Airspace security in the south Caribbean: US F-35 aircraft reported 75 km from Caracas airport
- casper4871
- Oct 7
- 6 min read
Report date: 06/10/2025
Where: Venezuelan exclusive Economic Zone, Southern Caribbean
Who is involved: US military, Venezuelan authorities
What is happening?
Venezuela’s defence minister, Vladimir Padrino Lopez, stated that on 02/10/2025, five US F-35 aircraft were detected flying approximately 75 km off the country’s coast, though he did not specify the exact location or an altitude.
Venezuelan defence authorities said in a 02/10/2025 statement that they will keep the Integrated Aerospace Defence System on high alert and stand ready to exercise their full rights to the defence of sovereignty in response to the F-35 flights reported near their coast.
In mid-September, Venezuela’s defence minister accused the United States of tripling reconnaissance flights over areas near its territory, alleging the use of RC-135, P-8 Poseidon, E-3 Sentry aircraft and suggestions of possible MQ-9 Reapers without mentioning the latter explicitly, and expanding operations to include night-time missions in addition to the usual daytime patrols.
On 04/10/2025, a former Venezuelan air force officer in exile, Eduardo José Figueroa Marchena, claimed that the five US F-35 aircraft were detected visually by a civilian aircraft, which relayed the sighting to Caracas’ Maiquetía Airport via its contacts. The veracity of this claim remains unclear, but it raises concern that aircraft not detected by radar could lead to a serious airspace incident in the region.
The incident coincided with a fourth US strike on what defence officials described as a narcotics-trafficking boat off Venezuela’s coast, reportedly killing four on board. It followed similar actions on 02, 15 and 19 September this year.
No significant deviations or unusual flight patterns were observed on 02/10/2025 or in the days that followed. Air traffic activity in the region remained consistent with established civilian and military flight corridors, and there were no confirmed reports of radar anomalies or unauthorised incursions beyond the Venezuelan statement regarding F-35 detection.
As of 05/10/2025, airlines reported to be overflying Venezuelan airspace include Air Europa, Air France, Arajet, Avianca, Azul, Gol, Iberia, LATAM, Turkish Airlines, and Wamos Air.
A sample of 20 flights from various airlines overflying Venezuela between 28/09/2025 and 05/10/2025showed an average cruising altitude of 11,576 metres, consistent with that of flights over Colombia, Guyana and Brazil, with no indication of altered or restricted flight patterns prior to and after the F-35 incidents.
No formal statements of concern or NOTAMs have been issued by airlines operating in the area, indicating that no significant collision risk involving off-route or unidentified aircraft has been assessed at the time of writing.
Analysis
The F-35 sighting appears to be one of the first notable incidents involving US military fighters operating close to the Venezuelan coast in recent times, amid increasing tension and rhetoric between both governments. The most plausible explanation is that US Air Force flights operated in international airspace inside the Maqueitia FIR roughly 75 km offshore, supporting maritime interdiction or reconnaissance of Venezuelan military or governmental activity. Caracas announcing a “detection” without releasing details such as coordinates or altitude allowed it to demonstrate vigilance while maintaining ambiguity over what its sensors actually tracked. The unverified claim by the exiled Venezuelan air force officer, that a civilian aircraft first observed the jets rather than them being detected by radar, aligns with official reports mentioning a civilian Avianca flight sighting the aircraft. However, the same statement also referred to F-35s being “detected” without specifying the means. There is no publicly verified information indicating that Venezuela possesses radar systems capable of tracking stealth aircraft, suggesting that visual contact would be necessary for identification. This, combined with heightened alert levels and the perception of increased external threats, raises the likelihood of more frequent Venezuelan military patrols, which could intermittently interfere with civilian air routes in the area.
In mid-September, Venezuela’s defence ministry accused the United States of increasing aerial surveillance near its territory, alleging a threefold rise in reconnaissance missions using RC-135, P-8 Poseidon and E-3 Sentry aircraft, with possible MQ-9 Reaper involvement, and extending operations into night-time hours. The claim coincided with data released by Venezuela’s Strategic Operational Command, which reported US flights entering the Maiquetía FIR over Caracas and La Guaira, an area Venezuela treats as part of its defensive perimeter though the United States considers it international airspace. The episode followed a series of maritime encounters, including Venezuelan troop deployments and a Venezuelan jet approaching a US Navy vessel earlier in September. These developments reflect a gradual escalation of surveillance and counter-surveillance activity by both governments, with Venezuela using such incidents to reinforce its narrative of vigilance and sovereignty while Washington maintains a visible regional presence under the banner of lawful intelligence gathering and deterrence.
Probable area of F-35 flyover near Venezuela’s coast as reported on 02 October 2025
On 03 October, further reports indicated that at least one Venezuelan S-125 Pechora air-defence system was moving west from Maracay towards Carabobo along the Autopista Regional del Centro, a day after the F-35 reports, suggesting a bid to strengthen coastal air defences and signal readiness. The S-125 offers mobile, medium-altitude cover but is of limited use against fifth-generation stealth, with the move perceived as largely demonstrative. Venezuela also possesses Russian-supplied S-300VM batteries, which could be postured to augment coverage with a range of up to 250 km and create a more layered air-defence system. If pushed forward, the S-300VM’s longer-range engagement zones would widen the offshore coverage area, warranting tighter civil–military deconfliction even if routine overflights remain unaffected for now.
Examples of Venezuela’s S-300VM and S-125 Pechora air defence systems
Venezuela’s readiness cycle has clearly shifted. A publicly declared high-alert posture usually translates into shorter response times, stricter rules of engagement, and more frequent radio challenges or intercepts of aircraft near the country’s coast that are perceived as potential threats. It also increases the likelihood of short-notice airspace restrictions if radar tracks appear ambiguous or uncoordinated. This heightens the potential for friction at the civil–military interface, as commercial flights transiting near Venezuela’s coastline could experience brief altitude holds, vectoring instructions, or additional identification checks such as squawk or voice verification. Although none of these effects were observed during the 02 October F-35 episode, the declared defensive posture indicates greater sensitivity to perceived incursions and reduced decision-making time for radar operators and air defence crews—factors that, in congested airspace, can amplify the risk of miscommunication or inadvertent escalation.
Avianca flights over Venezuela throughout the day on 02 October 2025
Looking ahead
The 02 October F-35 episode signals a new operating baseline off Venezuela’s coast. US military flights close to, yet outside, Venezuelan airspace are likely to become more routine as part of ongoing maritime interdiction and reconnaissance, alongside continued strikes on suspected narcotics-trafficking vessels since early September. In combination with Venezuela’s heightened air-defence posture this raises the probability of false radar contacts, near-coast intercepts or short-notice airspace measures. Forward posturing of S-125 and potential S-300VM assets could extend the offshore risk envelope and compress decision times around coastal fixes.
Area of F-35 sightings, Avianca flights and high-altitude airways on 02 October 2025
For civil aviation the present impact remains limited as carriers have maintained normal overflights and no formal advisories or NOTAMs have been issued. Persistent military presence along busy international air corridors inherently raises the risk of misidentification or unintended escalation, especially if radar detection or communications falter. If US sorties continue at current or higher tempo, Venezuelan forces operating with shorter timelines and tighter rules of engagement could misread an aircraft’s intent, prompting abrupt restrictions or delays even without hostile intent. The risk remains low but potentially high-impact, as illustrated by incidents such as Iran Air 655 downing by a US warship in 1988 over the Persian Gulf, the Siberia Airlines 1812 accidentally shot down by a Ukrainian fighter in 2001 during an exercise, the Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 targeted by Iranian air defence in 2020 or the 2024 Red Sea friendly-fire downing of a US F/A-18, highlighting the need for robust civil-military deconfliction, clear channels and close monitoring of air and maritime activity around northern Venezuela.
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