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Written by Giulia Corradetti, Abigail Mikhail, Yusuf Babayusuf, Thijmen Kaspersma, Marnix Van ‘t Hoff, Iris de Boer, Jacob Dickinson, Britt Verregghen, Sara Frisan
Russia-Ukraine: Ukraine destroys mass ammunition storages, as Russia is expanding on its Pokrovsk salient.
Israel: The focus of Israel is shifting from Gaza towards Lebanon, where it started a ground operation. The region is on the verge of a full-scale conflict.
Myanmar: The Junta seeks a peace deal despite the resistance forces gaining ground and the worsening humanitarian crisis due to the conflict and a recent typhoon.
Sudan: While fighting between the army and the RSF persists in several regions, the SAF launched a major offensive in Khartoum.
Tunisia: As the October 6 elections approach, the government intensifies its crackdown on the opposition.
Mali: Following a major attack in Bamako, concerns over the expansion of Islamist militant groups in the region are rising.
Afghanistan: The Taliban further violates international human rights law as it prohibits women and girls from letting their voices be heard in public.
Mexico: As violent intra-cartel clashes intensify in Sinaloa state, new judicial reform sparks nationwide protests.
Colombia: The suspension of negotiations between the government and the ELN jeopardizes the Colombian peace process.
DRC: While the M23 violence persists, trial hearings between DRC and Rwanda begin.
Venezuela: While crackdown on dissent intensifies, the arrests of foreign nationals strained diplomatic relations between Venezuela and Western countries.
China-Taiwan: Tensions keep rising between China and Taiwan because of increasing military actions of the PLA and growing interference from Western countries.
China-Philippines: China and the Philippines ended a standoff in the Sabina Shoal in the South China Sea following months of tensions over the Second Thomas Shoal.
Conflicts, September 2024
Russia-Ukraine
The most notable event of the war in the past month is the first (publicly known) use of the recently announced Ukrainian ‘Palianytsia’ drone. This indigenously designed and produced drone was used in three separate attacks on some of Russia’s mass ammunition storage. The secondary explosions at these locations caused approximately 80% destruction among the stored munitions. It is likely that amongst these munitions were recently delivered North Korean and Iranian missiles, which were supposed to be used to strike Ukraine. The largest of these storages kept around 30.000 tons of munitions, which set off light earthquake warnings in the Baltic states as it detonated. There are six of such storage facilities within range of these new drones, two of which are situated near Moscow.
The Russian advance towards Pokrovsk has slowed down significantly, but has expanded its salient southward, capturing significant portions of territory. Russia managed to all but encircle the Vuhledar stronghold, which Ukraine has been holding since the start of the war in 2014 and a focus point for Russian forces since the beginning of the full-scale invasion.
The US devoted another aid package, likely the last under the Biden administration, worth $8 billion. The future of US aid packages to Ukraine hangs in the balance as the US elections are approaching.
Israel
The conflict between Israel and Hamas is ongoing. Despite the international urge for a ceasefire and the Israeli protests in the country, PM Benjamin Netanyahu seems to have shifted his focus. Israel now appears less interested in a ceasefire and securing the hostages and more concentrated on attacking the Lebanon front, which is experiencing a rapid escalation of hostilities over the past few weeks, and is on the verge of a ground war.
This month has seen the continuation of strikes and raids in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, where the killing of an American-Turkish protester and the closure of the Al Jazeera bureau have signaled a stringency in the media repression, which has seen the death of more than 100 journalists since the start of the conflict. The IDF also succeeded in eliminating the Hamas leader Fatah Sharif, which represents another defeat for the Palestinian group that has experienced severe losses in recent months.
The past weeks have seen a rapid escalation of hostilities between Israel, Hezbollah, Iran, and its proxies. Heavy airstrikes and attacks were launched from both sides, culminating with the explosion of dozens of walkie-talkies and hundreds of pagers belonging to the armed group Hezbollah, which resulted in severe losses for the Hezbollah and Iranian-backed allies. Despite the international call for a 21-day of ceasefire, attacks have continued, and most of the Hezbollah command has been killed. Lebanon has been severely damaged in terms of territory and political power, and it is not impossible that it will see the fall of the Hezbollah group. The recent death of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has left the group very disorganized and has signaled a turning point in the conflict, leaving Hezbollah highly vulnerable. This event is a blow to Iran’s influence as well. It is likely to weaken Hezbollah's Iran-backed allies, which have suffered severe losses in their operational commands by Israeli attacks. After warning the residents of the southern part of Lebanon to evacuate late on September 30, the Israeli military has begun what the IDF has called a “limited localized and targeted” ground operation against Hezbollah, which will probably become a proper ground invasion of the southern part of the country.
Given the latest events, the possibility of de-escalating the conflict seems far from happening: Israel is shifting the balance of power in its favor, and with the Lebanon front severely damaged and the conflict against Hamas still ongoing, Israel appears not to be close to accepting any ceasefire, and the whole region is likely to become a warzone.
Myanmar
With increased hostilities and a rising humanitarian disaster further destabilizing Myanmar, September 2024 saw ongoing major issues in the country’s civil war. The military junta made an unexpected peace proposal and started arrangements for a national census while confronting growing opposition to its authority. A possibly major change came from the military junta's unexpected offer for peace talks with ethnic armed organizations and resistance forces. But the opposition responded with cynicism and conditional acceptance and demonstrated the deep mistrust and significant political aspirations differences that still limit chances for a solution. At the same time as the junta's declaration of a national census, which indicates a possible path towards elections, the viability of carrying out a credible census and election in a conflict-torn area is yet unknown.
Combat continued in several areas during September, leading to ongoing civilian fatalities and displacement. In early September Typhoon Yagi worsened the humanitarian situation by leaving hundreds of thousands of people in need of immediate aid. Rising violence in Rakhine state caused a fresh migration of Rohingya refugees to Bangladesh, therefore taxing resources and posing questions about regional stability.
Sudan
Fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has intensified in the capital Khartoum. The RSF tried to attack various SAF strongholds in north Khartoum in September, among which a major SAF base. The SAF succeeded in repelling this attack. Other parts of the city also remained contested, and the SAF has targeted RSF locations in Khartoum with airstrikes from time to time. Around September 26, the SAF launched a new major offensive in Khartoum and took control over three of the city’s main bridges. This is seen as a significant win for the SAF, as it cuts off supply routes used by the RSF. On September 30, the SAF was accused of bombing the diplomatic post of the UAE in Khartoum. The SAF has denied the accusations and blamed the RSF. The government of Sudan has earlier blamed the UAE for supporting the RSF in the war, partially by providing weapons to the RSF.
Fighting between the RAF and RSF also took place in the southeastern city of Sennar. Local NGOs reported dozens of civilian casualties, partly due to the RSF shelling a market in Sennar on September 8, Fighting also continued in the region of Darfur, where the RSF conducted a drone attack on RAF strongholds in el-Fasher on September 8. A few days later, on September 12, the SAF claimed to have thwarted an attack by the RSF in el-Fasher that killed dozens of RSF members. On September 13, Doctors Without Borders reported that the RSF has been blocking access roads to the Zamzam camp for internally displaced people in the parts of el-Fasher it controls. This hinders the camp’s supply of food, drinking water, and medicines. High number of civilian casualties and alleged atrocities committed by the RSF were reported in September 2024.
September 2024 also marks the further stagnation of the humanitarian situation in Sudan as heavy rainfall continued causing floods across 15 states in the country. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that approximately 491,100 people have been affected. The floods have been a breeding ground for a cholera outbreak in 10 states in Sudan, with over 15,000 cases and 473 deaths reported by the health ministry.
Alerts, September 2024
Tunisia
The past month has seen the rise of oppressive measures against political freedom from the Tunisian government in light of the upcoming presidential election that will be held on October 6th. This has led to a rise of turmoil in the Tunisian population, which has begun to protest against the current government. Since the current Tunisian President Kais Saïed expressed his willingness to seek a new mandate, the country has experienced an intensification of media repression, together with a series of arrests of the opposition members, in order to prevent its leaders from running. Many candidates have been left off the ballot based on the government’s claim that their campaign fillings were incomplete. After a recent judicial order to reconsider some candidates as eligible, the Tunisian parliament amended a law to take decisional powers from the judicial courts. With the recent imprisonment of the opposition leader Ayachi Zammel, the elections will see only one candidate facing Saïed, which is Zouhair Magzhaoui, member of People’s Movement, one of the parties supporting the exceptional measures imposed by Saïed since 2021, which has seen the president centralizing the political power.
The political environment in which the election will take place will probably be characterized by repression and opacity. It is likely that Saied will win the next mandate, and will try to strengthen his political control of the country, thereby making the possibility of a definitive authoritarian turn of the regime more likely. The democracy of the country is at risk, and a new series of protests should be expected after the elections, the results of which will determine a turning point for the political regime of the country. Tension in Tunisia is high, and the risk of a civil revolution cannot be excluded. The elections are likely to have an impact on the neighboring regions as well.
Mali
On September 17, a major jihadist attack occurred in the Malian capital, Bamako, marking a significant escalation in the ongoing conflict. This assault on the gendarmerie training center in Falidie district and Modibo Keita International Airport resulted in substantial human and material losses, with fires set to military, government, and UN aircraft. This was the first high-scale attack on the capital since 2015, when Mali was under civilian rule with French troop support.
Militant Islamist groups are expanding their territorial control in Mali. These groups have taken advantage of the power vacuum left by the withdrawal of Western forces following the departure of the French, US, and Germans. Italy is an exception, with around 300 troops in the area. This situation has led to increased instability and security concerns across the region. Many residents have fled the areas due to fears of violence and intimidation. However, some communities have formed self-defense groups to protect themselves against Islamist attacks. The Bamako attack highlights growing concerns about the increased capabilities of militant groups to reach southern Mali from strongholds in northern and central regions. There is potential for escalation of threats across the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and risk of cross-border attacks. The rising number of displaced persons may also strain resources in bordering countries. These developments underscore the complex security landscape in Mali and its impact on the broader region as military-led governments pursue alternative alliances and strategies to address longstanding security challenges. Since moving away from Western forces, the three military juntas are strengthening their relations and cooperation with Russia and China. In addition, the AES has launched a new biometric passport to facilitate movement within the alliance, solidifying its estrangement from the ECOWAS bloc.
Afghanistan
The living conditions for women and girls in Afghanistan have strongly deteriorated over the course of September 2024 as the Taliban started enforcing new laws that ban women and girls from letting their voice be heard in public. While the Taliban has defended the new restrictions as being in line with Sharia law, many human rights organizations and international bodies have condemned the new laws as they strongly contribute to the complete removal of women and girls from public life in the country. Women in Afghanistan have started an online campaign in which they record themselves singing and publish the videos on social media. The new laws add to earlier implemented laws that deny women the right to education and employment. In addition, women are only allowed to leave the house with a male guardian and force them to cover their entire body and face in public. On September 25, Canada, Australia, Germany and the Netherlands announced at the UN general assembly to take the Taliban to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for gender discrimination. This is the first legal move taken against the Taliban since it took power in 2021. While the Taliban does not acknowledge the authority of the ICJ, supporters of the ICJ case against the Taliban are positive about the deterrent effect of the case on states that try to normalize their relationship with the Taliban. Human rights organizations have accused the international community and the UN of not speaking out against the Taliban’s violations of the international human rights law.
On September 24, a spokesperson of the Taliban stated that the group has requested to join the upcoming BRICS economic forum in Russia in October 2024. There has been no response from Moscow yet. While Russia established ties with the de facto government in Afghanistan and bilateral talks on trade were held in recent months, Russia did not recognize the Taliban as a legitimate government yet.
Mexico
The final weeks of outgoing Mexican President Lopez Obrador’s term, replaced by his ally and successor Claudia Sheinbaum on October 1, were marked by a tense political climate. In recent weeks, the approval of a judicial reform that will allow voters to elect judges to the Supreme Court and other courts has sparked massive protests nationwide. Judicial workers called for demonstrations and strikes in coming days and weeks to oppose the new judicial legislation, claiming it would undermine the independence of the judiciary and would jeopardize judges’ impartiality while strengthening the power of the ruling Morena party. During the Senate vote, protesters broke into the building. In response, Lopez Obrador justified the reform, which officially went into effect on September 15. Obrador has presented the reform to be a necessary measure to eliminate corruption from the judiciary and make judges more accountable. Nonetheless, along with rising concerns on the legality and potential impacts of the reform on the rule of law and judiciary independence, Lopez Obrador’s new legislation could have implications on Mexico’s capability to comply with international obligations, especially with the United States. A weakened and politicized judiciary could discourage foreign investment and affect Mexico's diplomatic relations.
Violence has been spreading in Mexican western Sinaloa state since fighting between two factions of the Sinaloa cartel erupted in the city of Culiacan on September 9. The trigger for the conflict dates back to the arrest in the US of Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada, top leader of one of the main factions of the Sinaloa cartel, allegedly after being kidnapped and handed over to authorities by a member of the rival faction, Los Chapitos. In the past three weeks, intra-cartel fighting resulted in at least 53 people killed and over 50 people missing. As Mexican authorities tighten security, deploying additional 600 soldiers in the area, and intensify arrests of members of both cartel factions, the recent escalation of violence is spurring diplomatic tensions between Mexico and the US after the Mexican President claimed that the US should be considered "co-responsible" for the spiral of violence in Sinaloa state. The US administration ensured deep cooperation with the incoming Sheinbaum government to address armed violence and drug trafficking. The intra-cartel dispute in Sinaloa state is raising concern over potential spill-over of violence in other Mexican states.
Colombia
A new setback in peace negotiations jeopardizes Colombian President Petro's ambitious plan for stabilization and peace, known as “Total Paz”. Following a deadly explosive attack on September 17 targeting a military base in Aracua province, the government suspended negotiations with the National Liberation Army (ELN), the largest guerrilla group in the country. Violent attacks targeting security forces and infrastructure and clashes involving the ELN have increased since the ceasefire with the government expired in early August. The latest attack came just a day after the Colombian government authorized the negotiations with ELN dissident faction Comuneros del Sur. In the last few months, the talks with ELN have been stalled after the government opened parallel negotiation in February 2024 with the faction Comuneros del Sur without the approval of the central command of the ELN, causing the split of the group from the guerrilla. The indefinite suspension of peace talks with the ELN raises fears of increased violence in the country and could undermine President Petro's political agenda credibility as the "Total peace" policy loses one of its main components.
Updates, September 2024
Democratic Republic of Congo
Violence from armed rebel groups remains a pressing concern, particularly from the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group, who want to maintain political and economic influence in the mineral-rich eastern DRC. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring center, the M23 conflict caused 73% of the displacements in the DRC in 2024. Despite the government signing a cease-fire agreement with the M23 rebels in July, the fighting persists. On September 27, HRW accused Rwanda’s army and the M23 rebel group of shelling camps for displaced people in eastern Congo, only deeping the humanitarian crisis. A day prior to this, the public hearing began by the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights regarding DRC accusing Rwanda of violating its sovereignty, violating international law and committing atrocities against civilians. In addition to the court case, the Congolese President called for sanctions to be placed on Rwanda for its support of the M23 rebel group. UN MONUSCO is still active in deploying troops, transporting civilians and providing emergency responses across the area. There have however been anti-MONUSCO protests. Despite their presumed withdrawal in the coming months, reports have claimed that the mission will continue past December 2024 due to fears that a security vacuum will occur if the mission ends.
Amid the dispute with Rwanda and M23 violence, the government is dealing with other challenges, including addressing the Mpox outbreak in the region. Moreover, on September 2, there was an attempted mass breakout from the largest prison in the DRC that killed over 120 people. Due to significant overcrowding issues and poor conditions, authorities released over 2000 prisoners in the last few weeks. Also, in recent weeks the country’s military tribunal sentenced 37 people to death for their alleged involvement in a foiled coup last May, including three US citizens.
Venezuela
The recent presidential elections in Venezuela have triggered a deep domestic political crisis and international controversy. Although the Maduro regime claims victory in the polls, opposition forces and several Western nations dispute the results and denounce the manipulation, lack of transparency, and credibility of the electoral process. Available data from polling centers reportedly record an estimated 67% of the votes for the leading opposition candidate González Urrutia. Nonetheless, the regime of President Maduro, who has been in office since 2013, is increasing its grip on the country's electoral, judicial, and military bodies. On September 17, the UN reported a sharp deterioration of the repression in Venezuela, including crimes against humanity of politically motivated persecution. The report described Maduro's government strategy to silence the opposition as “one of the most acute human rights crises in recent history”. Reportedly, in the past two months, at least 25 protestors were killed and nearly 2500 arbitrarily detained with the accusation of terrorism.
On top of the political crisis, diplomatic relations between Caracas and Western countries are souring. The Venezuelan government escalated its repression, targeting foreign nationals and ordinary citizens. In recent weeks, seven foreign nationals - four US nationals, two Spaniard and a Czech citizen - have been arrested for allegedly participating in plots to assassinate President Maduro. The arrests come just days after the imposition of 16 new US sanctions on Venezuelan entities - including the President of Venezuela’s Supreme Court, the director of the electoral council, and several military and intelligence officials - and rising diplomatic strains between Spain and Venezuela. In September, Spain granted asylum to opposition leader González and recognized his victory in the Venezuelan elections. The EU also formally recognized González as the legitimate winner. Tensions are also mounting between Maduro and some regional leaders, including Argentine President Milei, who asked Interpol to arrest the Venezuelan president. Neighboring country leaders fear severe repercussions for the region, especially for a likely aggravation of the migration crisis. The imposition of new sanctions could also have severe implications on the Venezuelan population and regional dynamics, aggravating the economic crisis and spurring mass exodus. Currently, no indicators suggest a resolution of Venezuela's political crisis.
China - Taiwan
Tensions keep rising between China and Taiwan because of increasing military actions by the People’s Liberation Army of China surrounding territorial waters and the Taiwanese airspace. An increase in military drills seems to be the case every September for the last five years. China is trying to gain more power, for example, by executing joint landing exercises directly across the Taiwan Strait. This results in many Chinese military aircraft operating around the island and them breaching Taiwanese airspace multiple times. Another way the CCP is trying to gain power is through meddling in the access to the Taiwanese Strait. Since China is claiming Taiwan as its own territory, including the Taiwan Strait, they view countries that cross the Strait as provocative. For example, German warships that were passing through on September 13. Western countries (and Taiwan) say the Strait is an international waterway and are using it as a major trade route. By passing through, Germany wanted to show Beijing that they are standing with the Western allies during this time of rising tensions between China and Taiwan. The Kinmen island owned by Taiwan and located 3km from China is under pressure, because they want to be on good terms with China as well as Taiwan.
On September 16, another arms deal took place for Taiwan under the Biden administration. China claims that closer relations between the US and Taiwan and more interference from the US will only lead to the destruction of ‘Taiwanese separatist forces’. In addition, China has reacted to the arms sale by freezing the assets of nine US companies. However, the US interference grows with the bill stating that information will be published of CCP officials’ ‘illicit’ financial assets if China begins the invasion of Taiwan.
China - Philippines
On September 15, 2024, China and the Philippines ended a standoff in the Sabina Shoal in the South China Sea after months of tensions over the Second Thomas Shoal. The Philippines National Maritime Council said the Philippine Coast Guard flagship BRP Teresa Magbanua was leaving the Shoal, and China withdrew a mixture of coast guard and military forces from the disputed Shoal. China’s claims over most of the South China Sea as its immediate neighborhood have led to repeated clashes with the Philippines over the past few years, which have flared up over the past year. China also launched criticisms of the Philippines and the US to keep mid-range missile systems deployed in April 2024 in the northern Philippines to boost deterrence in the South China Sea and against the prospect of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The Philippines and the US have stepped up joint training exercises, also in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines.
The South China Sea has also seen rising military equipment build-up and naval exercises. At the end of September, the Philippines, the US, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand took part in military exercises in Manila’s exclusive economic zone to improve their naval and military coordination in the South China Sea. At a meeting at the Quad summit on September 22, the US, Japan, Australia and India met to discuss tensions in the East and South China Seas, in which they have not mentioned China explicitly.
About the authors
Giulia Corradetti
Giulia is a new intern at Dyami as junior intelligence analyst. She holds a BA in International Studies from the university of Trento, and she is currently studying Security Risk Management at the University of Copenhagen. During her academic career, she has collaborated with the University Journal “L’Universitario”, covering topics regarding international and security issues, such as conflicts involving the Asian region and human rights violations. With Dyami, she is contributing to joint publications, writing articles and briefs on current or developing security situations around the globe, and keeping up to date with key regional developments
Abigail Mikhail
Abbie is one of Dyami’s newest Security Analyst interns, bringing a strong academic foundation and international experience. She recently earned her Master's degree in Crisis and Security Management, with a focus on Intelligence and National Security. During her studies, she tackled a range of complex security issues, from the inner workings of the Chinese Intelligence Community to the repression in Iran. Her most notable project, conducted for the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), involved investigating the repatriation of foreign fighters and offering key recommendations. Having lived across multiple countries, with 11 years in Beijing, China, Abbie draws on her rich cultural and global background. She is eager to deepen her expertise in conflict analysis and global security threats, making a valuable contribution to Dyami’s research and intelligence efforts.
Yusuf Babayusuf
Yusuf is a Safety and Security Management student at The Hague University of Applied Sciences, eager to apply his academic knowledge to real-world security challenges. He is particularly interested in geopolitical analysis, risk management, and the unique dynamics of Eastern Europe, Turkey, Central Asia and the Caucasus. Drawing from his cultural background and language skills in Turkish and Bulgarian. Yusuf is excited to learn from the experienced professionals at Dyami and contribute to their mission of creating a safer world.
Thijmen Kaspersma
Thijmen is currently in his final year of his bachelor's degree in Safety & Security Management at Avans University of Applied Sciences, 's-Hertogenbosch. During his education, he conducted assignments regarding public safety topics and raising security awareness in The Netherlands. Due to his recent completion of the Integral Safety and International Conflicts & Security minor, he is now eager to contribute to security internationally. Next to his research product, he will expand his expertise by joining the tasks of geopolitical conflict monitoring and writing analyses about various international security-related topics. During the internship, he will focus his research product on the threat of rail sabotage. He is providing insights into the origin of this topic and the developments we can anticipate going into the future, aiming to make the target group more resilient.
Marnix Van ‘t Hoff
Marnix Van 't Hoff is an experienced Aviation Security Consultant & Trainer with a background in Aviation Studies from the Amsterdam University of Applied Sciences. He has a strong background in aviation security and has worked as a security risk and threat assessments (SRTA) specialist for aviation clients. He is an experienced crisis team leader and a HEAT trainer. His knowledge and expertise in these areas make him well-equipped to provide training, guidance and support to Dyami clients in ensuring the safety and security of their operations.
Iris de Boer
Iris works as a Global Intelligence Analyst at Dyami, leveraging her background in Human Geography. Additionally, Iris holds an MA degree in Conflict Studies and Human Rights from Utrecht University, specializing in conflict analysis, peace processes, and geopolitics. Her MA thesis delved into the securitization of the war in Ukraine by the Heads of State, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and Ministers of Defense of the Netherlands and Poland. Within Dyami, Iris is actively involved in security risk management, travel security, and geopolitical analysis. Her enthusiasm for addressing topics in international security extends across a diverse spectrum of countries and regions
Jacob Dickinson
Jacob studied Global Political Economy at Leiden University. He is passionate about international development and is looking to expand his expertise in geopolitics and crisis management. Curious about other cultures, he has traveled in Europe and Asia for both academic study and professional purposes. His expertise includes the geopolitics of oil and industrial upgrading in the electronics global value chain. He is particularly interested in the evolving political and economic relationships between China and ASEAN, and the consequences for regional development and security.
Britt Verregghen
Britt is currently a Security Management student at Saxion University of Applied Sciences. During her education, she conducted an assignment on behalf of the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence regarding the creation of security awareness around stability policing.. During the internship, she focused on researching Chinese interference with malicious intent in Dutch companies and organizations. Britt is interested in raising awareness about this subject and making this target group more resilient.
Sara Frisan
Sara works at Dyami as a Geopolitical Intelligence Analyst, leveraging her background in Peace and Conflict Studies. Sara joined Dyami after completing her MA in Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University and held an MA degree in International Sciences and Peace Studies. During her academic career, she conducted research in South America, primarily Colombia, on the dynamics of collaboration and resistance between civilians and non-state armed groups in violent settings. In her previous internship at the investigative think-tank InSight Crime, Sara developed some expertise on transnational organized crime and political-criminal alliances.
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