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Early Warning Report by Ruben Pfeijffer

By Robyn Kelly-Meyrick Heightened tensions between mainland China and Taiwan, have frequented global headlines in recent months. China has upped the ante through an increasingly aggressive rhetoric toward the island, which it backed up by sending a record number of warplanes into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone. Taipei’s admission that by 2025, China will likely be able to mount a “full scale’’ invasion of Taiwan has triggered an international debate on whether or not China will actually use force to subordinate the island, and what the response might be. Why is China opposed to Taiwanese independence? Since the surrender of Japan after World War Two, the status of Taiwan as a legal part of China has been disputed. After the Chinese Civil War, the Republic of China (ROC) lost the mainland to the communist People’s Republic of China (PRC) and fled to Taiwan. The PRC views itself as a successor of the ROC as a result of the civil war and has therefore rejected the democratization process of Taiwan and the notion that the ROC is a legitimate government. Whilst in 1991 Taiwan proclaimed that the war with the mainland PRC was over and relations between the two improved, the election of Chen Shui-bian - who openly backed independence - as president of Taiwan raised concerns in Beijing, resulting in the latter passing an anti-secession law which affirmed the right to use force against Taiwan should it persevere to break free. In the last few decades, relations between China and Taiwan have deteriorated as the latter has gained more international recognition as an independent state, with the PRC growing increasingly concerned by ties between Taiwan and the US which deepened under the Trump administration. President Biden subsequently became the first to invite a Taiwanese delegation to the presidential inauguration. Allowing Taiwan to turn independent would undermine the legitimacy of the PRC, whilst reunifying the island with the mainland would help to cement China as a hegemonic power in Asia. Why have concerns over Chinese/Taiwanese relations grown? Beijing has reiterated its willingness to use force to align Taiwan with the mainland as a last resort if necessary, and Xi Jinping has stated that ‘the historical task of the complete reunification of the motherland [...] will definitely be fulfilled’. Taiwan’s defense minister Chiu Kuo-cheng predicts that by 2025, China will be capable of launching a full-scale invasion of the island, a statement which followed the intrusion of around ‘150 People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) fighter jets, nuclear-capable bombers, anti-submarine aircraft, and airborne early warning and control planes’ into Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in early October of 2021. The surge of military activity coincided with Taiwan’s official application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) free-trade pact. China remains staunchly opposed to the admission of Taiwan to any kind of bilateral or multilateral organization of an official nature. In the Biden-Xi virtual summit, China re-emphasized that US backing of Taiwan’s independence would be ‘playing with fire’. The combination of rhetoric and military activity has given relations between China and Taiwan global focus, but is an invasion the likely conclusion? China and Hong Kong - the will to unify The events that have taken place in Hong Kong over the last two years put the sharp rhetoric toward Taiwan into a context that illustrates China’s will to reunify the motherland. Hong Kong developed under British rule from 1898 up until 1997 (a period during which China agreed to lease the land to Britain following the First Opium War that saw the UK occupy Hong Kong). In 1997, the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed by the UK and China, which agreed upon the retention of some of Hong Kong’s autonomy through a ‘one country, two systems’ policy that would last for a subsequent 50 year period. This means that in 2047, Hong Kong’s mini-constitution - the Basic Law - will expire, leaving the future of the region’s autonomy from China unclear. Largely, Hong Kong’s relative independence from the communist mainland is observed to be in decline. In June 2019, a highly controversial plan to extradite criminal suspects from Hong Kong to the mainland resulted in months of heavy protests from concerned Hongkongers, who believed the plans would enable arbitrary detention and unfair trials under the Chinese judicial system. The plans were eventually withdrawn in September 2019. In June of 2021, a new national security regime was introduced by Beijing, which imposed significant curtailing of freedom of speech within Hong Kong through the National Security Law. Voices critical toward the CCP have been silenced, with journalists and high-profile critics arrested and imprisoned. Hongkongers must now self-censor and contradictorily exercise media freedom with constraint in order to avoid punishment. Unsurprisingly, Taiwan apprehends the National Security Law. How has the situation in Hong Kong affected Taiwan? Since Beijing has sought to influence and control Hong Kong more closely, relations between the Special Administrative Region and Taiwan have deteriorated. In June 2021, around the same time the National Security Law came into being, Taiwan representatives in Hong Kong were met with a demand from Hong Kong’s government to sign a document supporting Beijing’s ‘One China’ claim to Taiwan. In response, Taiwan withdrew representatives from the region, and Hong Kong has since suspended activities at its representative office in Taipei. Taiwan has certainly played close attention to China’s moves to diminish Hong Kong’s autonomy and even extended an invitation for Hong Kongers to move to the island, but reinforcement of the One China notion by Hong Kong officials has not affected Taiwan’s staunch opposition to the CCP. Following disputes between the two regions, Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council stated: "Our government stands firm in guarding national dignity and lodges stern condemnation and a warning to the Chinese Communist Party and Hong Kong government." Taiwan and Hong Kong have taken very different paths historically, and the biggest difference between the two regions in this context is that whilst China agreed to lease Hong Kong, it never relinquished full control of the region, whereas Taiwan has proclaimed itself independent of China since World War Two. China cannot therefore insidiously exert power over Taipei in the way that it has been possible in Hong Kong. If Taiwan was to be returned to the motherland, force may indeed be the only means possible, which returns us to the question of whether an invasion is likely. The likelihood of China capturing Taiwan by use of military force China’s increased military activity in the last months has raised concerns for Taiwan on a national and international level, but these events are not unique. Many Taiwanese citizens experience aggression from China in the Air Defense Identification Zone like an occurrence not out of the ordinary; indeed, Beijing has been hostile toward Taiwan ever since 1949 when the ROC fled there. The main difference now is the weaponry capability. China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has gained advanced military experience and power that could not be matched by Taipei. However, Taiwan is not alone in the international community. Bringing Taiwan under the control of the CCP would indeed be a significant step toward Chinese hegemony in Asia, but China has a lot to lose from staging a military attack. The US has made its support for Taiwan in the event of an invasion clear, and US special forces and marines are already operating training missions in preparation for this scenario. More significantly, China is aware that even if it is able to overcome the US and Taiwan militarily, the result may be a complete naval blockade of the country. As the Chinese economy is overwhelmingly dependent on foreign trade, the chance of this outcome should be enough to reserve force as an absolute last resort. For exports to continue uninterrupted, Chinese cargo needs to be able to pass via Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, and an attack on Taiwan puts this route in serious jeopardy. The increase of Chinese military operations in Taiwan’s defense zone, therefore, appears to act as more of a warning at this time - a warning that China will not back down from its stance against Taiwanese independence, and that allies of the region should not cross the ‘red lines’ of the CCP, which include warming relations with Taiwan as a sovereign entity. It is an exhibition of power and a confirmation that China could strike Taiwan if desired. Beijing most likely hopes that this intimidation tactic will prevent Taiwan from obtaining formal recognition as an independent state, but even if things do move in this direction, China will have to weigh up the benefits of an invasion before any serious and irreversible steps are taken. About the author: Robyn Kelly-Meyrick Robyn holds an MSc in Political Science and a BA in International Relations, and split her studies between the UK, Japan and the Netherlands. She is an experienced Analyst and has worked with a range of organisations in roles pertaining to political risk consultancy and business compliance

By Mark Bruno In June 2017, Ukraine was the recipient of an absolutely devastating cyber-attack. Allegedly carried out by the Russian state-sponsored hackers known as Sandworm, the attackers deployed a formidable ransomware virus known as “NotPetya.” Most public infrastructure and a massive portion of Ukraine’s private sector were brought to their knees by this weapon. The entirety of the nation’s healthcare system had to go offline, crippling any ability to get effective and timely healthcare to an unknown number of citizens. As cyberwarfare knows no borders, the NotPetya worm spread to several major multinational corporations. Among them were Maersk - the largest shipping company in the world, and Merck - the American vaccine manufacturer, despite neither company being the virus’ intended target. In 2021, with a backed-up supply chain and a global need to support COVID-19 vaccine rollouts, the implications of a similar attack could result in widespread loss of life. The very nature of the world’s response to the pandemic has required quick and reliable access to niche supply networks, efficiently allocated healthcare resources, and for the population to receive accurate information easily. This renders the current global effort extremely vulnerable to internet-based attacks and posits a grim new possibility for the damage that can be done with cyberweapons. The Fragility of Cold Chain Logistics Cold chain, the niche supply network designed to move items that are temperature-sensitive, has proven to be vulnerable to cyber-attacks since the earliest days of COVID-19 vaccine development. A number of vaccines, including most influenza shots and the MRNA-based COVID-19 jabs, must be stored and transported at low temperatures. This is a massive feat-of-scale, considering that the World Health Organization is hoping to deliver 11 billion COVID-19 vaccines worldwide by next Summer. Given the delicate nature of the cold chain, its importance, and the expense it takes to maintain, it presents an enticing target to threat actors. In December of last year, IBM’s Security X-Force announced that they had uncovered a massive global phishing campaign against The Gavi Vaccine Alliance’s Cold Chain Equipment Optimization Platform (CCEOP). The CCEOP is a public-private partnership developed to promote global vaccine distribution primarily in developing countries. The campaign attempted to spear-phish credentials from high-level employees at businesses associated with Gavi’s CCEOP program in at least six countries. The report does not name any entity specifically, but asserts that the precise nature of the attack was indicative of a state-sponsored actor. The idea that this could be a threat actor with the capabilities of a government behind them is troubling. There are no firm rules at the moment as to what constitutes an act of war in the cyberspace realm. Many definitions of the term “cyber warfare” assert that it is when one nation attacks the critical infrastructure of another. However, when critical infrastructure in so many nations is reliant on the private sector, corporate-government partnerships, and various international bodies, when does an attacker meet that threshold of an “act of war?” Gavi’s CCEOP and the attacks discovered by X-Force demonstrate a prime example of such a conundrum. Holding Healthcare Systems Ransom Another way that hackers have become increasingly threatening during the COVID-19 pandemic has been the outright attacks taking place on hospitals and healthcare infrastructure. The increased pressure on healthcare systems from treating COVID-19 patients has come with a marked increase in the amount of cyber-crime directed at that infrastructure. Threat actors often choose Ransomware attacks against such institutions. A Ransomware attack is when malware that has made its way onto a system encrypts all of a computer’s files, making them completely unusable. The attackers then demand payment for the decryption key. While extremely common, Ransomware can be altered in some cases to make a system unrecoverable. Such an alteration was a component of the NotPetya cyber weapon. In May, Ireland’s public healthcare service, the Health Service Executive, announced that it had sustained two ransomware attacks. Ireland was forced to temporarily shut down the entirety of its Health Services’ IT systems. The Irish government claimed that they paid no ransom to the attackers, with the consequences being a week of backed up emergency rooms, an inability to process COVID-19 PCR tests, and workers being forced to use an entirely on-paper system. A similar incident took place in Lazio, Italy, this time specifically targeting the government’s vaccine appointment system. It inhibited nearly six million citizens from receiving their injections. After the initial announcement, Lazio’s governor followed up by saying that the attacks were ongoing, and of a “terrorist nature”, but did not elaborate as to whether or not a specific organization may have been implied. The attacks came from outside of the country, and also utilized ransomware. It’s critical to note that these incidents, by directly impeding individuals’ access to treatment and preventative medicine, are risking those individuals’ lives. Cyber criminals bet on this realization, in the hopes that they’ll be able to monetize their Ransomware. This also means that they are willing to gamble with innocent lives, and one can reasonably assume that they have been indirectly responsible for a number of deaths in this way. Directed Disinformation Being a novel illness, information on the COVID-19 infection still continues to amass rapidly. Suggested treatments, countermeasures to slow its spread, and research on its mutations and symptoms have all required rapid delivery to both authorities and the public. This has rendered social media and internet communication both a major strength and a serious liability to any unified global response. This is because the nature of today’s internet provides a platform to disinformation as readily as scientific findings. Disinformation has certainly claimed lives throughout the course of the pandemic. The amount of distrust in vaccines and expert recommendations continues to propagate on every social media platform, despite the current efforts of Facebook and Twitter. One way that disinformation replicates is through the manipulation of stolen data. This gives the disinformation the apparent credibility of an authoritative source, while allowing the attacker to craft their narrative. These attacks also send clear threats to the organizations that they have stolen their information from. In December of 2020, the Netherlands-based European Medicines Agency (EMA) became the victim of such a data breach, and the investigation is still ongoing. According to the EMA, the hackers stole digital correspondence documents and manipulated them in a way, “that could undermine trust in vaccines.” An analysis of the incident by Switzerland’s CyberPeace institute stated that, “The targeted nature of the attack and manipulated leak hints towards a state-sponsored cyber-enabled information operation that could potentially undermine the reputation of Comirnaty [the BioNTech/Pfizer vaccine], both globally and regionally. In turn, this could give rival vaccines a competitive edge in states’ soft power bid of ‘vaccine diplomacy’ as well as impede the pandemic response in the EU as part of a greater Infodemic.” An Honest Threat Assessment It’s important to note that while the pandemic didn’t necessarily bring with it any specific, new cyber warfare tactics, it’s the world itself that has become more vulnerable. COVID-19 has tested the limits of our world’s systems in a way that would make a tool such as the NotPetya cyberweapon absolutely devastating. ICUs and emergency rooms all over the world are pushed to capacity, despite the now-plentiful availability of vaccines in many nations. Should the mobility of those vaccines be reduced through an interruption to the cold chain or if patients are unable to secure their vaccine appointments, how many millions more will require such hospitalizations? If those hospitals’ internal networks go down across a continent, how many patients could potentially die waiting for treatment? How many people have been convinced, through any number of disinformation efforts, to refuse, or even just hesitate to be vaccinated? Is there ever going to be a way to tell just what that death toll could be? There are a number of long-established cybersecurity best practices that would reduce the harm generated by the threats outlined in this analysis. Many of those practices, however, require an engaged public and a non-complacent security culture among our institutions. As with any security policy, this must begin with an honest threat assessment. About the author: Mark Bruno Mark Bruno is a non-commissioned officer in the United States military, where he serves as a Combat Medic and a Public Affairs Representative. He is currently a Master’s Student of Information Assurance at the University of Maryland’s Global Campus, and holds a Bachelor of Science in Communication. Aspiring to a career in Conflict Journalism, his areas of security interest are in military medicine, information security, and weapons technology. Any analysis or views expressed in this article are personal and do not represent any positions or policies of the US Department of Defense.

By Chiara Longmore Update to Sliding Doors: Ethiopia’s Future Paths In July, a unilateral ceasefire brought tentative hopes for peace in Ethiopia. However, last week the Ethiopian government announced a state of emergency as TPLF rebels marched on the capital Addis Ababa. Facing an escalating civil war, several western countries have ordered their citizens to leave Ethiopia. Events in Ethiopia mark a continuation of an already devastating conflict that has created a burgeoning humanitarian crisis. If violence continues to escalate, the risk to human security will continue to deepen and impact the regional security of the Horn of Africa. Context: The Tigray War Tigray, a region in northern Ethiopia, is one of ten which constitute Ethiopia. Despite being a minority group, Tigrayans have historically dominated Ethiopia’s political landscape for almost thirty years. The Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) represented the region of Tigray and were a dominant political and military force in Ethiopia, leading the war against Eritrea from 1998 to 2000. In 2018, Abiy Ahmed became Ethiopia’s Prime Minister and sought to establish a more centralised political system for the country. As Abiy’s policies reduced their political power, the TPLF also felt that they were being disproportionately targeted by Abiy’s government for their past political and military dominance. As such, the TPLF broke away from the centralised government’s coalition of parties and in September 2020 held their own elections. Violence erupted in early November 2020 when Prime Minister Abiy’s government suspended the elections in Tigray, declaring them unlawful. Months of intense conflict have since followed, with the TPLF and Tigrayan Special Forces (TSF) fighting against Ethiopia’s National Defence Force (ENDF), the Eritrean Defence Force (EDF), and Amhara Special Forces (ASF). On 28th June 2021, a unilateral ceasefire between the TPLF and the Ethiopian government presented a tentative path to peace, with Prime Minister Abiy describing it as a “moment of reflection”. However, this ‘reflective moment’ did not hold. Last week a joint force of eight rebel groups joined Tigrayan rebels to march on Ethiopia’s capital Addis Ababa. The coalition of rebel forces reportedly seeks to overthrow Abiy and instate a transitional government - “we are left with one option — changing the situation; otherwise, we’ll all be massacred” stated Berhane Gebre-Christos, former foreign minister for Ethiopia, speaking on behalf of the TPLF. In response to the advance of rebel groups, the Ethiopian government has declared a state of emergency, calling upon citizens to pick arms against potential rebel sympathisers. The state of emergency also grants authorities the power to arrest individuals without a court warrant, and potentially detain them for as long as the measures are in place (projected to be six months). Deepening Divisions Human rights organisations, such as Amnesty and Human Rights Watch, have raised concerns that the state of emergency will bestow the government greater powers to conduct arbitrary detentions, specifically along ethnic lines. Indeed, it was reported Tuesday (9th November 2021) that sixteen UN staff have been detained in Addis Ababa, and it is widely suggested they were of Tigrayan ethnicity. Whilst an Ethiopian government spokesman told Associated Press the individuals were being detained for their “participation in terror”, it is countered that the detentions indicate a deliberate targeting of ethnic Tigrayans. Whilst the topic remains contentious, the ethnic dimension to the conflict in Ethiopia must be considered. As a minority ethnic group, Tigrayans constitute 6% of the population and have allegedly been subjected to discrimination since violence erupted last November. Tigrayans have reportedly faced arbitrary arrests, had bank accounts frozen and experienced forced redundancies. There is therefore a fear, particularly from human rights groups, that increased government powers will be used to pursue further discriminatory action against Tigrayans. Whilst there are extremely concerning accounts of ethnically targeted violence, it must be emphasised that the situation in Ethiopia is incredibly complex. As a country of more than 110 million, and over ninety different ethnic groups, the Ethiopian conflict cannot easily be framed as an ethnic conflict of ‘one group versus another’. Indeed, the Tigrayan coalition of rebels alone includes Oromos, Somalis, and the Sidama, to name but a few. Thus context-specific issues must be considered when analysing the conflict in Ethiopia in order to avoid an oversimplification of dynamics, particularly regarding ethnic divides. Despite the complexities of the ethnic dimensions to the conflict in Ethiopia, what can be argued is that the extension of government powers risks the protection of human rights, as well as creating deeper divisions between groups. There is thus a potential for conflict escalation which is particularly concerning when considering the humanitarian crisis occurring as a result of violence. Humanitarian Crisis The humanitarian cost of the conflict in Ethiopia runs deep. The UN High Commissioner Michelle Bachelet commented how the “conflict has been marked by extreme brutality”, and this has been perpetrated by all warring parties. Last week, a joint UN-Ethiopia report suggested that crimes against humanity and war crimes have been committed during the Tigray conflict by all sides. Based on around 270 interviews with victims and witnesses, the report found evidence of sexual violence being perpetrated by Tigrayan, Eritrean and Ethiopian forces, with thirty survivors sharing their experiences. Furthermore, the report also found evidence of the persecution of refugees by Tigrayan and Eritrean forces, as well forced displacement particularly of ethnic Amharas from their homes. The UN further estimates that around 400,000 people are living in “famine-like conditions” in Tigray with a further five million facing food shortages. Such issues are compounded by the 1.7 million people who are currently internally displaced, as well as the fact that access to communication lines and electricity still remains limited to many in Tigray. According to Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Rosemary DiCarlo, “no aid trucks have reached Mekelle since 18 October” and highlighted how airstrikes have continued to disrupt access to aid and services to the region of Tigray. There is therefore a severe crisis of human security in Ethiopia, a country which is “teetering on the brink of a human rights and humanitarian catastrophe”. This is catastrophic not just for Ethiopia’s internal stability (large numbers are reportedly fleeing from Tigray into neighbouring regions of Amhara and Afar) but it also threatens broader regional security of the Horn of Africa. More than 46,000 refugees have crossed the border into Sudan, using the Hamdayet border in Kassala state as an access point. In response to the increasing influx of refugees into Sudan, the UN established a settlement in Tunaydbah-Gedaref State in January of this year, where more than 18,000 Ethiopians are currently situated. As such, the UN political chief told the Security Council this week that Ethiopia had reached “disastrous proportions” with the stability of East Africa subsequently at risk. Inclusive Solutions There are long-standing grievances between the TPLF and the Ethiopian government, and the ripple effect of the conflict between the sides is having a devastating impact on human security. The state of emergency recently implemented risks deepening divisions and fomenting further conflict in Ethiopia. Therefore, whilst it is positive that Prime Minister Abiy engaged in discussion with UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator at the weekend, a framework of internal dialogue between warring groups is necessary if an effective peace process is to take place. This is reiterated by the UN which calls for an “immediate cessation of hostilities” so that an “intra-Ethiopian dialogue” can be pursued. If left unresolved, the Ethiopian conflict will continue to feed a humanitarian crisis which risks destabilising the wider region of East Africa. About the author: Chiara Longmore Chiara is originally from Scotland; however, she has moved to the Netherlands to complete a master’s at Leiden University in International Relations and Diplomacy. With an interdisciplinary background, her bachelor’s was in Liberal Arts, she has analysed situations of violence and conflict with a multi-disciplinary framework, in particular with Political Science, Anthropology, and Sociology.

By Nathalie Heidema Often described as ‘Europe’s last dictatorship,’ the Belorussian President Alexander Lukashenko has been in power since 1994. The demonstrations that erupted as a result of the August 2020 elections that saw Lukashenko’s sixth presidential term confirmed have changed little – if anything – and the gap between the West and Belarus is widening. On the other hand, the Minsk-Moscow relations have always been based on asymmetric dependency, yet the cooperation has recently even intensified in the economic, security and defense aspects. Where does Belarus stand on… Human rights? As the (Western) international community condemns Belarus for the infringement of human rights, its leadership continues to reject and repress any political opposition and its alternatives. A recent resolution from the European Parliament has evaluated the situation in Belarus one year after the protests and stated that the authorities continue to violently repress its citizens, organizations, and businesses that are opposed to the regime. It is estimated that authorities have detained around 40.000 Belarusians for participating in the protests, including hundreds of filed cases of ill-treatment, torture, and other severe violations of human rights. Moreover, there are thousands of neglected reports referring to police brutality, as well as 120 unfair and arbitrary verdicts in politically motivated trials. Opposition politicians are targeted and imprisoned for up to 14 years. The Belarusian regime has undertaken repression campaigns against civil society and human rights defenders to silence the remaining independent voices in the country. Since the protests initiated, the regime has liquidated around 250 civil society organizations, thus testifying to the justice system failing to equally enforce and independently adjudicate the rule of law in Belarus. Notably, in May 2021, Athens-Lithuania commercial flight was diverted to Minsk, where young Belarusian journalist Roman Protasevich and his partner were immediately detained and imprisoned. The international community has responded with outrage about the fact that Belarus resorted to such extreme measures as hijacking a plane. The EU leaders agreed to impose additional sanctions on Belarus and considered it an act of state terrorism. Lukashenko has also recently suspended the accord on migration that had been signed with the EU before the 2020 elections. He says it is a response to the EU's sanctions, however, the EU condemns such instrumentalization of people. Poland claims that Lukashenko has been using refugees as political weapons, and has even alarmed the army to guard the border. Fellow NATO allies Latvia and Lithuania find themselves in a similar situation, as hundreds of migrants are encouraged to illegally cross the border into the EU. Where does Belarus stand on… Economic development? The economy in Belarus is founded and sustained on large state-owned enterprises, as is the majority of production assets. Belarus deviates from the principles of democracy and market economy, which continues to challenge cooperation therewith – meanwhile consolidating its relations with Russia and the EAEU (Eurasian Economic Union). Belarus is heavily dependent on Russian energy, and simultaneously serves as an important transit route for Russian oil and gas to Europe. And thus, despite having had several oil and gas disputes in the past decade, Lukashenko and Putin met in Moscow in September 2021 and agreed to deepen their economic integration and set up a unified oil and gas market. Further, they agreed on 28 integration road maps encompassing common approaches to macro-economic policies; including monetary policy, taxes and custom rules. To lessen its reliance on Russian energy, Belarus is constructing a nuclear power plant Ostrovets, near the border with Lithuania. Nuclear safety is a topic that highly worries the EU, yet is not actively elaborated on nor engaged with from the Belarusian side. The EU, however, encourages Belarus to cooperate with international authorities and especially its neighboring countries, to build on cross-border trust and the overall nuclear safety in the region. The nuclear power plant operation is part of an important strategy for Belarus’s energy empowerment, but paradoxically, the project is financed by Russia itself. One of the greatest challenges for Belarus will be sustained economic growth without structural reforms. Historically, economic development has been guaranteed through energy subsidies from Moscow. Looking ahead, however, especially oil subsidies are expected to decline as of 2030, due to the energy transition policies at the global level. Market reforms will be thus necessary (even if pushed from Moscow), and their effects are expected to bring a change to Lukashenko’s political and societal status. This could mean even greater subordination to the Kremlin’s influence, and it begs the question - is Lukashenko willing to risk trading off Belarus’s sovereignty in exchange for more support from Russia? Where does Belarus stand on… Relations with Russia? Due to the deteriorating relations that isolate Belarus ever more from the West, Lukashenko has recently been fully compliant and willing to cater to Russia’s aid – political, economic, and military. Accordingly, Lukashenko has removed the neutrality clause in Belarus’ constitution in July 2021 while publicly displaying his full allegiance to Russia. Moscow supported the decision and affirmed that Belarus has relinquished any obligations to the West and demonstrated full involvement in Moscow’s strategic priorities. Militarily, Russia is increasing its military presence in Belarus, as it deployed fighter jets for joint patrols of airspace along the borders. The two countries have established a joint air force and defense training center in Grodno, less than 15 kilometers from the border with Poland. In an already sensitive political environment, the joint Zapad 2021 military exercise was held in Belarus in September 2021 – involving 200.000 troops, hundreds of planes, armored vehicles, and ships. The EU reiterated that this exercise, including other similar large-scale exercises, testify to Russia’s offensive posturing and provocations. Putin stated that it was purposefully held near the western borders as a reaction to NATO’s expansive presence in the region. Belarus is also highly susceptible to Russian influence on its (national) media. In fact, around 60% of the broadcasting and media content in Belarus is produced by Russia, which consequently has a conditioning effect on its population. The problematics here are rooted in the fact that private national media are largely limited and prohibited, and thus there is a lack of alternative media sources in Belarus. As already mentioned, the government persistently violates freedoms of speech and persecutes journalists, hence making it difficult for independent media to work without fearing consequences. Therefore, amidst such frozen relations between Belarus and the West, countries should be pragmatic rather than optimistic in observing the next (geopolitical) developments in our shared neighborhood space. About the author: Nathalie Heidema Nathalie is passionate about the EU external policy, international cooperation and security, specializing in the Latin American and East European region. She holds a double Master degree in Political Science and East European Affairs. Coming from a bi-cultural background, she is eager in bridging the gap between the divided East & West, and thus being an avid mediator. She has field experience from both Latin America (Mercosur) and Eastern Europe. Nathalie now works for the EU Delegation to the UN. Her experience is mainly in the field of economics, environment, and other development programs. nathalie.heidema@gmail.com About DEWIS: Dyami Early-Warning for International Security is a project developed by Dyami Strategic Security Solutions team. The project’s goal is to analyze current threats to international security, review trends, and keep relevant and precise information circulating. Follow us on our channels to keep yourself up to date with analyses, infographics, and news! @dewisbydyami

Infographic by Alessia Cappelletti

Infographics By Chiara Longmore

An opportunity or a curse? By Alessia Cappelletti Taliban leaders pledged not to turn Afghanistan into a narco-state, but whether the fight on opiates and illegal poppy farming is just another piece of the group’s rhetoric remains to be seen. With a long history of involvement in the narcotics business, the current economic struggles of the country, and the dependence of thousands of livelihoods on poppy and other illicit crops, eradicating the production of such a profitable endeavor will not be met without challenges. On the other hand, not showing efforts to address the issue will lessen the probability of the Taliban getting international recognition. The Taliban and Opium Poppy Production The Taliban did not always have an interest in the drug trade, says Brookings expert Dr. Felbab-Brown. In the mid-1990s, the group pledged to ban opium poppy cultivation, and for a time, it did in fact crack down on the production and consumption of drugs. However, such a hardline on narcotics did not last long. The Taliban allowed production to run again already in 1996 and began to tax farmers and traffickers, offering protection for their operations. The taxes ended up being worth between $45 million to $200 million a year in the late 1990s. At the turn of the millennium, however, the Taliban issued yet another ban on opium poppy that resulted in a 75% fall in the world’s supply of heroin. The ban severely affected Afghanistan’s rural population, whose support for the Taliban was then lost, but barely touched the traffickers. It is likely that the Taliban were trying to win international legitimacy by banning the cultivation, yet it was not interested in interfering with the trafficking. The ban may have also been strategic. France24 reports this crackdown was a move to ramp up the price of heroin, as it declined after the 1990s production boom. According to the newspaper, Taliban groups had stored large amounts of opium, which was then sold for ten times the price amid their own ban. Since the Taliban’s spokesman Mujahid announced that Afghanistan will not ‘turn into a narco-state,’ opium prices tripled briefly. After the Taliban regime collapsed in 2001, the UNODC observed a divide in poppy production in the country, in which the provinces controlled by the Taliban were also the provinces where poppy cultivation was increasing, meaning that the group was no longer opposed to the illicit trade. Additionally, a DEA operation presented in 2013 shed light on the reach of the Taliban’s involvement in the opium trade. After 2001, the ties between the Taliban and the drug traffickers were consolidated, Politico reports, and the group methodically assumed more control over the process, leading the DEA investigation right at the top of Taliban leadership. Individuals of such alleged leadership are now part of the Taliban’s government announced in August 2021. According to the UNODC, Afghanistan is the largest producer of opium in the world, accounting for 83% of global production (2015-2020). In 2020, opium poppy was cultivated on 224,000 hectares in Afghanistan, a 37% increase from the year prior. Additionally, drug production in Afghanistan is not limited to heroin but includes hashish and Ephedra, a plant used for the extraction of ephedrine, a key component of methamphetamine. Its market could become as large as heroin’s, according to a 2020 EMCDDA report. However, the Taliban’s spokesman reassured that opium production will be zero under their rule, as it had been in 2000-2001. This promise comes with conditions, as the Taliban requested international assistance in order to be able to contain the drug trade and implement alternative crops substitution plans. The Taliban's Dilemma As opium and other drugs represent a lucrative market for Afghanistan, it will be hard for the Taliban to suppress their production without impoverishing an entire nation. Like in any other country where plants essential for drug production grow (see Colombia, Peru, Bolivia with coca plants), cultivating the crop is a profitable business and farming becomes a stable source of income for marginalized communities. Especially in areas with scarce access to education and employment opportunities, and where the State is not present, the cultivation of illegal crops often becomes the only way locals can support their families. In fact, in 2000, the ban on poppy cultivation brought problems to the Taliban themselves, as it removed the livelihoods of many farmers throughout the country. The current economic conditions of the country do not favor a harsh crackdown on illicit crops. With the mass emigration witnessed in mid-August, the internal displacement soaring by 73%, the severe cash shortages that occurred before the fall of Kabul, and the overall dire situation left by the COVID-19 pandemic and the end of a twenty years old war, Afghanistan is on the brink of collapse. The previous government relied heavily on foreign assistance (around 75% of its budget), but the Taliban administration has been restricted access to the Afghan central bank’s assets and denied funding by the IMF and the World Bank. In addition, the various groups that compose the Taliban vary in ideological and governance orientation, and some may need material incentives to remain loyal to the leaders in Kabul. Taking these challenges into account, it might be close to impossible for the Taliban to completely eradicate poppy and other illicit cultivations, nor would it be politically desirable to do so. That is not to say that the drug trade is the only source of income of the Taliban (it is estimated it represents 9%) as they tax a wide array of licit and illicit activities, but it is a significant one, nevertheless. The group’s spokesman mentioned the need for a crop substitution plan which would require international assistance. Similar plans could curb illicit production while still providing a livelihood to local farmers who relied on the opium trade; however, the implementation of substitution plans will be impossible unless the Taliban regime is recognized as legitimate. It is thus likely that the Taliban’s promise to curb drug production will only be used to leverage international aid and political recognition of their government, but little indicates that it will lead to effective change. Policy Implications The rapidly changing situation in Afghanistan makes many policy research documents already obsolete. In June 2021, the UNODC suggested strengthening international cooperation with Afghanistan while supporting the country to provide sustainable alternative crops and build better governance and security. Now that the Taliban are governing, cooperation, aid, and assistance will hardly be options. For Europe, this means that the drug flow of opium and methamphetamines from Afghanistan will continue. Without trustworthy cooperation with the Taliban, efforts should be focused at the regional level rather than at the national. The UNODC suggests that countries in the region need advanced investigative support to track financial crimes and scale-up interdiction of drugs and precursor chemicals. Other research also points at interdiction as being a viable solution that does not directly affect local livelihoods. About the Author: Alessia Cappelletti Alessia is Global Security Analyst and Project Manager of DEWIS. She has field experience in South America, Colombia especially, and has experience in researching organized crime and illicit flows. Her academic background includes conflict analysis, international humanitarian law, human rights protection, and criminology.

Inside the Operations Room during Kabul Evacuation Efforts On Sunday the 15th of August, amid the Taliban takeover of Kabul, part of Dyami's team started working to support people evacuating the city. With a conference speaker always on and surrounded by whiteboards, multiple screens, and a myriad of papers, the team worked tirelessly day and night to make sure people weren’t left alone in a city that went from hospitable to hostile overnight. Crisis management has been the keyword. Who to call, where to stay, what to look out for, and what security measures to keep in mind. The responsible team made an effort to keep in contact with both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the people on the ground in Kabul, who had been anxiously waiting for instructions for days, sharing easy security tips with them, maintaining the information flow, and offering mental support in an indubitably stressful situation. Crisis Management When confronted with a crisis, it is important to identify what exactly needs to be done to bring structure to chaos. A very important first step is to define and understand the crisis in detail. Gathering information and critically assessing how the crisis could evolve is essential to be ready as the situation unfolds. The team that would later work on the evacuation started to gather information on the 14th of August when Kabul had not fallen yet. No one had been notified or approached for help, but the team was already monitoring the situation so that when the crisis escalated, in less than 24 hours, they were ready to respond to the initial requests. Once the information is gathered and everyone involved has a clear overview of the situation, the team can start defining who are the stakeholders. Who is in need of help? Who can assist us in delivering help? Who’s in control? And more specifically to this case, who is responsible for the airport and airlifts? Which parts of the city are already controlled by the Taliban? Where are the checkpoints? Etc. The team went through their contact list, got in contact with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and understood what was needed to leave Kabul. In the meanwhile, Dyami’s management got asked to join and support a family in a WhatsApp group that was created, and in just a few days, that group grew exponentially with people in need of assistance. Lastly, practical steps. Identify the actions that need to be taken to reach the goal and understand how they can be fulfilled. In this case, what was revealed to be essential in the evacuation procedure was to get Dutch citizens in Afghanistan on the Foreign Affairs list of people to evacuate. Dyami got all the contacts and information to put on such a list, and people started to receive official communication from the Ministry. Mental navigation Unfortunately, receiving official communication is often not enough. On the weekend, the take over of the city had been relatively calm, and the eyes of the world were on Kabul and the Taliban. However, on Wednesday the 18th of August, the situation became tense, and the Taliban started to increase their use of violence. By then, Foreign Affairs had all the information of the evacuees but did not communicate effectively with them. Normally, the Ministry only sends emails with essential information, such as where to go and when but not how to reach the indicated location, or what to look out for on the way there. In a situation of panic, in which emotions are heightened and where people’s lives are at stake, that is often not enough. Dyami made an effort to keep in close contact with whoever reached out, asking how they were coping and listening to their needs. Mental navigation was essentially ‘filling the gap’ between the people and Foreign Affairs; listening to people’s stories and worries and helping them to handle the situation as calmly as possible. Mental navigation is also giving security tips, such as erasing WhatsApp conversations, writing their own phone numbers on the children’s arm, and making sure to be easily reachable while on route to the airport. Dyami guided people through Kabul, through Taliban checkpoints, and in the surroundings of the airport. Lastly, the team helped to get the paperwork in order before leaving the safehouses. Bringing the correct documentation is essential, and in the chaos, one can easily forget. Intelligence and information collection The last essential step is gathering information and intelligence. That is an effort that brings together different sources, from human intelligence to open source information, and that needs to be verified and cross-referenced. Once a piece of information is corroborated, one should connect it to other pieces and get ‘intelligence,’ or interpreted information. Since the team was in contact with many people in the city, cross-referencing information was fairly simple, which gave Dyami a solid information position on Kabul - from an office in Leidsche Rijn. Because of this vantage point, the team was able to identify more suitable places to access the airport, thanks to on-the-ground sources who often checked the situation at Hamid Karzai Airport. In similar circumstances, keeping close contact with local people helps to understand the context and the cultural and social habits of the region in which one is operating, which in turn facilitates risk mitigation. When possible, the information received was promptly verified through open-source research. Kabul a month after the Taliban takeover A month has just passed since the fall of Kabul, and to date, Dyami has helped 121 people to evacuate the city. However, much is yet to be done. NOS reports that the people who remained behind after August 31 received little or no help from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the situation has worsened. People are running out of medication and general supplies, there is little or no money circulating and banks imposed a withdrawal limit to preserve their liquidity. Those who are hiding are about to finish the small amounts of cash they were able to put together, but they need the money to pay those who are helping them hide. The World Food Programme has also warned their supplies may run out by the end of the month. In the chaos, many have started to distrust each other, as they desperately try to find a way to leave the country. Approximately, there are still 150 people linked to the Netherlands who are still waiting for support to evacuate the country, but it is unclear when or how the situation may develop. Written by Alessia Cappelletti

Hongkongers in the Netherlands share their stories by Esmeralda Vane – August 2021 “It is a sad reality, a sad truth. I feel restricted in the freedom that I can exercise here [in the Netherlands]. If I go to a protest, it may not lead to immediate safety threats, but there are other consequences given what we have seen in the news.” Katy[1], a Hongkonger residing in the Netherlands, shares that she exercises her freedom with caution, as she fears becoming subject to the repressive activities of the Chinese Government. Freedom House reports that “China conducts the most sophisticated, global, and comprehensive campaign of transnational repression in the world.” With transnational repression, authoritarian states reach across borders to silence dissent among diasporas and sometimes others who criticize them. It encompasses a spectrum of tactics, such as threats, exile, assassinations, prosecution, surveillance, and family intimidation. The Chinese Government is not new to these practices, as it represses Tibetans, Mongolians, Uyghurs, Taiwanese, Hongkongers, Falun Gong practitioners, journalists, human rights defenders, and others who criticize it. Twenty-one stories from Hongkongers in the Netherlands were collected, and from these accounts concerns over democracy grow. Hong Kong national security law reaches beyond national borders To secure Chinese sovereignty and security, the Chinese Government passed the Hong Kong National Security Law (NSL) in June 2020. The law criminalizes any act of subversion (undermining the authority or power of the central Government), secession (breaking away from the country), terrorism (using intimidation or violence against people), and collusion with external or foreign forces. In other words, the NSL punishes political speech, limits foreign contacts, and targets individuals opposed to the Chinese Government. Such a law applies to anyone on Earth, regardless of nationality or location, making it legal for the Chinese Government to target individuals outside of its borders. Hongkongers in the Netherlands describe the law as repressive due to its vagueness and extraterritorial reach. They believe that the Chinese Government leaves the description of the NSL broad and vague so that they do not know when their actions cross the red line. Sophia, also a Hongkonger living in the Netherlands, explains that as a result of this “People are just afraid and people self-censor.” Andrew agrees. He raises concern about how the NSL connects to other repression methods, such as prosecution, family intimidation, or harassment: “The way the NSL is written applies to anybody in the world, regardless of nationality. […] If they know who you are, they may arrest you when you are visiting Hong Kong, or they might put your family or anything in danger. Even if you are here in the Netherlands, there is also a presence of the Chinese Government […]. So, you might get harassed or things like that.” Similar to Andrew, other Hongkongers believe there is a presence of the Chinese Government in the Netherlands. It is argued that Chinese patriots abroad work for the Chinese Government and collect information for it. There is a shared belief that Chinese businesses and Dutch-Chinese residents in the Netherlands support the NSL, which can result in surveillance by those who support the law. Hongkongers also point out that the Chinese Government is capable of surveilling individuals abroad through, for example, Huawei or social media. As Andrew says, if they know who you are, you may face prosecution, family intimidation, or harassment. Hongkongers often base their stories on the experiences of others who faced Chinese repression, such as Uyghurs or well-known Hong Kong activists abroad. One person said fear started to creep in after reading a BBC article with stories about Uyghurs experiencing repression abroad. The article included the story of Qelbinur Sedik, an Uyghur residing in the Netherlands who received a threatening phone call from a Chinese policeman after she spoke up about China’s detention camps. Another story scaring various Hongkongers is that of activist Gwyneth Ho, their fellow national. She studied journalism at the University of Amsterdam, though now she is being prosecuted under the NSL. For Hongkongers abroad, these stories are a constant reminder of the reach of the NSL, making the possibility of falling victims to Chinese repression enough to self-deprive of the democratic freedoms granted to them in the Netherlands. Self-deprivation of democratic freedoms Katy is one of the Hongkongers that constrains herself in the democratic freedoms granted her by the Netherlands. Katy is afraid of speaking up about the Chinese Government in public because she believes that the Government and its supporters may be watching her wherever she goes. Katy says that news stories about the intimidation of family members of Uyghurs abroad make her worry about the safety of her family members in Hong Kong. She also fears that if she speaks up, she would be unable to re-enter Hong Kong without suffering any consequences. Similar to Katy, other Hongkongers living in the Netherlands voice that the Chinese Government threatens their freedoms in the Netherlands. This results in Hongkongers restricting themselves in their freedom of expression and assembly. They share that they feel constrained to talk about home-country politics, online and offline. They avoid political demonstrations and conversations and are careful with exposing their views on Hong Kong and the Chinese Government on social media or during online conversations. Some Hongkongers who study in the Netherlands feel restricted in their academic freedom too. They are afraid to talk about Hong Kong politics in the classroom or to make their academic work on their homeland available to a broader public. This self-deprivation particularly happens when Hongkongers are in circles with other co-nationals, as exposing yourself to supporters of the Chinese Government could have serious consequences. However, when interviewed, they were also careful not to provide detailed personal information or answer questions about the Chinese Government or external or foreign forces, attributing these feelings to the NSL. The threat to democracy Even though there is no clear evidence that transnational repression tactics are employed, Hongkongers in the Netherlands prefer to keep their political views to themselves and avoid speaking freely and assembling. Even the mere possibility of falling victim to China’s repressive methods, therefore, is enough to prevent criticism. China is not alone in using transnational repression tactics. Other authoritarian states also expand their reach beyond national borders, such as Rwanda, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Russia. Authoritarian states do not only target diaspora members, but sometimes also foreign nationals abroad. The Dutch Government strongly opposes these practices and states that home-country governments that recognize and repress dissident voices can form a threat to the Dutch state, as it can harm its democratic values. By threatening the basic civil rights of their diasporas by preventing them to voice their opinions, China and other authoritarian governments are eroding the democratic freedoms granted to individuals residing in democracies around the world. This directly harms the values of democratic states, undermining the very way in which they function. Therefore, transnational repression should be given more attention and it should occupy a larger space in democratic countries’ agendas. [1] All the names used in this article are pseudonyms to guarantee full anonymity and security for Hongkongers in the Netherlands that agreed to share their story. About the author: Esmeralda Vane Esmeralda Vane is a Conflict Studies and Human Rights master’s student at Utrecht University. She worked as a research intern at the Dutch Ministry of Defence and did literature research into state threats. For her bachelor’s in Cultural Anthropology and Development Sociology, she has lived abroad in Sri Lanka and Hong Kong. Throughout her career, she has been interested in and focused on international relations regarding China. Therefore, she wrote her thesis on resistance and submission by Hongkongers in the Netherlands to Chinese authoritarian repression.

El Salvador’s president, Nayib Bukele, has been a disruptive leader since the day he took office in 2019. While attempting to deliver on his promises to be tough on crime and be different from the previous political elites, he has taken unorthodox and unprecedented measures which have been met with polarizing opinions. Many claim he is the salvation that the country needed, others fear we might be witnessing the birth of another autocratic government in Central America. After a successful term as San Salvador’s mayor, the capital city of El Salvador, Bukele won the presidency, breaking for the first time in 30 years the alternation of the two major political parties (FMLN and ARENA) of El Salvador. The 39-year-old ‘millennial’ president has had high approval ratings throughout his presidency - which is a rare occurrence in El Salvador. In a country tired of the political elite, as an ‘outsider’, Bukele promised to do things differently than previous administrations. On that, he has not disappointed. The millennial president Throughout his presidency, Bukele has maintained a high approval rate. Over his mandate he has enjoyed for most of the time an approval rate above 85%, making him one of the most popular presidents in the Americas.[1] After two years in government, Bukele’s administration has managed to place El Salvador in the spotlight of Latin American politics, and for moments, the world. His government has been defined by taking actions that were long overdue in El Salvador: from raising teachers' salaries, modernizing public schools equipment, to raising the minimum wage. The many measures the government has taken to boost the economy are working: the IMF and the World Bank predicted a 4.9% economic growth for El Salvador in 2021. The average economic growth in recent years has been 2.3%.[2] He has also been known for his unorthodox methods. In his first week as president of El Salvador, Bukele made headlines by using Twitter – his favorite method of communication – to fire several family members of the previous president who held public positions.[3] Criticism of his lack of regard for the use of official channels was quieted down by a supportive crowd that was tired of the nepotism and corruption in the previous administration. The president’s recent law to make Bitcoin a legal currency in El Salvador has been a topic of discussion worldwide. While many see it as a dangerous move given Bitcoin’s volatility, others claim this will be a game-changer and will open a new avenue for remittances coming from abroad. Remittances currently form 20% of El Salvador’s gross domestic product, amounting to $4 billion USD a year.[4] Whether this will be a brilliant move or a significant blow to the country’s economy remains to be seen. A source of praise to Bukele has been the management of the COVID-19 crisis. From the start, strict lockdowns were introduced in the country, the borders were closed and a COVID hospital was built to double the ICU capacity in the country.[5[ Economic relief was also provided: the payment of electricity, water, and the internet was suspended for three months, and the government handed out stimulus checks to families who lost their income during the pandemic. El Salvador managed to maintain a low rate of infections and COVID-related deaths in comparison with other countries in the region. One of his biggest accomplishments so far has been the significant reduction of violence. One of the most violent countries in the world, El Salvador had a rate of homicides as high as 103 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2015, one of the highest in the world.[6] His strategy consisted of deploying larger numbers of police and military personnel to the streets, attack the gang's finances and structures, recuperate the city centers in the country – a known territory of the major gangs – and modernizing the equipment and capacity of public security forces. It seems to be paying off: in 2020 the homicide rate of El Salvador had been reduced to 20 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, a 45% reduction from 2019.[7] A firm hand or abuse of power? The implementation of his security strategy, however, has not gone without controversy. When violence in the streets rose again after conflicts between the main gangs, Bukele ordered that imprisoned members of rival gangs MS-13 and Barrio 18 be put together in jail cells, a known place from where gangs impart orders. While the measure did stop the rise in street violence, the overcrowded facilities (especially in the COVID times) and the potential for violence outbreaks in prisons raised concerns among the international community. His security strategy caused controversy again when the Legislative Assembly refused to meet to block the approval of a 109 million USD loan requested by Bukele to the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (BCIE) to be used in public security equipment and training. At the refusal of representatives to join the session, Bukele took over the Assembly by force with the help of the military. Unsurprisingly, this move was deemed an attack on democracy by local and international organizations. In February 2021 Bukele’s political party, Nuevas Ideas, won by a wide margin the majority in the Legislative Assembly’s election. With an absolute majority in the Assembly, the party took the controversial decision to destitute the 5 Supreme Court Justices and the Attorney General. Bukele’s party claimed they did not have El Salvador’s best interest at hand and cited occasions in which the Supreme Court blocked Nuevas Ideas-backed emergency measures during the COVID crisis. This was his most controversial move yet, and it was met with fierce criticism, from local organizations to international leaders (such as Kamala Harris, the EU, and human rights organizations) citing concern over the fundamental need of an independent judicial system in order to maintain democracy. Bukele responded by saying El Salvador has opened doors for the international community to trade, cooperate, and work together, but in El Salvador “we are cleaning house… and that is none of your business”.[8] While some interpret these moves as an abuse of power, others believe that a firm hand is what the violence and corruption-ripped country needs. Despite the criticism, his government is delivering results: the pandemic has been contained, violence and crime have decreased, and the country is growing economically. But, do the ends justify the means? And more importantly, are we witnessing the beginning of an authoritarian regime? What to watch out for The recent 2021 midterm elections where a new Legislative Assembly was elected marked a big win for the current president. His political party, Nuevas Ideas, won 56 out of the 84 seats available which gave his party an absolute majority over the legislative. This gives Bukele a wider margin for action, which he has already used in a controversial way by removing the Supreme Court Justices. It will be important to look out for new developments on this front. Presidential elections will take place again in El Salvador in 2024. Under Salvadoran constitution, reelection for continuous periods is not possible. In the next few years, it will be crucial to observe if Bukele or his party will attempt to amend the electoral law in the country. So far no steps have been taken in that direction. About the Autor: Isabel Oriol Isabel Oriol Llonin is a contributing analyst at Dyami. She holds a bachelor’s degree in International Relations and has a post-graduate degree in Public International Law from Utrecht University. She has expertise in the Latin American region and the public international law implications of conflict analysis.

The Growing Industry of Loitering Munitions In the Fall of 2020, a full-scale state-on-state conflict unfolded in Nagorno-Karabakh (also known as Artsakh), a contested region between Armenia and Azerbaijan. After six weeks, a ceasefire was called, and Armenia ceded several areas to Azerbaijan. The utilization of drone technologies, including an increased reliance on so-called “Loitering Munitions,” was considered one of the critical factors in Azerbaijan’s victory. Occasionally referred to as a “kamikaze drone”, this specific class of unmanned aerial vehicle demands the world’s attention as they become increasingly affordable and sophisticated, while demonstrably altering the outcome of terrestrial engagements. With the conflict between the two nations threatening to spark again, Loitering Munitions could make another appearance. It May Seem Like Science Fiction Imagine a battlefield wherein whole swarms composed of hundreds of independently-thinking and precision-guided explosives are just waiting to drop on combatants and vehicles from overhead. Most of them are only slightly visible from the ground (if at all), but are still capable of destroying the heaviest armor most ground forces can bring to bear. Their automated systems have them programmed to attack quickly, quietly, and accurately at anything below that emits an electronic signal. They fly too low for traditional air defenses to engage with them, and yet appear silently and too swiftly to effectively counter them with small arms. This nightmare battlespace, a coalescence of innovations in unmanned flight and artificial intelligence, is very close to the reality facing contemporary ground forces. The technology is already here, embodied in a little-discussed class of drone weaponry known as the Loitering Munition. What is a Loitering Munition? Often, the term “drone warfare'' conjures images of the Predator or Reaper series of unmanned aircraft favored by the United States in places like Pakistan, Yemen, or Somalia where they’ve targeted suspected terrorists. Reapers are typically remote-operated, are nearly as large as a conventional aircraft, and are relatively expensive. They are depicted as weapons of assassination and precision. The legitimacy of their use in conflict is still a matter of intense debate. However, with the rise of Loitering Munitions, this image of drone warfare is already starting to appear dated. A Loitering Munition is a weapon system that fills in a tactical niche between the traditional conception of drone weaponry and a guided missile. Often called “kamikaze” or “suicide” drones in the media, Loitering Munitions can be either autonomously or remotely piloted flying vehicles that collide with ground-based targets and are themselves the weapon (self-destructing on impact). In aviation, “loitering” is the word used to describe aircraft hovering over a small area in order to provide quick reaction times for close support. This need for continual replacement incentivizes manufacturers to build them cheaply and in large numbers. The concept is remarkably simple, and with expendability as part of the design, they can appear primitive, but this is deceptive. Loitering Munitions are reliant on extremely sophisticated cameras and sensors that simply weren’t cost-effective only a few years ago. These technologies enable a human operator on the ground, or in an armored vehicle platform, to pilot the Loitering Munition in any weather or lighting conditions. Of even more concern is their implementation of automated and algorithmic flight, formation, and decision-making softwares. These allow for ever more complex and widespread adoption of the weapons, and indicates that they’ll be even further divorced from human hands in the future. Organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross have sounded the alarm over this sort of automation in warfare for several years. Affordable, Sophisticated, and Effective The low cost and learning curve for these weapons has propelled rapid adoption in several countries that may have previously been unable to invest in state-of-the-art air assets. While Israel has historically been cited as the developer of affordable Loitering Munitions systems, more recently, Ukraine and Poland have come out as innovators in this space. Ukraine-based weapons developers CDET and Athlon Avia have been showcasing their extremely versatile RAM and somewhat more powerful ST-35 “Silent Thunder” Loitering Munitions platforms at various international events. Athlon Avia claims that the ST-35 can launch, loiter, ascertain targets, approach, and dive for an attack without the input of a human operator. Both systems offer anti-tank, fragmentation, and incendiary options for warheads. Poland’s WB Group has developed their own system known as WARMATE. WARMATE can be deployed and operated by a single soldier, and is incredibly hard to detect. Though faster to deploy (estimated ten minutes), it carries a smaller payload than its Ukrainian counterparts. It is also developed for compatibility with automated systems. Massive improvements continue to be researched for the software utilized by these automated systems. These updates can impact the lethality and complexity of attacks, even by legacy units. Recent research in swarm information sharing has shown that Loitering Munitions will only continue to increase in sophistication. Azerbaijan’s recent victories over Armenia demonstrated the effectiveness of Loitering Munitions in the context of a full-scale, state-on-state conflict. Many of these drones were sold to them by Israel, and Azerbaijan is now licensed to manufacture their own derivative variations. As the uneasy ceasefire continues to be tested, accurate numbers of material loss are elusive. That said, open-source intelligence efforts continue to chronicle the effectiveness of the Azeri drone campaign, particularly their use of the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 UAV and various Loitering Munitions. This conflict showed that traditional infantry tactics and defenses are extremely vulnerable to these weapons systems. Having Opened Pandora’s Box Participants in conflict, international regulators, and informed consumers of media have to understand the massive implications Loitering Munitions are having on 21st century warfare. If unregulated, their automated systems will validate many fears about the use of artificial intelligence in combat (and in many ways already are). Many of the proposed tactical countermeasures are expensive, and seem to only contribute to the escalation of the sophistication of these technologies. Some of these suggestions include new implementations of laser and microwave-based weaponry, automated counter-munitions, and other obvious proliferation rabbit holes. Legal recourse must be implemented sooner rather than later in regards to Loitering Munitions. As more states (and non-state actors) find that they’re able to facilitate their manufacture and deployment, there is a sense that it will only get harder to turn away from this troubling direction. Recommendations by the Netherlands-based organization Pax for Peace, highlight the urgency of reaching out to these new actors in drone production, as most are not participants in existing arms trade agreements and treaties. A regulatory framework, including a re-examining of the widely-accepted definition of what makes a platform a “drone”, and a discussion of why these technologies are so enticing to the actors moving on them, must be brought to the scrutiny of regulatory bodies and media discourse. The safety of civilian populations, the direction in which we take the development of artificial intelligence technologies, and the integrity of human rights in armed conflict will be adversely affected by a failure to recognize the changes in warfare embodied in Loitering Munitions. About the author: Mark Bruno Mark Bruno is a noncommissioned officer in the United States military, where he serves as a Combat Medic and a Public Affairs Representative. He is currently a Master’s Student of Information Assurance at the University of Maryland’s Global Campus, and holds a Bachelor of Science in Communication. Aspiring to a career in Conflict Journalism, his areas of security interest are in military medicine, information security, and weapons technology. Any analysis or views expressed in this article are personal and do not represent any positions or policies of the US Department of Defense.