-introduced what is predominantly  China’s vision of a more Sino-centric global order, also known as ‘The Great Rejuvenation’ or ‘The Chinese Dream’. China’s president Xi Jinping spoke  multiple times about this vision, extending its reach to the BRICS+ bloc’s leaders.  Xi Jinping during the summit focused mostly on the CCP’s Global Security Initiative (GSI) . The GSI covers various areas such as counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, biosecurity, emerging technologies and international policing. The GSI serves as a framework for the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) norms in terms of diplomacy, governance and security. Additionally, the GSI outlines the ways in which China would play the most important role in the new global governance system.  During the summit, Xi raised the motive for the newest members of the BRICS  group, namely Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the UAE, to also implement the GSI framework in their own governance.   Initiatives as a result of China’s Global Security Initiative can already be seen. For example, China and Brazil’s six ‘common understandings’ – or the so-called ‘peace plan’ – strategizing a peaceful solution to the Russia-Ukraine conflict that was agreed upon prior to the summit.  Analysis : BRICS+ is an increasingly disparate group of countries representing at times polar opposite ideals, societies, and political systems, that nonetheless have a shared message to challenge what they see as a Western dominance in the world’s political and economic institutions such as United Nations Security Council as well as major development banks such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The GSI follows these ideas by objecting to the U.S.-led global security system. The GSI was Xi Jinping’s main message in his 2024 BRICS+ summit opening speech. The GSI is a diplomatic tool for the CCP to help China be at the forefront of the several and serious challenges the world is undergoing, such as climate change, terrorism, escalating conflicts and worsening geopolitical tension. As a result, the GSI is expected to have a strong influence on Chinese foreign and security policy. The GSI further attempts to unify the Global South through its focus on peace in the region. For example, Xi Jinping voted for a cease fire in the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Gaza conflicts. China is also re-establishing its ties with India, despite years of disputes, and both have withdrawn their troops from their shared border. Although India and China are far from close allies, these steps show the CCP’s willingness to make the GSI succeed.  Xi’s focus on the GSI during the BRICS+ summit shows the CCP’s eagerness to instill the GSI as an ideological framework within the BRICS+ nations and their institutions, and introduce Chinese security norms into their operational practices. International policing for example, is already implemented in different (western) countries , sometimes without permission from the local government.  Other BRICS+ nations did not directly respond to the GSI, however Xi Jinping stated that: “Many parties have responded warmly to my Global Security Initiative.”  Even though the specifics of the GSI remain vague, there are some similarities between it and the BRI in terms of cooperation between China and other nations in the Global South. Both the GSI and the BRI create new opportunities for the Global South to develop critical processes away from U.S. and EU help and influence, creating more independence from the U.S. and the EU, and more cooperation between nations within the Global South.  During the summit, Xi Jinping also expressed his view on the future development of the BRICS+ bloc, and included five suggestions for a united Global South. He recommended steering BRICS+ towards a group of nations that is committed to peace, innovation, green development, justice and closer people-to-people exchanges. Not only do these goals overlap with the GSI, some of these goals are very similar to ‘Xi Jinping Thought’, the ideology that drives the rejuvenation of China.  Conclusion Although the BRICS+ bloc has few tangible results, the bloc is growing and the message of the bloc remains strong and uniting. The 2024 summit held in Kazan, Russia, gave Xi Jinping a platform to promote the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) GSI to several leaders from across the world, including the latest nations to join the BRICS+ bloc. The GSI provides the CCP with a framework for ways in which China can be at the center of the new global governance system, as an alternative to the current U.S. and western hegemony, assisted by the Global South. With initiatives such as the BRICS+ summit, the Belt and Road Initiative, and the GSI, China’s aim to unify countries within the Global South and present itself as their leader appears more within reach, challenging the current global order in which the U.S. plays the major role.

In this report: A detailed assessment of the latest Chinese Chinese cyber campaigns A breakdown of the various threat actors and their subsequent toolsets and tactics A timeline of significant events throughout the Fall of 2024 related to these threat actors In a statement released on September 23rd , the United States Department of Commerce proposed a ban on importing and selling internet-connected vehicles that incorporate software or hardware from foreign adversaries, particularly China. The ban would go in effect for the 2027 model year, and is focused on Vehicle Connectivity Systems (VCS) and Automated Driving Systems (ADS) used in such cars. The concerns cited are that such technology could enable adversaries to collect sensitive data or remotely control vehicles on U.S. roads. While the European Union hasn’t adopted a similar approach , there are growing concerns  that there is a significant cybersecurity risk to critical European infrastructure from such Internet-of-Things (IoT) attack vectors. The DoC’s decision came just a few days after an announcement by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)  that the Bureau, with the help of several international partners, dismantled a botnet consisting of over 260,000 devices, including 60,000 or more from Europe, controlled by China-based cyber threat actors. If undiscovered, it would have enabled such threat actors to conduct various cyberattacks all over the world. This latest sequence of policy moves and cyber defense actions reflects a growing, global consensus on the urgent need to counteract cybersecurity risks posed by Chinese threat actors. As Chinese cyber campaigns increasingly target critical infrastructure and exploit IoT vulnerabilities, European agencies and their allies are playing catch-up with their defenses and various investigations.  It can be easy to dismiss the Chinese cyber campaign as a type of brinksmanship between US and Chinese interests, however, the massive implications on global trade between China, Southeast Asia, and Europe cannot be understated.

Date:   08/11/2024 Where:   Israel Who’s involved : Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, Hamas, US president-elect Donald Trump What happened? On 06/11/2024, Israeli members of Knesset congratulated Donald Trump for his victory, and Benjamin Netanyahu affirmed his election marks a powerful recommitment to the great alliance between Israel and America. The Israeli Defense Minister considered this event as a positive step to strengthen the US-Israel alliance, which will positively influence the talks on the hostages release. On 05/11/2024 , the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu fired the country's Defence Minister Yoav Gallant. The event gave rise to a series of protests in Israel calling on Netanyahu to resign. They further demanded the new defense minister Israel Katz to prioritize a hostage deal. After being appointed, Katz vowed to prioritize the return of Israel's hostages from Gaza, and the destruction of Hamas and Hezbollah. On 05/11/2024 , the US State Department said that Hamas rejected a proposal for a short-term ceasefire and hostage release deal, still sticking to the demand of a permanent withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip.  On 03/11/2024  Netanyahu spokesperson Eliezer Feldstein was arrested on suspicion of removing and manipulating sensitive information from the Israel Defense Forces database and leaking it to the German tabloid, Bild. The documents concerned Hamas military strategy, and alleged that the organization was trying to smuggle terrorists and hostages out of Gaza to Iran via Egypt.  On 03/11/2024  the former Senior Shin Bet official Micha Kobi, who was also Yahya Sinwar’s interrogator, said in an interview that Hamas members do not know precisely where the hostages are being held, and the organization is not interested in releasing them On 02/11/2024  Hamas political official dismissed the proposal for limited truce and affirmed that it would only accept a deal that includes the cessation of aggression and withdrawal of military forces from Gaza.  On 30/10/2024  two sources familiar with the hostage situation revealed to The Times of Israel that Donald Trump pressured Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to end hostilities in Gaza before his return to office, in case of victory in the elections. Analysis: The recent dismissal of the Israeli Ministry of Defense is significant because Gallant was a more moderate person in Netanhyau’s government, and the one who most disagreed with the Prime Minister on the deal to release the hostages. Unlike the Israeli prime minister Netanyahu, Gallant was more inclined to make concessions for the purpose of bringing the hostages back from Gaza. In addition, Gallant was considered closer to the US pentagon, holding regular meetings with US Secretary of State Blinken and acting as the main point of communication between the US and the Israeli war cabinet. Gallant’s replacement as the new defense minister is Israel Katz, who is more aligned with Netanyahu’s vision. This will impact the future steps Israel will take regarding the ceasefire with Hamas, and could likely mean that the country will not be condescending on the talks, thereby hindering the efforts of the Israeli negotiators to bring more flexibility in the deal. The recent imprisonment of Netanyahu spokesperson Eliezer Feldstein for the security breach might influence the Israeli government's future, and hinder Netanyahu’s position. The scandal might compromise the talks with Hamas on the release of the hostages as well. The leaked documents contained sensitive and confidential information, including Hamas unwillingness to accept any hostage negotiations, and its plan to smuggle hostages through the Philadelphi Corridor. The control of this latter was Netanyahu’s baseline condition to accept a ceasefire in September. Therefore, the leak of this document not only could compromise Netanyahu, alleging that he knew of Hamas intentions, but may also have compromised the possibility of Israel reaching a ceasefire earlier in September. In addition, it is not impossible that it could undermine future talks. The possibility of a ceasefire is also jeopardized by the allegations made by Micha Kobi on Hamas' members not knowing where hostages are. If these turn out to be true, it could escalate the tensions between Hamas and Israel, thereby hindering the possibility of a ceasefire. The recent election of Trump as the 47th president of the United States of America will likely influence the next Israeli steps toward a deal with Hamas. Trump has already stated his willingness to achieve a ceasefire signed between Israel and Hamas before his establishment in the White House next January, and repeatedly  called for a fast resolution of the conflict. Therefore, it is possible that Trump will put pressure on Netanyahu to accept a ceasefire with Hamas soon, and might push the Israeli Prime minister to sign a deal with the other Sunni countries in the region as well, to de-escalate the current situation.  Conclusion  The election of Trump as 47th president of the United States of America has marked a significant shift in the US stance regarding the conflict between Israel and Hamas, and will likely influence the next steps of the Israeli government as well. The recent events regarding the Israeli government might impact the next steps of the country regarding the hostage deal. The appointment of a new defense minister might hinder Israeli flexibility during future talks with Hamas, and it is not impossible that the recent security breach will play a role as well. This latter might also impact Netanyahu’s presidency in the near future. Moreover, the newly appointed US President Trump will likely speed up the course of the negotiations on the release of the hostages, and influence the future steps of the Israeli government in the relations with Hamas and the other countries in the region. The following weeks will show what consequences these events will have in the stability of the region.

We are sharing our two most recent Information Assurance reports. These are designed to provide a Western Europe-focused report on information and data security related to cyber threats, various vulnerabilities, and changes in the technology landscape that may impact your business. Both reports are in-depth (over 12 pages) and have actionable insights for threat mitigation. Summaries and Key Takeaways October Chinese “Salt Typhoon” Breaches Wiretapping Systems: A Chinese state-sponsored threat actor, Salt Typhoon, has infiltrated critical wiretapping systems used by major US telecom providers. This breach could grant the attackers access to sensitive surveillance data and has raised severe national security concerns. The incident highlights vulnerabilities in systems designed for lawful surveillance and is likely to influence global discussions around encryption and cybersecurity policies. “GoldenJackal” Breaches European Government Air-Gapped Systems: Threat actor, “GoldenJackal”, successfully breached air-gapped systems used by European government entities, stealing sensitive data through malware-laden USB drives. The attackers used custom tools to exfiltrate valuable information, including encryption keys and documents, showing that even isolated systems can be compromised if physical devices are improperly secured. Infostealer Malware Bypasses Chrome's Cookie Encryption:   Various infostealer malware, including Lumma Stealer and WhiteSnake, have developed methods to bypass Google Chrome’s App-Bound Encryption, a defense intended to secure sensitive data like cookies and passwords. These malware variants can now steal user data without requiring elevated privileges, increasing the risk of unnoticed data theft in enterprise environments. September Google Faces Legal Challenges Over Ad Monopoly: Google is facing significant antitrust legal battles in both the U.S. and Europe. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) is pushing for the company to divest parts of its advertising business, particularly Ad Manager, after claims that Google manipulated the online ad market. This lawsuit, combined with recent accusations of evidence tampering, could reshape the ad tech industry and have far-reaching impacts on advertisers and business users of Google's services. Aalberts N.V. Data Breach Exposes Senior Management Information: A significant data breach at Dutch company Aalberts N.V. led to the leaking of personal details of senior management, including C-Level executives. The data, which is being sold on the dark web, includes sensitive information such as emails, phone numbers, and network details, putting the affected individuals at risk of further cyberattacks. This breach highlights the growing risks facing Dutch companies and the increasing sophistication of cybercriminals targeting high-profile organizations. New China-Linked IoT Botnet 'Raptor Train' Discovered:   A new Internet-of-Things (IoT) botnet, dubbed  Raptor Train , has been attributed to the Chinese APT group, Flax Typhoon.  This botnet has compromised over 200,000 IoT devices globally, including small office and home routers, IP cameras, and other internet-connected devices. Raptor Train’s design allows for large-scale distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, though its full capabilities have not yet been deployed. This discovery demonstrates the ongoing threat of state-sponsored cyber activity targeting critical infrastructure. Downloads:

Date:  06/11/2024 Where:   Bolivia  Who’s involved:   Incumbent Bolivian President Luis Arce, former President Evo Morales, pro-Morales supporters  What happened? On 01/11/2024, Bolivian President Luis Arce reported that  armed supporters of former President Evo Morales  (2006-2019) had taken control of a military facility near the city of Cochabamba, holding at least 200 soldiers hostage  and seizing weapons. Although the foreign minister later called the attackers “irregular groups” without specifying their connection to Morales, the attack is the latest development of a three-week long social unrest sparked by legal investigations against former Bolivian leader Morales. The former leader is currently implicated in multiple  legal proceedings, including statutory sexual abuse and human trafficking.  Following the issue of an arrest warrant for Morales in early October, Morales supporters have been maintaining over 20 roadblocks in multiple areas of the country , including the central Cochabamba, traditionally Morales’s political stronghold. In the past few weeks, at least 61 law enforcement officers and nine civilians have been injured during clashes between protestors and security forces. Over 50 pro-Morales protesters have been arrested . The protestors claim that the ongoing investigations are nothing but a strategy of Arce’s government to prevent Morales’ candidacy.  On 27/10/2024, after his car was shot fourteen times while driving in Cochabamba, former President Morales claimed he was the victim of a staged government assassination attempt . The government denied the accusation, claiming that the former leader's convoy had fired at police during an anti-drug patrol.  After the issue of the arrest warrant, Morales took refuge in the central coca-growing province of Chapare in central Bolivia, protected by his supporters. His supporters demanded an end to the “judicial persecution” against Morales and threatened to intensify anti-government actions. As protests and blockades by Morales supporters calling for Arce’s resignation and the dismissal of the case against Morales  continued on 30/10/2024, President Arce appealed to the Bolivian people to end the roadblocks. According to Arce, they are exacerbating the already precarious economic condition and shortages of fuel and basic goods, and have already caused  more than $1.7 billion in economic losses . Arce warned that if the blockades and unrest persist, the government “will exercise its constitutional powers to safeguard the interests of the Bolivian people.” Morales reacted by criticizing Arce on X for threatening the people instead of seeking dialogue to resolve the conflict. On 03/11/2024 Morales announced that he is carrying out a hunger strike until Arce agrees to dialogue.  Analysis:  Ahead of the presidential elections of 2025 , Bolivia has been strangled for months by a deep political crisis. Tensions arise from the rivalry and competition for the leadership and candidacy of the traditional leftist Movement for Socialism (MAS)  party between President Luis Arce and his predecessor and mentor Evo Morales (2006-2019), a former coca-grower and first Bolivian indigenous President.    In its recent past, Bolivia has already experienced an escalation of turmoil and political crises.  In 2019, 21 days of uninterrupted protests rocked the country following the disputed elections that initially saw Morales' reelection. Due to alleged election fraud, the Organization of American States (OAS) opened an investigation against irregularities in favor of Morales. Forced to step down and replaced by an opposition senator, Áñez, after the election was annulled, Morales called the crisis a coup and incited massive protests by his supporters , which were violently suppressed by the interim government, resulting in dozens of deaths. The Áñez government was later accused of human rights violations, including the arbitrary detention of 600 protesters.  Arce, who was Morales' finance minister for 11 years, replaced the MAS leader in the 2020 elections while Morales was exiled in Argentina and barred from running following allegations of electoral fraud and incitation of violence in the post-election period. In the 2020 elections, Arce garnered 54 percent support of the vote, initially giving the perception that his presidency would ensure continuity to Morales' MAS political agenda and bring stability. However, as the policies of Arce’s administration deviated from Morales' political project, tensions arose among the former allies.  Upon Morales' return in 2021, the rivalry between MAS prominent figures created a deep rift in the ruling party that split into MAS-Morales and MAS-Arce.   In September 2023, Morales announced his intention to run for re-election in 2025  as the MAS candidate. However, in December 2023,  the Constitutional Court prohibited his reelection . The court ruled that no more than two terms as president, consecutive or discontinuous, are allowed. Morales, who rejected the legitimacy of the court, already tried to bypass the constitution in 2019 by seeking a fourth presidential term.  The peak of the MAS’s internal political conflict  was reached in June 2024, following an attempted coup by dissident armed forces dissidents  led by General Zúñiga. Following the foiled coup, former President Morales accused his political rival of orchestrating a “self-coup” to gain sympathy from the population. Arce does not enjoy much popular support in the country and is facing  simmering discontent and criticism over the ongoing economic crisis , which raises inflation and debts, and increases fuel, basic goods and US dollar shortages. Morales’ supporters consider Arce responsible for the collapse of previously one of South America's most successful economies. On the other hand, Morales enjoys great popularity  among substantial segments of the population, particularly among coca farmers, unions, and indigenous groups. During his tenure, Morales has been committed to improving socioeconomic conditions and promoting the political inclusion of marginalized segments of the population. His policies focused on the creation of social programs but also on economic growth. The left-wing President nationalized Bolivia's oil and gas industries, limiting the influence of foreign companies and governments, especially the US. According to the International Monetary Fund,  Bolivia's GDP grew by 4.8 percent per year from 2004 to 2017 under Morales’ leadership , while the percentage of the population living in extreme poverty was more than halved.  Morales has been accused by the opposition of growing authoritarianism, corruption, pressure on media and the judiciary, persecution of political opponents, and harming the environment. Controversies arose from Morales’ attempt to hold on to power for a fourth term and, more recently, his attempt to be reelected in 2025 despite a veto by the Constitutional Court. The dispute between Arce and Morales escalated into a  conflict between supporters of the two MAS factions . Morales' supporters promptly responded to their leader's appeals, wreaking havoc in the country. While roadblocks and clashes persist in several areas of the country, political instability and the social unrest are paralyzing the government's ability to address the country’s economic collapse  and led to a security crisis. This exacerbates an even more severe economic crisis. Conclusion: Five years after the political crisis of 2019, Bolivia is once again on the brink of a political and security crisis  that the Arce government seems unable to curb on its own. If Arce and Morales fail to reach a dialogue,  political polarization and nationwide protests  will likely increase and persist at least until the elections in 2025, given the overwhelming support that former leader Morales enjoys. The former indigenous President's determination to participate in the 2025 elections, in spite of his exclusion from the MAS party and veto to run, will surely open  new controversies and institutional challenges  in the coming months. Meanwhile, the unrest has already brought the Bolivian economy to its knees and anti-government frustration over economic hardship is growing ; prolonged protests will certainly result in a dramatic worsening of the economic crisis. The economic and political ramifications of the ongoing crisis in Bolivia could have  serious short-term as well as long-term repercussions for the country and the region , with even the possibility of an open conflict between pro-Morales protesters and the Arce government’s security forces .

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Date :  02/11/2024 Where :  Sudan Who’s involved : Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Rapid Support Forces (RSF), UAE, Egypt. What happened?  On 25/10/2024,  reports emerged of mass killings of civilians in Sudan’s Gezira state , allegedly carried out by the RSF . At least 124 civilians were killed in these attacks, local sources estimate that over 1,000 people have been killed in 50 villages across Al Jazirah and Sennar state in recent weeks. On 23/10/2024  after five days of fierce battle the SAF retook control of Al-Dinder  in the Sennar State back from the RSF. Al-Dinder city, some 25 km east of Singa, the capital city of Sinnar state, is considered to be a strategic location linking Sinnar and Blue Nile states with eastern Sudan .  On 05/10/2024, the SAF recaptured Jebel Moya area in Sinnar, a crossroads linking Gezira, White Nile, and Sinnar states. This recapture enabled the SAF to besiege the RSF fighters in Sinnar and cut off their supply lines. On 22/10/2024   the RSF shot down a Russian-crewed cargo plane over Darfur  after the RSF accused the company of supplying the SAF. Flight data suggests that, over the last year   it had been supplying the SAF from its stronghold, operating from Port Sudan. However, the aircraft was operated by New Way Cargo, a Kyrgyzstan-based airline, which has previously been reported to have supplied the RSF with aid from the UAE.  On 22/10/2024  the SAF conducted an air strike on a mosque south of Khartoum which resulted in the loss of 31 civilian lives.  On 21/10/2024  the SAF claimed that a commander from the RSF had defected  to the SAF with some of his troops, the first such move by a senior figure since the two sides went to war. On 13/10/2024  the SAF conducted an airstrike targeting the main camp occupied by the RSF, but in the process they hit a central market and nearby residential area, killing at least 23 civilians. On 10/10/2024 Hemedti , the head of Sudan's RSF, accused Egypt of being involved in airstrikes  on the group's troops, and training the opposing forces of the SAF . On 30/09/2024 a few days into the offensive, the UAE ambassador's home was attacked by a military aircraft. The SAF rejected accusations of the UAE that its forces had bombed the residence in Khartoum, blaming the RSF instead. Notably, the SAF has repeatedly accused the UAE of providing the RSF with military aid. The UAE has denied all allegations, despite a UN panel finding credible evidence.  On 26/09/2024 the SAF launched artillery and airstrikes in Sudan's capital ,  Khartoum, in its  biggest operation to regain ground  since early in its 18-month war with the RSF. Analysis : Since the SAF launched its major offensive, key strategic points have been taken in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum. However, the ground gained by heavy air strikes and artillery comes at the cost of increased civilian casualties . In the months leading up to the offensive, the SAF prepared thousands of recruits and established training camps for its ally, Darfur Joint Forces. In August, Russia and Egypt supplied the SAF with new fighter jets. The head of Sudan RSF also accused Egypt of training SAF forces and being involved in airstrikes. These accusations further deteriorate Cairo’s previous role, as host of peacekeeping talks between factions, making the scenario for a cease fire or further negotiations very difficult. The foreign influences supplying both sides are significantly complicating the conflict. The UAE has allegedly been supporting the RSF because it views Sudan as resource-rich and strategically located on the Red Sea opportunity to expand its influence and control in the Middle East and East Africa.  Additionally, the UAE's involvement stems from its significant trade relationships, particularly its purchase of large quantities of gold from Sudan. Egypt, on the other hand, is supporting the SAF primarily for strategic geopolitical reasons, including maintaining influence over the Nile River Basin and securing access to Sudanese territory for military operations against neighboring countries. Since the start of the war over 24,000 people have been killed, up to 11 million people have been displaced, and 3.1 million have fled to neighboring countries.  On 17/10/2024, the UN warned that Sudan faces one of the worst famines in decades as over half of the Sudanese population—approximately 26 million people—are experiencing acute food insecurity. 8.5 million are in emergency levels of hunger. In August, the Zamzam camp for over 500,000 internally displaced people was labeled as having famine conditions. Other areas in Sudan are also at risk of reaching famine conditions such as Darfur and South Kordofan. It is ever more vital to shine a light on the crisis and for the international community to come together to take the necessary steps to manage the conflict and the crisis that has arisen out of it. Conclusion: The ongoing conflict in Sudan's capital has reached critical levels, significantly escalating the already dire situation. Despite the urgent need for diplomatic solutions, the involvement of external actors complicates efforts towards ceasefire negotiations and de-escalation. The absence of clear progress in talks, coupled with allegations of foreign military support for both warring factions, suggests a prolonged conflict ahead. The international community faces significant challenges in addressing the mounting issues of sexual violence, food insecurity, and disease outbreaks, all while grappling with limited resources. As the situation continues to deteriorate, it becomes imperative for regional stakeholders and global powers to reassess their approaches and prepare for long-term engagement in resolving this complex and multifaceted crisis.

Written by Giulia Corradetti, Abigail Mikhail, Yusuf Babayusuf,  Marnix  Van ‘t Hoff, Iris de Boer,        Jacob Dickinson, Sara Frisan Russia-Ukraine : Zelensky announced Ukraine's intention to build nuclear weapons to ensure its security in case of a lack of NATO support. Middle East Region: While on-ground operations continue against Gaza and Lebanon, hostilities escalate between Israel and Iran.  Myanmar: After a year of Operation 1027 the military junta is on the backfoot, with crisis situation for millions of civilians  Sudan:   The conflict escalated following the SAF’s airstrike operations to regain ground in Sudan, particularly Khartoum. United States: With November 5th presidential elections approaching, concerns over post-election violence are growing.  Moldova: Second round presidential elections will be held on November 3rd, amid concerns over Russian interference.  Georgia: The opposition rejects the Georgian Dream party's victory, denouncing electoral fraud.  Mozambique: Massive protests erupt upon the release of the October 2024 presidential election results.  Bolivia: Ahead of the 2025 presidential elections, pro-Morales protests and social unrest intensify.   Turkey: The attack by the PKK on Turkish aerospace industries led to retaliatory airstrikes and heightened security measures. DRC: The M23 rebel group’s violence remains a pressing threat in the DRC. Haiti: The crisis in Haiti remains exceptionally acute, with gangs expanding outside the capital and the political transition at risk.  Mexico:  As cartel-related violence grips the country, the Supreme Court resigned to oppose judicial overhaul.  China-South China Sea: China’s coast guard assertiveness expands to Vietnamese fishermen and Indonesian oil projects.  China-Taiwan: Cross Strait relations are tense as China conducts naval and air military exercises around Taiwan. Conflicts, October 2024  Russia-Ukraine Earlier this month, Ukraine’s President Zelensky presented his ‘victory plan’  to Western supporters of Ukraine. The plan outlines a five-step plan to ensure Ukraine’s security, how to end the current conflict, and how to ensure Russia will not try taking Ukraine again. President Zelensky was frustrated with the relatively cold reception from Western leaders. On October 30, information from the secret part of the victory plan was leaked to the media , outlining Ukraine’s desire for Tomahawk cruise missiles to be donated, which have a reported range of 1500 to 2500 km. The results of this leak are playing out at the time of writing and might have long-term implications in the war, comparable to the breach of Ukraine’s plans for a summer counteroffensive in 2023. As a response to the lukewarm response to Zelensky’s ‘victory plan’ and the wavering and lacking support by the West to guarantee the security of Ukraine during and ‘after’ the war, Zelensky announced that Ukraine is considering to start rebuilding its nuclear arsenal . The country got rid of its arsenal (and the bombers attached to that arsenal) with the 1994 Budapest Memorandum in return for security guarantees from Russia, and protection from the United States and the United Kingdom. Since Russia has invaded the nation (both in 2014 and 2022) and neither the US nor the UK protected Ukraine’s sovereignty, Ukraine is left as the only country abiding by the Budapest memorandum , it claims there is no reason for it to keep doing so. However, after meeting NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on October 17, Zelensky said that Ukraine is not seeking to produce nuclear weapons after all.  Whether Zelensky genuinely wanted Ukraine to develop nuclear weapons, or it was made out of emotion, he has since toned down the call to develop nuclear weapons, especially in front of NATO member countries. The claim also might have been a calculated move to motivate NATO to include Ukraine in its protection  after the current war is over/‘frozen’, something currently not guaranteed or accepted as an idea by all NATO members.  Middle East Region  The conflict between Israel and Hamas is ongoing, and  the recent killing of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar on October 16 has dealt a blow to the organization . However, there seems to be little progress in ceasefire talks between Hamas and Israel. Talks regarding a ceasefire are in place, and on October 28, Mossad Chief discussed a new unified framework for the release of hostages with CIA Director William Burns and Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed Al-Thani. However,   on October 31, Hamas rejected the hostage release deal, which also included a one-month pause in fighting in Gaza.  This month also signed the  deadline for South Africa to present all the evidence to the ICJ to charge Israel guilty of genocide.  The report was submitted on October 28. Regarding human rights protection, Israel’s Knesset approved two bills to ban the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) from operating on Israeli territory and areas under Israel’s control. In addition, on November 1, Israeli bulldozers severely damaged the UNRWA office in West Bank's Nur Shams camp, which is now no longer usable. On the Lebanese front, the escalation of hostilities with Hezbollah has led to a ground war in the southern part of the country . Several Hezbollah strategic sites and financial institutions have been targeted over the weeks by Israel, which appears to be aiming at destroying the Iran-backed organization’s support. Israel is willing to consider accepting a ceasefire deal   if Hezbollah withdraws from its position close to Israel's northern border and stops firing rockets into Israel. The recent appointment of the new Hezbollah leader, Naim Qassem, might bring the country close to a deal. Indeed, the latter stated on October 30 that Hezbollah is open to a possible ceasefire deal with Israel but threatened that they could keep up the attacks for months. The past month has seen an escalation of hostilities between Israel and Iran . Iran launched over 180 ballistic missiles on October 1, 2024, against Israel and conducted several espionage operations in Israeli territory. On   October 25, Israel retaliated by conducting airstrikes targeting Iran’s military assets . Iran said it is ready to respond, but the damage it underwent seems quite severe and might create an obstacle to the country's direct response. It is unlikely that Iran will ignore the attacks and may respond in the future, but it is possible that it will refrain from an open offense. The situation is unstable, and although Israel and Iran have never directly been involved in an open conflict against each other, the tension could escalate. Neighboring Arab countries and the US fear that the whole region could become a warzone if the current conflicts continue and the tension between Iran and Israel escalates . Therefore, they have been pressuring for a halt to the hostilities and highlighting the necessity for a ceasefire in both Gaza and Lebanon.  Myanmar  October 2024 saw the anniversary of the beginning of Operation 1027 of the Three Brotherhood Alliance in the violent Myanmar conflict. The offensive has changed the pace of the Myanmar civil war significantly, with the mix of ethnic armed groups and pro-democracy forces now controlling swaths of the country in the northeast, in the west in Rakhine State, and approaching urban centers in Myanmar. The military junta has lost several strategic command posts  and is unable to mount an offensive. Military junta troops are deserting en masse, prompting the junta to mass conscription to fill its ranks. The military junta has tried to stop the progress of Operation 1027 by bombing villages with aircraft and artillery and killing thousands of civilians. In Rakhine State, the Arakan Army and the military junta have been implicated in war crimes against civilians and the thousands of Rohingya  who face starvation and mass displacement.  The Association of Southeast Asian Nations met in Vientiane, Laos, to discuss the crisis in Myanmar and implement a Five-Point Consensus for the conflict in Myanmar. The military junta was allowed to attend the summit for the first time since the coup in February 2021 due to its ties with the Laos special envoy. The plan proposes an end to the violence, constructive dialogue, and humanitarian aid but has yet to see results. Due to the military junta’s losing fight, China has been pushing the junta to hold elections , and the latter views China with increasing skepticism for endorsing the China-affiliated Kokang Army  in seizing territory from the military junta. Sudan  The humanitarian crisis is worsening in Sudan. October 2024 saw the Sudanese army (SAF) regain the advantage in the conflict  over the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). There was a significant escalation in the conflict from the start of the month following the SAF’s operation to regain ground in Khartoum at the end of September. The attack was the SAF’s most extensive operation to regain ground since the conflict began. On October 13, the SAF conducted an airstrike targeting the main camp in southern Khartoum, occupied by the RSF . The strike killed 23 civilians as it also hit a nearby market and residential area. Another airstrike carried out by the SAF targeted a mosque located in the south of Khartoum, which resulted in the loss of 31 civilians. The most recent operation was carried out on October 23, when the SAF took back control of Al-Dinder  in the Sennar State from the RSF.  On October 22, the RSF shot down a Russia-made ilyushin Il-76 cargo plane carrying Russian crew members in Darfur over suspects of carrying supplies to the SAF in Al-Fashir. On October 25, the RSF carried out one of the deadliest attacks since the beginning of the conflict . The mass killing targeted the Al Seriha village, South of Khartoum, and caused  at least 124 victims . The conflict shows no signs of slowing down and has been exacerbated following multiple accusations from both sides of the war, claiming that UAE provided the RSF with military aid and Egypt has trained the SAF as well as being involved in airstrikes. Both Egypt and the UAE have denied claims of supporting either the RSF or the SAF.  Most recent data from the United Nations state that the conflict has led to 11 million displaced people inside Sudan and 3.1 million people displaced outside the country . Increased sexual violence, high levels of food insecurity, and the spread of disease are increasingly growing issues in the country, while international aid and support are underfunded and limited.  Alerts, October 2024  United States Former President Donald Trump, as well as his challenger Kamala Harris, have ramped up their election campaigns as Election Day takes place on November 5, 2024 . Recent election polls suggest that it will be an extremely tight race between Republican candidate Trump and Democrat candidate Harris , with all eyes on the seven “swing states”, namely Georgia, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin, Nevada, and Arizona. While for most states, it is clear whether its voter base will prefer Republicans or Democrats, in these “swing states”, the preference of the voter base is not set in stone and can shift until the moment of voting. This means the “swing states” usually play a crucial role in US elections . In addition, it is important to note that preliminary election polls are not reliable, and the outcome of the presidential elections in 2016 and 2020 was very different from what the polls expected. Hence, it will remain unclear until the end of Election Day on November 5 (local date) who will become the next President of the United States of America.  As election rallies by Trump and Harris continue, there is a heightened chance of protests in the US , especially at the rally and voting locations. Most recent protests have expressed support for or discontent with the stances of the election candidates, for example, about abortion rights, climate change, or the role of the US in the war in Gaza.  Protests are expected to continue in the run-up to Election Day  as well as its aftermath, with most of them being peaceful. However, peaceful protests can escalate due to the high level of polarization in US society . In addition, intelligence officials have expressed worries over the possibility of Russian and Iranian-backed actors encouraging violent protests.   A recent survey by The Associated Press-NORC for Public Affairs Research finds that 4 in 10 voters are concerned about political violence and attempts to overturn the election results . Grounds for such worries can be found in the past, for example, when Donald Trump did not accept his loss in the 2020 elections against current President Joe Biden. This ignited a mob of Donald Trump supporters storming the Capitol Building in Washington D.C., in an unsuccessful attempt to hinder the certification of the election results. The spread of misinformation on social media, which played a significant role in the Capitol attack in 2021, can once again create a basis for political violence in the aftermath of the 2024 Presidential Elections. There is also a high risk of misinformation  being spread by fake social media accounts connected to unfriendly foreign actors. In addition, two assassination attempts on Donald Trump in 2024, confirmed by US authorities, further increase worries about political violence. Hence, security services will be on high alert during the upcoming weeks. Georgia Tensions in Georgia have risen over the 2024 Parliamentary Elections on October 26, 2024,  and its results. Voters were able to choose between the ruling Georgian Dream Party and four other opposition coalitions. The Georgian Dream Party has recently been following a pro-Russian foreign policy, with the opposition coalitions and Georgia’s current President favoring a pro-European course. The Parliamentary Elections were thus seen as a pivotal moment for Georgia’s alignment concerning its foreign policy. Early results indicated that the opposition groups were on the winning side, but later on, the official results named the Georgian Dream Party the winner.  The opposition coalitions and President Zourabichvili do not accept the results and accuse the Georgian Dream Party of  vote-rigging, intimidation, and violence . Following the release of results, US President Biden, the EU, and other Western leaders called for investigations over the alleged electoral fraud . So far, only a few countries have accepted the Georgian election results, namely Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey, China, and Hungary. The opposition called for protests on October 28, 2024, with thousands of voters adhering to the call  and waving EU and Georgian flags outside parliament in Georgia’s capital. The Election Commission claimed that a partial recount of the votes confirmed the win of the Georgian Dream Party. However, the opposition is now asking the election commission to release the election data to prove the electoral fraud. It is still unclear whether this data will be shared and if it would indeed prove election fraud if shared. Prosecutors stated on October 30, that they started a probe into the alleged election fraud.  While no additional opposition protests have been announced so far, it is possible that new protests against the election results will take place in the upcoming days.  Georgian security forces are known for taking harsh measures during opposition protests against the ‘foreign agent law’ in May 2024, with violent clashes between protesters and security forces. Similar situations could take place in the upcoming days, especially if the election results will not be shared and the opposition will call for new protests.  Moldova Elections in Moldova were held on October 20, 2024 , with an EU referendum  on the same day. The referendum was introduced by the current pro-European President, Maia Sandu, with her opponents claiming that the referendum was misused to guarantee her second term as President. While the referendum was expected to pass easily, the final results showed that just 50.4% of the voters chose 'yes' and 49.6% chose 'no'. According to Moldovan officials supporting the referendum, these results have been caused by Russian interference , creating irregularities in the voting process. The Moldovan General Police claimed that a Russian state bank and the Kremlin-supported opposition politician, Ilan Shor, have paid over 138.000 Moldovan citizens to vote ‘no’ during the referendum and to vote for pro-Russian presidential candidates.  It is still unclear whether the Moldovan Constitutional Court will confirm the referendum results, for which it will make a final decision on November 4, 2024. If the results are rejected, there will be a new vote within two weeks. If the results are accepted, Moldova will amend its constitution and include joining the EU as one of its goals . However, it is possible that opponents of the referendum will protest this decision due to the low margin of ‘yes’ votes. It seems that the opposition is fighting the referendum results in the hope that the referendum will pass with a higher percentage of the population supporting it in a new vote, increasing the legitimacy of changing the country’s constitution.  The Presidential elections will go to a second round of voting on November 3, 2024 , during which voters can choose between current President Maia Sandu and Alexandr Stoianoglo, who is supported by pro-Russian parties. While Sandu received a majority of the votes during the first round, it is possible that Stoianoglo’s votes will increase during the second round, with only two candidates to choose from. If Sandu loses the vote, she might reject the results and again blame Russia for its interference in the voting process.  Mozambique Mozambique is experiencing an intense political crisis and social unrest following the contested presidential election on October 9, 2024.  Massive protests erupted at the release of the official electoral results on October 24 , which declared the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) ruling party candidate, Daniel Chapo, the country’s presidential election winner, having secured over 70 percent of the votes. Hundreds of opposition supporters took to the streets of the capital, Maputo, and other major cities, denouncing fraudulent election results. Security forces violently repressed the protests; at least 11 people were killed , and dozens were injured by live bullets and tear gas. Local NGOs reported the arrests of around 500 protestors for alleged engagement in public disorder, looting of shops, destruction of public and private property, and attacks on police stations and cars. The opposition leader Venâncio Mondlane , who ended second place in the election with 20 percent of the votes for his PODEMOS party, called for a one-week general strike  starting on October 31. He also called for demonstrations at the National Electoral Commission (CNE) on November 7 to contest the results. On October 28, PODEMOS filed a lawsuit demanding the recount of the votes. In addition to Mondlane, Ossufo Momade, president of the traditional opposition party RENAMO, which gathered nearly 6 percent in the elections, called for the vote to be annulled. While election results still need to be validated by the Constitutional Council,  further protests across the country and violent crackdowns by security forces are to be expected .  The latest protests and clashes came after weeks of social unrest in the country. Since the beginning of the electoral campaign in late August 2024, there has been a spike in election-related violence and alleged irregularities in polling. In the run-up to the elections, international electoral observers reported escalating violence and abuses, including assassinations, fraud, and intimidation of opposition candidates.  Tensions escalated after PODEMOS Mondlane claimed victory on October 10 and denounced the assassination of two members of his party by security forces. The European Union, the African Union, and the UN called for investigations  over the electoral process irregularities and Mozambique government repression. Human rights organizations, like Human Rights Watch, are urging for the immediate end of violence and the release of all the unjustified detained people and denouncing the excessive use of force by riot police and severe human rights violations , including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, intimidation, repression of the freedom of assembly and expression.  Bolivia Bolivia is experiencing political instability and social unrest  amid the growing rivalry between incumbent President Luis Arce and controversial former President Evo Morales (2006-2019) ahead of the 2025 presidential elections . Arce and Morales were once close allies but now compete for dominance of Bolivia's Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) leftist party. Arce replaced Morales as party leader in 2019, after the latter fled Bolivia following allegations of electoral fraud and was briefly forced into exile, and won the 2020 presidential election. The rivalry between Morales and Arce caused a deep political rift within the ruling party. In September 2023, Morales tried to exclude Arce from the party and announced his intention to run in the 2025 elections as the MAS candidate, with the support of a significant portion of party members. However, in December 2023, Bolivia's Constitutional Court prohibited his reelection. Following an attempted coup orchestrated by dissident Armed Forces officers led by General Zúñiga on June 26, 2024, Morales accused President Arce of having staged a self-coup to regain public support.  Morales, though controversial, enjoys great influence and popularity among substantial segments of the population, including coca farmers, unions, and indigenous groups; on the other hand,  Arce is facing simmering discontent and critics of mismanagement for the ongoing economic crisis, rising inflation, and fuel shortages.   Since mid-September 2024, anti-government protests and clashes have intensified.  On September 23, major confrontations between Morales supporters and police forces supported by pro-Arce protesters occurred in the capital, La Paz. Tensions rose after Morales issued a 24-hour ultimatum to the Arce government, demanding cabinet change, and organized a week-long march across the country. Since October 14, Morales supporters have been maintaining roadblocks in multiple areas of the country to protest against Morales's possible arrest for the alleged rape of a minor. On October 27, Morales claimed he was the victim of a staged government assassination attempt after fourteen bullets hit his car. The Bolivian PM denied the allegations and stated the gunfight happened during an anti-drug check of the former President's convoy and that his security officers opened fire first. Pro-Morales protests to demand Arce's resignation turned violent on October 29. On October 30, President Arce made a plea to the Bolivian people to end the roadblocks that have caused more than $1.7 billion in economic losses over the past 17 days.  Updates, October 2024 Turkey  Conflict and security concerns escalated in Turkey in October 2024.  The PKK claimed responsibility for an attack on Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) on   October 23,  which killed five people and injured 22 more. This prompted Turkish forces to launch retaliatory bombings on PKK sites in Northern Iraq and Syria. In response to the attack, the government increased security throughout the country , especially during the Republic Day celebrations on October 29 . These measures included heightened security patrols at airports, transportation hubs, and public gatherings. The Republic Day celebrations in Ankara and Izmir were canceled.  In October 2024, Turkish authorities carried out major security operations, resulting in the arrest of over 230 people accused of having links to the PKK . Among these, the arrest of the mayor of Esenyurt caused outrage and raised questions about possible political intentions regarding the arrest. Social and political issues added to the difficulties in Turkey throughout October due to the broad condemnation of the attack on TAII and voicing concerns about human rights and political liberties. Democratic Republic of Congo The DRC continues to grapple with numerous armed groups, most notably the M23 rebel group, which reportedly generates $300,000 monthly  from its control over the Rubaya mining area in the eastern region. While negotiations between Rwanda and the DRC were scheduled to commence earlier this month, the DRC accused Rwanda of creating obstacles to resolving the M23 conflict. On October 21st, the M23 expanded its territory by seizing the town of Kalembe , although the  DRC army quickly reclaimed it the following day . This escalation in conflict has delayed the planned departure of UN MONUSCO peacekeepers, who are essential in providing aid, protection, and support to the  1.7 million people displaced  by violence. Their potential withdrawal by the end of December 2024 poses significant risks for an already vulnerable region, and given the ongoing instability, the mission may need to extend beyond the scheduled date.  At the beginning of October, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) reported over 30,000 suspected cases of Mpox and more than 900 deaths . On October 5th, the European Union and the United States donated 265,000 doses of Mpox vaccines. With the support of the Ministry of Public Health and Prevention, as well as UNICEF and WHO, these vaccines were prioritized for distribution in vulnerable provinces across the country. Additionally, a boat capsized on Lake Kivu, claiming the lives of 78 individuals . The ongoing conflict between the Congolese Army and various rebel forces has forced many passengers and traders to rely on this lake as an alternative route, as roadways have become too dangerous due to rebel blockades. Haiti  The situation in Haiti remains exceptionally volatile despite the deployment of Kenyan-led international support mission forces.  The United Nations reported that the security and humanitarian crisis in Haiti has worsened over the past three months,  with a 22% increase in displaced persons, which now exceeds 700,000. From July to September 2024, 1223 people were killed and 522 injured as a result of gang violence and security forces anti-gang operations. Among the gang-related casualties, at least 106 are attributable to arbitrary execution carried out by law enforcement . Among the targets of the security forces are also minors reported, at least six of whom are under the age of ten. Moreover, the UN reported an alarming rise in killings and violence by self-defense groups and sexual violence  against women and children. The UN estimates that there are currently 5,500 gang members, about 50 percent of whom are minors and children.  Violence is reaching new peaks in the capital city of Port-au-Prince,  which has been the epicenter of gang violence for months. Ramping-up gang attacks caused 10,000 internally displaced people in only a week. An increase in violence against civilians has been reported in the La Saline slum, with over 200 residents killed in the past few weeks. Gangs have also recently occupied the communities of Carrefour and Gressier in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, gaining complete control. Since October 18, gangs have carried out repeated attacks and a week-long siege on the community of Solino, one of the few areas in the capital not yet under gang control. On October 24, gangs opened fire and struck a UN helicopter,  forcing an emergency landing in Port-au-Prince, while two US airlines suspended flights to the Haitian capital. On October 25, the US announced the evacuation of all nonessential diplomatic personnel after gunmen targeted two US embassy vehicles. In October 2024, there was a new escalation of gang-related indiscriminate violence outside Port-au-Prince.  It has been reported that gangs started attacking small boats and kidnapping the staff of international cargo companies. On October 3, an armed attack by gangs in the town of Pont-Sondé left at least 115 civilians dead and dozens injured. Gang attacks also were reported in the coastal town of Arcahaie, located northwest of Port-au-Prince, and in the central city of Estere, where gunmen opened fire near a school.  Given the rampant gang violence,  concerns grow that the Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) lacks the capacity and personnel to contain and resolve the crisis.  In late October 2024, the President of Haiti's Transitional Presidential Council, Voltaire, urged the UN to transform or replace the MSS with a peacekeeping mission . The US, the main funder of the MSS, is also pushing for the installation of a peacekeeping mission to restore peace and political stability in Haiti. The  deteriorating political environment  further complicates the situation in Haiti, as the already fragile transition is hanging by a thread due to soaring tensions between PM Conille and the Presidential Transitional Council, which is urging the PM to replace some of the ministers.  Mexico  Only a few weeks into her term as Mexico's new President, Claudia Sheinbaum faces a complex political and security landscape . In recent weeks, the approval of a controversial judicial reform has sparked massive protests. Protesters and international observers argue that the reform could erode Mexico’s democracy by  undermining the independence of the judiciary and strengthening the power of the ruling Morena party . The reform entails a full-scale judicial overhaul, introducing the popular election of judges. The Mexican Supreme Court published on October 28 a proposal to invalidate key points of the controversial reform; nonetheless, on October 31, 8 of the 11 Supreme Court justices handed in their resignations, refusing to participate in the elections for Supreme Court judges scheduled for June 2025. Moreover, investors and economic partners, including the United States, have expressed concern about the  repercussions of the new legislation on foreign investment  in the country and Mexican economic relations.  Meanwhile, the new administration has to deal with a widespread wave of increased cartel-related violence across the country.  Sheinbaum launched a new security strategy, which renewed concerns over the increased presence of the militarized National Guard across the country. The killings of several political figures, including the latest murder of the mayor of Chilpancingo, Guerrero state,  on October 6, are fomenting anger and frustration among the population. Amid the wave of violence, journalists have also been recently targeted. On October 30, two journalists were killed in western states. Moreover, violence has been spreading in Mexican western Sinaloa state  as intra-cartel violence intensified since early September, following the arrest in the US of one of the cartel leaders, “El Mayo”, causing at least 300 victims and more than 250 others missing. On October 21, Mexican authorities announced the arrest of a local cartel leader and the killing of 19 alleged Sinaloa cartel members. On October 26, 14 civilians were killed in armed clashes in the state capital Culiacan. Despite the deployment of substantial security forces, including 650 National Guard and special forces officers, cartel violence and insecurity continues to worsen in the state of Sinaloa.  On top of the surge in violence and political turmoil, US election results will have significant impacts on the US-Mexican bilateral relationships on security, immigration, and trade.   As the US presidential election approaches, trade concerns in Mexico are growing about the  2026 U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) review.  A major risk for Mexico stemming from the US election is that a Trump administration could withdraw from the USMCA free trade agreement, leading to significant adverse impacts on the Mexican economy, inflation, and foreign investment. The migration crisis between Mexico and the US is also a hot topic for relations between the two countries. While Trump has promised mass deportations and Harris proposes tight asylum and migration control policies, the Mexican government has intensified the crackdown on illegal immigration,  moving all non-Mexican migrants to the south of the country to slow and limit the entry of migrants into the US.  China-Taiwan  Tensions are high in the Taiwan Straits. Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te made a speech on October 10, 2024, stating that China had no right to represent Taiwan and declared his commitment to resist annexation or encroachmen t, repeating the same line as his predecessor, Tsai Ing-Wen. China responded  on October 14 with extensive military exercises around the island, claiming that they were in opposition to ‘Taiwanese independence forces’. The Chinese military deployed the Liaoning aircraft carrier, ships, and aircraft to simulate a blockade of the island by cutting off ports and removing supplies to the island in the event of an invasion. The Taiwanese military was put on high alert  for the duration of the drills and closely monitored the activities closer to the island.  The tensions in the Taiwan Strait highlighted the stakes of the  intense geopolitical competition before the US presidential election.  At the end of October, the US sold advanced surface-to-air missile systems and radar to Taiwan in its attempts to deter China’s military  posturing on the island. As part of the Biden administration’s view that China poses a security threat to the Indo-Pacific, the US has sold further mid-range missile systems and placed them on the northern Philippines island of Luzon, established nuclear deals with Australia, the UK, and the US and established security ties between the cold neighbors of South Korea and Japan. China views the US military sales to Taiwan as stoking tensions on the Taiwan Strait and the broader system of alliances as an attempt to ‘contain’ China’s rise. Xi Jinping continues to make threats to build a military and capabilities to ‘fight and win wars’.  China-South China Sea The maritime disputes in the South China Sea expanded  beyond the China-Philippines in October 2024. In an expansion to other claimant states, Vietnam’s Communist Party condemned China’s ‘brutal behavior’ in its exclusive economic zone after it claimed that a Chinese Coast Guard attacked 10 Vietnamese fishing boats  near the Paracel Islands by boarding the boats, attacking the fishermen, and sending them toward the coast. Vietnam said that China had violated Vietnam’s sovereignty in the Paracel Islands and that international law and agreements should be used to manage territorial disputes. The Indonesian Coast Guard drove a Chinese Coast Guard vessel away from an Indonesian oil and gas area in the South China Sea after three similar incidents in one week.   While China’s assertiveness against Vietnam and Indonesia is nothing new, the events over October 2024 mark a shift in strategy. China’s coast guard is growing in confidence in defending its claims in the South China Sea . China and the Philippines’ disputes over the Scarborough Shoal took place over the previous year and they have come to an agreement on the resupply mission to the Second Thomas Shoal. China has, until recent events, allowed Vietnam to continue building a new military base in its maritime territorial claim and stayed away from provoking Indonesia. For now,  Vietnam and Indonesia are continuing their balancing act of encouraging infrastructure and economic links with China while reiterating their commitments to resolving territorial disputes peacefully and within the bounds of international law.  About the authors Giulia Corradetti Giulia is a junior intelligence analyst. She holds a BA in International Studies from the university of Trento, and she is currently studying Security Risk Management at the University of Copenhagen. During her academic career, she has collaborated with the University Journal “L’Universitario”, covering topics regarding international and security issues, such as conflicts involving the Asian region and human rights violations. With Dyami, she is contributing to joint publications, writing articles and briefs on current or developing security situations around the globe, and keeping up to date with key regional developments Abigail Mikhail Abbie is one of Dyami’s newest Security Analyst interns, bringing a strong academic foundation and international experience. She recently earned her Master's degree in Crisis and Security Management, with a focus on Intelligence and National Security. During her studies, she tackled a range of complex security issues, from the inner workings of the Chinese Intelligence Community to the repression in Iran. Her most notable project, conducted for the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), involved investigating the repatriation of foreign fighters and offering key recommendations. Having lived across multiple countries, with 11 years in Beijing, China, Abbie draws on her rich cultural and global background.  Yusuf Babayusuf Yusuf is a Safety and Security Management student at The Hague University of Applied Sciences, eager to apply his academic knowledge to real-world security challenges. He is particularly interested in geopolitical analysis, risk management, and the unique dynamics of Eastern Europe, Turkey, Central Asia and the Caucasus. Drawing from his cultural background and language skills in Turkish and Bulgarian. Yusuf is excited to learn from the experienced professionals at Dyami and contribute to their mission of creating a safer world. Marnix Van ‘t Hoff Marnix Van 't Hoff is an experienced Aviation Security Consultant & Trainer with a background in Aviation Studies from the Amsterdam University of Applied Sciences. He has a strong background in aviation security and has worked as a security risk and threat assessments (SRTA) specialist for aviation clients. He is an experienced crisis team leader and a HEAT trainer. His knowledge and expertise in these areas make him well-equipped to provide training, guidance and support to Dyami clients in ensuring the safety and security of their operations. Iris de Boer Iris works as a Global Intelligence Analyst at Dyami, leveraging her background in Human Geography. Additionally, Iris holds an MA degree in Conflict Studies and Human Rights from Utrecht University, specializing in conflict analysis, peace processes, and geopolitics. Her MA thesis delved into the securitization of the war in Ukraine by the Heads of State, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and Ministers of Defense of the Netherlands and Poland. Within Dyami, Iris is actively involved in security risk management, travel security, and geopolitical analysis. Her enthusiasm for addressing topics in international security extends across a diverse spectrum of countries and regions Jacob Dickinson  Jacob is a Geopolitical Intelligence Analyst at dyami. He studied Global Political Economy at Leiden University. Curious about other cultures, he has traveled in Europe and Asia for both academic study and professional purposes. His expertise includes the geopolitics of oil and industrial upgrading in the electronics global value chain. He specializes in the evolving political and economic relationships between China and ASEAN, and the consequences for regional development and security.  Sara Frisan  Sara works at Dyami as a Geopolitical Intelligence Analyst, leveraging her background in Peace and Conflict Studies. Sara joined Dyami after completing her MA in Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University and held an MA degree in International Sciences and Peace Studies. During her academic career, she conducted research in South America, primarily Colombia, on the dynamics of collaboration and resistance between civilians and non-state armed groups in violent settings. In her previous internship at the investigative think-tank InSight Crime, Sara developed some expertise on transnational organized crime and political-criminal alliances.