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By Sytske Post

We are proud to announce that Dyami | strategic security services has become a member of the European Business Aviation Association (EBAA) This membership enables us to join a group of more than 700 aircraft operators and operational aviation experts. With our security & intelligence expertise, we will be sharing best practices and offering unique safety and security experiences to EBAA members to the highest standards required by the highly dynamic and challenging business aviation industry. Dyami provides support to your dispatcher, operations centre or risk manager. To help them anticipate properly and make better critical decisions. Our mission is to enable safe and secure aviation operations. We also look forward to joining high-profile industry events hosted by the EBAA, that started with our booth at #ebace2022 in Geneva. Visit our route & destination risk assessment page or contact us at info@dyami.services Many thanks to Robert Baltus and Athar Husain Khan from EBAA. #aviationtraining #avsec #aviationsecurity #aviationconsulting #EBAAmember #businessaviation #aviation #security #intelligence #czib #airspace #flightoperations

By Sytske Post

By Oussama Kebir Once the cradle of the Arab Spring movements across the Middle East, Tunisia has recently been witnessing a political upheaval. On 25 July 2021, President Kais Saied suspended Tunisia’s parliament, banned opposition parties amid widespread public protests against the government, and announced to draft a new constitution. Though President Saied’s promises to oust corruption from the political system, the profound economic challenges which drove the 2011 revolution remain unresolved and tensions have increased as a consequence of the democratic erosion. Political Situation Since the 2011 revolution that sparked a wave of democratic movements across the Middle East, Tunisia’s politics have remained in flux. Tunisia has experienced twelve changes in government dominated by wealthy businessmen, and as a result, public confidence in political institutions has collapsed. In the 2019 presidential election, Kais Saied, an independent constitutional lawyer who campaigned against corruption won the second round of the presidential election with 72.7% of the vote. Tunisian society was put under severe pressure as the government attempted to handle the COVID-19 pandemic. Tunisia’s shrinking economy worsened economic hardship, overwhelmed doctors, and accompanied low vaccination rates. Protests began demanding the resignation of the government for its handling of the pandemic response. In the midst of the turmoil, on 25 July 2021 President Saied suspended Tunisia’s parliament, lifted legal immunity for its members, and dismissed the prime minister Hichem Mechichi. Without a Supreme Constitutional Court to challenge the legality of this ruling, Kais Saied seized wide-ranging powers based on his interpretation of the constitution. Opposition groups, such as the Ennahda Movement, labeled the suspension of the constitution a coup. Constitutional situation Tunisia’s 2014 constitution contained strict separations of powers between the executive, the judiciary, and the legislature. Until 25 July 2021, the President’s powers lay mainly in diplomatic affairs and international relations. Yet Saied has managed to concentrate power at the expense of other branches of government through several moves. On assuming the role of the prime minister without a parliament until the referendum, Saeid has allowed the executive to act without legislative oversight. This paved the way for measures that effectively changed the relationship between the executive and the judiciary powers and ended by reducing the powers of the latter and its impact on the Tunisian administration. According to the roadmap that the President has set out, the country will hold a referendum on a revised constitution on 25 July 2022. To include ‘the people's’ opinions, President Saied announced a national consultation to draft a new constitution that took place on 20 March 2022, Tunisia’s independence day. The consultation, carried out online, received 500,000 responses out of the 3 million expected. However, the consultation raised various concerns, from digital security and possible leading questions. Additionally, even after the consultation, the content of this referendum remains ambiguous. Although there are less than two months before the date of the referendum, Tunisian people still do not know the contents of the potential new constitution. This problem is highlighted in the Report of the Venice Commission, on 27 May 2022, “[...]such short delays for public discussion of a new constitution (less than one month between the publication of the draft of the new constitution and the referendum) can confer democratic legitimacy to the process.” President Saied continues to overwrite the constitutional authority of the judicial system, as the recent sacking of 57 judges shows, leading to an overall erosion of democracy in Tunisia. The last three months have been marked by persistent political instability and strikes due to divisions between supporters and opponents of Saied’s seizure of power. Economic situation After the 2011 revolution, Tunisia’s economy has struggled to create a prosperous and fair economy despite a change in the political system. The unemployment rate has remained high at 15% and GDP per capita has declined. Social indicators demonstrate the extent of the crisis facing Tunisian society; the poverty rate trebled from 14% to 21% in one year since the start of the pandemic. The direct dependence on international trade for food and oil products prevents, to a certain extent, the adaptation and the search for sustainable solutions to these upheavals. In 2020, the already precarious situation was worsened by the economic crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. GDP contracted by an astonishing -8.6% in 2020. According to IMF estimates, growth has rebounded to 3% in 2021 and is expected to increase further to 3.3% in 2022 before slowing to 2.5% in 2023. However, with the rise in interest rates in the US, and staggering fuel and food prices around the world, Tunisia’s economy is in considerable flux, and the country’s heavy dependence on energy imports jeopardizes its energy security. The Government is counting on the loan from the International Monetary Fund to finance the budget for the year, but currently, the state of the negotiations is unclear. On the other side, the main industry sectors, like agriculture counts for 10.1% of the GDP and employs 14% of the workforce, Industry represents 21.7% of the GDP, and employs 33% of the active population are living an improvement in production. Outlook The referendum on the revised constitution is unlikely to produce the political changes needed to address the social and economic problems facing Tunisia. Especially since President Saied and his Cabinet, including the government, will be involved by providing their advice and technical knowledge, there is little hope for change. Overall, the strengthening hold on power and democratic erosion of President Saied, the war in Ukraine, and the subsequent price increase and food shortages are likely to worsen the social divisions in Tunisia. For these reasons, tensions in the country remain high and various strikes will continue to occur, but large-scale uprisings are unlikely. About the author: Oussama Kebir Oussama is a weapons systems engineer, PhD in computer science applied to counter-terrorism, and a Master student in human rights and international humanitarian law. He has proven experience in analytical skills, crisis intervention, geopolitical analysis, strategic planning, research, and management. He has also several publications related to counter-terrorism in international conferences and journals.

Written by Annette Bross The Amazon is the largest tropical rainforest in the world. Not only does it regulate temperature outside the Americas and provide the oxygen we need to breathe, the Amazon rainforest also carries water to a substantial part of the South American continent, in turn considered one of the breadbaskets of the world. In the last 40 years, the Amazon has lost an area equivalent to 8.4 million soccer fields, and according to a study by the Climate Observatory published in April 2022, deforestation reached a new monthly peak of 1,012.5 square kilometers. The deforestation has been the result of both legal and illicit mining, as well as the expanding agricultural industry, which is safeguarded by Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s policies. As Brazil holds approximately 60% of the Amazon rainforest, a conflict between economic development and environmental concerns is currently taking place in the region. Due to climate change, deforestation, and wheat shortages as a result of the war in Ukraine, it is crucial for the world to reconsider the importance of such a vital ecosystem and closely watch President Bolsonaro’s policies. The Bolsonaro Regime Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro came into power in January 2019. During his election campaign the nationalist politician promised to greatly boost the country's economy. He has done so, but at the cost of one of the world's largest and most vital ecosystems. Bolsonaro has publicly stated that his government aims to stop or slow down the deforestation of the rainforest, but behind the scenes there has instead been an active engagement in a campaign to privatize and boost economic development in the Amazon. Not only that but Brazil’s environmental agencies’ budgets also got slashed as their mission of protecting the biggest oxygen producing area of the world is incompatible with Bolsonaro’s economic policies directed toward industrial development inside the rainforest. At the COP26 climate summit in Glasgow, Brazilian representatives committed to end illegal deforestation by 2028. However, the government has yet to present adequate plans and concrete results toward this goal. The Bolsonaro regime is not the first one to turn a blind eye to actions that harm the Amazon, but it is the first one to encourage land grabs like never before. The Bolsonaro government has actively accelerated the course of the Amazon rainforest’s destruction. Corruption is one of the most prominent contributing factors to this problem. In 2019 penalties for cutting down trees in protected areas were around 17 billion dollars, but only less than 4% were actually ever collected. This means there is currently a severe lack of implementation of Brazil’s forest protection laws. Deforestation rates on lands securely held by Indigenous peoples tend to be significantly lower than in other comparable areas, yet Bolsonaro and his allies in Congress have promoted a bill to prevent Indigenous peoples from obtaining legal recognition of their traditional lands. A good example of this are the plans to construct infrastructure along the Tapajos River basin, where several dams are planned to be built. This would deprive indigenous populations, and the flora and fauna of the rainforest, of their access to water. Mining in the Amazon Mining is one of Brazil’s most important economic activities as it contributes an estimated gross value of USD 43.7 billion or 2.4% of its GDP. With one of the world's largest iron ore mines in Carajás, Pará, and reserves of 7.2 billion metric tons of iron ore, Vale S.A. is Brazil's largest mining firm and the world’s second-largest iron producer. Iron ore makes up almost 74% of the country’s mining sector based on 2020 tax figures. Brazil is also a significant gold, nickel, tin, and zinc producer. Due to rising gold prices, local gold miners in the Amazon rainforest have recently expanded their operations. These miners are thought to account for around a third of Brazil's total gold production. At the same time, illegal mining accounts for about 15% of gold production. Local miners and global companies have prioritized their economic needs over environmental protection, despite the fact that this behavior has already resulted in mercury pollution in the water. In the state of Pará, Brazilian authorities estimate that 30 metric tons of illegal gold worth around 1.1 billion USD have been excavated - this is six times more than the legal gold excavated in Brazil. On top of that, 2,300 illegal mining sites have been found in protected areas. Local Impact In an effort to extend mining in the Amazon even further, the government introduced bill PL191/2020 in 2020 to regulate commercial mining on protected Indigenous lands. According to InfoAmazonia, almost 2,500 requests have been submitted, encompassing a total area of 5.6 million km2. This includes more than half of Brazil. If the bill is passed, mining might damage 17.6 million hectares (176,000 square kilometers) or 15% of total Indigenous lands in the Amazon. About 97% of these mining demands are concentrated on the territory of 21 isolated tribes, which tend to be the most vulnerable to the consequences of these kinds of operations. The deforestation of the Amazon rainforest has led to the displacement of hundreds of indigenous communities despite said territories having a protected status. Permanently evicting indigenous people from their land is forbidden under article 231 of the Brazilian constitution. As a rippling effect of the displacement of hundreds of people, violence has increased due to the fight for land and natural resources. In addition, Brazil’s indigenous peoples are more likely to assist in illicit mining and be exploited as a result of it. Given the increasing need for mining activity as a result of the shortages caused by the war between Russia and Ukraine, this could eventually lead to the potential extinction of many of Brazil’s indigenous’ peoples and their rich cultures and ways of life. The Russian-Ukrainian War and Fertilizer Demands Brazil is the largest importer of potash, a powder that is obtained from the ashes of burned wood and sometimes used as fertilizer. For the largest part, the country relies on imports of this fertilizer for its grain crops. A quarter of Brazil’s demand for potash has usually been met by Russia, which halted exports due to sanctions following the country’s invasion of Ukraine. President Bolsonaro has used the conflict in Ukraine as the motivation for his newest attempt to gain further access to indigenous lands. During a radio interview, he stated: “This crisis between Ukraine and Russia is a good opportunity for us. We have a bill in Congress that will allow us to exploit those indigenous lands.” Due to the suspension of Russian exports, Brazil will be forced to meet the demand for potash through different methods, and members of Congress will likely vote in favor of the exploitation of indigenous territories. It's crucial to remember that this discourse about potash is, of course, extremely political, especially with elections coming up in October. Bolsonaro needs to find a solid approach to continue to appeal to a fraction of the Brazilian population, especially since former President Lula da Silva launched his candidacy and became the man leading in the polls to win the October election. There is now an increase in the demand for Brazil’s agricultural industry as a result of the worldwide wheat shortages due to the war in Ukraine. This increases the internal demand for more potash and fertilizers in order to meet the world's needs and possibly take advantage of this opportunity to grow its economy. The Amazon Rainforest’s Future Enhanced mining operations would impact the entire world. In addition to this already critical scenario in which we only have until 2025 to halt irreparable environmental harm, the war in Ukraine has exacerbated the issue. Rising demand for wheat and minerals is shifting production to other parts of the globe which may be at greater risk of violence, criminal activities, and corruption. This will impact the supply chain, the livelihoods of the inhabitants, and the environment. About the author: Annette Bross Annette holds a bachelor's degree in History from Universidad Iberoamericana in Mexico City. She has now moved to the Netherlands to pursue a master’s at Leiden University in International Relations and Diplomacy. She is passionate about development, climate action, public policy, and security challenges with a strong commitment to social justice. She has experience in researching topics like the influence of soft power in Latin America and the Middle East. The article was edited by Ruben Pfeijffer

"Our mission to become a leader in global security & safety solutions means that we also need qualified and experienced team members. That is why I am happy to announce that Frank Koelewijn has joined Team Dyami!" - Eric Schouten CEO Dyami Frank started his career as a government employee and switched to aviation security in 2003. He developed and executed inflight security training programs specialized in business aviation. Frank focuses especially on security awareness to provide the flight crew with the knowledge and tools needed to ensure their and the company’s safety while abroad. Alongside training, Frank also works as a teacher at the MBO level, focusing on security, law, and regulations. He now joins dyami | strategic security services, bringing his training and extensive security expertise to the team.

Written by Sietske Moshuldayev This May 2022 report highlights conflicts with diverse causes, threats and consequences. As the Russia-Ukraine war develops in Europe, the economic situation in Sri Lanka deteriorates amidst political challenges. Meanwhile, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mali face jihadist insurgencies, both causing international commotion. Costa Rica is experiencing increased cyber security threats, carrying lessons for other states. As for brief alerts: Israel and Palestine may continue to see deadly attacks, just as regional violence in Tajikistan may escalate. Additionally, challenges to the legitimacy of Pakistan’s central government will likely persist - much like in Somalia, but under very different circumstances. Finally, diplomatic spats in the Taiwan Strait are likely to continue. The conflicts described in more detail below - selected based on open-source intelligence gathering - do not intend to cover all ongoing crises around the globe but merely call attention to some of the most pertinent and interesting developments in the past weeks. 1. World Conflicts - May 2022 a. The Ongoing Russia-Ukraine War With Mariupol and Kherson captured by Russian forces, Russian attacks in the Donbas are now at their most intense point, according to Ukrainian officials. Peace talks are largely stalled and Russia continues to publicly justify its ‘special military operation’, while Ukraine reiterates it will not accept territorial losses. Meanwhile, foreign companies continue to exit Russia as its citizens feel the impacts of Western sanctions. The EU will halt the import of Russian oil supplies via sea routes by the end of 2022, albeit the deal has shown rifts in EU unanimity. The US supports Ukraine financially and militarily and Finland and Sweden have applied for NATO membership this month. The next steps, however, are on halt due to objections from Turkey. As the war goes on, UN figures indicate approximately 6.8 million people have fled Ukraine, with some 2.2 million people having (re-)entered Ukraine and casualty figures rising. Simultaneously, the ripple effects of the war are still felt across the globe, especially worsening humanitarian conditions and food shortages. b. Worsening Political and Economic Crises in Sri Lanka Political and economic conditions continue to deteriorate in Sri Lanka as opposition demands for President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to resign are not met and citizens face pressing shortages of energy, food and medical supplies. Following turmoil that started months ago , the country's contested Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa - the Presidents’ brother - finally resigned and was replaced by Ranil Wickremesinghe. Wickremesinghe, who has already held the PM post five times and is now also Minister of Finance, intends to limit the Presidential powers and secure deals with the International Monetary Fund, Japan and China to support the country’s failing economy. These moves, however, do not yet seem to appease the disgruntled opposition and citizens as calls for the removal of the president remain. As an important warning for countries that face similar economic woes, such as Nepal , Sri Lanka’s crises are likely to see further escalations and require a close watch in the upcoming weeks. c. Intensified Fighting in The Democratic Republic of Congo Instability in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) worsened this month as militant groups intensified their attacks on local targets, then to be countered by government forces. On May 25th, M23 attacked an important military base in Rumangabo, signalling their most intense offensive since 2013. DRC’s army has reclaimed some lost territories but UN statistics indicate that the fighting in the meantime forced over 72,000 people to flee in just one week. With a total of 5.6 million people already internally displaced throughout the country and at least 120 active militant groups in the east, reignited attacks are troubling signs. These events have also further complicated ties between the DRC and Rwanda, the former accusing the latter of supporting M23. Various international actors have expressed their concern over the conflict yet it is likely that the ongoing conflict will see more violence and challenges in the upcoming weeks. d. Shifting International Cooperation Efforts in Mali Following heightened concerns last month , international efforts to bring stability to Mali have disintegrated even further. Mali has called off its defence accords with France and is also pulling away from the G5 Sahel, with which it was countering jihadist insurgencies in the wider area. Claiming it has seen no progress, this isolates the government from its neighbours as it has also accused the West of supporting an attempted coup this month. Meanwhile, the European Union has reaffirmed the suspension of its military training in the country, with Germany reducing its EU commitments but sending more support to the UN mission. Militant activity simultaneously continues to cause casualties and challenge the central government, with reports indicating at least 500 civilian deaths since the beginning of this year. As worsening instability in Mali is likely, neighbouring countries such as Burkina Faso, Togo and Benin are also likely to see further increases in spillover militant attacks. e. Threatening Cyber Attacks in Costa Rica Costa Rica’s President Rodrigo Chavez declared a national state of emergency on May 8th following cyber-attacks on at least 27 government institutions. The actions have been claimed by Conti, a Russia-based hacker group known for targeting Western states and businesses for money. Newly elected President Chavez, however, refuses to pay the 20 million USD ransom despite taxation systems, export services, health care institutions and other services being impacted since April 12th. Claiming to work with insiders, Conti has also threatened the overthrow of the government and has already released some stolen data. Even though Costa Rica is now collaborating with the US, Spain and Israel to ramp up their cyber defences, threats and impacts are likely to persist. Notably, states of emergency have not previously been declared following cyber-attacks and the ongoing cyber threat looms for other countries too, where hackers may similarly operate for ransoms or demand more politically-laden outcomes. 2. Brief Alerts - May 2022 a. Ongoing Israel-Palestine Tensions Rifts between Israel and Palestine persisted this month as attacks and clashes led to deaths on both sides once again - including the sudden shooting of an Aljazeera reporter. Like last month, violent confrontations at the Al-Aqsa Mosque indicate that the conflict may see tensions rise further. b. Regional Tension Escalates in Tajikistan Disputes intensified in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast this month as local protestors demanding political change were brutally met by government forces. On different occasions, over 40 people died and (officially) 46 have been arrested. With tensions at their highest since Tajikistan’s 1992-1997 civil war and heated since events in November 2021 , the Oblast may see further escalations . c. Political and Economic Uncertainty in Pakistan Violent clashes ensued in Islamabad on May 26th between government forces and supporters of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, who was ousted from office in April. Having set an ultimatum for new elections in June, Khan is likely to continue to challenge the legitimacy of the incumbent government. This comes as the country faces a growing economic crisis . d. Insecurity Remains in Somalia Despite appointing a new president and thereby securing an extension of International Monetary Fund loans, much remains uncertain in Somalia. Al-Shabaab militants continue to attack government and African Union peacekeeping forces, while critics are wary of the impacts of US troop redeployments . Instability is likely to persist. e. Diplomatic Spats Concerning Taiwan Sino-US relations were tested this month as US President Joe Biden indicated he would be prepared to use force to defend Taiwan, angering China. With pressure on Taiwan heightened since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine - due to fears of China doing the same - global and regional relations may see further intensifications, if not mixed signalling . Conclusion This past month has primarily seen a continuation of conflicts where armed confrontations were already ongoing, such as in Ukraine, Mali, Somalia and Israel and Palestine, or where tensions had already been brewing, such as in Sri Lanka, Costa Rica, Pakistan and Taiwan. Others have seen intensifications in violence in recent weeks, such as in the DRC and Tajikistan. What will happen in these locations over the next weeks remains uncertain but it is likely that most situations will deteriorate. This may, too, be true for conflicts not considered in this report. As events play out in all conflicts, implications will undoubtedly fall upon both local and foreign groups, intentionally or unintentionally. In order to increase awareness and be well-prepared should escalations arise, these conflicts call for close monitoring in the upcoming weeks. About the author: Sietske Moshuldayev Sietske has an international background and is inherently intrigued by the causes and consequences of geopolitical events. She has completed two bachelors at the University of Leiden (International Studies, BA & Political Science, BSc) and currently pursues a masters in International Security at Sciences Po, Paris. Having specialized in East Asian affairs for her undergraduate studies, she now focuses on global risks and risk management. This article was edited by Ruben Pfeijffer

Written by Facundo E. Saponara As NATO members continue to concentrate on the ongoing events in Eastern Europe, the situation in the Middle East, particularly in Syria, has been remarkably dynamic in the last couple of weeks. ISIS has been capable of exploiting the current security situation and may probably continue to do so at a larger scale in the following months. What is needed to put a stop to the groups revived growth? Attack on Ghuwaryan prison Since the fall of the physical caliphate in 2019, thousands of Islamic State combatants have been placed in Kurdish-run prisons to temporarily limit the possibility of the group's resurgence in the region. However, thousands of the arrested suspects linked to the Islamic State have been released due to the perceived 'low threat' they pose. Kurdish authorities informed their prisons currently hold over 12,000 ISIS-linked detainees. According to the UN, Kurdish prisons appear to be overpopulated and undermanned. Which has made these installations very likely targets for ISIS activity either from within (indoctrination and radicalization of other inmates, facilitated by the poor living conditions and the lack of control) or from outside (assaults on the structure itself). On 20 January, 2022, over 100 fighters linked with Daesh attacked the Ghuwayran prison in Hassakeh, northern Syria. At the time, Ghuwayran held an estimated 3,500 ISIL-linked prisoners and approximately 5,000 detainees total, consequently making the prison an important target for the group. The scale of the attack is exemplary of ISIL’s expansionist pursuit in the Syrian Arab Republic and the Middle East. Daesh was capable of mobilizing over 100 of its fighters for a single attack (in the largest operation in almost three years) which should be considered a sign that the group has slowly but surely been securing limited gains in the country. Such victories have materialized in renewed control over areas of the Syrian desert, where the security apparatus of the Syrian Arab Armed Forces is not capable of projecting power in a permanent manner. ISIL used this critical factor to expand its presence further north and exploit security gaps in the areas between Kurdish-controlled and Syrian-controlled territories. The limited pressure suffered by the group has increased its operational margin, as local, regional and global actors continue to pursue objectives not necessarily aligned with a continued military effort against the Islamic State. From the Syrian perspective, the biggest threat continues to lay in the Turkish presence in Northern Syria and the Turkish-backed rebel groups in the Northwest of the country. These circumstances have created a context where the Islamic State is capable of exploiting power vacuums that are existent in the country after a decade of war, the partial withdrawal of the US from Syria, and the limited control of the majority of the country's territory by the Syrian Arab Armed Forces. U.S. response The attack on Ghuwayran was considered critical enough for the US to provide air support for the Kurdish forces holding back the terrorist militants. Additionally, Washington put in motion a raid in Syrian territory that liquidated Daesh's leader Abu Ibrahim al-Qurayshi in February 2022. The death of an ISIS Caliph is not a minor occurrence. The loyalty sworn by the group's cells is not to Daesh itself but to the specific Caliph leading the organization at a particular moment. Every time a leader of ISIS is eliminated, all cell leaders need to pledge loyalty to the new Caliph. A very political process that might not always lead to an actual pledge. However, alarmingly, ISIS has recently been gaining ground in Syria and Iraq, and the outer provinces. This, in addition to ISIL's demonstrated ability to adapt to new circumstances, has probably simplified the decision-making process for most cell leaders. In the past weeks, there have been numerous pledges of loyalty by the group's external leaders that were to be expected as a result of the victories the organization has been securing as of late. How the global context could benefit ISIL Even as the group still finds itself limited in its capabilities and reach, ISIL has regained strength in Syria and the region. The global, regional, and local contexts continue to benefit the growth of Daesh. The events at a global level are worrying as they could potentially worsen the security scenario in a matter of months. The direct or indirect involvement of the two major players in Syria, Russia and the United States, in the Ukrainian conflict might greatly benefit Daesh's activity in the country in the short term. Unconfirmed reports of Russian withdrawal from some areas of Syria and their replacement by Iranian troops have also been circulating as of late. Analysts have considered this might be a prelude to a possible partial Russian withdrawal. Up until this point, the Russian invasion of Ukraine hasn't been costly enough to demand the relocation of the Russian units deployed in Syria. That being said, the dawn of new threats may force Russia into making such a move. The possible inclusion of Finland and Sweden in NATO, the ever-growing number of NATO troops deployed to the alliance's 'eastern flank', and the indefinite continuation of the conflict in Ukraine could potentially alter the balance of power in Syria. If reports on Iranian forces replacing Russian military units are correct, the ingress of a new flux of Iranian fighters may fuel sectarian tensions in the near future, straining the Syrian society even further and opening the gates for Daesh's exploitation of the country's historical sectarian conflict. Facing China's expansion and a possible war with Russia, Washington will likely continue to focus their efforts on their near-peer adversaries. Thus, limiting their actions in the Middle East and possibly withdrawing troops as the context in the region continues to become more unfavorable for maintaining a military presence. If the United States were to continue its current course of action in the Middle East, US forces will be restricted to reactionary military operations. Such an approach would facilitate the growth of Daesh in Syria as long as they continue to maintain a low operational profile. State of ISIL and policy recommendations The current operational status of the Islamic State (low-level insurgency) makes them incapable of exploiting sectarian tensions at the national level. But ISIL has proven its ability to make use of sectarian and social tensions in the areas where the group is present. Thus, recruiting more militants into their lines and weakening their local adversaries. The potential for ISIS to grow in Syria is considerable, especially if the aforementioned scenarios were to materialize. Very recently, the new leader of ISIL, Abu Hasan al-Hashemi al-Qurashi, has vowed to take revenge on the death of the group's previous leader and is urging its supporters to take advantage of the situation in Ukraine and attack Europe from within. If the context continues to facilitate it, ISIL will probably continue to augment its operations in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere (mainly in Africa and Central Asia). If Daesh is allowed to grow at a sustained rate in Africa or Central Asia, the outer cells may be able to function as sponsors of terrorist activity in the Levant. Similarly to how ISIL sponsored the growth of its cells at a global level in the previous decade. The Islamic State continues to grow in Syria as a consequence of the limited threat that they currently pose to local, regional and global actors. If ISIL considerably expanded and established a permanent presence over a particular area (unlikely as they continue to benefit from small-scale operations), this would turn their operatives, capabilities, and facilities into more vulnerable targets, damaging their activities in the region. Additionally, IS cannot currently sponsor terrorist attacks in Europe. The Islamic State is heavily dependent on sleeper cells -as well as "lone wolves"- that are spread all over the continent to take action and acquire the means to do so by themselves. Turkish officials announced the capture of a member of ISIL on May 26th, 2022, after a raid in Istanbul. National authorities claim this is the Islamic State's new leader as of February 2022. If ISIL's leader is truly detained in Turkey, this would be a historical event as a Caliph of the Islamic State has never been captured alive before. Consequently, this could alter the current trend of the group's operational expansion in the region through a method of leadership decapitation that the Islamic State has never previously experienced, namely imprisonment. The capture of Öcalan, leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), is exemplary of the fact that capturing alive the leadership of a terrorist organization could prove to be much more destabilizing than eliminating them (at least in the short term). Lamentably, the Islamic State has proven itself capable of adapting to new circumstances rather rapidly and efficiently. And, although the capture of Öcalan was a bargaining chip for the Turkish government and forced the PKK into reducing its lethality, this was just a momentary solution as PKK has become more and more lethal as time went by. This could very much be the case for the Islamic State as even if the group wasn't able to fully adjust to these new set of circumstances in the short term, ISIL's senior leadership could continue operating at a local scale. At least, until communications with the group's Caliph can be reestablished. Which, considering Öcalan is still capable of leading the PKK from within a Turkish prison (not a minor detail since the PKK presents a much more of a threat to the Turkish State than the Islamic State does), ISIL may very well replicate this strategy. Security forces all over the European Union should continue to hunt down as many of the group's sleeper cells as possible to limit the threat of a new wave of terrorist attacks and reduce the number of individuals that may fall under the indoctrination program of IS. Security measures are to be put in motion to limit the growth of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, in particular through military cooperation with all parties that have a considerable military presence in the region. In order to accomplish this, intermediaries, such as the Kurds or the Iraqi government, would play a crucial role in facilitating cooperation between adversaries and achieving the shared goal of limiting the growth of the Islamic State. Furthermore, Humanitarian support is to be provided to Kurdish forces in northern Syria as a prerequisite to limit the success of ISIL's indoctrination programs in refugee camps by bettering the living conditions of those residing inside them. Military and technical support should be directed towards Kurdish forces in order to increment the security inside al-Hol and other refugee camps, properly man and equip Kurdish prisons and increment the security on the border between the Kurdish-controlled and Syrian-controlled territories. And lastly, in the light of a new set of Turkish offensives on northern Syria, NATO members should instigate both Kurdish and Turkish actors into making compromises, such as the usage of ISIS prisons and the recognition of their direct vicinity as defensive zones protected by Kurdish forces. These zones should be left unharmed by the Turkish army and Turkey-aligned militias. About the author: Facundo E. Saponara Facundo E. Saponara holds a BA in Government and International Relations from the Universidad Argentina de la Empresa and is currently enrolled in the Master’s degree in Strategy and Geopolitics at the Escuela Superior de Guerra. He has been assigned as the Area Coordinator of the Middle East Investigation Team at the Center for International Policy Studies from the University of Buenos Aires. Facundo has dedicated most of his professional and academic career to the study of international security and asymmetric warfare in particular, with a special interest in terrorism. The article was edited by Ruben Pfeijffer

Written by Jacob Dickinson After two years of canceled meetings due to COVID-19, on 15 May 2022, China’s Deputy Director of the Foreign Ministry of Information Zhao Lijian called for face-to-face consultations on a renewed code of conduct between the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Considering that the PRC is currently experiencing severe lockdowns due to the rapid spread of COVID-19, why has Beijing called for these negotiations to go ahead? The PRC’s use of coercive force in the SCS adds to escalating regional tensions in the Asia-Pacific. The prospect of an invasion of Taiwan, Sri Lanka’s escalating social and political crisis, and North Korea’s test-firing of ballistic missiles pose dire challenges to stability in the wider region. Whether a code of conduct can ease escalating tensions and accommodate the interests of all claimants in the SCS remains an open question. Competing Claims The South China Sea (SCS) covers an area of over 3,000 square kilometers and includes a wide range of resources and strategic routes. As well as comprising land and islands, the SCS consists of significant oil and gas deposits. The SCS is also vital for fishing communities in the region as an important source of income and food. Located at the center of the most economically dynamic region in the world, up to 40% of maritime trade between the EU and Asia is conducted through the SCS. The strategic value of the SCS has also been met with competing claims which go back decades. In 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) claimed the ‘nine-dash line’ encompassing around 90% of the SCS as an area of historic exclusive sovereignty. This line was meant to demarcate a maritime claim to the reefs and rocks of the South China Sea, yet Beijing has interpreted the line as an area of exclusive sovereignty. This is by far the largest claim on the SCS, but other states in the region also have disputed claims. According to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), signed in 1982, signatory states have the right to develop resources within 400km of their coasts. As a result, disputes have frequently arisen through diplomatic, force and direct coercion between claimant states. Changing Security Environment The code of conduct was first conceived by ASEAN member states as a response to the PRC’s military occupation of the Mischief Reef over 25 years ago. A multilateral agreement was reached in 2002 in Phnom Penh, with both Beijing and ASEAN seeking to avoid US involvement in regional affairs. Since then, progress on a new code of conduct has been slow. There is little agreement on fundamental issues; the code’s geographic scope, outright bans on the seizure of land and whether the agreement will be binding on all signatory states. Beijing is reluctant to agree to a code of conduct that could constrain its future actions in the SCS. ASEAN member states such as Laos, Cambodia and Thailand, have little direct interest in the SCS and prefer to keep security issues away from deepening economic relations with the PRC. This came to the surface when, in 2016, a prepared communique between the PRC and ASEAN member states was resolutely retracted due to objections from Beijing and member states. The SCS faces a vastly different security situation when compared with that of 2002. Since 2007, Beijing’s assertiveness through coercion to control the SCS has risen dramatically. The People’s Liberation Army Navy has built military complexes with airstrips and ports on constructed islands. Chinese State-Owned Enterprises regularly drill for oil and gas within other claimant’s Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). This trend has only worsened during the COVID-19 pandemic. The PRC unilaterally claims two administrative districts covering the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands, both of which are claimed by Vietnam. The PLA Navy launches regular patrol boats and military exercises with the PRC’s most advanced destroyer. Toward Consensus? While the PRC has often exploited divisions within ASEAN member states to enhance its own interests, there are indications of ASEAN taking a more unified stance. The PRC has begun to provoke other actors in the region through drilling and land seizures. Beijing demanded in 2021 that Indonesia stop drilling for oil and gas in the Natuna Islands. In response, Indonesia invited counterparts from Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore and Vietnam to ‘foster brotherhood’ against Beijing’s assertiveness in the SCS. Indonesia’s size and political weight could provide a basis for more consensus among ASEAN states to counter China’s aggression. Analysts have also pointed to the use of legal and diplomatic means to resolve tensions in the region. In 2012, Chinese fishing vessels entered the Scarborough Shoal and the Philippines reacted by sending Coast Guards. After a month-long stand-off between the PLA Navy and the Philippine Navy, the PRC coerced the Philippines through informal sanctions on agricultural products. In response, the Philippines brought a case against the PRC for violating the UNCLOS treaty. The arbitrary tribunal ruled that the ‘nine-dash line’ had no historical basis and no basis in international law. However, the Philippines' former president, Rodrigo Duterte has refused to attempt to enforce the ruling and the PLA navy has remained on the Shoal. However, the 2016 ruling has dealt a blow to the legal legitimacy of the PRC’s maritime claims to the ‘nine-dash line’ and could set a precedent for other claimant states. Vietnam is the most vulnerable to Beijing’s military pressure. The PRC’s invasion of Vietnam in 1978 and frequently coercive exchanges have led to deteriorating relations between the two countries. After China sent a ship for months-long seismic survey in Vietnam’s internationally designated EEZ, Hanoi issued a warning on bringing legal proceedings against the PRC in 2019. Other actors such as the EU and the US have supported it and other claimant states could take similar actions. Why is Beijing Pushing for a Code of Conduct? The call for a code of conduct has been looming since 2019, but COVID-19 has delayed further negotiations. However, Zhao Lijian's call for the finalization of a code of conduct comes at an important time for three reasons. First, the yearly rotating ASEAN chair is held by Cambodia. Hun Sen, the country's authoritarian leader, seeks to promote economic ties with China and has little interest in the SCS. It is far from certain that the PRC has complete diplomatic support from Burma, Laos and Thailand, but Beijing could gain additional support for a new code of conduct in line with its own interests. Second, the newly elected president of the Philippines and son of former dictator Ferdinand Marcos Jr pledged during the 2022 general election campaign to work closely with China. Although every leader in Southeast Asia acknowledges the PRC’s economic and diplomatic influence, Marcos has argued that the 2016 ruling was ineffective and Manila will seek a bilateral code of conduct instead of at a regional level. Yet this should not overcompensate for the strategic realities facing the Philippines. There have been protests against China’s aggression and the PRC is far more unpopular when compared with the US. Up to 42% of the Philippines have a favorable view of China compared to 80% of the US. Should Marcos be seen to deliberately play to Beijing’s interests, he could see his popularity fall dramatically. It is uncertain whether Marcos’ entrance to Malacanang Palace could result in an agreement more conducive to Beijing’s interests. Lastly, the US-ASEAN meeting on 15 May 2022 reinforced Beijing’s worries of encirclement in its perceived sphere of influence. The US provided military commitments to the region. Japan has reiterated its concerns over Beijing’s assertiveness and offered new patrol boats to Indonesia and other allies. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently stated that, despite Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Biden administration's long-term aim is to shape the strategic environment to counter the PRC’s aggressive actions. Beijing is aware of the relative cohesion of the West against Russia as a result of Russia’s war against Ukraine. In this context, the code of conduct could recalibrate the PRC’s foreign policy toward the SCS as a partner for ASEAN countries, presenting itself as a collaborative partner to ASEAN. Future outlook As General Secretary Xi Jinping continues the zero-COVID policy, the PRC’s collapse in economic growth and its ensuing global economic slowdown could potentially lead to further escalation in the region. While the code of conduct negotiations could lead to better management of tense relationships, it could also entrench the asymmetry between ASEAN and the PRC. The code of conduct will have immediate effects on the sovereignty and security of the region. Without accountability, the next two decades could resemble the previous two decades; rising tensions, a breach of national sovereignty and further instability in a region with acute security challenges. About the author: Jacob Dickinson Jacob studies Global Political Economy at Leiden University. He is passionate about international development and is looking to expand his expertise in geopolitics and crisis management. Curious about other cultures, he has traveled to Europe and Asia for both academic study and professional purposes. His expertise includes subjects like the geopolitics of energy, China’s international political economy, and the implications of globalized supply chains for industrial policy. He is particularly interested in the evolving political and economic relationships between China and ASEAN, and the consequences for regional development and security. The article was edited by Alessia Cappelletti.

Greater awareness is warranted for the intensifying threats to regional stability in the Western Balkans; especially amidst the ongoing Russia-Ukraine crisis. With recent calls for secession and shifting alliances, local ethno-nationalist groups are bolstering their demands that serve their own interests. Meanwhile, these groups are receiving increasing influence and support from foreign players that are led by their own agendas. It is important to note that tensions of the 1991-2001 Yugoslav Wars are still very current. Therefore, a potential escalation of events is a factor that should be taken into account by travelers and security managers posted within the region. Read more in the PDF below

Written by: Sytske Post After weeks of speculation about whether Elon Musk would join the board of directors or only remain an investor, the business magnate struck a deal to buy the media giant Twitter for $44 billion on April 25, 2022. This deal has triggered debates around the concept of the right to freedom of expression. However, where does society draw the line? What happens when this right clashes with other rights (life, non-discrimination)? The public response to the deal reveals the complexities of internet governance as well as security concerns regarding the limits of online freedom of expression. Musk's idea of creating an arena for free speech perhaps oversimplifies the complicated politics, socio-economic diversity and geographics in which the platform operates. Twitter, and other social media platforms, have had very positive impacts on democratic practices. However, the darker sides to these platforms should not be underestimated, as they are also spaces where hate speech, disinformation and conspiracies are amplified and spread. These discourses may not be dangerous in and of itself, but they can create environments where violence against another can be legitimised. The reality of local free speech laws Musk claimed that the objective of the purchase of Twitter is to secure the site's role as a "digital town square where matters vital to the future of democracy are debated". Despite plans on the actual future direction of the platform remaining unclear, especially since the deal has been temporarily put on hold, the takeover has triggered worldwide reactions. Advocates for Musk's takeover anticipate that this transition will have a positive impact on free speech, democracy, and freedom of press. Whereas, human rights advocates have been alarmed by these prospective modifications to the platform, and are concerned about an increase in the amount of hate speech and misinformation on the platform. They see it as a worrying development that may signal the unravelling of many key initiatives that have been put in place to protect users from individual and collective harm. What has actually been said by Musk himself that has brought about scepticism from these human right advocates? And how do these two sides provide insights into the complexity of content moderation? In the scenario that the sale proceeds, let's first consider what Musk has said about Twitter's future direction. Musk, who calls himself a free ‘speech absolutist’, has indicated a desire to loosen the platform’s content moderation policies. However, in an interview with Chris Anderson, responding to a question about free speech, Musk also stated that Twitter or any forum is bound by the laws of the country that it operates in… “In my view, Twitter should match the laws of the country” Musk said. In a later tweet, Musk reaffirmed his rather legalistic attitude to free speech when he stated: "By 'free speech', I simply mean that which matches the law. If people want less free speech, they will ask the government to pass laws to that effect. Therefore, going beyond the law is contrary to the will of the people." However, this stance perhaps reveals a lack of understanding of content moderation generally, but also the complex reality of freedom of speech laws in countries outside the United States. Twitter has faced some political restraints and regulations based on local laws, and in certain cases abiding to local laws can actually minimise the inclusivity of free speech. Nigeria, which banned the site from operating in the country from June 4, 2021 to January 13, 2022, is a recent example of this complexity. The banning of the platform was seen as something that had been coming for a long time. Twitter played a large role in the support of the youth-led #EndSARS protest against police brutality, which swept through Nigeria and her diasporic communities in 2020 and posed challenges to Buhari's government. The youth movement used the platform to propel, mobilise, and fundraise for the movement. This social media activism soon spiraled into street protests in various Nigerian cities. The government, not happy about the support the digital platform was providing, banned the platform accusing it of threatening the country's national security. Eventually, the ban was lifted after months of negotiations, with Twitter agreeing to abide by Nigerian laws in the moderation of prohibited content and to establish a local legal personality. Nigerian laws on social media regulation, however, have previously been criticised. In 2019, the government proposed a social media bill that would allow law enforcement to shutdown parts of the Internet and limit Nigerian users’ access to any ‘online location’ (including WhatsApp, Facebook, or Twitter. It also sought to criminalise statements that the government deemed “prejudicial to the security of Nigeria”. The bill has been stalled due to criticism by digital rights groups. However, these regulations demonstrate that relying on primarily local laws for Twitter content moderation could actually infringe on a person's freedom of expression. Twitter, and other social media platforms, are indeed arenas where public debate can contribute to holding governments accountable and mobilise for political and social causes. But content moderation and the politics of Twitter regulation is complex. The free speech philosophy grounded only in following local law is therefore a simplistic way of thinking about how such regulations work in practice, and it can jeopardise users' digital rights in certain countries, such as Nigeria. Escalation to violence Another challenging concern in debates over freedom of expression is the potential impact of words on the violent escalation of conflict. What does unrestricted freedom of speech look like? Even in the United States, where free speech is protected as a constitutional right, there is a vital distinction to be made between one’s freedom to say whatever they want and others' right to impose consequences if that speech causes harm to others. Certainly a line would be drawn when speech directly incites violence, but the difficulty with such an understanding is that words will rarely be as clear as an order to shoot someone. Incitement to violence frequently, but not always, overlaps with hate speech, but also is intertwined with dis/misinformation and conspiracies. One of the most prominent cases showing this relationship between online free speech and the incitement of violence has been Myanmar. The use of Facebook to spread anti-Muslim messages, and dehumanisation of the Rohingya community, as stated in an investigation of the United Nations, has played a significant role in the Rohinya genocide. Facebook was able to play such a significant role in the Myanmar context due to the country's socio-historical context and treatment of the Rohingya community. The Rohingya's acute vulnerability is the result of decades of state policies and practices that have gradually marginalised them. This vulnerability created an environment where the group could be easily targeted and used as scapegoats. This intensified in 2012, when a Buddhist ultranationalist group emerged and built on these already existing divisions in society. Creating a community united through shared anxieties. These fears were formed around two targets, 1) the broader Muslim community in urban and rural regions across the country, and 2) the Muslim Rohingya people centered in Rakhine State. The group framed the Muslim population as both a personal threat and a threat to the Buddhist majority nation. They disseminated information that Muslim birthrates were rising, that Muslim economic power was growing and that Muslims were plotting to take over the country. These conspiracies and disinformation campaigns contributed to hate speech against the Rohingya community. In the case of Myanmar, the rise of the Buddhist ultranationalist group was thus partly due to Facebook, using the platform as a useful instrument to spread their narratives. The wide reach, the speed with which information can be disseminated, and the participatory aspect of sharing and commenting, contributed to creating a climate of fear, hatred and anger among Myanmar's Buddhists and other non-Muslims. When such a climate is created as a result of online discourse, violence against a group, in this case the Rohingya, could be instigated. Why can an unrestricted space for freedom of speech pose a security threat? Offensive language, conspiracy theories or disinformation are not necessarily dangerous in and of itself. The speaker, the audience, the situation, and the media must all be taken into account. If the remarks are hateful but the speaker is a minor character, intercultural tolerance is well ingrained, and people seek information from a variety of sources, then words are unlikely to have any serious influence. However, when such speech is used by speakers who are highly regarded, or in a society where existing divisions exist between various groups, offensive speech can become particularly dangerous. Especially when the medium via which such speech is broadcast, such as social media platforms, can reach a huge audience. In the case of Twitter, the amount of interest in the platform's sale vastly outweighs the site's economic importance. Twitter does not even make the top ten most popular social networking sites in the world. However, it has a unique and important reputation that helps it to stand apart from competitors. It is the preferred platform for journalists and government officials, two significant groups whose engagement in the site allows it to reach beyond the site's real users. People pay attention to these people and often regard their information as trustworthy, and therefore the site has significant power to organise and influence audiences. Additionally, due to the presence of these specific groups, traditional media often picks up on specific tweets and rebroadcasts them on television, radio, or newspapers. Thereby amplifying the impact of certain tweets beyond the users of the site. These characteristics have also provided Twitter, and other social media platforms, with the ability to contribute to democratic practices. Providing a platform that can be utilised for public dialogue, and mobilised social change. However, the concept of freedom of speech is complex and deciding where the legal and/or societal borders to free speech should be drawn can be extremely challenging. Musk's desire to loosen content moderation glosses over coordinated disinformation and propaganda, endemic harassment, and pervasive hate speech, all of which can drown out and silence other voices. If the objective is to create a more inclusive environment for public debate and to ensure that free speech is as free as possible, the question that therefore should be asked is: “an inclusive environment for who?”. If absolute free speech is the aim, then abiding by local laws might have the opposite effect, as speech laws in countries outside the United States have far more restrictive laws and could endanger user's digital rights. If inclusivity means allowing disinformation, hate speech, or conspiracies, which is increasingly targeting minority communities, this promise of unrestricted free speech could feel more like a danger to these individuals who have faced the social and political ramifications of these discourses. Content moderation and identifying dangerous speech is challenging since Twitter and other social media platforms have such a global audience, with different geographies, varied politics, and socio-economic variety. But a degree of moderation is necessary, as is evident in the case of Myanmar and many other cases (e.g. U.S. Capitol riot or the conflict in Ethiopia). The reality around content moderation is thus tricky, as is the concept of freedom of expression. The future of Twitter is still unclear and the sale of the company might eventually not even happen. However, these debates provide a deeper insight into the complexity of freedom of speech, content moderation and the impact technologies are having on our society. To create an inclusive arena for speech, perhaps it is more productive to think about future governance of media platforms. What lessons can we learn from the mistakes that were made and the opportunities that were created? Beyond Twitter, what rules and systems will we need to have in place to prevent whatever the next iteration of social media will be from repeating the harms of the platforms we have now, while simultaneously grasping the opportunities? Disclaimer: Any analysis or views expressed in this article are personal and do not represent any positions of © Dyami B.V. About the Author: Sytske Post Sytske is a graduate of International Studies and is currently enrolled in the Master's degree Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University. This educational background has provided her with an interdisciplinary understanding of violent conflict and security. Currently, she is particularly interested in the intersection of technology and conflict, ranging from digital disinformation to the shifting nature of warfare powered by artificial intelligence. The article was edited by Ruben Pfeijffer

17 May 2022 we released our latest Situational Report for Baltics & Scandinavia. As usual, a closer look at the effect of the conflict in #Ukraine on #Aviation. Other sectors might also benefit from the information provided. Our latest Situational Report about The Baltics and Scandinavia because of the situation in Ukraine and its vicinity is V1.8. Information sharing is key during a crisis like this. Especially for aircraft operators. Feel free to share. More information and questions? Feel free to contact us. 17-05-2022 Sitrep Baltic States and Scandinavia V.1.8 (download as PDF) 04-04-2022 Sitrep Baltic States and Scandinavia V.1.7 (download as PDF) 21-03-2022 Sitrep Baltic States and Scandinavia V.1.6 (download as PDF) 09-03-2022 Sitrep Baltic States and Scandinavia V.1.5 (download as PDF) 03-03-2022 Sitrep Baltic States and Scandinavia V.1.4 (download as PDF) 28-02-2022 Sitrep Baltic States and Scandinavia V.1.3 (download as PDF) 26-02-2022 Sitrep Baltic States and Scandinavia V.1.2 (download as PDF) 25-02-2022 Sitrep Baltic States and Finland V.1.1 (download as PDF)