Search dyami insights

Written by Facundo E. Saponara As NATO members continue to concentrate on the ongoing events in Eastern Europe, the situation in the Middle East, particularly in Syria, has been remarkably dynamic in the last couple of weeks. ISIS has been capable of exploiting the current security situation and may probably continue to do so at a larger scale in the following months. What is needed to put a stop to the groups revived growth? Attack on Ghuwaryan prison Since the fall of the physical caliphate in 2019, thousands of Islamic State combatants have been placed in Kurdish-run prisons to temporarily limit the possibility of the group's resurgence in the region. However, thousands of the arrested suspects linked to the Islamic State have been released due to the perceived 'low threat' they pose. Kurdish authorities informed their prisons currently hold over 12,000 ISIS-linked detainees. According to the UN, Kurdish prisons appear to be overpopulated and undermanned. Which has made these installations very likely targets for ISIS activity either from within (indoctrination and radicalization of other inmates, facilitated by the poor living conditions and the lack of control) or from outside (assaults on the structure itself). On 20 January, 2022, over 100 fighters linked with Daesh attacked the Ghuwayran prison in Hassakeh, northern Syria. At the time, Ghuwayran held an estimated 3,500 ISIL-linked prisoners and approximately 5,000 detainees total, consequently making the prison an important target for the group. The scale of the attack is exemplary of ISIL’s expansionist pursuit in the Syrian Arab Republic and the Middle East. Daesh was capable of mobilizing over 100 of its fighters for a single attack (in the largest operation in almost three years) which should be considered a sign that the group has slowly but surely been securing limited gains in the country. Such victories have materialized in renewed control over areas of the Syrian desert, where the security apparatus of the Syrian Arab Armed Forces is not capable of projecting power in a permanent manner. ISIL used this critical factor to expand its presence further north and exploit security gaps in the areas between Kurdish-controlled and Syrian-controlled territories. The limited pressure suffered by the group has increased its operational margin, as local, regional and global actors continue to pursue objectives not necessarily aligned with a continued military effort against the Islamic State. From the Syrian perspective, the biggest threat continues to lay in the Turkish presence in Northern Syria and the Turkish-backed rebel groups in the Northwest of the country. These circumstances have created a context where the Islamic State is capable of exploiting power vacuums that are existent in the country after a decade of war, the partial withdrawal of the US from Syria, and the limited control of the majority of the country's territory by the Syrian Arab Armed Forces. U.S. response The attack on Ghuwayran was considered critical enough for the US to provide air support for the Kurdish forces holding back the terrorist militants. Additionally, Washington put in motion a raid in Syrian territory that liquidated Daesh's leader Abu Ibrahim al-Qurayshi in February 2022. The death of an ISIS Caliph is not a minor occurrence. The loyalty sworn by the group's cells is not to Daesh itself but to the specific Caliph leading the organization at a particular moment. Every time a leader of ISIS is eliminated, all cell leaders need to pledge loyalty to the new Caliph. A very political process that might not always lead to an actual pledge. However, alarmingly, ISIS has recently been gaining ground in Syria and Iraq, and the outer provinces. This, in addition to ISIL's demonstrated ability to adapt to new circumstances, has probably simplified the decision-making process for most cell leaders. In the past weeks, there have been numerous pledges of loyalty by the group's external leaders that were to be expected as a result of the victories the organization has been securing as of late. How the global context could benefit ISIL Even as the group still finds itself limited in its capabilities and reach, ISIL has regained strength in Syria and the region. The global, regional, and local contexts continue to benefit the growth of Daesh. The events at a global level are worrying as they could potentially worsen the security scenario in a matter of months. The direct or indirect involvement of the two major players in Syria, Russia and the United States, in the Ukrainian conflict might greatly benefit Daesh's activity in the country in the short term. Unconfirmed reports of Russian withdrawal from some areas of Syria and their replacement by Iranian troops have also been circulating as of late. Analysts have considered this might be a prelude to a possible partial Russian withdrawal. Up until this point, the Russian invasion of Ukraine hasn't been costly enough to demand the relocation of the Russian units deployed in Syria. That being said, the dawn of new threats may force Russia into making such a move. The possible inclusion of Finland and Sweden in NATO, the ever-growing number of NATO troops deployed to the alliance's 'eastern flank', and the indefinite continuation of the conflict in Ukraine could potentially alter the balance of power in Syria. If reports on Iranian forces replacing Russian military units are correct, the ingress of a new flux of Iranian fighters may fuel sectarian tensions in the near future, straining the Syrian society even further and opening the gates for Daesh's exploitation of the country's historical sectarian conflict. Facing China's expansion and a possible war with Russia, Washington will likely continue to focus their efforts on their near-peer adversaries. Thus, limiting their actions in the Middle East and possibly withdrawing troops as the context in the region continues to become more unfavorable for maintaining a military presence. If the United States were to continue its current course of action in the Middle East, US forces will be restricted to reactionary military operations. Such an approach would facilitate the growth of Daesh in Syria as long as they continue to maintain a low operational profile. State of ISIL and policy recommendations The current operational status of the Islamic State (low-level insurgency) makes them incapable of exploiting sectarian tensions at the national level. But ISIL has proven its ability to make use of sectarian and social tensions in the areas where the group is present. Thus, recruiting more militants into their lines and weakening their local adversaries. The potential for ISIS to grow in Syria is considerable, especially if the aforementioned scenarios were to materialize. Very recently, the new leader of ISIL, Abu Hasan al-Hashemi al-Qurashi, has vowed to take revenge on the death of the group's previous leader and is urging its supporters to take advantage of the situation in Ukraine and attack Europe from within. If the context continues to facilitate it, ISIL will probably continue to augment its operations in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere (mainly in Africa and Central Asia). If Daesh is allowed to grow at a sustained rate in Africa or Central Asia, the outer cells may be able to function as sponsors of terrorist activity in the Levant. Similarly to how ISIL sponsored the growth of its cells at a global level in the previous decade. The Islamic State continues to grow in Syria as a consequence of the limited threat that they currently pose to local, regional and global actors. If ISIL considerably expanded and established a permanent presence over a particular area (unlikely as they continue to benefit from small-scale operations), this would turn their operatives, capabilities, and facilities into more vulnerable targets, damaging their activities in the region. Additionally, IS cannot currently sponsor terrorist attacks in Europe. The Islamic State is heavily dependent on sleeper cells -as well as "lone wolves"- that are spread all over the continent to take action and acquire the means to do so by themselves. Turkish officials announced the capture of a member of ISIL on May 26th, 2022, after a raid in Istanbul. National authorities claim this is the Islamic State's new leader as of February 2022. If ISIL's leader is truly detained in Turkey, this would be a historical event as a Caliph of the Islamic State has never been captured alive before. Consequently, this could alter the current trend of the group's operational expansion in the region through a method of leadership decapitation that the Islamic State has never previously experienced, namely imprisonment. The capture of Öcalan, leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), is exemplary of the fact that capturing alive the leadership of a terrorist organization could prove to be much more destabilizing than eliminating them (at least in the short term). Lamentably, the Islamic State has proven itself capable of adapting to new circumstances rather rapidly and efficiently. And, although the capture of Öcalan was a bargaining chip for the Turkish government and forced the PKK into reducing its lethality, this was just a momentary solution as PKK has become more and more lethal as time went by. This could very much be the case for the Islamic State as even if the group wasn't able to fully adjust to these new set of circumstances in the short term, ISIL's senior leadership could continue operating at a local scale. At least, until communications with the group's Caliph can be reestablished. Which, considering Öcalan is still capable of leading the PKK from within a Turkish prison (not a minor detail since the PKK presents a much more of a threat to the Turkish State than the Islamic State does), ISIL may very well replicate this strategy. Security forces all over the European Union should continue to hunt down as many of the group's sleeper cells as possible to limit the threat of a new wave of terrorist attacks and reduce the number of individuals that may fall under the indoctrination program of IS. Security measures are to be put in motion to limit the growth of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, in particular through military cooperation with all parties that have a considerable military presence in the region. In order to accomplish this, intermediaries, such as the Kurds or the Iraqi government, would play a crucial role in facilitating cooperation between adversaries and achieving the shared goal of limiting the growth of the Islamic State. Furthermore, Humanitarian support is to be provided to Kurdish forces in northern Syria as a prerequisite to limit the success of ISIL's indoctrination programs in refugee camps by bettering the living conditions of those residing inside them. Military and technical support should be directed towards Kurdish forces in order to increment the security inside al-Hol and other refugee camps, properly man and equip Kurdish prisons and increment the security on the border between the Kurdish-controlled and Syrian-controlled territories. And lastly, in the light of a new set of Turkish offensives on northern Syria, NATO members should instigate both Kurdish and Turkish actors into making compromises, such as the usage of ISIS prisons and the recognition of their direct vicinity as defensive zones protected by Kurdish forces. These zones should be left unharmed by the Turkish army and Turkey-aligned militias. About the author: Facundo E. Saponara Facundo E. Saponara holds a BA in Government and International Relations from the Universidad Argentina de la Empresa and is currently enrolled in the Master’s degree in Strategy and Geopolitics at the Escuela Superior de Guerra. He has been assigned as the Area Coordinator of the Middle East Investigation Team at the Center for International Policy Studies from the University of Buenos Aires. Facundo has dedicated most of his professional and academic career to the study of international security and asymmetric warfare in particular, with a special interest in terrorism. The article was edited by Ruben Pfeijffer

Written by Jacob Dickinson After two years of canceled meetings due to COVID-19, on 15 May 2022, China’s Deputy Director of the Foreign Ministry of Information Zhao Lijian called for face-to-face consultations on a renewed code of conduct between the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Considering that the PRC is currently experiencing severe lockdowns due to the rapid spread of COVID-19, why has Beijing called for these negotiations to go ahead? The PRC’s use of coercive force in the SCS adds to escalating regional tensions in the Asia-Pacific. The prospect of an invasion of Taiwan, Sri Lanka’s escalating social and political crisis, and North Korea’s test-firing of ballistic missiles pose dire challenges to stability in the wider region. Whether a code of conduct can ease escalating tensions and accommodate the interests of all claimants in the SCS remains an open question. Competing Claims The South China Sea (SCS) covers an area of over 3,000 square kilometers and includes a wide range of resources and strategic routes. As well as comprising land and islands, the SCS consists of significant oil and gas deposits. The SCS is also vital for fishing communities in the region as an important source of income and food. Located at the center of the most economically dynamic region in the world, up to 40% of maritime trade between the EU and Asia is conducted through the SCS. The strategic value of the SCS has also been met with competing claims which go back decades. In 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) claimed the ‘nine-dash line’ encompassing around 90% of the SCS as an area of historic exclusive sovereignty. This line was meant to demarcate a maritime claim to the reefs and rocks of the South China Sea, yet Beijing has interpreted the line as an area of exclusive sovereignty. This is by far the largest claim on the SCS, but other states in the region also have disputed claims. According to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), signed in 1982, signatory states have the right to develop resources within 400km of their coasts. As a result, disputes have frequently arisen through diplomatic, force and direct coercion between claimant states. Changing Security Environment The code of conduct was first conceived by ASEAN member states as a response to the PRC’s military occupation of the Mischief Reef over 25 years ago. A multilateral agreement was reached in 2002 in Phnom Penh, with both Beijing and ASEAN seeking to avoid US involvement in regional affairs. Since then, progress on a new code of conduct has been slow. There is little agreement on fundamental issues; the code’s geographic scope, outright bans on the seizure of land and whether the agreement will be binding on all signatory states. Beijing is reluctant to agree to a code of conduct that could constrain its future actions in the SCS. ASEAN member states such as Laos, Cambodia and Thailand, have little direct interest in the SCS and prefer to keep security issues away from deepening economic relations with the PRC. This came to the surface when, in 2016, a prepared communique between the PRC and ASEAN member states was resolutely retracted due to objections from Beijing and member states. The SCS faces a vastly different security situation when compared with that of 2002. Since 2007, Beijing’s assertiveness through coercion to control the SCS has risen dramatically. The People’s Liberation Army Navy has built military complexes with airstrips and ports on constructed islands. Chinese State-Owned Enterprises regularly drill for oil and gas within other claimant’s Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). This trend has only worsened during the COVID-19 pandemic. The PRC unilaterally claims two administrative districts covering the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands, both of which are claimed by Vietnam. The PLA Navy launches regular patrol boats and military exercises with the PRC’s most advanced destroyer. Toward Consensus? While the PRC has often exploited divisions within ASEAN member states to enhance its own interests, there are indications of ASEAN taking a more unified stance. The PRC has begun to provoke other actors in the region through drilling and land seizures. Beijing demanded in 2021 that Indonesia stop drilling for oil and gas in the Natuna Islands. In response, Indonesia invited counterparts from Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore and Vietnam to ‘foster brotherhood’ against Beijing’s assertiveness in the SCS. Indonesia’s size and political weight could provide a basis for more consensus among ASEAN states to counter China’s aggression. Analysts have also pointed to the use of legal and diplomatic means to resolve tensions in the region. In 2012, Chinese fishing vessels entered the Scarborough Shoal and the Philippines reacted by sending Coast Guards. After a month-long stand-off between the PLA Navy and the Philippine Navy, the PRC coerced the Philippines through informal sanctions on agricultural products. In response, the Philippines brought a case against the PRC for violating the UNCLOS treaty. The arbitrary tribunal ruled that the ‘nine-dash line’ had no historical basis and no basis in international law. However, the Philippines' former president, Rodrigo Duterte has refused to attempt to enforce the ruling and the PLA navy has remained on the Shoal. However, the 2016 ruling has dealt a blow to the legal legitimacy of the PRC’s maritime claims to the ‘nine-dash line’ and could set a precedent for other claimant states. Vietnam is the most vulnerable to Beijing’s military pressure. The PRC’s invasion of Vietnam in 1978 and frequently coercive exchanges have led to deteriorating relations between the two countries. After China sent a ship for months-long seismic survey in Vietnam’s internationally designated EEZ, Hanoi issued a warning on bringing legal proceedings against the PRC in 2019. Other actors such as the EU and the US have supported it and other claimant states could take similar actions. Why is Beijing Pushing for a Code of Conduct? The call for a code of conduct has been looming since 2019, but COVID-19 has delayed further negotiations. However, Zhao Lijian's call for the finalization of a code of conduct comes at an important time for three reasons. First, the yearly rotating ASEAN chair is held by Cambodia. Hun Sen, the country's authoritarian leader, seeks to promote economic ties with China and has little interest in the SCS. It is far from certain that the PRC has complete diplomatic support from Burma, Laos and Thailand, but Beijing could gain additional support for a new code of conduct in line with its own interests. Second, the newly elected president of the Philippines and son of former dictator Ferdinand Marcos Jr pledged during the 2022 general election campaign to work closely with China. Although every leader in Southeast Asia acknowledges the PRC’s economic and diplomatic influence, Marcos has argued that the 2016 ruling was ineffective and Manila will seek a bilateral code of conduct instead of at a regional level. Yet this should not overcompensate for the strategic realities facing the Philippines. There have been protests against China’s aggression and the PRC is far more unpopular when compared with the US. Up to 42% of the Philippines have a favorable view of China compared to 80% of the US. Should Marcos be seen to deliberately play to Beijing’s interests, he could see his popularity fall dramatically. It is uncertain whether Marcos’ entrance to Malacanang Palace could result in an agreement more conducive to Beijing’s interests. Lastly, the US-ASEAN meeting on 15 May 2022 reinforced Beijing’s worries of encirclement in its perceived sphere of influence. The US provided military commitments to the region. Japan has reiterated its concerns over Beijing’s assertiveness and offered new patrol boats to Indonesia and other allies. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently stated that, despite Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Biden administration's long-term aim is to shape the strategic environment to counter the PRC’s aggressive actions. Beijing is aware of the relative cohesion of the West against Russia as a result of Russia’s war against Ukraine. In this context, the code of conduct could recalibrate the PRC’s foreign policy toward the SCS as a partner for ASEAN countries, presenting itself as a collaborative partner to ASEAN. Future outlook As General Secretary Xi Jinping continues the zero-COVID policy, the PRC’s collapse in economic growth and its ensuing global economic slowdown could potentially lead to further escalation in the region. While the code of conduct negotiations could lead to better management of tense relationships, it could also entrench the asymmetry between ASEAN and the PRC. The code of conduct will have immediate effects on the sovereignty and security of the region. Without accountability, the next two decades could resemble the previous two decades; rising tensions, a breach of national sovereignty and further instability in a region with acute security challenges. About the author: Jacob Dickinson Jacob studies Global Political Economy at Leiden University. He is passionate about international development and is looking to expand his expertise in geopolitics and crisis management. Curious about other cultures, he has traveled to Europe and Asia for both academic study and professional purposes. His expertise includes subjects like the geopolitics of energy, China’s international political economy, and the implications of globalized supply chains for industrial policy. He is particularly interested in the evolving political and economic relationships between China and ASEAN, and the consequences for regional development and security. The article was edited by Alessia Cappelletti.

Greater awareness is warranted for the intensifying threats to regional stability in the Western Balkans; especially amidst the ongoing Russia-Ukraine crisis. With recent calls for secession and shifting alliances, local ethno-nationalist groups are bolstering their demands that serve their own interests. Meanwhile, these groups are receiving increasing influence and support from foreign players that are led by their own agendas. It is important to note that tensions of the 1991-2001 Yugoslav Wars are still very current. Therefore, a potential escalation of events is a factor that should be taken into account by travelers and security managers posted within the region. Read more in the PDF below

Written by: Sytske Post After weeks of speculation about whether Elon Musk would join the board of directors or only remain an investor, the business magnate struck a deal to buy the media giant Twitter for $44 billion on April 25, 2022. This deal has triggered debates around the concept of the right to freedom of expression. However, where does society draw the line? What happens when this right clashes with other rights (life, non-discrimination)? The public response to the deal reveals the complexities of internet governance as well as security concerns regarding the limits of online freedom of expression. Musk's idea of creating an arena for free speech perhaps oversimplifies the complicated politics, socio-economic diversity and geographics in which the platform operates. Twitter, and other social media platforms, have had very positive impacts on democratic practices. However, the darker sides to these platforms should not be underestimated, as they are also spaces where hate speech, disinformation and conspiracies are amplified and spread. These discourses may not be dangerous in and of itself, but they can create environments where violence against another can be legitimised. The reality of local free speech laws Musk claimed that the objective of the purchase of Twitter is to secure the site's role as a "digital town square where matters vital to the future of democracy are debated". Despite plans on the actual future direction of the platform remaining unclear, especially since the deal has been temporarily put on hold, the takeover has triggered worldwide reactions. Advocates for Musk's takeover anticipate that this transition will have a positive impact on free speech, democracy, and freedom of press. Whereas, human rights advocates have been alarmed by these prospective modifications to the platform, and are concerned about an increase in the amount of hate speech and misinformation on the platform. They see it as a worrying development that may signal the unravelling of many key initiatives that have been put in place to protect users from individual and collective harm. What has actually been said by Musk himself that has brought about scepticism from these human right advocates? And how do these two sides provide insights into the complexity of content moderation? In the scenario that the sale proceeds, let's first consider what Musk has said about Twitter's future direction. Musk, who calls himself a free ‘speech absolutist’, has indicated a desire to loosen the platform’s content moderation policies. However, in an interview with Chris Anderson, responding to a question about free speech, Musk also stated that Twitter or any forum is bound by the laws of the country that it operates in… “In my view, Twitter should match the laws of the country” Musk said. In a later tweet, Musk reaffirmed his rather legalistic attitude to free speech when he stated: "By 'free speech', I simply mean that which matches the law. If people want less free speech, they will ask the government to pass laws to that effect. Therefore, going beyond the law is contrary to the will of the people." However, this stance perhaps reveals a lack of understanding of content moderation generally, but also the complex reality of freedom of speech laws in countries outside the United States. Twitter has faced some political restraints and regulations based on local laws, and in certain cases abiding to local laws can actually minimise the inclusivity of free speech. Nigeria, which banned the site from operating in the country from June 4, 2021 to January 13, 2022, is a recent example of this complexity. The banning of the platform was seen as something that had been coming for a long time. Twitter played a large role in the support of the youth-led #EndSARS protest against police brutality, which swept through Nigeria and her diasporic communities in 2020 and posed challenges to Buhari's government. The youth movement used the platform to propel, mobilise, and fundraise for the movement. This social media activism soon spiraled into street protests in various Nigerian cities. The government, not happy about the support the digital platform was providing, banned the platform accusing it of threatening the country's national security. Eventually, the ban was lifted after months of negotiations, with Twitter agreeing to abide by Nigerian laws in the moderation of prohibited content and to establish a local legal personality. Nigerian laws on social media regulation, however, have previously been criticised. In 2019, the government proposed a social media bill that would allow law enforcement to shutdown parts of the Internet and limit Nigerian users’ access to any ‘online location’ (including WhatsApp, Facebook, or Twitter. It also sought to criminalise statements that the government deemed “prejudicial to the security of Nigeria”. The bill has been stalled due to criticism by digital rights groups. However, these regulations demonstrate that relying on primarily local laws for Twitter content moderation could actually infringe on a person's freedom of expression. Twitter, and other social media platforms, are indeed arenas where public debate can contribute to holding governments accountable and mobilise for political and social causes. But content moderation and the politics of Twitter regulation is complex. The free speech philosophy grounded only in following local law is therefore a simplistic way of thinking about how such regulations work in practice, and it can jeopardise users' digital rights in certain countries, such as Nigeria. Escalation to violence Another challenging concern in debates over freedom of expression is the potential impact of words on the violent escalation of conflict. What does unrestricted freedom of speech look like? Even in the United States, where free speech is protected as a constitutional right, there is a vital distinction to be made between one’s freedom to say whatever they want and others' right to impose consequences if that speech causes harm to others. Certainly a line would be drawn when speech directly incites violence, but the difficulty with such an understanding is that words will rarely be as clear as an order to shoot someone. Incitement to violence frequently, but not always, overlaps with hate speech, but also is intertwined with dis/misinformation and conspiracies. One of the most prominent cases showing this relationship between online free speech and the incitement of violence has been Myanmar. The use of Facebook to spread anti-Muslim messages, and dehumanisation of the Rohingya community, as stated in an investigation of the United Nations, has played a significant role in the Rohinya genocide. Facebook was able to play such a significant role in the Myanmar context due to the country's socio-historical context and treatment of the Rohingya community. The Rohingya's acute vulnerability is the result of decades of state policies and practices that have gradually marginalised them. This vulnerability created an environment where the group could be easily targeted and used as scapegoats. This intensified in 2012, when a Buddhist ultranationalist group emerged and built on these already existing divisions in society. Creating a community united through shared anxieties. These fears were formed around two targets, 1) the broader Muslim community in urban and rural regions across the country, and 2) the Muslim Rohingya people centered in Rakhine State. The group framed the Muslim population as both a personal threat and a threat to the Buddhist majority nation. They disseminated information that Muslim birthrates were rising, that Muslim economic power was growing and that Muslims were plotting to take over the country. These conspiracies and disinformation campaigns contributed to hate speech against the Rohingya community. In the case of Myanmar, the rise of the Buddhist ultranationalist group was thus partly due to Facebook, using the platform as a useful instrument to spread their narratives. The wide reach, the speed with which information can be disseminated, and the participatory aspect of sharing and commenting, contributed to creating a climate of fear, hatred and anger among Myanmar's Buddhists and other non-Muslims. When such a climate is created as a result of online discourse, violence against a group, in this case the Rohingya, could be instigated. Why can an unrestricted space for freedom of speech pose a security threat? Offensive language, conspiracy theories or disinformation are not necessarily dangerous in and of itself. The speaker, the audience, the situation, and the media must all be taken into account. If the remarks are hateful but the speaker is a minor character, intercultural tolerance is well ingrained, and people seek information from a variety of sources, then words are unlikely to have any serious influence. However, when such speech is used by speakers who are highly regarded, or in a society where existing divisions exist between various groups, offensive speech can become particularly dangerous. Especially when the medium via which such speech is broadcast, such as social media platforms, can reach a huge audience. In the case of Twitter, the amount of interest in the platform's sale vastly outweighs the site's economic importance. Twitter does not even make the top ten most popular social networking sites in the world. However, it has a unique and important reputation that helps it to stand apart from competitors. It is the preferred platform for journalists and government officials, two significant groups whose engagement in the site allows it to reach beyond the site's real users. People pay attention to these people and often regard their information as trustworthy, and therefore the site has significant power to organise and influence audiences. Additionally, due to the presence of these specific groups, traditional media often picks up on specific tweets and rebroadcasts them on television, radio, or newspapers. Thereby amplifying the impact of certain tweets beyond the users of the site. These characteristics have also provided Twitter, and other social media platforms, with the ability to contribute to democratic practices. Providing a platform that can be utilised for public dialogue, and mobilised social change. However, the concept of freedom of speech is complex and deciding where the legal and/or societal borders to free speech should be drawn can be extremely challenging. Musk's desire to loosen content moderation glosses over coordinated disinformation and propaganda, endemic harassment, and pervasive hate speech, all of which can drown out and silence other voices. If the objective is to create a more inclusive environment for public debate and to ensure that free speech is as free as possible, the question that therefore should be asked is: “an inclusive environment for who?”. If absolute free speech is the aim, then abiding by local laws might have the opposite effect, as speech laws in countries outside the United States have far more restrictive laws and could endanger user's digital rights. If inclusivity means allowing disinformation, hate speech, or conspiracies, which is increasingly targeting minority communities, this promise of unrestricted free speech could feel more like a danger to these individuals who have faced the social and political ramifications of these discourses. Content moderation and identifying dangerous speech is challenging since Twitter and other social media platforms have such a global audience, with different geographies, varied politics, and socio-economic variety. But a degree of moderation is necessary, as is evident in the case of Myanmar and many other cases (e.g. U.S. Capitol riot or the conflict in Ethiopia). The reality around content moderation is thus tricky, as is the concept of freedom of expression. The future of Twitter is still unclear and the sale of the company might eventually not even happen. However, these debates provide a deeper insight into the complexity of freedom of speech, content moderation and the impact technologies are having on our society. To create an inclusive arena for speech, perhaps it is more productive to think about future governance of media platforms. What lessons can we learn from the mistakes that were made and the opportunities that were created? Beyond Twitter, what rules and systems will we need to have in place to prevent whatever the next iteration of social media will be from repeating the harms of the platforms we have now, while simultaneously grasping the opportunities? Disclaimer: Any analysis or views expressed in this article are personal and do not represent any positions of © Dyami B.V. About the Author: Sytske Post Sytske is a graduate of International Studies and is currently enrolled in the Master's degree Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University. This educational background has provided her with an interdisciplinary understanding of violent conflict and security. Currently, she is particularly interested in the intersection of technology and conflict, ranging from digital disinformation to the shifting nature of warfare powered by artificial intelligence. The article was edited by Ruben Pfeijffer

17 May 2022 we released our latest Situational Report for Baltics & Scandinavia. As usual, a closer look at the effect of the conflict in #Ukraine on #Aviation. Other sectors might also benefit from the information provided. Our latest Situational Report about The Baltics and Scandinavia because of the situation in Ukraine and its vicinity is V1.8. Information sharing is key during a crisis like this. Especially for aircraft operators. Feel free to share. More information and questions? Feel free to contact us. 17-05-2022 Sitrep Baltic States and Scandinavia V.1.8 (download as PDF) 04-04-2022 Sitrep Baltic States and Scandinavia V.1.7 (download as PDF) 21-03-2022 Sitrep Baltic States and Scandinavia V.1.6 (download as PDF) 09-03-2022 Sitrep Baltic States and Scandinavia V.1.5 (download as PDF) 03-03-2022 Sitrep Baltic States and Scandinavia V.1.4 (download as PDF) 28-02-2022 Sitrep Baltic States and Scandinavia V.1.3 (download as PDF) 26-02-2022 Sitrep Baltic States and Scandinavia V.1.2 (download as PDF) 25-02-2022 Sitrep Baltic States and Finland V.1.1 (download as PDF)

Written by Sietske Moshuldayev Where several countries have seen a clear escalation in tensions over the past month, a majority of the conflicts covered in this report focus on situations where threats are looming, with potential exacerbations yet to come. Ten conflicts are briefly identified below based on global news monitoring and open-source intelligence gathering. In past weeks, Russian operations in Ukraine have continued, Wagner Group operations in Mali raised international concerns and Afghanistan experienced deadly militant attacks. North Korean nuclear threats have reinvigorated and a China-Solomon Islands security pact alarmed other regional players. Meanwhile, gang violence intensified in Haiti and the upcoming Somali presidential elections bolstered threat levels, amidst ongoing Israel-Palestine attacks. In addition, both Peru and Sri Lanka faced civil protests. Keeping track of further potential escalations among these conflicts is called for. 1. World Conflicts - April 2022 a. The Russia-Ukraine Crisis Russian offensives in Eastern Ukraine have intensified as diplomatic talks continue to prove no alternative to the ongoing eleven-week conflict. With heavy fighting especially in Mariupol, cross-border distress was fuelled by Russian claims that Ukraine attacked its Belgorod region. Recent explosions in the Moldovan breakaway region of Transnistria - which local and Russian media attributed to Ukrainian saboteurs - are also perceived as potential indicators of Russian military interest in pulling Moldova into the conflict. This month also saw Russia close-off gas pipelines to Poland and Bulgaria, with energy insecurity complicating unanimous support for a sixth European Union sanction packet. As NATO’s talks to admit Finland and Sweden to the military alliance advance, the United States and United Nations continue to penalize Russia while the threat of nuclear weapons still looms. With UN General Secretary Antonio Guterres visiting Ukraine end-April, various countries are re-opening their diplomatic missions in Kyiv. As the number of Ukrainian refugees nears 6 million and sanctions are expected to cause an economic recession for Russia, the conflict will likely continue to impact many beyond Ukrainian and Russian borders in the upcoming weeks. b. Greater Security Concerns in Mali International concerns over the stability and security in Mali have amplified this past month following indications of greater cooperation between Malian security forces and Wagner Group, a Russian private military company (PMC). They are currently filling the void left by reduced European Union military commitment to the country, signalled earlier this year by the departure of French troops. Despite official Malian and Russian claims that Wagner Group only provides military instructors, the PMC fighters were reportedly involved in the killings of approximately 300 civilians in March. This month, the EU has halted part of their training of Malian forces and Germany has stepped out of its EU contributions to prevent its troops from collaborating with the mercenaries. Facing continued terrorist attacks, a worsening food crisis, economic sanctions and an uncertain future of the UN’s stabilization mission in the country, the extended Malian junta leadership seems to be leaning towards Russia to further secure their position. c. Militant Attacks in Afghanistan Militant activity continues to challenge Taliban control over Afghanistan and threaten the security of Afghan civilians. Following fatal explosions in Mazar-e-Sharif and Kunduz, the deadliest bombing took place on April 29th at the Khalifa Sahib Mosque in Kabul where at least fifty people were killed. A week earlier, attacks at a high school in Kabul killed six and injured more than twenty people. With some explosions claimed by the Islamic State, Central and South Asian states are concerned about their border security and the potential overflow of militant activity. In the case of Pakistan, Afghan-based militants have already launched cross-border attacks. Pakistan retaliated through airstrikes, killing at least forty seven Afghans - most claimed to be women and children. Meanwhile, the Taliban continues to face international economic sanctions and criticism over their intensifying control over females in the country. In this context, the degree of the Talibans’ consolidation over the country remains disputable. d. Revived North Korean Nuclear Threats Several indications have given rise to concerns that North Korea may re-initiate its nuclear weapon testing in the upcoming month, despite its programme being on halt since 2018. North Korean President Kim Yong Un has promised to enhance the country’s nuclear programme, a month after claims of a successful intercontinental ballistic missile launch in March. One of fifteen missile tests this year already, the aforementioned launch signifies the first of its kind since 2017 - with the used missile known for its capability to carry nuclear weapons. The United States has issued a warning about nuclear tests as satellite images have shown the reactivation of North Korea’s testing site. This comes right as South Korea has inaugurated a new president who is more conservative and hardline on issues pertaining to its northern neighbour. In addition to US President Biden's scheduled visit to East Asia from May 20th to 24th, dynamics on the Korean peninsula may see frictions intensify. e. Concerns over the Solomon Islands and China Security Pact Diplomatic tensions in the South Pacific Ocean rose this month following the signing of a security pact between the Solomon Islands and China in mid-April. The pact, which comes three years after the Solomon Islands broke-off relations with Taiwan, has caused the United States, Australia and Japan to voice concern over potential Chinese military expansion in the region. China, however, has claimed that it does not seek to develop a naval base on the islands and the Solomon Islands have also stated that they will not permit this. Following the re-opening of its embassy on the Islands in February, the US has nonetheless additionally sent a top official to the islands and enhanced its cooperation with Papua New Guinea. As both the US and China continue to expand their influence in the region, it remains to be seen what further issues this new security arrangement may bring about. 2. Brief Alerts - April 2022 1. Intensified Gang Violence in Haiti Gang violence in Haiti turned deadly at the end of April, forcing locals to relocate and threatening diplomats and tourists. With general violence occurring daily, Acting-President Ariel Henry’s term having ended in February this year and elections not yet rescheduled, the question remains as to who is to hold political power. 2. Violent Electoral Pressures in Somalia Deadly Al-Shabaab terrorist attacks have targeted lawmakers and international peacekeeping forces in Somalia as presidential elections are coming up on May 15th. Amidst a worsening famine, continued IMF support is conditioned upon the installation of a new government by May 17th. With the loyalty of national security forces split between different political leaders, stakes are raised and the election process requires close monitoring. 3. Ongoing Israel-Palestine Escalations Israel-Palestine relations remain tense as violent attacks on either side continue. Among other attacks, this past month saw weekly confrontations at the Al Aqsa mosque, injuring at least 57 and 42 people on different occasions. With various international actors condemning the ongoing attacks, stability is not yet in sight. 4. Civil Unrest in Peru The Peruvian government imposed a short-lived state of emergency on April 5th in response to nationwide protests and strikes against increased fuel and fertilizer costs. With economic conditions under pressure from the ongoing Russia-Ukraine crisis and recurring national political challenges, vulnerabilities may be exacerbated both in Peru and other South American countries. 5. A Heightened Crisis in Sri Lanka Violent clashes ensue in Sri Lanka as the economic and political crisis deepens. Despite top-level officials resigning, protestors continue to demand President Gotabaya Rajapaksa also step down. With demonstrations likely to continue, these escalations have raised alarm in other countries with similar economic conditions, such as Nepal. Conclusion The above-mentioned conflicts indicate potential escalatory events across the globe. As international, regional and national players attempt to consolidate their power, civilians continue to be entangled and embroiled in the ensuing disputes, with their safety and security threatened. With developments in one conflict able to influence the course of others, such as the impact of the Russia-Ukraine crisis on global economic trends, monitoring multiple conflicts simultaneously is of high value. Similarly, discords reflecting decades-long historical contestations - in addition to other situations not covered in this report - require continuous close monitoring and preparedness for sudden aggravations. About the author: Sietske Moshuldayev Sietske has an international background and is inherently intrigued by the causes and consequences of geopolitical events. She has completed two bachelors at the University of Leiden (International Studies, BA & Political Science, BSc) and currently pursues a masters in International Security at Sciences Po, Paris. Having specialized in East Asian affairs for her undergraduate studies, she now focuses on global risks and risk management.

Written by Jacob Dickinson. Following an intense period of political in-fighting and constitutional meddling, Imran Khan of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party (PTI), the Prime Minister of Pakistan since 2018, was removed from power on the 10th April, 2022. His replacement marks a return to Pakistan’s political dynasties. Shehbaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), former chief administrator of Punjab, came to power with the promise of a return to stability. Yet the new Prime Minister faces acute uncertainty in Pakistan’s politics, economic situation, and security threats from India and Afghanistan. Therefore, despite the hopes of Khan’s detractors for a semblance of stability, Pakistan is facing short and long-term turmoil. A ‘Managed Democracy’ The new Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif, came to power on the back of a complex legacy. In the 2018 general election, Imran Khan campaigned on a populist message against the corruption scandals of Pakistan’s political families. He pledged to build an ‘Islamic Welfare State,’ end the repeated debt cycles of Pakistan’s economy, and curb rampant corruption. He was initially praised for his handling of the COVID-19 pandemic in Pakistan. Infections were low during the initial phases of the COVID-19 pandemic, though the economic and social consequences were dire. Imran Khan was credited with preventing 15 million families from falling into extreme poverty through a cash transfer payment program to low income households. However, Khan was unsuccessful in reducing Pakistan’s pervasive corruption, and under his administration, Pakistan dropped to the bottom third of the Transparency International annual corruption index. Pakistan is sometimes labeled a ‘managed democracy’ due to the position of the military which dominates the political and economic institutions of Pakistan. Since the Partition of British India and the founding of Pakistan in 1947, the military has seized power 3 times (1958-71, 1977-88, 1999-2008) and retains control of key foreign policy posts. Maintaining a working relationship between the government and the military is a necessity for leading politicians. Pakistan’s powerful Army Chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, was instrumental in Imran Khan’s rise to power. With his fall from power, it is noteworthy that the military did not play a part in civilian politics, given its history of coup d’états. While the military declared that there will be ‘no return to martial law in Pakistan,’ the armed forces had originally turned against the political dynasties of Sharif and Bhutto who are part of the current ruling coalition. Civil-military relations could, therefore, worsen under the current leadership. The effect of Khan’s ousting from power on Pakistan’s political institutions are contradictory. On the one hand, the political institutions showed remarkable resilience in upholding the constitution. On the other hand, there are signs of further political instability. Dismissing his ousting as a US conspiracy, Khan has called for immediate elections and public protests against the Sharif administration. Sharif will struggle to maintain stability under intense public pressure while holding together a coalition government of three parties which share very little common ideological ground, especially with the acute economic pressures facing Pakistan. Debt without development Pakistan’s society faces acute developmental challenges owing to Pakistan’s social inequalities. Pakistan is a young country with a median age of 23 and a population of 220 million. Yet Pakistan underperforms when compared with Bangladesh and India. Pakistan’s literacy rate is 62.3% of the population compared with India and Bangladesh which are 74.9% and 74.4% respectively. The conflict in Ukraine and the impact on global energy and food markets has also significantly affected the economic situation in Pakistan. According to the United Nations Center for Trade And Development (UNCTAD), Pakistan is one of 10 countries facing both a shortage of funds for debt and a substantial trade imbalance. Additionally, the elite’s control of unproductive but lucrative export industries has made Pakistan subject to repeated balance of payments crises. The Pakistani rupee foreign currency reserves supplies are the lowest in 23 months, suggesting that the country will be unable to pay for food and oil imports without comprehensive adjustment. Image 1. Composition of Pakistan’s external public debt as of end of June 2021. Image retrieved from Dawn News. As the World Bank has warned, Pakistan and low and middle income countries around the world are facing immediate risk of exorbitant rates of debt servicing costs and unsustainable loans. Shehbaz Sharif has indicated that he is willing to negotiate with the IMF in return for extended debt servicing payments. On 24th April, the IMF reached an agreement with the government of Pakistan to increase the size of the $6 billion loan program by $2 billion and extend the loan payment until 2023. However, the implementation of fiscal austerity measures will severely strain the newly formed government. Additionally, the possibility of debt restructuring is made more difficult due to the emergence of other lenders since the mid-2000s. Global debt markets are populated not only with bilateral governments and international institutions, but also with private commercial institutions. With many actors with divergent commercial and geopolitical interests (see Image 1), it is difficult to envision a comprehensive restructuring of Pakistan’s debt. Security threats in South Asia Pakistan’s position on the doorstep of the Indo-Pacific and Central Asia places it at a geopolitical crossroad between Afghanistan, India, and China. The security situation between Pakistan and Afghanistan is worsening since the removal of US forces and the return of the Taliban in August 2021. Conflicts between Taliban affiliated groups and Pakistan security forces have escalated over the Durand Line, a historically disputed region since the boundaries were drawn by British imperialists in the mid-20th century. In April 2022, Pakistan security forces had allegedly launched air strikes on Afghan border villages killing 45 people. While the Pakistan security forces have not admitted carrying out strikes, they targeted the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (PTT) militant group, who have been attacking Pakistan territory from within Afghanistan. On the east of the country, Pakistan has looked to China to counter India’s strong military relationship with Russia. While Russia has supplied India with Su-330 aircraft, Pakistan has purchased Chinese-made JF-17 fighter jets. Amidst deepening maritime presence by Western powers in the Indo-Pacific, Beijing is also ramping up naval power to Pakistan, exporting 8 submarines scheduled for delivery in 2024. This is a move to counter what Beijing sees as the new Cold War encircling the Indo-Pacific, which it sees as a vital strategic interest. Sharif has also said that he wants to strengthen ties with China. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the largest investment out of the China-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, there are financial problems with servicing costs of the CPEC and the Gwadar port, the flagship CPEC project in Pakistan, has run into construction problems. While India-Pakistan relations will continue to be defined by their history, Sharif has advocated a softer approach to India. The long-standing sovereignty dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir had worsened under Imran Khan. The former Prime Minister criticized Modi’s BJP nationalist government and imposition of a draconian citizenship law in contested Kashmir in 2020. In response, Khan reinforced the nuclear capabilities of Pakistan ending with a ceasefire on the Kashmir Line of Control. Sharif has expressed intentions to seek better relations with India, though they will be constrained by India’s concerns over the military’s support for militant groups in Indian-controlled Kashmir. Future outlook Pakistan’s political turmoil is likely to continue in the coming months. Sharif’s tenuous hold on power, worsening relations with the military, and a new election scheduled for 2023 suggests that political stability is at risk. Pakistan is also facing, like other low and middle income countries across the world, high risk of debt default and severe cuts in socially necessary public services, as well as rampant inflation derived from rises in global food and energy prices. The divergent holders of Pakistan’s debt suggest that debt will likely become a contentious issue in the future. In the short term, continuing clashes with the Taliban insurgents over the Durand Line and the sovereignty dispute between Pakistan and India could lead to further political turmoil in the region. About the author: Jacob Dickinson Jacob studies Global Political Economy at Leiden University. He is passionate about international development and is looking to expand his expertise in geopolitics and crisis management. Curious about other cultures, he has travelled in Europe and Asia for both academic study and professional purposes. His expertise includes subjects like the geopolitics of energy, China’s international political economy, and the implications of globalized supply chains for industrial policy. He is particularly interested in the evolving political and economic relationships between China and ASEAN, and the consequences for regional development and security.

Dyami will be attending the European Business Aviation Convention & Expo, EBACE 2022 held in Geneva. We will showcase our Risk Assessment services for the aviation industry. The actual flight is where everything comes together. Your security policies, procedures and insights. But threats along the flight route, destination and possible enroute alternates change every day. We make on-demand security risk & threat assessments for any location in the world. Is it safe for your crew to operate the planned route? What is the actual situation regarding (geo)political factors, crime, corruption, espionage, terrorism or health risks? Our extensive reports are easily understandable to allow you to anticipate properly and make better critical decisions. Learn more about Dyami and our route and destination risk assessments by visiting our booth W54. Meet the team present in Geneva: Eric Schouten | Annick Dingemans | Tom Franke Schedule a meeting through email (info@dyami.services) or WhatsApp (+31621185339). Or use our contact form. Looking forward to meeting you live! Booth: W54 23-25 May 2022, PALEXPO, Geneva. EBACE official site ​

Written by Annette Bross As the Arctic ice increasingly melts, the region is emerging as a new frontier for fishing, natural resource exploration, and trade routes. The Arctic contains many rare minerals and is regarded to be a favorable site for oil and gas mines, making it of strategic and economic importance to the countries claiming its territories. Up until recently, its remote location has always been the main issue of Arctic exploration, due to its high costs and impracticality. However, due to climate change-related ice melting, it is becoming more accessible. As a result of this chain of events, some of the world’s powers brought their attention to this desolate region, laying the seeds for potential future tensions. How Arctic sovereignty is regulated On a map, the Arctic Region is claimed by eight countries: Canada, Denmark (through Greenland), Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, the United States of America, and Russia. These nations are all members of the Arctic Council, an international body founded in 1996 to address concerns in the Arctic. While the Council does not address military security directly, its working groups meet several times a year to examine development, exploration, shipping, search and rescue, Indigenous rights, resource extraction, and environmental impact assessments around the region; besides upholding peace. Such concerns are addressed through the creation of rules and regulations, as the several delegations joining the Council have competing interests; especially as economic development becomes more vital given recent world developments. The designation and division of continental shelves, the continent parts that are submerged under shallow water, is one of the most crucial tasks of the Council. In fact, each country’s capacity to explore and utilize the Arctic’s natural riches and its dominance over trade routes depends on the legitimacy of its claims over the continental shelves. However, continental shelves have not yet been fully mapped. Countries maintain the exclusive rights to conduct economically generating activities such as fishing or drilling in their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which is 370 kilometers or 200 nautical miles off the coast. However, the space between two or more frontiers is considered “up for grabs” by whoever can establish ownership. Hence, countries are increasingly investing in research to prove the extent of their continental shelves. If a country can demonstrate that its claims to a continental shelf are legitimate, by international law it receives exclusive rights to the minerals found on the shelf’s seabed. Only Norway and Iceland have applied and received approval for their request for continental shelf space. Russia has an outstanding claim over the North Pole that however overlaps with Greenland’s. The North Pole is the heart of the Arctic Circle, and whoever controls it has a strategic advantage over the remainder due to its geographic location. Why it matters There are economic, military, and strategic reasons why the melting arctic represents an opportunity for states. In terms of trade, passing through the Arctic by sea reduces the time it takes to import and export goods between Asian and Western markets by several weeks. Journeys could be cut in half if the ice caps melt sufficiently for cargo ships to pass. Geopolitically, as a result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Sweden and Finland are considering joining NATO and this threatens Russia’s dominance over the far north. Since the prospect of NATO membership expansion was a significant motive for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the first place, this might become a long-lasting point of tension between Arctic states. What is Russia’s role? As the arctic ice melts further, one of the council members has shown a greater interest in defending the territory. For the past 15 years, Russia has been boosting its military and commercial operations in the region, which led the US and other NATO members to see Russia’s actions as a possible threat. Russia accounts for half of the Arctic landmass, as it owns 53% of the Arctic Circle’s coastline where about 2 million people reside (representing 50% of the region’s population). Russian presence in the region reinforces the country’s claim to the Arctic territories. Adding to the tension, Russia was selected to preside over the council between 2021 and 2023. In the wake of the Russian attack on Ukraine, the seven other Council members condemned President Putin’s actions in a joint statement where they decided to suspend the cooperation. The Council may continue its work, but not until the summer of 2023, when the rotating chair passes from the Russian Federation to Norway. If sanctions continue, though, they may prevent Russian participation in the Council at all or impede meetings on Russian soil. In the Arctic, Russia has also made efforts to boost its ‘soft power.’ An example of this is the town of Barentsburg. Although situated on the Norwegian island of Svalbard, the settlement is almost entirely made up of ethnic Russians and Ukrainians. There are no military bases allowed there, but Russia is investing heavily in tourism, from bars to a museum that tells the story of Russian presence in the Arctic. The investments aim at sharing Russian cultural heritage with the people living in the town and ultimately strengthen their identity. In the future, this can lead to Russia using the same ‘cultural legacy’ rhetoric used in Ukraine to justify military action, and in general, harvest political support. Conflict and the environment As a result of climate change, socio-economic activity in the region is increasing. These activities, particularly fossil fuel exploitation and mineral extraction, are accelerating the Arctic's transformation. All of this new activity in a once icy and barren area of the earth could create additional turmoil. A frozen ocean that melts more and more each year provides growth opportunities for states, and this implies that having a presence in the Arctic means having a presence in a new ocean. In the high north, diplomacy is more important than ever if the world wants to avoid conflict. Despite a resurgence of significant military interest in the region, the international community still believes in “Arctic exceptionalism,” which recognizes it as a pacific area and a space for dialogue. The impending Arctic concerns will not only play a vital role in international relations, but they will also redefine states’ borders and sovereignty in the world. Although the world's attention is diverted from the Arctic by the escalating war in Ukraine, the need for regional cooperation is more than ever, as the consequences reach beyond those related to climate change and permafrost studies. About the Author: Annette Bross Annette holds a bachelor's degree in History from Universidad Iberoamericana in Mexico City. She has now moved to the Netherlands to pursue a master’s at Leiden University in International Relations and Diplomacy. She is passionate about development, climate action, public policy, and security challenges with a strong commitment to social justice. She has experience in researching topics like the influence of soft power in Latin America and the Middle East. The article was edited by Alessia Cappelletti and Ruben Pfeijffer.

Written by Sietske Moshuldayev Various conflicts have intensified this past month, while others have abated following a period of escalation. Based on global news monitoring and intelligence gathering, this report includes ten different conflicts that have been dynamic and prominent these past few weeks. These include the Russia-Ukraine crisis, a surge in attacks between Israel and Palestine, a worsening political and economic crisis in Sri Lanka and enlarged political instability in Tunisia and Pakistan. These are complemented below by several brief alerts: deadly attacks in Burkina Faso, a state of emergency in El Salvador, enhanced migration concerns along the US-Mexican border, continued junta-led violence in Myanmar and apparent peace talks concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. It is likely that further implications of these conflicts will build up in the upcoming weeks and thus call for continued monitoring. 1. World Conflicts - March 2022 a. The Ongoing Russia-Ukraine Crisis Ukrainian forces continue to resist and oppose Russian attacks, with the latter decreasing the geographical scope of its main offensive. Facing economic sanctions, Russia has set new military objectives, focusing on the Donbas region. As the Russian troops retreat, reports indicate mass killings of Ukrainian civilians - such as in Bucha - which Western states recognized as war crimes and Russia denies. Meanwhile, Western actors continue to support Ukraine through monetary and military supplies, reinforced by US President Joe Biden’s trip to Europe and President of the European Union Ursula von der Leyen’s visit to Kyiv. At the same time, the number of refugees fleeing Ukraine stands at more than 4.6 million as of April 12th, with reports indicating that some are returning to their hometowns in Ukraine. Implications of the war continue to be felt across the world, in part through grain shortages threatening the food security in various low- and middle-income countries. b. Israel-Palestine: Surge in Attacks Tensions between Israel and Palestine continue to escalate as both sides saw several deadly attacks in recent weeks. Terror attacks killing Israeli citizens were responded to by reinforced Israeli military activity in the West Bank in an attempt to capture the assailants and their relatives. This led to the deaths of both Palestine-based militants and civilians. Whereas the Islamic State has claimed responsibility for certain attacks and Hamas praised the actions, the Palestinian National Authority condemned the violence. Analysts relate the series of attacks to the start of Ramadan, remembering the 11-day crisis that occurred in May 2021. At the same time, however, these events come amidst Israel hosting an international conference on the Iran nuclear deal on March 28th with the United States, Egypt, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Morocco present. This signifies an important step forward for Israel as it seeks to normalize its relations with several Arab League countries, a move contested by other League members and Palestine actors. c. Sri Lanka’s Economic and Political Crisis Amidst a severe economic crisis, Sri Lanka faces violent protests by disgruntled citizens targeting the country’s leadership. With Sri Lanka enduring high inflation, low foreign currency reserves and defaulted external debts, its citizens endure a lack of basic goods and services. Queuing lines have led to several deaths and energy shortages hold. The government originally responded with a curfew and a state of emergency but soon revoked these following growing discontent. The country’s cabinet has resigned, with the exception of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and his brother, Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa. They blame the economic crisis on external factors, including COVID-19 impacts on the country’s tourism sector, yet analysts indicate that poor economic planning also played a role. Talks with the International Monetary Fund, India, China and other potential credit providers continue as threats to the security of Sri Lanka’s citizens increase. Rising global fuel prices further enhance the severity of the crisis, which also sees its repercussions in other areas of the world, especially states in Africa and the Middle East. d. Tunisia: Presidential Power Grab Tunisian President Kais Saied increased his grasp on power as he dissolved parliament on March 30th, a move met by public protests just a few days later. This move directly follows the first (online) meeting since the parliaments’ suspension in July 2021. During the session, members of parliament denounced earlier decrees enacted by President Saied, including his enhanced executive control over judiciary powers since February 2022. In an attempt to re-configure the country’s constitution, Saied plans to hold a referendum on a new constitution next July and hold parliamentary elections in December. In the meantime, opposition parties have indicated that they will boycott the referendum and have called for elections to be held prior to the establishment of a new constitution. With increased potential for the political situation to destabilize, the country also faces deteriorating economic conditions, meaning public unrest may grow in upcoming weeks. e. Political Turmoil in Pakistan Following a vote of no confidence for former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan by parliament, Shehbaz Sharif has been selected as the new Prime Minister on April 11th. This development came after weeks of political uncertainty in the country, starting with indications of opposition parties initiating the vote based on claims that Khan has mismanaged the economy and foreign policy. Several of Khan’s coalition partners subsequently walked away, disbanding his parliamentary majority. Khan opposed the vote, postponed parliamentary sessions, attempted to instigate legal measures to stall the opposition and called for early elections. These actions did not prevent the current outcome, with the parliament able to either legally continue to rule until the next general elections in 2023 or call elections soon. Facing ongoing protests, a worsening economic crisis and some new policy indications, it remains to be seen what alterations occur in the country’s political and economic stability. 2. Brief Alerts - March 2022 a. Burkina Faso: Increased Militancy Following a military coup in January of this year, Burkina Faso’s military leadership has now stated it will continue to stay in power until security has been restored in the country. Earlier reports indicated they were looking at a three-year transition. As insurgent attacks related to Islamic State and Al-Qaeda groups continue to occur in the country, the supposed political transition remains uncertain. b. State of Emergency in El Salvador El Salvadors’ President Nayib Bukele declared a 30-day state of emergency on March 27th following a spike in gang-based violence, with 67 deaths in just one day. The measure is implemented along with new regulations to restrict gang mobilization and communication, but also has implications for human rights in the country. c. Mexico-US Border Concerns Humanitarian tensions may arise along the US-Mexico border, as President Biden’s administration imposed new regulations this month to expedite the asylum process for immigrants. This comes amidst an expected surge of refugees from Central and South American states. d. Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Negotiations High-level diplomatic talks between Armenia, Azerbaijan and the European Union this month indicate potential progress on the Nagorno-Karabakh territorial disputes. While this announcement followed discord between Russia and Azerbaijan over the 2020 ceasefire agreements just days before, it remains to be seen what impact this new direction will have. Conclusion Far from covering all ongoing conflicts around the world, this report highlights ten conflicts that experienced a building up of tension this past month. As European states continue to predominantly be engulfed in the Russia-Ukraine crisis, various states elsewhere face intensifying domestic instability - if not enhanced international threats and insecurity. Most conflicts indicate that more serious periods of upcoming turmoil may occur soon, yet some suggest the opposite. As all conflicts mentioned in this report carry both short and long term implications, they call for continued attention in the upcoming weeks. About the author: Sietske Moshuldayev Sietske Moshuldayev has an international background and is inherently intrigued by the causes and consequences of geopolitical events. She has completed two bachelors at the University of Leiden (International Studies, BA & Political Science, BSc) and currently pursues a masters in International Security at Sciences Po, Paris. Having specialized in East Asian affairs for her undergraduate studies, she now focuses on global risks and risk management. The article was edited by Ruben Pfeijffer

As of April 19th 2022, socio-political unrest is escalating in Sri Lanka. Police have used violent force against protesters in the town of Rambukkana, with at least one person dead as of the writing of this Early Warning. Protests are occurring in the capital city of Colombo, with similar scenes emerging elsewhere across the island. The direct cause for these gatherings is growing discontent with government incompetence and worsening socio-economic conditions, the latter of which are anchored on soaring fuel prices, and scarce food and medical supplies. Various factors such as the global Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine have affected the Sri Lankan economy’s ability to gather foreign currency and import commodities such as grain and oil [including its derivatives]. In turn, this has worsened the damage caused by the poor taxation policies of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s administration, which as of the 12th of April 2022 has frozen repayments on Sri Lanka’s outstanding 51 billion USD in foreign debt. Despite earlier resignations of top government officials, protestors continue to demand the resignation of President Rajapaksa and his remaining political allies, some of which are his family members. While protests in past weeks have been relatively peaceful, due to regular power outages in excess of ten hours around the country and many of Sri Lanka’s poorer communities have been without access to basic food necessities for weeks, agitation levels seem to be climbing. While foreigners are not a direct target of these protests, it is still advisable for all visitors and residents of a foreign country to stay clear of any hot spot for civil gatherings. Additionally, it is advised to carry documentation on one's person in the event police checkpoints are set up in the coming hours, days, and even weeks. On that same note, it is important to follow any new rules implemented by the local authorities, such as curfews. Depending on how quickly this situation escalates, it may be harder to enter/leave Sri Lanka in the short term. If in doubt, contact your embassy/consulate for the latest advice. More information, in need of tailor-made reports or questions? Feel free to contact us.

Over the past years, Dyami has been building to become one of the major Dutch players in the field of Security Risk & Intelligence Management. Supporting companies by protecting their people and assets all over the world. To deliver on that mission we attract experts that have the same passion and drive in trying to make this world a safer place. With pride, We can announce that Mohammad Al-Weshahi will join Dyami | strategic security services as Intelligence Consultant. (text continues below image) Eric Schouten (CEO Dyami) and Intelligence Expert Mohammad Al-Weshahi Mr. Al-Weshahi is a counter-terrorism expert, in the business of actionable #intelligence collection aimed at disrupting terrorist activities. He has 26 years of experience working as a counter-terrorism operations officer at the Central Intelligence Agency. He has accumulated liaising experience with more than 55 countries, and he has successfully helped build over 40 counter-terrorism operations projects around the world. Mr. Al-Weshahi's main drive is to help inoculate future generations against Islamic extremism and thereby ensuring the safety of individuals and communities. As of 2022, Mr. Al-Weshahi started his own consultancy in the Netherlands that offers tradecraft and intelligence training and provides consultancy services in both fields. He joined Team Dyami in April 2022. Besides supporting our analyst team in creating Intelligence reports (i.e. the aviation sector), Al-Weshahi will also work with our training department and our partner Pro-Intell Security & Intelligence in offering an array of training programs. Educating business travellers to work safe and secure all over the globe. Interested? Don't hesitate to contact us now.