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Date: 04/10/2023 Where: Haiti Who’s involved: Haiti Prime Minister Ariel Henry, G9 leader Jimmy Cherizier, UN Security Council What happened? On 02/10/2023, the UN Security Council voted to send a Kenyan-led multinational force to support the Haitian government in countering armed gang violence. The mission, called Multinational Security Support (MSS), has been approved with 13 votes in favor out of the 15 members of the Security Council. Russia and China abstained. The MSS has been authorized for a year with a renewal after nine months. Although voted on by the Security Council, the MSS is a non-UN mission, so it will not be directly run by the United Nations. Kenya has volunteered to lead the international force and will provide 1,000 police officers. The Kenyan President William Ruto had previously expressed in July 2023 the willingness to lead a support operation in Haiti. Other countries, including CARICOM members such as the Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigua, and Barbuda, will join the MSS and dispatch personnel. The United States, while not participating with personnel, has agreed to logistically finance the operation with $100 million in intelligence, medical assistance, equipment, communications, and airlift. The approval of international assistance comes more than a year after Haiti's Prime Minister Ariel Henry repeatedly called for “robust support” to re-establish order and tackle gang-related violence and the humanitarian crisis in Haiti. The ongoing humanitarian and security crisis in Haiti started in September 2022 when a powerful coalition of gangs that controls several parts of the Haitian capital Port-au-Prince, known as the G9 Family and Allies gang alliance, took control of a major fuel terminal of the country, preventing the distribution of diesel and petrol. The terminal blockade also worsened the precarious conditions of the Haitian population, which experienced a dramatic rise in food insecurity. In September, the G9 leader Jimmy “Barbecue” Cherizier called for an overthrow of PM Ariel Henry, announcing a truce among metropolitan gangs and urging the population to rise up against the unelected government. Cherizier was sanctioned by the UN in 2022 for human rights abuses and involvement in acts that “threaten the peace, security, and stability of Haiti.” The gang leader, while opposed to international intervention, said he would welcome a foreign force if they were to arrest the “illegitimate prime minister and corrupt politicians.” Moreover, Cherizier appealed to the international community, declaring that human rights abuses will not be tolerated. Analysis: Haiti has experienced an unprecedented escalation of violence in the past year. According to the United Nations, more than 3,000 homicides and 1,500 kidnappings were reported in the first nine months of 2023. Moreover, the surge in gang-related violence, especially in the capital, forced the population to flee urban areas, resulting in more than 200,000 displaced people. Also, sexual and gender-based violence is reportedly on the rise in the country. Increased violence and the uncontrolled flow of displaced persons from Haiti affect regional stability and security. In mid-September, the Dominican Republic closed all borders with Haiti over a canal dispute. The closure of access points to the Dominican Republic, the main receiving country for Haitian refugees could also worsen economic conditions. Haiti has suffered from gang violence for decades but the current wave of violence escalated after the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021. Following Moïse's death, power was taken by the current unelected prime minister Henry, whose government is perceived by many as corrupt. The one-year multinational support mission aims to support and train Haiti’s police force to deal with gang violence. The country’s security forces are, in fact, under-equipped and inadequately prepared to handle the violence and insecurity that come with gang crime. It must be noted that the MSS is not a UN peacekeeping operation. While the UN maintains multiple support activities for Haiti, such as the BINUH political mission to achieve political stability and good governance, the MSS is not a UN-led operation. Haiti has a troubled history with international interventions. The last international intervention, the U.N.’s 2004-2017 MINUSTAH mission, resulted in a massive sexual abuse scandal and a cholera epidemic, killing some 10,000 people. The MSS will be the first international force deployment in Haiti approved by the UN since MINUSTAH. The MINUSTAH scandals have caused outrage and distrust of foreign forces by the people of Haiti. To date, a large part of local civil society remains opposed or skeptical toward international interventions, claiming that the solution for the country should be identified and led by Haitians. Besides Haiti’s records with international interventions, other factors delayed the international community’s decision-making and approval of the MSS. Some states have been reluctant to support Ariel Henry’s contested government openly. Concerns have also been raised about the capabilities of Kenyan security forces to handle the rampant violence in Haiti. Moreover, Kenyan military and police have been domestically accused of human rights abuses, excessive use of force, and corruption. China and Russia abstained from the vote, arguing that the operation does not provide a plan for an eventual withdrawal and that Haiti would first need “a legitimate, effective, and accountable government” for successful foreign intervention. Conclusion The United Nations has green-lighted a “historic” international support mission in Haiti. The Kenyan-led multinational force will assist Haitian authorities and security forces in managing the rapidly deteriorating, multi-faced security and humanitarian crisis. Gangs have taken control of much of the capital, spawning a surge in crime, homicides, extortion, and kidnapping. The situation is also volatile in the country's peripheral and rural areas due to displaced people flows. In addition, protests and demonstrations against Henry's perceived corrupt government are erupting and spreading across the country. The year-long deployment of foreign support forces will face a highly fragile and armed environment. Curbing gang violence would create the conditions necessary to hold elections, which have not occurred in Haiti since 2016. For the MSS to take off, it will be necessary to await the Kenyan parliament's decision on when and which security forces will be deployed to Haiti. In the meantime, the UN is encouraging states to contribute personnel, equipment, and funds.

Executive Summary The incidents from the last few months show the importance of keeping up-to-date with the recurring and emerging security threats to the business aviation sector in Europe and the wider world. Timely analysis and accurate information regarding new threats are necessary for planning ahead and taking precautionary measures. There are several new threats which pose potential risks for business aviation around the world. Over Iraq, GPS spoofing is affecting aircraft ranging from business jets to 777s, potentially leading to serious incidents. Conflict is brewing in the Southern Caucasus, with Azerbaijan potentially not being satisfied after claiming the Nagorno-Karabakh. India is developing into a new hub for the trafficking of valuable items such as wildlife and gold. Global 1.1. GPS Spoofing The frequency and intensity of GPS spoofing incidents is on a rise. For now mostly found over Iraq, but it can be replicated all over the world. GPS spoofing has been shown to put aircraft upwards of 60 nm off of their flight path. 1.2. Drug trafficking Business model jets have been and continue to be used for drug/contraband smuggling across the globe. These flights are usually to and from Latin America, Ethiopia and India. The aim of using business jets instead of commercial aviation is to lower the chance of getting caught, and increase the volume per flight. 1.3. Human trafficking In order to improve the ease of human trafficking, and to stay away from prying eyes of airport security as well as cabin crew, traffickers prefer to use business jets if they can. This presents a worldwide challenge that is hard to combat. 1.4. Valuables trafficking Ethiopia and India have become hubs for trafficking of valuables, such as wildlife and gold. While the majority of the detected smuggling was on commercial flights, there has been an increase in (attempts to) smuggle with business jets via smaller regional airports. 1.5. Cyber threats In the first half of 2023, cyber attacks in the aviation sector surged by 24% worldwide. In business aviation, a notable trend among cyber criminals is gaining unauthorized access to confidential business data. Europe 2.1. Climate activism European airports are still targeted by climate activists who are mainly focusing on the business aviation sector. Besides physical damage, the protests result in disruptions and closures of airports, forcing jets to divert elsewhere. 2.2 GPS interference Severe GPS interference can be found over the Black sea as a spillover effect from the war in Ukraine. Middle East 3.1. Overflight Risks Recent developments in the region have caused a need for extra security measures differing per country. These are important to adhere to, as ignoring the risks while overflying can lead to catastrophic results. Asia 4.1. New Zealand pilot hostage in Papua On February 7, independence fighters from West-Papua took a pilot from New Zealand hostage in exchange for independence from Indonesia. On May 31, a video message appeared in which the pilot said that if demands are not met within two months, he will be executed. Since then, several rescue attempts failed, resulting in casualties on both sides, and the demands of the hostage takers were lowered. On July 20, 2023, an Indonesian official said that negotiation attempts are still ongoing. As of September, a rebel spokesperson admitted there has been no contact for three months. 4.2 Military operations by Azerbaijan Tensions on the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia are still high after the military operations performed on September 19 by the Azeri authorities. The Turkish president has visited Azerbaijan to reportedly discuss the ‘Zangezur corridor’ which would connect Azerbaijan and Turkey through Armenia. Iran has already stated that they will not allow any change of borders in the region and has bolstered military presence at the border. 4.3. Overflight risks Due to the tension between Azerbaijan and Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh and the growing involvement of Turkey, overflying the Armenia Azerbaijan border area should still be avoided at the moment. Overflying Georgia using waypoints DISKA and ADEKI is preferable, as BARAD skims the border of both nations. Both nations have long range air defense systems with ranges up to and exceeding 100 km in radius, and up to 30 km in height. Africa 5.1. Overflight risks Recent developments in the region have caused a need for extra security measures differing per country. These are important to adhere to, as ignoring the risks while overflying can lead to catastrophic results. 5.2. Illicit trafficking Addis Ababa Bole International Airport [HAAB] has become a trafficking hub for wildlife and narcotics. The Ethiopian Customs Commission stated that it is struggling with the growing sophistication and capacity of smugglers, which is a notable pattern throughout the region. North America 6.1. Trafficking Over the last two months, cartels and other criminal organizations have continued to use private aircraft to smuggle narcotics and for human trafficking. The lack of security for private flights, especially at smaller regional airports, makes it easier for traffickers. 6.2. Protests Protestors have disrupted flight operations at several airports in Mexico, the United States and Canada. While not always specifically targeted at aviation, airports are becoming an increasingly used site for protests. South America 7.1. Trafficking Cartels continue to use private aircraft for drug trafficking throughout the continent. Criminal organizations use old aircraft for these flights because a large number of aircraft are destroyed after only a small number of trafficking flights. Oceania There were no significant events in Oceania in the months of August and September. Forecast The months of August 2023 and September 2023 have been calmer than the months before. This is mostly caused by the summer months being a time of the year when some regions have to focus on tourism. Local conflicts are expected to reignite in the coming months. In the case of climate activists, summer months prove more difficult for gathering large groups, because participants may go on holiday. More activism is expected in the coming months. That being said, the past two months saw a major event endangering air traffic over the Southern Caucasus, and the tensions in the region have not dwindled yet. Another fast growing threat to aviation is GPS spoofing, which is both a security and safety risk, and will increasingly become so as more and more modern aircraft rely solely on GPS for their navigation. GPS spoofing can cause aircraft to drift into unfriendly skies , or into the path of other traffic. Mitigating spoofing means returning to rudimentary means of navigation. Global 1.1. GPS Spoofing GPS spoofing is a growing trend facing the aviation sector. GPS spoofing is more dangerous than jamming, as most civilian aircraft are not equipped and/or capable of detecting GPS spoofing. This can result in extremely dangerous situations, where aircraft stray from their flightpath without realizing, causing the aircraft to deviate up to 80 nm. This can lead to a multitude of consequences; from straying into the path of other (oncoming) traffic to, in a worst-case scenario, crossing into unfriendly skies, resulting in an intercept or even shootdown. Aircraft ranging from Falcon 8x to Boeing 777s have been affected by GPS spoofing. 1.2. Drug trafficking Drug trafficking is still a present risk for business aviation. For organized crime groups and cartels, business aviation is often the preferred method of transportation. There are numerous cases of drugs, or other valuable goods such as wildlife and gold, trafficked by cabin and flight crew on commercial flights. It is possible that cabin or flight crew on private jets could also smuggle illegal goods, emphasizing the need to be vigilant. Throughout Latin America, cartels have continued to use business jets to smuggle large amounts of narcotics over long distances. These jets are often acquired in the United States and then destroyed after a single or very few flights to avoid detection. It is important to clearly identify when asked to minimize the risk of misidentification by law enforcement and/or the military. India also has become a major market for both drugs demand and supply side. The drugs in India are mainly coming from Pakistan, Myanmar, Nepal, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Uganda and sometimes via Dubai or Sharjah. The central government has been urged to tighten up border security. 1.3. Human trafficking With human trafficking still being a major issue today, the involvement of business aircraft is to be expected. In commercial aviation steps have been and are still being made to improve the awareness and the prevention of human trafficking. While most of these measures have generally been effective for commercial aviation, it could push human traffickers into finding other solutions. One of these solutions for human traffickers is business/private aviation. If a trafficking organization can overcome the increased costs of using business aviation, it allows for flights to smaller airports with less experienced and limited security compared to larger commercial airports. Additionally, it is easier to bribe or blackmail security personnel to turn a blind eye to human trafficking, especially in unstable countries or regions. 1.4. Cyber threats In the first half of 2023 cyber attacks within the aviation sector surged by 24% worldwide. A notable trend among cyber criminals targeting business aviation is them gaining unauthorized access to confidential business data. When providing unsecured WIFI on board hackers can easily establish connections from the ground getting access to passwords and credentials. Europe 2.1. Climate activism Climate actions are still happening all over Europe, albeit mostly small scale actions over the past two months. The absence of large actions is possibly due to the summer holidays. These actions mostly come from XR affiliates, and the usual MO is the throwing or spraying of paint on parked private/business aircraft. Another effect of the climate actions is the interruption of operations. 2.2 GPS interference Severe GPS interference is to be expected when overflying the Black Sea, coastal Romania, and Bulgaria. Due to the war in Ukraine, most of the Black Sea has also turned into a combat zone. A collateral effect of this is GPS jamming, which spreads into Romania, as well as the south western Black Sea. Middle East 3.1. GPS spoofing GPS spoofing is most prevalent over Iraq, specifically route UM688, the closest route to Iran. This brings both safety as well as security risks, as GPS spoofing can without warning deviate an aircraft (reported up to 80 nm, but theoretically endlessly) from its intended flight path. This can bring aircraft into the flight path of other (oncoming) aircraft, or even worse, bring the aircraft into Iranian airspace. This could lead to an aircraft being intercepted, or even shot down. GPS spoofing will in most civilian aircraft not produce a warning, as the computer still receives a strong and clear GPS signal, albeit an incorrect one. GPS spoofing effects have for now been stopped by pilots who were lucky enough to see the moment their GPS jumped location when the spoofing started. In case of GPS spoofing, for now only dead reckoning or radar vectors can provide a navigational alternative. This is because within minutes, GPS spoofing will make the INS faulty on modern aircraft. 3.2. Increased military presence There is a significant increase in military presence above the Strait of Hormuz to deter Iran from seizing vessels in the area. The tensions and presence have remained, as no changes have happened to the geopolitical situation. Avoid flying over the Strait of Hormuz and clearly identify when asked to minimize the risk of misidentification. 3.3. Overflight Risks Developments in the region have caused a need for extra security measures. These include an advised minimum flight level of 320 over Iraq, with a focus on northern Iraq. Additionally, GPS interference is to be expected when overflying the country as well as over Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, the Eastern Mediterranean, Israel and Turkey. The airspace above Iran, Afghanistan (except for P500/G500), Yemen and Syria is still unsafe for Western aviation. Overflying Saudi Arabia is safe, as long as flying above FL260. Asia 4.1. Pilot held hostage in West Papua (Indonesia) The pilot taken hostage in West Papua to demand independence is still being held by his captors. Since the capture on February 7, the hostage takers have freed the passengers and lowered demands. Negotiations have stranded numerous times and several rescue attempts failed, resulting in casualties on both sides. The indepence fighters have threatened to kill the pilot if demands, which are not publicly known, are not met and have published several videos of the pilot in captivity. On July 20, a senior official of the Indonesian military said that negotiation attempts are still ongoing and that the pilot is alive and healthy. As of September a rebel spokesperson admitted there has been no contact for three months. 4.2. Military operations by Azerbaijan From September 19th to the 20th, Azerbaijan conducted military operations in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. These came with no warning in advance from officials, only at the moment operations started. Dyami first warned its open network for military operations in Nagorno-Karabakh on September 8th. The operation included missile strikes, drone activity, heavy artillery and small arms combat. The presence of drones and cruise missiles can cause a massive risk to any aviation caught in the vicinity, as air defense systems will try to intercept these. Such air defense systems were in the area of operations, but it is not confirmed whether they produced any results. Tensions in the area still linger, as Turkey and Azerbaijan are pushing for Armenia to relinquish a part of the south for a corridor between the former two countries. Besides Armenia, Iran is strongly opposed to this idea, which mobilized forces to its border with the three northern neighbors, stating it will ont allow any international borders to be changed. The advice for now is to completely avoid the Armenia-Azerbaijan border area, as well as southern Armenia. Crossing east-west should be done over Georgia instead, using waypoints ADEKI or DISKA. 4.3. Regional instability Political instability has led to recurring protests and (armed) attacks, particularly in northern India, Pakistan, Myanmar and the border region of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Instabilities prove themselves risky to aviation, including business aviation. The instability in northern India poses a serious risk to aircraft on the ground, while the unrest in Pakistan and Myanmar introduce threats to overflight as well. As a result of proliferation of anti-air weapons, a minimum flight level of 300 AGL is advised. The tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia accumulated to Azerbaijan conducting military operations in Nagorno-Karabakh, resulting in the exodus of almost all Armenians from the region. These tensions have resulted in armed conflict and skirmishes without warning numerous times. Since both countries operate advanced air defense systems, overflying the border region as well as southern Armenia should be avoided. Africa 5.1. Overflight risks Overflying Africa has risks, which differ per country. Libya and Sudan are the only countries with a do not fly advisory while most other countries can be overflown by sticking to a security advisory. Egypt: advice to fly above flight level 300 over the Sinai region due to terrorist organizations in possession of anti-air weapons Ethiopia: the Tigray region remains unstable even though an official peace deal was signed in November. The advice is to avoid overflying the region because of the presence of anti-air systems. Somalia: advisory to not overfly the country below flight level 300 because of the instability in the country in combination with the presence of anti-air systems. Kenya: the border region has an overspill effect of the civil war in Somalia, thus posing the same threat as in Somalia itself. The advisory is to not fly below flight level 300. Mali: militants are in possession of anti-air systems and thus the advice is to not fly below flight level 300 over the country. Niger: as a result of the political instability, the advice is to avoid flying over Niger Western Sahara: due to the conflict in the region between Morocco and the independence movement in the region, there is a risk of proliferation of anti-air weapons. The advice is to stick to a flight level of 250 AGL or more. Gabon: A coup kicked out the sitting ruler of the country, leaving instability in its wake. 5.2. Political instability Political instability has resulted in unpredictable protests and revolts throughout Africa. The political violence in Sudan and Niger has led to serious security risks for aircraft on the ground and overflights. Where the situation in Gabon is headed is unclear for now. It is important to stay up-to-date with the latest developments to minimize the risk of getting caught in armed violence while staying in a vulnerable African country or region. North America 6.1. Trafficking Over the last two months, cartels and other criminal organizations have continued to use private aircraft to smuggle narcotics and for human trafficking. These organizations regularly use private flights to and from smaller regional airports in the south of the United States because of limited security. Airport personnel and/or the flight crew can be coerced or bribed into aiding the traffickers to further ease the smuggling. South America 7.1. Trafficking Cartels continue to use private aircraft, ranging from smaller Cessna to business jets, for drug trafficking throughout the continent. The criminal organizations use old aircraft for these flights because a large number of aircraft are destroyed after only a small number of trafficking flights. These aircraft also pose a risk during flight at low FLs/during departure and descent, as these flights are done without transponders or any form of communication. When returning to your parked aircraft, make sure to check that no one has been on board/accessed cargo hatches to hide illicit goods. If illicit goods are found, take the stance of the local authorities into consideration, as some will imprison crews reporting such goods on their aircraft as the perpetrators. Dyami, a leading provider of aviation security solutions, is proud to announce the appointment of Jan-Peter van Viegen as Head of Aviation. With an illustrious career spanning two decades in various facets of aviation, Jan-Peter brings a wealth of experience and expertise to the Dyami team. Jan-Peter's extensive background encompasses flight operations, business aviation, flight training, safety, and compliance. He has held various key positions in the aviation sector, starting as an operations officer and working his way up to roles such as assistant flight operations manager, flight instructor and Captain on various business aviation aircraft. Most recently, he served as a senior inspector at CAA-NL (Civil Aviation Authority Netherlands).

Date: 28/09/2023 Where: Atlantic islands, Central, and South America. Most recent incident focused on Bermuda Who’s involved: The entirety of the Bermudan government’s services Governments of several neighboring countries Hackers allegedly based out of Russia What happened? The government of Bermuda experienced a network breach in its public infrastructure, first detected on the night of 20/09/2023. An official statement was put out on 21/09/2023, with a formal Press Appearance by the Island's Premier, Mr. E. David Burt, on 25/09/2023. In the statement, the premier blamed hackers from Russia. According to the press, all government departments were in some way impacted, though there haven't been any specifics released as to the extent of the damage. The recovery is still ongoing, with payroll and critical infrastructure now largely restored. However, a full restoration will take weeks. Mr. Burt says that attribution information is still not publicly available as a matter of national security. The classified information indicates that other neighboring countries were attacked, as well. There is an investigation ongoing as to whether or not any critical information was stolen. While too early to determine for sure, this attack follows a pattern of major Ransomware attacks that have been launched against other neighboring countries by Russia-based threat actors over the past two years. Rick Mello, CISO of Sentinel Cybersecurity, said in a statement to Bermuda’s Royal Gazette that, “All signs point to [a] ransomware attack,” based on the reaction from the government and the timeline of recovery. This is all unfolding in the leadup to Bermuda’s Personal Information Protection Act going into effect, which will impact the disclosure procedures of these events. Beginning in 2025, all cybersecurity events that may impact citizens’ private information have to be explicitly reported in as much detail as possible. It will also encourage more private-public cooperation and the ability for responders to work with staff from other countries if it’s deemed necessary. Analysis: Bermuda is the latest Atlantic island nation that’s found itself to be the target of a major cyberattack tied to Russian threat actors. The attacks have crippled Bermuda’s public infrastructure since the night of 20/09/2023, and are expected to do so for the next several weeks. Bermuda’s Premier, Mr. E. David Burt, has stated that other Atlantic locales were impacted as well, but did not disclose which ones. While the details still haven’t been confirmed by Bermuda’s government, expert opinion seems to indicate that this is a Ransomware attack. If this is true, it means that Bermuda would join Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela as the latest victims of such an offensive. This is likely part of a broader trend by Russian threat actors against developing nations, whose own experts see a solution in regional “cyber-cooperation”. So far, there has been a lack of transparency in the name of national security, a policy that is slated to change in 2025 when Bermuda’s Personal Information Protection Act goes into effect. Increased transparency and information sharing are factors that both Bermuda’s own Privacy Commissioner, Alexander White, and other experts from the Caribbean and Latin American cybersecurity communities have insisted will be needed to improve resiliency in the developing areas of the western hemisphere. Since 2020, Russian ransomware groups such as Conti, Clop, and others have crippled infrastructure in these regions and gone largely unpunished. In 2022, the Dominican Republic and its neighbors had to cooperate and share information to combat the Conti Ransomware, which had threatened to do significant damage to the entire Caribbean. A reason for these moves towards regional cooperation, especially among nations with smaller economies, is the fear of a nightmare scenario such as the 2017 Petya and NotPetya Ransomware attacks. These nearly shut down Ukraine’s banking and healthcare sectors, while inflicting nearly a billion US dollars in damages on the Maersk corporation. Mitigation guidelines for institutional malware targets as recommended by ENISA and CISA: Immediate Response 1. Containment: Isolate affected systems to prevent the spread of malware. Disconnect affected systems from the network. 2. Eradication: Remove malware from affected systems. Apply patches and updates to fix vulnerabilities. 3. Incident Reporting: Inform internal security teams. Report the incident to relevant local, national, or international authorities. Forensic Investigation 1. Collect Evidence: Preserve logs, memory dumps, and other relevant data. Document every action taken during the incident response. 2. Investigate: Analyze the malware to understand its functionality and purpose. Determine the scope and impact of the incident. Communications 1. Internal Communication: Inform employees and stakeholders about the incident. Provide guidance on actions they should take to prevent further damage. 2. External Communication: Notify affected parties and the public, as appropriate. Coordinate with external partners and vendors to address the incident. Recovery Measures 1. Restore Operations: Rebuild affected systems. Restore data from backups. 2. Monitor: Closely monitor network traffic and system behavior for signs of malicious activity. Update threat intelligence feeds and security controls. 3. Post-Incident Review: Evaluate the incident response to identify areas for improvement. Update incident response and recovery plans based on lessons learned. Preemptive and Proactive Measures 1. Security Awareness Training: Educate users on recognizing and reporting phishing and other malicious activities. Perform regular simulated phishing exercises to reinforce learning. 2. Cyber Hygiene: Regularly update and patch systems and applications. Enforce the use of strong, unique passwords. 3. Network Segmentation: Segment networks to limit lateral movement of attackers. Use firewalls, intrusion detection/prevention systems, and other security tools to monitor and control traffic. 4. Vulnerability Management: Regularly scan for and remediate vulnerabilities. Prioritize vulnerabilities based on risk to the organization. 5. Backup and Restore: Regularly backup critical data and systems. Test restore procedures to ensure data integrity and availability. Legal and Regulatory Compliance Compliance with Laws and Regulations: Adhere to relevant legal and regulatory requirements related to data breach notification and reporting. Consult legal counsel to navigate legal obligations and potential liabilities. Collaboration and Information Sharing Collaborate with Other Organizations: Engage in information sharing with peer organizations, industry groups, and government agencies. Leverage shared threat intelligence to enhance situational awareness. Mitigation Summary These mitigating practices, when effectively combined, form a robust and resilient approach to managing the risk posed by malware attacks. The key is to be proactive, keep abreast of the evolving threat landscape, and continuously refine and update strategies and controls to counter emerging threats.

Date: 02/10/2023 Where: Russia, Barents Sea Who’s involved: Russian Government, International Aviation. What happened? Russia is potentially testing their new nuclear powered missiles over the Barents Sea in the near future. These missiles use nuclear energy to propel themselves theoretically thousands of miles. It is important to note that during tests, there are no actual nuclear warheads on the missiles, although these missiles are capable of carrying such warheads. The missiles are 12 meters long and 1,5 meters in circumference, and are claimed to be capable of hypersonic speeds. Analysis: The threat to international aviation comes from the threat of mid air collision with either the flying missile, but mostly the debris caused by a test gone wrong. The missiles are in an early testing phase, and thus are very unpredictable. There is a real chance of the tests going out of control, leading the missiles to potentially fly uncontrolled for thousands of miles. Due to the secretive nature of the missiles and their tests, there is a danger in not knowing when and exactly where these tests are conducted. If a test/flight goes wrong, the missiles have the potential to spread radioactive emissions, due to the nuclear material powering the missiles. Peace of mind Dyami offers a comprehensive One-Stop Aviation Security Solution to assist aviation security officers and dispatchers in enhancing their capabilities and capacity, streamlining operations, and bolstering security measures. ​ Our solution aims to provide an affordable holistic approach to security risk management that results in more secure and efficient airline or charter operations. Visit dyami aviation for more information.

Written by Jacob Dickinson, Roos Nijmeijers, Sara Frisan, Mark Bruno Russia-Ukraine: Progress in Ukraine's counter-offensive as President Zelensky asks for continued support. Azerbaijan-Armenia: Outbreak of conflict as Azerbaijan's military moves into Nagorno-Karabakh. Serbia-Kosovo: Terrorist attacks in the north of Kosovo heighten tensions between Serbia and Kosovo. Sudan: Intense fighting continues in Sudan with infrastructure damage and extensive civilian casualties. Gabon and Niger: Military leaders seize power from democratic governments. DRC: Protests against unpopular UN peacekeeping missions and crackdown on protestors. Myanmar: Civil war continues as opposition forces target the regime's military infrastructure. Ethiopia: The Ethiopian government declared a state of emergency following escalation of violence. Somaliland: Rise in terrorist attacks against civilians following a crackdown on Al-Shabab. Ecuador: Escalating violence and insecurity in Ecuador as gangs compete over cocaine trafficking routes. Pakistan: Pakistan continues to face political instability as economic crisis worsens. China-Taiwan: China conducts military exercises in the South Pacific and send record numbers of aircraft into Taiwan's airspace Haiti: Haiti sees rising gang violence as Haiti's Prime Minister calls for international intervention. South China Sea: Regional tensions rise over Chinese territorial claims. Conflicts, September 2023 Russia-Ukraine: Ukraine’s counter-offensive has made progress to the south of Bakhmut. Attacks against targets in Russia and Russian-occupied Crimea continue to escalate with both unmanned weapons systems and irregular ground forces. A 25 September 2023 aerial attack on Odessa has left the port facilities damaged. Notably, two Russian vessels in Sevastopol were destroyed, including a kilo-class submarine. President Zelensky attempted to encourage international support at the UN General Assembly in September. This preceded mixed political responses from the US Congress and attacks from Poland’s ruling Law and Justice Party (PiS) regarding food import and export policies. Canada’s response proved more positive as further economic ties between Kyiv and Ottawa were signed. Despite the increased impact of sanctions against Russia, US government sources assess that Russian missile production has increased to pre-war levels, though at great cost to the economy. Nevertheless, reports have emerged that two-thirds of Russian oil exports have avoided the price cap sanctions imposed by the G7. Azerbaijan-Armenia: On 19 September, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive in the Nagorno-Karabakh region , where 120,000 ethnic Armenians live. The Karabakh capital Stepanakert was heavily shelled and an estimated 200 people died during the Azeri offensive, according to Karabakh officials. After two days, Azerbaijan regained total control over Nagorno-Karabakh following a ceasefire agreement and the abdication of the authorities that governed the enclave. As Azerbaijan regains control over the region, there are growing fears of an ethnic cleansing campaign causing many ethnic Armenian residents to flee to neighboring Armenia. Meanwhile, Turkish-Azeri relations are being strengthened, causing fear in the region of further instability. As Azerbaijan successfully conquered Nagorno-Karabakh, it is feared that their military campaign will not stop there. The Azeri exclave of Nakhchivan, bordering Turkey, is separated by the Armenian region of Zangezur. Together with Turkey, Azerbaijan may want to establish a corridor through Armenia , connecting the main part of Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan and ultimately Turkey. Azerbaijan has stated that they are willing to use force if necessary, which could lead to the Azeri army entering southern Armenia. Serbia-Kosovo: On 24 September, 30 armed gunmen ambushed a Kosovar police patrol and fled into a monastery in the majority ethnic-Serb north of Kosovo. The following siege resulted in the death of one Kosovar police officer and three gunmen, as the paramilitary group crossed into Serbia. Kosovar police eventually arrested other civilians involved, discovering weapons and communications equipment to support the operation. EU-led diplomatic talks between the two countries have stalled following the attack. Kosovo’s PM Albin Kurti accused Serbia of directly supplying the gunmen with uniforms and claimed that the paramilitary leader was closely affiliated with Serbia’s President Vucic. Serbian leader Vucic accused Kosovo of inflaming tensions in the north of Kosovo by not respecting the wishes of ethnic Serbs in the region. He subsequently requested the NATO-led peacekeeping mission to replace the Kosovo police force with NATO troops and remove Kurti from the area. NATO subsequently rejected the proposal and called for calm between the two countries. Sudan: September has been a violent month in the capital of Khartoum as fighting continues between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The death of Abdelazim Suleiman Jumah, a key figure in the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North Democratic Revolutionary Movement, marked an escalation in hostilities. Ukrainian Special Operations are suspected of killing Wagner Group fighters in Khartoum with improvised drone strikes. SAF commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan issued a constitutional decree to dissolve the rival RSF on 6 September 2023, alongside U.S. sanctions placed on RSF commanders due to human rights abuses. RSF commander Hemedti threatened to establish an independent government in Khartoum. During the UN General Assembly, al-Burhan designated the RSF a terrorist organization and underscored the potential regional implications of the current conflict. DRC: The security situation in the DRC is worsening. The presence of the UN peacekeeping mission MONUSCO, which has been in the DRC for 25 years, has become increasingly unpopular . The East African Community (EAC) has pushed the armed group M23 out of some parts of the occupied parts of the DRC, but has failed to end the conflict with the armed group. Critics say they have failed in their mission to protect citizens from rebellion and armed conflict. Protests in Goma against the UN peacekeeping and the East African Community (EAC) resulted in a crackdown by government authorities. On September 5, six soldiers were charged for killing 56 people in an army crackdown in the eastern DRC. President Tshisekedi has asked the UN to end the peacekeeping mission by the end of this year . The DRC government, along with the U.S., several Western countries and UN experts, has accused neighboring Rwanda, a member of the EAC, of supporting the M23. Tshisekedi says Rwanda’s support to the M23 is for its own exploitation and profit. Ethiopia: On August 4, the Ethiopian government declared a six-month state of emergency, following the escalation of violence and clashes in Amhara region between the Fano militia group and the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF). Reports have emerged of alleged atrocities and arbitrary mass detentions of civilians carried out by the government. On August 29, the UN claimed that at least 183 people have been killed during clashes since July. Despite the peace agreement signed in November 2022, the region is still experiencing a severe humanitarian crisis. The United Nations has reported persistent sexual crimes and rape against civilians by Eritrean troops still in the territory. Heavy clashes with civilians involved have also been reported in the Oromia region between Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and State forces. Somalia: Somalia is contending with the aftermath of a violent truck bombing that occurred on 23 September 2023 in the town of Beledweyne. Estimates of the death toll have ranged between 18 and 30, with at least 40 bystanders injured in the attack. No group has claimed responsibility as of 25 September, but police officials have pointed out that the attack comes after the government has intensified attacks against al-Shabab (an al-Qaeda-linked organization). The Somali government has asked the UN Security Council’s African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (Atmis) to delay the reduction of its presence in the country until December, which was originally slated to draw down 3000 personnel by the end of the month. Somalia is also the subject of competing grain deals with Russia and Ukraine, the latter of which has largely increased its supply to Somalia in recent months. Haiti: In September, Haiti continued to see rising gang violence following the assassination of President Jovenel Moise in July 2021. Armed groups are prevalent in the neighborhoods of Carrefour-Feuilles and Savanes Pistache of the capital Port-au-Prince. More than 19,000 people were driven out of their homes in September. The situation has also been worsened by the closure of all borders, by land, sea, or air, by the Dominican Republic, the main destination for Haitian migrants . On September 19, Jimmy Chérizier, leader of Haiti's most powerful gang, called for the armed overthrow of Prime Minister Ariel Henry, threatening daily demonstrations and armed clashes for as long as the Prime Minister remains in office. Haiti's Prime Minister repeatedly called for international intervention to help quell the gang-armed violence . On September 20, Haiti setup diplomatic relations with Kenya, which will likely lead a United Nations multinational security force to support and train local police. The UN Security Council could decide on international intervention in Haiti in the coming days or weeks. Alerts and developing situations Niger-Gabon: On August 30 2023, Gabon’s military seized power in a coup to oust president Ali Bongo, making a move away from democratic governments in the region. Military juntas have been in power in Chad, Guinea, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, Sudan since 2020. Military leaders have exploited rising disenchantment with civilian leaders, who are struggling to address attacks by armed groups on civilians and rising poverty levels. The regional organization ECOWAS stated that it was willing to use military force to reinstate the ousted president in Niger. Nigeria, Rwanda and Cameroon announced military reshuffles shortly after the coup in Gabon. As many of the military coups led to heavy criticsm of France’s military interventions, France is facing questions over the efficacy of their international interventions in the region and the apparent willingness of new military governments to look to Russia for any kind of support. Ecuador: Ecuador is experiencing an unprecedented spiral of violence. Over the past two years, the country has shifted from being the most peaceful in the Latin American region to being ranked fourth-highest in homicide rate . The security crisis has been sparked by criminal groups and gangs, local and foreign, who are taking advantage and competing over the country's strategic role in global cocaine trafficking routes. The country faces a political crisis, which began on May 17, with the impeachment trial against President Lasso. As a result, President Lasso dissolved the opposition-led National Assembly and called snap presidential and legislative elections on August 20. As no candidate was able to secure an absolute majority, a run-off election will be held on 15 October. T he months leading up to the August election have been marked by escalating political violence targeting politicians and local officials, culminating in the assassination by a gunman of Fernando Villavicencio, one of the front-runners for president, on August 9 . The same day, President Lasso announced a 60-day national emergency. The spike in crime spurred widespread distrust in authorities' ability to provide security, triggering the expansion of vigilante and self-defense groups. Pakistan: Pakistan faces ongoing protests and political instability while attempting to face off an economic crisis. Protests against rising electricity and fuel prices across the country have been ongoing since August 23. The Supreme Court dropped corruption charges against Imran Khan, former Prime Minister of Pakistan, who still has a political following in the country . He is also being charged with leaking state secrets, adding to the more than 100 charges leveled against him since his removal from power. Khan remains in jail however, with the military targeting his supporters and holding greater sway in the government. The planned elections of Pakistan have been delayed from October to the last week of January. Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan has seen several skirmishes between the Taliban and Pakistan security forces. In early September, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an ideologically aligned group with the Taliban in Afghanistan, claimed they attacked two military checkpoints in the Chitral district in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. This was one of 300 attacks in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa this year. China-Taiwan: China’s People’s Liberation Army conducted the largest number of aircraft incursions into Taiwan’s airspace to date on 18 September. The Chinese navy also began military exercises to the south of the island, deploying China’s aircraft carrier. The exercises are meant to simulate a potential blockade of Taiwan’s ports. China claims it is targeting ‘separatist forces’ seeking to break Taiwan away from China’s sovereignty over the island. China is likely to apply pressure to gain a more China-friendly candidate in Taiwan’s upcoming presidential election in January 2024 . Taiwan has become a flashpoint in US-China competition and regional responses with military build-ups are rapidly reshaping Asia’s geopolitics. South China Sea: In September, tensions in the South China Sea rose as states in Southeast Asia began to respond to China’s assertiveness. On the 25th September, the Philippines removed a Chinese barrier to the Scarborough Shoal , a contested island which the Philippines claims as its territory. The Chinese coast guard issued radio challenges to the Philippines vessels, accusing them of violating international law. Japan cautioned calm and said the South China Sea was a key part of regional stability. This comes as maritime ASEAN states launched new joint military exercises in response to China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, and Vietnam upgraded diplomatic ties with the US to improve security and economic cooperation. Following up on previous conflict monitoring reports Myanmar: In September, fighting from opposition forces in Myanmar’s bloody civil war picked up as they launched attacks on junta-controlled convoys and infrastructure. The military junta has shifted tactics from arson of entire villages to using more selective intelligence to help identify and kill resistance fighters. Despite extensive sabotage against the junta’s military infrastructure in the east of the country, the regime’s air and artillery capabilities prevent either side from gaining control over the country. On the border with Thailand, the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) is the largest resistance movement, attempting to mobilize anti-regime forces against the junta. As a sign of the junta’s loss of credibility in Southeast Asia, the ASEAN regional group directly condemned the military actions for the first time in a joint published communique . About the authors Jacob Dickinson Jacob studied Global Political Economy at Leiden University. He is passionate about international development and is looking to expand his expertise in geopolitics and crisis management. Curious about other cultures, he has traveled in Europe and Asia for both academic study and professional purposes. His expertise includes the geopolitics of oil and industrial upgrading in the electronics global value chain. He is particularly interested in the evolving political and economic relationships between China and ASEAN, and the consequences for regional development and security. Roos Nijmeijers Roos works as a junior intelligence/research analyst. She is also currently doing the Bachelor of Security Studies at Leiden University. She has always loved the security field and she immediately got the right feeling when meeting Dyami's team for the first time. With the wide range of knowledge she accumulated thanks to her bachelor’s program, she brings new aspects to the intelligence department and helps us write insightful products. Sara Frisan Sara Frisan joined Dyami as a Junior Intelligence/Research Analyst post-graduate intern to deepen her passionate interest in conflict analysis and security. Sara recently completed her MA in Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University and held an MA degree in International Sciences and Peace Studies. During her academic career, she conducted research in South America, primarily Colombia, on the dynamics of collaboration and resistance between civilians and non-state armed groups in violent settings. In her previous internship at the investigative think-tank InSight Crime, Sara developed some expertise on transnational organized crime and political-criminal alliances. Mark Bruno Mark Bruno is a non-commissioned officer transitioning out of the United States military, where he served as a Combat Medic and a Public Affairs Representative. He is currently a Master’s Student of Cybersecurity and Information Assurance at Western Governors University, and holds a Bachelor of Science in Communication. Aspiring to a career in Conflict Journalism, his areas of security interest are in military medicine, information security, and weapons technology.

Date: 27/09/2023 Where: Guatemala Who’s involved: President-elect Bernardo Arévalo, Attorney General Porras, Supreme Electoral Tribunal. What happened? Since early September, widespread protests have taken place across Guatemala in defense of presidential election results. Protesters supported the newly elected President Bernardo Arévalo, son of the first President elected in the Guatemalan democracy, and his political party, Movimiento Semilla (Seed Movement). In the presidential elections run-off on August 20, Guatemalan anti-corruption and center-left candidate Arévalo won over front-runner candidate Sandra Torres of the National Unity of Hope party, securing 58% and the majority of votes in 17 of Guatemala's 22 departments. On August 28, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) confirmed the results of the elections, announcing that Arévalo will take office on 14 January 2024, replacing the outgoing President Alejandro Giammattei. However, on the same day, a few hours before the confirmation of the elections, Guatemala’s attorney general, Consuelo Porras, suspended the Semillas party pending investigations. On September 3, Guatemala’s electoral authorities blocked the suspension of Arévalo’s party, temporarily restoring the party’s legal status at least until October 31, the official end of the electoral process. Nevertheless, it is still likely that the party will be suspended again from November 1st. In response, Arévalo called prosecutors’ investigations into his electoral victory violations of the constitution and part of a coup attempt by “judges and prosecutors.” On September 12, Arévalo decided to suspend his participation in the transition process, demanding the removal of Attorney General Porras. The President-elect announced that the process would resume once electoral interference ends and “the necessary institutional and political conditions are restored.” On the same day, the Organization of American States (OAS) claimed that prosecutors’ actions were aimed at preventing Arévalo from taking office. Indeed, this was not the first electoral interference against the Semilla Movement. Following the June 25 first-round elections, which showed surprising support for Arévalo, the party’s legal status was questioned. On July 12, a minor judge, likely at the behest of Rafael Curruchiche, the head of the Special Prosecutor’s Office Against Impunity, suspended the party for alleged money laundering and technical irregularities. On July 13, the Constitutional Court (CC) overturned the Seed Movement's disqualification from the August run-off as the suspension violated the electoral law. Analysis: Political and judicial interference in the electoral and presidential transition process in Guatemala is shedding light on the widespread corruption in the country’s political system. Corruption and impunity are embedded in the Guatemalan system. In Guatemala’s political system, all elected officials enjoy complete immunity from prosecution, which can only be revoked by the Supreme Court and Congress. Guatemalan politicians have taken advantage of immunity for decades to avoid corruption convictions. In 2007, the International Commission against Impunity (CICIG) was established. In 2019, the UN-backed commission was shut down by then-President Jimmy Morales. In 2015, investigations conducted by the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the CICIG unveiled a scheme of corruption, fraud, and alliances with criminal groups involving then-President Otto Pérez Molina. The 2015 corruption scandal sparked a peaceful protest movement that led to Pérez Molina’s forced resignation. He was convicted of corruption in 2022. The Semilla Movement originates from the 2015 anti-corruption protests. Arévalo’s progressive political program is centered on zero tolerance for corruption and reform of the criminal justice system and pledged to save the country from the rising authoritarian threat. The victory of the Semilla Movement indicates widespread frustration with the corrupt establishment and expectations for a more transparent political system. Outgoing President Giammattei denounced “unnecessary international involvement” in the election aftermath. The United States denounced unprecedented attempts to undermine the election results and urged Guatemalan authorities to end their intimidation efforts. The EU stresses that any attempts to prevent the democratic transition will have consequences for Guatemala’s international relations. Brazilian President Lula de Silva addressed the UN General Assembly supporting Arévalo, warning that electoral obstructions put Guatemala at risk of a coup. Being the largest economy and most populated country in Central America, any further deterioration of democracy and the political crisis in Guatemala would lead to economic repercussions and affect foreign investment in the country. Guatemala's main economic partner is still the U.S. The country also plays a strategic role in the transit of migrant flows and international organized crime networks. Conclusion: Arévalo’s victory came as a “surprise” given the deep-rooted corruption networks in Guatemala’s political elite. The election’s results have been interpreted as a symptom of the population’s frustration with systemic corruption in Guatemala, worsened by the economic crisis and the increase in poverty and crime following COVID-19 emergence. In recent decades, Guatemala has experienced among the lowest levels of support for democracy in Latin America. Yet, the 2023 elections recorded a massive popular turnout. Moreover, international observers see the triumph of a center-left political force in Guatemala as a powerful means of halting democratic deterioration and authoritarianism in the region. Given the uncertainty over the outcomes of the presidential transition process, it is likely that the anti-corruption protests in the country's major cities will continue. While not violent, such demonstrations could cause unrest and business and transportation disruption. The political crisis could also be protracted as the Semilla Movement may be suspended again in November at the end of the election period. Considering the substantial political and judicial interference, it is uncertain whether President-elected Arévalo will take office as expected on January 14th, 2024. The international community is observing the transition with concern.

Route most commonly known for GPS Spoofing Date: 26/09/2023 Where: Worldwide, current hotspot in ORBB/Baghdad FIR Who’s involved: Aviation worldwide, local governments, local non-state actors. What is happening? Where with GPS jamming, the GPS signal is interrupted to a degree that it is unusable, with GPS spoofing, a false GPS signal is broadcasted, causing GPS systems to produce false positioning without a warning shown to the pilots. With GPS spoofing, a falsified GPS signal is received by the aircraft, which is of sufficient strength and integrity to fool aircraft systems, and will render an aircraft's IRS unusable in minutes, and has often resulted in the complete loss of navigational capability of the aircraft (OPSGROUP). Navigation systems are unlikely to produce warnings for spoofing compared to jamming, as the systems do not detect spoofing. GPS spoofing in ORBB/Baghdad FIR has resulted in up to 80 nm deviation from the flight path. To OPSGROUP alone, twelve separate reports have come in quick succession from a range of aircraft platforms, from 777s to 8Xs, all affected by spoofing. The reports mentioned the crews noticing other aircraft in their vicinity also affected by the spoofing (OPSGROUP). Aircraft affected by the spoofing in ORBB had to rely on radar vectors from ATC (OPSGROUP). GPS jamming happens above the Baltic Sea, Eastern Finland, the Black Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean, affecting major Europe to Middle-East and Asia routes. Spoofing does not always have to happen from the ground. Airborne spoofing originating from ‘normal’ aircraft as well as UAVs are both feasible. GPS spoofing development is further discussed at the bottom of the article. Analysis & recommended mitigating practices: In most modern aircraft, GPS is integrated in their navigational systems and lacks stand-alone, self-contained INS and IRS systems. Make sure to check your AFM to check where your aircraft navigational capability is based on. If your company hasn’t designed a contingency procedure yet on how to deal with this situation, here are a few steps you could undertake to be aware of the problem and mitigate it. Mitigation actions before and during the flight: Check enroute FIR NOTAMs for any reported GPS spoofing and (https://gpsjam.org/) Cockpit Preparation: Perform full IRS alignment if entering a known area with GPS spoofing risk Be aware of typical sensor hierarchy for FMS position: GPS, then IRS, DME/DME, VOR/DME, and DR. Consider de-selecting GPS sensor input if option is available. Perform a time check and set the correct time on a personal device or watch. When flying through known areas of GPS spoofing, make a habit of logging your position at regular intervals and cross-check using dead reckoning. Inform ATC when navigational accuracy is degraded significantly or this is suspected. Recognition of being spoofed. Loss of GPS integrity FMS position error Map shift on your PFD / MFD Large increase in your Estimated position uncertainty (EPU). Incorrect UTC time displayed on your FMS or cockpit clock Other aircraft reporting position errors on 121.5 Do not solely rely on ATC to provide vectors in case of navigational issues during a jamming or spoofing occurrence. Make sure that you know how to apply dead reckoning as an alternate means, it is hardly taught and practiced in the current initial pilot training era. Example of aircraft relying solely on GPS input for positioning. The Embraer Phenom 300, like the Cessna Citation CJ3+/M2 is equipped with a Garmin 3000 and relies solely on GPS input for positioning. If both GPS signals are lost, the aircraft does not have a conventional backup for the FMS to have positional information. The VOR and DME can be used for conventional navigation but cannot be linked to the Garmin FMS. The AHRS takes a signal feed from the GPS, Magnetometer, and Air Data, and if any of these are interrupted, an AHRS FAULT CAS is seen by the crew, which means the AHRS is working in a degraded mode of operation. Some or all of the following annunciations or CAS messages will be seen on the Garmin 3000 in the event of a loss of GPS signal. GPS LOI (PFD) BOTH ON GPS 1/2 (PFD) TAWS N/A (SVS NOT AVAILABLE) (PFD) AHRS 1/2 FAULT (CAS) WSHEAR NOT AVAIL (CAS) ADS-B NOT AVAIL (CAS) NO FMS POSITION (MFD) GPS NAV LOST (GTC) AHRS 1/2 GPS (GTC) DR (HSI) Note: Dead Reckoning Mode (DR) only functions in enroute (ENR) or Oceanic (OCN) phase of flight. In DR Mode, the system uses its last-known position combined with continuously updated airspeed and heading data (when available) to calculate and display the aircraft’s current estimated position. In all other phases, an invalid GPS solution produces a ‘NO FMS POSITION’ annunciation on the map, and the system stops using GPS. If any of the above messages are presented, and GPS integrity is suspected, the following QRH checklists should be followed: GPS NAV SYSTEM FAILURE - NAP1-18 AHRS 1/2 FAULT This checklist must be followed to slow the aircraft down to prevent a possible AHRS mis-compare limit from being exceeded, which could lead to an AHRS FAIL situation. Note: Ventral rudder availability has been improved to depend on AHRS yaw rate values only. Previously, it also required the use of roll parameters. In practical terms, later oscillations will not occur when AHRS are operating in alternate mode. Additional Actions Check the GPS Status Page (Utilities / GPS Status) on the GTC and the detailed information shown on the PFD when this page is selected on the GTC. Identify the failed sensor, cross-check aircraft position using VOR / DME. Monitor aircraft position and navigation performance. Inform ATC when navigational accuracy is degraded significantly or this is suspected. GPS spoofing (Garmin 3000) is an attempt to deceive a GPS receiver by broadcasting incorrect GPS signals. These signals may cause a complete failure of GPS, similar to GPS jamming, or cause the GPS position to shift from the actual position. As GPS is the primary position sensor, the FMS position will shift with the GPS position. Depending on the rate of change of GPS position, this shift may not be detected automatically. The following are potential indicators of GPS spoofing: GPS LOI NO FMS POSITION LOSS OF GPS NAVIGATION (GTC) Map shift on PFD / MFD Excessive deviation between FMS position and conventional navigation sources. Inform ATC when navigational accuracy is degraded significantly or this is suspected. GPS Spoofing Development The surge in GPS jamming and spoofing incidents within the Iraqi FIR, along with their widespread occurrences, strongly indicates the involvement of an airborne platform (UAV). In the past, Iran has successfully intercepted a drone by GPS spoofing. Spoofing provides an attack vector that enables control over the target UAV (aircraft) without compromising the flight control software or the command-and-control radio link. Furthermore, a GPS spoofing attack can be carried out by an attacker who is equipped with an RF transmitter that can be ground or airborne-based. Peace of mind Dyami offers a comprehensive One-Stop Aviation Security Solution to assist aviation security officers and dispatchers in enhancing their capabilities and capacity, streamlining operations, and bolstering security measures. ​ Our solution aims to provide an affordable holistic approach to security risk management that results in more secure and efficient airline or charter operations. Visit dyami aviation for more information.

Date: 25/09/2023 Where: North Kosovo Who’s involved: Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, Kosovar police What happened? On 24/09/2023 two patrolling Kosovar police officers were ambushed near Banjska, on the Kosovo-Serbian border. “The police unit was attacked from different positions by 30 gunmen armed with heavy weapons, including grenades”. After the attackers murdered one police officer and injured the other, they fled to a nearby Orthodox Christian monastery. They barricaded themselves in and they fought gun battles for hours. At least three assailants were shot dead and one attacker was arrested during the battle. Another four civilian suspects were arrested because they had radio equipment and weapons. On 25/09/2023, Kosovar police units moved in armed vehicles to the village Banjska hoping to arrest the gunmen. The siege at the monastery has ended, but whether all gunmen were caught is unclear. Both Serbia and Kosovo have blamed each other for the violence. Albin Kurti, prime minister of Kosovo, called it a terrorist attack and accused the Serbian state of sponsoring the gunmen. He sees the attack as criminal and terrorism. The President of Serbia, Vucic, called this action a rebellion against Prime Minister Albin Kurti, as Kurti refused to form an association of Serb municipalities in north Kosovo. Vucic stated “Serbia will never recognize independent Kosovo, you can kill us all.” The attack took place more than a week after the leaders of Serbia and Kosovo had talks on improving their relations. They failed to come to an agreement during EU-mediated negotiations in Brussels. Analysis: The terrorist attacks in the north of Kosovo mark a serious increase in tensions between Serbia and Kosovo. Both countries have blamed the other for the violence and the rhetoric has heightened. This comes as EU-led negotiations to normalize political relations between the countries have stalled. The relations between Serbia and Kosovo are highly complex and strained. The ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo launched a rebellion in 1998 to throw off Serbian rule. The violence of the conflict led to a NATO intervention and peacekeeping in 1999. The majority of Kosovo is ethnic Albanian, though 5 percent of Kosovo’s 1.8 million people are ethnic Serbs and concentrated in the north of the country. Serbia refuses to recognize Kosovo’s independence after succeeding from Serbia in 2008. Today, it is recognized as an independent state by the U.S. and EU, and more than 100 countries. Russia and China, as well as five European states, do not recognize Kosovo’s sovereignty and/or are stalling Kosovo’s EU membership. Unrest in the region intensified after elections in April 2023, when ethnic Albanian mayors took office in the Serb-majority northern part of Kosovo, resulting in violent clashes between Serb protesters and NATO peacekeepers. The Serb majority had boycotted local elections as a form of protest to claim their autonomy. The mayoral election had a low turnout, with only 3.5% voting in the elections. Diplomatic efforts to normalize political relations have failed to produce a lasting settlement between Serbia and Kosovo. The EU and U.S. are pressing both governments to sign a compromise proposal to end Belgrade’s lobbying against international recognition of Kosovo in return for Kosovo’s concession to form an association of 10 Serb-majority municipalities. The association’s establishment was originally a part of the 2013 Pristina-Belgrade agreement but failed as it was declared unconstitutional by Kosovo’s Constitutional Court. The 4,500 NATO peacekeepers stationed in the country are on alert and have increased their presence on the Kosovo-Serbian border. Serbia is unlikely to start a full-scale military mobilization against Kosovo because of the presence of NATO troops and because of Russia’s current lack of support for its allies. Conclusion The attack on police officers in north Kosovo marks an acute heightening in tension in the country. First, it raises questions over the origins of the military equipment used. Second, it presents a serious threat to the political normalization of ties between Serbia and Kosovo, with both sides accusing each other of inciting the violence. Both Pristina and Belgrade need to normalize ties to gain access to the EU but without a breakthrough in talks, there will be further instability and the potential for violent clashes. Despite a spike in tensions, a Serbian military mobilization against Kosovo is unlikely without significant support from Russia. The presence of NATO peacekeepers also mitigates the threat of military escalation between the two countries.

Date: 25/09/2023 Where: Azerbaijan, Nakhchivan Who’s involved: Turkish Government, Azeri Government. Events: On 25/09/2023, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is visiting Azerbaijan’s autonomous Nakhchivan exclave. Here he will meet with the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, to discuss bilateral relations, international and regional politics, and the current situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. During the talks, Erdoğan and Aliyev will most likely discuss the ‘Zangezur Corridor’, a project by Azerbaijan and Turkey to connect the Nakhchivan exclave over land through Armenia’s southern region of Zangezur. Azerbaijan has stated that they are willing to use force if Armenia refuses to cooperate with the establishment of the corridor. Currently, Turkish media has been reporting suspected militarization of the Zangezur region by Armenia, and referring to the Erdoğan-Aliyev meeting as ‘the corridor meeting.’ Iran stated that it “will not allow any change of borders in the region” warning against the possibility of Azerbaijan and Turkey using force to establish the Zangezur corridor. For Iran, the connection with Armenia is what allows them to conduct land route trade with Russia. It is reported that Iran has bolstered its military presence at the border. Analysis: The establishment of a ‘Zangezur corridor’ will be highly beneficial to Turkey, as Azerbaijan will then be able to export oil and natural gas from the Caspian Sea to Turkey. With Armenia weakened by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and lacking Russian support, Azerbaijan may feel encouraged to escalate its pressure campaign over the Zangezur corridor. Although Turkish media reports of Armenian militarization of the Zangezur region, the reports may not be accurate, especially as Turkish media is mostly state-controlled. The Turkish media reports may indicate that the Turkish government is starting to push a narrative about safeguarding Turkish international interests. With this narrative, it will be easier for Turkey to domestically legitimize military involvement, if Azerbaijan chooses to engage militarily in the Zangezur region. The narrative regarding the ‘Zangezur corridor,’ that emerged from the meeting between Erdoğan and Aliyev, will be key to determining future moves of Turkey and Azerbaijan in the region. Iran’s red line on borders between Azerbaijan and Armenia could either prevent military operations from happening or it will involve Iran in the conflict. Conclusion Turkey’s interest in the development of the gas pipeline connection through the ‘Zangezur corridor’ suggests that it could use the current Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict to its advantage. An escalation of the conflict is likely if rhetoric continues from both Turkey and Azerbaijan that the establishment of the ‘Zangezur corridor’ is necessary and that Armenia is continuing to refuse cooperation while militarizing the region. In this scenario, it is likely that Azerbaijan will militarily engage in the Zangezur region together with Turkish support. If this conflict escalates, it will be relatively soon as Azerbaijan will likely want to use the military momentum gained from the Nagorno-Karabakh engagement.

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Written by Alper Cezmi Ozdemir Turkish general elections concluded on May 28th, with incumbent President Recep Tayyip Erdogan defeating his opponent Kemal Kilicdaroglu by securing 52.2% of the vote. President Erdogan's People’s Alliance also secured a comfortable lead in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, despite consensus among pollsters and many analysts that his 20-year rule could come to an end. Indeed, the elections took place in the shadow of unprecedented inflationary pressures plaguing the country’s economy and a disastrous response to the February 6th earthquakes that decimated the country’s southern and central Anatolian region. President Erdogan securing another five-year term will help cement his legacy in Turkish politics. His electoral victory will also serve as a reaffirmation of Turkey’s foreign policy transformation, which is largely defined by a turn towards strategic autonomy, the adoption of transactional relationships with Western partners, and a more assertive and military-focused regional posturing in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. While observers should expect the continuation of these themes, the extent of Turkey’s balancing act may be limited. Turkey's Quest for Strategic Autonomy Turkey’s foreign policy under President Erdogan’s 20-year rule can be defined as a pursuit of strategic autonomy through the balancing of partners and diversifying dependencies. Analyses that depict Turkey “divorcing” from the Western alliance in favor of the rivals of the Western-led order are misguided. Rather, it is the case that Turkey is leveraging emerging rivalries and great power competition to carve out its sphere of influence and advance its interests abroad. Turkey’s unilateral military intervention in Syria, the expansion of Turkish military presence in Iraq, and the balancing between Russia and the West during Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine are all manifestations of this rebalancing. Turkey deepened its relations with Russia at the expense of its long-standing strategic alliance with the United States. In 2017, Turkey purchased the S-400 missile defense system from Russia which led to its expulsion from the F-35 program. However, Turkey also remains outside the sanctions regime implemented by its Western allies to punish Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. Instead, its trade volume with Russia has grown since February 2022, according to a report by the Atlantic Council. The same report also outlines how Turkey helped Russia evade Western sanctions by exporting Western-made critical dual-use technology, such as integrated circuits and semiconductors. Meanwhile, Turkey deepened its defense cooperation with Ukraine even before Russia invaded the country. This cooperation extends well beyond the immediate humanitarian, financial, and defense aid Turkey started to provide following the invasion. The two countries inked a joint production agreement for Turkish Bayraktar drones days before Russia’s full-scale invasion began. Turkey’s drones provided much-needed aerial capabilities to the Ukrainian defense effort during the initial phase of Russia’s offensive in February 2022. Furthermore, Turkey has supported Ukrainian territorial integrity since 2014 and is a vocal supporter of Ukraine’s NATO accession. Most recently, Turkey repatriated the captured leaders of the Azov battalion following Ukrainian President Zelenskyy’s visit to Ankara, despite Russia’s objections. In addition, Turkey remains deeply reliant on its Western allies for aerial capabilities and critical technologies to advance its own defense industrial base. Turkey’s economic integration in European markets, and the fact that the European Union is Turkey’s largest trade partner make a total divorce unlikely. For its part, Turkey is essential for advancing transatlantic security. It is a serious security provider to the Alliance as well as being among the largest contributors to NATO’s collective defense from a manpower perspective. Turkey has the second-largest standing army among NATO Allies and boasts the fifth-largest military ship inventory within the Alliance, including the TCG Anadolu, the country’s first-ever helicopter carrier and amphibious assault platform, which was unveiled by the Turkish Navy in April 2023. Turkey is also an essential pillar of NATO’s defense of its eastern and southern flank, especially considering the rising geopolitical importance of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Moreover, Turkey hosts the Maritime Security Centre of Excellence which acts as a hub to advance NATO’s efforts in maritime security and is a main contributor to NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian where it led multiple rounds of operations, exercises, and capacity-building activities. The NATO Response Force, located in Istanbul, is a key pillar in ensuring NATO’s rapid response capacity on the eastern flank in the event of an attack against the Alliance. Transactional Relations under Erdogan Turkey’s relationship with its transatlantic partners under President Erdogan’s rule has devolved into a transactional relationship. Turkey often leverages international crises such as the migrant crisis in Europe in 2015 or Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine in 2022 to advance its own interests. A key part of this changing relationship is Turkey’s use of international platforms such as NATO as bargaining tools to extract concessions from its alliance partners. The transactional nature of relations became most evident surrounding Sweden’s accession to NATO. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Sweden along with Finland applied for NATO membership. Whilst initially blocking the accession proceedings for both countries, Turkey eventually approved Finland’s NATO accession in March 2023 but continued its opposition to Sweden’s membership. In doing so, President Erdogan repeatedly cited Sweden’s alleged support for the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) – an armed insurgent group recognized as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States, and the European Union. Erdogan called on Sweden to reform its counterterrorism policy in exchange for Turkey’s support for accession. However, Sweden’s approach to the PKK was only an ancillary concern behind Turkey’s opposition. Up until the lead-up to the NATO summit in Vilnius in July 2023, Turkey used its veto power to extract concessions from the United States regarding the purchase of F-16s. Turkey wanted these fighter jets to compensate for being kicked out of the F-35 program. However, the US Congress has been blocking major arms sales – worth upwards of $20 billion – to Turkey citing Turkey’s unilateral intervention in Syria and its brinkmanship in the Eastern Mediterranean. Access to these defensive capabilities mattered much more to President Erdogan than any concession Sweden could make in its counterterrorism policy. US President, Joe Biden, explicitly linked these two matters and voiced support for Turkey’s purchasing of F-16s. However, he alone cannot force a vote in favor of the sales in Congress where opposition to Turkey remains strong. Despite Turkey’s last-second approval of Sweden’s NATO bid in Vilnius, Bob Menendez, the Chair of the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, continues to oppose the sale of the fighter jets to Turkey. And President Erdogan does not want to surrender Turkey’s biggest leverage, its veto power, without assurances that the sales will indeed materialize. Despite Erdogan’s public endorsement, the Turkish president has the power to delay Sweden’s accession through the Turkish parliament if it allows him to extract concessions from Western Allies. The Future of Turkish Strategic Autonomy For President Erdogan, the results of the May 2023 elections are evidence that his foreign policy vision is popular among the Turkish electorate. Thus, he now believes he has the mandate to further build on the policy of strategic autonomy and chart an independent path for Turkey’s future. Key appointments in his cabinet also signal continuation rather than a drastic change. Hakan Fidan, the former intelligence chief who is the architect behind Turkey’s intelligence-supported drone warfare in Syria and Iraq, became the country’s new foreign minister. Ibrahim Kalin, who replaced Fidan as the head of the Turkish intelligence services, served as the presidential spokesperson for Erdogan for nearly a decade before his new role. Appointments like Fidan and Kalin, among others who were responsible for overseeing efforts to transform Turkish foreign policy, signal President Erdogan’s intention to stay the course. However, Turkey’s bid for strategic autonomy is bound to be limited. The purchase of S-400s from Russia failed to produce the independence President Erdogan envisioned: whilst it created new dependencies for the Turkish defense industry, it did cost Turkey access to advanced F-35 fighter jet systems. Russia’s reckless invasion of Ukraine also demonstrated that Russia’s regional ambitions may one day pose a threat to Turkey. Security assurances provided by NATO are, therefore, more valuable now than since the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, due to economic mismanagement, the Turkish lira has depreciated drastically and the country’s foreign reserves have cratered, which makes Turkey’s access to US-led financial markets and mechanisms essential for its economic survival. In short, Turkey remains an important element of the transatlantic alliance, even if it plays an outsider role within it. About the author: Alper Cezmi Ozdemir Alper is a researcher of international affairs and security. He was a researcher with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly where he worked on transatlantic relations, climate security, and the civil dimension of security. Prior, he held other research assignments in the United States and Turkey on Middle East studies and security studies. Alper has a number of publications on Middle East politics, Turkish foreign policy, and transatlantic relations. He holds an MA in International Relations from the University of Chicago in the United States, and is also a Fulbright alumnus.

Date: 20/09/2023 Where: Armenia and Azerbaijan Who’s involved: Armenian government, Azeri government, Ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, Russian government, Turkish government. What happened? On 20/09/2023, peace talks between the ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijan will take place on 21/09/2023 in the Azerbaijani city of Yevlakh. On 20/09/2023, An official ceasefire agreement was reached by the Azerbaijan authorities and ethnic Armenians with the help of Russian peacekeepers. On 19/09/2023, The Azerbaijan authorities officially launched their military offensive in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Close to 100 people have been said to be killed and the Russian peacekeepers are evacuating around 2000 civilians out of the region. Azerbaijan has conducted military operations in the Nagorno-Karabakh region after peace talks have failed. Additionally, for the past couple of months, Azeri state media has repeatedly depicted Armenia as ‘western Azerbaijan.’ Analysis: Even though a cease-fire in the Nagorno-Karabakh region is now officially in place as of 20/09/2023 0900 GMT, the situation is still very volatile and it is therefore still recommended to keep avoiding the airspace above the border of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Routing via Georgia and Waypoint ADEKI is preferable instead. The chance of a full-scale conflict between the two nations is still probable. Yesterday’s operation could have been an attempt by Azerbaijan to drag Armenia into a conflict. Now that Armenia has refrained from engaging so far, Azerbaijan could seek other ways to achieve this goal. This would give Azerbaijan a chance to connect to their Exclave Nakchivan. If a full-scale conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan breaks out in the region, air travel will be severely affected, as it would be unsafe to travel anywhere near the territories of Armenia or Azerbaijan. This would close yet another option for commercial aviation between Europe and Asia.