Tensions in the Caribbean: civilian risks due to an increasingly militarised environment
- casper4871
- Oct 15
- 17 min read
Report date: 14 October 2025 (17:00 hours UTC+2)
Executive summary
Recent military activity by the United States and Venezuela in the southern Caribbean increases exposure for civilian airliners and merchant ships to short-notice airspace and sea-lane restrictions, re-routing and delays. Night-time reconnaissance patterns in the southern Puerto Rico FIR, added airlift and refuelling flights, and exercises near busy approaches raise the chance of misidentification, especially in low visibility or during degraded communications. Electronic interference, such as GPS disruption, radar clutter or radio degradation, could complicate navigation, air traffic control co-ordination and collision avoidance. Concentration of Venezuelan movements in the north, alongside US units operating outside the Venezuelan EEZ, may create congested diversion paths, tighter logistics for energy supply, crew duty pressures and higher insurance and operational costs. Overall, the operating environment for civil traffic is more fluid and carries a higher risk of inadvertent spillover from military actions.
Current situation
While political tensions between Venezuela and the United States date to Hugo Chavez’s rise in 1999 and continued under Nicolás Maduro Moros after 2013, recent months show a sharper US political rhetoric and subsequent militarisation of the southern Caribbean as political goals of the US translate into military pressure. President Trump appears to be sustaining a maximum-pressure approach linking Venezuela to organised crime and terrorism, namely the Tren de Aragua cartel, designated as an International Terrorist Organisation (ITO) in February of this year. The cartel was sanctioned in July, and referred to Venezuela’s current president Nicolas Maduro as its leader. A month later, in August, the US Secretary of State officially referred to Maduro as a “fugitive from American justice,” increasing a bounty on him from $25 million placed in January to $50 million. The same month, the US armed forces were authorised to use military force against drug-trafficking boats and deployed around seven warships and a submarine to the Southern Caribbean, targeting the first reported Venezuelan narco trafficking boat in or near Venezuela’s exclusive economic zone on 02 September, killing 11. US policy on Venezuela has evolved across administrations, from designating the country as a national security concern under Obama, with sanctions placed on senior officials during both the Chávez and Maduro governments, to the current developments under the Trump administration.
Parallel to the new US posture, in September, President Maduro responded with a rare press conference in which he alleged the US was seeking regime-change, among concerns of US officials meeting several Venezuelan opposition leaders months before. He also stated that “Venezuela’s military is super prepared,” warning that any US attack would trigger armed resistance and mobilisation. In September, Venezuela then mirrored the late August-to-September US amphibious assault exercises in Puerto Rico with exercises on La Orchila and Patos islands, deployed over 25,000 personnel across multiple areas, mobilised and trained militia units, and placed its aerospace forces on high alert on 3 October after five F-35 aircraft reportedly came within 70 km of their coastline the previous day.
Both the US and Venezuela have stepped up not only rhetoric against each other, but have deployed numerous military assets in what appears to be an unprecedented militarisation of the south Caribbean region. In this context, not only are the two countries subjected to threats and risks from each other, but civilian airliners and maritime vessels using Venezuela’s flight information region (FIR) and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) are at increased risk when operating in the region due to the possibility of accidental targeting, be it through missiles or non-kinetic radio frequency, GPS or radar jamming, or other electronically-disruptive measures.
Beyond politics, long-term causes for tensions
Beyond political rhetoric, underlying factors for US-Venezuela tensions may be found in the energy security dynamics and a more robust foreign policy projection by the Trump administration, expected to last throughout his presidential term. In 2019, about 41% of Venezuelan crude exports went to the United States but by 2023 this had fallen to 23%, while China’s share rose from 25% to approximately 69%. Over six years, exports to the United States were cut in half and exports to China almost tripled, showing China’s growing influence on an energy security partner who, even during Hugo Chavez’s time, did not significantly modify energy exports to the US. Even with the US administration’s decision in July 2025 to renew Chevron’s licence for limited operations, American investment and activity remain constrained, with Venezuela constituting the only OPEC member in the western hemisphere linking part of its energy policies to a non-regional organisation.
Immediately adjacent to Venezuela, strategic US interests have appeared in Guyana, linked in the energy security sector. Around €12.3 billion US direct investments have flowed instead into neighbouring Guyana between 2020 and 2024. Between 2015 and 2019, roughly 96% of total foreign direct investment in that period came from the US aimed at developing significant offshore discoveries leading to first production of oil in the country in 2019. Washington is also strengthening its military posture; at Guyana’s presidential inauguration on 8 September the US Embassy in Georgetown reaffirmed support for the country’s defence, signalling beyond counter-narcotics to backing Guyana in its decades-long dispute with Venezuela over the Essequiba, particularly after renewed claims by the Venezuelan leadership in 2023.
The current increase in US pressure on Venezuela may aim to quell the Venezuelan claims on Guyana, reassert US influence in former Monroe Doctrine areas during a reformulation of the US military-foreign policy doctrine under the current administration, protect US energy interests and leave open the possibility of regime change in Caracas to a more regionally-integrated government. Additionally, US interests in safeguarding energy security have seen it competing with China in an area traditionally under its geopolitical sphere of influence, as Beijing increases its reach and presence in Latin America to include not only trade deals, but police training programmes and other security-related cooperation. Similar ties also include Venezuela, pursuing mutually exclusive interests with the US for over two decades.
Growing militarisation of the southern Caribbean?
Significant US naval deployments to the Caribbean Sea have historically been rare and short-lived. However, since August 2025 at least ten US naval vessels have operated in the region, presumably outside but in areas bordering Venezuela’s EEZ. The build-up heightens risks to civilian aircraft and merchant shipping, as both sides possess capabilities that could prompt airspace and sea-lane closures and raise the chance of misidentification or accidental targeting. Military flight activity has also increased, particularly night-time reconnaissance patterns in the southern Puerto Rico flight information region (FIR) and additional airlift and refuelling flights by the US military, while most Venezuelan movements remain concentrated in the north of the country. Overall, the regional posture suggests an elevated risk environment in which routine civil traffic could be disrupted with little warning.
Military presence in the southern Caribbean Sea: Deployments, patrols and operations
Significant United States naval deployments to the Caribbean Sea are not common, as the perceived threat level to the United States in the area does not warrant such operations. Since 2017, deployments in the area have typically involved single-ship missions for storm or earthquake relief or military exercises, excluding simple transits through the region between home ports or other overseas deployments. Previous deployments of United States naval assets in the Caribbean Sea, before the current one, have included the following:
April 2024: Aircraft carrier USS George Washington, guided-missile destroyer USS Porter and the USNS John Lenthall replenishment ship deployed only temporarily in the area for the Southern Seas 2024 exercises during which they circumnavigated the South American continent.
August 2021: USS Arlington, LHD deployed for earthquake relief to Haiti.
October 2020: USS Gerald Ford deployed off the coast of Florida for test and trials ahead of deployment.
July 2020: Landing helicopter assault ship USS Tripoli sails through Caribbean to get to home port in San Diego, no military operations.
October 2018: USNS Comfort, a hospital ship present in the Caribbean en route to Honduras to support US Southern Command’s operations such as the Enduring Promise initiative to boost partnership, not related to direct military operations.
September - October 2017: Aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman Amphibious assault ships USS Wasp and USS Kearsarge, as well as the dock landing ship USS Oak Hill deployed to areas between Dominica and Puerto Rico to provide humanitarian relief to areas affected by hurricanes Irma and Maria. USS Iwo Jima and USS New York also deployed with the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit.
Beginning in August 2025, the United States deployed at least ten naval vessels in the southern Caribbean, according to publicly-available information. This development appears to be unprecedented since Operation Just Cause in Panama between 1989 and 1990 and the 1983 intervention in Grenada. There is no evidence to suggest that any United States naval ships are operating within the Venezuelan Exclusive Economic Zone, as all official reports indicate their positions have placed them outside that area. Current United States deployments in the Caribbean include the following warships:
USS San Antonio: Amphibious transport dock vessel, berthed at Ponce, Puerto Rico, as of 6 October.
USS Fort Lauderdale: An amphibious transport dock, part of the Amphibious Ready Group, operating in an undisclosed area south of Puerto Rico as of 6 October.
USS Iwo Jima: Landing helicopter dock, last reported at St Thomas, United States Virgin Islands, during a port visit; capable of carrying at least three CH-53E, ten MH-60S and fourteen MH-60R helicopters.
USS Jason Dunham: Guided-missile destroyer based at Mayport Naval Station, Florida.
USS Gravely: Guided-missile destroyer based at Norfolk Naval Station, Virginia.
USS Stockdale: Guided-missile destroyer based at San Diego Naval Station, California; deployed at Ponce, Puerto Rico, as of 6 October.
USS Lake Erie: Guided-missile cruiser based at San Diego Naval Base, California; officially reported as operating in an unspecified area of the Caribbean, unofficially reported to be off the east coast of Trinidad and Tobago as of 04 October.
USS Minneapolis–Saint Paul: Littoral combat ship located at Guantánamo Bay.
MV Ocean Trader: Merchant vessel converted into a special operations mothership, thought to have been used in military operations around the world, was unofficially reported to be off the east coast of Trinidad and Tobago as of 04 October.
USS Newport News: Nuclear-powered attack submarine reportedly deployed in the Caribbean region according to media sources, unconfirmed by US official sources.
Deployments of US naval assets in the Caribbean Sea as of October 2025
*Exact current locations of vessels may differ from those shown on map
The growing militarisation of the southern Caribbean Sea could pose serious risks to commercial airliners and merchant vessels. While the combat readiness of US forces is generally high, their exact willingness to engage perceived adversaries, in this instance Venezuelan assets, is not publicly known. Although there have been no recorded incidents of the Venezuelan military engaging US forces, any potential confrontation would endanger not only military targets but also civilian aircraft and shipping in the area. The specific weapons fitted to US warships may vary according to mission requirements and are not always publicly disclosed, but a combination of the following systems could be employed by those currently deployed in the region:
Mk 46 30 mm gun systems: Range up to 4,000 metres, used against high-speed surface targets.
Phalanx CIWS radar guided 20 mm cannon: Used against high-speed sea/surface craft, and low flying aircraft, rate of fire 3,000 to 4,500 rounds per minute, presumed range 3,600 metres.
RIM-116 missile: Solid-fuel supersonic surface-to-air missile known to have been used by amphibious assault (LHA, LHD) and littoral combat vessels, fired from the Rolling Airframe Missile system, infrared passive radar homing guidance (fire-and-forget), range between 9 and 16 km depending on the model.
RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile: Solid fuel surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles launched through the MK 41 Vertical Launching System, range up to 50 km.
SM-2 missile: Surface-to-air missile, primary defence missile of the US navy, fired from the MK41 Vertical Launching System, command guided and semi-active radar homing, able to target at an altitude of 19,800 metres and range of between 160 and 240 km.
SM-3 missile: Surface-to-air ballistic missile used against exo-atmospheric ballistic targets, command, GPS and infrared guided, range 700 km.
SM-2 missile launched from an unspecified US warship during trials unrelated to the current US-Venezuela tensions
In relation to military flights between the United States and the central Caribbean, sample data from May, August, September and October indicates an increase in activity during the latter two months. According to publicly available AIS flight-tracking software, cargo aircraft were the main type to show this rise, operating between the continental United States, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands. When cross-referenced with official statements from both Venezuelan and US authorities, the following aircraft have been identified as active in the aforementioned areas:
F-35 Lightning: Thought to be deployed alongside US forces in the Caribbean, possible based out of Puerto Rico. On 02 October, Venezuelan authorities reported five F-35 aircraft flying 75 km off the country’s coasts, also sighted by a civilian airliner from Avianca. The use of these is thought to be for reconnaissance purposes, although their combat capabilities may also be used for further show of force.
AV-8B Harrier II: Thought to be deployed on the USS Iwo Jima, these aircraft briefly flew over the Guyanese capital on 07 September during the country’s presidential inauguration. Official notifications from the US embassy in the country stated that the flyover "symbolises the US’ full solidarity with the Guyanese people” as both advance “regional security.” Suggesting the presence or willingness to deploy combat aircraft on Venezuela’s eastern flank in Guyana.
P-8 Poseidon: Used for reconnaissance, these aircraft have been tracked operating in the southern portion of the Puerto Rico FIR. Regular sorties are observed between 20:00 and 04:00 Puerto Rico time (UTC−4), with the vast majority routed towards the southern FIR boundary between Puerto Rico and Venezuela.
C-17 Globemaster III: Numerous flights originating from the continental United States (e.g. El Paso, Fort Walton Beach, Charleston, Tampa and Alamogordo) to Ceiba, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands have been tracked during US military exercises at the beginning of September this year and in the first week of October. Although the cargo is more likely than not military grade, given the origin and destinations, the contents of cargo remains unidentified.
KC-130J Super Hercules: Similar to C-17 flights, KC-130 flights have been seen from areas in the continental US such as Charleston and Miami en route to Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands.
KC-135 Stratotanker: Although less frequent, at least one flight was confirmed to have departed an air base in Tampa, Florida, transited near the southern edge of the Puerto Rican FIR, then returned to base shortly before entering the Venezuelan FIR on 7 October. No other aircraft were tracked or identified in the vicinity, though the sortie likely supported an unspecified air mission in the area.
KC-46 Pegasus: At least two confirmations of this air-to-air refuelling aircraft were observed, the most recent on 16 September, when it departed the US Virgin Islands, flew south towards the boundary between the Puerto Rico and Venezuelan FIRs, then dropped from public tracking roughly halfway to the latter. This pattern suggests it was supporting an air mission deeper into the Caribbean, possibly close to the Venezuelan coast.
RQ-4 Global Hawk: Numerous social media reports have claimed the involvement of this aircraft type from bases in Puerto Rico, although these remain unverified. Additionally, in mid-September, Venezuela’s Ministry of Defence issued a statement suggesting that RQ-4 flights were being conducted and extended into night-time hours. While unconfirmed, the US military routinely employs these aircraft for reconnaissance in other theatres of operation.
Troop presence
A potential US force relevant to Venezuela is the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), reportedly embarked on the USS San Antonio after forming at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The MEU consists of Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 263 providing rapid air mobility, Combat Logistics Battalion 26 for sustainment and engineering support and a Battalion Landing Team built around 3rd Battalion 6th Marines with attached armour, fires and reconnaissance enablers. Operating from an amphibious platform, it can conduct maritime security, show-of-presence patrols, limited amphibious raids, air assault insertions, non-combatant evacuations and crisis response along littoral areas. Its presence would not confirm intent but offers a flexible and scalable option for contingencies in the wider Caribbean. Exact numbers and locations of deployments remain unspecified.
There has been no explicit and significant detection of increased US troop numbers or movements around the Caribbean beyond official reporting on the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit. Troop numbers and movements from other US bases in the region appear unchanged, with no significant indicators of a broader build-up according to publicly available information. Although US military flights to and from Colombia (Barranquilla), Costa Rica (Daniel Oduber Quiros airport), US Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico and Antigua, as well as in the airspace over Honduras and El Salvador, have been observed by AIS-based software, these movements alone do not constitute clear evidence of heightened deployments and may reflect routine patterns rather than a substantive shift in posture.
Venezuelan air defence
Venezuela fields a layered combination of S-300VM, Buk-M2E, S-125 Pechora-2M systems and at least 4,000 Igla-S MANPADS that, if engaged, could complicate both civilian and military aviation around key hubs and approach corridors. Although locations and readiness remain largely unconfirmed, reported positions at Manuel Ríos, Caracas, Puerto La Cruz, Isla Margarita and La Carlota imply engagement ranges from high to low zones that raise the risk of misidentification, airspace restrictions and inadvertent engagements.
BUK 2M: Official statements indicate Venezuela acquired three Buk-M2 air-defence systems in 2013, while unofficial reporting suggests the total could be as high as twelve. Given their mobility on tracked and wheeled chassis, precise deployment locations are uncertain, though sightings and analysis point to Punto Fijo, location of the country’s largest refinery with a 940,000 b/d capacity, Caracas (including La Carlota airfield as of 05 October 2025), La Orchila Island during September 2025 exercises, and movements to or from Güiria port in the east. The systems are believed to be distributed across multiple branches of the armed forces. The Buk-M2E is a radar-guided, medium-range system with an engagement range of up to 50 km.
S-125 Pechora 2M: With an approximate range of 35 km and mounted on tracked or wheeled vehicles, Venezuela acquired at least eleven of these systems in 2014. Footage from military exercises over the years shows them being tested, and they have been reported or sighted near Cúcuta (on the Colombian border), Maracay, Caracas, Puerto La Cruz and Isla Margarita, although precise deployment locations remain officially unconfirmed.
S-300VM: With a range of up to 250 km, open-source geolocations indicate Venezuelan S-300VM systems at Manuel Ríos Air Base (115 km S of Caracas). Additional reports, all officially unconfirmed, place S-300 systems in Caracas (defending government sites), Puerto La Cruz (commercial port, second largest refinery, Rafael Egañez Marcano naval complex), and on Margarita Island, this latter according to an exiled admiral with limited other verifying sources. Typical S-300VM deployment would include a command post, acquisition radars, an engagement radar and interceptors, enabling high-altitude, long-range area defence and limited intercept capability. Actual Venezuelan inventory, readiness and missile loads are unverified.
Igla-S MANPADS: With an approximate range of 6 km and maximum flight altitude of 11,000 km, Venezuela purchased two separate batches of 2,000 Igla MANPADS from Russia in 2010 and 2012. Their precise distribution across the country remains unclear, but units are believed to be deployed within the army, navy and air force, as well as at strategic sites such as military bases, airports, government facilities and refineries. The system has appeared frequently in footage of military exercises and is thought to have a shelf life of around ten years from the date of manufacture, although those dates are unknown. Without maintenance or life-extension work, many of these systems may be prone to misfires or malfunctions.
Left to right: Venezuelan S-125 2M Pechora, BUK 2M and S-300VM anti-air defence systems
Air and Naval bases in Venezuela
Venezuela has at least sixteen air bases and airports, some believed to be dual use and others dedicated to military roles. Although the status of several sites is unclear, flight tracking shows activity at a number of them. Major air bases are concentrated in the north and are thought to operate Russian-acquired Su-30s and legacy F-16s procured in the 1980s. Other air assets include C-130 transports, Chinese Shaanxi Y-8s, Mi-35 attack helicopters and Mi-17 utility helicopters, plus smaller types and up to fifteen Iranian-designed Mohajer armed UAVs acquired around 2012. Naval assets number about thirty-five and include three diesel-electric submarines, six gunboats and at least twenty patrol craft of varying tonnage based at several Caribbean ports. The exact level of readiness and crew training remains uncertain, though the systems listed have appeared in exercise footage in recent years.
Air and naval bases in Venezuela known to be active at the time of writing
Venezuelan military flights and naval movements are less numerous on AIS tracking software, and open-source reporting likewise offers limited detail on exact locations and assets. In parallel with an increase in US military flights in September and October this year, Venezuelan military flights, although with limited visibility in open sources, have increased by 100% based on flight samples taken from May, August, September and October. These flights mainly include east–west C-130 transport sorties and coastal tracks over the Caribbean Sea resembling reconnaissance by an unspecified low-flying, low-speed aircraft taking off from and returning to Caracas’s Francisco de Miranda Air Base. No significant north–south movements have been identified in open sources, suggesting the majority of military movements in the country remain in the northern area.
US military deployments (left) and participating military hardware in the Caribe Soberano 200 snap drills (right) on Orchila Island as reported by Venezuelan authorities
Military exercises by Venezuela
In response to Venezuela’s perceived threats, a series of military drills were carried out between September and October of this year. Venezuela’s true combat readiness and capabilities remain unclear and are unlikely to withstand a large-scale US incursion. If imagery shared by official and unofficial accounts is accurate, the main risks stem from inadvertent targeting of merchant vessels or civilian and military aircraft. The following outlines what was reportedly conducted.
Isla de Orchila: Venezuela conducted a three-day Caribe Soberano 200 exercise on La Orchila Island, centred on the Antonio Díaz naval base, with over 2,500 personnel, 12 navy vessels (including six Lupo-class frigates, four Avante 2400 offshore patrol vessels, U-209/A-1300 diesel-electric submarines, logistics and multipurpose ships), 22 aircraft, and 20 militia peñeros. Activities included Su-30MK2 over-water flights with Kh-31 anti-ship capability, employment of armed UAVs for air defence and surveillance, Buk-M2 surface-to-air missiles, ZU-23 anti-aircraft artillery, coastal live fire, amphibious landings with armoured vehicles, air-defence drills, parachute drops, cargo airdrops, and tactical air support. Special forces conducted air, sea and land infiltration and underwater reconnaissance, while intelligence and electronic warfare units practised call interception, jamming and communications disruption. The Bolivarian Militia operated armoured vehicles and co-ordinated shipboard electronics, and the National Police supported reconnaissance tasks.
Images of Venezuela’s military exercises on Isla de Patos, 10 km from Trinidad and Tobago
Isla Margarita: Around 8 October, Venezuelan officials reported the start of “Operación Defensa Insular Luisa Cáceres de Arismendi 200” along Margarita Island’s coasts and adjacent waters, though participation levels remain unclear. Unconfirmed reports suggest the event was cancelled or scaled down in response to increased US military presence in the region. Prior official descriptions pointed to intensive patrols, maritime surveillance and exploration with artisanal fishing councils, plus parachute and cargo drops within integrated air–sea–land manoeuvres. A co-ordinated military–police–civil approach was highlighted for deterrence and maritime control, but the actual extent of execution remains uncertain.
Isla de Patos: Footage and reports emerged that Venezuela was conducting rare live-fire exercises simulating an amphibious landing using patrol boats and anti-air exercises 10 km from Trinidad and Tobago on the northeastern end of Venezuela, with the participation of a Los Frailes class transport vessel and smaller landing craft. Zu-23 23mm anti-air cannons were observed in a video, as were what appeared to be .50 calibre guns firing on the island. Unconfirmed reports stated the event disrupted local fishing operations, although this remains unverified.
Venezuela’s defence minister showing a map of the “Caribe Soberano 200“ military exercises on La Orchila island
Threats to maritime and aviation
Military presence of the two sides can be broken down into deployments, patrols and operations, each side interacting with the other in a tense environment where split-second decisions or misidentification of adversary aircraft may contribute to a serious incident.
Maritime field
Accidental targeting, misidentification: Heightened alert states, non-standard interventions (missile targeting of suspected drug trafficking boats) and rapid decision cycles increase the risk that civilian craft are misidentified as hostile or narcotics carriers. Contributing factors include low visibility, AIS outages, high-speed approaches, poor radio communication and profile similarity to narcotics-laden craft. Probable outcomes range from boardings and warning shots to disabling fire, with elevated risk near exclusion perimeters, convoys and exercise boxes.
Collateral damage to nearby vessels: Exchanges of fire with suspected threats, air or surface weapon tests during exercises, as well as missile interceptions can endanger merchant vessels and small boats operating in the proximity of such events. Risks include stray rounds, fragmentation, shock effects and debris fields. Choke points or port approaches may be of particular concern during live-fire periods, air-defence alerts or when multiple forces manoeuvre in confined spaces.
Deviation due to closed maritime spaces: Short-notice activation of exclusion zones for exercises or operations, modification of patrol lines and ad hoc safety corridors can close or constrict established routes. Even with Notices to Mariners (NOTMAR), rerouting may be required with limited warning, causing schedule disruption, traffic compression, higher collision risk and pilotage challenges at primary hubs. Expect rolling adjustments to sea lanes around task groups, tanker routes and approaches to major Caribbean ports.
Aviation field
Accidental targeting, misidentification: Aircraft operating in or near conflict zones face a heightened risk of misidentification, where a military actor may mistake a civilian flight for a threat and engage it. This has occurred in the past, notably PS752 (Ukraine International Airlines), shot down shortly after take-off from Tehran in January 2020, and J2-8243 (Azerbaijan Airlines), reportedly shot down near Grozny in December 2024 by Russian air defence. Small, low-flying aircraft are at greater risk, particularly following deviation from a cleared route or during loss of communication. While such incidents are unlikely, they remain a credible consideration amid regional tensions.
Heightened GPS jamming and spoofing: These forms of electronic interference can disrupt or manipulate satellite-based navigation and timing signals, potentially affecting civilian airliners transiting the area. At present there are no signs of heightened digital interference in the area in question. If the situation were to escalate, significant interference would be a likely scenario.
Flight interruptions, Closed airspace, airports: Sudden closure of airspace during armed confrontation can occur and cause significant disruptions for aircraft, passengers and businesses. Individual airports may also close at short notice if landing and take-off are deemed unsafe. This can cause disruptions, re-routing and aircraft to enter holding patterns. If tensions escalate, these are very likely scenarios and aircraft may need extra fuel for possible re-routing.