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Date:   23/09/2025 What happened?  On 22/09/2025 , NATO allies convened to discuss a significant incident involving the violation of Estonian airspace by Russian military jets . Estonia had invoked Article 4 of the NATO treaty. Article 4 was invoked earlier this month as well. On 10/09/2025, Poland’s government also invoked the article after several drones violated its airspace and had to be shot down by NATO fighter jets.  Article 4 of the NATO treaty  allows member states to consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, their territorial integrity, political independence, or security is threatened. This marked the first time since the war in Ukraine began that Article 4 was activated in response to a direct military incursion by Russia into a NATO member's airspace. During the summit, NATO allies expressed strong concern  over the incident, emphasizing the potential risks of escalation  and the importance of maintaining the alliance's collective defense posture .  While the summit did not result in immediate public declarations or actions, the consultations reaffirmed NATO's consensus-based decision-making process and its readiness to address emerging threats collectively. The alliance's response to this incident is expected to influence its future strategic posture and defense planning, particularly concerning the protection of its eastern borders. In a UN emergency meeting on 22/09/2025 , European allies also warned that they would shoot down Russian jets or drones involved in any further violations of NATO airspace.  Regardless of the outcome, the risk for aviation is trending upwards. While the immediate risk of full-scale war remains low , we caution that continued violations could lead to unintended escalation. Analysis Current analysis is divided on whether the Estonian airspace violation was a deliberate provocation or a miscalculation . The incident's timing, following similar breaches in Poland and Romania , suggests a pattern that could be aimed at probing NATO's defenses and unity. “This event, following on the heels of the Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace, creates the impression that Russia either wants to escalate and pull more countries into this conflict with Ukraine, or doesn’t have full control of those who operate its fighter planes and drones,” US Ambassador to the United Nations Waltz said. NATO's swift and unified response, including the invocation of Article 4 and condemnation of the violation, underscores the alliance's commitment to collective defense . This collective stance is seen as a deterrent against further provocations  and a signal to Russia of NATO's readiness to defend its members. This willingness to escalate when confronted with these events could also be perceived as a weak point by an adversary that is merely probing for capabilities and response patterns . While the immediate risk of full-scale war remains low , we caution that continued violations could lead to unintended escalation. Repeated breaches may erode the threshold for military engagement  and increase the likelihood of miscalculations leading to broader conflict . “Our commitment to Article 5 is ironclad” is what was stated by NATO in a climate where Polish prime minister Donald Tusk, working with a Defense budget nearing 5% of its GDP, claims all flying objects in violation of Polish airspace will be shot. The incident has prompted NATO to reassess its defense posture , particularly in the Baltic region . Strengthening air patrols and enhancing rapid response capabilities are among the measures being considered to bolster deterrence and ensure swift action in case of future violations. On 12 September, NATO launched “Eastern Sentry” to bolster its posture along the entire Eastern flank. Aside from military considerations, these violations have serious consequences for civil and business aviation in central and eastern Europe. Airlines operating in this region face heightened risks due to increased military activity, increased GNSS interference, and potential unpredictable air defense responses. The result of this will be higher operating costs for airlines and growing pressure in European regulators to adapt to an increasingly volatile security environment.  Conclusion The violation of Estonian airspace serves as a critical juncture in NATO-Russia relations. While the immediate threat of escalation is contained, the situation remains fluid. Ongoing diplomatic efforts and military preparedness will be essential in managing tensions and preventing further provocations. From a security perspective, it remains crucial to keep a close eye on current developments that could trigger further escalation towards Article 5 scenarios. Article 5 in the NATO Charter states that an armed attack against one or more NATO members is considered an attack against all members. Future events will play out between the two, namely Article 4 and Article 5. Regardless of the outcome, the risk for aviation is trending upwards with risks including but not limited to heightened military activity, increased GNSS interference and potential unpredictable air defense responses. Historical incidents, like the MH17 shootdown over Ukraine, show this is a real danger.

Date:   23/09/2025 What happened?  On 22/09/2025 , a treason trial began against the Vice President of South Sudan, Riek Machar. Machar is charged with murder, treason and crimes against humanity in relation to an attack by a militia earlier this year. Alongside him, seven others are also charged, including petroleum minister Puot Kang Chol. The trial, however, is crucial for the future of South Sudan. The latest break between Machar and the South Sudanese President Salva Kiir is not just interpersonal friction but represents an interethnic clash too, as both men belong to different ethnic groups. Kiir, the president, is a Dinka (around 35.8% of the country), while Machar belongs to the Nuer people (+-15.6%). Puot Kang Chol also belongs to the Nuer group. Shortly after independence in 2011, South Sudan got engulfed in a devastating civil war which spanned from 2013 to 2020 and was largely the result of unresolved ethnic tensions. South Sudan is home to 60 different ethnic groups. The civil war ended in 2020 and the peace agreement encompassed a power-sharing agreement in which the most dominant ethnic groups (Dinka and Nuer) would both occupy important state positions to maintain balance. The composition between Dinka Kiir and Nuer Machar was a result of that agreement. While good in theory, the power-sharing relationship always remained fragile, partially also due to personal differences between the two most important political figures in the world’s youngest nation.  Aside from this week’s trial, tensions were already mounting for months. In March, of 2025 heavy fighting took place between the White Army, an ethnically Nuer militia, and the South Sudanese army (SSPDF). A UN helicopter was shot down and dozens were killed on both sides.  As a response to the Nasir clashes, the SSPDF increased their pressure on the White Army, with significant collateral damage. On 18/03/2025 , an army airstrike killed 21 civilians in the same town where earlier clashes took place, Nasir. Around 26/03/2025 , it was reported that Vice President Riek Machar was put under house arrest, adding significantly to pre-existing tensions in the country.  On 27/03/2025 , the SPLM-IO, Riek Machar’s political party, stated that his arrest cancelled the pre-existing peace deal.  Several months of the uneasy status quo followed, until renewed tensions in September. On 02/09/2025 , renewed fighting in South Sudan led to 14 killed, also in the Nasir area.  On 11/09/2025 , in an escalating turn of events, Riek Machar was charged with murder, treason and crimes against humanity for his alleged involvement in the fighting in Nasir earlier in March.  Slowly, the fragile power sharing in South Sudan appeared to break down. On 12/09/2025 , the SLPM-IO publicly stated that the government is trying to enforce ‘one tribe rule’. Not long after, on 17/09/2025 , the same party called for regime change.  Analysis The trial of Vice President Riek Machar of South Sudan is much more than just a legal proceeding: it is a turning point in South Sudan’s post-civil war fragile political experiment. By putting Machar, the most influential Nuer political figure in the country, on trial for crimes against humanity, Kiir’s government is effectively dismantling the power-sharing structure that has held South Sudan together since 2020, designed to balance power among South Sudan’s patchwork of ethnic groups. The fact that Petroleum Minister Puot Kang Chol is also on trial signifies that it is not just about Machar - it appears to be a wider effort to sideline the Nuer in South Sudan’s political structure.  The consequences are already visible. The SPLM-IO, Riek Machar’s political party, a predominantly Nuer political party and important player in South Sudanese politics has already called for a regime change, which means that in essence, the power-sharing agreement has failed. Looking forward, the situation in South Sudan warrants close monitoring as violence could re-escalate at a moment’s notice. If Machar is convicted, the likelihood that the situation might escalate is high, as several Nuer hardliners might see the South Sudanese state as being an opponent to Nuer interests. Backing down from the charges would mean that Kiir could be perceived as weak by giving in to the pressure. The only other viable option would be mediation by the African Union or any other mediating third-party. A complete failure of mediation would mean that South Sudan could slip back into civil war. Conclusion  The trial of South Sudan’s Vice President Riek Machar threatens to destabilize the country at its core, as it signals not only a political struggle but also the marginalization of one of its key ethnic communities from a power-sharing framework crafted after the 2020 peace deal. With tensions already rising and the balance of representation unraveling, the outlook for the world’s youngest nation remains uncertain. Without mediation, South Sudan risks sliding back into the interethnic violence that has defined much of its history since independence in 2011.

Date:   19/09/2025, 17:00 UTC+2  Where?  Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, Mexico Timeline   On 12/09/2025 , the Ecuadorian government  announced the immediate removal of the diesel subsidy, aiming to redirect funds to social programs. The announcement triggered widespread protests across seven provinces, including the capital city Quito.  On 14/09/2025 , hundreds protested against gentrification and rising rents in Mexico City’s  centro historico, demanding housing access and an end to evictions. The U.S. embassy issued a security alert advising caution near demonstrations. On 14/09/2025 , the demonstrations in Peru  began following the expiration of the tourist bus operator Consettur's 30-year concession. On  16/09/2025  President Daniel Noboa declared a 60-day state of emergency in Ecuador , aiming to reduce disruptive gatherings in affected provinces.  On 16/09/2025 , residents in Peru blocked train tracks to Machu Picchu, stranding about 900 tourists, to protest the bus service contract for the site. On 17/09/2025 , tens of thousands of Argentines filled the streets of downtown Buenos Aires  to demand increased funding for universities and pediatric care, which have suffered cuts under libertarian President Javier Milei's austerity measures. Scheduled  On 20/09/2025 , a pro-Palestine protest is scheduled in Mexico City . The United Workers Front (FUT) has announced a nationwide protest in Ecuador scheduled for 23/09/2025 . Mexico city, Mexico   On 14/09/2025 , hundreds gathered in Mexico City’s centro historico to protest gentrification and rising rents. Similar protests have taken place in the capital since July 2025. Demonstrators demanded housing access and an end to forced evictions, blaming luxury developments and short-term rentals for displacing long-term residents. Some protests involved vandalism and anti-foreigner slogans against tourists and expatriates, as the sharp rise in property value has been partially driven by an influx of foreign residents. The U.S. embassy issued a security alert warning to avoid demonstrations, highlighting risks of property damage and possible arrests for political involvement under Mexican law. For years, residents, especially in popular neighborhoods like Roma and Condesa, have been priced out of their homes. Rent in some areas has more than doubled, while the average local monthly wage remains significantly lower than the cost of a two-bedroom apartment. The protests are expressing growing inequality and community frustration with urban policies favoring real estate speculation over affordable housing. These tensions complicate Mexico City's social cohesion and urban planning. What happens now? City officials have proposed regulations to limit rent increases and control short term rentals to address housing affordability. However, protestors remain skeptical of these measures. Protests are likely to continue as community groups push for more comprehensive policies to prevent displacement and ensure affordable housing access. Authorities are closely monitoring  demonstrations to manage public safety.  Ecuador On 12/09/2025 , President Daniel Noboa’s government announced the immediate removal of the diesel subsidy, aiming to redirect funds to social programs. This decision triggered widespread protests across 7 of the 24 provinces, including Quito, where fuel prices surged from $1.80 to $2.80 per gallon. Clashes erupted between security forces and civil society, with police deploying tear gas and riot control tactics to disperse demonstrators. In response to escalating unrest, President Noboa declared a 60-day state of exception on 16/09/2025 , later updated to a state of emergency, granting security forces expanded powers to suppress disruptive gatherings while maintaining general movement. Simultaneously, in Cuenca, around 90,000 people marched against the environmental license for the Loma Larga gold mining project, fearing threats to the city’s main water source. The diesel subsidy, instituted in the 1970s after the discovery of Amazonian oil reserves, was designed to share national wealth and keep automotive fuel prices low, especially for sectors reliant on fuel like agriculture and transport. While it provided economic relief, the subsidy placed a $1.1 billion annual burden on fiscal accounts and was divided among Super, Extra, and Ecopais fuels. Past attempts to reduce subsidies have repeatedly led to unrest: the Moreno government’s 2019 reforms triggered  nationwide riots and lockdowns, while the Lasso administration faced an 18-day strike in 2022.   ​​ What happens now?   Historical precedents show that subsidy cuts and fuel price hikes have often led to large-scale protests and forced government reversals most notably in 2019 and 2022. If the subsidy cuts are not addressed or revoked, the protests are likely to continue in the upcoming days. Travellers may experience disruptions and should exercise caution, especially in provinces currently under state of emergency: Carchi, Imbabura, Pinchincha, Azuay, Bolívar, Cotopaxi and Santo Domingo.  Machupicchu, Peru On 16/09/2025 , Machu Picchu faced major operational disruptions due to protests by local residents in Aguas Calientes. Demonstrators blocked railway tracks that connect the town to the UNESCO World Heritage Site, halting passenger train services operated by Perurail. The protests arose from dissatisfaction with the government's selection of new bus operators to replace the previous company whose 30-year concession had expired. Residents demanded a transparent bidding process to ensure local business participation. As a result, approximately 900 tourists were stranded at the site and 1400 tourists were evacuated overnight in a coordinated effort by Peruvian authorities. Protestors also caused physical damage to railway infrastructure, complicating transportation logistics and evacuation efforts. The protests significantly interrupted tourism, one of Peru's critical economic sectors, causing strain on emergency services and transportation infrastructure. The U.S. embassy issued travel warnings due to risks of being stranded or caught in further unrest. A global heritage group  warned that ongoing conflict threatens the site's reputation. This highlights systemic governance and tourist management challenges in Peru, including opaque concession processes and lack of local community inclusion factors that drive unrest and threaten long-term stability. What happens now? Authorities and local stakeholders agreed on a temporary halt to resume transit services and began discussions to resolve the bus operator dispute. Travelers should anticipate possible disruptions in the near term, prepare carefully and stay updated through official channels. Buenos Aires, Argentina  On 17/09/2025 , tens of thousands of Argentines marched near the national congress and through the downtown of Buenos Aires to protest President Milei’s vetoes of bills that would increase funding for public universities and healthcare. Demonstrators, including students, teachers and healthcare workers called for rejecting the vetoes and restoring funding cuts that have severely impacted education and health services. The demonstrations coincided with significant political challenges for Milei, including declining approval ratings and upcoming midterm elections. The protest, which have occurred at various times and locations in the past two years, highlights widespread dissatisfaction with austerity policies that threaten essential social services, including public education, healthcare, and pensions. Milei’s government has also devalued the Argentine peso and privatized state-owned companies. The sustained unrest reflects risks further destabilizing the country's governance amid economic pressures. What happens now?  In response, the lower house of Congress overturned the vetoes, although the Senate’s approval is still needed. Continued political negotiations and potential protests are expected to continue, especially in the capital, as discontent with President Milei’s policies continues. Travelers should monitor official websites for strikes and demonstrations announcements and avoid protest areas. For more information about our services or subscription options, contact info@dyami.services

Date: 18/09/2025  (12:00 UTC+2) Where?  South China Sea: Scarborough Shoal Who’s involved?  China, Philippines What happened?  On 07/08/2025, three Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) Zhaoyu-class  cutters, Hailing (3301), Dahao (3304)   and Zhongjian (4304), were spotted in the Luzon Strait, approaching the Batanes island group. Batanes is the northernmost Philippine province, located just south of Taiwan. The vessels reportedly did not respond to Philippine radio challenges (requests/demands). This was the first publicly known instance in which the CCG had deployed vessels this far east in Philippine waters. On 11/08/2025,  CCG  Jiangdao-class cutter (3104) collided with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Type 052D destroyer Guilin (164) while the former was chasing   Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) Parola-class patrol vessel BRP Suluan  (MRRV-4406) ,  which was reportedly delivering supplies to Philippine fishermen near Scarborough Shoal. On 12/08/2025, China deployed several CCG vessels, as well as some Chinese Maritime Militia (CMM) vessels. The latter is a mix of actual fishing vessels whose crew can occasionally be used in quasi-military operations and purpose-built CMM vessels. These look like fishing vessels, but are usually larger and always much better equipped. These deployments are often referred to as “swarms” due to the sheer number of vessels that approach a given position or asset (i.e. a Philippine vessel). These deployments usually aim to block Philippine vessels from entering a certain area and force them back.  On 13/08/2025, the US carried out a Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) near Scarborough Shoal with US Navy (USN) Arleigh Burke- class destroyer USS Higgins (DDG-76). Independence-class USS Cincinnati (LCS-20) was also spotted nearby, although it was not officially named as being part of the FONOP.  On 13/08/2025, the PLA’s Southern Theater Command spokesperson, Senior Capt. He Tiecheng, stated it had “sent its naval troops to track, monitor, warn and expel the US Navy vessel”. The PCG reported two PLAN Type 054A frigates shadowing and issuing radio challenges to Higgins. The USN refuted the claim that it had been “expelled”, or otherwise halted Higgins’ FONOP due to PLAN actions. On 10/09/2025, China announced its plans to create a national nature reserve in Scarborough Shoal. The reserve will occupy around 3.523 hectares (35 km²). On 11/09/2025, the Philippines protested the plan, arguing it serves as a “pretext to eventual occupation”. On 16/09/2025, the PCG released footage showing two CCG vessels, a likely Zhongtao-class patrol craft (21562) and a Zhaojun-class  cutter (5201), harassing Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) ship BRP Datu Gumbay (MMOV-3014) (Appendix A; A1, A2, A3) . The latter was conducting a resupply mission to provide Philippine fishermen in the area with ice and fuel. The CCG used water cannons to harass Datu Gumbay , which resulted in an injured crew member and significant damage to the ship. On 18/09/2025, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs filed a formal diplomatic protest against China’s actions in the 16/09/2025 incident.  Analysis The contention of Scarborough Shoal dates back to 2012, when China first restricted access to the Shoal, which is within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The Philippines expected the US to intervene, as the two countries share a mutual defence treaty and Manila had made clear it saw the blockade of the island as a violation of its sovereignty. The US, however, did not recognise anyone’s sovereignty over the island, Philippines included, and did not intervene. Subsequent Philippine efforts to solve the issue via the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) were, although the court ruled in Manila’s favour, unsuccessful, as China essentially ignored the ruling.  China has since maintained a presence around the Shoal using CCG and CMM assets. Despite this, the Philippines always sought to contest the Chinese presence. China had, from 2013 to 2016 embarked in constructing the so-called “Wall of Sand”, a large-scale land reclamation in the Spratly Islands archipelago which resulted in China effectively taking control over several reefs within the contested archipelago. Manila’s will to maintain presence and pressure over the Shoal was to avoid a similar occurrence.  On 17/07/2024, the CCG interfered with a Philippine resupply mission to BRP Sierra Madre , a deliberately grounded ship that the Philippines has, since 1999, used as an outpost in Second Thomas Shoal, within the Spratly Islands. Although tensions never really de-escalated since 2012 — and Chinese interference on rotation and reprovision missions (RORE) was commonplace — this incident was particularly heated and resulted in both parties almost using deadly force on each other. Since then, tensions in both Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal had calmed, especially compared to recent years.  However, the collision on 11/08/2025 reignited China’s anger, arguably due to the public humiliation it had suffered. The plan to create a national reserve around Scarborough Shoal gives China an excuse to unilaterally formalize its claims on the shoal and does so without the need to construct a structure of any sort, at least not immediately. Moreover, it directly challenges the use of the water around the shoal, a known fish-rich area, for fishing. The Philippines, joined by its allies, has already criticized the plan. Still, if the latter goes through, criticism will have a negligible impact on China’s willingness to defend its newly created reserve against “...all types of illegal and irregular activities”, supposedly by any means it deems necessary. Conclusion The national nature reserve plan may be only a threat, but the situation remains fragile. A national nature reserve will give China the opportunity to justify harsher harassment against Philippine fishing vessels and their supporting fleet; it will also give China an excuse to erect some sort of construction in the shoal, cementing, literally, Beijing’s claim over it.  If the plan were to materialize, it would also become another way in which Beijing can test Manila’s resolve. It is unlikely that either country wants to deliberately use lethal force, but, if that were the case, Manila’s resolve, and by extension Washington’s, would be thoroughly tested. Philippine President Marcos has already indicated that if Chinese harassment against Philippine vessels were to result in a fatality, the Philippine government would regard it as an act of war. In this regard, the death of a Philippine national at the hands of China is a plausible occurrence, exemplified by the use of high-pressure water cannons against Philippine vessels, which already cause significant damage to the watercraft they target (Appendix A; A4). In an already heated environment in the South China Sea, such an event could result in unpredictable developments. Appendix A A1 A CCG patrol craft, likely Zhongtao-class,  (21562) using one of its water cannons against BRP Datu Gumbay (MMOV-3014) A2   Zhaojun-class  cutter (5201) navigating close to BRP Datu Gumbay (MMOV-3014) A3 CCG patrol craft, likely Zhongtao-class,  (21562) using one of its water cannons against BRP Datu Gumbay . Filmed from the CCG vessel.  Zhaojun-class  cutter (5201) can be seen in the background. A4 Damage sustained by BRP Datu Gumbay (MMOV-3014) due to a water cannon. A5 Damage sustained by BRP Datu Gumbay (MMOV-3014) due to a water cannon.. It appears that the windows in the aft section of the upper deck shattered.

Date:   12/09/2025 (15:00 UTC+3) Where?  Syria The Run-Up to Syria’s Election On 29/05/2025 , Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, was named Syria’s Transitional President, after the ousting of former regime leader Bashar al-Assad on 08/12/2024. On 13/03/2025 , al-Sharaa signed a draft constitution establishing a five-year transitional period leading up to the next presidential elections, while also formalizing the separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. In March 2025, a surge in pro-Assad insurgent attacks against Syrian government forces led to heavy clashes  in the Syrian western provinces of Tartous and Latakia, resulting in significant casualties and further deepening the country’s internal divisions.  On 10/03/2025 , the Syrian transitional government reached an agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who had been engaged in conflict with the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) prior to the fall of Assad’s regime. However, poor implementation of the deal, combined with recent clashes between the SDF and Syrian government forces, underscores its failure to take effect thus far and highlights the division in the north.  On 07/04/2025 , the brother of al-Sharaa, Maher, was reported to have been appointed Secretary-General of the Presidency of the Syrian Republic, transitioning from his previous role as health minister. On 22/08/2025 , al-Sharaa issued Presidential Decree No. 143/2025, establishing a temporary electoral system for the new parliament, which increased seats from the originally announced 150 to 210, and forming the parliamentary elections committee (the People’s Assembly Election Committee). During June and July 2025, US and European sanctions on Syria were lifted, aiding the country's rebuilding efforts. On 12/07/2025 , violent clashes  erupted between armed Bedouin tribal fighters and Druze militias in the southern governorate of Suwayda, resulting in heavy casualties and forcing many residents to flee. Syrian government forces intervened to provide support, followed by direct involvement from Israel, underscoring its intent to exert influence over parts of Syria while fueling further instability.  Syria’s Electoral Commission initially announced the postponement of parliamentary elections in Suwayda, Hasakah, and Raqqa on 23/08/205 , due to ‘security concerns’ following the recent clashes and ongoing tensions in the regions. However, on 12/09/2025,  the spokesperson of the People's Assembly Elections Committee announced that citizens in Raqqa and Hasakah provinces will be allowed to vote as they "are under the control of the legitimate government in Damascus". Between  15/09/2025  and 20/09/2025 , the Syrian elections are to take place, during which 140 of the 210 parliamentary members will be chosen, for a transitional term of approximately five years. How will the elections work? The election system does not follow the format of a traditional popular vote or general election. Rather, it uses a mixed approach: representatives for each district are chosen through voting by pre-selected electoral colleges, while additional seats are filled through direct appointments made by the president. As depicted in the image below, President Al-Sharaa personally chooses one-third of the parliament, which is 70 out of the 210 total parliamentary seats, and has also established the Higher Committee for People’s Assembly Elections. This committee oversees the entire process and selects members of roughly 62 sub-committees. Each of the sub-committees have selected candidates for the ‘electoral bodies,’ which have compiled the list of nominees for next week’s elections. These nominees will fill the remaining 140 seats, effectively denying most Syrians any meaningful role in choosing their representatives. Source  : @gargaristan on X, August 24, 2025. Analysis The upcoming Syrian parliamentary elections are pivotal. They are the first under the new transitional government following the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in December 2024. On the positive side, these elections represent a crucial democratic milestone, a foundational step in rebuilding state institutions and establishing a more representative government after decades of authoritarian rule. The formation of a new government through this process could also contribute to greater stability, attracting much-needed foreign investment for economic recovery and infrastructure reconstruction, with Gulf states having already pledged substantial investments providing energy, as well as Turkey, which has also played an important role in rebuilding the country’s security infrastructure.  However, while economic support from foreign powers is crucial for rebuilding, it is not a guarantee for stability on its own. There is a tangible danger that financial aid might merely paper over deep-seated resentments and divisions, which could reignite future conflicts if people's grievances are not genuinely addressed. Moreover, external intervention, as well as internal problems like the recent clashes in Suwayda, ongoing fighting in Aleppo, and pro-Assad insurgent attacks throughout the country, and the severe drought leading to a national water crisis continue to challenge the long hoped-for stability in Syria. Furthermore, concerns exist that the parliamentary elections may solidify the central government's authority rather than facilitating genuine representation.   Although Al-Sharaa’s appointed People’s Assembly Elections committee has set requirements for electoral bodies—including at least 20 per cent women, as well as representatives of displaced communities, families of those killed or wounded in the conflict, people with disabilities, and survivors of detention—the legitimacy of the elections is undermined by the exclusion of the Druze-majority Suwayda and previously the Kurdish-dominated regions of Hassakeh and Raqqa. The exclusion of Suwayda still might lead to the sidelining of an important minority group and deprives them of political representation, while power remains concentrated in the hands of al-Sharaa. Moreover, if the elections are ultimately perceived as unfair, or exclusive, they could further erode public trust in the new government and prolong the cycle of conflict and instability.  Conclusion The upcoming Syrian parliamentary elections, while a momentous occasion with the potential to usher in a new era of stability, face significant challenges. The ongoing national division,  exemplified by ongoing violent outbreaks together with the lack of representation during the election process, which is mainly in the hands of al-Sharaa, threatens to undermine the transition's success and could exacerbate existing divisions. Without addressing critical concerns regarding minority exclusion and deep-seated grievances, these elections risk becoming a mere administrative milestone or a catalyst for further violence, rather than a genuine stride toward a stable and pluralistic Syria.

Locations  of reported drone downings in Poland (yellow circles) between 09/09/2025 and 10/09/2025 and restricted airspace in Poland and Latvia following the incident (blue areas eastern border). Report date:   11/09/2025 (10:00 UTC+2) Where:  Eastern, central and northern Poland Who’s involved: Polish Government and Armed Forces, Armed Forces of the US, Italy, Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and the Royal Dutch Air Force UPDATED INFORMATION (11/09/2025) On 10/09/2025, Polish authorities announced airspace restrictions along their eastern border with Belarus and Ukraine, banning unauthorised civilian flights that must file a flight plan and carry an operational Mode A, C or S transponder, as well as a total ban on civilian drone flights with certain exceptions, in place until 23:59 on 09/12/2025. Latvian authorities announced airspace closures up to an altitude of 6,000 metres within 50 km of the country’s border with Russia and Belarus, in force until 18/09/2025 and possibly subject to extension. Russia’s Defence Ministry stated that the maximum range of the Gerbera-type drones found in Poland is 700 km, confirmed that Ukrainian arms production facilities in the west of the country were targeted that night, and said it was ready to hold consultations with its Polish counterparts if required. The presidential spokesman declined to comment, referring questions to the defence authorities, but dismissed the reports. Belarus’ Chief of the General Staff said it had warned the Polish side about incoming drones, noting that Russian and Ukrainian drones were active in the area and that some, affected by electronic warfare measures, strayed into Belarus, where they were also brought down. Polish authorities have also requested formal consultations with NATO partners by invoking Article 4 of the treaty, which foresees consultations amid the perception of serious threats by a member state.  Polish authorities released the names of several locations where drone wreckage was found, including Olesno, Mniszkow, Czosnowka, Wohyn, Krzywowierzba-Kolonia, Czesniki, Wyryki-Wola and Wyhalew. None of the drones were reported to have carried explosive material. US President Donald Trump appeared to limit comments on the incident stating “What’s with Russia violating Poland’s airspace with drones? Here we go!” on his Truth Social social media account, while the US ambassador to NATO affirmed the US “stands by” their NATO allies in the face of airspace violations, ready to defend the territory of the organisation.  Between 12 and 16 September, Russia and Belarus will conduct the yearly “Zapad-2025” large-scale military drills with around 13,000 participants in Barisov, central Belarus. India will also be participating this year with a contingent. Images of drone wreckages at unspecified locations provided by Polish authorities  Source: Various Polish media, 10/09/2025 What happened? On the night of 9 September, Polish authorities reported tracking more than ten unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in their airspace during a Russian strike campaign in western Ukraine. Polish F-16s were reported to have engaged the UAVs, later stated to be of Russian origin.  The Polish Operational Command announced the activation of full air defence procedures, placing allied aircraft and radar systems on their highest state of readiness to respond to airspace violations. Polish airports such as Warsaw’s Chopin (WAW/EPWA) and Modlin (WMI/EPMO) airports, and Lublin (LUZ/EPLB) and Rzeszów (RZE/EPRZ) temporarily halted operations between the night of 9 and 10 September due to increased risks over their airspace. Operations were resumed as of 07:00 hours local time on 10 September.  At 05:40 hours local time, a drone wreckage was discovered in Cznosnowka village, 28 km west of the border with Belarus. The drone was able to be identified according to local authorities, although no country was mentioned in official notifications ( source , source 2 ,) At 05:48 hours, the Polish military reported that operations were underway to identify and counter UAVs of then-unknown origin. At 07:29, the Polish authorities reported an “unprecedented violation of Polish airspace by drones” and confirmed that only those deemed a threat had been downed. The origin of the drones was not specified, but the command stated that operations were conducted with allied forces. As of 09:42 hours, all operations related to airspace violations had ended, with searches continuing to locate and identify the UAVs. Ground radar and air defence systems had reverted to standard operational status. Reports of another drone wreckage found in Wyryki, slightly damaging a roof.  No deaths, injuries or significant damage to infrastructure were reported as a result of the UAV downings at the time of writing.  Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk called an emergency government meeting to discuss the developments as of 08:00 hours on 10 September, subsequently stating that the origin of the UAVs was Russian.  At the time of writing, Russian authorities had not yet released any statements on the incident, but did report heavy targeting of Ukrainian logistical hubs in the Odessa area, further away from Poland.  Image of the damaged damage in Wyryki as a result of a drone downing Source: Nowy Tydzien, 10 September 2025 Analysis The incident appears to mark the first time that Russian UAVs have been downed over NATO territory, representing a notable escalation in the conflict’s spillover risks. Polish authorities reported tracking over ten drones during Russian airstrikes in Ukraine, with air defence procedures fully activated and allied forces, such as F-35s from the Royal Dutch Air Force, involved in countering the threats. The closure of Poland’s biggest airport in Warsaw (WAW/EPWA), as well as several other smaller ones, highlights the seriousness of the situation.  An F-35 from the Royal Netherlands Air Force similar to the ones involved in the incident Source: Royal Netherlands Air and Space Force   Debris from the downed drones was later recovered in Czosnowka and Wyrywki. Although Polish authorities did not initially announce the origin of the aircraft, Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated they were of Russian origin after an emergency meeting held with the security ministries of the country on the morning of 10 September. The event echoes earlier incidents such as a presumed Iranian-designed Shahed drone entering Polish airspace in 2024, a Russian missile briefly crossing into Polish airspace in 2023 and a missile linked to Ukrainian air defences crashing in Polish territory in 2022. Prime Minister Tusk described the incident as an act of aggression. If Russia’s responsibility is taken as definitive, the incident may represent a premeditated test of NATO’s resolve and US willingness to respond to repeated violations of allied airspace.  Looking ahead The downing of Russian drones over Poland may or may not prove to be a turning point in how NATO addresses the spillover of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Similar incidents have occurred before without significantly altering the alliance’s involvement and support for Ukraine, and with the new administration in Washington seemingly focused on de-escalating rather than expanding the conflict, this incident may be downplayed. Although the incident prompted heightened readiness from the Polish military, the temporary suspension of civilian aviation at some airports, the intrusion did not involve a ground incursion, resulted in no casualties and was carried out with relatively small, low-cost UAVs with limited capabilities. Consequently, the operational risk calculus for NATO may continue unaltered. Nonetheless, repeated violations could create a precedent whereby allied airspace is challenged without reciprocal escalation, eroding deterrence capabilities and forcing NATO to eventually clarify a threshold for defensive action along its eastern flank.

By Dyami Intelligence Analysis Center Intel cut-off time: 09/09/2025 17:00 UTC+2 What is happening in the Caribbean? A land invasion of Venezuela appears improbable given the low number of assets and a lack of military forces in the country’s vicinity, compared to similar actions by the US in  Granada (1983) and Panama (1989).  According to available information, there is no indication that eight US warships are deployed in Venezuelan territorial waters or its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Four vessels, three guided missile destroyers and a cruiser, appeared to be deployed near waters between eastern Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago. An additional three are part of an amphibious assault group involved in military exercises in Puerto Rico.  On 7–8 September, US Secretary of War Peter Hegseth visited troops in Puerto Rico and aboard the USS Iwo Jima, where he instructed the vessel to be prepared for counter-narcotics operations. On the night of August 29, 2025 the USS Lake Erie  was spotted crossing the Panama canal towards the Caribbean. By August 29, 2025 US officials and media confirmed seven US warships, along with one nuclear powered submarine had either arrived or were on the verge of arriving in the region, not specifying any locations.  On August 19, 2025, the United States stated that it would deploy warships to the Venezuelan coast to conduct an anti-narcotics operation. The specific anti-narcotics mission objectives include drug interdiction operations targeting Latin American drug cartels and affiliated criminal groups. On 2 September 2025 United States forces struck a speedboat that had departed San Juan de Unare, Venezuela, bound for an unidentified port in Trinidad and Tobago, allegedly transporting narcotics and resulting in 11 reported fatalities. President Donald Trump released video of the incident, describing the occupants as terrorists moving drugs through international waters, while Venezuela’s Communications Minister claimed the footage was fabricated using artificial intelligence. At the time of reporting President Maduro had not issued a statement. Analysis of the imagery raises doubts over the reported casualty figure, as fewer individuals appear on board than the 11 stated officially. The vessel’s size and configuration are consistent with fishing boats commonly used in the Peninsula de Paria, Sucre State, a region long associated with narcotics and human trafficking. According to reports, two drug-laden boats had departed San Juan de Unare shortly before the targeted boat, supporting the likelihood of narcotics trafficking activity. Further credible assessments suggest the strike may have occurred on the Atlantic Ocean side of the area rather than in the Caribbean as initially assumed. In the early August of 2025, US officials intensified rhetoric against the Venezuelan president, accusing his government of running large scale drug trafficking operations through a network known as the ‘’Cartel de los Soles’’ and designating it as a terrorist organization in July 2025.  President Trump appears to be continuing his first-term approach to Venezuela, maintaining maximum pressure on its leadership through measures linked to organised crime and terrorism; the August 2025 authorisation of military force against drug cartels seems to have been applied for the first time in or near Venezuela’s EEZ. More broadly, US policy towards Venezuela has evolved across administrations, with the country designated a national security concern under Obama and sanctions imposed on senior officials during both the Chávez and Maduro governments. On Monday September 1, Maduro responded with a rare press conference stating that the United States are seeking a regime change through military threat and that his country is peaceful but will not bow to threats. The Venezuelan President said ‘’Venezuela’s military is super prepared’’ and added that if the U.S. forces attack Venezuela, the country would  declare a state of armed resistance and military mobilization. The possibility of a US military intervention in Venezuela Despite President Maduro’s claims of a ‘US military threat,’ there is no evidence at present that the United States is preparing for a land invasion of Venezuela. The 1983 invasion of Grenada involved between 6,000 and 7,000 troops on an island of 344 km², while the 1989 operation in Panama required around 26,000 personnel in a country of about 75,000 km². By contrast, the stretch of coastline in Venezuela 100 km deep is about 65,000 km², while the country itself covers 915,000 km². A military invasion into Venezuela would require more than double the assets currently deployed in the southern Caribbean, along with an increase in troop numbers and hardware from US military bases in neighbouring countries. Such an effort would necessitate a surge in military transport flights, something not observed in open sources. Additionally, major powers such as China, Russia and Iran are expected to act as a deterrence against either a change in government in Venezuela or direct military intervention by the US. At different moments over the past two decades, these countries have invested in Venezuela’s security and energy sector:  China channelled roughly €52–55 billion to Venezuela in 2007–2016 through oil-backed loans and joint funds focused on energy and infrastructure and in May 2024 both sides signed a bilateral investment-protection treaty that underpins future projects. Russia supplied around $9 billion in arms by 2013 and invested roughly $8 billion in Venezuelan oil ventures that were later moved from Rosneft to the state company Roszarubezhneft. In July 2025 Rostec opened an ammunition plant in Maracay aimed at producing up to 70 million 7.62×39 cartridges a year. Iran has concentrated on the energy sector with a €110 million contract to repair the El Palito refinery plus a €460 million revamp agreement for the Paraguaná complex alongside a 20-year cooperation roadmap and defence-industrial ties such as assembly of Arpía/Mohajer-2 UAV, preceded by a €23 million contract for Iranian Mohajer-2 UAVs and an overall UAV programme for reconnaissance and loitering munition drones.  Given these countries’ involvement and investments in Venezuela they are expected to provide political and security support as a means of deterrence against any possible US intervention. The extent of their involvement in military terms should a US intervention take place remains undetermined, particularly should the US only carry out aerial strikes on Venezuela.  Given the information available, a US land invasion into Venezuela is not probable at the time of writing. Energy security, however, appears to be a major factor in the continued pressure, as Venezuelan heavy crude remains well suited for US Gulf Coast refineries despite the shift in export flows towards China. Reports of US warships deployed in the Caribbean sea near Venezuela  The breakdown of United States military deployments in the southern Caribbean shows guided missile destroyers USS Gravely , USS Jason Dunham and USS Sampson , as well as the guided missile cruiser USS Lake Erie , operating somewhere in the region of Venezuela’s exclusive economic zone. Their location is more likely than not off the eastern Venezuelan coast near Trinidad and Tobago, based on the inference that a Hellfire missile was used against a motor boat on 2 September. This missile is deployed from an SH-60 Seahawk helicopter and has an operational range of approximately 350 kilometres, thereby situating the probable launch zone within that radius. It is anticipated that additional United States aircraft may be deployed to Curaçao in support of this mission, in which event Venezuela is expected to heighten its surveillance of the islands. Venezuelan spotters are known to operate there, monitoring the United States Forward Operating Location (FOL) and other sites, reporting every inbound and outbound movement directly to Caracas. Activity on the islands cannot be concealed and this has long constituted the established modus operandi, employing a variety of tactics and manoeuvres designed to obscure operations. At the same time there are strong indications that three navy vessels, the transport dock ships USS San Antonio  and USS   Fort Lauderdale and the assault ship USS Iwo Jima , that were off the coast of Guayana, Puerto Rico may now be deployed either near Trinidad and Tobago, or Guyana. These were taking part in amphibious landing exercises which began on 31 August involving around 4,500 troops of the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit. The Iwo Jima, essentially a small aircraft carrier, carries Osprey, Chinook, Huey, Blackhawk and Cobra helicopters as well as vertical take off aircraft such as the Harrier and possibly F-35s. Although the F-35 is capable of both intelligence-gathering and combat tasks, the USS Iwo Jima  does not yet appear cleared to operate the aircraft. For the exercise in Puerto Rico, a more plausible configuration involves AV-8B Harrier IIs in multi-role capacity, MV-22 Ospreys, AH-1Z Vipers, CH-53E Super Stallions and UH-1Y Venoms, covering both light and heavy lift requirements. The subsequent deployment between Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana appears intended as a deterrent with movements not directly indicative of operations against Venezuela, while the location of the transport dock ships remains unknown. However, the troop levels involved fall short of what would be required for any credible deployment scenario in Venezuela. Military flights in the region also point to a connection with the ongoing military drills in Puerto Rico. A P-8 Poseidon reconnaissance aircraft has also been observed flying between Puerto Rico and Florida, but not southward towards Venezuelan waters. A series of military flights involving mainly C-17 Globemaster and C-130 Hercules transport aircraft were tracked between 27 August and 2 September, all flying between Puerto Rico and the United States, Trinidad and Tobago or the neighbouring US Virgin Islands. This initially suggested that flights in the region were focused on supplies to Puerto Rico and the ongoing military drills, but now  point to a deployment beyond the US island territory in light of official footage of Harrier aircraft flying above Georgetown, Guyana between 7 and 8 September during the country’s presidential inauguration.  An amphibious ready group is normally made up of an amphibious assault vessel, a dock landing ship, amphibious transport docks and a contingent of marines. The Puerto Rico deployment features two transport dock vessels but no dock landing ship, diverging from the standard structure of such a group. This makes it more likely that the presence of USS San Antonio , USS Fort Lauderdale , USS Iwo Jima and the Marine Expeditionary Unit represents a demonstration of force rather than a direct preparation for operations inside Venezuela. Trump’s policies towards Venezuela Recent developments suggest a shift in United States policy under President Trump towards Venezuela, with greater emphasis on security and organised crime. In March, the White House stated that President Maduro had facilitated the infiltration of the Tren de Aragua group, designated by Washington as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation, into the United States. The statement also linked Venezuela’s internal conditions to wider regional pressures through migration and instability. In July, the US Treasury sanctioned the Cartel de los Soles, alleging involvement by senior Venezuelan figures in narcotics trafficking. Together these actions reflect a hardening of tone, portraying Venezuela not only in terms of governance concerns but also in connection with transnational criminal activity. In August, this approach was reinforced through a broader directive. On 7 August, President Trump signed an order authorising US military action against drug-smuggling cartels and criminal groups if national security was considered at risk, a step initially met with concern in Mexico. While the directive was not specific to Venezuela, it provides Washington with greater latitude to apply pressure in the region. The combination of sanctions, accusations of organised crime and the authorisation of military measures points to an evolving US policy that increasingly links Venezuelan actors to hemispheric security challenges. Energy security: Venezuela’s shift to China instead of the US, US presence in Guyana Venezuela’s trade relationships have shifted significantly, particularly with the United States. Although the share of Venezuelan crude sent to US refineries has declined, the country’s heavy crude oil remains well suited for Gulf Coast facilities. In 2019, about 41% of Venezuela’s crude exports went to the United States but by 2023 this had dropped to 23% while China’s share rose from 25% to 69%. Over this six year period exports to the United States were cut in half while exports to China almost tripled, underlining the impact of sanctions and the central role of economic considerations in US policy. Even with the US administration’s decision in July 2025 to renew Chevron’s licence for limited operations in Venezuela, American investment and activity in the country remain restricted. US crude oil imports from Venezuela between 1980 and 2023 Source: US Energy Information Administration US energy investment in Venezuela has largely dried up while capital has flowed into neighbouring Guyana. After major offshore hydrocarbon discoveries in 2015, Guyana began producing oil in 2019 and has since become central to US energy security, with US firms investing about €12.3 billion, roughly 96% of the country’s total foreign direct investment between 2020 and 2024. In parallel Washington is strengthening its military posture in the Caribbean; at Guyana’s presidential inauguration on 8 September the US Embassy in Georgetown reaffirmed support for the country’s defence, signalling a remit that extends beyond counter-narcotics to protecting Guyana as it contests a decades-long territorial dispute with Venezuela that includes offshore reserves. Official notification from the US Embassy in Guyana  on support for the country’s territorial integrity amid an ongoing territorial dispute with Venezuela In the longer term, the steady increase of Venezuelan crude exports to China, driven by rising energy demand, could solidify a durable partnership between both countries. This would come at Washington’s expense, as it risks not only losing access to a decades-long supplier but also seeing an increasing presence of China in areas perceived as its traditional zone of influence. From a strategic perspective, the United States has an interest in keeping Venezuela within its energy orbit, as well as reducing the growing Chinese influence in its side of the hemisphere. Venezuela’s reserves of hydrocarbons, discovered to be the largest in the world in the late 2000s, are an essential strategic interest that the current US leadership appears very focused on pursuing, in addition to Guyana’s, determined to be one of the largest reserves in the world found since 2015.  Following this logic, in March 2025, US President Trump signed an Executive Order imposing 25% tariffs on all goods from countries that import oil from Venezuela. Both Trump administrations issued rewards for information leading to the arrest or conviction of Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro, officially offering a $15 million reward in 2020, increased to $25 million in January 2025, and $50 million in August of the same year. The deployment of military assets in the region and narcotics trafficking charges against Venezuela’s leadership, combined with unilateral strikes on vessels departing or near its exclusive economic zone, serve as instruments of pressure designed to push Caracas towards a negotiated arrangement by President Trump as “making a deal,” bringing its government policies more in line with US interests.  Official bounty increases issued by the US Government against of Nicolas Maduro in January (below left) and August (below right) 2025  Source: US Department of State (accessed 04 September 2025) Looking ahead The prospect of a United States military intervention in Venezuela remains limited at present. Force levels in the southern Caribbean including guided missile destroyers, an amphibious group exercising in Puerto Rico or a deployment of the USS Iwo Jima  near Guyana or Trinidad and Tobago  do not match what would be required for a land operation. Historical precedents in Grenada and Panama point to far larger commitments than are currently visible. Any campaign against Venezuela would require a much greater build up of personnel logistics and transport capacity, none of which appears in open source reporting. Instead Washington is pursuing a calibrated strategy of coercion short of invasion that uses sanctions, legal designations, tying Venezuelan actors to narcotics trafficking and terrorism, and selective strikes such as the 2 September action against a Venezuelan vessel. This approach signals capability and intent while avoiding the burdens of a protracted conflict. The current US force posture in the Caribbean does not indicate preparations for a land invasion of Venezuela or a large-scale, sustained air campaign. The composition and size of deployed assets appear disproportionate to counter-narcotics missions and insufficient for a rapid invasion scenario akin to Panama in 1989, suggesting the posture is intended primarily as strategic pressure. A limited, high-risk contingency such as a targeted raid against Venezuelan leadership cannot be ruled out, though it would require extensive diversionary and electronic warfare measures beyond a special task group. Regional dynamics further reduce the likelihood of direct intervention. China is Venezuela’s dominant buyer of crude and Russia provides diplomatic and limited military technical support, which raises the cost of escalation for Washington. Sustained US naval and air activity and the absence of Venezuelan deescalation measures keep uncertainty high. A video that purported to show Venezuelan F-16s over a US warship has been assessed as misleading by some experts, with the ship identified as Venezuela’s own Guaiqueri class patrol vessel. A direct engagement by Caracas with US naval assets would be a serious escalation. The exact disposition of US destroyers whether inside Venezuela’s EEZ or just outside near Trinidad and Tobago remains unclear, but it is unlikely that President Maduro would court confrontation given Venezuela’s limited capacity to withstand escalation against superior US forces. Regional stability and civilian sectors are also at stake. Ongoing operations and the prospect of further incidents may depress European and US travel to the ABC islands of Aruba Bonaire and Curaçao. Dutch defence and state ministers have advised parliament that commercial flight risk has not increased and that authorities are monitoring developments while treating the activity as a US national operation. Taken together the indicators point to sustained pressure rather than invasion with sanctions, military signalling, and reputational tools used to constrain Caracas and shape its behaviour short of a direct campaign.

Date of Report:   10/09/2025 (10:00 UTC+2) Where:  Eastern Poland Who’s involved: Polish Government and Armed Forces, US Armed Forces, Russian Armed Forces, Royal Dutch Air Force, Italian Air Force What is happening? On the night of 9 September, Polish authorities reported tracking more than ten unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in their airspace during a Russian strike campaign in western Ukraine. Polish F-16s were reported to have engaged the UAVs, later stated to be of Russian origin.  The Polish Operational Command announced the activation of full air defence procedures, placing allied aircraft and radar systems on their highest state of readiness to respond to airspace violations. Polish airports such as Warsaw’s Chopin and Modlin airports, and Lublin and Rzeszów temporarily halted operations between the night of 9 and 10 September due to increased risks over their airspace. Operations were resumed as of 07:00 hours local time on 10 September.  At 05:40 hours local time, a drone wreckage was discovered in Cznosnowka village, 28 km west of the border with Belarus. The drone was able to be identified according to local authorities, although no country was mentioned in official notifications ( source , source 2 ,) At 05:48 hours, the Polish military reported that operations were underway to identify and counter UAVs of then-unknown origin. At 07:29, the Polish authorities reported an “unprecedented violation of Polish airspace by drones” and confirmed that only those deemed a threat had been downed. The origin of the drones was not specified, but the command stated that operations were conducted with allied forces. As of 09:42 hours, all operations related to airspace violations had ended, with searches continuing to locate and identify the UAVs. Ground radar and air defence systems had reverted to standard operational status. Reports of another drone wreckage found in Wyryki, slightly damaging a roof.  No deaths, injuries or significant damage to infrastructure were reported as a result of the UAV downings at the time of writing.  Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk called an emergency government meeting to discuss the developments as of 08:00 hours on 10 September, subsequently stating that the origin of the UAVs was Russian.  At the time of writing, Russian authorities had not yet released any statements on the incident, but did report heavy targeting of Ukrainian logistical hubs in the Odessa area, further away from Poland.  Image of the home damage in Wyryki as a result of a drone downing Source: Nowy Tydzien, 10 September 2025 Analysis The incident appears to mark the first time that Russian UAVs have been downed over NATO territory, representing a notable escalation in the conflict’s spillover risks. Polish authorities reported tracking over ten drones during Russian airstrikes in Ukraine, with air defence procedures fully activated and allied forces, such as F-35s from the Royal Dutch Air Force, involved in countering the threats. The closure of Poland’s biggest airport in Warsaw (WAW/EPWA), as well as several other smaller ones, highlights the seriousness of the situation.  Debris from the downed drones was later recovered in Czosnowka and Wyrywki. Although Polish authorities did not initially announce the origin of the aircraft, Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated they were of Russian origin after an emergency meeting held with the security ministries of the country on the morning of 10 September. The event echoes earlier incidents such as a presumed Iranian-designed Shahed drone entering Polish airspace in 2024, a Russian missile briefly crossing into Polish airspace in 2023 and a missile linked to Ukrainian air defences crashing in Polish territory in 2022. Prime Minister Tusk described the incident as an act of aggression. If Russia’s responsibility is taken as definitive, the incident may represent a premeditated test of NATO’s resolve and US willingness to respond to repeated violations of allied airspace.  Looking ahead The downing of Russian drones over Poland may or may not prove to be a turning point in how NATO addresses the spillover of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Similar incidents have occurred before without significantly altering the alliance’s involvement and support for Ukraine, and with the new administration in Washington seemingly focused on de-escalating rather than expanding the conflict, this incident may be downplayed. Although the incident prompted heightened readiness from the Polish military, the temporary suspension of civilian aviation at some airports, the intrusion did not involve a ground incursion, resulted in no casualties and was carried out with relatively small, low-cost UAVs with limited capabilities. Consequently, the operational risk calculus for NATO may continue unaltered. Nonetheless, repeated violations could create a precedent whereby allied airspace is challenged without reciprocal escalation, eroding deterrence capabilities and forcing NATO to eventually clarify a threshold for defensive action along its eastern flank.  Dyami is actively monitoring the situation. Dyami Services Security is not a luxury but a necessity. With Dyami Security Intelligence as a Service, you gain a proactive, flexible, and affordable solution to manage risks, monitor geopolitical threats, and respond immediately to crises. Why subscribe to security? ✅ Resilient business operations in today’s world ✅ We act as your security department and Geopolitical Risk Officer ✅ Direct access to security expertise without high costs ✅ Prevent crises with up-to-date threat intelligence ✅ Scalable subscription plans ✅ Access to our unique global network Want to know how this protects your organization? 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Date:   09/09/2025 (17:00 UTC+2) Where?  Doha, Qatar What happened?  On 09/09/2025 around 15:00, it was reported that several blasts were heard in the Katara district of the Qatari capital Doha. In several photos and videos circulating online,  the smoke and damage to buildings is visible.  Around 15:10, it was reported that an Israeli official told Axios correspondent Barak Ravid that the explosion in Doha was an assasination attempt targeting senior Hamas officials.  At 15:11, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and Israeli Security Agency (ISA) announced that a ‘ precise strike targeting the senior leadership of the Hamas terrorist organization ’ had been conducted. This attack came as the negotiators were meeting to consider the latest ceasefire proposal put forth by the US.  That Israel is targeting Hamas abroad does not come as a surprise. Last week, on 31/08/2025, IDF chief Eyal Zamir warned that  Israel “would reach them  [Hamas leaders abroad] too”. At 15:30, Majed Al Ansari, spokesman for Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said in a statement that the country "condemns [the attack] in the strongest terms”.  At 15:52, it was reported that the US declined to comment on the attack. At 15:57, a Hamas source reported to Al Jazeera  that no Hamas official was killed in the attack. Several other sources however claim the opposite, and state that Khalil al-Hayya and Zaher Jabarin were killed. Neither statement has been confirmed at the time of publication. At 16:12, in a social media post , Netanyahu’s office said that Israel acted alone in the attack and takes full responsibility.  One of the strikes was geolocated and confirmed through our analysis to have targeted a building in the vicinity of 25°21'25.1" N, 51°30'34.6" E  in the West Bay Lagoon area of Doha. Analysis The Israeli strike on Hamas leadership in Doha represents a major escalation in the broader conflict between Israel and its adversaries. By conducting such an operation on Qatari soil, Israel has openly violated international law and Qatar’s sovereignty. The action is unlikely to be received positively by the international community, specifically with the recent tensions surrounding certain European countries taking a harder stance against Israel on the eve of the UN General Assembly. The key question is what comes next. Qatar is expected to limit its response to strong diplomatic condemnation. The country has always sought to balance its regional relationships and avoid direct confrontation, as exemplified by its reaction to the recent Iranian missile strikes on the US’ Al Udeid Air Base, which prompted solely formal condemnations and a deterioration in Qatar-Iran relations. Hamas may be inclined to retaliate, but its operational capacity to do so remains limited at most. A further consequence of the attack is that Hamas leadership abroad will likely be forced underground even further, at least partially. What remains to be seen is how this will play out in other nations where Hamas has a presence, such as Turkey. It is improbable that Israel would extend similar operations in the country: Ankara is a powerful regional actor and Israel has little to gain and much to lose in a direct clash with the country.  This attack likely serves as a demonstration of power by Israel, signaling to Hamas and other adversaries that they are vulnerable anywhere. In that sense, this strike serves not only as a tactical operation but also as a strategic signal of deterrence, underlining the willingness of Israel to pursue its enemies across the border, even at the expense of diplomatic fallout.  If the situation escalates further in the Middle East, this could cause serious disruption for aviation. At the time of publication, Doha International Airport (DIA/OTBD) remains open and there have been no reported disruptions to air traffic.  Dyami is actively monitoring the situation.

Date:  01/09/2025  Where:  The Gambia and coastal waters Who’s involved: Gambian Government, local fishermen and fishing communities, Chinese, Egyptian, Greece, Italy, Portugal Spain and other EU or foreign-owned fishing companies. What is happening? The Gambia’s fishing sector and artisanal fishermen are under severe strain from foreign trawlers engaged in illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) practices , driving overfishing, pollution, violent confrontations, and the loss of livelihoods for many locals. According to 2018 official reports, there were 52 registered fishing vessels operating in Gambian seas, 90% are foreign owned. Subsequent data remains limited but is presumed to have increased , particularly with the 2019 European Union-Gambia sustainable fisheries partnership agreement.  Foreign-owned fishing trawlers sometimes operate close to the country’s coastal waters without permission , overfishing and leaving very little catch for local fishermen who rely on fishing for their livelihood. The majority of the country’s 2.5 million people live along a 20 km stretch of coastline and consume more than three times as many fish, 29 kg per year, compared with 9 kg for those living inland, who may eventually face a food crisis .  Industrial fishmeal factories process hundreds of tonnes of fish daily for export, competing directly with artisanal fishermen and accelerating depletion of fish stocks , while contributing to coastal pollution, taking a toll on the health of locals.  Local fishermen have reported their nets damaged and destroyed  by foreign-owned trawlers giving way to grievances that have resulted in attacks on larger vessels, and vice-versa. Foreign trawlers reportedly operate as close as 5 nautical miles  from the coast, in breach of the 9-mile artisanal zone  reserved for locals. As fishing collapses, some fishermen abandon the trade, turning to human smuggling or selling boats to traffickers. Migrants pay between €600–€1,000 per person, with boats carrying over 200 passengers and generating up to €200,000 per voyage. Analysis After the ousting of former authoritarian leader Yahya Jamme in 2017, the succeeding government opened their coasts to foreign fishing vessels in 2018. While initially welcomed as a means of foreign investment, risks to maritime vessels in Gambian waters are escalating as overfishing, encroachment and weak enforcement fuel hostility towards foreign trawlers. Attacks such as the arson on the Egyptian-owned trawler Abu Islam , which left at least one Gambian sailor aboard severely burned, highlight how confrontations have already crossed into violence. With at least 11 local fishermen killed in the past 15 years and foreign vessels repeatedly violating the 9-nautical-mile boundary into areas exclusively for local fishermen, both local and foreign operators face growing exposure to sabotage, arson or hijackings. Enforcement actions such as the detention of around eight vessels in 2023, remain rare and ineffective, as most offenders have been known to quickly return to sea, resuming their previous activities. If grievances continue unchecked and weapons enter circulation, Gambia risks sliding into Somalia-style dynamics, where unchecked foreign fishing directly contributed to piracy and systemic maritime insecurity. At the societal level, the serious challenges to the artisanal fishing economy is transforming the country’s economic and social structure, with dangerous consequences. Fishing equipment from artisanal fishermen is destroyed, often unable to be replaced, while fishmeal factories divert hundreds of tonnes of fish daily to foreign companies for export, pushing prices beyond local reach. Disenfranchised fishermen unable to sustain their families, are increasingly selling boats to traffickers or trafficking people themselves for between €600 to €1000, enabling smuggling voyages that can earn up to €200,000 per trip. This fusion of economic despair, corruption in licensing (reportedly as low as $275 per tonne) and perceptions of state complicity creates fertile ground for unrest, organised crime and militia formation. An extreme case was seen in Somalia starting the 2000s, with serious grievances from local fishing communities against foreign-operated trawlers and overfishing, resulting in widespread piracy and violence against not only foreign, but local fishing vessels. While The Gambia has more stable political institutions, grievances less widespread and far less weapons in the hands of locals, an overall transformation of the lives of fishing communities compromising their livelihoods has the potential to result in serious social unrest.  Looking ahead Looking ahead, the persistence of weak enforcement, and IUU fishing activities by foreign trawlers could entrench a cycle of violence at sea and deepen instability ashore. If left unresolved, tensions may escalate into organised piracy, militia activity and greater reliance on illicit smuggling networks. The social costs are equally severe, with declining food security, the erosion of traditional livelihoods and migration pressures that risk hollowing out coastal communities. Without targeted action, the Gambia’s fisheries sector may not only eventually collapse ecologically, but also generate a wider security crisis in the region, although the risk at the time of writing appears low, in part due to the political stability of state institutions in the country.  Mitigating these risks will require a multi-layered approach. Strengthening maritime enforcement through better-resourced patrols, regional cooperation and transparent licensing will be essential to curb IUU fishing and rebuild trust in fishing communities. Parallel to that, investment in alternative livelihoods, fair compensation schemes and sustainable management of fisheries can contribute to reducing social grievances and restore economic stability. Also, international actors, including governments and NGOs, have a role in supporting surveillance, enforcing sanctions on repeat offenders and ensuring global seafood supply chains do not fuel local instability. By combining maritime security with social investment programmes, The Gambia may be able to prevent a dangerous drift towards serious structural and social unrest. In January 2025, for example, the government distributed over 20 artisanal fishing boats to local fishermen, an initiative aimed at supporting livelihoods and easing grievances. Without such measures, the country risks following a trajectory similar to Somalia, where overfishing and grievances against foreign fishing vessels in the early 2000s severely undermined local livelihoods, creating instability that persists to this day. Dyami Services Security is not a luxury but a necessity. With Dyami Security Intelligence as a Service, you gain a proactive, flexible, and affordable solution to manage risks, monitor geopolitical threats, and respond immediately to crises. Why subscribe to security? ✅ Resilient business operations in today’s world ✅ We act as your security department and Geopolitical Risk Officer ✅ Direct access to security expertise without high costs ✅ Prevent crises with up-to-date threat intelligence ✅ Scalable subscription plans ✅ Access to our unique global network Want to know how this protects your organization? Request a free consultation! Subscription options Dyami Security as a Service: a flexible security subscription that keeps your organization protected at all times—without the need for costly internal capacity.

On August 11, 2025 , the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld a landmark trial ruling that has profound consequences for global aviation. In N.S. v. Ukraine International Airlines  (2025 ONCA 587), the court unanimously confirmed that Ukraine International Airlines (UIA) was negligent  in allowing Flight PS752 to depart Tehran on January 8, 2020 , when two Iranian missiles brought the aircraft down, killing all 176 passengers and crew . The Court emphasized a fundamental point: airlines carry a duty to conduct thorough conflict-zone risk assessments  before departure or overflight. UIA failed this duty, and as a result, the carrier was found fully liable under the Montreal Convention. The core finding: negligence in risk assessment Justice Akbarali’s trial decision, and now the Court of Appeal’s confirmation, makes clear that: Airlines cannot rely solely on airspace being “open” ; regulatory permissions do not replace operator due diligence. A thorough, timely risk assessment  was expected before allowing PS752 to depart. Even a short delay to gather intelligence on the volatile situation in Tehran could have prevented tragedy. This ruling sets a new precedent: if airlines fail to perform conflict-zone or overflight risk assessments, liability may be unlimited . This goes beyond flight PS752 Aviation operates in a world where geopolitical tensions, conflicts, and state-based threats evolve rapidly. In recent years we have seen: Surface-to-air missile incidents  not only in Iran but also in Ukraine (MH17) and other regions. Regional conflicts  where sudden escalations threaten civil aviation—examples include the Red Sea, Iraq, Sudan, and Syria. Airspace restrictions  that are inconsistently applied, leaving operators with gaps in official guidance. This means that every operator, commercial airlines, business aviation, and cargo carriers, must actively assess risks  when planning routes or departures. The broader lesson: safety and duty of care For operators, the PS752 case reinforces several key principles: Regulators alone cannot guarantee safety.   Operators must take responsibility for assessing real-time intelligence. Duty of care extends beyond compliance.   Families, clients, and insurers expect proactive safety measures, not reactive excuses. Risk assessments protect business continuity.   A single catastrophic incident can destroy not only lives but also reputations, partnerships, and financial stability. What proper risk assessment looks like A robust risk assessment process should include: Monitoring geopolitical intelligence  and real-time developments. Consulting with aviation security experts  who understand state threats and conflict dynamics. Evaluating airspace overflight risks  based on weapon ranges, military activity, and recent incidents. Documenting the decision-making process, demonstrating why a flight was routed, delayed, or cancelled. In short: airlines must be able to show their work . Conclusion: a turning point for aviation security The Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision sends a clear message: aviation safety cannot rely on luck, nor on minimal compliance.  Operators have a legal, moral, and operational obligation to perform conflict-zone and destination risk assessments. At Dyami Security Intelligence, we see this daily: proactive intelligence and structured assessments not only protect passengers and crew, they protect the very viability of aviation businesses. The PS752 tragedy reminds us all that failure to act can have irreversible consequences. About the author Eric Schouten  is the Founder & CEO of Dyami Security Intelligence , a Netherlands-based firm specializing in travel risk management, aviation security, and geopolitical intelligence. With a background in the Dutch intelligence services and extensive aviation security experience, Eric has been directly involved in high-impact crises such as the MH17 disaster , and played a role in founding the Dutch expert group on information sharing for airlines , which enhanced cooperation between carriers and government agencies. He is also actively involved with IBAC (International Business Aviation Council)  and other aviation organisations like the European Business Aviation Association , where he regularly teaches and advises on conflict-zone risk management and overflight security. As a recognized subject matter expert and international speaker  on overflight risks, Eric supports airlines, business jet operators, and global corporations in navigating today’s volatile security environment. His mission is to make world-class intelligence and risk management accessible, proactive, and people-centric.

Date:   13/08/2025 (15:00 GMT+2) Where?  Israel; Iran; broader Middle East could also be affected. What happened?  On 12/08/2025 , Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu uploaded a video  on his X- account (formerly Twitter ), in which he directly addressed the Iranian population.  The video, which is full of veiled messages (verbal and non-verbal), is a clear attempt at shaping the Iranian public opinion and turning it against Iran’s current government. The country is currently facing a ‘ triple crisis ’ - power and water outages combined with record-breaking heat. Netanyahu clearly frames the first two crises as the direct result of bad governance, while the “descendants of Cyrus the Great deserve so much more”. However, the video is more than an attempt to shape public opinion - it is a call to action. The Israeli PM is actively calling for people to stand up and ends with a note which sounds like an indirect warning, stating that “soon your country will be free. Do not let these Mullahs ruin your lives any longer. I stand with you. Israel stands with you!”.  Netanyahu has sent videos directly addressed to the Iranian public several times before. In May 2018, Netanyahu’s office began airing short YouTube videos  in which he emphasized Israel’s admiration for Iranian culture and its people. The central message was consistent: Israel views the regime, not its people, as a threat. In a similar video from September 2024, Netanyahu appeared to lay the causes of internal issues in Iran on the country’s leadership.  Recently, as tensions between Israel and Iran escalated into the 12-day war in June 2025,  Netanyahu asked Iranians to “ stand up against an evil and oppressive regime ” amidst a military standoff between the two nations.   This latest video presents what appears to be a next step toward another Israeli offensive against Iran. Reports  and our own human sources suggest that Iran is already preparing for a potential strike. As a response, it was allegedly reported - though unconfirmed - that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had started large-scale military readiness exercises  directly after the video was published involving the launching of ballistic missiles and fighter jets. Analysis Following previous video messages, military action did not follow suit. However, Netanyahu’s latest video may signal the beginning of a new round of tensions between Israel and Iran, with reports already indicating that both nations are preparing for potential escalation. This information is likely to be plausible for several reasons. An initial analysis of the 12-day confrontation in June 2025 between the two countries makes clear that Israel’s strategic objectives were not fully achieved, despite Iran’s nuclear facilities sustaining damage and the assasination of around 30 senior commanders and 19 nuclear scientists. However, most officials were quickly replaced, and instead of a popular uprising, a rally-around-the-flag-effect took place. These developments may well have fortified the Iranian government’s narrative that the country needs nuclear capabilities to effectively deter enemies.  More broadly, aside from the ‘nuclear factor’, Israel simply was not able to topple the current Iranian government amid the last conflict. Through its ‘forward defense doctrine’, Tehran, via its proxies such as the Houthis and Hezbollah,  forms what the Israeli government perceives as possibly the biggest national security threat to Israel. Having been unable to neutralize this threat previously, Israel may now be seeking another opportunity to achieve that goal. Another reason for Israel to start another offensive, is that Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu might be willing to start another offensive against Iran to shift the political narrative surrounding his leadership. The Israeli leader is currently facing three major corruption trials  and an ICC arrest warrant on the charge of war crimes. A new conflict with Iran could offer him a way to reassess his image as leader, divert national attention from these woes to a unifying external threat. But more importantly, it could allow the Israeli Knesset to extend the state of emergency which, in a similar manner to the June confrontation, may serve to further delay Netanyahu’s trial. Given the dominance of Netanyahu over Israeli politics and military operations, once again proven by his deeply controversial decision to occupy Gaza city , it is reasonable to conclude that his personal preferences carry significant weight in shaping Israel’s military decisions. Looking forward For mentioned reasons it is plausible that Israel is planning another operation against Iran. The question therefore is not necessarily when, but rather how such an action will occur. It could manifest as a military campaign - just like in June - but it could also unfold as an operation aimed at destabilizing Iran from within. Scenario  A: a military offensive Assuming Israel is planning to start another military offensive, it is likely that, in order to achieve its strategic objectives, Israel may seek to strike Iran again sooner rather than later. Iran is currently already in the process of rebuilding its military resources after the 12-day war in June. The longer Israel waits with another offensive, the more facilities the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was able to destroy during the last campaign might be operational again. This would align with Israel’s “mowing the grass” strategy, which encompasses conducting preventive and repeated (smaller) strikes to stop adversaries from developing capabilities that could challenge Israel’s military dominance.  It’s likely that the IDF will once again leverage its technological edge to reestablish aerial dominance, target key IRGC figures, and strike critical military infrastructure. Considering the strong intelligence capabilities Israel demonstrated during the previous offensive, it’s reasonable to assume those advantages remain in place - and that they will be used to maximum effect. While it is uncertain how much Iran has been able to replenish its stockpile,, it is likely it will respond with military measures and actions as well, similar to its actions in June, in order to project  strength and avoid perceptions of vulnerability.  However, regime change may require boots on the ground, outside of Israel’s capabilities due to numerous technical reasons. Iran, unlike Gaza, is not in Israel’s background, and the strategic implications of any plan to attack Iran via land would be a momentous task that the IDF is arguably incapable of undertaking. Instead of turning the tide of public opinion, the June confrontation appeared to create certain support for the Iranian government. What can be said, though, is that yet another Israeli-Iran war can destabilize the wider Middle East again, and that it will carry serious consequences for both local and overflight security.  As observed in June, closing the corridor between Iraq and the other Gulf countries creates significantly more complex operational routing, with detours potentially adding two or more hours to flight time. In any case, we are monitoring indicators of changes in overflight security assessments and will report on these developments accordingly.  Scenario  B: destabilizing Iran from within Given the aforementioned difficulties in achieving regime change through military means, Israel could instead choose to intensify operations aimed at destabilizing Iran from within and turn the tide of public opinion in Iran. Iran is already grappling with major internal crises: recurring power outages, water shortages during a period of drought, and the lingering shock of the largest protests in decades, which erupted in 2022 after the death of Mahsa Amini. Amini died under mysterious circumstances while in police custody, following her arrest for allegedly wearing her hijab improperly. Those demonstrations were widely described as “ unlike any the country had seen before ” - Israel might be aiming to ‘light the spark’ on this widespread resentment.   Such operations would aim to weaken the Iranian leadership’s grip on power and divert resources toward maintaining internal stability and security. This will indirectly slow down strategic programs like missile development and nuclear enrichment. In addition, this approach aligns with Netanyahu’s message in the video published on 12/08/2025 on X, where he encourages the Iranian people to protest and reclaim their power from the regime.  Conclusion Considering both Netanyahu’s latest video message and the broader geopolitical context, it seems plausible that Israel and Iran are preparing for another round of hostilities. This intelligence brief indicates that Israel - and prime minister Netanyahu himself - have ample motivation to engage in renewed conflict.  Building on that assumption, two scenarios were outlined for how a new Israeli offensive on Iran might unfold. The IDF could launch another military campaign, likely following a trajectory similar to the outbreak of hostilities last June. Israel would aim to leverage its technological superiority, while Iran would respond with military actions.  However, history has shown that achieving regime change through military means is virtually impossible without ground forces - a step Israel is unlikely to take, not least because of the significant logistical challenges involved. Another scenario outlined in here, which would also make sense in light of Netanyahu’s video message in which he called on the Iranians to stand up to their leadership. This could potentially be more fruitful, given the outburst of widespread resentment in 2022, the current ‘triple crises’ and general frustration about Iran’s isolation in the world. Looking ahead, the region is likely to remain highly unstable. Any renewed Israeli-Iranian confrontation could escalate unpredictably, fueling cycles of retaliation and heightening tensions across the Middle East. Without a clear path to resolution, political, economic, and security uncertainties are expected to persist, keeping the region on edge for the foreseeable future.