Search dyami insights

Written by Facundo E. Saponara The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant appears to have fallen out of relevance from the international security scenario as more urgent matters clutter the international agenda. Since 2020, a year after the group's last bastion of resistance of its physical caliphate had fallen, actions against the group were reduced to a menial task, applying minimal pressure on a defeated insurgency with a small dedicated following. But, three years later, can we still say that ISIL has been defeated? The Iraqi Case As Iraq continues to rebuild after the war on IS, the security context in the country continues to be complicated. First, the ever-growing influence of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) is not to underestimate as a negative factor. The PMUs are an Iranian-backed group of militias that had a central role in the war against IS in Iraq, placing them in the favorable view of a considerable part of the population. Their growing influence over Iraqi politics could prove as an example of how delicate and easily fractured Iraqi sectarian relations can be. Not many years ago, al Zarqawi, the founder of what would later become ISIS, used a similar context – Iranian interference – to artificially deepen the divide between Sunni and Shia populations. This divide dragged Iraq into an even deeper state of civil war, which by 2006 had the additional obstacle of a sectarian facet that facilitated the growth of al Qaeda in Iraq (IS’s predecessor). The growing role of the PMUs in Iraq’s public sphere presents Daesh with the opportunity to use the group's social engineering skills. If ISIL was to pursue a terror campaign on the Shia, PMUs and other Shia armed groups would retaliate on Sunni minorities with little to no opposition from the overstretched and underequipped national security apparatus. If this course of action materializes, new individuals would boost the Islamic State's lines following ideological or religious ideals or merely as means of protection from a numerically superior enemy. Second, the lack of State control over large swaths of the territory is another variable that has allowed IS to feed its wish for territorial expansion within Iraqi borders. Baghdad continues to lack the necessary resources to achieve a meaningful presence in the more deserted regions of Iraq unless it relies on the assistance of non-state actors like the PMUs to provide security – which are not welcomed in Sunni predominant areas. Such state absence, combined with the now restricted role of US troops in Iraq and their partial withdrawal from the country, has allowed ISIS to create safe zones from which to launch progressively more complex offensive operations. This has enabled the group to attack a larger array of targets. Recently, ISIL began targeting the energy infrastructure in central and northern Iraq, showing their strategic approach to wear down the Iraqi government’s ability to provide basic services and debilitate its governance. The Syrian Case In Syria, ISIS finds itself in a less mature state than its Iraqi counterpart, unable to devote the same amount of resources to its operations. The limited number and the generally low complexity and lethality of their attacks exemplify such limitations. However, the US Defense Intelligence Agency has stated that the current downward trend in the number of attacks claimed in Syria could prelude the group's launch of the next stage of its local insurgency. On a territorial level, ISIL is constrained by a plethora of actors that identify Daesh as an enemy, making it difficult to expand its holdings. However, the group's survival in the country is not being threatened by its lack of resources nor by the pressure applied by its rivals. Rather, limited coordination and conflicting interests between opposing factions have and will continue to enhance ISIS's chances of survival in Syria. As rebel and regime forces continue to face each other on the battlefield and neglect Daesh’s threat, the Islamic State will be given the space needed to regain some of its lost strength. Since the fall of the caliphate, ISIL has focused on signaling that it still is a functioning organization through the continuity of its attacks. Daesh’s targets have mainly been regime-aligned forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). ISIS has exploited gaps within the regime’s territorial holdings (particularly in the desert) in two ways. First, to reinstate some of its previous border crossings to Iraq to provide safe passage for its fighters and collect taxes from trade and oil routes. And second, it allowed ISIS to gain a safe foothold from where to launch small-scale attacks, as the group's Iraqi counterpart. ISIS’s campaign in Syria is not restricted to the military field, but it also focuses on civilian propaganda campaigns. In July 2021, the UN highlighted the Islamic State’s penetration of the al Hol camp in northern Syria. The camp currently holds over 55,000 individuals, 42% of whom are between 5 and 17 years old, making them a prime target for ISIS’s indoctrination and radicalization programs, intended to replace the non-existent education these children receive. If Daesh’s operations in the camp continue to go improperly counterbalanced, al Hol may produce the next generation of ISIL militants. Moreover, the group made clear its desire to liberate thousands of its fighters from Kurdish prisons in northern Syria. If ISIL manages to successfully free prisoners, or if they were to be freed under other circumstances, the group’s capabilities could increase significantly, bringing it back at the center of international attention. Daesh in Europe Daesh’s limited resources mean that it is still incapable of sponsoring terrorist attacks on the West. This has made the group rely heavily on individuals vulnerable to radicalization – inspired by the group’s online propaganda – to take up arms and attack Western societies from within. The ingress of over a million refugees to Europe from Syria alone may have paved the way for what’s known as Battlefield Migration. Through this process, ISIS-trained and battle-hardened combatants may now be settled within Western societies, bringing with them the possibility of a new series of attacks, the radicalization of more individuals, and the creation of underground networks. Forecast: where to go from here? Overall, ISIL should be considered as a persistent multifaceted threat that is still emerging from Iraq and Syria, as the group finds itself in a healing and recovery phase accelerated by the local context. The continuity of the Syrian Civil War, lack of State resources, easily exploitable sectarian tensions, and disillusionment with local governments will continue to facilitate the survival of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Despite the organization’s inability to capture and hold vast areas of territory, if such context continues to favor the group's growth, in a few years Daesh may be capable of a new substantial offensive, particularly if major players continue to withdraw from the Middle East. Whether it be through the reconstruction of the physical caliphate, the enflaming of a new jihadist insurgency, or successful social engineering, the ISIL threat should be tackled as a matter of regional stability and (inter)national security for the members of NATO. The North Atlantic alliance should prioritize avoiding an influx of new fighters from entering Syria and Iraq, alleviating sectarian tensions in both countries, pursuing an active policy regarding ISIS penetration of refugee camps, limiting external meddling in Iraq, staying on the lookout for any indicators of IS activities in Europe, and searching and destroying the group's financial assets, weapons depots, and leadership. NATO should tackle these issues simultaneously to successfully reach Operation Inherent Resolve's foundational objectives: degrade and destroy Daesh through a sustained and comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. About the author: Facundo E. Saponara Facundo E. Saponara, originally from Argentina, is currently enrolled in the master’s degree in Strategy and Geopolitics at the Escuela Superior de Ejército. Counting with a background in international relations, he has specialized in the analysis of interstate and intrastate conflicts and terrorism.

As you might know, our aim is to provide high-end aviation expertise to the aviation industry by offering a holistic array of unique aviation services. That is why it is our pleasure to announce that Hans de Best has joined Team Dyami. Hans has served with the Royal Dutch Marechaussee for 41 years. He has extensive experience within aviation security. He is a specialist in secure cargo operations, audits, ACC3 and European law- and regulations. During his career, he fulfilled several management roles within the aviation security unit. He was an advisor on the use of explosive detection dogs and was involved with the start of the High-Risk Flight operation at Amsterdam Schiphol Airport. His experience within a government authority and passion for this field of work makes him fit right in with our experts at the dyami | strategic security solutions team. Are you interested in how we can help you run your aviation operation safely and securely? Feel free to contact Eric Schouten or Tom Franke now! #security #aviation #training #avsec #acc3 #cargo #dyami #aviationsecurity #cargoairline #marechaussee #ecac

By Ruben Pfeijffer

The working group Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) offers INTERNSHIP OPPORTUNITIES for young researchers and analysts. Do you want to develop your analytical skills? Gain experience in applied intelligence and conflict analysis? Work in a young and growing environment? Then DEWIS is the place for you! Who are we? Dyami is a full-service strategic security provider. Our focus lies in providing strategic security solutions to interested parties like governments, NGOs, and the private sector. Our team consists of dedicated experts from different fields, including Intelligence, Foreign Affairs, Aviation Security, and Crisis Management. What is the DEWIS Working Group? DEWIS is Dyami’s think-tank, aimed at identifying and analyzing present and future security risks. The DEWIS team keeps track of current security issues, explores trends, and keeps information circulating by publishing articles and infographics on relevant topics. People working within DEWIS should be inherently interested in early-warning, geopolitics, and have a keen eye for important developments in the world as well as understand the consequences of these developments on a local and operational level. Ultimately, DEWIS serves to inform stakeholders and the general public by providing them with different types of high-quality analyses. The candidate: Working at DEWIS requires independent critical thought, the ability to present results and forecasts clearly, as well as a substantial interest in international security issues. We are especially interested in interns with experience or strong interest in the following topics: Environmental Conflict, Aerospace & Defense, Global Economics, Conflict and Civil Uprisings Monitoring. Additionally, the ideal candidate should have excellent writing skills and excellent English proficiency (any other language is a plus). Master-level interns are preferred. Intern responsibilities: Contribute to joint publications, or write your articles and create engaging infographics. Keep up to date with key regional developments. Write briefs on current or developing situations around the globe. Contribute to the analyses of particular case studies. Assists in the day-to-day operations of a start-up company. What we offer: A practical learning opportunity to apply analytical capabilities to real-world situations. An opportunity to develop professional analytical writing skills. Substantial feedback on your work by a variety of experienced veterans from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Security and Intelligence service, military special forces, and professional security analysts. Workshops on intelligence and security and risk management research methodologies. Exposure as an analyst on our website, social media, and through the extensive network of our team. The publication of your work on the website and Dyami’s social media channels. The opportunity to work in a young and growing company. Interested? If you are interested in applying for a position at the DEWIS working group, please send the following documents: A CV - maximum of two pages mentioning relevant experience. A brief cover letter that mentions your main topic(s) of interest (max one page). An article pitch on early warnings in one of the themes mentioned above (150-200 words). Please send your application to: dewis@dyami.services, with the topic “Application DEWIS Internship (YOUR NAME)” before the 31st of December 2021. The internship will start in February 2021. Flexible starting and ending dates and working hours can be discussed accommodating the intern’s academic needs.

As you might know, Dyami's roots lay in providing Aviation Security Services. Our aim is to provide high-end aviation expertise through partnerships and the combination of many years of operational knowledge in this field. That is why it is our pleasure to announce that Dyami will be partnering with John Korver from ProAvsec International, to offer his aviation security expertise through our holistic array of authentic services. John Korver has been at the forefront of the aviation security industry for over 30 years with wide executive-level experience in airport security. He was responsible for upgrading airport security and modification the airport's security concept at Amsterdam Schiphol Airport, to effectively meet present and anticipated threats. An important aspect of John Korver's career was to continuously ensure strict compliance with all international and local security requirements. Formerly he was responsible for global security operations in addition to heading up quality, audit, and training activities. He was responsible for the security process of high-risk flights at Amsterdam Schiphol Airport, in close relation with the Ministry of Justice, Netherlands, and the TSA. He has extensive experience developing and implementing airport security concepts, conducting audits, risk assessments, managing people in the security environment, and client relations. John is committed to finding the optimum efficient and effective solutions. Passionate about aviation security he fits right in the Dyami team. Are you interested in how we can help you run your aviation operation safely and securely? Feel free to contact Eric Schouten or Tom Franke now!

Ethics and integrity, keywords you hear about more and more in the news. As a company, you can no longer avoid setting up an integrity program. Especially if you are going to do business internationally, you will run into a lot of issues. Dyami is proud to announce that Andrew Hoffmanns has joined Team Dyami. Andrew has gained extensive international experience as an Ethics & Compliance Manager at Basrah Gas Company (Iraq), North Caspian Operating Company (Kazakhstan), Shell, and ExxonMobil. And recently started his company EthXCom. At Dyami, Andrew will help companies with their ethics and integrity issues, together with Ron Geraets and Willem de Bruin. This can be done, for example, with a quick scan of your integrity program, so that you immediately know where you stand, what your risks are, and what you can do about it. This is how Dyami and reisvoorbereid.nl supports your organization with safe business operations.

By Nathalie Heidema As the Argentinian-Chinese bilateral relations have deepened over the past years, it has also been reflected on three levels of cooperation: economic, political, and strategic. In 2020, for the first time in history, China became Argentina’s first business and trading partner, surpassing the long-standing number one - Brazil. China has become so important to the Southern Cone country that its national newspaper Noticias called the relation “ArgenChina, new carnal relations”, an expression only once used in regards to the US. Amidst the heightened socio-economic crisis aggravated by the pandemic, China is offering more carrots than sticks to Argentina – yet the underlying incentives go beyond economic influence. On Economic Cooperation The asymmetry between the Chinese-Argentinian global economic powers has been strengthened by the Covid-19 pandemic. Between 2020 and 2021, Chinese exports to Argentina increased by 78%, which has been significantly influenced by augmented exports of vaccines and other medical supplies. On the other hand, Argentinian exports (mainly soybeans and beef) have decreased by 15%. Nonetheless, Argentina is still China’s largest producer of soy and wheat. Moreover, China is also producing pork meat on a large scale on Argentinian territory, destined specifically to the Asian market. Chinese investments in Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries have been diversified from mostly financial acquisitions to specific public-private partnerships (PPPs). Already in 2009, when Argentina was facing rampant inflation and recession, China stepped in with a $10.2 billion currency swap to stabilize the Argentinian peso, including another $10 billion to fix the country’s deteriorated rail system. As of 2020, Argentina has advanced investment agreements with China of approximately $30 billion dollars. Chinese presence in Argentina’s mining sector has also significantly increased in recent years, especially due to the great interest of China in strategic lithium, critical for the manufacture of batteries for electronics. Argentina joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in March 2021, and also firmly declared its interest in joining China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, it would be difficult for Argentina to get into the BRI due to its macroeconomic instability and heavy indebtedness, which sums up to $44 billion to the US-based International Monetary Fund (IMF). Argentina thus needs to strike a balance between its largest creditor – the US; and China – that promises to mitigate the fiscal gap. If Argentina would manage to join the BRI, this would further unlock Chinese financing and investments in infrastructure, transport, energy, mining, agriculture, innovation, and information technology. The Argentinian president Alberto Fernández expects to reactivate the controversial Chinese-funded projects of hydroelectric dams in Patagonia, which were paralyzed during the previous government. Fernández considers these “the most important infrastructure construction work in the country” and a linchpin of the Chinese-Argentinian cooperation, as it will be 85% financed by the China Development Bank. Chinese investments in hydroelectric dams would serve as a gateway for a broader range of infrastructure projects in Argentina, such as the nuclear power plant in Buenos Aires, whose construction will start next year. On the Politico-Strategic Cooperation The mentioned infrastructure investments have meant that at the political level, China now holds a more prominent role in its strategic relations with Argentina. Their “comprehensive strategic alliance,” a diplomatic status enjoyed by a few countries, has resulted in more than 20 bilateral treaties in different sectors. The Chinese government is also working on four projects of geopolitical sensitivity, as they imply the control of air and water spaces monitored by Beijing. Most recently, the pandemic has brought Fernández and Xi even closer as millions of doses of Chinese Sinopharm have been delivered, while Argentina also approved additional 5.4 million of the single-dose Cansino vaccines. As for telecommunications, the Chinese firm Huawei has operated in Argentina since 2001 and it is also the major infrastructure supplier to Argentina’s three major telecom providers. As Huawei is in close dialogue with the government, it is likely that it will become the supplier of choice when Argentina builds a 5G network, expected for 2022. More interestingly, Huawei proposed to build “smart city” infrastructures in Argentina, which aims to export Chinese surveillance system technologies to Latin America. In 2019, Argentina`s province of Jujuy sealed a $30 million contract with the Chinese telecoms giant ZTE, to install a system of cameras with facial recognition and other sensors. Jujuy also happens to be the location of important Chinese mining and power generation operations. On the latest G20 summit that took place this October, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasized that next year will be the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties with Argentina. China is eager to host the Year of China-Argentina Friendship and Cooperation and create brighter prospects in their bilateral relations. Furthermore, China appreciates Argentina’s active response to the joint building of the BRI and is willing to sign the Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation as soon as possible. Having Argentina as a BRI member would undoubtedly be a great boost for the trade flows between the regions, however, Argentina finds itself in an uneasy position. The state-owned China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), which is the largest BRI infrastructure contractor, has been accused of corruption and expansionist agenda by the US, and sanctions thereagainst have already been issued. At the same time, Argentina is in the process of renegotiating its $44 billion debt with the IMF, in which the US could have an influential role, and thus postponing Argentina’s participation in the BRI. A Space Station in Patagonia? Argentina's rapprochement with China goes beyond economic cooperation. China has built a satellite and space mission control station in the Argentine province of Neuquén, in Patagonia. The bilateral negotiations ensued in secret, but it has been agreed not to use the base for military purposes. Nonetheless, US experts are concerned about China’s intelligence-gathering capabilities and other strategic uses of their technology. The station began operating as of March 2018, and it is a remarkable symbol of Beijing’s growing strategic influence in the LAC region. With Argentina’s support, China is planning an expedition to the far side of the Moon, which never faces the Earth. The Neuquén province gave China the right to the land for 50 years, for free. A helping influence When the whole world was swirled in the financial crisis of 2008, it was China who came to LAC to make trade deals and save the region from the worst economic damage. Even as Latin America has shifted more to the political right in recent years, its governments have continuously tailored their policies to appeal to Beijing. It is clear that China's idea of developing infrastructure projects, deploying 5G technology, and installing strategic (space) stations openly competes with Washington’s (and Europe’s) ambitions. China’s role as a central player is already established, it now remains to be seen to what extent will the US and Europe further undermine their strategic position in Argentina and the wider LAC region. About the author: Nathalie Heidema Nathalie is passionate about the EU external policy, international cooperation, and security, specializing in the Latin American and East European region. She holds a double Master degree in Political Science and East European Affairs. Coming from a bi-cultural background, she is eager in bridging the gap between the divided East & West, and thus being an avid mediator. She has field experience from both Latin America (Mercosur) and Eastern Europe. Nathalie now works for the EU Delegation to the UN. Her experience is mainly in the field of economics, environment, and other development programs.

Early Warning Report by Ruben Pfeijffer

By Robyn Kelly-Meyrick Heightened tensions between mainland China and Taiwan, have frequented global headlines in recent months. China has upped the ante through an increasingly aggressive rhetoric toward the island, which it backed up by sending a record number of warplanes into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone. Taipei’s admission that by 2025, China will likely be able to mount a “full scale’’ invasion of Taiwan has triggered an international debate on whether or not China will actually use force to subordinate the island, and what the response might be. Why is China opposed to Taiwanese independence? Since the surrender of Japan after World War Two, the status of Taiwan as a legal part of China has been disputed. After the Chinese Civil War, the Republic of China (ROC) lost the mainland to the communist People’s Republic of China (PRC) and fled to Taiwan. The PRC views itself as a successor of the ROC as a result of the civil war and has therefore rejected the democratization process of Taiwan and the notion that the ROC is a legitimate government. Whilst in 1991 Taiwan proclaimed that the war with the mainland PRC was over and relations between the two improved, the election of Chen Shui-bian - who openly backed independence - as president of Taiwan raised concerns in Beijing, resulting in the latter passing an anti-secession law which affirmed the right to use force against Taiwan should it persevere to break free. In the last few decades, relations between China and Taiwan have deteriorated as the latter has gained more international recognition as an independent state, with the PRC growing increasingly concerned by ties between Taiwan and the US which deepened under the Trump administration. President Biden subsequently became the first to invite a Taiwanese delegation to the presidential inauguration. Allowing Taiwan to turn independent would undermine the legitimacy of the PRC, whilst reunifying the island with the mainland would help to cement China as a hegemonic power in Asia. Why have concerns over Chinese/Taiwanese relations grown? Beijing has reiterated its willingness to use force to align Taiwan with the mainland as a last resort if necessary, and Xi Jinping has stated that ‘the historical task of the complete reunification of the motherland [...] will definitely be fulfilled’. Taiwan’s defense minister Chiu Kuo-cheng predicts that by 2025, China will be capable of launching a full-scale invasion of the island, a statement which followed the intrusion of around ‘150 People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) fighter jets, nuclear-capable bombers, anti-submarine aircraft, and airborne early warning and control planes’ into Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in early October of 2021. The surge of military activity coincided with Taiwan’s official application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) free-trade pact. China remains staunchly opposed to the admission of Taiwan to any kind of bilateral or multilateral organization of an official nature. In the Biden-Xi virtual summit, China re-emphasized that US backing of Taiwan’s independence would be ‘playing with fire’. The combination of rhetoric and military activity has given relations between China and Taiwan global focus, but is an invasion the likely conclusion? China and Hong Kong - the will to unify The events that have taken place in Hong Kong over the last two years put the sharp rhetoric toward Taiwan into a context that illustrates China’s will to reunify the motherland. Hong Kong developed under British rule from 1898 up until 1997 (a period during which China agreed to lease the land to Britain following the First Opium War that saw the UK occupy Hong Kong). In 1997, the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed by the UK and China, which agreed upon the retention of some of Hong Kong’s autonomy through a ‘one country, two systems’ policy that would last for a subsequent 50 year period. This means that in 2047, Hong Kong’s mini-constitution - the Basic Law - will expire, leaving the future of the region’s autonomy from China unclear. Largely, Hong Kong’s relative independence from the communist mainland is observed to be in decline. In June 2019, a highly controversial plan to extradite criminal suspects from Hong Kong to the mainland resulted in months of heavy protests from concerned Hongkongers, who believed the plans would enable arbitrary detention and unfair trials under the Chinese judicial system. The plans were eventually withdrawn in September 2019. In June of 2021, a new national security regime was introduced by Beijing, which imposed significant curtailing of freedom of speech within Hong Kong through the National Security Law. Voices critical toward the CCP have been silenced, with journalists and high-profile critics arrested and imprisoned. Hongkongers must now self-censor and contradictorily exercise media freedom with constraint in order to avoid punishment. Unsurprisingly, Taiwan apprehends the National Security Law. How has the situation in Hong Kong affected Taiwan? Since Beijing has sought to influence and control Hong Kong more closely, relations between the Special Administrative Region and Taiwan have deteriorated. In June 2021, around the same time the National Security Law came into being, Taiwan representatives in Hong Kong were met with a demand from Hong Kong’s government to sign a document supporting Beijing’s ‘One China’ claim to Taiwan. In response, Taiwan withdrew representatives from the region, and Hong Kong has since suspended activities at its representative office in Taipei. Taiwan has certainly played close attention to China’s moves to diminish Hong Kong’s autonomy and even extended an invitation for Hong Kongers to move to the island, but reinforcement of the One China notion by Hong Kong officials has not affected Taiwan’s staunch opposition to the CCP. Following disputes between the two regions, Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council stated: "Our government stands firm in guarding national dignity and lodges stern condemnation and a warning to the Chinese Communist Party and Hong Kong government." Taiwan and Hong Kong have taken very different paths historically, and the biggest difference between the two regions in this context is that whilst China agreed to lease Hong Kong, it never relinquished full control of the region, whereas Taiwan has proclaimed itself independent of China since World War Two. China cannot therefore insidiously exert power over Taipei in the way that it has been possible in Hong Kong. If Taiwan was to be returned to the motherland, force may indeed be the only means possible, which returns us to the question of whether an invasion is likely. The likelihood of China capturing Taiwan by use of military force China’s increased military activity in the last months has raised concerns for Taiwan on a national and international level, but these events are not unique. Many Taiwanese citizens experience aggression from China in the Air Defense Identification Zone like an occurrence not out of the ordinary; indeed, Beijing has been hostile toward Taiwan ever since 1949 when the ROC fled there. The main difference now is the weaponry capability. China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has gained advanced military experience and power that could not be matched by Taipei. However, Taiwan is not alone in the international community. Bringing Taiwan under the control of the CCP would indeed be a significant step toward Chinese hegemony in Asia, but China has a lot to lose from staging a military attack. The US has made its support for Taiwan in the event of an invasion clear, and US special forces and marines are already operating training missions in preparation for this scenario. More significantly, China is aware that even if it is able to overcome the US and Taiwan militarily, the result may be a complete naval blockade of the country. As the Chinese economy is overwhelmingly dependent on foreign trade, the chance of this outcome should be enough to reserve force as an absolute last resort. For exports to continue uninterrupted, Chinese cargo needs to be able to pass via Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, and an attack on Taiwan puts this route in serious jeopardy. The increase of Chinese military operations in Taiwan’s defense zone, therefore, appears to act as more of a warning at this time - a warning that China will not back down from its stance against Taiwanese independence, and that allies of the region should not cross the ‘red lines’ of the CCP, which include warming relations with Taiwan as a sovereign entity. It is an exhibition of power and a confirmation that China could strike Taiwan if desired. Beijing most likely hopes that this intimidation tactic will prevent Taiwan from obtaining formal recognition as an independent state, but even if things do move in this direction, China will have to weigh up the benefits of an invasion before any serious and irreversible steps are taken. About the author: Robyn Kelly-Meyrick Robyn holds an MSc in Political Science and a BA in International Relations, and split her studies between the UK, Japan and the Netherlands. She is an experienced Analyst and has worked with a range of organisations in roles pertaining to political risk consultancy and business compliance

By Mark Bruno In June 2017, Ukraine was the recipient of an absolutely devastating cyber-attack. Allegedly carried out by the Russian state-sponsored hackers known as Sandworm, the attackers deployed a formidable ransomware virus known as “NotPetya.” Most public infrastructure and a massive portion of Ukraine’s private sector were brought to their knees by this weapon. The entirety of the nation’s healthcare system had to go offline, crippling any ability to get effective and timely healthcare to an unknown number of citizens. As cyberwarfare knows no borders, the NotPetya worm spread to several major multinational corporations. Among them were Maersk - the largest shipping company in the world, and Merck - the American vaccine manufacturer, despite neither company being the virus’ intended target. In 2021, with a backed-up supply chain and a global need to support COVID-19 vaccine rollouts, the implications of a similar attack could result in widespread loss of life. The very nature of the world’s response to the pandemic has required quick and reliable access to niche supply networks, efficiently allocated healthcare resources, and for the population to receive accurate information easily. This renders the current global effort extremely vulnerable to internet-based attacks and posits a grim new possibility for the damage that can be done with cyberweapons. The Fragility of Cold Chain Logistics Cold chain, the niche supply network designed to move items that are temperature-sensitive, has proven to be vulnerable to cyber-attacks since the earliest days of COVID-19 vaccine development. A number of vaccines, including most influenza shots and the MRNA-based COVID-19 jabs, must be stored and transported at low temperatures. This is a massive feat-of-scale, considering that the World Health Organization is hoping to deliver 11 billion COVID-19 vaccines worldwide by next Summer. Given the delicate nature of the cold chain, its importance, and the expense it takes to maintain, it presents an enticing target to threat actors. In December of last year, IBM’s Security X-Force announced that they had uncovered a massive global phishing campaign against The Gavi Vaccine Alliance’s Cold Chain Equipment Optimization Platform (CCEOP). The CCEOP is a public-private partnership developed to promote global vaccine distribution primarily in developing countries. The campaign attempted to spear-phish credentials from high-level employees at businesses associated with Gavi’s CCEOP program in at least six countries. The report does not name any entity specifically, but asserts that the precise nature of the attack was indicative of a state-sponsored actor. The idea that this could be a threat actor with the capabilities of a government behind them is troubling. There are no firm rules at the moment as to what constitutes an act of war in the cyberspace realm. Many definitions of the term “cyber warfare” assert that it is when one nation attacks the critical infrastructure of another. However, when critical infrastructure in so many nations is reliant on the private sector, corporate-government partnerships, and various international bodies, when does an attacker meet that threshold of an “act of war?” Gavi’s CCEOP and the attacks discovered by X-Force demonstrate a prime example of such a conundrum. Holding Healthcare Systems Ransom Another way that hackers have become increasingly threatening during the COVID-19 pandemic has been the outright attacks taking place on hospitals and healthcare infrastructure. The increased pressure on healthcare systems from treating COVID-19 patients has come with a marked increase in the amount of cyber-crime directed at that infrastructure. Threat actors often choose Ransomware attacks against such institutions. A Ransomware attack is when malware that has made its way onto a system encrypts all of a computer’s files, making them completely unusable. The attackers then demand payment for the decryption key. While extremely common, Ransomware can be altered in some cases to make a system unrecoverable. Such an alteration was a component of the NotPetya cyber weapon. In May, Ireland’s public healthcare service, the Health Service Executive, announced that it had sustained two ransomware attacks. Ireland was forced to temporarily shut down the entirety of its Health Services’ IT systems. The Irish government claimed that they paid no ransom to the attackers, with the consequences being a week of backed up emergency rooms, an inability to process COVID-19 PCR tests, and workers being forced to use an entirely on-paper system. A similar incident took place in Lazio, Italy, this time specifically targeting the government’s vaccine appointment system. It inhibited nearly six million citizens from receiving their injections. After the initial announcement, Lazio’s governor followed up by saying that the attacks were ongoing, and of a “terrorist nature”, but did not elaborate as to whether or not a specific organization may have been implied. The attacks came from outside of the country, and also utilized ransomware. It’s critical to note that these incidents, by directly impeding individuals’ access to treatment and preventative medicine, are risking those individuals’ lives. Cyber criminals bet on this realization, in the hopes that they’ll be able to monetize their Ransomware. This also means that they are willing to gamble with innocent lives, and one can reasonably assume that they have been indirectly responsible for a number of deaths in this way. Directed Disinformation Being a novel illness, information on the COVID-19 infection still continues to amass rapidly. Suggested treatments, countermeasures to slow its spread, and research on its mutations and symptoms have all required rapid delivery to both authorities and the public. This has rendered social media and internet communication both a major strength and a serious liability to any unified global response. This is because the nature of today’s internet provides a platform to disinformation as readily as scientific findings. Disinformation has certainly claimed lives throughout the course of the pandemic. The amount of distrust in vaccines and expert recommendations continues to propagate on every social media platform, despite the current efforts of Facebook and Twitter. One way that disinformation replicates is through the manipulation of stolen data. This gives the disinformation the apparent credibility of an authoritative source, while allowing the attacker to craft their narrative. These attacks also send clear threats to the organizations that they have stolen their information from. In December of 2020, the Netherlands-based European Medicines Agency (EMA) became the victim of such a data breach, and the investigation is still ongoing. According to the EMA, the hackers stole digital correspondence documents and manipulated them in a way, “that could undermine trust in vaccines.” An analysis of the incident by Switzerland’s CyberPeace institute stated that, “The targeted nature of the attack and manipulated leak hints towards a state-sponsored cyber-enabled information operation that could potentially undermine the reputation of Comirnaty [the BioNTech/Pfizer vaccine], both globally and regionally. In turn, this could give rival vaccines a competitive edge in states’ soft power bid of ‘vaccine diplomacy’ as well as impede the pandemic response in the EU as part of a greater Infodemic.” An Honest Threat Assessment It’s important to note that while the pandemic didn’t necessarily bring with it any specific, new cyber warfare tactics, it’s the world itself that has become more vulnerable. COVID-19 has tested the limits of our world’s systems in a way that would make a tool such as the NotPetya cyberweapon absolutely devastating. ICUs and emergency rooms all over the world are pushed to capacity, despite the now-plentiful availability of vaccines in many nations. Should the mobility of those vaccines be reduced through an interruption to the cold chain or if patients are unable to secure their vaccine appointments, how many millions more will require such hospitalizations? If those hospitals’ internal networks go down across a continent, how many patients could potentially die waiting for treatment? How many people have been convinced, through any number of disinformation efforts, to refuse, or even just hesitate to be vaccinated? Is there ever going to be a way to tell just what that death toll could be? There are a number of long-established cybersecurity best practices that would reduce the harm generated by the threats outlined in this analysis. Many of those practices, however, require an engaged public and a non-complacent security culture among our institutions. As with any security policy, this must begin with an honest threat assessment. About the author: Mark Bruno Mark Bruno is a non-commissioned officer in the United States military, where he serves as a Combat Medic and a Public Affairs Representative. He is currently a Master’s Student of Information Assurance at the University of Maryland’s Global Campus, and holds a Bachelor of Science in Communication. Aspiring to a career in Conflict Journalism, his areas of security interest are in military medicine, information security, and weapons technology. Any analysis or views expressed in this article are personal and do not represent any positions or policies of the US Department of Defense.

By Chiara Longmore Update to Sliding Doors: Ethiopia’s Future Paths In July, a unilateral ceasefire brought tentative hopes for peace in Ethiopia. However, last week the Ethiopian government announced a state of emergency as TPLF rebels marched on the capital Addis Ababa. Facing an escalating civil war, several western countries have ordered their citizens to leave Ethiopia. Events in Ethiopia mark a continuation of an already devastating conflict that has created a burgeoning humanitarian crisis. If violence continues to escalate, the risk to human security will continue to deepen and impact the regional security of the Horn of Africa. Context: The Tigray War Tigray, a region in northern Ethiopia, is one of ten which constitute Ethiopia. Despite being a minority group, Tigrayans have historically dominated Ethiopia’s political landscape for almost thirty years. The Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) represented the region of Tigray and were a dominant political and military force in Ethiopia, leading the war against Eritrea from 1998 to 2000. In 2018, Abiy Ahmed became Ethiopia’s Prime Minister and sought to establish a more centralised political system for the country. As Abiy’s policies reduced their political power, the TPLF also felt that they were being disproportionately targeted by Abiy’s government for their past political and military dominance. As such, the TPLF broke away from the centralised government’s coalition of parties and in September 2020 held their own elections. Violence erupted in early November 2020 when Prime Minister Abiy’s government suspended the elections in Tigray, declaring them unlawful. Months of intense conflict have since followed, with the TPLF and Tigrayan Special Forces (TSF) fighting against Ethiopia’s National Defence Force (ENDF), the Eritrean Defence Force (EDF), and Amhara Special Forces (ASF). On 28th June 2021, a unilateral ceasefire between the TPLF and the Ethiopian government presented a tentative path to peace, with Prime Minister Abiy describing it as a “moment of reflection”. However, this ‘reflective moment’ did not hold. Last week a joint force of eight rebel groups joined Tigrayan rebels to march on Ethiopia’s capital Addis Ababa. The coalition of rebel forces reportedly seeks to overthrow Abiy and instate a transitional government - “we are left with one option — changing the situation; otherwise, we’ll all be massacred” stated Berhane Gebre-Christos, former foreign minister for Ethiopia, speaking on behalf of the TPLF. In response to the advance of rebel groups, the Ethiopian government has declared a state of emergency, calling upon citizens to pick arms against potential rebel sympathisers. The state of emergency also grants authorities the power to arrest individuals without a court warrant, and potentially detain them for as long as the measures are in place (projected to be six months). Deepening Divisions Human rights organisations, such as Amnesty and Human Rights Watch, have raised concerns that the state of emergency will bestow the government greater powers to conduct arbitrary detentions, specifically along ethnic lines. Indeed, it was reported Tuesday (9th November 2021) that sixteen UN staff have been detained in Addis Ababa, and it is widely suggested they were of Tigrayan ethnicity. Whilst an Ethiopian government spokesman told Associated Press the individuals were being detained for their “participation in terror”, it is countered that the detentions indicate a deliberate targeting of ethnic Tigrayans. Whilst the topic remains contentious, the ethnic dimension to the conflict in Ethiopia must be considered. As a minority ethnic group, Tigrayans constitute 6% of the population and have allegedly been subjected to discrimination since violence erupted last November. Tigrayans have reportedly faced arbitrary arrests, had bank accounts frozen and experienced forced redundancies. There is therefore a fear, particularly from human rights groups, that increased government powers will be used to pursue further discriminatory action against Tigrayans. Whilst there are extremely concerning accounts of ethnically targeted violence, it must be emphasised that the situation in Ethiopia is incredibly complex. As a country of more than 110 million, and over ninety different ethnic groups, the Ethiopian conflict cannot easily be framed as an ethnic conflict of ‘one group versus another’. Indeed, the Tigrayan coalition of rebels alone includes Oromos, Somalis, and the Sidama, to name but a few. Thus context-specific issues must be considered when analysing the conflict in Ethiopia in order to avoid an oversimplification of dynamics, particularly regarding ethnic divides. Despite the complexities of the ethnic dimensions to the conflict in Ethiopia, what can be argued is that the extension of government powers risks the protection of human rights, as well as creating deeper divisions between groups. There is thus a potential for conflict escalation which is particularly concerning when considering the humanitarian crisis occurring as a result of violence. Humanitarian Crisis The humanitarian cost of the conflict in Ethiopia runs deep. The UN High Commissioner Michelle Bachelet commented how the “conflict has been marked by extreme brutality”, and this has been perpetrated by all warring parties. Last week, a joint UN-Ethiopia report suggested that crimes against humanity and war crimes have been committed during the Tigray conflict by all sides. Based on around 270 interviews with victims and witnesses, the report found evidence of sexual violence being perpetrated by Tigrayan, Eritrean and Ethiopian forces, with thirty survivors sharing their experiences. Furthermore, the report also found evidence of the persecution of refugees by Tigrayan and Eritrean forces, as well forced displacement particularly of ethnic Amharas from their homes. The UN further estimates that around 400,000 people are living in “famine-like conditions” in Tigray with a further five million facing food shortages. Such issues are compounded by the 1.7 million people who are currently internally displaced, as well as the fact that access to communication lines and electricity still remains limited to many in Tigray. According to Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Rosemary DiCarlo, “no aid trucks have reached Mekelle since 18 October” and highlighted how airstrikes have continued to disrupt access to aid and services to the region of Tigray. There is therefore a severe crisis of human security in Ethiopia, a country which is “teetering on the brink of a human rights and humanitarian catastrophe”. This is catastrophic not just for Ethiopia’s internal stability (large numbers are reportedly fleeing from Tigray into neighbouring regions of Amhara and Afar) but it also threatens broader regional security of the Horn of Africa. More than 46,000 refugees have crossed the border into Sudan, using the Hamdayet border in Kassala state as an access point. In response to the increasing influx of refugees into Sudan, the UN established a settlement in Tunaydbah-Gedaref State in January of this year, where more than 18,000 Ethiopians are currently situated. As such, the UN political chief told the Security Council this week that Ethiopia had reached “disastrous proportions” with the stability of East Africa subsequently at risk. Inclusive Solutions There are long-standing grievances between the TPLF and the Ethiopian government, and the ripple effect of the conflict between the sides is having a devastating impact on human security. The state of emergency recently implemented risks deepening divisions and fomenting further conflict in Ethiopia. Therefore, whilst it is positive that Prime Minister Abiy engaged in discussion with UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator at the weekend, a framework of internal dialogue between warring groups is necessary if an effective peace process is to take place. This is reiterated by the UN which calls for an “immediate cessation of hostilities” so that an “intra-Ethiopian dialogue” can be pursued. If left unresolved, the Ethiopian conflict will continue to feed a humanitarian crisis which risks destabilising the wider region of East Africa. About the author: Chiara Longmore Chiara is originally from Scotland; however, she has moved to the Netherlands to complete a master’s at Leiden University in International Relations and Diplomacy. With an interdisciplinary background, her bachelor’s was in Liberal Arts, she has analysed situations of violence and conflict with a multi-disciplinary framework, in particular with Political Science, Anthropology, and Sociology.

By Nathalie Heidema Often described as ‘Europe’s last dictatorship,’ the Belorussian President Alexander Lukashenko has been in power since 1994. The demonstrations that erupted as a result of the August 2020 elections that saw Lukashenko’s sixth presidential term confirmed have changed little – if anything – and the gap between the West and Belarus is widening. On the other hand, the Minsk-Moscow relations have always been based on asymmetric dependency, yet the cooperation has recently even intensified in the economic, security and defense aspects. Where does Belarus stand on… Human rights? As the (Western) international community condemns Belarus for the infringement of human rights, its leadership continues to reject and repress any political opposition and its alternatives. A recent resolution from the European Parliament has evaluated the situation in Belarus one year after the protests and stated that the authorities continue to violently repress its citizens, organizations, and businesses that are opposed to the regime. It is estimated that authorities have detained around 40.000 Belarusians for participating in the protests, including hundreds of filed cases of ill-treatment, torture, and other severe violations of human rights. Moreover, there are thousands of neglected reports referring to police brutality, as well as 120 unfair and arbitrary verdicts in politically motivated trials. Opposition politicians are targeted and imprisoned for up to 14 years. The Belarusian regime has undertaken repression campaigns against civil society and human rights defenders to silence the remaining independent voices in the country. Since the protests initiated, the regime has liquidated around 250 civil society organizations, thus testifying to the justice system failing to equally enforce and independently adjudicate the rule of law in Belarus. Notably, in May 2021, Athens-Lithuania commercial flight was diverted to Minsk, where young Belarusian journalist Roman Protasevich and his partner were immediately detained and imprisoned. The international community has responded with outrage about the fact that Belarus resorted to such extreme measures as hijacking a plane. The EU leaders agreed to impose additional sanctions on Belarus and considered it an act of state terrorism. Lukashenko has also recently suspended the accord on migration that had been signed with the EU before the 2020 elections. He says it is a response to the EU's sanctions, however, the EU condemns such instrumentalization of people. Poland claims that Lukashenko has been using refugees as political weapons, and has even alarmed the army to guard the border. Fellow NATO allies Latvia and Lithuania find themselves in a similar situation, as hundreds of migrants are encouraged to illegally cross the border into the EU. Where does Belarus stand on… Economic development? The economy in Belarus is founded and sustained on large state-owned enterprises, as is the majority of production assets. Belarus deviates from the principles of democracy and market economy, which continues to challenge cooperation therewith – meanwhile consolidating its relations with Russia and the EAEU (Eurasian Economic Union). Belarus is heavily dependent on Russian energy, and simultaneously serves as an important transit route for Russian oil and gas to Europe. And thus, despite having had several oil and gas disputes in the past decade, Lukashenko and Putin met in Moscow in September 2021 and agreed to deepen their economic integration and set up a unified oil and gas market. Further, they agreed on 28 integration road maps encompassing common approaches to macro-economic policies; including monetary policy, taxes and custom rules. To lessen its reliance on Russian energy, Belarus is constructing a nuclear power plant Ostrovets, near the border with Lithuania. Nuclear safety is a topic that highly worries the EU, yet is not actively elaborated on nor engaged with from the Belarusian side. The EU, however, encourages Belarus to cooperate with international authorities and especially its neighboring countries, to build on cross-border trust and the overall nuclear safety in the region. The nuclear power plant operation is part of an important strategy for Belarus’s energy empowerment, but paradoxically, the project is financed by Russia itself. One of the greatest challenges for Belarus will be sustained economic growth without structural reforms. Historically, economic development has been guaranteed through energy subsidies from Moscow. Looking ahead, however, especially oil subsidies are expected to decline as of 2030, due to the energy transition policies at the global level. Market reforms will be thus necessary (even if pushed from Moscow), and their effects are expected to bring a change to Lukashenko’s political and societal status. This could mean even greater subordination to the Kremlin’s influence, and it begs the question - is Lukashenko willing to risk trading off Belarus’s sovereignty in exchange for more support from Russia? Where does Belarus stand on… Relations with Russia? Due to the deteriorating relations that isolate Belarus ever more from the West, Lukashenko has recently been fully compliant and willing to cater to Russia’s aid – political, economic, and military. Accordingly, Lukashenko has removed the neutrality clause in Belarus’ constitution in July 2021 while publicly displaying his full allegiance to Russia. Moscow supported the decision and affirmed that Belarus has relinquished any obligations to the West and demonstrated full involvement in Moscow’s strategic priorities. Militarily, Russia is increasing its military presence in Belarus, as it deployed fighter jets for joint patrols of airspace along the borders. The two countries have established a joint air force and defense training center in Grodno, less than 15 kilometers from the border with Poland. In an already sensitive political environment, the joint Zapad 2021 military exercise was held in Belarus in September 2021 – involving 200.000 troops, hundreds of planes, armored vehicles, and ships. The EU reiterated that this exercise, including other similar large-scale exercises, testify to Russia’s offensive posturing and provocations. Putin stated that it was purposefully held near the western borders as a reaction to NATO’s expansive presence in the region. Belarus is also highly susceptible to Russian influence on its (national) media. In fact, around 60% of the broadcasting and media content in Belarus is produced by Russia, which consequently has a conditioning effect on its population. The problematics here are rooted in the fact that private national media are largely limited and prohibited, and thus there is a lack of alternative media sources in Belarus. As already mentioned, the government persistently violates freedoms of speech and persecutes journalists, hence making it difficult for independent media to work without fearing consequences. Therefore, amidst such frozen relations between Belarus and the West, countries should be pragmatic rather than optimistic in observing the next (geopolitical) developments in our shared neighborhood space. About the author: Nathalie Heidema Nathalie is passionate about the EU external policy, international cooperation and security, specializing in the Latin American and East European region. She holds a double Master degree in Political Science and East European Affairs. Coming from a bi-cultural background, she is eager in bridging the gap between the divided East & West, and thus being an avid mediator. She has field experience from both Latin America (Mercosur) and Eastern Europe. Nathalie now works for the EU Delegation to the UN. Her experience is mainly in the field of economics, environment, and other development programs. nathalie.heidema@gmail.com About DEWIS: Dyami Early-Warning for International Security is a project developed by Dyami Strategic Security Solutions team. The project’s goal is to analyze current threats to international security, review trends, and keep relevant and precise information circulating. Follow us on our channels to keep yourself up to date with analyses, infographics, and news! @dewisbydyami