Intel Brief: Food, Fresh Water, Nuclear Sites - Ripple Effects from Iran Conflict Worsening
- 22 hours ago
- 4 min read
Date: 21/03/2026
Three weeks into the US-Israeli campaign against Iran, the security environment across the Gulf has continued to deteriorate. The conflict shows no credible signs of resolution. Iran's offensive capacity, while degraded, remains sufficient to sustain daily strikes across the Gulf and even new targets significantly further afield than anticipated.
Energy infrastructure has been systematically targeted and gas fields, oil tankers, and even nuclear sites are now clearly viable targets. The continued blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has not only sent fuel prices skyrocketing, it has also severely affected fresh food and water supply chains.
Besides this, both Israel and the US continue to send mixed messaging about the potential for a ground incursion into Iran.
Dyami’s assessment is that, even without “boots on the ground,” the situation in Gulf States and neighboring countries (UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Iraq) will worsen before it improves.
We urge all companies, NGOs, and multinational organisations with staff and families in the Gulf to reassess their presence now. We recommend to move non-essential personnel to safety while the means to do so remain available, based on a realistic assessment of what the coming weeks are likely to bring.
Over the past three weeks, Dyami has been actively working with organisations across the region to plan and execute the safe relocation of hundreds of staff and their families.
If your organisation has personnel in the Gulf and wishes to assess its exposure or plan a bespoke evacuation, please reach out to us directly at info@dyami.services.

The Nuclear Dimension
The Natanz uranium enrichment complex was struck the morning of 21/03, without leakage of radioactive material, according to Iran. Iran informed the IAEA, which confirmed no off-site radiation increase was detected and stated it is investigating. IAEA Director General Grossi has reiterated calls for military restraint to avoid a nuclear accident. This follows ordnance striking the site of the Bushehr nuclear power plant on 17/03, with a projectile landing just 350 meters from the reactor.
The combination of active strikes near nuclear sites and degraded monitoring capability represents a category of risk that has no precedent in this conflict and no reliable mitigation outside a halt to operations.
Clients should be aware that a radiological incident, however low its current probability, would trigger immediate and unplanned evacuations across a wide geographic area with very limited notice.
The Strait of Hormuz and the Humanitarian Consequence
The Strait remains effectively closed to normal commercial traffic. Iran has established an IRGC-run registration and vetting system requiring extensive disclosure of vessel ownership and cargo destination, with at least nine ships understood to have used the corridor and one tanker reported to have paid approximately $2 million for transit clearance. The system provides no guarantee of safety, with rogue IRGC factions assessed as capable of seizing or delaying vessels regardless of clearance status.
The humanitarian consequences of the closure are now becoming acute. Saudi Arabia imports more than 80% of its food, the UAE approximately 90%, and Qatar around 98%. The majority of food shipments to the region transit the Strait. With the waterway effectively blocked, alternative routes are costlier, slower, and unable to replace the volume of flow.
Approximately 20,000 sailors aboard 3,000 commercial ships are stranded in the Persian Gulf, with reports of fuel and drinking water shortages onboard. The World Food Programme has warned that supply chain disruption may reach the most severe level since the Covid-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war in 2022.
Shipping companies continue to refuse transit given the insurance environment, and wartime clauses in freight contracts have activated, giving carriers the right to divert shipments to alternative ports. The food security situation across the Gulf will worsen materially with each additional week of closure.
Evacuation Assessment
Governments across the region have largely stopped evacuation operations and recommend that citizens seeking to leave should use commercial flights. However, while local carriers are operating some flights, most international carriers have not reinstated suspended routes to the Gulf and the broader Middle East and have limited plans to do so.
The operational environment can change rapidly. Dubai International Airport (DXB) has been forced into temporary closures multiple times in the past week alone.
Dyami's assessment is that the conflict will continue for at minimum several more weeks and more likely longer. There is no credible ceasefire framework in place, no agreed US or Israel war objective, and Iran retains sufficient military capacity to sustain pressure across the Gulf indefinitely.
Commercial Flight Status
Emirates and flydubai are operating heavily restricted schedules from Dubai, prioritising stranded passenger clearance over new bookings.
Etihad is running a limited return service from Abu Dhabi to select hubs. Qatar Airways is operating a reduced schedule subject to rolling airspace clearances. Gulf Air has suspended hub operations in Bahrain entirely. El Al is running a minimal network from Tel Aviv, currently limited to six non-stop flights to New York designated for American citizens.
British Airways has frozen all routes to Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Amman, and Tel Aviv until at minimum 31 May. Singapore Airlines has cancelled Dubai indefinitely. KLM and Air France suspensions are being pushed back repeatedly without confirmed resumption dates. Air Canada, Lufthansa Cargo, Philippine Airlines, AirBaltic, Aegean, Finnair, and Oman Air have all suspended Gulf and Levant routes until dates ranging from late March to late October.
The suspension of international carriers is now compounding an emerging jet fuel shortage that is acute in several key markets. Australia holds reserves for fewer than 30 days. Vietnam's major importers have warned of default in April. China's hard ban on refined fuel exports, combined with South Korea and Thailand's export restrictions, has removed significant jet fuel supply from the Asian market at precisely the moment that rerouted flights around Iranian, Iraqi, and Israeli airspace are consuming more fuel per sector than normal operations. IATA has warned ticket prices could rise by up to 9%. The industry can absorb a geopolitical premium for weeks. It cannot absorb a structural fuel supply contraction of this scale for months.
Dyami's assessment is that clients should not plan around a commercial aviation recovery in the near term.
