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Reflecting on the truth and reconciliation process in South Africa, 25 years later By: Puck Holthuis & Chiara Longmore In the aftermath of apartheid, South Africa underwent a major political and societal transition. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established as a process of healing for the country, with formal hearings commencing on 15 April 1996. The TRC was established as a court-like body where victims and perpetrators alike could come to give testimony of their experiences during apartheid. As Mandela commented: “South African people must remember their dreadful past in order to be able to deal with it, to forgive when it is necessary, but never to forget”1 and the TRC was a key framework which facilitated this remembering in order to heal the nation. Peacebuilding through retributive justice For effective peace to be established it is largely understood that justice must be incorporated into peacebuilding processes.2 Nevertheless, the nexus between peace and justice is not straightforward - there is no ‘one-size fits all’ approach. Deciding what peace and justice mechanisms to use, and for whom, is a question policymakers grapple with across different contexts. In South Africa, the peace process emphasised restorative justice - the search for the truth in order to facilitate reconciliation and healing. South Africa’s TRC had a particular emphasis on truth-telling to heal as “dealing with the past means knowing what happened”.3 Figure I: Contemporary South African flag, Flowcomm, available at: https://www.flickr.com/photos/flowcomm/15318490720 The use of restorative justice in South Africa, with the emphasis on truth-telling to reconcile, was crucial in the post-apartheid context. At the time the TRC was established, South Africa was undergoing a transitional process, creating a highly politicised and tense environment where political legitimacy was tenuous.4 Therefore, the use of the truth commission was extremely appropriate in the context of South Africa to ensure that effective peace and healing could take place. No one official version of apartheid was established in South Africa’s TRC, and instead the commission facilitated a rich assembly of perspectives from a diverse range of individuals, both the victims and the perpetrators, who lived through apartheid to voice their lived experience of events.5 TRC testimonies To further our analysis of how the South African TRC functioned, we interviewed a former employee of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Joop Pinckaers. The South African TRC had a unique and never before seen unit, which was the Investigation Unit. During his employment, Joop helped establish and manage this department of the TRC. Prior to his work in South Africa, Joop had travelled to West Tanzania where he and his team examined and sophisticated the security and safety in and around the Rwandan refugee camps after the Rwanda genocide. These camps housed Hutus and Tutsis separately. In Burundi, where Joop and his team travelled to as well, the refugee camps housed mixed Hutu and Tutsi married couples. Joop’s close affinity with the African continent and its people made him a good candidate to try and help the TRC achieve stability in South Africa and help this nation move forward from its painful past. Figure II: Nelson Mandela's release from Victor Verster Prison in Paarl, South Africa. Photograph taken by Puck Holthuis The goal of the Investigation Unit was multiple: it both investigated and corroborated the testimonies bravely put forth by apartheid’s victims and their families, and the information from amnesty applications. Additionally, the unit facilitated through exhaustive investigation the granting of amnesty to perpetrators and, if determined by the commission, would engage in further independent investigation. In doing so, the TRC was better able to map out the apartheid regime and its damage. This in turn allowed the Amnesty Commission, the Human Rights Violations Commission and the Reparation and Rehabilitation Commission of the TRC to more accurately judge the cases before them. As mentioned, making room for healing largely determined the TRC’s course of action. As stated in the final report of the TRC: “However painful the experience, the wounds of the past must not be allowed to fester. They must be opened. They must be cleansed. And balm must be poured on them so they can heal. This is not to be obsessed with the past. It is to take care that the past is properly dealt with for the sake of the future.” 6 A shared traumatic past During the interview, Joop recalled the moment when the Investigation Unit did not trust the full admissions by Eugene de Kock, former commander of Vlakplaas. The Chairman of the Commission submitted this case to the State President who decided to send the case to Court, which would then determine the perpetrator’s punishment. The sentence passed were two life sentences plus 212 years in prison for crimes against humanity. Along with the passed sentence, the above quote is an indication of the difficulties and trauma the TRC faced in order to heal South Africa. This is further illustrated by Joop’s written notes that he took during his employment. He writes: Figure III: Flag during the Apartheid regime, available at: https://pixabay.com/illustrations/south-africa-flag-apartheid-1184104 “[The members of the Investigation Unit] worked with victims and experienced their trauma, anguish and pain. They worked with perpetrators and saw the brutalised, traumatised people who carried out horrific acts of violence. They worked with those stories, stories of torture, rape and murder, of bodies being blown up repeatedly, being burnt for hours. They were there when the remains of victims were exhumed. They saw the bullet holes in the back of heads and felt the terror of those victims in their last hours. They went home to be with their families, to interact with friends. And they returned to work another day to face the trauma, the stress and the anxiety.” 7 Those who could retell their painful experiences and relive their traumas for the sake of their own healing and that of the country, were met by empathetic members of the TRC, many of whom had lived through apartheid themselves. Nevertheless, their pain and grief had also permeated the skin of those who hadn’t lived through it. Local collective healing It is indicative of the South Africa’s use of restorative justice, bringing together individuals through the telling of lived experiences in a process of nation healing. This model of truth-telling to heal in South Africa’s TRC has been adopted by subsequent truth and reconciliation commissions, for example in Sierra Leone, positioning the South African model as one of the most influential templates for peace and justice.8 Whilst South Africa’s TRC is seen as an effective society-driven project of healing, its model of reconciliation may not be as usefully transferred to other contexts, particularly regarding the local level. Indeed, there have been increasing attempts to establish bottom-up peacebuilding approaches which place local communities and individuals at the focus.9 An example of this can be seen in Somalia with the Wajir Women for Peace Group, a group of local Somali women who used familiar customs and sharia law to administer justice and administer reparations between warring sides.10 The Somali case is illustrative of a local peacebuilding process, driven by locals, where the focus was less on reconciliation and more on delivering justice through reparations and indicates the importance of applying the appropriate mechanisms of peace and justice to the relevant contexts. The power of the truth Through examining the case of South Africa it is evident that the TRC’s model of reconciliation was effective through the power of truth-telling. In the aftermath of violence and oppression, establishing truth and allowing individuals to tell their experiences is of vital importance to ensure long-term peace. Indeed, individuals who participated in Sierra Leone’s TRC spoke of how being able to express their truth of events helped them to process the violence they experienced, with one victim stating how she went to the TRC: “[…] to clear my chest. If I just go and sit down and don’t talk, it would burn my heart more and more. But if I go and talk it in public, I will feel better in my heart. That’s what they told me, and it was true.” 11 The power of truth-telling through reconciliation processes is one which should not be underestimated in peacebuilding processes in order to prevent future violence from occurring. This is echoed in the words of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee, when they state that: “Those who forget the past are doomed to repeat it” [these] are the words emblazoned at the entrance to the museum in the former concentration camp of Dachau. They are words we would do well to keep ever in mind.” 12 Moving forward today Nevertheless, South Africa is still struggling to move forward today. The apartheid aftermath remains painfully visible as the nation battles with the many inconsistencies that are a result of the apartheid regime. Funds that should have been directed at the facilitation of reconciliation and rehabilitation were instead spent elsewhere. According to Joop, that is one of the reasons South Africa is not in the state it should have been in by today. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Authors: Puck Holthuis is a master student Conflict Studies & Human Rights at Utrecht University. She recently relocated back to The Netherlands after living abroad since 2006. During that time, she spent many years in South Africa and China. Puck continues to develop her passion for analysis; studying foreign cultures and using that to strengthen her intercultural communication skills. Chiara Longmore is originally from Scotland; however, she has moved to the Netherlands to complete a master’s at Leiden University in International Relations and Diplomacy. With an interdisciplinary background, her bachelor’s was in Liberal Arts, she has analysed situations of violence and conflict with a multi-disciplinary framework, in particular with Political Science, Anthropology, and Sociology.

By: Alessia Cappelletti & Anastasija Kuznecova On the 23rd of March, the United Nations Human Rights Council (OHCHR) passed a resolution demanding free and credible elections in Nicaragua. With 20 votes in favour and 18 abstentions, Russia, together with seven other countries, voted against. The resolution is not only showcasing the increasing international concern for the autocratic moves by Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, but also sheds a light on the continuation and strengthening of the country's bond with Russia. A New Dictatorship? Daniel Ortega rose to power after the Sandinista party's overthrow of the US-backed Somoza dictatorship in 1979. He led Nicaragua until 1990 and during his first administration, he promoted land reforms, wealth redistribution and literacy programs. After three failed election attempts, Ortega returned to the presidency in 2007 and was once again re-elected in 2011. His second term has increasingly become antidemocratic. Daniel Ortega filled the government with his allies and abolished term limits to get himself re-elected in 2016. Today, Sandinista party controls the courts and legislature, and many consider Ortega as bad as, or even worse, than Nicaragua's former dictator Anastasio Somoza.1 Figure I: Banner at Rotonda Metrocentro, Managua, Nicaragua. Jorge Mejía Peralta, taken 7 June 2008. Available at: https://www.flickr.com/photos/45879387@N00/2559645950 In April 2018, protests broke out in Nicaragua due to cuts to social security benefits. The protests developed into demands for Ortega to step down and allow early elections. Police and armed pro-government groups repressed protesters, leading to 328 deaths, more than 2000 injuries, and hundreds of arrests and prosecutions.2 It was reported that many captives were tortured in the prison with methods such as electric shocks, severe beatings, fingernail removal, suffocation, and rape. Sandinista government responded to the protests with accusing the opposition of attempting a coup-launch. As a result, in December 2020, the government approved a law that gives them power to ban citizens classified as "terrorists" or coup-mongers from running in elections This law has raised concerns whether there will be a unified opposition in the upcoming election in November 2021, as many opposition leaders are still being referred to as traitors by Ortega. Steps Towards a Repressive Authoritarianism The Ortega administration approved in 2020 the "Cybercrime Law", also known as the "Gag Law", which imposes jail sentences on journalists when they publish a story the authorities consider fake. The government continues restricting freedom of expression for reporters, as well as human rights defenders, through threats, surveillance, physical attacks, detentions, financial investigations, and forced closures of news outlets. Police raids are not uncommon for opponents of the Sandinista government, and the beginning of 2021 also saw Nicaragua's first police raid of a journalist's home that was carried out without a court order.3 Authorities in Nicaragua have denied COVID-19 impact, refused to implemented measures recommended by global health experts, and covered up suspected COVID-19 deaths. Between the outbreak of the virus and August 2020, more than 31 doctors have been fired from public hospitals due to their disagreement of the inadequate response.4 This treatment of health workers is not new. During the protests in 2018, around 405 health workers were fired from public hospitals because they were providing care to protesters or criticising Ortega and his government.5 Daniel Ortega as Nicaraguan President. Cancillería de Ecuador, taken 10 January 2012. Available at: https://www.flickr.com/photos/dgcomsoc/6679779009/in/photostream/ Inter American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has reported that between April 2018 and April 2020, more than 103,000 Nicaraguans have fled the country,6 with two-thirds seeking refuge in Costa Rica.7 It would be unsurprising if the numbers keep increasing with the continuation of human rights violations, lack of COVID-19 response, and undemocratic elections. International Response So far, the United States and the European Union, as well as other countries, have imposed sanctions on several Nicaraguan government officials who are responsible for human rights abuses, undermining democracy or corruption. Daniel Ortega has denied the allegations and stated that these sanctions constitute an attack on Nicaragua's sovereignty and interference in their internal affairs. On March 26, US Senators introduced the "Reinforcing Nicaragua's Adherence to Conditions for Electoral Reform" (RENACER) Act to pressure Daniel Ortega to keep free and fair elections. The Act recommends new actions to address corruption and human rights violations by the Nicaraguan government and security forces and calls for increased sanctions coordination with Canada and the European Union. RENACER also raises concerns on Russian activity in the country, suggesting that intelligence reporting on the matter has to be improved. The chief of U.S. Southern Command included Nicaragua in the list of ‘malign regional state actors,’ together with Venezuela and Cuba, for opening their doors to external powers (China and Russia) and criminal organizations. Old Friends: Russia and Nicaragua In Nicaragua, a country where 90% of the army is made up by Russian weapons, Moscow finds a substantial support platform in the Western hemisphere since the days of the Sandinista revolution in 1979. Russia and Cuba supported Ortega during the revolution and continue to support him today, and Nicaragua repays the favour. The country was very first to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, which almost immediately granted economic deals with Russian companies in the energy sector.8 Again, whilst half of the world condemns Russia’s actions in Crimea, Nicaragua opened an honorary consulate in the contested peninsula. In February 2021, this costed Nicaragua various sanctions from Ukraine, which defined the action as ‘an openly unfriendly step.’9 Nicaragua also offers miles of territory strategically close to the United States. Russia is allowed to dock warships in Nicaraguan ports and has built facilities for combatting drug trafficking in Managua, the capital, where officials from all over the continent are trained. Moscow recently also installed a satellite navigation system base in Nicaragua, part of the larger GLONASS network of twenty-four satellites operated by Russia’s Aerospace Defence Forces.10 The base is located on the hills of a volcano overlooking the U.S. Embassy in Managua. U.S. officials speculate that the GLONASS base would serve as Russian signal intelligence platform, given its proximity to their Embassy. Officials in Moscow denied the accusations.11 GLONASS project is also present in Brazil – the four Brazilian stations are easily accessible and work in close cooperation with the Brazilian Space Agency. In Managua, however, transparency is lacking surrounding the GLONASS base,12 some fear it could also be used to ‘simply’ spy on domestic critics of the government.13 Most recently, Russia showed its support for Nicaragua through donating doses of the Sputnik V vaccine. When vice-president and first lady Rosario Murillo announced the news in February, she did not disclose the number of doses received, though in January the government stated that 3.8 million doses would arrive. It is also unclear how the pandemic affected the country as number of covid cases and death are said to be heavily underreported.14 Sanctioned Allies Daniel Ortega is likely headed for his fourth consecutive term as president. However, the road is an upward slope for his mandate, with Nicaragua’s GDP consistently falling since 2017, the mismanagement of the COVID-19 crisis, and the various international sanctions received from western countries. The country’s strong financial ties with Venezuela do not help much in economic as well as political matters, as Venezuela has also been severely sanctioned, and neither does its ideological vicinity with Cuba, which has been recently victim of U.S. sanctions too (see Colombia, Cuba and Venezuela). However, the countries remain solid allies under the ALBA umbrella and Russian support for these nations. And as Nicaragua finds friends in countries ‘ostracized’ by western powers, it creates a cradle for Russian influence to grow and a solid axis from which Moscow could exert control over the region. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group, as part of the ‘Russian Strategic Interests in Latin America’ research project led by Alessia Cappelletti and Isabel Oriol. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Authors: Alessia Cappelletti is a Global Security Analyst and Program Manager of DEWIS. She has field experience in South America, Colombia especially, which makes her largely acquainted with the security challenges of the Latin American context. Her expertise includes conflict analysis and investigation, human rights protection, and criminality. Anastasija Kuznecova is a student at the MA program in Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University. She has field experience from Chile, Jamaica and the Balkans, and her interests include issues concerning social inequality, discrimination, and conflict escalation. With her combined practical experience and academic knowledge, Anastasija has a broad understanding of security, development, and human rights.

Does the CIA drone base expansion signal increased concerns over terrorism activities? By: Chiara Longmore Recent satellite images have shown that the CIA’s Dirkou drone base in Niger has been expanding, with a report from the New York Times stating that the CIA are continuing to conduct drone flights from the base. Within Africa’s Sahel region, home to growing violent Islamist extremism, the expansion of the Dirkou base could be indicative of increasing counterterrorism operations in the region. This is a surprising development, given Joe Biden’s statement halting US drone strikes in non-conflict zones. CIA’s Sahara airbase Within Niger’s Sahara Desert, situated next to a small airport, lies the Dirkou air base. The base, used by the CIA since 2018, has been steadily developed under the Trump administration with the purpose of conducting remote drone surveillance operations. A recent report from The New York Times shows satellite images indicating that Dirkou has undergone an expansion, with the site’s runway almost doubling in length. The CIA has made no public statement on the expansion of the base which will now be able to house MQ-9 Reaper drones and U-28 aircraft. The development of the drone base emerges despite the Biden administration’s temporary directive to limit remote airstrikes in non-conflict zones outside of Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. Figure I: USAF Drone Base in Dirkou, Niger [Satellite image]. Hozint – Horizon Intelligence, Political and Security risk monitor [Horizon+]. Brussels, EU. Using MapBox and OpenStreetMap Contributors. Leaflet Javascript. In Niger, the US military has airbases in Agadez and Niamey which carried out drone strikes in Libya during the Trump administration. The Agadez and Niamey airbases have also given support to the French-led International Coalition for the Sahel which aims to address the growing crisis in the Sahel by fighting armed terrorist groups, strengthening armed forces in the region, as well as assisting regional development. The Dirkou base is closer to the Libyan border than Agadez and Niamey and, consequently, is better positioned for counterterrorism surveillance of Islamist militants in southern Libya. Its strategic position may explain the base’s recent expansion, particularly as activities from extremist groups such as the Islamic State in Libya and across the Sahel region have intensified. Crisis in the Sahel Africa’s Sahel region crosses several states including Senegal, Sudan, Mali, Niger, Burkino Faso and Chad. The region has been subjected to growing violent activities from Islamist extremist groups, with the Islamic State based in southern Libya actively recruiting from the West African region. According to the UN, the Sahel has recently seen ‘unprecedented terrorist violence’ against both civilian and military targets, with casualties from terrorist-related attacks increasing ‘five-fold since 2016’ in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Indeed, in January of this year, 100 civilians in northern Niger were killed as a result of Islamist extremist fighting and intercommunal conflict. Contested counterterrorism strategies To combat the crisis in the Sahel, the international coalition led by France has engaged in a military-led strategy, training regional security forces and engaging in direct military engagement with extremist groups. Recently, the US and British militaries’ conducted training of the Somali National Army which demonstrates further military-led counterinsurgency strategies in the Sahel region. The expansion of the Dirkou base does not necessarily indicate increased US military activity, however, it does hint at enhancing military-led surveillance operations as well as the possibility of conducting remote drone strikes. Yet, the efficacy of a military-led counterinsurgency strategy in combatting the Sahel crisis is disputed. A recent report from International Crisis Group has emphasised the need to ‘reorient’ the military-centred approach in the Sahel region and instead focus on strengthening governance in the region. In areas where the security of the state is weak, extremist groups such as the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda assume a form of ‘rebel governance', providing security to civilians in return for their support. Growing discontent in the West African region, for example, the Mali uprising in August of last year, can be attributed to a failure of military-led strategies which do not effectively address the core needs of the regional governments in the Sahel region. Furthermore, ethical issues surround the use of remote strategies in counterterrorism efforts. Ethical issues are a central factor in the Biden administration’s recent halt on remote counterterrorism operations outside conflict zones, given past criticism of US drone attacks causing civilian casualties in, for example, Yemen and Pakistan. Military-led preparedness For an effective and sustainable strategy in the Sahel region, a balance of counterterrorism approaches is necessary to combat the complex issues at hand. On the one hand, ‘crisis of governance’ in the Sahel is indeed vital to address particularly when we consider the challenges that the vast geographic region brings to achieving sovereign power. On the other hand, military-led operations can be extremely useful in governmental support as well as placing needed pressure on Islamist groups with low financial and political costs and deter future recruitment. In conclusion, a comprehensive counterterrorism response in the Sahel is necessary, especially when we consider comments made by the UNOWAS chief that the “geographic focus of terrorist attacks…is increasingly threatening West African coastal States”. This shift towards the coast may be a cause of concern regarding the wider influence of extremist groups such as the Islamic State beyond West Africa. Therefore, while the expansion of the Dirkou Drone Base in Niger may not directly signal US military expansionism in the Sahel, the development of the base may be indicative of intentions to strengthen counterinsurgency surveillance in preparedness for further escalations of terrorist activities within the Sahel. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author: Chiara Longmore is originally from Scotland; however, she has moved to the Netherlands to complete a master’s at Leiden University in International Relations and Diplomacy. With an interdisciplinary background, her bachelor’s was in Liberal Arts, she has analysed situations of violence and conflict with a multi-disciplinary framework, in particular with Political Science, Anthropology, and Sociology.

Loyalist threats raise worries about post-Brexit stability in Northern Ireland By: Ruben Pfeijffer In early March, Northern Irish loyalist paramilitary groups sent a threatening letter to British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his Irish counterpart Michaél Martin. In this letter, the loyalist groups stated that they would withdraw their support for the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, unless the customs border between the UK and Northern Ireland is lifted. The Good Friday Agreement, which formally ended the Troubles and ushered in a new era of peaceful cohabitation and cooperation between republicans and loyalists, has been under increasing pressure since Brexit. The Northern Ireland Protocol The primary source of the current discontent among loyalist groups is the so called ‘Northern Ireland Protocol’ that is part of the Brexit Arrangements between the UK and the EU. The protocol, which went into effect this year, was one of the most heavily debated topics during the Brexit negotiations. Reaching an agreement that was sufficiently satisfying for all involved parties proved to be an enormous challenge. The Northern Ireland protocol was conceived in order to safeguard the terms of the Good Friday Agreement by avoiding a hard border between Ireland and Northern-Ireland, while preventing the UK from having a backdoor into the EU internal market by establishing a customs border between the UK and Northern Ireland. Loyalist groups are upset with this arrangement as they claim it cuts them off from their desired union with the UK, and moves them closer to reunification with Ireland. Republicans on the other hand are relatively satisfied with the Northern Ireland protocol. The arrangement ensures - in accordance with the Good Friday Agreement - the absence of a physical border between Ireland and Northern Ireland, keeping the existing all-island economy intact and safeguarding the rights of Northern Irish citizens with an Irish passport. This apparent disparity in satisfaction with the terms of the Northern Ireland protocol has caused a noticeable increase in unrest among loyalist groups over the last few months, culminating in the threatening letter sent to Boris Johnson and Michaél Martin by the Loyalist Communities Council (LCC). The LCC is a legal umbrella organisation that represents the paramilitary Ulster Volunteer Force, Ulster Defence Association and Red Hand Commandos. Although the LCC has pledged that opposition against the Northern Ireland protocol will remain peaceful and democratic for the time being, they have also warned that they would permanently withdraw from the Good Friday Agreement if the protocol were not repealed or amended according to their terms. EU and UK response Despite the recent threats by the LCC, it is unlikely that the EU is willing to change its stance on the Northern Ireland protocol. On the contrary, they are doubling down on the enforcement of the agreed regulations. On the 15 March, the EU announced that they would launch legal procedures against the UK for breaking international law by circumventing parts of the Northern Ireland protocol. Back in January, the EU allowed the UK a three month ‘grace period’ in order to give affected industries the opportunity to adapt to the new customs border between the UK and Northern Ireland. However, the UK has decided to unilaterally extend the grace period beyond the agreed period of time, a move which is in clear violation of international law. By extending the grace period, the UK and Northern Ireland avoid certain bureaucratic requirements of the Northern Ireland protocol. The UK’s decision to unilaterally extend the grace period was certainly welcomed by unionist/loyalist parties in Northern Ireland, as the absence of most border checks means they remain in relative union with the UK despite the Brexit. However, the UK’s move was met with strong disapproval from republican parties, Ireland and the EU. America as potential mediator Recently, the US has decided to become more involved in the ongoing EU-UK dispute. Home to almost 32 million people of Irish decent, the US has historically often shown interest in (Northern) Irish affairs. In 1998, it was a US senator that chaired over the historical Good Friday Agreement that ended the Troubles. Being of Irish decent himself, US president Joe Biden lately seems to have taken a stronger stance on the Northern Ireland protocols. During a virtual meeting with Irish Prime Minister Michaél Martin on St. Patrick’s day, president Biden expressed his strong support for the Northern Ireland protocols, as he claimed the protocols are integral to preserving peace and stability in Northern Ireland. However, US officials have also stated that they are currently unwilling to pick a side in the EU-UK dispute. Instead, they call upon all involved parties to sit down at the negotiating table and discuss the re-implementation of the protocols. Is the unrest here to stay? Even if the EU and UK are able to resolve their dispute on their own and move towards full implementation of the Northern Ireland protocols, the issue of the LCC will persist. The UK’s circumvention of the bureaucratic requirements of the protocol has so far alleviated unrest among loyalist groups to a certain extent. However, since this move violates international protocols, the British will have no choice but ending the extended grace period in the near future or face possible EU sanctions. Regarding the LCC’s threats, the organisation claims that they will protest against the Northern Ireland protocols peacefully and democratically. Since the horrors of the Troubles are still fresh in the memories of the majority of the Northern Irish population, it is indeed unlikely that a relapse into violence is seen as a preferable solution to the current dispute. Regardless, in recent weeks posters and graffiti with texts like: “Our forefathers fought for our freedoms and rights, no border in the sea or we continue the fight” have been spotted around the country8. While a return to full conflict remains highly unlikely for now, the threat of potential small-scale incidents should be taken seriously. After all, there is also a younger generation of loyalists that has no personal memory of the Troubles. Despite the fact that Brexit negotiators from the EU and UK considered the Northern Ireland protocols as the best possible compromise, it has become increasingly clear that loyalist groups in Northern Ireland will not accept a customs border within the UK under the current terms. Unless their concerns can be addressed and alleviated, it would seem that the current social unrest in Northern Ireland is here to stay for the time being. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author: Ruben Pfeijffer is a graduated anthropologist who currently follows the MA program Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University. While working on his bachelor thesis in the Netherlands during the early stages of the COVID-19 outbreak, Ruben gained experience with conducting ethnographic research under the challenging circumstances of the pandemic, and has learned to be adaptable with his research methods.

The Devastating Impact of COVID-19 By: Anastasija Kuznecova and Puck Holthuis Measures such as lockdowns and travel restrictions implemented to reduce the spread of COVID-19 were initially expected to dissuade human trafficking. Instead, one year later, it has left more people vulnerable to becoming the next victims and a growth in online sexual exploitation of children. With more manpower assigned to COVID-19 related tasks, many governments have deprioritised their responsibility for victims of trafficking and sexual exploitation. Where there already existed insufficient education, resources, and training for law enforcement to combat human trafficking, this industry's perpetrators now have more room to expand their money-making businesses. What is Human Trafficking? The United Nations (UN) defines human trafficking as "the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of people through force, fraud or deception, with the aim of exploiting them for profit".1 Human trafficking can result in sexual exploitation, forced labour, domestic servitude among other types of exploitation. Figure I: "NOT for sale: human trafficking" by Maria Charitou is licensed with CC BY-ND 2.0. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/2.0/ The traffickers often target marginalised people and those in need of economic assistance due to their vulnerability. The majority of trafficked victims are women and girls. In addition, traffickers often target migrants and vulnerable children. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported that in 2018 around one-third of detected victims were children. In low-income countries, the number is even higher, with children accounting for 50 per cent of the identified victims.2 Globally, most child victims are trafficked for sexual exploitation. This is particularly the case of child trafficking in East Asia, Central America and the Caribbean. In Sub-Saharan Africa, there is a trend of children being forced into labour, specifically at plantations, in mines and quarries, as vendors in markets, on farms, and on the street to beg for money. Similarly, in South America, children are exploited for labour at plantations, while in South Asia, they are trafficked for sectors such as agriculture, the garment industry and to work at hotels or in brick kilns.3 Human trafficking occurs both within national borders as well as cross-border, with increasing numbers of detected victims being trafficked within their own country.4 Traffickers often use false recruitment advertisements in a range of economic sectors to target people seeking to work abroad. Fraudulent vacancies have been detected in sectors such as construction, agriculture, modelling, cleaning, and manufacturing, attracting a variety of applicants of different ages, gender and backgrounds. Trafficking is a huge issue globally. It exploits people and violates their human rights. However, it is a crime that is difficult to uncover as it predominantly operates underground and on the dark web. Traffickers have adapted to modern technology and the internet, using it to find their victims, coerce them into forced labour or sexual exploitation, and simultaneously operate in multiple locations. Impacts of COVID-19: Increased Vulnerability and Risk of Exploitation COVID-19 has led to worsening poverty, an increase in unemployment, and reduced income, heightening the risk of vulnerable people being trafficked. Victims of trafficking are more susceptible to contracting the virus and might not have access to healthcare. This, together with reduced access to shelters, reinforces victims' vulnerability both to re-trafficking and to virus infection. Figure II: "Child Labour in Indonesia" by henri ismail is licensed with CC BY-NC-ND 2.0. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/ The pandemic has resulted in fears that identifying victims of human trafficking will become more challenging. This is due to the lockdowns and restrictions that reinforce the isolation of victims and further increases the trafficker's control over the victim's movements. Additionally, isolation and social distancing can aggravate a victim's mental health issues and restrict their access to support networks. Many victims who are currently sexually exploited or are in domestic servitude are experiencing worsening living conditions. Trafficked women in Latin America have been forced to meet men on the street or in their own homes due to hotel closures5. Furthermore, COVID-19 has increased violence against women, which, one could anticipate, has also increased the risk of violence for trafficked women. Original predictions claimed that travelling restrictions would lower the numbers of human trafficking. Police in Thailand reported that in 2020 they experienced the lowest number of trafficking investigations since 2010. However, experts have claimed that this smaller number is not due to fewer people being trafficked, but because of authorities doing fewer inspections.6 In Latin America, church activists who support victims of human trafficking, have reported that the numbers of victims have, in fact, gone up with the pandemic.7 As the pandemic increases economic difficulties experienced globally, more people become at risk of being lured or forced into sexual or labour exploitation. This might suggest that the numbers of victims of trafficking might escalate after the pandemic. Figure III: "Bar ‘Pussy Galore’, Pat Pong district, Bangkok, Thailand." by axlright is licensed with CC BY-NC 2.0. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/ (Disclaimer: whether the women working in this bar were traffic Exploitation of Children Children – an already heavily targeted group before the pandemic – are at a high risk of being trafficked due to school closures, which deprives many children of food and shelter.8 In addition, more children have been forced to help their families by providing food and income, which has increased their risk of both being exploited and of contracting the virus. Perpetrators' utilisation of the internet in the past years has made abuse easier and more accessible as they do not have to leave their houses, acquiring more security for themselves. Victims, on the other hand, experience the opposite. Sexual material can be used as the offender wants; it can be sold, uploaded on various forums, and used for further exploitation. 9 Thus, it increases the perpetrator's power and further contributing to the victim's vulnerability. Social isolation and lockdowns have led to more people spending time on the internet, increasing the online sexual exploitation of children. In 2020, more than 21 000 reports of child exploitation online were recorded, compared to 14 000 reports in 2019.10 These numbers are expected to rise further. Online sexual exploitation can take form in different ways, such as grooming, consuming sexual abuse material, live streaming, and forcing or blackmailing children for material. Many poor households facilitate online exploitation of their children because they see it as a means to earn money, which further shows that economic need contributes to human abuse. There are various forums and platforms dedicated to the production and exchange of sexual material of children. During the pandemic, the demand for child exploitation material has been so high that some of these platforms have crashed.11 Competitions for the best videos have also been arranged both during the pandemic and in previous years. In addition, EUROPOL has found posts where offenders share advice about safely travelling abroad to abuse children or groom them online.12 This increases the fear that online sexual exploitation will lead to more physical abuse of children. Perpetrators use encryptions and software to hide their IP address, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), preventing identification. Thus, law enforcement is struggling to trace the material back to the offenders. Awareness of the possible risks of online sexual exploitation remains low, which also increases the risk of children being abused. The buying and selling of humans and online exploitation of children and adults remains a lucrative business. In fact, it is a billion-dollar industry.13 As there continues to be a market for human beings – arguably a growing one after the pandemic fractured not the trade itself, but the fragile protective system that existed before – human trafficking is often referred to as ‘modern slavery’. Figure IV: "A child flower seller makes rounds through the early morning hours, Pat Pong district, Bangkok, Thailand." by axlright is licensed with CC BY-NC 2.0. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/ Lack of Law Enforcement and Resources Because of its high value, corruption closely ties into the ceaseless trade. With an already existing lack of human trafficking assigned resources and intelligence, the blow becomes even more painful when law enforcement and government officials, such as police and immigration officers, turn a blind eye to the suffering of human trafficking victims to fill their pockets instead.14 This lack of law enforcement with regards to the issue of human trafficking has worsened since the pandemic, with law enforcement stationed elsewhere to tackle COVID-19 related repercussions.15 The recent murder of the 33-year-old British Sarah Everard by metropolitan police officer Wayne Couzens is an example of the difficulties that victims worldwide face when it comes to their dependence on authorities. Although Couzens does not represent all law enforcement officials collectively, it brings to light that much too often, the suffering of victims is caused by the individuals who, instead of upholding standards and morale, abuse their power and break the laws they ought to protect. As described earlier, online platforms have also seen a massive spike in demand for human exploitation. With existing online realms where advertisements for purchasing humans and exploitation can be found advancing and expanding, such as the Deep (Dark) Web, the difficulty of policing the (anonymous) digital world adds fuel to the fire. This further shows that the issue of human trafficking too often remains unaddressed, even though it could affect us all in this age of widely accessible internet. Although the tracking and tracing of those who conceal their online identities for purposes of malice remain possible, the progress the internet has made demands additional research and policies to ensure the safety of millions of people. Efforts made to combat human trafficking and to protect the vulnerable groups of society are shown by, for example, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). This legally-binding international agreement ensures the protection of children’s civic, political, economic and social rights. A progressive 196 countries have ratified this agreement, with only, although shockingly, the USA, South Sudan and Somalia not (yet) participating. The undeniable global power the US has and taking into consideration its status worldwide and the role of law enforcement officials in the continuation of trafficking, we can begin to understand the painful difficulties victims of trafficking face not only whilst being trafficked, but also after they have reclaimed their position in society. At present and in all nations globally, neither protection nor justice is guaranteed for children, women or the disadvantaged.16 The Road Ahead Based on the UN's compiled research and suggestions, what follows are ways in which human trafficking can more efficiently be tackled. - Protect yourself and those around you when going online by staying informed - More investment in education, equal job opportunity and awareness - Education and the discussion of human trafficking should both include the protection of oneself online, but also prevention of an increasing number of perpetrators - More research needs to be conducted on how to protect especially vulnerable groups from online exploitation - More allocated resources and manpower to the issue of human trafficking - Increase cross-border cooperation - Improved training of service providers, police and healthcare workers to identify human trafficking and, - Provide a better support system for service providers and victims of trafficking 17 This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Authors: Anastasija Kuznecova is a student at the MA program in Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University. She has field experience from Chile, Jamaica and the Balkans, and her interests include issues concerning social inequality, discrimination, and conflict escalation. With her combined practical experience and academic knowledge, Anastasija has a broad understanding of security, development, and human rights. Puck Holthuis is a master student Conflict Studies & Human Rights at Utrecht University. She recently relocated back to The Netherlands after living abroad since 2006. During that time, she spent many years in South Africa and China. Puck continues to develop her passion for analysis; studying foreign cultures and using that to strengthen her intercultural communication skills.

How recent violence in Darfur threatens peace in South Sudan By Chiara Longmore Since gaining independence from Sudan a decade ago, South Sudan's early history has been marred by a destructive civil war. Slow steps towards peace have been made, with the latest ceasefire agreement being signed in October 2020. Nevertheless, with recent violent clashes in neighbouring Sudan's Darfur region threatening to rekindle old conflicts, the prospect of stable peace in South Sudan remains hanging in the balance. Violent Beginnings Since gaining independence from Sudan in 2011, South Sudan has experienced a bloody and violent birth as a new state. In December 2013, Vice President Machar's Sudan People's Liberation Party-In Opposition (SPLM-IO), largely reflecting the Nuer population, split from President Kiir's Sudan People's Liberation Party (SPLM), representing the Dinka people. However, South Sudan's violence is not merely 'Kiir-led-Dinkas vs. Machar-led-Nuers'. The complexity of the war in South Sudan is mostly related to the range of actors involved, from a variety of different ethnic/tribal groups. Despite the conflict's ethnic dimensions, the cause of violence cannot be reduced to ethnic divisions. Instead, the South Sudanese war's origin is rooted in its very creation, one which did not adequately consider the establishment of effective political institutions; and where President Kiir's new government mismanaged the country's economic potential in oil.1 This intensified political tensions in a state which was already heavily militarised from its recent fight for independence from Sudan. This has had catastrophic effects with an estimated 400,000 people being killed since the violence began, and 2.3 million refugees and asylum seekers created.2 The delicate balance of peace Since violence began, there have been various attempts at peace in South Sudan, with negotiated peace settlements in 2013 and 2015 failing, and accompanied by a series of ceasefires violations, notably in 2017 and 2018.3 The negotiated 'Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan' signed by Machar, Kiir and other parties in 2018 offered South Sudan a step in the right direction. The complex myriad of actors involved in South Sudan disrupted this when non-signatory groups, such as the National Salvation Front (NAS), joined a coalition of rebel groups called South Sudan Opposition Movement Alliance (SOMA).4 who clashed with the government's SPLM/IO army. This forced the creation of 'the Rome Declaration'; a ceasefire agreement signed by the SSOMA and the government in October 2020, which has seen a period of reduced violence in South Sudan. Nevertheless, as South Sudan has made some small movements towards greater stability and peace in the last six months, neighbouring Sudan has taken drastic steps back as violent clashes have rippled through the Darfur region. Since the joint UN-African Union Mission (UNAMID) withdrawal on 31 December 2020, the UN has reported a 'sharp uptick of intercommunal violence in Sudan's Darfur region'.5 In January of this year, days of violent clashes saw an estimated 250 people killed and 100,000 more displaced6. As of 11 February, East Darfur reported a State of Emergency due to violent clashes between groups.7 Local cycles of violence The recent violence in Sudan is predominantly being carried out by ethnic and tribal pastoralist groups.8This reflects a vital feature of the conflicts in Sudan and South Sudan through cattle raiding. This is a long-standing cultural tradition of pastoral communities in East Africa, where local groups steal cattle from each other to 'restock' after their own cattle had been lost to drought or disease as well as acquire status and wealth.9 Due to decades of conflict in the region, this tradition from pastoralist communities has recently taken on an intensely violent nature. Cattle raiding has not only being co-opted by 'commercialised criminal networks'10, but also by political elites in South Sudan who saw an opportunity through the local pastoralist tribes to garner support for their own agendas11. Such violence is not isolated and crosses Sudan, and South Sudan's borders through the Darfur region with the nomadic Misseriya in Sudan travel to Aweil East County in South Sudan, often clashing violently with the Dinka cattle herders12. Recently the killing of a Misseriyan tribesman caused the closure of the border between Sudan and South Sudan. Whilst cattle raiding is an intrinsic part of the violence in South Sudan and Darfur and is responsible for intense cycles of violence on the local level; it is an issue which has been left unaddressed by broader peace processes. In fact, the recent border closure was "the first time that the Sudanese government was directly involved in addressing the conflict" according to a representative of the Dinka Malul13. Recent steps have also been taken by the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to confront the problems of cattle raiding across the Sudan/South Sudan border, with an agreement been drawn up with the South Sudanese government and UNMISS' local partners to promote the freedom of movement without possession of weapons. Whilst the conflict in South Sudan and the Darfur region cannot be solely reduced to cattle raiding, acknowledging its role as a driving force for local-level violence is vital for sustainable peace and stability in the region. It is even more prevalent when we see consider how the recent events in the Darfur region raise concerns about a return of 'Sudan's old conflict'14, which will undoubtedly threaten South Sudan's tenuous peace. Therefore, continued collaborative efforts across the Sudan/South Sudanese border are imperative to reduce local-level conflicts which risk reigniting violence in the region. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group. It has also been published by Africa Nexus, an independent organisation seeking to provide focussed informational and strategic insights into extremism and conflict in Africa. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author Chiara Longmore is originally from Scotland; however, she has moved to the Netherlands to complete a master’s at Leiden University in International Relations and Diplomacy. With an interdisciplinary background, her bachelor’s was in Liberal Arts, she has analysed situations of violence and conflict with a multi-disciplinary framework, in particular with Political Science, Anthropology, and Sociology.

Developing disputes over the river’s basin amidst regional conflict By: Chiara Longmore The Nile, one of the longest rivers in the world, spanning across 11 African countries with around 280 million people living in its basin. Recently, a developing dispute has emerged between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia over the construction of the Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam (GERD), which will impact the flow of the river into Egypt and Sudan. Placed within the wider context of conflict and instability in the region, the use of the Nile as a potential bargaining chip is one which could escalate disputes with devastating consequences. Egypt’s River The Nile river has long been an important source of fertility for the land it traverses. In particular, Egypt has cultivated the river’s basin for more than 5,000 years, with the Nile Delta in the north measuring 161km. The Nile river flows from south to north and, as Egypt is a lower riparian state and has lower levels of rainfall than upper riparian states, the state is heavily reliant on the Nile as a water resource. Often referred to as ‘Egypt’s largest food basket’ the Nile Delta contributes to around half of Egyptian agricultural production, with the annual flooding of the riverbanks depositing nutrient rich silt. Whilst the Nile is a lifeblood for Egyptian agriculture, Egypt’s historic dominance over the Nile can be linked to colonialism. In 1929 the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was signed between Britain and Egypt, which granted Egypt the right to veto any projects which may impact its control and share of the river. Other African states in the Nile basin, such as Ethiopia, had no say in this treaty which ultimately granted Egypt a monopoly over the river. Egypt maintains that the 1929 agreement still stands, along with the 1959 treaty which gave Egypt access to 66% of the river’s annual water supply, Sudan access to 22%, and Ethiopia the rights to nothing. Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam Ethiopia’s historic exclusion from access to the Nile has left it unable to utilise its own natural resources. It is therefore unsurprising that Ethiopia has sought to rebalance this by building the Grand Renaissance Dam (GERD) on its border with Sudan. The hydroelectric dam project is one of the largest in Africa, its reservoir covering 74 billion cubic metres. Whilst hydroelectric power has advantages in its low emission energy production, it is also an economic opportunity for many developing nations. For Ethiopia, GERD’s production of electricity will be greater than the country’s domestic demand, producing a total 6,450MW, and this will allow Ethiopia to export around 2,000MW of excess electricity making it Africa’s major electricity provider. The export of energy is vital for developing countries to generate foreign income and stimulate their economic growth and GERD aims to generate around $1 billion per year in revenue for Ethiopia, making it Africa’s biggest exporter of electricity. GERD is situated on the Blue Nile, one of the river’s main tributaries. Starting in Lake Tana in Ethiopia, it crosses into Sudan and its capital Khartoum, and up into Egypt. The construction of the dam close to Sudan could benefit the country, specifically in its potential to prevent flooding. Nevertheless, Ethiopia’s dam could reduce levels of fertile silt in Sudanese lands which would impact its agricultural production and threaten the country’s food security. For Egypt, the construction of large hydroelectric dams by its southern neighbours is one of strategic concern. In particular, Egypt is alarmed at the timeframe by which GERD is filled by Ethiopia, as this could inflict significant damage to the region. Predictions indicate that if the dam is filled in 5 years this would cause Egypt to lose around half of its fertile land and cause a water deficit of 36%. Egyptian fears over its water resources are not unsubstantiated. In 2007 the country faced the “Revolution of the Thirsty” where water scarcity in the Nile Delta saw protests over limited access to clean water. Due to the tensions which have arisen over the development of GERD, a series of negotiations have been initiated between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan. In January of this year, talks chaired by the African Union quickly fell through over disagreements about the second filling of the dam planned for July of this year. Last week, Sudan’s Prime Minister Hamdok met with Egyptian President el-Sisi in Cairo to sign a military cooperation agreement and discuss the ongoing GERD dispute. Their calls for international involvement to mediate that talks have been rejected by Ethiopia, with Ethiopian Foreign Minister calling for “African problems to be solved through African solutions”. A Context of Conflict It is important to place the developing dispute over GERD and the Nile within the broader context of conflict and instability facing the Horn of Africa. Since obtaining power in 2018, Ethiopia’s President Abiy has overseen drastic political change in the country, establishing a more centralised system. Yet recently in the northern region of Tigray, violence has steadily escalated between the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian military, resulting in a devastating humanitarian crisis in the region. Mass movement of tens of thousands of refugees spilling across the Sudanese-Ethiopian border has increased tensions between the two states, with violent clashes between Ethiopian and Sudanese military occurring just last week. Sudan is also facing its own internal problems with East Darfur declaring a state of emergency on February 11 as violence in the region escalates. With recent reports emerging that Eritrean military have entered the Tigray region, the potential for a protracted and potentially inter-state conflict is one which seriously threatens the region. Within this context the dispute over GERD, and more broadly access to the Nile, risks becoming increasingly intertwined with the current political and military disputes of the region. As an upper riparian state, the GERD gives Ethiopia an advantageous position to potentially shut off water supplies to neighbouring states, particularly as Ethiopia’s President Abiy seeks to assert greater political and economic dominance in the region. This would have devastating consequences not just for Egypt and other lower riparian communities, but also to the wider international community as key trade routes such as the Suez Canal would be detrimentally impacted. The Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) estimates that by 2030, the current population within the Nile’s basin will increase by between 61-82%, placing further strain on the river basin. Therefore, with water becoming a more valuable resource due to increasing demands, the potential for the Nile to be used as political leverage is a frightening, but not unrealistic prospect in the midst of developing conflict and instability in the region. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group. It has also been published by the Planetary Security Initiative, launched by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2015. *Major Contribution from Akash Ramnath This article was written in collaboration with Akash Ramnath who is currently working at the Planetary Security Initiative at The Clingendael Institute in The Hague. Akash’s primary research interests focuses on climate security, specifically in relation to water security and the geopolitics of the energy transition. Akash is also currently completing an Advanced Master’s in International Relations and Diplomacy at Leiden University. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author: Chiara Longmore is originally from Scotland; however, she has moved to the Netherlands to complete a master’s at Leiden University in International Relations and Diplomacy. With an interdisciplinary background, her bachelor’s was in Liberal Arts, she has analysed situations of violence and conflict with a multi-disciplinary framework, in particular with Political Science, Anthropology, and Sociology.

Foreign Money but Internal Losses: When liberal peace schemes increase the country’s vulnerabilities By Alessia Cappelletti It is generally accepted that economic investment in the form of foreign aid or business ventures into post-conflict societies is a fruitful activity that can often enhance local peace and stability. The underlying reasoning of this ‘economic peace’ is to make stability more profitable than war - this is generally known as the ‘liberal peace’ framework. However, the reality is never as clear-cut as theories because local dynamics are not linear nor straightforward. Certain studies proved that there is no actual correlation between foreign direct investment (FDI) and post-conflict peace. Quickly re-opening the country to foreign investment may even destabilize the country further by introducing new influential stakeholders. In some instances, foreign economic interest is proven to be detrimental to the humanitarian development of the country. This is because they tend to create new elites or exacerbate preexisting cultural hierarchies. Often, in war-torn countries, discrimination against minorities is systematically enforced, and corruption is a common practice carried out at the - literal - expenses of minorities. If foreign donors or business people are not aware of this, they risk seriously aggravating the situation. Businesses in the Post-Conflict In Myanmar, it has been documented that the government-supported multinationals contributed to the instability of the country. At the end of the military regime in 2011, the country opened its doors to foreign businesses believing that the new frontier for a stable peace was the economic development of the territory. Whether this could be true in theory, the reality was different. Very few people benefitted from liberal peace models implemented in the country. Elites got richer, but tensions between Rakhine and Rohingya intensified since the 'development' promises that were made to the population ultimately did not materialise. The Rakhine population was promised a fortune from the business deals. Still, as exclusion became clearer, Rohingya Muslims were blamed - which is both a symptom and an aggravation of the active ethnic targeting being perpetrated to their expenses. As a result of these culturally unresponsive economic endeavours, the country is still far from the peace and stability it hoped to achieve at the beginning of the economic opening. Ethnic grievances have transformed into frequent clashes around the country between the military, Rakhine's armed group, and the rebel faction of the Shan state. In addition to this, there is, of course, the ethnic cleansing of millions of Rohingya Muslims taking place. Donors in the Post-Conflict Examples of such failed 'liberal peace' schemes are everywhere to be found, from Colombia to Congo, to Sierra Leone. Where foreign involvement is disconnected from local realities, it can result in unhelpful or useless projects and, in the worst-case scenarios, projects that are harmful to the local population. That is the case also for Nepal, in which foreign aid organisations often reinforced cast divisions, negotiating with the elites and excluding the rest of the population. Nepal suffered a ten-years long conflict, from 1996 to 2006, between the government of Nepal and Maoist insurgencies. The conflict came to an end in 2006, with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord and the abolition of the monarchy. In Nepal, foreign aid is now considerably significant (in 2018-19 it represented 22% of the yearly state budget) and after the accords, even the Maoist Party welcomed it. The issue is that the political elite's relatives manage the NGOs that receive foreign funding, which then is associated with one party or another,  thus creating a 'development cast.' Even by trying to operate as locally as possible, problems of power and authority did not change, and money flows are often ultimately controlled by some other elite – though not passing through the central government. This situation created a stall in which the subsistence of post-war Nepal is based on foreign money in-flow. Should this stop, the government would be severely underfunded. This also erodes the government's authority and legitimacy among the population, as only (some) foreign implemented projects are effective in reducing poverty. Moreover, the government is perceived to fail systematically at addressing the needs of the poor. Thereby, foreign investment has created a cycle that reinforces local structures of inequality, similar to the case of Myanmar. Conclusions Ultimately, 'going abroad' with a substantial investment capacity always needs an in-depth risk assessment, not only at the beginning stage of the project but also during its implementation. A constant re-evaluation and honest and transparent evaluation of the benefits of such projects will ultimately benefit the local population. If investment or aid is perceived as being detrimental for ethnic and class discrimination, or if it exponentially increases the dependence of the country, region, or village on foreign money, rather than empowering them, it should be stopped and re-assessed. This article is part two of a series highlighting the potential risks of doing business in post-conflict countries. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the author: Alessia Cappelletti is a Global Security Analyst and Program Manager of DEWIS. She has field experience in South America, Colombia especially, which makes her largely acquainted with the security challenges of the Latin American context. Her expertise includes conflict analysis and investigation, human rights protection, and criminality.

Europe's Failed Strategy in Libya By: Anton Witchell-Chibber European powers have struggled to devise a coherent strategy in Libya ever since long-standing dictator Colonel Muammar Qadhafi was ousted from power in a NATO-backed rebellion in 2011. The NATO mission, led by Britain and France – and initially opposed by Germany and Poland – led to a transferral of power to the National Transitional Council (NTC), and later to the General National Congress (GNC). Whilst these institutions were recognised in European capitals, as political and military power in Libya splintered, so did consensus in Europe on how to respond to the deteriorating security situation and political impasse. Rather, European actors supported opposing power centres and have been accused of prioritising parochial interests – such as countering Islamic extremist terrorism and controlling migration flows – over long-term goals to foster national reconciliation and lasting peace. A European Union? In November last year, an agreement was reached in Tunis between Libya's warring factions in the 75-member Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), led by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), to hold presidential and parliamentary elections on 24 December 2021. . In a rare display of unity on the Libya question, Britain, France, Germany and Italy released a joint statement on 23 November 2020 which 'welcome[d] the results of the […] Forum', called for 'Libyan parties to fully implement the ceasefire agreement', expressed 'full support to the UNSMIL led process' and called on 'all Libyan and International parties to refrain from any parallel… For the full article and source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author: Anton Witchell-Chibber is a contributing analyst at Dyami. He has a postgraduate degree in Conflict Studies & Human Rights from Utrecht University and has specialist knowledge on Chinese foreign policy and sectarian conflict in fragile states.

How the Amazon’s destruction is pushing away investors in Bolsonaro’s Brazil By: Isabel Oriol Llonin In the last article 'When political change becomes a risk: how the Mexican government undermined investor's confidence' a case was made that political change in some Latin American countries can bring about a drastic change in a country's economic policies. This can represent a risk for mid-term and long-term business interests. This Dyami Insights will discuss how political change in Brazil has impacted business interests with the new government of Jair Bolsonaro. As a controversial figure, Jair Bolsonaro has made world headlines for his far-right, discriminatory remarks. However, his problematic comments are not the only issue that has impacted Brazil's international image. The international community has not welcomed his environmental policies and the rise of deforestation and human-made fires in the Amazon rainforest. They have ultimately damaged investor's confidence in Brazil. A country in need of change The election of a far-right leader in Latin America's leading economy stirred controversy around the world. Many were afraid Brazil would take on a completely different direction bringing uncertainty to the country and the entire region, especially after 13 years of left-wing governments led by the Worker's Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores​). In the five previous years to Bolsonaro's election, Brazil faced the worst economic recession in the country's history with rising numbers of unemployment and crime. In 2014, operation 'Car Wash' (Lava​ Jato​) uncovered deeply rooted corruption at the highest levels of politics, extending to several government officials, companies, and countries across the region mostly in the form of handouts and briberies in the oil and energy sector. For many Brazilians, the Worker's Party and its leaders were responsible for such high levels of corruption, crime, and a struggling economy. Bolsonaro exploited people's discontent with a very discredited left and presented himself as the heavy-handed anti-establishment candidate the country needed to end corruption and crime. Once elected, Bolsonaro pledged to the outside world to 'eliminate uncertainty for foreign trade flows', by lowering taxes and loosening regulations in order to appeal to international investors.[1] However, major foreign businesses have started to see Brazil as unappealing for investments due to a different issue than economic policies: the Amazon rainforest. How the Amazon was put under the world’s spotlight The Amazon rainforest is the largest and most biodiverse rainforest globally; it comprises more than half of the world’s rainforest areas. The Amazon plays a crucial role in sustaining life on the planet, and it is estimated that it absorbs 5% of the CO2​ annual emissions, playing a vital role in preventing climate change. While the Worker's Party leadership in Brazil did not have a clean sheet in terms of environmental damage, regulations were put in place to contain the Amazon's deforestation. Since Bolsonaro, a climate-change denier took office, many of these regulations have been removed, and deforestation continues at alarming rates. Between August of 2019 and July 2020, a total of 11,080 sq km were deforested, a 9.5% increase from the year before setting the record for a 12-year high.[2] Additionally, in 2019 the Amazon made world headlines due to an increase in wildfires. By 2020 the situation had worsened with a rise of 28% in July 2020 over the previous year, almost 50% in September from a year earlier.[3] Many of the wildfires are human-made and illegal with the aim to repurpose the land for the production of beef and soybeans. Bolsonaro has been accused of turning a blind eye to these unlawful practices. A burned area in the Amazon Rainforest in Prainha, Para state, Brazil. (AP Photo/Leo Correa) Concerned about their reputation and the security of their long-term investments, international investors have urged the Brazilian government to curb deforestation. In June 2020, a group of financial institutions collectively managing more than $3.7 trillion in assets urged the Brazilian government to reconsider its environmental policy claiming it has generated "uncertainty about the conditions for investing in or providing financial services to Brazil".[4] Private investors are not the only ones pressing the Brazilian government for a change in the Amazon management. In 2019 president Emmanuel Macron of France called the Amazon wildfires a global crisis that should be addressed at the G7 summit. President Bolsonaro did not welcome this comment and accused Macron of colonialist tendencies. The tension between the two leaders had impactful consequences. Macron stated that France would be opposing the EU-Mercosur free trade agreement if Brazil failed to contain deforestation in the Amazon. The EU-Mercosur (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay) agreement is reaching the end of negotiations after nearly 20 years. It would create the largest free trade agreement area in the world. After the rejection of other European countries to Brazil's environmental policies, the deal now hangs by a thread. More recently US president-elect Joe Biden pledged to spearhead a $20 billion international effort to protect the Amazon while threatening with 'economic consequences' if Brazil failed to cooperate. So far Bolsonaro has been defiant of Biden's and other foreign leaders' remarks regarding the Amazon and framing it as an issue of Brazilian sovereignty. Concluding Remarks It is likely that in the upcoming months, with president-elect Biden taking office in January, the topic will regain attention. The US might join efforts with others in the international community to leverage against Brazil's environmental policies by imposing economic sanctions or encouraging companies to stop importing Brazilian products (just like Timberland, Vans, and The North Face have already done). This could potentially represent a significant blow to the Brazilian economy, which has been hit hardly by the COVID-19 economic crisis. It is a risk that Brazil might not want to take. This article is part two of a series highlighting the importance of political change in security risk analysis in the region of Latin America. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the author Isabel Oriol Llonin is a contributing analyst at Dyami. She holds a bachelor’s degree in International Relations and has a post-graduate degree in Public International Law from Utrecht University. She has expertise in the Latin American region and the public international law implications of conflict analysis.

How the Mexican Government has Underminded Investor's Confidence By: Isabel Oriol Llonin Traditionally security risks in Mexico are commonly associated with organised crime, drug trafficking and other sources of violence. However, there are other aspects of the Mexican context that should be considered when making a risk analysis, such as how political change and national policies can impact mid-term and long-term investments. Political changes are usually not seen as an imminent security risk in Mexico, or in most parts of Latin America, however, they can represent a risk to mid and long-term business interests. A new government can bring a drastic change in the country’s approach to economic policy and business affairs with international companies. Such is the case of Mexico with president Andrés Manuel López Obrador who took office in late 2018. A new era for Mexico with López Obrador López Obrador -or AMLO as he is known- is the first left-wing president that Mexico has had in recent decades. His victory broke a cycle of governance between the two major parties that have been in power in the last years, the PAN and the PRI, the first a conservative party, and the second a self-proclaimed centrist party, both with a history of strong neoliberal economic policies. With a society increasingly tired of the political elite and corruption scandals, AMLO ran a campaign based on the idea of being 'one of the people', with a strong preference for austerity policies and the promise to end corruption in the high political spheres. He also inherited a country with alarming rates of violence, crime, and rumours of organised crime infiltrated at all levels of government. Therefore, it is unsurprising that his government has been characterised by efforts to appear different from the traditional political elite. One of these efforts has been transforming the Mexican economy from the conventional neoliberal economic policies that the country has held for decades to a more state-controlled economy. Since his presidential campaign, both the national and international private sectors were unsettled about the potential consequences of such changes. Two years into his government, some of those concerns have proven to be true. Lessons learned from the Mexico City Texcoco Airport The Mexico City Texcoco Airport was a megaproject located in the highly populated capital of the country, a city with approximately 20 million inhabitants in its metropolitan area. It was intended to replace the current airport and meet the demand for a higher air traffic capacity in the city. The ambitious USD 13 billion projects, expected to have a capacity of 125 million passengers per year at its completion, was launched in 2016 by the previous administration led by Enrique Peña Nieto. As a presidential candidate, López Obrador took a strong stance against the project claiming it was too expensive. The Texcoco Airport project became a symbol of his discourse against 'unnecessary spending', playing into his narrative of a 'people's president' who refuses to favour the elites. The project also had some environmental concerns regarding the land in which it was being built, so AMLO then proposed the cheaper alternative of adapting the Santa Lucía military base, north of the city. However, critics pointed out several issues with this alternative: the project had severe viability concerns that would probably raise the cost of construction in the future -this was later proven to be true- and the environmental impact report had not been released to the public. In December 2018, within less than a month of taking office, President López Obrador announced the official cancellation of the Texcoco Airport after 30% of the project had already been built. Naturally, this raised serious concerns among the business sector, undermining investor’s confidence in public projects, and added to the overall air of uncertainty in the country. Uncertainty in the Energy Sector In 2013 former President Enrique Peña Nieto spearheaded a comprehensive energy constitutional reform that would, among other changes, allow the private and foreign investment across the energy sector. Along with the auctioning of untapped oil and gas blocks across the country, the reform ended a 75 year-long state monopoly over oil and energy supply chains. Fast forward to the current government; the energy sector has been a critical area in the efforts of López Obrador to counter decades of neoliberal economic policies. He has criticised the 2013 energy reform as fraudulent by pointing out the corruption and bribery scandals that have surrounded it since the beginning. Moreover, his government has been characterised by his attempts to strengthen the inefficient and indebted state-owned oil (PEMEX) and electricity (CFE) companies as key pieces to 'recover economic sovereignty'.[1] This has led to several controversial decisions. At the beginning of his presidency, López Obrador indefinitely postponed all auctions on oil and gas blocks to private companies, proving once again to foreign investors that previous administration's deals were at risk with the new government. In 2020, he announced a new sustainable energy policy that would impose considerable limitations and additional requirements to private renewable energy farms. The government argued it was intended to protect the reliability of the national supply of energy during the crisis. However, critics have speculated that it was an effort to protect the state-owned Federal Commission of Energy (CFE). The new sustainable energy policy resulted in the temporary closing of 44 farms of renewable energy while putting at risk investments for USD 6 billion and almost 30,000 jobs.[2] However, after a series of legal battles, the Supreme Court ruled that the president’s policies were unconstitutional, and most farms were allowed to carry out operations again. While the government did not win this battle, the actions it implemented certainly undermined investor’s confidence and could potentially harm the development of renewable energy soon. It is not completely clear what direction the government will take now, especially considering the economic and health crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic. The significant drop in oil prices is forcing national oil companies around the world to reconsider their long-term projects and investments, potentially allocating more resources to other sources of energy. While private investment into the energy sector, especially into renewable resources, could be the boost that the Mexican economy needs to revive after the crisis, it seems unlikely that López Obrador's government will take that path. With four more years left as president, chances are the business sector -especially the energy sector- will navigate a certain degree of uncertainty in Mexico. Therefore the political context should be considered in any security risk analysis. This article is part one of a series highlighting the importance of political change in security risk analysis in the region of Latin America. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the author: Isabel Oriol Llonin is a contributing analyst at Dyami. She holds a bachelor’s degree in International Relations and has a post-graduate degree in Public International Law from Utrecht University. She has expertise in the Latin American region and the public international law implications of conflict analysis.

An Introduction By: Bob Rehorst In February 2019, the Washington Post reported the existence of a 'secret' Chinese military base in the remote and inhospitable Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province of eastern Tajikistan. According to the report, local sources have witnessed Chinese soldiers purchasing goods and phone credit since 2017 at a nearby market. A Chinese soldier told the Post's investigator: "Remember, […] You never saw us here."1 Though, Chinese military presence abroad is not unique to Tajikistan. Since 2017, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has also constructed an operational military base in Djibouti, expanding its influence in the Horn of Africa – and has increased its presence in the South China Sea. China's external operations appear to be increasing, especially in the Central and Southern Asian region. This introductory article will explore and contextualise the apparent expansion of China's military presence abroad, indicating a move away from the PRC's core principle of 'non-interference'. It will question whether this phenomenon has developed in tandem with China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in order to protect Chinese commercial and economic interests abroad. One Belt One Road in Central Asia The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), previously known as ‘The Silk Road Economic Belt’ or the ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR), is a great illustration of the scope and size of Chinese ambitions abroad. The project, which aims to engender greater connectivity between China and the world, envisages a series of transportation networks which will traverse the Eurasian heartland towards Europe. Its total scope imagines global transportation connections via land, sea, air, and electronic means (a.k.a. the digital silk road). Here, we focus specifically on three economic corridors (EC’s) of the BRI, namely: (1) The New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor, (2) the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and the China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor. China’s ambition to operate overland through Central Asia – a region long overlooked as the vast and distant ‘heartland’ of the world – carries the possibility of major economic benefits for China. As a simple illustration, the average transport time from Shanghai to the Polish port of Gdansk by sea freighter is between thirty and thirty-three days. By rail transport, however, the already operational China-Poland connection takes between nine and fourteen days. Evidently, the Eurasian overland routes have the potential to decrease transportation time and costs for the PRC substantially. Consequently, China’s Western Xinjiang province, historically the country’s remote ‘back door’ bordering on the former Soviet ‘Stans’, is transforming into the CCP’s front gates. Generally, the BRI signifies the development of infrastructure and new foreign investment projects, which, not only further develops and globalises Chinese economy, but also warrants greater security initiatives beyond China’s borders to protect its trade and communication routes.[1] China’s flexible approach to non-interference: Interestingly, since the 1950s, Chinese governance has adhered to a strict ‘non-interference’ policy, as part of the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’.[2] In theory, this entails that China will refrain from intervening in the foreign affairs of other nations which stands in contrast to other regional and international power players such as the US, UN, EU, Russia, or even Turkey. In recent years, however, China’s strict adherence to its non-interference principle has unravelled, as its interests abroad have expanded.[3] While the 2015 National Security Law and Anti-Terrorism Law already permits China to partake in counter-terrorism operations abroad, this trend is no more apparent than in China’s 2019 White Paper: ‘China’s National Defence in the New Era’. The paper emphasises the need to strengthen the Chinese military and develop its overseas capacity in order to promote world peace and stability.[4] Chinese policy aims to realise a strategy where soft-power instruments, such as successful economic trade and investment (e.g. the BRI), eases recipients towards an increased Chinese presence, eventually opening up the possibility for other modes of influence. For example, the establishment of a Chinese military base in Djibouti, the first of its kind, marks a turning point in Chinese foreign policy and security.[5] Initially, the Djibouti base was stated to be a facility to support Chinese logistics and provide assistance in combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden. However, the CPP aims to have developed the PLA into a full-fledged military force by 2050 and we can expect that, not too far into the future, the Chinese military in Djibouti will fulfil other tasks such as extraditing nationals from hostile environments and take part in combat operations.[6] In short, Chinese security and military developments appear to coincide with its strategic interests in need of protection, the Djibouti Base being an example of defending Chinese interests in the turbulent Horn of Africa region. Now we can explore the case of the military presence in South-East Tajikistan. A military base in the mountains The base in Tajikistan, located approximately 30 kilometres away from the Chinese border and about thirteen kilometres from the Tajik-Afghan Border, is located deep within the Pamir mountain range. Chinese officials have explained how its security presence in Tajikistan extends into Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor, but is simply there for training and logistical purposes, not military occupation.[7] However, given the increased likeliness of US military withdrawal from Afghanistan, in relation to China’s operations against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, it is plausible that this base serves an alternative purpose. Uyghurs, TIP and China’s perceived threat In Xinjiang, the Strike Hard Campaign continues to control the repressed Uyghur population by means of mass surveillance. Human Rights Watch reports almost a million ‘vanished’ Uyghurs while others are being continuously monitored and harassed by Chinese authorities.[8] Aimen Dean, former Al-Qaeda operative and MI6 informant, has warned that that the repressive policies implemented against the Islamist community of the Uyghurs may effectively increase radicalisation within and against China – mainly by returning Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) militants, a prominent force in the Syrian civil war – rather than combat it.[9] Indeed, throughout China’s war on the ‘three evil forces’ (terrorism, separatism, and extremism), it has operated on the existence of a ‘direct threat’ towards China. Now that the US is moving forward with its withdrawal from Afghanistan, China increasingly fears that Afghanistan could become a potential ‘springboard of terrorism’ into the PRC. Dean has echoed this fear and has advocated dialogue between the Uyghurs and Beijing to prevent a mass insurgency targeting China and Chinese assets abroad. The Research Project A few things have become clear over the past years. Firstly, Chinese expansionism is manifesting itself heavily in Africa, the South China Sea and now also into Central- and South Asia. Secondly, subsequent to Chinese expansion through soft-power instruments, it seems that China is dead set on protecting its foreign investments. The Tajikistan Case presented here is indicative of a larger trend of China pivoting slowly into the Eurasian Heartland as part of its defensive strategies against terrorist threats coming from neighbouring countries. Now that China is expanding Westward, it is stepping out into possible inhospitable environments which may prove more sinophobic than anticipated. As a result, if China is to protect its strategic interests in Eurasia, it may be compelled to increase its military presence as well. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group, as part of the ‘Defending Chinese Strategic Interests in the Eurasian Heartland’ research project led by Anton Witchell-Chibber and Bob Rehorst. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author: Bob Rehorst is a Global Security Analyst at Dyami. He has extensive field experience in the Levant-Middle East region, North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. He holds a Graduate Degree in Conflict Studies and Human Rights, and an Undergraduate Degree in Cultural Anthropology, both from Utrecht University. Bob specializes in geopolitics, conflict development and global crises.