top of page

Conflict Monitoring Report: June 2024

Written by Arianna Lucà, Mickey Beckmann, Jacob Dickinson, Iris de Boer, Kevin Heller, Sara Frisan

  • Russia-Ukraine: The front has remained static despite Russian offensive operations in Kharkiv Oblast and Donetsk Oblast. Ukraine hit targets inside Russia with Western-supplied weapons.

  • Israel-Hamas: As Netanyahu's government faces instability, the conflict enters a new phase with Israel focused on eliminating Hamas leadership. 

  • Myanmar: Civil war intensifies in the western Rakhine state and the eastern parts of the country as the military junta shuts down the internet. 

  • Sudan: Ongoing conflict between SAF and RSF in Sudan worsens the humanitarian crisis and increases the risk of regional instability. 

  • Israel-Hezbollah: A war between Israel and Hezbollah seems inevitable. Several countries have called for its citizens to leave Lebanon as soon as possible.

  • Kenya: Widespread protests erupted across Kenya against the government's planned tax hikes, resulting in deaths, injuries and many arrests.

  • Mozambique: As SADC mission in Mozambique withdraws, violence resumes in the resource-rich Cabo Delgado province.

  • Venezuela: While opposition candidate González is far ahead in the polls, it remains uncertain whether Maduro will concede free and fair presidential elections on July 28. 

  • Bolivia: Alleged failed coup deepens political instability ahead of Bolivian elections in 2025.

  • New Caledonia: New protests erupt in New Caledonia after detained activists are sent to mainland France for trial.

  • DRC: As the eastern provinces face a surge in attacks by M23 and ADF armed groups, escalating tensions between DRC and Rwanda heighten the risk of  violence  in the region. 

  • Haiti: While the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support mission's arrival in Haiti is imminent, violence is spreading in rural areas. 

  • North Korea-South Korea: Tensions rise between North and South Korea as they ramp up their propaganda campaigns and strengthen ties with allies. 

  • China-Taiwan: Divisive legislative changes in Taiwan lead to mass protests as Beijing threatens ‘pro-independence leaders’ with the death penalty.

Conflicts, June 2024 


In June 2024, Russia continued its offensive operations in Kharkiv Oblast in the direction of Vovchansk and Kharkiv (city). Russia hit different cities in Kharkiv Oblast with deadly airstrikes and tried to push in the direction of Lyptsi. However, Russia did not manage to breach the frontline. The Ukrainian Armed Forces regained positions in the Lyptsi direction and also managed to remain in control of the majority of Vovchansk by conducting tactical counterattacks. Fighting continued in Donetsk Oblast, where Russia tried to make its way toward Chasiv Yar and captured a relatively small piece of Ivanivske. On June 9, 2024, the head of the Chechen Republic stated that soldiers also captured the village of Ryzhivka in Sumy Oblast, but this was contested by Zelenskyy, who called it a “propaganda operation”.

The pressure on the Russian Armed Forces is increasing because the promised Western aid for Ukraine has started to arrive. Nevertheless, this aid is not expected to lead to any significant changes on the battlefield before mid or late July. In late May and early June, the US, France, Germany, and other Western allies gave the green light for Ukraine to use the provided weapons to hit targets inside Russian territory. Hence, the Ukrainian Armed Forces hit targets in Rostov-on–Don, Belgorod Oblast, Azov, Sevastopol, and Voronezh Oblast. Some had their own military resources, and some had Western-provided resources. Moscow has publicly held the US. responsible for the deadly attack in Sevastopol, as it was conducted with five missiles that were supplied to Ukraine by the U.S. 

On June 23, 2024, the cities of Derbant and Makhachkala in the Russian Republic of Dagestan were hit by a terrorist attack targeting synagogues, churches, and a police post, killing at least 20 people. While most information currently points to Wilayat Kavkaz, the Northern Caucasus branch of Islamic State (IS), Russia has tried to blame the attack on Ukraine and the West, claiming that the terrorist attack is linked to the Ukrainian strikes in Sevastopol. 


The war between Israel and Hamas is moving to a new phase. The IDF has decided to focus more on special forces campaigns against Hamas leadership, bomb makers, and weapon dealers instead of conducting large operations that cover entire cities in Gaza. Targeted strikes and assassinations or arrests will have priority in the coming months. Some IDF troops will be sent home or redeployed to the north now that the operations in Gaza are winding down and the war with Hezbollah is likely to start.

Hamas is urging the US to put pressure on Israel to accept a peace deal, but Israel suspects Hamas is trying to stall for time so it can build up new strength in Rafah, Khan Yunis, and Gaza City. The US, Egypt, and Qatar are urging Hamas and Israel to return to the negotiating table, but so far, it has been unsuccessful. The humanitarian situation in Gaza is still dire, although more food trucks are arriving, and the US has resumed its project of a pier to distribute aid from the sea. The coming months will see Israel refocusing its forces to deal with the Hezbollah threat in the north as Hamas seems to be on the verge of collapse. If the Netanyahu government survives the coming weeks, the chances of peace negotiations are remote.

The Netanyahu government is further destabilized as some bills and decisions created a rift between the government's supporting parties. There is debate about whether or not to negotiate with Hamas or fully destroy the organization. Moreover, intentions for the management of Gaza in the future are unclear. Protests are increasing in Tel Aviv and other cities, calling for a peace agreement with Hamas to free hostages. Meanwhile, the ultra-Orthodox community is rising against the passage of the mandatory conscription law for all Israelis, from which the ultra-Orthodox are no longer exempt. 


The civil war in Myanmar has become more fluid over the past month. Pro-democracy forces and groups pushing for ethnic autonomy have made strides against the military junta, with fighting intensifying in the western Rakhine state. In early June, junta troops began emptying towns and villages in preparation for a planned attack on the regional capital, Sittwe, by the Arakan Army (AA), the armed ethnic organization of the Muslim Rohingya minority. The powerful AA said it was about to capture the city of Maungdaw, on the border with Bangladesh, and called on residents to evacuate as soon as possible. As the junta has lost territory, it has resorted to extreme measures, including indiscriminate bombing of towns and night drone attacks, targeting the Rohingya and Rakhine communities. 

The military regime has also struggled to refill stocks of ammunition in aircraft and artillery as Russia, North Korea, and China are distracted or refuse to sell further weapons. China seems willing to talk to ethnic armed groups in the country. Within areas inside the junta’s control, like the capital, its conscription order has forced thousands of civilians to flee to Thailand. The junta also cut off VPN access for as much as the country as possible, locking 20 million Burmese out of the internet. In Bangkok, supporters of Myanmar’s imprisoned leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, led a procession to object to the more than 20,600 people detained for opposing military rule. 


The civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan is deteriorating rapidly. Currently, the SAF seems unable to regain control of the country's main cities and infrastructure. Despite the slowdown in the RSF advance, it was reported on June 20 that paramilitaries took control of el-Fula, the capital of West Kordofan state. On June 15, the SAF accused the UAE of supplying weapons to the RSF, allegations rejected by the UAE, which denied any involvement in the Sudanese conflict. Other countries like Egypt, Libya, Chad, Iran, and Russia have been accused of supplying weapons to either or both warring sides. Most countries deny their involvement. Russia is the only exception, as it has openly stated its willingness to aid both sides.

The persistence of the conflict is aggravating the already dire humanitarian crisis for the Sudanese civilian population. The Darfur region has been particularly affected by the war. Amnesty International reports that RSF is perpetrating crimes against unarmed civilians, with dozens of people executed or mutilated. The displacement crisis is fuelling the risk of regional instability. Approximately 2 million displaced Sudanese have been seeking refuge in neighboring countries, including Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, and South Sudan, which are struggling to handle the influx of refugees on top of their already volatile political and economic situations. 

Alerts, June 2024 


The conflict between Hezbollah and Israel is intensifying. Hezbollah forces have ramped up their missile attacks on Israel and have shown that they can fly a UAV over Haifa and military installations in Israel without being intercepted by air defense systems. This escalation has led Israel to state its intent to start a full-scale war with Hezbollah to oust them from the south of Lebanon. The Israeli government is facing considerable pressure to ensure the return of displaced citizens from the north of the country.

The Israeli government has given the IDF the green light to start a war once it is ready to do so. The IDF intensified its targeted killings of Hezbollah commanders, weapon smugglers, and bomb makers. This has rattled the Hezbollah leadership, prompting them to hide and reinforce their controlled neighborhoods in Beirut to thwart any Israeli attacks. A full-scale war would likely not only target Hezbollah, but the entire Lebanese infrastructure would be seen as a legitimate target. Beirut will especially be a likely target as Hezbollah uses the international airport for storing and receiving weapons from Iran. The harbor is also a potential target for the IDF as it will want to stop cargo vessels from delivering weapons to Hezbollah. 

Several countries, like Canada and Kuwait, already called on their citizens to leave Lebanon as soon as possible, as it will be challenging to leave the country once the confrontations escalate. The US has been vague on whether or not it will support Israel in a war with Hezbollah. Israel is semi-dependent on intelligence gathered by US intelligence services and needs resupplies of weaponry coming from the US. The role of Iran and the IRGC  in a conflict between Hezbollah and Israel is yet to be seen. They might choose to remain in the background and offer advice and weapons or decide to commit to open warfare with Israel.


Since mid-June, 2024, widespread demonstrations erupted across Kenya in response to the government’s planned tax hikes laid out in the ‘Finance Bill’, which many fear will worsen the cost-of-living crisis. Organized mainly by young Kenyans via social media, the heaviest protests occurred in Nairobi, where police used tear gas and water cannons. The clashes resulted in several deaths, hundreds of injuries, and about 200 arrests, including protesters, journalists, and human rights observers.

The protests stem from discontent with President Ruto’s economic policies, which include raising $2.7 billion in additional taxes, equivalent to 1.9 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). Critics say Ruto has reneged on his promise to reduce taxes and lower living costs. Last month, Ruto defended the tax hikes, emphasizing the need to boost revenue and cut reliance on external borrowing, intending to make Kenya financially self-sustaining. The country faces a significant debt burden, with servicing costs soaring due to a two-year decline in the local currency's value, limiting President Ruto's options. 

In response to the demonstrations, the government dropped several controversial tax proposals, including the 16% VAT on bread. However, the government indicated the cuts will result in a budget shortfall of 200 billion shillings (about £1,2 billion), prompting increases in fuel prices and export taxes, likely exacerbating living conditions as well. Despite the protests, parliament passed the Finance Bill's second reading on June 20, 2024, leading to the continuation of protests in several Kenyan cities. On June 26, President Ruto eventually decided to decline the finance bill. However, protests continued and people started to demand Ruto’s resignation in the days after. Reuters reports that a widely shared pamphlet on June 28 called for seven days of activism, including nationwide strikes and road blockades on July 2 and July 4. Until the demonstrators’ grievances are addressed, the protests are likely to continue. Human rights watchdogs have accused authorities of illegal nighttime abductions of protestors, carried out by police in civilian clothes, and call for the release of all detainees. 


In recent months, Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province, rich in gas and natural resources and plagued by violence since 2017, experienced a surge in attacks by insurgents linked to the IS. More than 80000 people have been displaced since the start of 2024. Militant activity also prevents the provision of food and health services. The UN reports that about 1.7 million people in Mozambique need immediate assistance and protection. Between May 10 and May 14, armed groups launched a major offensive on the town of Macomia, displacing about 1,500 people. The offensive comes as French oil company TotalEnergies is restarting a $20 billion liquified natural gas (LNG) terminal located at Palma, about 200 kilometers from Macomia, halted in 2021 due to escalating violence. ExxonMobil and its partner ENI are also developing LNG projects in Cabo Delgado. However, The mandate of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) mission, deployed in 2021 to help reduce the presence of the Islamic State (IS) militants in Mozambique's northern province of Cabo Delgado, is set to expire on July 15, 2024. Botswana and Lesotho already withdrew their forces in April, and Angola and Namibia are reportedly preparing to leave in the next few weeks, while 1,000 South African troops will remain in the country until the end of 2024. In late May, non-SADC country Rwanda announced the deployment of 2,000 additional soldiers to Mozambique due to escalating violence. As attacks in the province persist, international observers are concerned that the withdrawal of regional forces is premature since it could give further momentum to the jihadist insurgency. This would have dire implications for the humanitarian and security situation in Mozambique and the region. 


On July 28, 2024, Venezuela will hold presidential elections. Current president and PSUV leader Nicolás Maduro is seeking a third term. However, for the first time in nearly a decade, an opposition candidate, Edmundo González Urrutia, has a viable chance of winning. González, a former diplomat, became the surprise candidate for the Platform Unitarian Democrática (PUD) after its leader, María Corina Machado, was barred from running by Maduro. Polls show that two-thirds of Venezuelans would support any candidate challenging Maduro. Millions have fled his authoritarian rule and economic mismanagement, and those remaining yearn for democracy and economic growth. However, the election process is expected to be neither free nor fair. Maduro controls the Electoral Council and judiciary and has placed many obstacles to prevent a strong opposition candidate. In recent months, Maduro has disrupted and intimidated the opposition by detaining members, banning them from holding public office, and imposing measures to deter criticism, leading the US to reimpose in May the oil sanctions against Venezuela. Maduro also demanded opposition candidates sign an agreement to respect the election results. González refused to sign it, accusing Maduro of violating the pact by rescinding the invitation to EU observers, while the UN and the Carter Centre announced that they will provide limited election scrutiny, but keep the findings confidential. 

The post-election scenario is uncertain. In the event of an opposition victory, it is uncertain if Maduro will accept the results, or if he would disregard the vote by disqualifying González. International observers argue that it would be hazardous for Maduro not to allow the electoral transition in case of an opposition victory. Besides international prosecution of his regime's crimes and violations, it might also exacerbate divisions among the parties that support the PSVU. Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded that Maduro will attempt to retain power anyway. This could fuel the outbreak of protests and popular uprisings. Should González be recognized as president-elect, Venezuela's democratic transition is likely to be anything but simple. The new president will inherit a country strangled by economic crisis, mass migrations, corruption and inconsistency of democratic institutions and rule of law. 


On June 26, Bolivia suffered a potential coup when military forces seized control of the capital's main square with armored vehicles and stormed the presidential palace with a tank. In the following hours, the army general who led the coup attempt, Juan José Zúñiga, and 17 others were arrested for their involvement in the failed coup. Zúñiga claimed, with no evidence provided, that President Arce staged the coup to boost his popularity ahead of the 2025 presidential election. Although the government immediately denied the allegations, some opposition figures called the riots a self-coup. During the coup, Arce posted a video calling on the Bolivian people to mobilize and organize against the coup in the name of democracy. On June 27, Bolivians took to the streets to support the president and denounce the foiled military coup.

The alleged coup attempt comes at a time of instability for Bolivia, rocked by protests over shortages of US dollars and fuel and political turmoil ahead of the 2025 elections due to the rivalry between Arce and former President Evo Morales. Despite the Constitutional Court disqualifying him for the 2025 elections, Morales intends to run against former ally Arce, creating a major rift within the Socialist Party and a battle between Arce and Morales for control of the ruling MAS (Movement for Socialism) party. Although Morales still enjoys the support of labor unions and coca growers, many complain that the former president should not be allowed to run for reelection. Among them, Gen Zúñiga had threatened, before the alleged coup attempt, that he would block Morales if he attempted to return as president. 

Even if the ramifications of the coup are still unclear, this event has strengthened Arce’s political position, despite investigations into his possible involvement in the coup attempt. The situation in Bolivia remains unstable; new protests and more violence in the coming weeks cannot be ruled out. Should the political crisis and fragmentation of the ruling party intensify, political violence could escalate ahead of the 2025 elections. 

Updates, June 2024

New Caledonia

After an initial break-in hostilities in May, 2024, the population rose in protest again after seven activists, arrested for allegedly orchestrating the May riots, were taken to France to be tried there. Riots broke out, and several buildings were set alight. Around 3500 French troops are currently on the island to support local forces restoring order. Moreover, it is reported that the protests in New Caledonia are also financed and supported by Azerbaijan as a response to French military supplies and pledged defensive support to Armenia against attacks by "outside forces," with which Azerbaijan is on the brink of conflict. 

The unrest was sparked in response to French plans to allow French citizens who have lived in New Caledonia for over 10 years  to be able to vote in local elections. The local population fears that such influence will reduce their power and will make way for French companies and such to come and exploit the natural resources of the island. With the French general election that took place on June 30, 2024, it is still unclear what the French government's future policy toward the overseas territories will be. A far-right cabinet under the Rassemblement National will likely not favor greater independence for those territories, which could trigger more uprisings and riots in New Caledonia in the coming future.

Democratic Republic of Congo

The conflict between the Congolese army and the Rwanda-supported M23 rebels continues to rage in mineral-rich eastern DRC, worsening the dire humanitarian crisis.  In 2024 alone, over a million people have been displaced, with about 23 million facing crisis levels of hunger. Despite plans to leave the country, the UN recently announced a temporary expansion of MONUSCO troops presence in eastern DRC to counter the surge in violence. The situation is worsened due to the violence conducted by several militia groups vying for mineral resources. The ISIS-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) are carrying out substantial attacks on multiple villages in the provinces of North Kivu and Ituri, eastern DRC. Local authorities reported around 150 civilian casualties attributed to the ADF in June 2024. On June 20 and 21, the armed group Cooperative for the Development of the Congo (CODECO) reportedly carried out deadly attacks on several villages in the mineral-rich Djugu territory, Ituri province. 

Rising violence in the eastern DRC is fueling regional tension and increasing the risk of conflict in the region. The DRC is currently engaged in a bitter political confrontation with Rwanda, repeatedly accused by Kinshasa of funding the M23 and of the presence of Rwandan troops in the DRC, accusations denied by Rwandan President Kagame. Tensions are now rising following accusations by Congolese President Tshisekedi that Rwanda is orchestrating genocide in DRC's eastern provinces. In response, Kagame declared that Rwanda would be "ready to fight" against the DRC if necessary and blamed Kinshasa for funding extremist Hutu militias.


After months of delay due to court rulings and the deteriorating situation in Haiti, the first Kenyan police units of the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission arrived in Port-au-Prince on June 25. While the Presidential Transitional Council, which recently appointed a new PM, Garry Conille, is counting on the deployment of international forces to address gang-related violence, there is little transparency on the strategic plan, political agenda, and human rights oversight of the mission. Kenyan police are currently under investigation over allegations of excessive use of force against protesters in Nairobi in late June 2024. Moreover, although the United States has assured that the mission will be coordinated by Kenyan authorities, most of the funding has come from the Biden administration, which has announced a fund to assist Haiti that includes $95 million to support the security mission and $15 million to the Haitian national police. Finally, it is uncertain how gangs will react to the arrival and operation of the MSS. The likelihood of greater violence and direct confrontations from gangs and foreign forces cannot be ruled out. Since February 2024, escalating gang violence and prolonged political instability in Haiti have led to the displacement of more than 578,000 people. Despite the epicenter of violence being the capital city of Port-au-Prince, numerous gang attacks, massacres, kidnappings, and increased displacement were reported in June 2024 in rural areas of the country as well.

North Korea-South Korea

Tensions between North Korea and South Korea have risen in the last month. North Korea seems to feel empowered by the open support of Russia and the lack of consequences from the West for sending weapons to Iran and Russia. North Korea has been sending hundreds of balloons across the border into the south that carry garbage and excrement in a new form of the propaganda war between the two states. On June 24, 100 balloons landed in the Seoul area. In the third week of June 2024, North Korea and Russia signed a treaty that requires each country to provide aid and defense support in case of attacks by an outside force.

South Korea, in return, has reignited its propaganda campaign and has been blasting music and speeches through megaphones across the border. It has also reinforced troops in the border region and is investing large amounts of money into the development of new stealth fighter jets, MLRS platforms and other weaponry to modernize and vastly reinforce its army. In late June, South Korea started vast military drills called Freedom Edge with Japan and US forces. On June 22, a nuclear-powered US aircraft carrier arrived in South Korea. This will be a show of force and a signal to North Korea to back down from its aggressive posture even though it seems likely that North Korea will continue to aggravate the south just short of starting an actual war.


Relations between Taiwan and China deteriorated in June. Protests drew 100,000 people outside of Taiwan’s legislature to show disagreement with a controversial law proposed by the opposition. The law allows the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan’s People’s Party (TPP) to call any government official to answer questions on issues of national security, including the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) president, Lai Ching-te. According to supporters of the bill, this is a measure to “consolidate and refine” Taiwan’s democracy. For the pro-independence DPP and the protesters, the measures were quickly passed through the legislature without the proper checks and balances necessary to prevent abuse. The bill was finally passed, causing several successive protests. 

In an attempt to ramp up pressure on the island, China threatened to impose a death penalty for Taiwan independence separatists, targeting "ringleaders" of the independence movement. Although Beijing has no jurisdiction over Taiwan, this indicates that Beijing is intent on increasing pressure on the island. Taiwan's president has stated that China should accept dialogue with the Taiwanese government, and the US urged restraint after the law was declared. There are risks of further tensions as China increases its ship patrols around Taiwan's islands Matsu and Kinmen, hardens its positions toward Taiwan's government, and the US pledges to aid the island. 

Conflict Monitoring Report_ June 2024
Download PDF • 3.58MB

About the authors 

Arianna Lucà

Arianna is a new intern at Dyami, covering the role of Research Intelligence Analyst to enrich her background knowledge in International Relations with topics involving security and conflict. She holds an MA in International Relations from Leiden University and an LLM in European Criminal Justice from Utrecht University. During her academic career, she has volunteered for different NGOs, mainly Amnesty International, and Emergency and ActionAid, embracing humanitarian and conflict security causes, and addressing issues like famine and lack of security in different regions of the world. With Dyami, she is contributing to joint publications, writing articles, and keeping up to date with key regional developments.

Mickey Beckmann

Mickey is currently enrolled in the master’s program Conflict Studies & Human Rights at the University of Utrecht. As of a young age she felt the need to help people in dire circumstances, which evolved into a deep interest and drive to address sociocultural and political issues related to conflict. Motivated to make the world a safer and more accessible place, she completed a bachelor in ‘International Relations in Historical Perspective’ at Utrecht University. Eager to broaden her knowledge of geopolitical conflict and security, during her internship at Dyami she will actively participate in writing collaborative publications and authoring articles, with a main focus on the region North and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Jacob Dickinson 

Jacob studied Global Political Economy at Leiden University. He is passionate about international development and is looking to expand his expertise in geopolitics and crisis management. Curious about other cultures, he has traveled in Europe and Asia for both academic study and professional purposes. His expertise includes the geopolitics of oil and industrial upgrading in the electronics global value chain. He is particularly interested in the evolving political and economic relationships between China and ASEAN, and the consequences for regional development and security. 

Iris de Boer

Iris works as a Global Intelligence Analyst at Dyami, leveraging her background in Human Geography. Additionally, Iris holds an MA degree in Conflict Studies and Human Rights from Utrecht University, specializing in conflict analysis, peace processes, and geopolitics. Her MA thesis delved into the securitization of the war in Ukraine by the Heads of State, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and Ministers of Defense of the Netherlands and Poland. Within Dyami, Iris is actively involved in security risk management, travel security, and geopolitical analysis. Her enthusiasm for addressing topics in international security extends across a diverse spectrum of countries and regions

Kevin Heller

Kevin has over a decade of experience in the world of counter-terrorism as a consultant, trainer, and analyst. His background is in military Close Quarter Battle/Combat and Krav Maga for Military and Law Enforcement agencies. As a Global Intelligence Analyst, he writes Intel Briefs on conflict zones and terrorism.He has extensive knowledge of conflicts, politics, and other events happening in the Middle East. Kevin also has a background in Journalism and International Affairs/Conflict Studies.

Sara Frisan 

Sara joined Dyami as a Junior Intelligence/Research Analyst post-graduate intern to deepen her passionate interest in conflict analysis and security. Sara recently completed her MA in Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University and held an MA degree in International Sciences and Peace Studies. During her academic career, she conducted research in South America, primarily Colombia, on the dynamics of collaboration and resistance between civilians and non-state armed groups in violent settings. In her previous internship at the investigative think-tank InSight Crime, Sara developed some expertise on transnational organized crime and political-criminal alliances. 

130 views0 comments


Commenting has been turned off.
bottom of page