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We are proud to announce that Willem de Bruin joined Team Dyami. Strengthening our pallet of services that we offer to organisations conducting business overseas. After completing his military service with the Dutch Royal Navy, Willem de Bruin joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During his 43-year career in the Foreign Service, he has served in 13 diplomatic and consular Missions in Europe, Asia, and Australasia. Willem was posted at embassies in high-risk areas like Beijing (Tiananmen uprising), Tehran (Islamic revolution and Iraq – Iran war), and a five-year posting in Islamabad where, as First Secretary of the Embassy he led a team detecting corruption and fraud within the local Administration with the aim of preventing identity fraud, illegal migration and people smuggling to Europe. Upon completing his assignment in Pakistan he was appointed Head of the Department of Special Investigations at the Security Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Willem completed his official career as Netherlands Dty Consul-General in Sydney (Australia.) This international background enables Dyami to test facts and circumstances in studies with a foreign aspect in a broader context as well as from an intercultural perspective.

Traditionally security risks in Mexico are commonly associated with organised crime, drug trafficking and other sources of violence. However, there are other aspects of the Mexican context that should be considered when making a risk analysis, such as how political change and national policies can impact mid-term and long-term investments. By: Isabel Oriol Llonin Political changes are usually not seen as an imminent security risk in Mexico, or in most parts of Latin America, however, they can represent a risk to mid and long-term business interests. A new government can bring a drastic change in the country’s approach to economic policy and business affairs with international companies. Such is the case of Mexico with president Andrés Manuel López Obrador who took office in late 2018. A new era for Mexico with López Obrador López Obrador -or AMLO as he is known- is the first left-wing president that Mexico has had in recent decades. His victory broke a cycle of governance between the two major parties that have been in power in the last years, the PAN and the PRI, the first a conservative party, and the second a self-proclaimed centrist party, both with a history of strong neoliberal economic policies. With a society increasingly tired of the political elite and corruption scandals, AMLO ran a campaign based on the idea of being 'one of the people', with a strong preference for austerity policies and the promise to end corruption in the high political spheres. He also inherited a country with alarming rates of violence, crime, and rumours of organised crime infiltrated at all levels of government. Therefore, it is unsurprising that his government has been characterised by efforts to appear different from the traditional political elite. One of these efforts has been transforming the Mexican economy from the conventional neoliberal economic policies that the country has held for decades to a more state-controlled economy. Since his presidential campaign, both the national and international private sectors were unsettled about the potential consequences of such changes. Two years into his government, some of those concerns have proven to be true. Lessons learned from the Mexico City Texcoco Airport The Mexico City Texcoco Airport was a megaproject located in the highly populated capital of the country, a city with approximately 20 million inhabitants in its metropolitan area. It was intended to replace the current airport and meet the demand for a higher air traffic capacity in the city. The ambitious USD 13 billion projects, expected to have a capacity of 125 million passengers per year at its completion, was launched in 2016 by the previous administration led by Enrique Peña Nieto. As a presidential candidate, López Obrador took a strong stance against the project claiming it was too expensive. The Texcoco Airport project became a symbol of his discourse against 'unnecessary spending', playing into his narrative of a 'people's president' who refuses to favour the elites. The project also had some environmental concerns regarding the land in which it was being built, so AMLO then proposed the cheaper alternative of adapting the Santa Lucía military base, north of the city. However, critics pointed out several issues with this alternative: the project had severe viability concerns that would probably raise the cost of construction in the future -this was later proven to be true- and the environmental impact report had not been released to the public. In December 2018, within less than a month of taking office, President López Obrador announced the official cancellation of the Texcoco Airport after 30% of the project had already been built. Naturally, this raised serious concerns among the business sector, undermining investor’s confidence in public projects, and added to the overall air of uncertainty in the country. Image 2: An aerial view of the unfinished Texcoco Airport. AFP. Uncertainty in the energy sector In 2013 former President Enrique Peña Nieto spearheaded a comprehensive energy constitutional reform that would, among other changes, allow the private and foreign investment across the energy sector. Along with the auctioning of untapped oil and gas blocks across the country, the reform ended a 75 year-long state monopoly over oil and energy supply chains. Fast forward to the current government; the energy sector has been a critical area in the efforts of López Obrador to counter decades of neoliberal economic policies. He has criticised the 2013 energy reform as fraudulent by pointing out the corruption and bribery scandals that have surrounded it since the beginning. Moreover, his government has been characterised by his attempts to strengthen the inefficient and indebted state-owned oil (PEMEX) and electricity (CFE) companies as key pieces to 'recover economic sovereignty'. This has led to several controversial decisions. At the beginning of his presidency, López Obrador indefinitely postponed all auctions on oil and gas blocks to private companies, proving once again to foreign investors that previous administration's deals were at risk with the new government. In 2020, he announced a new sustainable energy policy that would impose considerable limitations and additional requirements to private renewable energy farms. The government argued it was intended to protect the reliability of the national supply of energy during the crisis. However, critics have speculated that it was an effort to protect the state-owned Federal Commission of Energy (CFE). The new sustainable energy policy resulted in the temporary closing of 44 farms of renewable energy while putting at risk investments for USD 6 billion and almost 30,000 jobs. However, after a series of legal battles, the Supreme Court ruled that the president’s policies were unconstitutional, and most farms were allowed to carry out operations again. While the government did not win this battle, the actions it implemented certainly undermined investor’s confidence and could potentially harm the development of renewable energy soon. It is not completely clear what direction the government will take now, especially considering the economic and health crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic. The significant drop in oil prices is forcing national oil companies around the world to reconsider their long-term projects and investments, potentially allocating more resources to other sources of energy. While private investment into the energy sector, especially into renewable resources, could be the boost that the Mexican economy needs to revive after the crisis, it seems unlikely that López Obrador's government will take that path. With four more years left as president, chances are the business sector -especially the energy sector- will navigate a certain degree of uncertainty in Mexico. Therefore the political context should be considered in any security risk analysis. This article is part one of a series highlighting the importance of political change in security risk analysis in the region of Latin America. Download as PDF About the Author Isabel Oriol Llonin is a contributing analyst at Dyami. She holds a bachelor’s degree in International Relations and has a post-graduate degree in Public International Law from Utrecht University. She has expertise in the Latin American region and the public international law implications of conflict analysis.

Today I can proudly welcome Jos Meijer to Team Dyami. Jos will be added to our pool of experts. In the role of Privacy & Data Protection Consultant, Jos will add to the services we offer to the aviation industry. Jos Meijer is an experienced aviation professional with over 36 years within KLM. His expertise covers various areas, like contract/vendor management, customs, airport processes. His last position was focused on privacy/data protection. Jos has gained vast knowledge of the EU General Data Protection Regulation(GDPR) and how to implement subject requirements in a (large) international organization. He recognizes the advantage of the use of personal data, but also the risks related to the same. Moreover, the use of personal data in relation to security is a familiar topic for Jos, like the use of PNR/API data in the aviation environment. Next to that Jos gained knowledge in the use of personal data to improve processes, like the use of biometrics. Recently adding insights on the use for personal data in Covid19 related programs. #privacynews#privacylaw#pnr#api#aviationsecurity#gdprcompliance#privacyofficer#dataprotection#gdpr

The Effects of COVID-19 on the Cocaine Trade in Latin America and Europe By: Anastasija Kuznecova COVID-19 has brought lockdown measures and disruptions in transportation all around the world, leading to various challenges in both production and trafficking in the illegal drugs market. However, a year later, new trends are emerging indicating that the cocaine industry has adapted to the pandemic increasing the flow to Europe with maritime transportation. The Impact of COVID-19 on the Cocaine Market Measures implemented to prevent the spread of the pandemic has led to reports of a global shortfall of diverse types of drugs at retail level, increased street prices, and reduction in purity.1 However, the cocaine industry seems to be faring well with the consequences of the pandemic, as compared to other industries that suffered heavy losses. The cocaine market has benefited from its continuous storing of large amounts of cocaine in warehouses and other secretive storage places. The industry also has experience with various trafficking methods, making them more adaptable to the pandemic, with reports of a rise in the usage of sea routes and replacing street dealing with home deliveries and drive-in services. The drug industry can lead to negative impact on the legal economy and increase drug-related violence. This is particularly true in exporting countries, where the cocaine industry often provokes internal conflicts, intensifies corruption, leads to environmental destruction and increases exploitation of vulnerable and indigenous populations. In addition, drug profits are often invested in other crimes, such as human trafficking and money laundering. Production of Cocaine in Latin America The three main producers of cocaine in Latin America are the Andean nations of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) have reported that during 2020, the law enforcements in Colombia have increased their activities against drug trafficking and despite lockdowns, continued with its coca bush eradication campaign.2 Due to restricted transportation, the country is experiencing a shortage of gasoline, necessary for cocaine production, as it used to be imported from Venezuela. However, at the moment, this will not have any significant impact on the drug trade, as most drug gangs store large amounts of cocaine on hand. Bolivia might experience an increase in its cultivation as the country's political conflict in November 2019 and the consequences of the pandemic have limited the current government's capability to control coca bush cultivation. Peru, on the other hand, experienced a decline in the price of cocaine at the beginning of the pandemic, which at first seemed to reduce the country's level of drug trafficking. However, due to the continuing economic crisis, more farmers may increase or take up coca cultivation in all three countries. This trend is already noticeable in Peru where several farmers have switched from harvesting coffee beans to coca plants due to the fall in coffee prices, as coca cultivation offers more stability than other types of crops even though the coca price has still not fully recovered.3 Increase in Maritime Support One explanation for the continuing high numbers of cocaine smuggling to Europe is due to the industry's reliability on maritime trafficking, as it is the transportation method that has been the least affected by the pandemic. Usually, cocaine is trafficked in containers filled with legal products. Reports from Colombia have indicated that maritime transport has increased due to COVID measures, specifically the use of submersibles for drug trafficking to Central America and container cargos for trafficking to Europe.4 In addition, other types of drug trades, which previously relied on overland and air traffic, seem to have also increased their use of sea routes due to the ongoing measures. Latin American and European law enforcements are aware of the threat posed by sea trafficking. Even though Europe experienced a record-high number of cocaine seizures in 2020,5 only two percent of the containers around the world are inspected, thus, creating perfect opportunities for the drug traffickers.6 The Cocaine Market in Europe Europe is the second-largest market for cocaine, with an estimated minimum retail value of EUR 9.1 billion in 2017.7 The key points for cocaine trafficking in Europe are in Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands. From here, the drug is exported to other parts of Europe, as well as increasingly to other markets such as Australia, New Zealand and countries in the Middle East and Asia. Colombian and Italian organised crime groups continue to have a central role in cocaine distribution. However, other groups are increasingly gaining more power, including Albanian-speaking, British, Dutch, French, Irish, Moroccan, Serbian, Spanish and Turkish criminal groups. European criminal groups are also establishing themselves in Latin America and purchasing cocaine closer to the production regions at a lower cost, which increases competition and violence within the market, as well as corruption within Europe. Increase in Use of Digital Technology The pandemic has increased the use of dark web markets, social media and mobile apps for the distribution of cocaine, and methods such as food deliveries and drive-in services have been used by the dealers. In addition, the drug trade has had a decrease in reliance on cash and face-to-face dealing. Some of these adaptations are predicted to last after the restrictions will be lifted, as they are considered to be more convenient.8 Growing Risk The cocaine marked in Latin America and Europe has adapted to the restrictions implemented as a result of the pandemic. The trade seems to expand in Europe, generating a major source of income for organised crime groups. This could explain the increase in number of criminal groups involved in the cocaine trade. These changes threaten European nations at their very core, eroding their political security, economy, as well as undermining their efforts to protect human rights. In short, we can see how the cocaine marked continues to negatively impact Latin American and European countries, creating new challenges for law enforcement. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author: Anastasija Kuznecova is a student at the MA program in Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University. She has field experience from Chile, Jamaica and the Balkans, and her interests include issues concerning social inequality, discrimination, and conflict escalation. With her combined practical experience and academic knowledge, Anastasija has a broad understanding of security, development, and human rights.

Russia's Strategic Interests in East Africa (and beyond) By: Ruben Pfeijffer The quest for strategically located warm water ports has always played an important role in Russia's foreign policy. After consolidating ice-free access to the seas in the country's direct vicinity, it seems Russia has now set its sights on the coast of East Africa. Warm water ports The absence of warm water ports has historically been a significant challenge to Russia's maritime ambitions. The largely landlocked country possesses very few ports that remain ice-free throughout the year. Even less are located on the Russian mainland itself. This has always been a significant strategic disadvantage compared to rivalling military powers like NATO, who have access to warm water ports all around the globe. Therefore, Russia has gone to great lengths to acquire and retain its current three warm-water ports outside of the Russian mainland: Kaliningrad, Sevastopol and Tartus. Kaliningrad Kaliningrad is Russia's only ice-free naval base in the Baltic Sea. The port city used to be the capital of Prussia but was acquired from the Germans during the Potsdam Conference. Through Russification of the population, the Russians managed to retain the naval base after the fall of the Soviet Union. However, this turned Kaliningrad into an exclave, cut off from mainland Russia and stuck between NATO members Poland and Lithuania. Nevertheless, the port remains ice-free throughout the year, making it of utmost strategic importance for Russia's maritime ambitions in the Baltic Sea, North Sea and Atlantic Ocean. Sevastopol Sevastopol is home to a strategically important naval base that provides the Russians access to the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea, Sea of Azov and the Caspian Sea. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia leased the base from their newly independent Ukrainian neighbours. This deal lasted until the Ukrainian crisis when Russia took a severe geopolitical risk and annexed the Crimean peninsula in order to safeguard their strategic interests in the region. This action made clear that Russia is willing to take serious steps to retain possession of their warm water ports. Tartus Tartus is Russia's only naval base in the Mediterranean and is located on the coast of Syria. Tartus initially only functioned as a small naval support facility. However, in return for Russia's military support for Assad's regime during the Syrian Civil War, the port has been allowed to expand further into a fully functioning naval base that can house up to eleven naval vessels. The naval base in Tartus makes the Russian 5th operational squadron in the Mediterranean less dependent on the Bosporus crossing, which is controlled by NATO member Turkey. The next step Recently, Russia seems to be no longer satisfied with just its current three warm water ports. In November last year, Russian officials announced a lease agreement with the Sudanese government for a new naval base on the coast of Sudan.1 This would be Russia's first military base in Africa and would position them along major shipping routes in the Red Sea. An estimated 10% of all global trade passes through these waters, making it a strategically valuable region to control. According to the Russians, the base in Sudan will only function as a 'naval logistics facility' that is used to carry out repairs and replenish supplies.2 However, considering the recent expansion of the initially small naval facility in Tartus, it is entirely possible that Russia plans a similar expansion for the Sudanese base in the future. Secret report The announcement of the base in Sudan is consistent with the content of a secret report from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs leaked to the media three months earlier.3 The report claimed that Russia had concluded military agreements with up to twenty-one African countries. Six of those countries, the Central African Republic, Egypt, Eritrea, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Sudan, would allegedly become the location of future Russian military bases. Russian officials have so far only confirmed the future establishment of Red Sea naval facilities in Eritrea and Sudan. Looking at the map of Africa, the strategic relevance of the alleged future Russian military bases immediately becomes clear. Egypt, Eritrea and Sudan are all perfectly located alongside the Red Sea, while Mozambique and Madagascar are located alongside another major shipping route, the Mozambique Channel. New naval bases in these countries would thus give Russia the strategic capabilities to disrupt trade as a geopolitical instrument and provide some form of counterbalance against the US 5th fleet, who previously had free reign in the region. Beyond East Africa There is reason to believe Russia will not stop at East Africa in its quest for additional warm water ports. Before the country was plunged into a constitutional crisis, it was reported that Venezuela and Russia had agreed to station Russian long-range bombers on the island of La Orchila, which is home to a Venezuelan naval base and military airfield.4 The deal is a testament to Russia's renewed strategic interests in the Caribbean, a region they have largely avoided since the Cuban Missile Crisis. Whether a future navy base is on the cards remains to be seen, however, as the Caribbean's close proximity to the US might make it too risky a geopolitical manoeuvre, even for Russia. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author: Ruben Pfeijffer is a graduated anthropologist who currently follows the MA program Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University. While working on his bachelor thesis in the Netherlands during the early stages of the COVID-19 outbreak, Ruben gained experience with conducting ethnographic research under the challenging circumstances of the pandemic, and has learned to be adaptable with his research methods.

When Might Liberal Peace Fail and Illiberal Peace Prevail? By: Puck Holthuis Liberal peacebuilding is a term many Western nations are familiar with and support. It commits to democratic ideals, such as rule of law, human rights, free markets, property rights and inter-group reconciliation.1 Often, Western actors dominate the process of (liberal) peacebuilding in post-conflict nations, while these often involve non-Western countries. This is an issue for liberal peacebuilding, as it has been criticized for being too monolithic. It does not consider that non-Western nations or regimes and their cultures may be less receptive to Western democratic politics. Illiberal Peacebuilding Although Western presence in the form of liberal peacebuilding is commonly implemented in non-Western post-conflict nations, it occasionally backfires when the methods used do not align with local processes, laws and culture. Not only is the transition from a post-conflict nation to a democracy a delicate process with many risks involved, but collaborating with foreign cultures also requires thoughtful consideration. A different kind of peacebuilding, called illiberal peacebuilding, is a process that is more common in a number of Southeast Asian countries, among other nations. Illiberal peacebuilding is dominated by local actors as opposed to Western powers, and drives on clientelism, cronyism and corruption, rather than economic neo-liberalism. An additional important characteristic of illiberal peacebuilding is that regime security is prioritised, rather than stability, accountability, human rights and social inclusion.1 Illiberal peacebuilding in Practice Several Southeast Asian countries showcase this type of peacebuilding. For example, whereas stability is a liberal peacebuilding ideal, Aceh (a province of Indonesia) and Nepal would not fare well in terms of equity should these nations initially opt for stability. Negotiating with subnational elites in Indonesia and Myanmar would ultimately be more promising for maintaining long-term peace, even though this process may be viewed unethical from a Western perspective as it encourages inequality. Sri Lanka and Myanmar (also known as Burma) showcase that elite bargaining (discrete agreements that seek out redistribution of power and resources among the elites) is more politically inherent. As a consequence, these more common practises should not be discarded as improper characteristics of a system that, from a Western perspective, may seem inappropriate and unfair. Instead, understanding such practises and acknowledging their pertinence could foster better cooperation and yield more desirable results. The recent protests in Bangkok against Thailand’s current regime highlight the local illiberal peacebuilding characteristics as well, such as the prioritization of regime security. Individuals can receive up to 15 years in prison for insulting the Royal family. This includes stepping on Thai currency on which the king’s face is printed or making negative remarks on the monarchy. It follows that many locals refrain from commenting on their king out of fear of persecution, or simply because they are unwilling to do so. In many Western nations, however, freedom of speech is not only the norm, but a much respected and appreciated pillar on which societies are built and continue to develop. This logically makes it difficult to understand practices that move away, even against, practices that are deemed valuable in Western nations. Understanding and Cooperation The practices and objectives of illiberal peacebuilding are perhaps controversial, as they risk strengthening corruption, inequality and elitism. Yet, in countries where politics and culture differ greatly from how Western nations tend to operate, identical methods for peacebuilding in both these parts of the world struggle for similar success. That is not to say that practises of inequality or corruption should be condoned. Rather, it is important to understand how peacebuilding tends to manifest in certain Southeast Asian nations as well as in other parts of the world. The means to achieve peace and stability in Southeast Asia differ from how most Western nations would approach this objective through liberal peacebuilding. However, there are many alternatives to this way of peacebuilding depending on the region of interest.2 Liberal peacebuilding is not a one-size-fits-all process, although it has been successful in various nations. However, for countries to achieve stability and peace, it is a better option to work alongside their culture and norms as opposed to implementing a sudden new way of life that may be too drastic a change. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author: Puck Holthuis is a master student Conflict Studies & Human Rights at Utrecht University. She recently relocated back to The Netherlands after living abroad since 2006 spending most of her years in South Africa and China. She combines her love for writing with her analytical capabilities, shaping an ambitious young professional with global insights.

An Introduction: By: Alessia Cappelletti Though Russia is known to be active in seeking control over neighbouring countries, its interests extend well beyond geographical proximity. In a region where US presence is a controversial topic, and Chinese influence is mainly manifested through business practices, Russia has plenty of opportunities to be the ‘alternative’ to US power. In order to analyze Russia’s interest in Latin America one has to consider three aspects: the economic, social, and geopolitical ones. The economic aspect clearly stands alone in that Latin America is an attractive, relatively new, and highly profitable environment, which would help Russia to diversify its portfolio. However, states are not businesses and never act on economic principles alone. The geopolitics has much to do with the closeness to the United States and European and US sanctions on Russian goods. The social sphere, instead, deals with Russia’s strategic communication and the use of soft power. After the fall of the Soviet Union and during the late 1990s and early 2000s Russia was virtually absent from the Latin American scenario. Moscow and its Hispanic counterparts started a deeper collaboration only in the late 2000s. This collaboration has seen import-exports to and from the region increase, focusing on bilateral agreements. Imports and exports of goods between Russia and the Hispanic region were around 2180 million dollars in 2000 and increased to 12,106 million in 2016, after reaching an all-time high in 2013 with 18,659 million dollars of goods being exchanged between the two regions. Still, trade between Russia and Latam is still relatively low, representing only 2,3% of the total Russian trade of 2016 [1]. Throughout academic and journalistic literature, it is accepted that Russia’s stance throughout Latin America follows a pragmatic doctrine aiming at “becoming a major power in a multipolar world” [2]. Moscow wants to leave behind an EU and US-centered world and aims at forming its identity as an ‘alternative’ to Western power, therefore originating from a binary tension. However, the days in which the world was polarized solely between the US and Russia are gone. A changing world China is a powerful new player that Russia must consider and growing regional powers should also be closely monitored. However, while China is affirming itself as an international economic power and relatively adhered to a line of non-interference [3], Russia has always meddled widely in world matters and continues to do so. Given its impossibility to contrast China commercially, Russia is likely to use trade as an opportunity to strengthen its print on the region. Economic powers are also on the rise in Latin America, with Brazil and Russia both being part of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). On the economic level, they (should) operate as peers. With the dominant economies of Latin America (Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina), the Kremlin plays a careful game that is based on creating economic interest and tries to break away from western dependence. After the EU and US’ economic sanctions against Russia, the Kremlin had to start scouting for trading partners finding Latin American countries interesting allies, as the majority abstained from implementing said sanctions. Looking at the future, the Kremlin must also consider the end of Trump’s presidency. Political relations with the Americas deteriorated under Trump. In Latin America Trump left a political void, at times filled with insensitive statements and clear anti-immigration rhetoric, that Biden will have to rescue promptly. The world will see the United States trying to assert themselves more on the international stage, which could mean reversing the gradual escalation of Russia in Latin America, or their relation turning sourer than before. Strategic Communication and Soft Power The Kremlin is also implementing a carefully curated communication strategy in Latin America, which in some instances has been directly compared to the one of Daesh [4]. Since 2010, for example, Russia Today (now RT) started to broadcast in Spanish, signaling a wish to expand its influence over the continent. RT is a state-owned company that broadcasts in various languages, including Arabic, and a brand of TV Novosti later demarcated as an organization of “strategic importance for Russia” by Vladimir Putin. Results of the effectiveness of this practice are quite visible with the Sputnik V vaccine against Covid-19. Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela already registered and received the vaccine, alongside countries like Iran, Palestine, and Armenia. Brazil will start producing the Sputnik V shortly, whereas Mexico approved the vaccine on February 2, and bought millions of doses after showing the highest rate of awareness worldwide regarding the Sputnik V [5]. In the worldwide race to get out of the covid crisis, western-manufactured vaccines have been almost entirely bought by richer countries leaving little for the rest of the world. Russia’s Sputnik V has the opportunity to be the leading vaccine for lower-income countries, together with Chinese Sinovac. In that way, the two countries may exploit the vaccine distribution to gain significant soft power among non-western countries (and western too, as Hungary). Even more so the Sputnik V, being the first vaccine to be approved worldwide. Away from profit and interests: The case of Venezuela Despite the claim about Russia's investments in Latin America being ‘pragmatic,’ [6] in Venezuela another storyline is visible. Russia also largely and controversially invested in Venezuela’s oil apparatus which was debated as it was seen as short-lived. Indeed, according to Reuters’ investigation, the Russian Rosneft oil company invested billions of USD in its Venezuelan counterparts, state-owned PDVSA. However, Reuters analyzed documents and communications that showed the internal auditor’s worries about the investment. [7] It is then clear that the project was political and directly contrasts the ‘pragmatic’ view that researchers tend to take when observing Russian interests abroad. In March 2020, after the US released a 15 million USD bounty for the capture of President Maduro for narco-terrorism charges, Russia apparently retired their economic investments into the country. This also coincided with the fall of oil prices after the beginning of the Coronavirus pandemic, which made recovering Rosneft’s investment virtually impossible. [8] However, Russian hegemony over PDVSA is far from being over, as Rosneft simply sold the related shares to another Russian state-owned oil company, this time fully under the control of the state (Moscow only owns 40% of Rosneft). Therefore, the Kremlin still has a key role to play in managing Venezuela’s rich resources [9]. The Research Project Clearly, Russia did not completely abandon its wish to become a world power, that much echoes that of the USSR. Being close to Washington but far away from Moscow, Latin America is both a difficult challenge and a priceless outpost to achieve such a wish. It has become clear that Russia is actively taking steps to ‘come back’ to the region, however, the story of its strategic interests in Latin America is not a linear one and ought to be explored with different geopolitical angles. The Russian ‘pragmatism’ in the region does not manifest in Venezuela and the trade between the countries is too insignificant to be the main strategy used by the Kremlin throughout the whole region. Therefore, Russia is seemingly implementing different strategies that vary per country, depending on political affinity (Venezuela and Nicaragua), closeness to the US (Colombia), and economic potential (Mexico and Brazil). As there is no coherent document that discusses different foreign strategies implemented by Russia in Latin America, this report aims at monitoring Russian strategy and highlighting observable trends. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group, as part of the ‘Russian Strategic Interests in Latin America’ research project led by Alessia Cappelletti and Isabel Oriol. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author: Alessia Cappelletti is a Global Security Analyst and Program Manager of DEWIS. She has field experience in South America, Colombia especially, which makes her largely acquainted with the security challenges of the Latin American context. Her expertise includes conflict analysis and investigation, human rights protection, and criminality.

Is Colombia jouw pot met goud? De Wereldbank beschrijft Colombia als het meest bedrijfsvriendelijke land in Latijns-Amerika. De goudprijzen stijgen wereldwijd. En het land werkt aan een plan van meerdere miljoenen voor een duurzaam herstel, wat Colombia doet ontwikkelen tot een paradijs voor investeringen en nieuwe zakelijke kansen. Door: Alessia Cappelletti President Iván Duque staat er om bekend voornamelijk grootschalige, particuliere en buitenlandse investeringsprojecten aan te moedigen en de sector omtrent grondstoffen delven te pushen als de drijvende economische kracht van het land. De overheid zet zich echter ook krachtig in voor duurzame alternatieven en werkt met het idee van 'duurzame mijnbouw', waarbij de industrie gebruikmaakt van nieuwe technologieën zodat het proces zo min mogelijk vervuiling oplevert. Dit is ook bijzonder interessant voor landen zoals Nederland, die koploper zijn op het gebied van technologische vooruitgang en in hoge mate kunnen bijdragen aan dit soort ontwikkelingen. Als je dit hebt gelezen, zou je kunnen denken dat je de langverwachte pot met goud echt aan het einde van de regenboog hebt gevonden, alleen deze bevindt zich helemaal in Zuid-Amerika. Colombia is echter geen oneindig paradijs voor mineralen, en het exploiteren ervan zal nooit de weg vooruit zijn. Na Brazilië, is het land de gastheer van het op één na meest bio diverse ecosysteem ter wereld. Verder heeft het een levendige traditionele cultuur, met ongeveer 100 inheemse gemeenschappen die binnen haar grenzen leven met de angsten die zijn voortgekomen uit het 50 jaar durende conflict. Als je echt duurzaam wilt zijn tijdens je investering, is het belangrijk om rekening te houden met de drie aspecten van duurzaamheid: De ecologische, culturele en sociale aspecten. Als je deze in gedachten houdt, kun je een positieve impact hebben en op jouw beurt helpen om de veiligheid en levensduur van het project te waarborgen. Met andere woorden, zorg dat je je ecologisch, cultureel en sociaal gevoelig opstelt. Dit geldt met name in postconflictsituaties, waarin mensen hebben geleden en een wrok koesteren ten opzichte van potentiële dreigingen. En jij als buitenlander, kunt als zo'n bedreiging worden gezien. Dat is natuurlijk niet wenselijk. Waarom kunnen bedrijven door de lokale bevolking als een bedreiging worden ervaren? Om de impact te laten zien die buitenlandse investeringen kunnen hebben als ze niet voldoen aan de drie hierboven geïntroduceerde duurzaamheidsaspecten, laten we een voorbeeld bespreken dat rechtstreeks uit de mijnbouwsector komt. De mijnbouwsector is een van de grootste vormen van buitenlandse investeringen in Colombia. Het geval van de kolenmijn Cerrejón in de regio La Guajira is al jaren het middelpunt van controverse. ABColombia en CINEP hebben onlangs een oproep geplaatst wegens het niet naleven van een reeks uitspraken van het Constitutionele Hof van Colombia. De ‘La Guajira’-regio is de thuishaven van de verschillende inheemse gemeenschappen. Tevens ook de grootste exporteur van steenkool in Colombia. De grootschalige kolenmijn Cerrejón is eigendom van Anglo America, BHP en Glencore. Zij vestigde zich in 1976 in de regio. Sindsdien zijn er hele dorpen verdrongen. De wateren van nabijgelegen rivieren werden omgeleid om een van de grootste openlucht kolenmijnen in de wereld te kunnen bouwen. Deze mijn draagt de verantwoordelijkheid van het vervuilen van bodems en het aantasten van de gezondheid onder de lokale bevolking. Cerrejón heeft altijd enigszins open gestaan voor dialoog. Volgens een rapport van de non-profitorganisatie INDEPAZ, zijn veel gemeenschappen nooit gecompenseerd en is de vervuiling van nabijgelegen wateren nog steeds hoger dan de maximale normen die in de wet zijn vastgelegd. Cerrejón zette zich ook in om drinkwater te leveren aan de getroffen gemeenschappen. Toch besloten ze in september 2020 om een dergelijke voorziening stop te zetten na een staking. Dit leidde tot protesten in La Guajira. Vooral in deze tijden is hygiëne essentieel voor het bestrijden van Covid-19. De kwaliteit van en toegang tot water kunnen het verschil maken tussen leven en dood voor de gemeenschappen die rond de mijn wonen. Maar jij bent geen deel van Cerrejón, en misschien ben je niet eens van plan om een kolenmijn te openen. Waarom zou het je dan iets kunnen schelen? Het probleem beperkt zich helaas niet alleen tot La Guajira. Soortgelijke gebeurtenissen hebben zich ook elders voorgedaan. Zo erg zelfs dat in Bogotà, op 21 oktober 2020, de straten gevuld waren met inheemse demonstranten die na een mars van zeshonderd kilometer in de hoofdstad aankwamen. Zeshonderd kilometer om hun boodschap onder de aandacht te brengen van de regering. Zeshonderd kilometer lopen door het land om te protesteren tegen het beheer van de vredesakkoorden van 2016. Het gebrek aan bescherming van de mensenrechten en het economische model dat het land nastreeft. Ze hebben gezelschap gekregen van studenten en boeren die allemaal in gelijke mate worden getroffen door de slechte managementpraktijken van de overheid. Waaronder het verlenen van vergunningen aan buitenlandse bedrijven, die kunnen leiden tot culturele, sociale en ecologische schade. Dit laat zien in hoeverre mensen bereid zijn om hun stem te laten horen. Wat eigenlijk de ernst van de situatie aangeeft. Jij hebt waarschijnlijk goede bedoelingen. Jij wilt nuttige diensten en economische ontwikkeling aanbieden. Echter kun jij ook geassocieerd worden met degene die in het verleden problemen hebben veroorzaakt. Nu moet je niet ontmoedigd raken, maar je moet je er wel van bewust zijn. Beginnen vanuit een plaats van nieuwsgierigheid, openstaan voor een gesprek en wederzijds begrip is essentieel. Houd rekening met de ecologische, sociale en culturele impact die jouw project zal hebben en luister naar de meningen en adviezen van de lokale bevolking. Buitenlandse investeringen kunnen de economische ontwikkeling van een land op weg helpen. Toch kan dit niet worden gedaan ten nadele van de mensen die er van zou moeten profiteren. De pot met goud bestaan misschien wel echt, maar als hij wordt gebruikt, moet iedereen profiteren van de rijkdom die erin zit. Alessia Cappelletti Alessia is een Global Security Analist bij Dyami. Ze heeft praktijkervaring in Zuid-Amerika, specifiek in Colombia, waardoor ze bekend is met de veiligheids-uitdagingen in de Latijns-Amerikaanse context. Ze is met name geïnteresseerd in de vraagstukken van criminele organisaties, illegale handel en het effect op de luchtvaart en persoonlijke veiligheid. Haar expertise varieert van conflictanalyse tot mensenrechten bescherming en criminaliteit..

Two Russian diplomats are expelled from the Netherlands for espionage. They were after sensitive scientific and technological information and, according to the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), had "contact with at least ten sources" who work in the Dutch high-tech sector. The AIVD has approached various people who cooperated with the Russians about this. Companies and higher education institutions have also been warned about sources in their workforce. The security service does not want to say which organizations are involved. This clearly shows the importance of thinking further than just ensuring security in the cyber domain. Dyami helps organizations to increase their resilience against espionage. Knowing more? Contact us now. Protect your IP!

We are proud to announce that we have added another expert to team Dyami. Remco Slijkhuis provides consulting and project management expertise to our security solutions for security in the public domain. Remco Slijkhuis worked for more than 10 years in the airport industry. Expert in baggage handling, Security Policy, and Security R&D. He implemented Std 3 Baggage Scanners in an existing baggage handling system and was one of the team members who developed de Security Lane at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. In his last role as Security Manager at Lelystad Airport part of the Royal Schiphol Group) he developed an airport security program (ASP), started projects to implement CCTV and Access Control, and had a big role in Landside (public) Security Planning and Realisation.

On October 11th, 2020 the ILT (Dutch Human Environment and Transport Inspectorate) released a report on flying over conflict areas. The report covers the current situation at Dutch airlines and aircraft operators regarding their access to sources and information networks. Dyami's roots lie in supporting airlines in obtaining a good information position, making the correct analyzes, and implementing their security policy. We are happy to use our extensive expertise in this subject. Please feel free to contact us, if you want to discuss how to gain a good information position regarding flying near or over (upcoming) conflict zones. We are happy to help! More information about Dyami Aviation Security Services: Download and read the report (in Dutch) here: #aviationsecurity#riskmanagement#overflights#czib#expertgroep

Denk er eens over na, wie ben jij? Je kan er vrij letterlijk over nadenken, Wie ben jij? Je kunt dit beantwoorden door te beschrijven waar je vandaan komt, wat je voor de kost doet, of dat je jezelf identificeert door een hobby in plaats van een baan. Hoe dan ook, het zal hoogstwaarschijnlijk een antwoord zijn op basis van hoe je van buitenaf gezien wilt worden. Denk er nu in omgekeerde volgorde over na, als je van buitenaf zou worden gezien, hoe zou je dan worden waargenomen? Het is in dit omgekeerde denken dat we kunnen beginnen na te denken over hoe we worden waargenomen wanneer we naar onbekende plaatsen verhuizen. In gebieden die dicht bij jouw comfortzone liggen, kun je wellicht manipuleren hoe je wordt gezien door ‘een goede indruk proberen te maken’. Maar stel je voor hoe je overkomt als je geen controle hebt over wat voor indruk je zou kunnen maken. Sterker nog, wanneer we naar onbekende landen en culturen reizen, kunnen we dan verwachten dat we worden waargenomen zoals we denken dat we worden waargenomen? Deze gedachtegang over het besef van onze posities en percepties is vrij zwaar voor iedereen die de wereld intrekt en onbekende culturen ervaart. Je zou kunnen denken dat iets speciaals als ‘overwegen hoe ik word gezien’ niet op jou van toepassing is. In een tijdperk met Wikipedia, Tripadvisor, Lonely Planet en uw nationale reisadvies, kunnen we alles opzoeken wat we moeten weten. We leven in een informatietijdperk en het opzoeken van lokale gebruiken en reisadviezen is slechts een muisklik verwijderd. Maar is dat allemaal écht waar? Is zelfs de term ‘informatietijdperk’ correct als we kijken naar de toestand van de wereld van vandaag? Nepnieuws, vervalste artikelen en meningen overspoelen het internet, waardoor het moeilijk wordt om onderscheid te maken tussen feiten en fictie. Het resultaat hiervan kan erg gevaarlijk zijn. In 2018 verzamelde zich in het kleine Mexicaanse stadje Acatlán een grote menigte rond twee mannen in het centrum van de stad. Deze twee mannen, Ricardo en Alberto Flores, werden beschuldigd van het ontvoeren van jonge kinderen voor orgaanhandel. Hoewel deze mannen onschuldig waren aan deze misdaad, wonnen de veronderstelde beschuldigingen terrein onder de menigte boze dorpelingen. Het gerucht dat deze mannen kinderhandelaren zijn, verspreidde zich als een lopend vuurtje via privé Whatsapp-berichten. Of het gerucht waar was of niet, deed er niet toe, want wat volgde was dat deze mannen levend verbrand werden voordat iemand het controleerde Een groot aantal mobiele telefoons werd omhoog gehesen om het moment dat Ricardo en Alberto in brand werden gestoken vast te leggen' - Bron: BBC World News Geruchten zijn gevaarlijk, en deze geruchten worden gestaafd door percepties van het onderwerp van het gerucht. Deze geruchten kunnen op elk moment en overal ontstaan en kunnen iedereen overkomen. In 1993 werden drie journalisten van Reuters en Associated Press aangevallen door een woedende menigte in Somalië. Zij deden verslag van de interventie van de VS tegen de Somalische krijgsheer Mohamed Farah Aideed. Bij een luchtaanval werd een compound vernietigd waarvan men dacht dat het soldaten van de militie van Aideed bevatte. Toen de journalisten eenmaal arriveerden, beweerde de woordvoerder van Aideed dat de compound dorpsoudsten bevatte die over vrede bespraken. De menigte rond het rampgebied keerde zich tegen de journalisten uit Duitsland, Kenia en Dan Eldon, een in Engeland geboren inwoner van Kenia. Dan Eldon (22 jaar) was, samen met zijn collega's, het onderwerp van woede tegen de Amerikaanse regering en hij werd doodgeslagen. Van links naar rechts: Antony Macharia (21), Hos Maina (38) en Dan Eldon (22). Drie vermoorde journalisten in Mogadishu op 12 juli 1993 - Bron: The Washington Post Wat deze verhalen illustreren, afgezien van de verschrikkelijke gevolgen van valse realiteiten, is dat je niet altijd de luxe hebt om te controleren wat er met je gebeurt. Individuele risico's worden geconstrueerd door de perceptie van de omgeving waarin u zich bevindt. Men moet zich bewust zijn van dergelijke processen. Bovenstaande voorbeelden zijn illustraties van lokale gebeurtenissen, maar in een tijdperk van (dis)informatie, reist ‘nieuws’ snel. In Pakistan zagen we protesten plaatsvinden naar aanleiding van een Mohammed￾cartoonwedstrijd op initiatief van het Nederlandse parlementslid Geert Wilders. Duizenden islamisten eisten dat de nieuwe Pakistaanse regering de diplomatieke banden met Nederland verbrak. Hoewel Wilders het land niet vertegenwoordigt, vertegenwoordigde Nederland wel Wilders in de Pakistaanse perceptie.De opkomst van geruchten, boze percepties, angstige frustraties tegen de 'ander' is iets van alle tijden. Maar gezien de snelheid waarmee ‘nieuws’ de wereld over reist, moeten we bedenken dat de acties van landgenoten een effect kunnen hebben op degenen die in het buitenland wonen. Met de Covid-19-crisis hebben we vergelijkbare patronen van woede en angst over de hele wereld gezien. We hebben Europeanen in het buitenland al zien vrezen voor de geruchten over hen tijdens de uitbraak van Covid-19 in maart. Reizigers werden uit bussen in Colombia gehaald, de toegang tot supermarkten in Rwanda werd geweigerd en Nederlanders werden het doelwit van de Palestijnse autoriteiten, allemaal uit angst voor de verspreiding van het virus. Een voorbeeld hiervan was een Nederlandse man die in begin Maart nog op het Thaise eiland Phuket woonde. Terwijl het toerisme weg viel, werd de sfeer op het eiland ineens grimmig. De lokale bevolking werd met grotere getalen werkloos en uitte hun frustraties richting de Europeanen die op dit moment nog op het Eiland verkeerde. Simpele opdrachten als boodschappen doen was beangstigend voor de Nederlander, gezien de afkeurende blikken in het straatbeeld. Nu Nederland, net als andere Europese landen, wederom een toenemende piek in infecties ziet, gaat de perceptie van Nederland en, per uitbreiding, de Nederlanders op weg naar een perceptie van angst. Deze angst wordt vertaald en gecommuniceerd, wat resulteert in gevaarlijke geruchten. Als we deze geruchten begrijpen zoals ze zijn geconstrueerd in de lokale context, kunnen we begrijpen dat risico's een ‘product van positionaliteit’ zijn. Met andere woorden: in het veld zijn betekent dat mensen een indruk van je krijgen. Of die indruk goed of slecht is, hebt u niet in de hand. Erkennen dat risico's zijn geconstrueerd en niet simpelweg ‘daarbuiten’, zou een goede eerste stap zijn richting het managen van deze risico’s. Auteur: Bob Rehorst Bob Rehorst is een Global Security Analist bij Dyami. Met een achtergrond in antropologie en conflictanalyse specialiseert hij zich in patroonherkenning en mondiale crisissen.