Report: Venezuela at the Crossroads of Latin America’s Evolving Threat Networks
- casper4871
- 22 hours ago
- 5 min read
26 November 2025
Executive Summary
Venezuela has evolved into one of the most significant hybrid threat hubs in the Western Hemisphere, where state authority, criminal enterprises, armed groups, and foreign intelligence services converge. The Maduro regime’s alliances with Iran, Russia, and Cuba — combined with deep integration with FARC dissident factions, the ELN, and transnational criminal organizations — have transformed the country into a strategic platform for destabilizing regional activity.
A recent US Senate testimony (October 2025) confirms that Hezbollah, facing unprecedented financial strain following heavy battlefield losses and disrupted Iranian funding channels, is now increasingly reliant on Latin American drug-trafficking and money-laundering networks. Venezuela sits at the center of these operations, providing documentation, safe haven, logistical support, and permissive access to free-trade zones that facilitate Hezbollah’s global financial architecture. This places Caracas at the core of a hemispheric network that links narcotics flows, illicit finance, and the survival of a major Iranian proxy.
Russia’s footprint in Venezuela has simultaneously expanded from political support to direct military enhancement. Ukrainian Intelligence reports indicate that a Russian general implicated in the Kakhovka Dam attack is now training Venezuelan forces to mark a shift toward embedding Russian doctrine and hybrid warfare capabilities inside the Venezuelan security apparatus. This development strengthens regime resilience while further entrenching foreign strategic influence.
These networks sow instability across the Caribbean and in South America. Armed groups enjoy sanctuary and operational freedom in Venezuelan territory; illicit maritime corridors into the Caribbean are expanding; and Hezbollah-linked financial and logistical cells continue to surface in Brazil, Argentina, and beyond. The result is a transnational ecosystem in which state actors, criminal syndicates, and foreign proxies reinforce one another.
In the foreseeable future, barring a US military intervention, the integration of Iranian, Russian, criminal, and insurgent structures into the Venezuelan state is expected to intensify. This presents growing risks to regional governments, international businesses, and Western security interests, while increasing the likelihood that the hemisphere becomes an active theatre for global hybrid conflict dynamics.

Situation Overview: Threat networks
Venezuela has developed into a permissive operating environment for insurgent and criminal networks with historical roots in the region. FARC dissidents, the ELN, and a mosaic of armed militias have established parallel structures in border areas and mining regions. Their survival depends on illicit economies — gold, cocaine, fuel smuggling, extortion, and migrant trafficking — which are now increasingly integrated with regime-aligned military and political elites. The Cartel de los Soles, embedded within the Venezuelan armed forces, remains central to this fusion of state authority and organized crime.
Cuba’s entrenched role within Venezuela’s intelligence and security architecture reinforces these dynamics. Cuban advisors shape surveillance, counter-dissent operations, and the internal control mechanisms that protect regime elites. This creates a stable authoritarian backbone that enables the regime to absorb foreign partners and maintain cohesion despite economic collapse.
Russia’s influence has deepened significantly. Beyond political backing and disinformation support, Russian advisors now play a direct role in shaping Venezuela’s military capabilities. Intelligence from Ukrainian, including head of Ukraine’s Military Intelligence HUR Kyrylo Budanov and Western sources indicates that a Russian general, Oleg Makarevich, associated with hybrid warfare operations in Ukraine — including the Kakhovka Dam sabotage — is training Venezuelan forces in drone warfare, electronic warfare, reconnaissance, and irregular tactics. This marks a shift from advisory presence to direct force-development support, embedding Russian doctrine within Venezuela’s armed forces and securing Moscow’s foothold in the hemisphere.
Iran’s footprint in Venezuela continues to expand across industrial, energy, intelligence, and logistical channels. This presence has taken on renewed significance as Hezbollah faces an acute financial crisis. According to Sales and Levitt (US Senate hearing of 20–21 Oct 2025), Hezbollah has lost a major portion of its funding pipeline due to:
destruction of cash and gold stockpiles in Israeli strikes
collapse of Syrian regime support
reduced Iranian capacity to subsidize its proxy due to sanctions and internal pressures
dismantling of Hezbollah’s shadow banking networks such as al-Qard al-Hassan
As a result, Hezbollah is doubling down on drug trafficking and money laundering in Latin America — with evidence showing that Venezuela is a key enabler. Sales identifies Venezuela under Maduro as a key operational safe haven, providing:
official documentation (passports, IDs) to Hezbollah operatives
logistical support for drug shipments, weapons transfers, cash handling, and contraband
permissive ports and airports for trans-shipment
freedom for Hezbollah-linked figures to operate with impunity
Levitt’s testimony reinforces this, documenting cases where Venezuelan-linked couriers moved drug proceeds to Lebanon, where Hezbollah facilitators used Venezuelan Free Trade Zones or FTZs (notably Margarita Island) for money laundering, and where Venezuelan diplomatic cover supported Hezbollah-connected movement across the hemisphere.
The impact
The regional impact is broadening. Colombian border provinces suffer spillover from Venezuelan-based armed actors; Ecuador’s institutional collapse shows how quickly hybrid networks can overwhelm state capacity; Brazil and Argentina continue to expose Hezbollah-linked financial and logistics cells; and Caribbean territories linked to Europe (Aruba, Curaçao, Bonaire, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Guadeloupe, Martinique) function as transit nodes for Venezuelan-origin cocaine, gold, weapons, and illicit finance. These maritime corridors further anchor Venezuela’s position within global criminal–militant supply chains.
Across Latin America, risk indicators suggest accelerating hybridization. Armed groups expand territorial control within Venezuela, Iranian technical deployments increase, Hezbollah’s facilitators deepen their financial networks, and Russia’s military presence grows more explicit. Together, these developments indicate the emergence of a fully integrated hybrid threat ecosystem supported — and in some cases orchestrated — by the Venezuelan state.
Looking ahead
Baseline Scenario: Consolidation of the Hybrid Threat Hub (Most Likely)
Hezbollah escalates its reliance on Latin American drug money to offset declining Iranian subsidies. Venezuela tightens its cooperation with Russia, Iran, and Cuba, embedding foreign operatives and intelligence services within its security architecture. FARC/ELN groups expand their control in border zones. Illicit financial flows through Venezuela, Brazil, and Caribbean jurisdictions continue to rise.
Outcome: Increasing regional instability and expanding exposure for financial institutions and logistics operators.
Escalation Scenario: Operational Activation and Geopolitical Friction (Plausible)
Hezbollah-linked networks, under financial and strategic pressure, transition from financial functions to operational activities, including surveillance or planned attacks against Western or diplomatic targets in the region. Russia expands military training or deploys additional personnel, heightening US.–Russia tensions in the hemisphere. Debate intensifies over designating Venezuela a State Sponsor of Terrorism.
Outcome: High risk of targeted attacks, maritime disruptions, and destabilizing incidents across Latin America.
Stabilization Scenario: Partial Rollback Through Regional Alignment (Least Likely)
A limited political opening in Caracas, combined with coordinated regional diplomacy and enhanced intelligence-sharing, leads to partial containment of armed group expansion. Colombia regains control over key frontier zones, while Ecuador stabilizes critical institutions. Tehran focuses its resources elsewhere, slowing its operational tempo in the hemisphere. Illicit economies persist, but the strategic environment stabilizes, reducing the momentum of hybrid operations.
Outcome: Moderate friction for Hezbollah but persistent networks.
Conclusion
Venezuela’s evolution into a hybrid threat hub is now quite firmly established. The convergence of armed groups, criminal economies, and foreign strategic actors — including Russia’s escalating military role, Iran’s expanding intelligence footprint, and Hezbollah’s increasing dependence on Latin American narcotics revenues — positions Venezuela as a hemispheric and global destabilizer. The 2025 Senate testimonies confirm that Venezuela’s permissive environment is now a central regional node in Hezbollah’s financial architecture and to Iran’s broader proxy ecosystem. Over the coming year, these networks could intensify, reshaping Latin America’s security landscape and complicating Western efforts to counter agile, state-supported hybrid threats.



