Intel brief: France and Mali stop intelligence sharing following dispute

casper4871
Oct 2
4 min read

Report date: 01/10/2025

What happened?

On 15/08/2025, Mali’s junta announced it had detained a French national accused of spying for the French intelligence services. Colonel Assimi Goïta's government claimed “foreign states” were supporting a plot to destabilise Mali’s institutions, allegedly involving a small group within the Malian armed forces.
France rejected the charges as baseless and demanded the immediate release of its staff member, stressing he was a duly accredited diplomat.
On 14/09/2025, five French diplomats were declared persona non grata by the Malian junta and left the country. This incident was a direct result of the aforementioned diplomatic clash between the two governments.
In a corresponding move, the French ordered two Malian diplomats to leave the country on 19/09/2025 and suspended all bilateral counter-terrorism operations with Bamako.
The suspension of intelligence sharing between Paris and Bamako can carry serious consequences for the nation that is fighting security threats on multiple fronts. That said, this incident follows a pattern of steady deterioration of relations between the two countries.

Historical context

The latest rift between Bamako and Paris can only be understood when put in the proper historical context. The deterioration of French-Malian relations follows a steady pattern since its peak in 2013, when French President François Hollande visited French troops stationed in the country and was met by cheering crowds in downtown Bamako. That year, the French military launched Operation Serval to fight back an alliance of jihadist and Tuareg nationalist rebels who threatened to overrun the Malian capital, deploying not only troops but also intelligence officers. France’s DGSE (foreign intelligence) and DRM (military intelligence) worked closely with local forces, using drones and surveillance aircraft from local airbases, and deploying SIGINT (intelligence-gathering discipline that involves intercepting and analyzing electronic signals and communications) capabilities to support counterterrorism operations under Operation Barkhane. Despite initial successes, the collaboration with the French also had its downsides. While not always publicized, local accusations of espionage occasionally surfaced, with mostly Mali and Burkina Faso claiming Western agents operated beyond agreed frameworks.

In August 2020 Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta was overthrown by Colonel Assimi Goïta in a coup that came in the wake of mass protests against corruption, poor governance, and insecurity in northern Mali. In May 2021, Goïta staged a second coup, removing transitional president Bah N’Daw, thus consolidating power under the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP). After the military junta expelled French forces and welcomed Russian military contractors, pro-government media accused French soldiers of “espionage” and even staging massacres (notably around Gossi, 2022, when France released drone footage to counter Malian claims). Not just in Mali: similar accusations were made against French diplomats and NGOs in Burkina Faso in 2023 and 2024, alleging interference and intelligence gathering. Some French and European staff were expelled under that pretext. After the coup that overthrew President Bazoum in 2023, Niger’s junta accused France of clandestine operations and claimed to have dismantled a French spy network. Paris denied this.

As the accusations of espionage against Paris piled up and the French troops gradually left Africa, ending France’s centuries-long presence in Central and West-Africa, the Russians gradually filled the gap the French left behind. Since 2021, the Russian PMCs Wagner Group and Afrika Corps have been active in Mali and, to a lesser extent, Burkina Faso. The Russian paramilitaries have been accused of running counter-espionage operations, monitoring NGOs and suspected Western operatives. Multiple reports in 2023 and 2024 indicate that Russian advisers have encouraged Sahelian military governments to crack down on Western intelligence networks, thereby shifting regional intelligence dynamics in favor of Russian-aligned operations.

Analysis

The suspension of intelligence sharing between Paris and Bamako marks a significant rupture in Mali’s ability to track and respond to jihadist threats. For years, France supplied SIGINT, satellite imagery, and drone surveillance that Malian forces could never have obtained on their own. In return, Mali contributed valuable on-the-ground insights, drawing its own military networks. With this exchange now cut off, both sides are left weaker. Mali faces a dangerous intelligence gap against jihadist groups active in its territory, while France loses situational awareness that Malian forces could once provide from the ground.

The breakdown of cooperation extends beyond intelligence. Although Operation Barkhane formally ended, France continued to support Malian forces through logistics, staff-level training, and joint planning. This coordination provided a degree of cohesion in the fight against Al-Qaeda–linked Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). Without it, the Malian army must rely almost entirely on its own overstretched capabilities and on Russian support, particularly from Wagner’s successor formations such as the Africa Corps. This shift risks producing more fragmented and less effective military operations. France, meanwhile, maintains partnerships with Niger and Chad, but Mali is in danger of becoming a blind spot within the regional counterterrorism architecture.

The timing is particularly perilous. Jihadist groups are expanding their reach in central and northern Mali and may seize the opportunity created by the diplomatic rift. Civilians, aid workers, and local officials already face severe risks, and the absence of coordinated counterterrorism efforts could embolden militants to push closer to Bamako. The weakening of Mali’s defenses also threatens to spill across borders, with neighboring states such as Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, and Ghana potentially exposed to an intensification of cross-border raids and insurgent expansion.

Beyond the security consequences, the diplomatic fallout signals a deeper geopolitical realignment. By severing ties with France, Mali is doubling down on its strategic turn toward Russia. Moscow provides weapons, training, and paramilitary forces, but this support emphasizes raw military power over intelligence-driven operations. The result is a counterterrorism posture that risks becoming more militarized, less integrated with regional and Western partners, and increasingly isolated from international donors such as ECOWAS and the African Union. The espionage dispute has thus accelerated Mali’s drift into a new security orbit—one in which Russian influence rises while traditional Western alliances erode.

Conclusion

In sum, the latest espionage dispute is less an isolated incident than the culmination of a long decline in Franco-Malian relations since their 2013 peak. The rupture in intelligence cooperation leaves Mali exposed to jihadist threats, which only seem to increase, and pushes Bamako further into Moscow’s orbit. A more fragile and militarized security situation is what remains, one that risks isolating and destabilizing Mali diplomatically and weakening regional counterterrorism efforts at a moment when the threat environment is worsening across the Sahel.