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Date: 17/10/2023 Where: Ecuador Who’s involved: Newly elected President of Ecuador Daniel Noboa, former President Guillermo Lasso, Ecuador gangs and transnational criminal networks What happened? On Sunday, October 15, 2023, the second round of presidential elections was held in Ecuador between leftist candidate Luisa González of the Citizen Revolution Movement - protégé of Rafael Correa, President from 2007 to 2017 - and Daniel Noboa, candidate of the center-right National Democratic Action party. Noboa ultimately won the ballot with 52% of the votes. The 35-year-old newly elected President is the youngest in Ecuador's modern history and is the son of the most prominent banana tycoon and former presidential candidate, Alvaro Noboa. Since 2021, Noboa has been a designated member of the National Assembly and chaired the Economic Development Commission. Noboa will take office in December 2023. However, his mandate will last only until May 2025, to complete the term of former President Guillermo Lasso, who, on May 17, 2023, invoked the so-called “muerte cruzada” which means dissolving the National Assembly, and called for early elections to avoid an impeachment trial for alleged corruption. Noboa will be guaranteed a chance to run again in the 2025 elections. Ecuador's elections took place in a climate of gang-related and political violence. A few days before the primary election, on August 9, 2023, anti-corruption and anti-gangs presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio was assassinated. Subsequently, six suspects were assassinated in Quito on October 6, in the country's largest penitentiary institute, while a seventh was found dead the day after. Given the climate of violence, exacerbated further by Villavicencio's assassination, the political agendas of the presidential candidates, regardless of their political stance, have focused on increasing security and stability in the country. Both candidates proposed a "mano dura" approach inspired by the model implemented by Bukele in El Salvador. The term mano dura, in English 'firm hand,' entailed a set of crime policies usually adopted against gangs. According to pre-election polls, most voters strongly supported more restrictive and militarized anti-crime policies. Most of Ecuador's young population, the part of society mostly affected by gang and drug-related violence, stood in favor of tightening measures against organized crime. Noboa's policy agenda revolves around overcoming youth unemployment through socio-economic reforms and addressing the security crisis and growing violence in the country. His security plan, known as "Phoenix," calls for significant reforms of the security sector and judicial system, high-security prison boats to mitigate prison overcrowding and massacres, and the expansion of military authority, reminiscent of "mano dura" security measures. Noboa plans to create a new intelligence unit to tackle gangs and organized crime, equipped with technologies such as drones and access to images and military equipment. Analysis: In the past five years, especially since the pandemic, security in Ecuador has deteriorated drastically. The country has shifted from being the most peaceful in the region to now registering the fourth-highest homicide rate in Latin America. Between 2016 and 2022, Ecuador's homicide rate spiked by nearly 500%. The security crisis has been triggered by the rise of gangs and criminal groups taking advantage of Ecuador's increasingly key role in the cocaine trafficking chain to Europe. Colombian, Mexican, Venezuelan, and Albanian drug trafficking networks compete to control Ecuador ports to exploit banana trade routes, of which the country is the world's largest exporter, to smuggle drugs, mainly to Europe. Meanwhile, once fragmented and not very influential, local organized crime has gained much power through drug trafficking. In recent years, Ecuadorian gangs have undergone a process of sophistication, becoming more structured and violent. The country records numerous prison gangs, which control most detention facilities from which they orchestrate criminal activities and forge relationships with international drug trafficking networks. The most prominent local gang in Ecuador is Los Choneros. Ecuador, for decades, despite its proximity to Colombia and Peru, leading producers and exporters of cocaine, has managed to be relatively shielded from the region's violent and criminal dynamics. Several factors facilitated the recent escalation of violence. First, tightening policies and controls against drug trafficking in neighboring countries has caused transnational criminal groups to turn to Ecuador's poorly controlled ports. Moreover, the demobilization of the Colombian guerrilla FARC in 2016 has influenced the violent shift in the country. The Ecuadorian government had stable relations with the group to ensure a relatively peaceful and non-involvement of narco-traffic. Finally, regarding domestic policies, President Correa's 2007-2017 administration's crime reduction initiatives based on the construction of mega-prisons led to the counterproductive effect of increasing the prison population and facilitating gang organization. Noboa proposes more restrictive anti-crime policies to curb rising violence in Ecuador. "Mano dura" policies, based on militarization and mass incarceration of gangs and criminals, have significantly decreased violence and homicides in El Salvador. Nevertheless, this approach could be highly counterproductive in the long run. Conservative policies foster human rights violations, impose restrictions on freedoms, grant forceful authority to the military, erode the rule of law, and reinforce the power of elites. Moreover, mass incarcerations lead to prison overcrowding and facilitate the reorganization and strengthening of criminal groups and gangs. Ecuador is not the only state unfolding its gaze toward restrictive policies against crime. Many countries in the region have adopted Bukele-like hard-line measures, including Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Mexico, Bolivia, Colombia, and Argentina. Conclusion: Ecuador's new President, Daniel Noboa, will face multiple challenges during his temporary tenure to meet the expectations and address the frustrations of citizens. The top priority will be addressing the security crisis, reversing the trend of escalating violence, and eradicating rising crime and drug trafficking by local gangs and transnational organized criminal groups. Yet Noboa's policy agenda, which includes the creation of prison boats to isolate the most dangerous and powerful criminals, is still poorly articulated and ambitious for the available time. The likely shift toward hard-line and restrictive security strategies, while effectively reducing crime and gang-related violence in the short term, could result in increased militarization, state of violence, and potential socio-political and democratic deterioration in the country.

Date: 13/10/2023 Where: Israel, Gaza Who’s involved: Israeli government, Hamas, Hezbollah, Iranian government. What has happened since October 11th? Most airlines have postponed their flight operations into Ben Gurion airport. Only carriers still flying at Ben Gurion International airport besides the current NEO missions are El Al, and Israeli Airlines (Isair), Austria,, Fly Dubai, Emirates, Sun Express, Tus Air, Blue Bird, Ethiopian Airlines, Georgian Airways. Countries currently undertaking or completed NEO (Noncombatant Evacuation Operations). Austria, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Chili, Czechia, Germany, Hungaria, Italy, Mexico, Norway, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States. We haven’t received any laser attacks reports since 11 October at Ben Gurion International airport, most were reported earlier during the approach phase and a couple during departure. The Red Alert app, warning for missile attacks, continues to be under cyber attack and offline from time to time. On Thursday Oct 12th the Israeli Air Force conducted combat operations in Syria, successfully targeting Aleppo International Airport (ALP) and Damascus International Airport (DAM) destroying the runways at both airports to prevent military supply missions. Like the previous days, the 12th and during the morning on the 13th multiple Rocket attacks were undertaken by Hamas aimed at Tel Aviv and a few at Ben Gurion airport, non penetrated successfully. The airport remained open during the attacks and they had no effect on the Flight Operations. Since the start of the current conflict no missile was successful at hitting the airport or any of the structures. The Israeli Defense force has taken additional mitigation measures on the ground and in the air to minimize the potential threat of Surface to Air Missiles attacks against Flight Operations at Ben Gurion airport. With the current measures in place around Ben Gurion International Airport and the arrival and departure routes, the potential threat of this being used against the current flight operations at Ben Gurion airport is minimal. . As of Sunday Oct 8 th there are no more General Aviation(business) flights possible to and from LLBG Ben Gurion International Airport as per NOTAM is still in effect: A1089/23 NOTAMR A1059/23 Q) LLLL/QFALT/IV/NBO/A /000/999/3201N03453E005 A) LLBG B) 2310081328 C) 2310191600 E) ARR OF GA ACFT PROHIBITED FM OCT 08 0500UTC (0800LMT). DEP OF GA ACFT PROHIBITED FM OCT 08 1700UTC (2000LMT). CAA (Civil Aviation Authority) Israel informs that Eilat-Ramon International airport (LLER-ETM) is available, both as a preferable alternate airport and as a possible destination within Israel, outside the present zone of conflict. Israair Airlines has begun operating flights from Ramon Airport to the following destinations: Athens, Vienna, Oslo, Paris and London. EASA (European Union Aviation Safety Agency) brought out a CZIB (Conflict Zone Information Bulletin) for the Tel Aviv FIR (Flight Information Region) FIR Tel Aviv (LLLL) Oct 8th, 2023 remains unchanged. Analysis: Status Quo, For the current situation we don’t expect the Israeli Air Force to conduct a similar operation against Beirut International Airport (BEY) as conducted in Syria due to the high number of International flights. Beirut International airport conducts around 500 flights per week. Most flights are between Istanbul and Beirut, Dubai and beirut, and Cairo-Beirut; Current carriers operating frequently are Air France, Lufthansa and Transavia. Saudi Air has postponed its flight operation to Beirut until further notice. Escalation; In the event of Hezbollah openly entering the war when Israel starts the ground war we foresee military action from the Israeli Air Force aimed at destroying the runway of Beirut International airport and other airports in Lebanon as highly likely. If flying to Ben Gurion, contingency fuel is needed in case of (temporary) airport closure. Ben Gurion is a primary target for Hamas missile strikes. The ground war is expected to start within 24 hours resulting in an increase of missile attacks aimed at Tel Aviv and Ben Gurion Airport, a day-to-day assessment should be made on the security of the airspace and the country. Air operators should closely monitor airspace developments in the region and follow all available aeronautical publications issued by Israeli State authorities, alongside available guidance or direction from their national authorities, including information shared through the European Information Sharing and Cooperation Platform on Conflict Zones. Air Operations who will have crew staying overnight provide their crew with proper security training and information for the ground situation, like location to the nearest bomb shelter, etc this information is being provided by the Israel authorities. They should ensure that a robust risk assessment is in place together with a high level of contingency planning for their operations and be ready for short notice instructions from the Israeli authorities.

Date: 13/10/2023 Where: Serbia - Kosovo Who’s involved: Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, Kosovar police What happened? On 02/10/2023, Serbian military officials announced that they reduced Serbian troops on the border with Kosovo following reports of an unprecedented increase in Serbian troops including advanced Serbian military equipment such as artillery, tanks and mechanized infantry units. The Serbian president Vucic claimed that this was a normal military activity, and didn’t result in an escalation. This comes after an attack in the north of Kosovo which has inflamed an already tense political situation. On 24/09/2023, 30 ethnic Serb armed gunmen with heavy weapons and grenades attacked two patrolling Kosovar police near Banjska, on the Kosovo-Serbian border. Albin Kurti, prime minister of Kosovo, called it a terrorist attack and accused the Serbian state of sponsoring the gunmen, citing the discovery of advanced military equipment in police searches. Belgrade has denied this allegation. Vucic condemned the terrorist attack and blamed it on Albin Kurti’s policies in the north of Kosovo, as Kurti refused to form an association of Serb municipalities in north Kosovo. Following the attack and ramping up of tensions, Vucic stated “Serbia will never recognize independent Kosovo, you can kill us all.” On 02/10/2023, the Belgrade police arrested Kosovo Serb politician Milan Radoicic who admitted responsibility for organizing the terrorist attack. However, on 04/10/2023, a Belgrade court released him once again, but banned Radoicic from leaving the country. Analysis: The Serbian mobilization on the border with Kosovo has been reduced, but tensions still remain high between Serbia and Kosovo. Vucic and the Serb military likely increased the border forces to see the reaction from the international community. Warnings from the US to back down eventually convinced the Serb military to reduce its troop numbers. With an upcoming election by the end of this year, Vucic could heighten tensions with Kosovo to build domestic support for his own re-election. Within Serbia, weekly protests against mass shootings and growing criticisms over authoritarian leadership has led to calls for him to step down. Kosovo also started an investigation into a possible involvement of Russia in the attack. There are fears in Europe and the U.S. that Russia is attempting to push its allies to open a new front in the center of Europe, to distract NATO from the conflict in Ukraine. Whether the attack was actively coordinated with Vucic is disputed however. The U.S. has also pointed to the co-ordinated and sophisticated planning of the attack in the north of Kosovo, noting that ethnic armed Serbs groups remain a destabilizing force in the Balkans. The EU's approach to Serbia-Kosovo peace talks is being reconsidered following an investigation into the attack on 24/09/2023. The EU has attempted to bring Serbia into the western fold and away from its historical ally Russia. However, critics say this has been too lenient on Vucic. The EU is facing calls to sanction Serbia, though this approach would have to be voted on by a unanimous vote by the European Council. With Hungary ruling out further sanctions against Serbia, this is unlikely to pass. However, if the attack was not ordered by Vucic, it seems that Vucic has lost control of ethnic Serb proxies in northern Kosovo, which would raise concerns for EU policy that relies on Vucic for controlling the situation in the north of Kosovo. Serbia refuses to recognize Kosovo’s independence after succeeding from Serbia in 2008. The majority of Kosovo is ethnic Albanian, though 5 percent of Kosovo’s 1.8 million people are ethnic Serbs and concentrated in the north of the country. Today, it is recognized as an independent state by the U.S. and EU, and more than 100 countries. Russia and China are diplomatic, economic and military supporters of Serbia and do not recognize Kosovo’s independence from Serbia. Further attacks in the north of Kosovo would be a direct threat for Kosovo and European security. Following the attack in the north, both Kurti and Vucic requested that NATO take over policing in that region. NATO has rejected the call, saying it is not a policing organization, but it has sent another 300 troops to the KFOR peacekeeping mission there. Conclusion The tensions between Kosovo and Serbia remain heightened following the increase in Serb armed forces on the border. NATO is actively increasing troop presence in the north of Kosovo in an attempt to deter Serbian military build-ups. The latest actions present a serious threat to the EU-led political normalization of ties between Serbia and Kosovo, with both sides accusing each other of inciting the violence. Both Pristina and Belgrade need to normalize ties to gain access to the EU but without a breakthrough in talks, there will be further instability and the potential for violent clashes. The large presence of advanced weaponry and the scale of the attack in the north of Kosovo, while disputed, demonstrates that armed groups are still active in the region. Moreover, with an upcoming election for Vucic in December 2023, he could use the Kosovo issue to distract from his domestic unpopularity in Serbia. Whether the EU changes its approach to the issue remains to be seen, though Hungarian opposition to sanctions constrains the EU’s economic pressure on Vucic.

Date: 11/10/2023, 16:00 Situation Report Update October 11, 2023 Israel formed an emergency government and a war management cabinet. The emergency unit government was approved by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and opposition leader Benny Gantz. Hamas reportedly claimed that they were targeting southern and central Israel with rockets. It has been reported that a rocket from Gaza struck a hospital in Ashkelon, south of Israel. Gaza’s power authority announced that the only power plant ran out of fuel. People in Gaza will have to rely on generators for as long as fuel is available. Hospital conditions in Gaza are deteriorating due to overcrowding and shortages of medical supplies. With no power and fuel, hospitals can only rely on their own generators. It is reported that some hospitals have fuel for only a few days. Iranian-backed Kataib Hezbollah militia threatened the United States to attack American bases if they intervened in the Israel-Hamas war. Israel struck inside Lebanon after anti-tank missiles were launched and landed at an IDF post, in the north of Israel. Hezbollah said they fired in response to the killing of three of its members. The United States warned Lebanese Hezbollah against escalating confrontations at the border. As of 16:00 on 11/10/2023, at least 1055 people in Gaza and at least 1,200 Israelis have been killed since Saturday. Hamas militants have abducted over 100 hostages, Israel says up to 150, both soldiers and civilians. At least 7 journalists and 9 UN workers lost their lives in Gaza. More than 260000 people have been displaced in the strip. Fighting from both sides continues. Update October 10, 2023 Air raid sirens sounded in Tel Aviv as well as Ashdod. Israeli airstrikes on Gaza continue as well as Hamas’ rocket attacks in the south of Israel, especially on Ashkelon. Two kibbutzim in the South have been hit by Hamas. The IDF found more than 100 bodies in the Israeli Kibbutz Be’eri and said 1,500 bodies of Hamas militants were recovered since Saturday. The only border crossing between Gaza and Egypt was struck by Israeli warplanes. It is not yet confirmed where exactly the crossing was hit, but workers were evacuated. The crossing is the only available crossing for people fleeing Gaza. The IDF responded to reports of aerial infiltration in the northern areas of the Golan Heights and Upper Galilee. Later in the day, Israel shelled Syria after rockets hit the Golan Heights. It has been reported a Palestinian faction conducted the strike from Syrian territory. Update October 9, 2023 On the night of 09/10/2023, the IDF launched another 200 airstrikes. Hamas responded threatening to kill civilian hostages if the aerial attacks continue without warning. On 09/10/2023, the IDF said that they had regained control of towns on the border with the Gaza Strip, though there could still be Hamas militants in the south. Gunfights continued between IDF forces and Hamas militants in Zikim, on the border between Gaza and Israel. In response to the assault, the IDF declared a “complete siege” of the Gaza Strip. The Israeli defense minister has extended the pre-existing blockade of electricity, food, and fuel to Gaza. Israel’s bombing campaign in Gaza has displaced 100,000 people. Foreign response: On Wednesday 11/10/2023, the Arab League is holding an emergency summit, as requested by the Palestine delegation, to discuss the efforts needed to “stop Israeli aggression.” The outcome of the meeting remains unclear. Egypt stated its intention to keep out of the conflict, even as a mediator, as national elections approach. On the same day, Jordan’s King Abdullah claimed that no peace would be endorsed without the emergence of an independent Palestine state. The US is flowing military supplies to Israel like munition, aircraft, equipment, and interceptors to sustain the Iron Dome defense system. The IDF stated that the first U.S. replenishment of munition arrived in Israel on the morning of 11/10/2023. On 10/10/2023, US President Biden had a call with Israeli PM Netanyahu. Reportedly, Biden did not urge Netanyahu to exercise restraint in Gaza. Rather, the US President stated that “Israel has the duty to respond to Hamas.” The US also strengthened its military force posture in the region, moving the USS Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group to the eastern Mediterranean and increasing fighter aircraft presence, as a deterrent to regional actors like Iran or the Lebanese group Hezbollah. On 10/10/2023, it was announced that US Secretary of State Blinken would travel to Israel and Jordan on October 11-13 to meet with senior officials. On Tuesday 10/10/2023, Turkey's President Erdogan criticized the US decision to move a carrier strike group closer to Israel and bolstered their aircraft presence, stating that it would lead to a massacre. On the same day, Erdogan renewed his offer to act as a mediator to de-escalate the situation. He also announced that Israeli PM Netanyahu could visit Turkey in October or November to discuss further cooperation. On 11/10/2023, Erdogan stated that Israel is “not acting as a state” due to its violent counterattacks in the Gaza Strip. On Tuesday 10/10/2023, European Union Foreign Ministers held an emergency meeting to discuss the ongoing situation. The High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission Josep Borrell announced that EU aid to Palestinian authority would not be suspended. While there is no official statement, there are indications that the EU is willing to work toward a two-state solution to achieve peace in the Middle East. Such European orientation is also suggested by Oman’s Foreign Minister’s statements after the strategic dialogue session held between the EU and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Russia stated on 10/10/2023 to maintain diplomatic ties with both Israel and Palestine. On 09/10/2023 the Russian Foreign Minister suggested talks for a two-state solution. Allegedly, Palestinian President Abbas is planning a visit to Moscow, although Russia has not released an official statement yet. On Tuesday 10/10/2023 the Kremlin released a statement about a phone call with Turkish President Erdogan, expressing both leaders’ concern for civilian casualties and stressing the need for “resumption of the negotiation process.” Earlier on 10/10/2023, Putin stated that the creation of a Palestinian state is “necessary” and blamed U.S. policy in the Middle East for the conflict. On the same day, Putin hosted a meeting with Iraqi PM Sudani to discuss cooperation in OPEC+. Sudani, who supports the Palestinian cause, incited Russia to use its status as a permanent member of the Security Council to stop Israeli attacks. It is reported that Iranian President Raisi spoke with Hamas on 08/10/2023, suggesting financial and military support to the Palestinian militant group. While the U.S. believes Iran has supplied and trained Hamas, intelligence has not yet found conclusive evidence. On 09/10/2023, Ayatollah Khamenei, while praising the militias’ attack, stated that Iran was not involved in Hamas’ operation. On 10/10/2023, French President Macron stated that although “it’s likely that Hamas was offered help”, there is no proof of Iran’s support for the attack. Lebanon militant group Hezbollah congratulated Hamas for the attacks against Israel’s occupation and declared to have been in contact with Hamas before and during the operation. However, the Lebanese PM stated that Lebanon does not wish to be involved in the Hamas-Israel conflict. On 10/10/2023, Yemenese Houthi’s leader warned that they would respond “by firing drones and missiles” if the United States actively intervened in the conflict. On 10/10/2023, Iraqi Kata’ib Hezbollah warned that they would target U.S. bases if Washington intervened. Many governments are organizing evacuation flights and arrangements for their citizens. However, countries such as the United States and the UK are not planning any emergency evacuation from Israel yet. It is reported that on 11/10/2023, the US government discussed with partner countries, like Egypt and Israel, to ensure safe passage for American nationals and other civilians out of Gaza. Pro-Palestinian demonstrations keep taking place in most Middle Eastern countries, such as Jordan, Yemen, Lebanon, Turkey, Iran, and Syria. In Europe, pro-Palestine rallies occurred, among others, in London, Berlin, Barcelona, Rotterdam, and the Hague, while pro-Israel protests were held in Paris and Rome. On 09/10/2023, German President Steinmeier stated that no public celebration of the attack on Israel would be tolerated. In the US, pro-Israel and pro-Palestine rallies are spreading across the country, also sparking clashes. Canada condemned pro-Gaza demonstrations, defining the support as a “glorification of violence”. On 10/10/2023, Israeli and American flags were burned during protests in Pakistan. Many European states have heightened their alert and security measures for Jewish institutions, facilities, and communities. On 11/10/2023, the French government reported an unprecedented number of anti-Semitic acts. On 10/10/2023, Australian authorities raised the level of alert for Jewish communities and opened investigations over alleged anti-Semitism during pro-Palestine protests. On 10/10/2023, Volker Türk, High Commissioner of Human Rights, expressed his concern for the surge in hate speech, anti-Semitism, and Islamophobia worldwide. Cyber attacks: RedAlert: On 11/10/2023, AnonGhost, a hacktivist group, claimed to have interrupted service again of Israel’s RedAlert app, a smartphone application that tracks reports of rocket attacks in real-time. Since 07/10/2023, there have been statements published by Russian-sympathetic cybercriminals, Anonymous Sudan, indicating that outages began at least 06:50 CET on that day, though this doesn’t necessarily indicate that the group is responsible. Industrial and Infrastructure Control Systems: On 10/10/2023 through the morning of 11/10/2023, several groups of cyber criminals targeted industrial control systems. Specific targets included various GPS systems, Building Control Systems, and the MEKOROT national water company of Israel. Groups claiming to be involved included the Cyber Av3ngers, SiegedSec, and Anonymous Sudan. Statements by Israeli cybersecurity experts assert that this round of attacks is of minimal concern and that attackers have only managed to enter the feeds of insecure CCTV cameras. Media Institutions: 11/10/2023 has been the Jerusalem Post’s first day of consistent service since the weekend. It is notable that the Jerusalem Post was trying to provide live updates of attacks throughout the country right up until the outages began in the afternoon of 08/10/2023. Flight Booking Portals: On the afternoon of 10/10/2023, AnonGhost asked for volunteers to assist in targeting several internet portals for booking flights out of Israel with DDoS attacks. Brief conflict analysis: Hamas Attack Trigger: Recent developments in Israel’s regional economic relations with Arab nations, especially Saudi Arabia, may have increased animosity from Hamas leaders over the years. During 2023, in addition, Netanyahu’s government policies further marginalized Palestine and tensions between Palestinians and Israeli settlers have been particularly high in the West Bank. Between the country-wide protests and the tensions in the West Bank, the Israeli forces partially shifted away from the south and focused on the north. This may have compelled Hamas to launch its large-scale attack. Hamas Objectives: In the short term, Hamas wants to exchange hostages for Palestinian prisoners and deter Israeli violations of the Al-Aqsa Mosque. However, their endgame is still unclear. Hamas may be trying to provoke Israel and prompt a reaction to gather wider Arab and international solidarity against Tel Aviv, further escalating the conflict. Plausible Consequences: The conflict could jeopardize Israel’s recent gains in regional international relations and halt ongoing talks – especially the prospective deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia. As the conflict progresses, it will be increasingly difficult for Saudi Arabia to justify a normalization of relations with Israel. This would favor Iran, which can capitalize on the situation and push for reigniting a nuclear deal and lifting some of the current US sanctions on the country. Key Points to Monitor: In the upcoming days, it will be important to monitor Hezbollah’s involvement in Lebanon, Hamas’ treatment of hostages, the international reaction, and the cohesion of the Israeli government.

Date: 11/10/2023 Where: Israel, Gaza Who’s involved: Israeli government, Hamas, Hezbollah, Iranian government. What has happened since October 10th? Multiple laser attacks were reported yesterday at Ben Gurion International airport, most were reported during the approach phase and a couple during departure. The following NOTAM (navigation) was published indicating that the Ben Gurion was temporarily closed for landing between 2200-2300 UTC which was later withdrawn. A1103/23 NOTAMN Q) LLLL/QFALT/IV/NBO/A /000/999/3201N03453E005 A) LLBG B) 2310101825 C) 2310191600 E) CLOSURE FOR LDG BTN 0100-0200LMT (2200-2300UTC) TEMPO WITHDRAWN. ISRAEL AIP, PART AD, PAGE AD-2-LLBG-15, PARA 6.4 REF. CREATED: 10 Oct 2023 18:25:00 SOURCE: EUECYIYN The Red Alert app, warning for missile attacks, was hacked by Pro-Palestinian hacktivist group that exploited a flaw in the Red Alert app and sent a fake threat of nuclear attack and missile attack. On Tuesday the 10th there were a couple of Rocket attacks by Hamas aimed at Tel Aviv and a few at Ben Gurion airport, non penetrated successfully. The airport remained open during the attacks and they had no effect on the Flight Operations. Since the start of the current conflict no missile was successful at hitting the airport or any of the structures. The Israeli Defense force has taken additional mitigation measures on the ground and in the air to minimize the potential threat of Surface to Air Missiles attacks against Flight Operations at Ben Gurion airport. With the current measures in place around Ben Gurion International Airport and the arrival and departure routes, the potential threat of this being used against the current flight operations at Ben Gurion airport is minimal. Most airlines still look at the situation on a day-by-day basis and have announced to postpone flight operations until thursday. Turkish Airlines has joined the list of Airlines currently postponing flight operations into Ben Gurion airport. Only carriers still flying are El Al, and Israeli Airlines (Isair), British Airways (morning rotation), Fly Dubai, Emirates, Sun Express, Tus Air, Blue Bird, Ethiopian Airlines, Georgian Airways. Lufthansa Cargo is continuously monitoring the development of the situation closely and is in close contact with the authorities. Decisions on the future flight program will be taken on Thursday Oct 12th. British Airways has changed its daily flights from London Heathrow to Tel Aviv so that they depart in the morning instead of the afternoon. It is thought the move is to avoid crew having to stay overnight in Israel. As of Sunday Oct 8 th there are no more General Aviation(business) flights possible to and from LLBG Ben Gurion International Airport as per NOTAM: A1089/23 NOTAMR A1059/23 Q) LLLL/QFALT/IV/NBO/A /000/999/3201N03453E005 A) LLBG B) 2310081328 C) 2310191600 E) ARR OF GA ACFT PROHIBITED FM OCT 08 0500UTC (0800LMT). DEP OF GA ACFT PROHIBITED FM OCT 08 1700UTC (2000LMT). Countries currently undertaking or completed NEO (Noncombatant Evacuation Operations). Brazil, Bulgaria, Hungaria, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, Romania, United States, the Netherlands, Spain, Chile. Countries planning NEO (Noncombatant Evacuation Operations). United Kingdom. CAA (Civil Aviation Authority) Israel informs that Eilat-Ramon International airport (LLER-ETM) is available, both as a preferable alternate airport and as a possible destination within Israel, outside the present zone of conflict. Israair Airlines has begun operating flights from Ramon Airport to the following destinations: Athens, Vienna, Oslo, Paris and London. EASA (European Union Aviation Safety Agency) brought out a CZIB (Conflict Zone Information Bulletin) for the Tel Aviv FIR (Flight Information Region) FIR Tel Aviv (LLLL) Oct 8th, 2023 Analysis: If flying to Ben Gurion, contingency fuel is needed in case of (temporary) airport closure. Ben Gurion is a primary target for Hamas missile strikes. The war is expected to continue for at least the near future, and a day-to-day assessment should be made on the security of the airspace and the country. Air operators should closely monitor airspace developments in the region and follow all available aeronautical publications issued by Israeli State authorities, alongside available guidance or direction from their national authorities, including information shared through the European Information Sharing and Cooperation Platform on Conflict Zones. Air Operations who will have crew staying overnight provide their crew with proper security training and information for the ground situation, like location to the nearest bomb shelter, etc this information is being provided by the Israel authorities. They should ensure that a robust risk assessment is in place together with a high level of contingency planning for their operations and be ready for short notice instructions from the Israeli authorities.

Article written by Mark Bruno - October 2023 In April 2018, four men were arrested outside of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) headquarters in The Hague. They were initially spotted by security for conspicuously taking photos from the parking lot of a Marriott hotel next to the OPCW building. All four men were arrested after it was found that the Dutch military intelligence service (MIVD) had been tracking them for several days, and identified them as four agents of Russia’s GRU Unit 26165 (Cyber Operations). Investigators later found that the agents’ rental car was loaded with thousands of dollars in signals equipment for monitoring and possibly attacking the OPCW’s network. During the attempted intrusion, the OPCW was examining a chemical weapons assault on ex-Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter in Salisbury, UK. Attacks like this may seem like something from the imagination of Tom Clancy, but this was only one of several times that Russian threat actors have attempted to obfuscate various war crime investigations, utilizing a mix of Cyber and Information Warfare tactics. While the April 2018 incident was unique in its brazenness, it was one of several more traditional attacks. The Intersection of Cyber, Information, and Hybrid Warfare Russia's information operations against international judicial bodies like the OPCW and ICC highlight a concerning trend of utilizing cyber and information warfare to obstruct war crimes investigations. These events not only undermine the credibility and functioning of these international institutions but also hinders the global pursuit of justice for victims of war crimes. The infiltration of Russian threat actors into the OPCW plays into the modern frameworks of Cyber, Information, and Hybrid Warfare. While the objective seems simple–a state actor doesn’t want to be implicated in War Crimes– it’s important to understand the distinctions between terms that often get conflated: Cyberwarfare, Information Warfare, and Hybrid Warfare. All of them refer to something distinct, and yet can describe the same operation in many cases. Specifically, Cyberwarfare refers to the use of digital techniques to attack an adversary's computer systems, networks, and digital infrastructure. This is typically what’s being referred to when a situation involves hacking or network penetration. The overall purpose is to disrupt, destroy, or gain unauthorized access to computer systems and data. Information Warfare is about using information (or misinformation) to gain an advantage over an adversary. It's about shaping perceptions and beliefs to influence a population or decision making process. There is a lot of crossover with Information Warfare and what is typically called “Psychological Operations (psyops)”, and one may find the terms used interchangeably in some articles, though it’s not necessarily accurate. It does this through altering perception of events with propaganda, deception, and manipulating the framing of information gathered through intelligence operations. Hybrid Warfare is a blend of conventional and unconventional warfare tactics, which may include elements of Cyberwarfare, Information Warfare, and traditional military operations. The targets of Hybrid Warfare are wide-ranging, from public opinion to physical infrastructure, to political systems. It utilizes a combination of cyber attacks, misinformation campaigns, guerrilla warfare, economic pressure, and more. This is generally done to achieve strategic objectives by blurring the lines between different forms of warfare and using the most effective tools available. Dangers To Investigators And Value To The Threat Actor What would a country in Russia’s position seek to gain from infiltrating the OPCW? What threat do attacks like this really pose to the work of international organizations such as the International Criminal Court, Human Rights Watch, or the Genocide Network? While the investigations into cyber operations can be drawn out, the goals of a threat actor can often be easily ascertained. An obvious danger is evidence tampering. Infiltrating digital systems where evidentiary data is stored or transferred, threat actors could alter or delete crucial evidence, making it difficult to substantiate claims of war crimes. Concealing the identities of perpetrators is another objective. A threat actor can obscure the identities of those involved in war crimes, ensuring a degree of impunity for those accused of war crimes. Threat actors can also bypass unauthorized systems and acquire sensitive information, including the identities of witnesses, investigators, or other key personnel. Such attacks can be used to intimidate or retaliate against individuals, organizations, or states involved in investigating or prosecuting war crimes, potentially dissuading further inquiry or action. A final danger of cyber operations is that they can allow for wholesale cover ups and a lack of confidence in accusations of weapons or tactics generally shunned by the international community. MH17 Plane Crash Investigation In 2015 and 2017, during the investigation of the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 over Ukraine, it was found that Russian hackers had attempted to disrupt proceedings by the Dutch Safety Board and the Dutch Police’s Joint Investigation team. The 2015 attempt was reportedly thwarted by the AIVD and the Dutch Safety Board, and attributed to the now-infamous Fancy Bear hacking group that has, in the years since, been firmly linked to Russia’s GRU. This was done by mimicking an email server hoping to use it to collect the credentials of the Safety Board members and enabling access to the inspection team’s files. From here, any amount of data could have been destroyed and findings manipulated. In 2017, a similar attempt was made, targeting the Dutch Police’s Joint Investigation Team, which was trusted with prosecuting the incident. Attribution in this instance pointed to Cozy Bear, a Russian SVR or FSB-linked hacking group. In The Context Of Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion Last year, the AIVD noted that the ICC may be a target of interest for Russia, as it was at the time (and still is) investigating alleged Russian war crimes in Georgia and Ukraine. As if to give credence to the warning, the following June, the AIVD revealed the discovery of a Russian military agent masquerading as a Brazilian intern with the ICC, in an attempt to infiltrate. One year later, in an August 20th piece submitted to Digital Frontlines, ICC prosecutor Karim Khan discussed the role of the ICC as both agent and target within the landscape of hybrid warfare. Four weeks after the piece’s publication, the Hague found itself confronted with yet another breach as investigations at the International Criminal Court continue regarding crimes in Ukraine and the Central African Republic. On the 21st of September, the War Crimes Tribunal of the ICC confirmed that it had been the subject of a cyberattack, the details of which are still limited. The impact of this attack, which was largely mitigated, was mostly felt internally, as workers within the ICC were unable to access certain essential services. However, of particular concern is whether or not data was stolen, which potentially encompasses crucial evidence or the identities of protected witnesses. On September 22nd, the day after news of this attack was announced,Yurii Shchyhol, head of the State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine (SSSCIP), warned that attacks like this are following a pattern his agency has highlighted in an upcoming report. On the 25th, the SSSCIP published the report, which indicated its own investigative bodies were under increasing numbers of cyberattacks. The Ukrainian government warns this was explicitly done to inhibit its own investigations into Russian war crimes in places like Bucha and Mariupol. The same day, Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs put the Chairman of the International Criminal Court, Peter Hofmanski, his deputy, Luz del Carmen Ibáñez Carranza, and Judge Bertram Schmitt, on its own wanted list. Moving Forward The various incidents outlined demonstrate that a nation-state actor, for relatively little expense and consequence, can make a strategic effort to conceal evidence, protect perpetrators, and control narratives surrounding war crimes. These actions pose significant threats not only to the integrity of investigations but also to the individuals and organizations involved in these judicial processes. They can empower further use of weapons systems that may be discouraged by international norms: for instance, the back-and-forth about Russia and Ukraine’s usage of cluster munitions has become a heated front in such a debate. The threat of cyber warfare has led to the beginnings of expanded international cooperation in both the ICC and NATO, as well as the private sector. In light of these events, and the widespread damage cyber operations have done in Ukraine, the ICC has stated that it will begin investigating instances of cyberwarfare and crimes in cyberspace as war crimes. Much of this intelligence is gathered through private-public partnerships such as the Cyber Defense Assistance Collaborative. This is a group of various private cybersecurity firms that have offered to share valuable cyber intelligence with each other and the governments of allied nations, largely based in Europe and North America. For several years, it has been acknowledged that there needs to be grounds for a cyber attack to trigger a NATO Article 5–the rule accepting that an attack on a member state constitutes an attack on all member states. This has been the onus for an annual NATO exercise known as “Locked Shields”, wherein teams from all member states, as well as some non-member states, conduct a joint training mission in cyberspace. As recently as 2019, however, what the alliance considered an “attack” in cyberspace and what constitutes merely a “crime” seemed vague. In this years’ NATO summit in Vilnius, however, it would seem that a consensus has been reached on this matter, but the wording of these conditions will remain classified for the time being. The digital attacks on The Hague indicate a pressing need for stronger cybersecurity measures and international cooperation to ensure the resilience of judicial institutions against such threats. It’s crucial for the global community to acknowledge and address the evolving challenges posed by cyber and information warfare to maintain the rule of law and uphold humanitarian principles in the digital age.

Date: 10/10/2023 Where: Israel, Gaza Who’s involved: Israeli government, Hamas, Hezbollah, Iranian government. What happened since October 9th? A couple of Rocket attacks happened near Ben Gurion airport, during the morning attack on Oct 9th only one rocket penetrated successfully falling in an empty adjacent lot next to the airport. This attack temporarily closed the airport. So far no missile was successful at hitting the airport grounds or structures. This however did force flights into a holding pattern while air defense was working . The afternoon and evening attacks had no effect on flight operations. The Israeli Defense force has taken additional mitigation measures on the ground and in the air to minimize the potential threat of Surface to Air Missiles attacks against Flight Operations at Ben Gurion airport. Hamas claims to have developed the Mubar-1 missile from a ground to ground missile to a ground to air missile. These missiles are unguided and use a pretimed fusing system and pose a very small threat to aircraft. Various sources claim that Hamas is in the possession of 9K32 Strela-2 Manpads, with a slant range from 3.4 to 4.2 km (2.1 to 2.6 mi) and ceiling from 1.5 to 2.3 km (0.93 to 1.43 mi). With the current measures in place around Ben Gurion International Airport and the arrival and departure routes, the potential threat of this being used against the current flight operations at Ben Gurion airport is minimal. Most airlines still look at the situation on a day-by-day basis and have announced to postpone flight operations until thursday. Only carriers still flying are El Al, and Israeli Airlines (Isair), Turkish Airlines, Swiss Air, British Airways (morning rotation) and a couple of low cost Carriers to and from countries in the region. Lufthansa Cargo is continuously monitoring the development of the situation closely and is in close contact with the authorities. Decisions on the future flight program will be taken on Thursday Oct 12th. British Airways has changed its daily flights from London Heathrow to Tel Aviv so that they depart in the morning instead of the afternoon. It is thought the move is to avoid crew having to stay overnight in Israel. As of Sunday Oct 8 th there are no more General Aviation(business) flights possible to and from LLBG Ben Gurion International Airport as per NOTAM: A1089/23 NOTAMR A1059/23 Q) LLLL/QFALT/IV/NBO/A /000/999/3201N03453E005 A) LLBG B) 2310081328 C) 2310191600 E) ARR OF GA ACFT PROHIBITED FM OCT 08 0500UTC (0800LMT). DEP OF GA ACFT PROHIBITED FM OCT 08 1700UTC (2000LMT). Countries currently undertaking or completed NEO (Noncombatant Evacuation Operations). Brazil, Bulgaria, Hungaria, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, Romania, United States. Countries planning NEO (Noncombatant Evacuation Operations). Chili, United Kingdom. CAA (Civil Aviation Authority) Israel informs that Eilat-Ramon International airport (LLER-ETM) is available, both as a preferable alternate airport and as a possible destination within Israel, outside the present zone of conflict. Israair Airlines has begun operating flights from Ramon Airport to the following destinations:: Athens, Vienna, Oslo, Paris and London. EASA (European Union Aviation Safety Agency) brought out a CZIB (Conflict Zone Information Bulletin) for the Tel Aviv FIR (Flight Information Region) FIR Tel Aviv (LLLL) Oct 8th, 2023 Analysis: If flying to Ben Gurion, contingency fuel is needed in case of (temporary) airport closure. Ben Gurion is a primary target for Hamas missile strikes. The war is expected to continue for at least the near future, and a day-to-day assessment should be made on the security of the airspace and the country. Air operators should closely monitor airspace developments in the region and follow all available aeronautical publications issued by Israeli State authorities, alongside available guidance or direction from their national authorities, including information shared through the European Information Sharing and Cooperation Platform on Conflict Zones. Air Operations who will have crew staying overnight provide their crew with proper security training and information for the ground situation, like location to the nearest bomb shelter, etc this information is being provided by the Israel authorities. They should ensure that a robust risk assessment is in place together with a high level of contingency planning for their operations and be ready for short notice instructions from the Israeli authorities.

Date: 05/10/2023 Who’s involved: Azeri govt., Armenian govt., Turkish govt., Iranian govt., French govt. What happened? President of Azerbaijan Aliyev stated in a press conference that now that the ‘Karabakh problem’ is solved, the next priority of the Azeri government is reclaiming ‘West-Azerbaijan.’ ‘West-Azerbaijan’ covers all of Armenia, as well as a small part of Iran. After its swift victory in the Nagorno-Karabakh region and its victory over Armenia in 2020, Azerbaijan now seems emboldened to seek further expansion through conquest. This mainly concerns Armenia, but it may also affect Iran. Azerbaijan’s expansionism directly impacts Iran’s territory, as well as its trade routes with Russia. Turkish president Erdogan in recent talks with Aliyev expressed interest in opening the so-called ‘Zangezur’ corridor, “by force if necessary”. This is a stretch of land in Southern Armenia, which would connect Azerbaijan to its exclave Nikchivan. The corridor could be the first step of Azerbaijan to apply pressure on Armenia. Iran is opposed to this corridor. On 03/10/2023 France decided to deliver weapons to Armenia, to support the nation’s capability to defend itself. In response, President Aliyev abstained from joining EU brokered talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Aliyev stated that “there was an anti-Azerbaijan setting” at the talks. The former president of Artsakh (aka Nagorno-Karabakh) was arrested by Azeri forces on 03/10/2023. Azeri allegations against him include committing war crimes. Analysis: With France selling weapons to Armenia it is demonstrating to Azerbaijan that Armenia has international support. On the other hand, France and Turkey, who are staunch supporters of Azerbaijan, are both members of NATO and close partners within the European Union sphere of influence. Any armed conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia will also put France and Turkey in diplomatic hot water. Diplomatic relations between Azerbaijan and Iran are tense. Azerbaijan has developed close security relations with Iran’s regional competitor, Israel. Azerbaijan has bought Israeli air-defense systems and Israeli and Azeri secret services work together closely. Iran has blamed Israel and Azerbaijan for setting up electronic listening posts on Iran’s border. Azerbaijan and Turkey held joint military exercises near the border with Iran and Iran responded with military drills. Azerbaijan claims that Iran has delivered weapons to Armenia and accuses it of supporting terrorist groups like Hezbollah. Iran has responded by accusing Azerbaijan of harboring ISIS/L terrorists. If a conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia erupts, there is a chance that Iran will support Armenia, but in what capacity is unknown. Now that Azerbaijan has gained full control over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, this could create a false sense of security in the Caucasus, now that tensions have settled. However, Azerbaijan appears particularly confident and seems to have no interest in a peaceful resolution with Armenia. Now that both Turkey and Iran are getting more actively involved in the region’s issues, tensions are as high as ever. For aviation overflying the area, it is advised to avoid overflying the border region between Armenia and Azerbaijan until Azeri’s intentions are clearer. It is advised to use Georgia for crossing the Southern Caucasus. Waypoints ADEKI and DISKA are preferred, as BARAD skims the border of the two squabbling nations. Conclusion: The conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia is far from over. With Azeri president Aliyev calling for actions concerning “West-Azerbaijan,” he is openly challenging Armenia’s integrity. With France, Iran, Israel, Russia and Turkey heavily involved in the internal politics of Azerbaijan and Armenia, any conflict can lead to strained diplomatic relations on the geopolitical stage. There is also little doubt as to how a conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia will end with Azerbaijan having military capabilities that by far outweigh Armenia’s. It is unknown if the EU, the US, NATO, Russia and/or other countries will be able to quell Azerbaijan’s hostility toward Armenia now that it easily annexed Nagorno-Karabakh.

Business as usual? Zaken doen in de Golfregio biedt Nederlandse ondernemers onmiskenbaar aantrekkelijke kansen. Deze bloeiende regio staat bekend om zijn welvarende markten, strategische ligging en enorme investeringsmogelijkheden. Echter, het is van cruciaal belang om te erkennen dat er naast de voordelen ook aanzienlijke risico's zijn verbonden aan ondernemen in deze regio. Een van de meest urgente kwesties is het aspect van maatschappelijk verantwoord ondernemen (MVO). Hoewel de Golfstaten indrukwekkende economische groei doormaken, moeten ondernemers zich bewust zijn van de mensenrechtenschendingen die in sommige landen in de regio plaatsvinden. Hierbij gaat het onder andere om kwesties als arbeidsrechten, vrijheid van meningsuiting en gendergelijkheid. Het negeren van deze kwesties kan niet alleen leiden tot reputatieschade voor uw bedrijf, maar kan ook juridische en financiële gevolgen hebben. Daarnaast moeten Nederlandse ondernemers zich bewust zijn van het potentieel voor spionage in sommige landen, zoals Qatar en Saoedi-Arabië. Deze landen staan erom bekend geavanceerde spionagetechnieken te gebruiken om hun internationale invloed uit te breiden. Het is verstandig om zorgvuldig om te gaan met gevoelige informatie en beveiligingsmaatregelen te treffen om uw bedrijf te beschermen. Het is dus van essentieel belang dat Nederlandse ondernemers die de Golfregio willen betreden, zich grondig laten informeren over de specifieke situatie in elk land en proactieve stappen ondernemen om hun bedrijf te beschermen en MVO-normen te handhaven. Dyami helpt hier bij om deze risico's in kaart te brengen. Met een goed begrip van de kansen en risico's kunnen Nederlandse ondernemers een positieve impact creëren en tegelijkertijd hun bedrijf laten groeien in deze dynamische markt. Lees meer in onze Dyami Insights over ondernemen in Golfregio: Heb jij vragen, hoe dyami jou kan helpen met internationaal ondernemen? Neem dan nu vrijblijvend contact op!

Date: 04/10/2023 Where: Haiti Who’s involved: Haiti Prime Minister Ariel Henry, G9 leader Jimmy Cherizier, UN Security Council What happened? On 02/10/2023, the UN Security Council voted to send a Kenyan-led multinational force to support the Haitian government in countering armed gang violence. The mission, called Multinational Security Support (MSS), has been approved with 13 votes in favor out of the 15 members of the Security Council. Russia and China abstained. The MSS has been authorized for a year with a renewal after nine months. Although voted on by the Security Council, the MSS is a non-UN mission, so it will not be directly run by the United Nations. Kenya has volunteered to lead the international force and will provide 1,000 police officers. The Kenyan President William Ruto had previously expressed in July 2023 the willingness to lead a support operation in Haiti. Other countries, including CARICOM members such as the Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigua, and Barbuda, will join the MSS and dispatch personnel. The United States, while not participating with personnel, has agreed to logistically finance the operation with $100 million in intelligence, medical assistance, equipment, communications, and airlift. The approval of international assistance comes more than a year after Haiti's Prime Minister Ariel Henry repeatedly called for “robust support” to re-establish order and tackle gang-related violence and the humanitarian crisis in Haiti. The ongoing humanitarian and security crisis in Haiti started in September 2022 when a powerful coalition of gangs that controls several parts of the Haitian capital Port-au-Prince, known as the G9 Family and Allies gang alliance, took control of a major fuel terminal of the country, preventing the distribution of diesel and petrol. The terminal blockade also worsened the precarious conditions of the Haitian population, which experienced a dramatic rise in food insecurity. In September, the G9 leader Jimmy “Barbecue” Cherizier called for an overthrow of PM Ariel Henry, announcing a truce among metropolitan gangs and urging the population to rise up against the unelected government. Cherizier was sanctioned by the UN in 2022 for human rights abuses and involvement in acts that “threaten the peace, security, and stability of Haiti.” The gang leader, while opposed to international intervention, said he would welcome a foreign force if they were to arrest the “illegitimate prime minister and corrupt politicians.” Moreover, Cherizier appealed to the international community, declaring that human rights abuses will not be tolerated. Analysis: Haiti has experienced an unprecedented escalation of violence in the past year. According to the United Nations, more than 3,000 homicides and 1,500 kidnappings were reported in the first nine months of 2023. Moreover, the surge in gang-related violence, especially in the capital, forced the population to flee urban areas, resulting in more than 200,000 displaced people. Also, sexual and gender-based violence is reportedly on the rise in the country. Increased violence and the uncontrolled flow of displaced persons from Haiti affect regional stability and security. In mid-September, the Dominican Republic closed all borders with Haiti over a canal dispute. The closure of access points to the Dominican Republic, the main receiving country for Haitian refugees could also worsen economic conditions. Haiti has suffered from gang violence for decades but the current wave of violence escalated after the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021. Following Moïse's death, power was taken by the current unelected prime minister Henry, whose government is perceived by many as corrupt. The one-year multinational support mission aims to support and train Haiti’s police force to deal with gang violence. The country’s security forces are, in fact, under-equipped and inadequately prepared to handle the violence and insecurity that come with gang crime. It must be noted that the MSS is not a UN peacekeeping operation. While the UN maintains multiple support activities for Haiti, such as the BINUH political mission to achieve political stability and good governance, the MSS is not a UN-led operation. Haiti has a troubled history with international interventions. The last international intervention, the U.N.’s 2004-2017 MINUSTAH mission, resulted in a massive sexual abuse scandal and a cholera epidemic, killing some 10,000 people. The MSS will be the first international force deployment in Haiti approved by the UN since MINUSTAH. The MINUSTAH scandals have caused outrage and distrust of foreign forces by the people of Haiti. To date, a large part of local civil society remains opposed or skeptical toward international interventions, claiming that the solution for the country should be identified and led by Haitians. Besides Haiti’s records with international interventions, other factors delayed the international community’s decision-making and approval of the MSS. Some states have been reluctant to support Ariel Henry’s contested government openly. Concerns have also been raised about the capabilities of Kenyan security forces to handle the rampant violence in Haiti. Moreover, Kenyan military and police have been domestically accused of human rights abuses, excessive use of force, and corruption. China and Russia abstained from the vote, arguing that the operation does not provide a plan for an eventual withdrawal and that Haiti would first need “a legitimate, effective, and accountable government” for successful foreign intervention. Conclusion The United Nations has green-lighted a “historic” international support mission in Haiti. The Kenyan-led multinational force will assist Haitian authorities and security forces in managing the rapidly deteriorating, multi-faced security and humanitarian crisis. Gangs have taken control of much of the capital, spawning a surge in crime, homicides, extortion, and kidnapping. The situation is also volatile in the country's peripheral and rural areas due to displaced people flows. In addition, protests and demonstrations against Henry's perceived corrupt government are erupting and spreading across the country. The year-long deployment of foreign support forces will face a highly fragile and armed environment. Curbing gang violence would create the conditions necessary to hold elections, which have not occurred in Haiti since 2016. For the MSS to take off, it will be necessary to await the Kenyan parliament's decision on when and which security forces will be deployed to Haiti. In the meantime, the UN is encouraging states to contribute personnel, equipment, and funds.

Executive Summary The incidents from the last few months show the importance of keeping up-to-date with the recurring and emerging security threats to the business aviation sector in Europe and the wider world. Timely analysis and accurate information regarding new threats are necessary for planning ahead and taking precautionary measures. There are several new threats which pose potential risks for business aviation around the world. Over Iraq, GPS spoofing is affecting aircraft ranging from business jets to 777s, potentially leading to serious incidents. Conflict is brewing in the Southern Caucasus, with Azerbaijan potentially not being satisfied after claiming the Nagorno-Karabakh. India is developing into a new hub for the trafficking of valuable items such as wildlife and gold. Global 1.1. GPS Spoofing The frequency and intensity of GPS spoofing incidents is on a rise. For now mostly found over Iraq, but it can be replicated all over the world. GPS spoofing has been shown to put aircraft upwards of 60 nm off of their flight path. 1.2. Drug trafficking Business model jets have been and continue to be used for drug/contraband smuggling across the globe. These flights are usually to and from Latin America, Ethiopia and India. The aim of using business jets instead of commercial aviation is to lower the chance of getting caught, and increase the volume per flight. 1.3. Human trafficking In order to improve the ease of human trafficking, and to stay away from prying eyes of airport security as well as cabin crew, traffickers prefer to use business jets if they can. This presents a worldwide challenge that is hard to combat. 1.4. Valuables trafficking Ethiopia and India have become hubs for trafficking of valuables, such as wildlife and gold. While the majority of the detected smuggling was on commercial flights, there has been an increase in (attempts to) smuggle with business jets via smaller regional airports. 1.5. Cyber threats In the first half of 2023, cyber attacks in the aviation sector surged by 24% worldwide. In business aviation, a notable trend among cyber criminals is gaining unauthorized access to confidential business data. Europe 2.1. Climate activism European airports are still targeted by climate activists who are mainly focusing on the business aviation sector. Besides physical damage, the protests result in disruptions and closures of airports, forcing jets to divert elsewhere. 2.2 GPS interference Severe GPS interference can be found over the Black sea as a spillover effect from the war in Ukraine. Middle East 3.1. Overflight Risks Recent developments in the region have caused a need for extra security measures differing per country. These are important to adhere to, as ignoring the risks while overflying can lead to catastrophic results. Asia 4.1. New Zealand pilot hostage in Papua On February 7, independence fighters from West-Papua took a pilot from New Zealand hostage in exchange for independence from Indonesia. On May 31, a video message appeared in which the pilot said that if demands are not met within two months, he will be executed. Since then, several rescue attempts failed, resulting in casualties on both sides, and the demands of the hostage takers were lowered. On July 20, 2023, an Indonesian official said that negotiation attempts are still ongoing. As of September, a rebel spokesperson admitted there has been no contact for three months. 4.2 Military operations by Azerbaijan Tensions on the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia are still high after the military operations performed on September 19 by the Azeri authorities. The Turkish president has visited Azerbaijan to reportedly discuss the ‘Zangezur corridor’ which would connect Azerbaijan and Turkey through Armenia. Iran has already stated that they will not allow any change of borders in the region and has bolstered military presence at the border. 4.3. Overflight risks Due to the tension between Azerbaijan and Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh and the growing involvement of Turkey, overflying the Armenia Azerbaijan border area should still be avoided at the moment. Overflying Georgia using waypoints DISKA and ADEKI is preferable, as BARAD skims the border of both nations. Both nations have long range air defense systems with ranges up to and exceeding 100 km in radius, and up to 30 km in height. Africa 5.1. Overflight risks Recent developments in the region have caused a need for extra security measures differing per country. These are important to adhere to, as ignoring the risks while overflying can lead to catastrophic results. 5.2. Illicit trafficking Addis Ababa Bole International Airport [HAAB] has become a trafficking hub for wildlife and narcotics. The Ethiopian Customs Commission stated that it is struggling with the growing sophistication and capacity of smugglers, which is a notable pattern throughout the region. North America 6.1. Trafficking Over the last two months, cartels and other criminal organizations have continued to use private aircraft to smuggle narcotics and for human trafficking. The lack of security for private flights, especially at smaller regional airports, makes it easier for traffickers. 6.2. Protests Protestors have disrupted flight operations at several airports in Mexico, the United States and Canada. While not always specifically targeted at aviation, airports are becoming an increasingly used site for protests. South America 7.1. Trafficking Cartels continue to use private aircraft for drug trafficking throughout the continent. Criminal organizations use old aircraft for these flights because a large number of aircraft are destroyed after only a small number of trafficking flights. Oceania There were no significant events in Oceania in the months of August and September. Forecast The months of August 2023 and September 2023 have been calmer than the months before. This is mostly caused by the summer months being a time of the year when some regions have to focus on tourism. Local conflicts are expected to reignite in the coming months. In the case of climate activists, summer months prove more difficult for gathering large groups, because participants may go on holiday. More activism is expected in the coming months. That being said, the past two months saw a major event endangering air traffic over the Southern Caucasus, and the tensions in the region have not dwindled yet. Another fast growing threat to aviation is GPS spoofing, which is both a security and safety risk, and will increasingly become so as more and more modern aircraft rely solely on GPS for their navigation. GPS spoofing can cause aircraft to drift into unfriendly skies , or into the path of other traffic. Mitigating spoofing means returning to rudimentary means of navigation. Global 1.1. GPS Spoofing GPS spoofing is a growing trend facing the aviation sector. GPS spoofing is more dangerous than jamming, as most civilian aircraft are not equipped and/or capable of detecting GPS spoofing. This can result in extremely dangerous situations, where aircraft stray from their flightpath without realizing, causing the aircraft to deviate up to 80 nm. This can lead to a multitude of consequences; from straying into the path of other (oncoming) traffic to, in a worst-case scenario, crossing into unfriendly skies, resulting in an intercept or even shootdown. Aircraft ranging from Falcon 8x to Boeing 777s have been affected by GPS spoofing. 1.2. Drug trafficking Drug trafficking is still a present risk for business aviation. For organized crime groups and cartels, business aviation is often the preferred method of transportation. There are numerous cases of drugs, or other valuable goods such as wildlife and gold, trafficked by cabin and flight crew on commercial flights. It is possible that cabin or flight crew on private jets could also smuggle illegal goods, emphasizing the need to be vigilant. Throughout Latin America, cartels have continued to use business jets to smuggle large amounts of narcotics over long distances. These jets are often acquired in the United States and then destroyed after a single or very few flights to avoid detection. It is important to clearly identify when asked to minimize the risk of misidentification by law enforcement and/or the military. India also has become a major market for both drugs demand and supply side. The drugs in India are mainly coming from Pakistan, Myanmar, Nepal, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Uganda and sometimes via Dubai or Sharjah. The central government has been urged to tighten up border security. 1.3. Human trafficking With human trafficking still being a major issue today, the involvement of business aircraft is to be expected. In commercial aviation steps have been and are still being made to improve the awareness and the prevention of human trafficking. While most of these measures have generally been effective for commercial aviation, it could push human traffickers into finding other solutions. One of these solutions for human traffickers is business/private aviation. If a trafficking organization can overcome the increased costs of using business aviation, it allows for flights to smaller airports with less experienced and limited security compared to larger commercial airports. Additionally, it is easier to bribe or blackmail security personnel to turn a blind eye to human trafficking, especially in unstable countries or regions. 1.4. Cyber threats In the first half of 2023 cyber attacks within the aviation sector surged by 24% worldwide. A notable trend among cyber criminals targeting business aviation is them gaining unauthorized access to confidential business data. When providing unsecured WIFI on board hackers can easily establish connections from the ground getting access to passwords and credentials. Europe 2.1. Climate activism Climate actions are still happening all over Europe, albeit mostly small scale actions over the past two months. The absence of large actions is possibly due to the summer holidays. These actions mostly come from XR affiliates, and the usual MO is the throwing or spraying of paint on parked private/business aircraft. Another effect of the climate actions is the interruption of operations. 2.2 GPS interference Severe GPS interference is to be expected when overflying the Black Sea, coastal Romania, and Bulgaria. Due to the war in Ukraine, most of the Black Sea has also turned into a combat zone. A collateral effect of this is GPS jamming, which spreads into Romania, as well as the south western Black Sea. Middle East 3.1. GPS spoofing GPS spoofing is most prevalent over Iraq, specifically route UM688, the closest route to Iran. This brings both safety as well as security risks, as GPS spoofing can without warning deviate an aircraft (reported up to 80 nm, but theoretically endlessly) from its intended flight path. This can bring aircraft into the flight path of other (oncoming) aircraft, or even worse, bring the aircraft into Iranian airspace. This could lead to an aircraft being intercepted, or even shot down. GPS spoofing will in most civilian aircraft not produce a warning, as the computer still receives a strong and clear GPS signal, albeit an incorrect one. GPS spoofing effects have for now been stopped by pilots who were lucky enough to see the moment their GPS jumped location when the spoofing started. In case of GPS spoofing, for now only dead reckoning or radar vectors can provide a navigational alternative. This is because within minutes, GPS spoofing will make the INS faulty on modern aircraft. 3.2. Increased military presence There is a significant increase in military presence above the Strait of Hormuz to deter Iran from seizing vessels in the area. The tensions and presence have remained, as no changes have happened to the geopolitical situation. Avoid flying over the Strait of Hormuz and clearly identify when asked to minimize the risk of misidentification. 3.3. Overflight Risks Developments in the region have caused a need for extra security measures. These include an advised minimum flight level of 320 over Iraq, with a focus on northern Iraq. Additionally, GPS interference is to be expected when overflying the country as well as over Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, the Eastern Mediterranean, Israel and Turkey. The airspace above Iran, Afghanistan (except for P500/G500), Yemen and Syria is still unsafe for Western aviation. Overflying Saudi Arabia is safe, as long as flying above FL260. Asia 4.1. Pilot held hostage in West Papua (Indonesia) The pilot taken hostage in West Papua to demand independence is still being held by his captors. Since the capture on February 7, the hostage takers have freed the passengers and lowered demands. Negotiations have stranded numerous times and several rescue attempts failed, resulting in casualties on both sides. The indepence fighters have threatened to kill the pilot if demands, which are not publicly known, are not met and have published several videos of the pilot in captivity. On July 20, a senior official of the Indonesian military said that negotiation attempts are still ongoing and that the pilot is alive and healthy. As of September a rebel spokesperson admitted there has been no contact for three months. 4.2. Military operations by Azerbaijan From September 19th to the 20th, Azerbaijan conducted military operations in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. These came with no warning in advance from officials, only at the moment operations started. Dyami first warned its open network for military operations in Nagorno-Karabakh on September 8th. The operation included missile strikes, drone activity, heavy artillery and small arms combat. The presence of drones and cruise missiles can cause a massive risk to any aviation caught in the vicinity, as air defense systems will try to intercept these. Such air defense systems were in the area of operations, but it is not confirmed whether they produced any results. Tensions in the area still linger, as Turkey and Azerbaijan are pushing for Armenia to relinquish a part of the south for a corridor between the former two countries. Besides Armenia, Iran is strongly opposed to this idea, which mobilized forces to its border with the three northern neighbors, stating it will ont allow any international borders to be changed. The advice for now is to completely avoid the Armenia-Azerbaijan border area, as well as southern Armenia. Crossing east-west should be done over Georgia instead, using waypoints ADEKI or DISKA. 4.3. Regional instability Political instability has led to recurring protests and (armed) attacks, particularly in northern India, Pakistan, Myanmar and the border region of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Instabilities prove themselves risky to aviation, including business aviation. The instability in northern India poses a serious risk to aircraft on the ground, while the unrest in Pakistan and Myanmar introduce threats to overflight as well. As a result of proliferation of anti-air weapons, a minimum flight level of 300 AGL is advised. The tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia accumulated to Azerbaijan conducting military operations in Nagorno-Karabakh, resulting in the exodus of almost all Armenians from the region. These tensions have resulted in armed conflict and skirmishes without warning numerous times. Since both countries operate advanced air defense systems, overflying the border region as well as southern Armenia should be avoided. Africa 5.1. Overflight risks Overflying Africa has risks, which differ per country. Libya and Sudan are the only countries with a do not fly advisory while most other countries can be overflown by sticking to a security advisory. Egypt: advice to fly above flight level 300 over the Sinai region due to terrorist organizations in possession of anti-air weapons Ethiopia: the Tigray region remains unstable even though an official peace deal was signed in November. The advice is to avoid overflying the region because of the presence of anti-air systems. Somalia: advisory to not overfly the country below flight level 300 because of the instability in the country in combination with the presence of anti-air systems. Kenya: the border region has an overspill effect of the civil war in Somalia, thus posing the same threat as in Somalia itself. The advisory is to not fly below flight level 300. Mali: militants are in possession of anti-air systems and thus the advice is to not fly below flight level 300 over the country. Niger: as a result of the political instability, the advice is to avoid flying over Niger Western Sahara: due to the conflict in the region between Morocco and the independence movement in the region, there is a risk of proliferation of anti-air weapons. The advice is to stick to a flight level of 250 AGL or more. Gabon: A coup kicked out the sitting ruler of the country, leaving instability in its wake. 5.2. Political instability Political instability has resulted in unpredictable protests and revolts throughout Africa. The political violence in Sudan and Niger has led to serious security risks for aircraft on the ground and overflights. Where the situation in Gabon is headed is unclear for now. It is important to stay up-to-date with the latest developments to minimize the risk of getting caught in armed violence while staying in a vulnerable African country or region. North America 6.1. Trafficking Over the last two months, cartels and other criminal organizations have continued to use private aircraft to smuggle narcotics and for human trafficking. These organizations regularly use private flights to and from smaller regional airports in the south of the United States because of limited security. Airport personnel and/or the flight crew can be coerced or bribed into aiding the traffickers to further ease the smuggling. South America 7.1. Trafficking Cartels continue to use private aircraft, ranging from smaller Cessna to business jets, for drug trafficking throughout the continent. The criminal organizations use old aircraft for these flights because a large number of aircraft are destroyed after only a small number of trafficking flights. These aircraft also pose a risk during flight at low FLs/during departure and descent, as these flights are done without transponders or any form of communication. When returning to your parked aircraft, make sure to check that no one has been on board/accessed cargo hatches to hide illicit goods. If illicit goods are found, take the stance of the local authorities into consideration, as some will imprison crews reporting such goods on their aircraft as the perpetrators. Dyami, a leading provider of aviation security solutions, is proud to announce the appointment of Jan-Peter van Viegen as Head of Aviation. With an illustrious career spanning two decades in various facets of aviation, Jan-Peter brings a wealth of experience and expertise to the Dyami team. Jan-Peter's extensive background encompasses flight operations, business aviation, flight training, safety, and compliance. He has held various key positions in the aviation sector, starting as an operations officer and working his way up to roles such as assistant flight operations manager, flight instructor and Captain on various business aviation aircraft. Most recently, he served as a senior inspector at CAA-NL (Civil Aviation Authority Netherlands).

Date: 28/09/2023 Where: Atlantic islands, Central, and South America. Most recent incident focused on Bermuda Who’s involved: The entirety of the Bermudan government’s services Governments of several neighboring countries Hackers allegedly based out of Russia What happened? The government of Bermuda experienced a network breach in its public infrastructure, first detected on the night of 20/09/2023. An official statement was put out on 21/09/2023, with a formal Press Appearance by the Island's Premier, Mr. E. David Burt, on 25/09/2023. In the statement, the premier blamed hackers from Russia. According to the press, all government departments were in some way impacted, though there haven't been any specifics released as to the extent of the damage. The recovery is still ongoing, with payroll and critical infrastructure now largely restored. However, a full restoration will take weeks. Mr. Burt says that attribution information is still not publicly available as a matter of national security. The classified information indicates that other neighboring countries were attacked, as well. There is an investigation ongoing as to whether or not any critical information was stolen. While too early to determine for sure, this attack follows a pattern of major Ransomware attacks that have been launched against other neighboring countries by Russia-based threat actors over the past two years. Rick Mello, CISO of Sentinel Cybersecurity, said in a statement to Bermuda’s Royal Gazette that, “All signs point to [a] ransomware attack,” based on the reaction from the government and the timeline of recovery. This is all unfolding in the leadup to Bermuda’s Personal Information Protection Act going into effect, which will impact the disclosure procedures of these events. Beginning in 2025, all cybersecurity events that may impact citizens’ private information have to be explicitly reported in as much detail as possible. It will also encourage more private-public cooperation and the ability for responders to work with staff from other countries if it’s deemed necessary. Analysis: Bermuda is the latest Atlantic island nation that’s found itself to be the target of a major cyberattack tied to Russian threat actors. The attacks have crippled Bermuda’s public infrastructure since the night of 20/09/2023, and are expected to do so for the next several weeks. Bermuda’s Premier, Mr. E. David Burt, has stated that other Atlantic locales were impacted as well, but did not disclose which ones. While the details still haven’t been confirmed by Bermuda’s government, expert opinion seems to indicate that this is a Ransomware attack. If this is true, it means that Bermuda would join Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela as the latest victims of such an offensive. This is likely part of a broader trend by Russian threat actors against developing nations, whose own experts see a solution in regional “cyber-cooperation”. So far, there has been a lack of transparency in the name of national security, a policy that is slated to change in 2025 when Bermuda’s Personal Information Protection Act goes into effect. Increased transparency and information sharing are factors that both Bermuda’s own Privacy Commissioner, Alexander White, and other experts from the Caribbean and Latin American cybersecurity communities have insisted will be needed to improve resiliency in the developing areas of the western hemisphere. Since 2020, Russian ransomware groups such as Conti, Clop, and others have crippled infrastructure in these regions and gone largely unpunished. In 2022, the Dominican Republic and its neighbors had to cooperate and share information to combat the Conti Ransomware, which had threatened to do significant damage to the entire Caribbean. A reason for these moves towards regional cooperation, especially among nations with smaller economies, is the fear of a nightmare scenario such as the 2017 Petya and NotPetya Ransomware attacks. These nearly shut down Ukraine’s banking and healthcare sectors, while inflicting nearly a billion US dollars in damages on the Maersk corporation. Mitigation guidelines for institutional malware targets as recommended by ENISA and CISA: Immediate Response 1. Containment: Isolate affected systems to prevent the spread of malware. Disconnect affected systems from the network. 2. Eradication: Remove malware from affected systems. Apply patches and updates to fix vulnerabilities. 3. Incident Reporting: Inform internal security teams. Report the incident to relevant local, national, or international authorities. Forensic Investigation 1. Collect Evidence: Preserve logs, memory dumps, and other relevant data. Document every action taken during the incident response. 2. Investigate: Analyze the malware to understand its functionality and purpose. Determine the scope and impact of the incident. Communications 1. Internal Communication: Inform employees and stakeholders about the incident. Provide guidance on actions they should take to prevent further damage. 2. External Communication: Notify affected parties and the public, as appropriate. Coordinate with external partners and vendors to address the incident. Recovery Measures 1. Restore Operations: Rebuild affected systems. Restore data from backups. 2. Monitor: Closely monitor network traffic and system behavior for signs of malicious activity. Update threat intelligence feeds and security controls. 3. Post-Incident Review: Evaluate the incident response to identify areas for improvement. Update incident response and recovery plans based on lessons learned. Preemptive and Proactive Measures 1. Security Awareness Training: Educate users on recognizing and reporting phishing and other malicious activities. Perform regular simulated phishing exercises to reinforce learning. 2. Cyber Hygiene: Regularly update and patch systems and applications. Enforce the use of strong, unique passwords. 3. Network Segmentation: Segment networks to limit lateral movement of attackers. Use firewalls, intrusion detection/prevention systems, and other security tools to monitor and control traffic. 4. Vulnerability Management: Regularly scan for and remediate vulnerabilities. Prioritize vulnerabilities based on risk to the organization. 5. Backup and Restore: Regularly backup critical data and systems. Test restore procedures to ensure data integrity and availability. Legal and Regulatory Compliance Compliance with Laws and Regulations: Adhere to relevant legal and regulatory requirements related to data breach notification and reporting. Consult legal counsel to navigate legal obligations and potential liabilities. Collaboration and Information Sharing Collaborate with Other Organizations: Engage in information sharing with peer organizations, industry groups, and government agencies. Leverage shared threat intelligence to enhance situational awareness. Mitigation Summary These mitigating practices, when effectively combined, form a robust and resilient approach to managing the risk posed by malware attacks. The key is to be proactive, keep abreast of the evolving threat landscape, and continuously refine and update strategies and controls to counter emerging threats.