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Date: 20/09/2023 Where: Beijing Who’s involved: Chinese President Xi Jinping and Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro What happened? On 13/09/2023 Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Venezuelan counterpart Nicolas Maduro Moros signed bilateral cooperation agreements in the joint efforts on the Belt Road Initiatives (BRI), economy, trade, energy, tourism, and technology. The bilateral agreements provide for cooperation in civil aviation, with increased flight connections between the countries, and aerospace. In July 2023, Venezuela expressed interest in cooperating with Russia and China in the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS). Venezuela was the first country to openly support the Sino-Russian spatial initiative, a response to the 2020 US-led Artemis Accords. The two announced that President Maduro's seven-day visit to China, the first in five years that also coincides with the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the countries, launched a new era of diplomatic ties between China and Venezuela, unveiling an "all-weather" partnership. During the meeting, Xi Jinping emphasized that China and Venezuela are “good friends who trust each other” as long-term strategic partners for joint and mutual development. In the meanwhile, Maduro praised this partnership as an outstanding example of international cooperation in the Global South and expressed gratitude to the Chinese leader for the support provided to Venezuela to overcome the difficulties imposed by unilateral sanctions and the COVID-19 pandemic. The meeting also stressed Venezuela's willingness to cooperate with China and join the BRICS and related economic and financial cooperation initiatives such as the New Development Bank, the Global Development Initiative, and the Global Security Initiative. In a statement, Caracas expressed confidence that as the world's largest oil supplier and fourth largest natural gas reserve, Venezuela will greatly contribute to the BRICS. Analysis: By signing new bilateral cooperation agreements with Venezuela, China is sending a message internationally, especially to the United States. The strengthening of the bilateral relationship with Venezuela comes just days after the sealing of a strategic partnership between Washington and Vietnam. Being the largest world importer of crude oil, China is a key player in the Venezuelan oil and gas sector. Since 2007, under the Chavez administration, the development of the oil industry in Venezuela has been financed by Chinese banks under loan-for-oil deals. China is currently Venezuela’s main creditor; it is estimated that Venezuela currently owes over $10 billion to China. Despite the economic crisis that has hit Venezuela since 2014, sanctions imposed by the United States in 2019, and difficulties related to COVID-19, in 2020 China has granted Venezuela a grace period for loan repayment. Despite U.S. sanctions, China is estimated to have imported about 430 thousand barrels per day (bdp) of Venezuelan crude from January to August 2023, although officially, it has not been supplied with Venezuelan oil since 2019. China has bypassed U.S. sanctions by receiving crude from Venezuela through third-party traders counterfeiting its origin. The Biden administration is reportedly negotiating with Venezuela for sanctions relief in exchange for free and fair elections. Such a softened stance could come as a reaction to Venezuela's strengthening alignment with China and Russia. China is continuing to expand its sphere of influence globally, especially in the countries of the Global South, challenging the hegemony and unilateralism promoted by the United States. In a joint statement, Maduro and Xi Jinping expressed their desire to "consolidate a multi-center, multi-polar world and work together to build a community with a shared future." Through its “South-South” cooperation agreements, China has become a major investor and trade partner for the majority of countries in Latin America. The major areas of bilateral cooperation are energy development, technology, and infrastructure. Besides Venezuela, Beijing has also strengthened space cooperation with other Latin American countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile. China also established military ties and cooperation with Latin America on issues such as defense and security. In the region, Venezuela is the top purchaser of military equipment from China. Between 2006 and 2022, Beijing exported roughly $630 million worth of weapons to Latin America. China is also a supplier of military aircraft, vehicles, and air defense radars. China could make use of the renewed relationship with Venezuela to expand intelligence cooperation and espionage activities. This could concern the United States, already alarmed by intelligence cooperation established between China and Cuba. According to the U.S., although Cuban authorities deny the allegations, China since 2019 established espionage facilities on the island. Conclusion: The elevated China-Venezuela partnership suggests Beijing's growing interest in expanding its economic and political influence in the Latin American region. Twenty-one Latin American and Caribbean countries have already joined the BRI. Chinese engagement in the region is evolving. Under Xi Jinping, China's interests in the area have shifted from the need to access South America's natural resources into a broad international cooperation agenda that includes Infrastructure, security, technology, and even spaceflight initiatives. China overtook the U.S. role as South America's major trading partner and investor. Moreover, beyond economic and financial relations, Beijing demonstrated geopolitical and strategic interests in Latin America by strengthening its influence and diplomatic and military presence throughout the region. Also, China supported Latin America during the COVID-19 emergency, providing loans, medical equipment, and hundreds of millions of vaccine doses. The signing of bilateral agreements between Xi Jinping and Maduro could be a further step in China's strategy to extend its influence and keep eroding U.S. leverage in Latin America.

Date: 19/09/2023 Who’s involved: U.S. President Joe Biden, Vietnam General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong. What happened? On 10/09/2023, the U.S. and Vietnam officially upgraded diplomatic ties to the level of ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’. This is the highest level of diplomatic engagement for Vietnam, and matches the relationship it shares with China, Russia, South Korea, and India. The CSP with the U.S. is a profoundly important development, as Hanoi had previously been cautious to upgrade bilateral ties fearing a backlash from China. The US-Vietnam agreement also presents economic opportunities for Vietnam. For R&D development upgrades economic ties with Vietnam in semiconductor manufacturing, where Intel and other U.S. firms have a significant presence. The agreement also helps with the transition of green technology and help develop Vietnam’s domestic R&D sector. The Biden administration said maintaining stronger ties with Vietnam was not an attempt to start a ‘cold war’ with China. On 06/09/2023, a high-ranking official from the Chinese Communist Party and Vietnam General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong met five days before the U.S.-Vietnam meeting. They discussed developing further bilateral ties in cooperation and development and reinforced their relationship. On 29/08/2023, Vietnam media released rare footage of a Vietnamese fishing boat being harassed and attacked by a Chinese Coast Guard patrol in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone. On 10/08/2023, the President of the Philippines, a close security ally of the U.S., met with Vietnam Ambassador Hoang Huy Chung to discuss maritime cooperation against China’s aggressive actions in their respective exclusive economic zones in the South China Sea. Analysis: China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea have pushed Vietnam to upgrade ties with the U.S.. China’s push for the illegal nine-dash line, which asserts Chinese sovereignty over 80% of the South China Sea, threatens Vietnam’s sovereignty. China regularly harasses fishermen, illegally develops oil rigs in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone, and has built military bases on constructed islands in the South China Sea. The dependence of Cambodia and Laos, Vietnam’s sphere of influence, on China’s economy has made Vietnam worried for its immediate interests. The agreement will likely reduce Vietnam’s dependence on trade with China. The U.S. market provides trade diversification for Vietnam and the country can leverage further technology ties with Intel and other U.S.-based companies to improve digital skills. The country can also leverage the U.S. intelligence capabilities and security ties to build defense capabilities and counterbalance China’s aggressive actions in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone. For U.S. strategy, China’s actions toward the Philippines and Vietnam has led to an alignment of interests. However, the aim of the diplomatic upgrade to ‘strategic comprehensive partnership’ with the U.S. is to prevent Vietnam from becoming a battleground between great powers. Vietnam shares the same diplomatic relationship with South Korea, Russia, China, and India. The diversification of relationships reflects how other countries in Southeast Asia are attempting to balance security reassurance from the U.S. without attracting aggression from their dependence on Beijing with a leadership bent on achieving regional dominance. Conclusion The upgrade of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Vietnam marks a profound shift in the maritime security of the South China Sea. For Vietnam, it presents an opportunity to improve its economy, build defensive capabilities to counter China’s assertiveness, and become a more prominent player in the region. For the U.S, Vietnam could become more of a partner in the South China Sea against China’s push for influence in Southeast Asia. 48 years after the end of the war between the two countries, these are major steps toward reconciliation and strategic realignment in Southeast Asia.

Date: 15/09/2023 Where: Russia, Vostochny Cosmodrome Who’s involved: North Korean leader Kim Jong un, Russian President Vladimir Putin What happened? On 10/09/2023 Kim Jong Un left Pyongyang in his private train to Russia accompanied by top arms industry and military officials. Two days later, Kim Jong Un arrived in Russia where President Putin was waiting for him. The US White House reported last week already that it was likely that Kim Jong Un was going to visit Russia. The Presidents met at the Vostochny space center, which had symbolic importance. In fact, Putin stated that he was interested in helping Pyongyang build satellites. Kim Jong Un appears to have a large interest in missile technology. According to the US, Putin and Kim Jong Un will discuss arms deliveries, as Russia is urgently looking for ammunition for its war in Ukraine. In turn, North Korea would like to get access to Russian defense technology; this can include satellites and nuclear submarines. On 11/09/2023, Washington urged Pyongyang to honor its promise not to sell weapons to Russia for use in the war in Ukraine, saying this would violate the Security Council resolutions banning all arms deals with North Korea. Putin declared that he and Kim Jong Un will “talk about all issues” when he was asked if military-technical cooperation would be on the agenda, but did not specify the topics. A Kremlin spokesperson said the countries are cooperating on “sensitive issues” and the information can not be shared publicly. Kim Jong Un stated during the meeting to Putin that “Russia has entered into a sacred struggle to protect its sovereignty and security from hegemonic forces and we will always support the decisions of President Putin and the Russian leadership and fight together against imperialism”. On 12/09/2023, the meeting between Kim Jong Un and Putin came to an end, it is still unclear if the meeting has led to agreements on military cooperation. Kim Jong un has however made clear during the meeting that he wants to cooperate with Russia and that the ties with the neighboring country are of “highest priority.” Analysis: Kim Jong Un does not travel abroad frequently, seven trips away from his country with two of them being across the inter-Korean border in his twelve years of being North’s Korean leader. Four of those trips were to China, North Korea’s only treaty ally and main economic partner. His trip to Russia was his first trip abroad after the corona pandemic and even in the last four years. Washington and its allies have expressed concerns about the meeting between Kim Jong Un and Putin because it shows signs of closer military cooperation between Russia and North Korea. The impact of Kim Jong Un delivering artillery rounds from the stockpile of North Korea to Russia, can change Russia’s capacity in the short term in the Ukraine war. US officials warned Kim Jong Un that North Korea would pay a price if they would supply Russia with weapons. Both Putin and Kim Jong Un are denying US’s claim that the meeting’s aim is the acquisition of North Korean weapons to use in the war against Ukraine. Discussion between Kim Jong Un and Putin could also include humanitarian aid to North Korea and discussions about the U.N. Security Council resolutions imposed against Pyongyang, according to Russian officials. North Korea is one of the few countries that have openly supported Russia since the beginning of the war with Ukraine openly. Russia and China, however, both voted for Security Council resolutions in 2017 to punish Pyongyang for launching nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches. Pyongyang's relations with Moscow are in the spotlight as Kim Jong Un, after four years of traveling abroad, chose to visit Russia instead of China, giving rise to the idea that Kim wants to pit the two superpowers, Russia and China, against each other. So far, China stated it has no problems with Russia and North Korea having a meeting and that “at present, China-North Korea relations are developing well.” Beyond the potential weapons acquisition, the meeting in itself could have implications for the war in Ukraine, tensions with South Korea and Japan, and the rivalry between China and the US. Conclusion: So far it is not known what Putin and Kim Jong Un discussed. There is still a possibility that North Korea will supply Russia with weapons for the war in Ukraine, but the US has warned Kim Jong Un that this would be in violation of Security Council resolutions. If North Korea does supply weapons, Russia's position in the war in Ukraine could change quickly. So far, China has not shown any interest in the visit between Russia and North Korea. For more in-depth Sitreps, analyses, or bespoke advice on the aviation security and safety concerns regarding this region, or other areas across the globe, please contact Dyami at +31 30 207 2120 or through our webpage.

Date: 14/09/2023 Where: Armenia and Azerbaijan Who’s involved: Armenian government, Azeri government, Russian government, Turkish government. What happened? Azerbaijan has been mobilizing a significant military force since 06/09/2023 to the border with Armenia. This all comes after progression during peace talks between the countries have ground to a halt. Additionally, Azeri state media repeatedly has depicted Armenia as ‘western-Azerbaijan’. Azerbaijan is almost step-for-step copying Russia’s behavior before their full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Analysis: As a preventative measure, all aviation should avoid the airspace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Routing via Georgia and Waypoints DISKA and ADEKI should be done instead. Even though BARAD is not located on the Armenian-Azeri border, it should be avoided. The chance of full-scale conflict between the two nations is highly likely. The goal of Azerbaijan for such a conflict is likely to connect Azerbaijan to its exclave Nakchivan. This would provide Azerbaijan with a direct land connection to its closest ally, Turkey. This would mean that Azerbaijan’s goal for the potential conflict would be to annex the south of Armenia. There is a small chance that the current troop buildup is used as a political move, to try and force certain results in the ‘peace’ talks between the two countries. If a full-scale conflict breaks out in the region, air travel will be severely affected, as it would be unsafe to travel anywhere near the territories of Armenia or Azerbaijan. This would close yet another option for commercial aviation between Europe and Asia.

Date: Situation as of 12/09/2023 Location: Khartoum, Sudan Who's involved: Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Security situation developments: Throughout August, the conflict spread around the country, with the RSF and SAF controlling various regions. In South Kordofan, clashes between the SAF and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), a militant organization active in South Kordofan and Blue Nile siding with the RSF, caused the displacement of over 50,000 people. On 04/08/2023, the RSF claimed it obtained control of Central Darfur. Thousands of people were displaced between 11/08/2023 and 17/08/2023 due to renewed clashes between SAF and RSF in South Darfur capital Nyala Town. Meanwhile, the Governor of Darfur announced the deployment of the Joint Forces of the Armed Struggle Movement (ASM) to protect civilians in the area. In Geneina, West Darfur, the governor confirmed a ceasefire between the warring parties. Despite this, Khartoum remains the epicenter of violence. During the first week of September, several clashes between SAF and RSF and airstrikes have been reported. Also on 04/08/2023, the UN denounced that the ongoing violence in Darfur, perpetrated by the RSF, is increasingly based on ethnicity and sexual/gender-based violence and is drastically increasing as the conflict continues. On 29/08/2023, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, leader of the SAF, flew to Egypt to attend talks with Egypt President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to discuss efforts to end the conflict in Sudan. On 29/08/2023, the Ministry of Interior announced the resumption of passport issuance in the country, apart from North Darfur and North Kordofan. Citizens seem dissatisfied with the high cost of passports, it restricts people’s right to free movement. On 30/08/2023, the governor of the Blue Nile province proclaimed the state of emergency in place would be extended for another month. On 04/09/2023, the UNHCR, supported by 64 humanitarian and national civil society organizations, announced they need $1 billion to provide essential aid and protection to more than 1.8 million people fleeing the ongoing conflict in Sudan. Sudan’s airspace has been partially reopened. The first commercial flight between Cairo and Port Sudan took place on 05/09/2023. There are unconfirmed reports on Chad partially reopening the border with Sudan. Analysis The situation in Sudan is still volatile. Fighting between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) is spreading around the country. The conflict heavily affects the population. Several humanitarian organizations have expressed their concern for the civilians. If the crisis and the displacement continue it is very likely to expect a high level of food and water insecurity. Humanitarian and medical assistance is limited due to frequent attacks against medical personnel. According to the Federal Ministry of Health (FMoH), the conflict significantly facilitates the outbreak of diseases. The few hospitals still open in Khartoum are in danger of being closed after some Doctors Without Borders (DWB) employees were beaten and whipped by armed forces. Both SAF and RSF are gaining local support. Tensions are arising between groups in Darfur, with Arab militias supporting the RSF and allegedly targeting non-Arab groups and African tribes. There will likely be a rise in interethnic violence in Darfur. To date, over 3 million individuals have been internally displaced (mostly from 8 states). On the regional level, there is widespread concern about the continuation of the conflict in Sudan. The conflict is exacerbating regional insecurity and humanitarian crises. Specifically, the displacement crisis is concerning for neighboring countries, like Egypt, Chad, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Libya. The United States and Saudi Arabia sponsored negotiations in May 2023 but they collapsed quickly due to violations of the ceasefire and the SAF leaving negotiations in June 2023. The United States remains Sudan’s leading aid supplier, while implementing sanctions and visa restrictions on SAF and RSF members. The African Union is seeking to facilitate mediation between the parties and restart the democratization process in Sudan. However, the AU's willingness to interact with both sides is causing discontent on the part of the Sudanese authorities. Egypt is siding with SAF. Besides geopolitical and stability interests, Egypt is directly affected by the neighboring state's conflict because of the massive flow of refugees pouring into the country. Strong evidence suggests that Russia’s Wagner mercenary group has armed and financed the RSF and is likely to benefit from its mining profits. Conclusion The conflict between the SAF and RSF will continue in the near future. The involvement of various regional and international actors and their multiple interests make a short-term solution to the conflict unlikely. The protracted conflict will exacerbate the ongoing humanitarian crisis. It is likely to lead to an escalation of the flow of displaced persons to neighboring countries and a consequent increase in migration flows to Europe. The conflict is also likely to result in a deepening of divisions between the different groups, characterized by ethnic cleansing practices and increased violence against civilians.

Utrecht, 7 September 2023 – Dyami Academy proudly welcomes Charlotte Bakker, an accomplished training actress and contributor, to its team of experts dedicated to enhancing security and awareness across diverse industries. With a rich background in theater and a proven track record as a theater director, Charlotte's unique talents will play a vital role in advancing Dyami Academy's mission. Charlotte Bakker's journey in the world of performing arts began in the theater, where her passion for storytelling and captivating audiences took root. Her experiences as a theater director allowed her to refine her skills in creating compelling narratives and engaging performances. Now, as a member of Dyami Academy, Charlotte artfully blends her theatrical expertise with a strong commitment to improving security awareness in various sectors. In her role at Dyami Academy, Charlotte Bakker will focus on developing immersive and lifelike scenarios that serve as essential training tools for organizations looking to enhance security and awareness. Her creative approach to crafting realistic situations will empower businesses, NGOs, and the aviation sector to train their personnel effectively and prepare them for an array of security-related challenges. "We are thrilled to have Charlotte Bakker join Dyami Academy," said Sophie Buur, head of training at Dyami Academy. "Her unique background in theater and her dedication to enhancing security awareness align perfectly with our mission. Charlotte's contributions will undoubtedly help organizations prepare for and respond to security challenges more effectively." Charlotte Bakker's addition to Dyami Academy's team represents a significant step forward in the organization's commitment to providing innovative and immersive training solutions for a safer and more secure future. For more information about Dyami Academy please visit dyami.services or contact Victor Kummeling at info@dyami.services. About Dyami Academy Dyami Academy , part of Dyami Security Intelligence Services is a leading provider of security and awareness training solutions for organizations across various sectors. By offering immersive and realistic training scenarios, Dyami Academy equips personnel with the knowledge and skills needed to respond effectively to security-related challenges. Through a commitment to innovation and excellence, Dyami Academy strives to create a safer and more secure world for all.

Utrecht, 12 September 2023 - Dyami Security Intelligence is honored to announce the appointment of former Brigadier General Ajmal Shinwari as a Geopolitical Intelligence Expert. General Shinwari's extensive experience and dedication to global peace and stability make him a valuable addition to the Dyami team. General Shinwari has had a distinguished career in the intelligence service of Afghanistan, the National Directorate of Security (NDS). Rising through the ranks to the esteemed position of Brigadier General, he notably served as the Commander in Chief of the Special Forces of the NDS and as the spokesperson for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). His military journey has equipped him with a deep understanding of warfare, security, and intelligence intricacies. Beyond his military service, General Shinwari has contributed to the field through research, professional articles, and his book titled "Important Notices for the Commander." To further enhance his expertise, General Shinwari has actively participated in courses and seminars in Washington DC, focusing on Operation Management and Leadership, Strategic Issues, Intelligence Reporting, and Operational Tradecraft. "We are thrilled to welcome General Shinwari to our team," said Eric Schouten, CEO of Dyami Security Intelligence. "His vast experience and commitment to global peace align perfectly with Dyami's mission to provide quality analysis on key global issues, making them accessible and affordable." About Dyami Dyami Security Intelligence specializes in geopolitical forecasting, emphasizing informed decision-making, risk mitigation, and long-term success. By harnessing accurate and up-to-date information, Dyami assists companies and organizations in navigating the complexities of geopolitics, effectively mitigating risks, and seizing opportunities in a constantly evolving world. Dyami offers tailored threat and geopolitical analyses, ensuring businesses remain updated with global intelligence. Their systematic security risk and intelligence management approach aids in anticipating and responding to potential threats, thereby supporting better preventive measures and cost reduction. Membership at Dyami gives you access to a range of products and services to build a secure, compliant, and resilient organization. Our bespoke services linked to your membership are available on demand through a single contract and subscription fee. For media inquiries, please contact: Eric Schouten eric@dyami.services www.dyami.services +31302072120

Date: 04/09/2023 Location: the island of Cyprus Parties involved: the United Nations, UNFICYP Peacekeepers, Turkish Cypriot authorities, the UN’s special representative in Cyprus, the government of the Republic of Cyprus. What happened? On 17/08/2023 Turkish Cypriot authorities unilaterally announced their decision to begin construction on a road linking the villages of Pyla/Pile and Arsos/Yigitler. The planned road would traverse the UN buffer-zone and grant Turkish Cypriots direct access to Pyla/Pile by circumventing a checkpoint at the Dhekelia British military base. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) immediately deemed the construction of such a road as “unauthorised” as it would alter the status-quo along the ceasefire lines and encroach into the buffer zone. Subsequently, UN Peacekeepers moved to block the road should construction begin. On 18/08/2023 violence erupted after UN Peacekeepers attempted to prevent the building of the illegal road. Around a dozen UN Peacekeepers clashed with a group of Turkish Cypriot military and police personnel in plain clothes. Three Peacekeepers were injured and taken to hospital. Several UN vehicles were also badly damaged after Turkish Cypriots rammed them off the road or attempted to pull them away. The clashes happened less than a mile from the perimeter of the Dhekelia military area, one of the two British sovereign bases on the island. On 21/08/2023 the Cyprus representatives of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States all released a statement as permanent members of the UN Security Council. The statement expresses concern at the launch of an unauthorised construction by the Turkish Cypriot side and condemns the assaults on UN personnel and property as a serious violation of international law. The de facto “government” of Northern Cyprus accused the UN of being biased against Turkish Cypriots and making unfounded claims that UN soldiers and property were attacked. According to the Turkish Cypriot side, the UN’s decision to physically intervene and obstruct the construction team operating within Turkish Cypriot territory was unacceptable. The UN is maintaining a constant presence in the Pyla area to monitor the situation and prevent the recurrence of arbitrary operations. Despite reports by Turkish news agencies that construction work has continued as normal, the UN reported that the works have been halted since the incident on 18/08/2023. On 01/09/2023 a solution was allegedly found to the controversy surrounding the Pyla-Arsos road. Mediation talks between the United Nations’ special representative in Cyprus, Colin Stewart, and the respective governments of the Republic of Cyprus and Northern Cyprus seem to have proved fruitful. The agreement proposes that the road will be built with the condition that the UNFICYP will have the sole responsibility for the buffer zone area. The agreement also includes a plan for the development of the Pyla village regarding housing as well as agriculture in the surrounding area as far north as Pergamos. However, the agreement has not yet been ratified. Further talks are needed regarding the special use management of the various zones within the Pyla area, taking into account local stakeholders. Cyprus has also been experiencing violence due to tensions resulting from increased migration flows to the island. On 27/08/2023 and 28/08/2023, the Greek Cypriot local community clashed with Syrian asylum seekers in the village of Chloraka, leading to 21 arrests being made by the police in the aftermath of the riots. The violence also spread to Limassol on 01/08/2023 when a far right protest against migrants and refugees resulted in racist assaults and vandalism. A further 13 arrests have been made since. Analysis: With an apparent solution having been found recently, it is unlikely that the clash between UN Peacekeepers and Turkish Cypriots will lead to an escalation in the conflict. However, the agreement has still not been officially ratified which is cause for concern as tensions remain high in the Pyla/Pile area. Turkish Cypriot authorities are likely to continue to press for the construction of the road since it would offer residents of Northern Cyprus greater freedom of movement into the Pyla/Pile area. The peaceful resolution of the dispute will heavily depend on the UN’s mediation efforts led by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, Colin Stewart. On the other hand, the UN is straddling an increasingly difficult position due to accusations from the Turkish government and the de facto Turkish Cypriot government that it has lost its neutrality in the conflict. The violent incident involving UN Peacekeepers has brought the Cyprus conflict back into the attention of the international community at a challenging time for international security. The Security Council released a press statement on the matter on 21/08/2023 calling for the two sides to reach an agreement regarding the appointment of an UN envoy to support the return to urgent formal negotiations for a lasting settlement in Cyprus. Peace talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides have broken down since 2017 when a deal failed to materialise. The eruption of violence in the UN buffer zone is likely to serve as a reminder of the fragility of the peace that is keeping the Cyprus conflict in a frozen state. An escalation in the conflict would present severe consequences not only for the stability of the EU but also for the wider Eastern Mediterranean region due to Cyprus’ strategic position and the presence of 2 British military bases on the island. Unless formal peace talks resume in light of the seriousness of the situation, there is a considerable risk that Turkish-Greek Cypriot relations will continue to sour. Whilst there have been previous infringements of the UN buffer zone in Cyprus over the years, they have never resulted in a violent altercation with UN Peacekeepers. The resort to force by Turkish Cypriot military and police personnel indicates an increase in the continuous challenge coming from the Turkish Cypriot side to UNFICYP’s authority and legitimacy to maintaining the status quo on the island. The official challenge first came in July 2018 when the former Turkish-Cypriot leader, Mustafa Akinci, sent a letter to the UN Security Council asking for the reassessment of the mandate of UNFICYP. Indeed, the Turkish Cypriot side insists that UNFICYP is cooperating with Turkish Cypriot authorities without a legal basis since consent for the admission and operation of a UN force has only been granted by the government of the Republic of Cyprus. However, because the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is not recognised by the UN as a sovereign state, it cannot give such consent under international law. The Turkish side is likely pushing for a “solution based on two states cooperating with each other” rather than the unification of Cyprus under a bizonal, bicommunal federation model as stipulated in previous UN Resolutions. This is certain to be a contentious issue in any formal negotiation on the Cyprus conflict and is therefore likely to lead to further challenges to the mandate of UNFICYP by the Turkish side. There is a realistic probability that the migration crisis and violence experienced by the Republic of Cyprus has been aggravated by the actions of Turkey and the de facto Turkish Cypriot state. The government of the Republic of Cyprus claims that around 90% of migrants cross from mainland Turkey into the breakaway Turkish Cypriot north through a loosely regulated student visa system. Thousands then cross the UN buffer zone to seek asylum in the EU member Greek Cypriot south. Greek Cypriot national security officials have accused Turkey of waging a hybrid war against the Republic by using migration flows to escalate tensions and destabilise the country. Indeed, Turkey has previously been known to weaponize migration as a tool to accomplish broader political, economic, and foreign policy goals. The Turkish side may therefore be utilising migration as a tool to put pressure on the Greek Cypriot Republic and the international community to gain recognition for the sovereignty of the TRNC. Conclusion The violent clash between UN Peacekeepers and Turkish Cypriot military and police personnel over the construction of the Pyla/Pile-Arsos/Yigitler road has called attention to the possible volatility of the political situation in Cyprus. Moreover, the Turkish side is likely to continue to challenge the UN’s authority and legitimacy as the primary mediator on the Cyprus conflict and may therefore pursue further destabilising actions in order to extract political concessions. In light of the many geopolitical dynamics at play in Cyprus, the frozen conflict on the island as well as the status of UNFICYP must remain closely monitored.

Date: 08/09/2023 Where: Armenia and Azerbaijan Who’s involved: Armenian government, Azeri government, Russian government, Turkish government What happened? Azerbaijan has been mobilizing a significant military force since 06/09/2023 to the border with Armenia. Specifically, this appears to be the case near the southern end of the border with Armenia. This all comes after progression during peace talks between the countries have ground to a halt. Additionally, Azeri state media repeatedly has depicted Armenia as ‘wester-Azerbaijan’. Analysis: The chance of full-scale conflict between the two nations is likely, but not guaranteed. The goal of Azerbaijan for such a conflict is likely to connect Azerbaijan to its exclave Nakchivan. This would provide Azerbaijan with a direct land connection to its closest ally, Turkey. This would mean that Azerbaijan’s goal for the potential conflict would be to annex the south of Armenia. There is a small chance that the current troop buildup is used as a political move, to try and influence certain decisions in the ‘peace’ talks between the two countries. If a full-scale conflict breaks out in the region, air travel will be severely affected, as it would be unsafe to travel anywhere near the territories of Armenia or Azerbaijan. This would close yet another option for commercial aviation between Europe and Asia.

Date: 05/09/2023 Where: Poland Who’s involved: Polish government, Russian government, Belarussian government, US government What happened? Since the invasion of Ukraine, Poland has majorly supported its neighbor but it has also started to invest massively in its own military. With this investment, Poland’s military size is set to almost double by the year 2035. However, with elections coming in October 2023, the military expansion has raised questions on possible alternative motivations of the ruling party, as well as doubts about whether Poland can even sustain such a military force. Russia and Belarus: Two main reasons for Poland’s military expansion are the combination of its geographical location and the invasion of Ukraine. Poland has received multiple threats from the Russian and Belarussian regimes, specifying Poland as their next war target after Ukraine. Poland is not willing to ‘wait and see’ what will happen in Ukraine, without preparing itself for an actual invasion. Political motivations: There is an internal political motivation to increase the military spending of Poland. The ruling party Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość(PiS)) has been losing support according to polls, and the upcoming elections will be on October 15, 2023. Investing in the military could turn around the prospected loss of the ruling party. Opposition parties are worried if Poland will be able to sustain the military expenditure that comes from having a large standing army in the future, without compromising for instance living standards. US political situation: Depending on the 2024 elections, there is a possibility that US support for Ukraine and European NATO members will dwindle. This will be true especially if the Republicans win. This will leave European countries alone in supporting Ukraine. With the recent improved bond between Poland and Ukraine, the new military budget could mean Poland will be ready to fill some of the gap that the US will potentially leave in the future. Analysis: Recent developments: Since 2015, the amount of active serving personnel in the Polish military has significantly grown from 100,000 to 175,000. Besides the growth in numbers, the Polish military has undergone and still is undergoing major modernization efforts to raise above its status as a NATO army with Soviet gear. To achieve this, Poland is scheduled to hit 4% GDP expenditure on its military from the end of this year already, this doubles the NATO 2% standard. Modernization: The Polish military has in recent years already started shedding its Soviet equipment, in favor of western designs. A major catalyst for Poland’s military modernization was the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In this time period, Poland donated much of its Soviet equipment to Ukraine, for which it was pledged modern western replacements by the US. Future plans: The Polish plans are to expand their military personnel count from the current 175,000 to around 300,000 active personnel in 2035. To accommodate this massive expansion, the Polish military is ordering and buying an equally massive amount of new hardware. This includes but is not limited to: 1500 Main Battle Tanks, of which 1000 of the South-Korean K2 variant; close to 1500 domestic produced Infantry Fighting Vehicles; around 800 artillery pieces, mostly from South-Korean produce, just like the 288 Multiple Rocket Launch Systems; as well as 96 Apache attack helicopters, 32 F-35A Multirole aircraft and 44 South-Korean FA-50 variants. Why South-Korea? Poland's choice of South Korean weapons is the combination of quality and capabilities of the products, which is comparable to Western counterparts, and short delivery dates. This made Poland prefer South-Korea as their main arms supplier over countries such as Germany and the US. Deterrence. As stated by president Duda, the aim for Poland is to “(...)create such a defense system that no-one ever dares attack us, that Polish soldiers will never need to fight." If Poland manages to establish the kind of military force, then expansionist neighbors will look elsewhere. Poland’s many experiences and historical grievances with being besieged, invaded and conquered fuel the need for a deterrence force even more. Can Poland maintain this expansion? As mentioned above, raising a large standing army does not only come with a large first time investment, it also ensures a high total maintenance cost - especially if Poland is planning to keep its new material ready for action. Even though the Polish economy has been steadily growing, whether Poland will be able to afford its military expansion will be dependent on its willingness to withdraw funds from other departments of the government. Poland could optionally decide to put some of their new hardware in long-term storage, preserving the machines but not having to pay the full running costs, while having them ready for use when needed. Conclusion The Polish military has and will see massive expansion in recent and coming years, and in a very short time has grown to the third highest military spender in NATO at 4% GDP. The Polish government’s security concerns are mainly motivated by their proximity to Belarus, and Russia, which the government considers to be hostile. Another motivation for Poland to expand its military capability is the future of domestic US politics. The US military support Europe currently enjoys is likely to reduce in the future; the extent of this will depend on the result of the 2024 US elections. Worries exist in Poland that these (promised) investments are made by the ruling party to score politically, due to them having lost influence in recent times. With the developments Poland has made and is planning to make, it will very quickly establish itself as one of, if not the main European fighting force for at least in the near future. However, it runs the risk of compromising its economy in doing so.

Date: 05/09/2023 Location: Tunisia Parties involved: Tunisian government and security forces, Muslim Brotherhood, European tourists. What happened? On 17/07/2023 the EU, under leadership of The Netherlands and Italy, signed a 100million euro deal with Tunisia to stop the flow of migrants to the EU. This deal attracted a lot of criticism from human rights groups saying that Tunisia is not known for abiding international laws and is known for its maltreatment of migrants. On 01/09/2023 the African Court on Human and People’s Rights ordered the Tunisian government to “eliminate all barriers” and allow detained political prisoners access to their legal representatives and doctors. On 03/09/2023, the Tunisian authorities arrested a senior opposition leader from the Ennahda Islamist Party. He headed the largest political party in Tunisia before the parliament was shut down by the ruling president Kais Saied in 2021. His arrest follows multiple targeting of opposition figures by the current authorities. On 04/09/2023, the Central Bank of Tunisia extended Tunisia’s currency bills to pay for imports of rice. Tunisia’s economy is in crisis. While the economy did not substantially improve after the Arab Spring in 2011, the spike in food prices following Russia’s war in Ukraine has raised prices for everyday goods. With rising debt levels to pay for everyday imports, the country’s debt levels are high, with no deal reached between the IMF and the government to extend financial assistance to the country. Analysis and implications: The political situation in the country is not stable with President Saied taking a more authoritarian stance since he dissolved the Tunisian parliament in July 2021. One of the recent measures by the President was to crack down on a political party associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, a radical religious and political organization. Human Rights Watch has called attention to the Tunisian government’s moves to systematically silence and dismantle the country’s largest opposition party. This may lead to unrest in the country as seen before during the Arab Spring in 2011 or even terrorist attacks from radicalized groups who feel silenced in parliament. Any unrest will also lead to a decline in tourists coming to Tunisia, which in turn will have a significant impact on the economy. There is a large influx of refugees coming from East and Central Africa to Tunisia. This has led to tensions between the Tunisian people and the refugees, who are mostly black Africans. President Saied has drawn international criticism for blaming Sub-Saharan refugees for the rise of crime in the country, which resulted in a significant rise in racist attacks towards them. This has also led to refugees searching for alternative countries or forming groups to defend themselves. When leaving Tunisia, however, refugees face a similar fate in neighboring countries. Libya, Algeria and Morocco are also known to crack down on refugees coming into the country. Tunisia is a popular tourist destination because of its beautiful beaches and low costs. Therefore, Tunisia is heavily reliant on the tourism industry. An uptick in violence towards foreigners has previously led to a crash in this industry, especially after a terrorist attack in the capital Tunis in 2015 and before that, the troubles coming from the Arab Spring in 2011. A terrorist attack like the one on 09/05/2023 might encourage other lone wolves or more organized terrorist groups to engage in attacks. Given the ongoing political instability, it is not unlikely that European tourists may be targeted in these attacks, considering Tunisia is an attractive holiday destination. Security in the country may decline due to unfavorable economic conditions. Negotiations between the IMF and the Tunisia government have stalled in recent months as President Saied rejected the terms of a $1.9 billion loan for extended financial assistance. He refused the terms of the IMF package to reduce subsidies for food prices and the sale of state-owned enterprises. Whatever the effectiveness of these policies, a deterioration in the quality of life of the Tunisian population may increase the likelihood of people joining criminal organizations or becoming radicalized. The influx and subsequent poor treatment of black refugees can also lead to more unrest in the country as refugees may organize self-defence groups against racist attacks. This might also lead to more people daring to cross the Mediterranean to go to Europe and a decline in tourists going to Tunisia. Concluding notes: The situation in Tunisia is one of declining stability. With president Saied taking a tougher stance on the political groups aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood. Political tensions may turn into large protests or even terrorist attacks. It is advisable to keep an eye on current events and be weary of the changing political landscape in the country. It is also encouraged to think of the security situation for tourists if there is a rise in terrorist attacks in places like Djerba, Tunis or other popular destinations in Tunisia.

Utrecht, September 2023 – Dyami, a leading provider of aviation security solutions, is proud to announce the appointment of Jan-Peter van Viegen as Head of Aviation. With an illustrious career spanning two decades in various facets of aviation, Jan-Peter brings a wealth of experience and expertise to the Dyami team. Jan-Peter's extensive background encompasses flight operations, business aviation, flight training, safety, and compliance. He has held various key positions in the aviation sector, starting as an operations officer and working his way up to roles such as assistant flight operations manager and security & compliance officer. Most recently, he served as a senior inspector at CAA-NL (Civil Aviation Authority Netherlands). Moreover, Jan-Peter boasts significant experience as a commercial pilot and flight instructor, specializing in aircraft like the Challenger 350/604 and Embraer Phenom 100/300. He has also contributed as a training developer and instructor trainer. With this diverse range of skills and a comprehensive understanding of aviation, Jan-Peter has a unique perspective on the aviation industry's multifaceted challenges and the ability to translate these into practical solutions. Jan-Peter van Viegen's role at Dyami will involve close collaboration with the aviation community, where he will represent Dyami's cutting-edge aviation security solutions. Dyami offers a One-Stop Aviation Security Solution aimed at assisting aviation security officers and dispatchers in enhancing their capabilities, optimizing operations, and reinforcing security measures. The Dyami solution is designed to provide an affordable and holistic approach to security risk management, ultimately resulting in more secure and efficient airline and charter operations. In an environment marked by evolving security threats and complex regulatory requirements, this solution is essential in ensuring the safety and security of passengers, crew, and assets. Dyami membership offers access to a range of products and services tailored to build secure, compliant, and resilient aviation organizations. These bespoke services, linked to membership, are available on-demand through a single contract and subscription fee. Jan-Peter van Viegen's appointment underscores Dyami's commitment to delivering cutting-edge aviation security solutions and further solidifies its position as a trusted partner in the aviation industry. For more information about Dyami and its aviation security solutions, please visit [www.dyami.com] Contact: Eric Schouten eric@dyami.services] About Dyami Dyami is a leading provider of aviation security solutions. With a commitment to enhancing aviation safety and security, Dyami offers a comprehensive One-Stop Aviation Security Solution that empowers aviation security officers and dispatchers to navigate the complex landscape of aviation security with confidence. Dyami's mission is to provide affordable and holistic security risk management solutions that enhance the security and efficiency of airline and charter operations. Dyami membership includes access to a range of tailored products and services designed to build secure, compliant, and resilient aviation organizations.