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Initial assessment of areas targeted by Israel inside Iran in blue   Date:  13/06/2025  Where:  Middle East, particularly Iran,  Iraq, Israel, Jordan and Syria Who’s involved: Israel, Iran What happened:  In the early hours of 13 June 2025, Israel carried out massive airstrikes on what it called strategic targets in Iran,  including military installations and the nuclear enrichment facility in Natanz. Official reports from Israel stated that more than 200 fighter jets participated in ‘Operation Rising Lion’, which resulted in the death of Iran’s military Chief of Staff, commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, commander of a major military coordination center, the Khatam Al Anbiya base, as well as five high ranking scientists responsible for the country’s nuclear program.  Iranian authorities vowed retaliation against Israel, with reports of at least 100 drones launched by them towards Israel over Iraqi and Syrian airspace . The drones also breached Jordanian airspace earlier in the day, prompting Jordan to intercept a number of drones. Unconfirmed reports suggest air forces from Israel, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, France, and the UK are also engaged in attacking Iranian drones , with the UK having issued statements denying their involvement. Significant tensions are expected in the Middle East, affecting maritime and air logistics, additionally, neighboring countries may be put in a state of heightened awareness, with increased security personnel and possible limitations on the movement of individuals.  Analysis: Iran-aligned Houthi forces in Yemen pledged their full support for Iran, condemning Israel’s airstrikes, suggesting they may either increase or prolong launching missiles towards Israel, as well as resume attacks on any maritime vessel perceived to be supporting Israel.  Reports suggest the US and neighboring states such as Jordan and Qatar are also assisting in downing Iranian drones towards Israel. A prolongation of the tensions may result in a spillover into neighboring areas, widening the conflict zone.  The drones launched by Iran may have been deployed as decoy to obscure or precede an impending strike. Israeli air defense capabilities may also be weakened by waves of either decoy or low-cost missile and drones launched prior to  a larger missile attack by Iran, in which case, other countries, particularly the US, may be required to step in and provide support to Israel. Iran (OIIX/Tehran FIR) and Iraq (ORBB/Baghdad FIR) have closed their airspace until at least 10:00 UTC and 09:00UTC on Friday June 13 respectively. Many carriers had already begun avoiding these FIR’s due to the warning signs over the past few days.  Jordan’s Queen Alia International Airport and Israel’s Ben Gurion International Airport have both suspended all operations. In contrast, airports in Bahrain and Kuwait continue to operate, though some flights have been cancelled as a precaution.  With evolving airspace restrictions, Saudi Arabia's skies have become increasingly congested, as flights that once traversed Iranian and Iraqi airspace are now being rerouted through its territory. A prolongation of the conflict may see a spillover into the South Caucasus, affecting a major air corridor through Georgia and Azerbaijan.  Maritime vessels in and around the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Gulf of Oman and eastern Mediterranean Sea appear to continue their routes, although heightened security in the region may render their routes dangerous. Additionally, Iran-aligned Houthi forces in Yemen may resume attacks on vessels transiting within their reach as they had previously done, possibly expanding targets, forcing cargo and tanker ships to reroute around Africa’s southern Cape of Good Hope, significantly extending travel time.  Expectations and recommendations : It is expected to see an increased risk of missile or drone attacks from Iranian proxies, particularly from Yemen or southern Lebanon, targeting Israeli territory or interest. Heightened military readiness and possible retaliatory strikes by Israel or the US raises the likelihood of further regional escalation. In light of the current conflict and its escalating, retaliatory nature, it is strongly recommended to continue avoiding operations in and over Iran (OIIX/Tehran FIR) and Iraq (ORBB/Baghdad FIR).  Additionally, it is recommended to suspend all operations in and over Syria (OSTT/Damascus FIR), Israel (LLLL/Tel Aviv FIR), Lebanon (OLBB/Beirut FIR), and Jordan (OJAC/Amman FIR) due to increased regional instability and elevated security risks, until further notice.

Date:  13/06/2025  Where:  Middle East, particularly Iran,  Iraq, Israel, Jordan and Syria Who’s involved: Israel, Iran Areas of major Israeli targeting in blue What happened:  In the early hours of 13 June 2025, the Israeli military launched extensive airstrikes on multiple targets across Iran, including military bases, radar installations, surface-to-air missile systems, a nuclear enrichment facility in Natanz, missile production sites, and the residences of senior Iranian officials and scientists. According to official sources, more than 200 aircraft were involved in the operation—most of them believed to be unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)—marking the largest Israeli strike of its kind against Iran, potentially signalling an ambition to achieve regime change. Iranian state media reported 78 fatalities and 329 injuries as a result of the airstrikes on Tehran, with the capital’s Mehrabad International Airport also targeted, leading to the suspension of all flights. Following the attacks, Iran raised the symbolic red flag of revenge above the Jamkaran Mosque in Qom. However, no missile launches have been confirmed so far. Iran has, however, launched 100 drones towards Israel via Iraqi and Syrian airspace. Earlier in the day, several of these drones breached Jordanian airspace, prompting Jordanian forces to intercept them—an action which may now expose Jordan to the risk of Iranian retaliation. Israel has continued its strikes throughout the day, targeting various locations across Iran. Prime Minister Netanyahu stated that operations will persist until Israel’s objectives are achieved. Simultaneously with Iran’s drone deployment, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) initiated a second wave of attacks. Confirmed targets include a missile production facility in Shiraz, an underground military complex in Kermanshah, residential areas and the international airport in Tabriz, the Natanz nuclear site, explosions in Eslamshahr reportedly aimed at government officials, nuclear facilities in Arak and Fordow, and potential strategic assets at or near Bushehr, among other sites. Unconfirmed reports surfaced regarding a potential radiation leak at the Natanz nuclear facility. However, Iranian officials have stated that the issue appears to be limited to an internal leak. Should a leak outside the facility be confirmed, it would likely involve uranium hexafluoride (UF₆), a compound used in centrifuges. Although UF₆ is not highly radioactive itself, it poses health risks when inhaled due to its reaction to air forming toxic uranyl fluoride (UO₂F₂) and hydrogen fluoride. Such a leak could therefore contaminate surrounding areas and pose health risks to nearby individuals, but it would not constitute a large-scale nuclear incident. A global activist-led march from Egypt to Gaza, scheduled from 12 to 16 June, has already triggered significant disruption at Cairo International Airport (CAI/HECA) and across parts of the city, following the detention and deportation of participants by Egyptian authorities. The next phase of the march, planned between Arish and Gaza on 15–16 June, is expected to escalate tensions, likely prompting increased surveillance and security activity across the Sinai Peninsula. Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Katz has called on Egypt to halt the march, warning that if Egyptian authorities fail to do so, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will take whatever measures necessary to prevent participants from entering Gaza. Context: In the early hours of 13 June 2025, Israel initiated a large-scale aerial assault, dubbed Operation Rising Lion , targeting what it identified as key strategic locations across Iran. These included military installations, missile infrastructure, and the nuclear enrichment facility at Natanz. According to Israeli sources, the operation involved more than 200 fighter jets and resulted in the reported deaths of Iran’s military Chief of Staff, the commander of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, a senior official at the Khatam Al Anbiya base, and five top nuclear scientists. In retaliation, Iran launched over 100 drones towards Israel, many of which traversed Iraqi and Syrian airspace, with several reportedly breaching Jordanian airspace—prompting interceptions by Jordanian defence forces. Around the same time, Israel is believed to have launched a second wave of strikes against Iran, demonstrating apparent air superiority over Syria, Iraq, and potentially parts of Iranian airspace. There are unconfirmed reports suggesting that aerial engagements may have involved Israeli, Turkish, Jordanian, Saudi, French and British aircraft, although the UK has publicly denied any involvement in the operation. Analysis: An elevated threat of missile and drone strikes from both Israel and Iran, as well as affiliated groups such as the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon, remains highly likely. Given the small geographical size of Israel, any retaliatory attacks could have significant impact, particularly if they spill into densely populated urban areas. Current high alert levels, combined with the possibility of counterstrikes by either Israel or the United States, increase the risk of a broader regional conflict. However, most Gulf states have so far limited their response to formal condemnations of Israeli actions, showing little willingness to engage directly. The Israeli offensive is not expected to conclude on 13 June, especially in light of Prime Minister Netanyahu's stated intention to continue operations until strategic objectives are achieved—a process that may take several days or even weeks, particularly if more actors become involved. Retaliatory drone or missile strikes by Iranian proxies are anticipated, especially from Yemen and southern Lebanon, targeting Israeli interests or territory. The continuation of hostilities raises the risk of conflict spillover into neighbouring countries, placing additional strain on regional airspace security and increasing the risk to civilian and commercial aviation. With the United States expected to defend Israel in the event of a large-scale Iranian response, there is growing concern that the conflict could escalate further and persist over an extended period. Israel is likely to maintain offensive momentum in the coming days in an effort to disrupt or pre-empt any Iranian countermeasures, aiming to prevent Tehran from regrouping or mounting an effective retaliation. Implications for air travel Airspace over Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria remains effectively closed, with flight tracking data showing a continued absence of commercial aircraft. These closures are a direct result of ongoing missile exchanges and the high risk of further strikes between Iran and Israel, making overflight operations in these regions unsafe. As of the time of reporting, Iran has not yet launched a significant retaliatory strike against Israel, despite earlier threats. Such action could still take place later in the day or at a time of Iran’s choosing, contributing to uncertainty around the duration and scope of current airspace restrictions. Major international airports in Beirut, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Riyadh, Jeddah, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar continue to operate, though they are experiencing considerable delays in both arrivals and departures. Passengers are being advised to check with their airlines for the latest updates and rebooking options due to the disruption caused by regional airspace closures. Jordan has revised its airspace restrictions to allow limited flight operations, but only with prior authorisation. Aircraft must enter via waypoint GENEX and exit through TULEP. In parallel, Egypt’s Ministry of Civil Aviation has placed Cairo International Airport and all national airports on high alert, anticipating potential emergency developments that may impact regional air traffic flows. Implications for maritime routes Maritime traffic in the region appears to be operating with relative normality at the time of writing; however, a prolonged conflict—lasting weeks rather than days—could lead to significant disruptions, particularly around key maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Bab al-Mandab. These routes are critical for global energy and commercial shipping, and any sustained instability could severely impact maritime logistics. At approximately 06:00 local time in the Persian Gulf, an unidentified vessel reported abnormal Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) readings, placing it at an incorrect location. The Maritime Security Center Indian Ocean (MSCIO) has indicated this may have been caused by radioelectronic interference, raising concerns about the safety and reliability of navigational systems in the area. While Houthi forces in Yemen have not officially stated an intention to resume targeting vessels associated with Israeli-aligned nations or operators, the likelihood of such actions increases significantly if the conflict between Iran and Israel continues to escalate. The group has previously targeted commercial shipping in regional waters and may view renewed hostilities as justification for further attacks. Meanwhile, maritime activity in Israeli waters has reportedly come to a halt, with vessels grounded and port operations possibly suspended as a precautionary measure amid the heightened security threat. Expectations and recommendations :  Companies are advised to strengthen travel risk assessments and ensure internal security briefings are regularly updated. It is essential to maintain fully operable communication channels with both stakeholders and employees, particularly those in or near the affected region. Airlines should coordinate closely with IATA and relevant national aviation authorities, monitoring real-time threats and ensuring the wellbeing of flight crews. Route viability must be reassessed continually, with close attention paid to regional NOTAMs—particularly from Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—for updates on airspace restrictions and routing guidance. Maritime operators should avoid high-risk waters and develop contingency plans for rerouting in the event of disruptions to established maritime corridors. Given the volatile and rapidly evolving nature of the conflict, all operations in Iranian, Israeli, Jordanian, and Iraqi airspace should remain suspended. Additionally, due to heightened security concerns, flights in and over Syrian (OSTT/Damascus FIR), Israeli (/Tel Aviv FIR), Lebanese (OLBB/Beirut FIR), and Jordanian (OJAC/Amman FIR) airspace should also be halted until further notice. Organisations and individuals in the region should remain in close contact with their respective embassies and monitor reliable news sources and official advisories for the latest developments. Proactive situational awareness is critical to ensuring safety and preparedness in this high-risk environment.

Date:   12/06/2025  Countries highlighted in orange may be directly involved in the potential escalation.  Countries outlined in light blue are countries from where the US removed non-essential staff. Context: The United States has begun withdrawing many non-essential personnel from its posts in the Middle East, amid growing concerns of significant destabilization in the region . Recent reports suggest a potential escalation of tensions between Iran and Israel, which could involve Israeli airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. In response, Iran may target Israeli military installations or US military bases in nearby countries. While the possibility of a land war remains minimal, attacks may be carried out through airspace over Iraq and Jordan as previously seen , with missiles and military aircraft involved.  Israel has repeatedly threatened to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities to prevent the Islamic Republic from acquiring nuclear weapons. However, with US-Iran negotiations having reached a current stalemate, Israel may now feel compelled to act. Developments supporting the possibility of increased tensions since 11 June 2025:  US Special Envoy Witkoff is set to meet Iran’s foreign minister Araghchi in Oman on 15/06/2025  amid rising tensions. Witkoff is also said to meet Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Dermer and Mossad Director Barnea ahead of the negotiations. On 12/06/2025 , the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors declared Iran in breach of its non-proliferation obligations . The resolution cited Iran’s repeated failures to comply with its Safeguards Agreement, particularly regarding undeclared nuclear activities and materials at multiple undisclosed locations. In response to the resolution, Iran denounced it as ‘politically driven’ and followed up on their recently made threats by announcing the launch of a third enrichment facility and upgrade of centrifuges to advanced IR-6 models. Following the heightened tensions, on 12/06/2025  Iran started large-scale military exercises across the country. On 11/06/2025 , the US Embassy in Iraq officially ordered  the departure of all non-essential staff from its embassy in Baghdad .  The same day the US State Department also authorized the voluntary departure of non-essential personnel from its embassies in Bahrain, UAE and Kuwait  ( 1 , 2 , 3 ). On 11/06/2025 , United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) warned  of increased tensions in the Arabian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman, advising maritime vessels and crews to take extra precautions when transiting the area . Israel-affiliated merchant shipping is assessed to be at heightened risk of reciprocal military action. On 11/06/2025 , Iran's Defence Minister Nasirzadeh warned  of strikes on US airbases in the Middle East if conflict breaks out with the US. On 11/06/2025 , US officials were told Israel is "ready to launch an operation into Iran"  according to media reports ( 1 , 2 ). Following five rounds of negotiation talks between the US and Iran, the US presented a nuclear deal proposal to Iran on 31/05/2025 , which would require Iran to eventually halt all uranium enrichment. Iran announced it would not accept this proposal on 04/06/2025  stagnating the negotiations, but later announced on 10/06/2025 that they would soon present a counter-proposal for a nuclear deal in response to the US proposal. On 20/05/2025 , US intelligence reports emerged indicating that Israel may be preparing for a military strike. The assessment was reportedly based on both public and private statements by senior Israeli officials, intercepted communications, and observed military movements suggesting the possibility of imminent action. Consequences of an escalation for aviation: Some major western airlines seem to have re-routed their flights from Iraq [ORBB/Baghdad FIR] to Saudi Arabia [OEJD/Jeddah FIR]. In April and October 2024, as tensions between Iran and Israel escalated, the airspace over Iraq was used for transit during multiple missile and drones attacks between the two countries. In the event of a renewed escalation, it is likely that this airspace will be used again for such attacks or potentially closed entirely by Iraq. As a result, increased traffic is expected in the Jeddah FIR. In case the conflict escalates beyond reciprocal strikes between Israel and Iran, to include the US involvement in strikes on Iran and Iranian retaliation on American targets in the region, a wider disruption is to be expected.  The US authorized the ‘voluntary departure’ of dependents of US personnel from Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. These countries host several military installations. This could involve the temporary closure of the OMAE/Emirates FIR, OBBB/Bahrain FIR, OKAC/Kuwait FIR, and OIIX/Tehran FIR, or the implementation of temporary rerouting measures to avoid heightened risk airspaces.  If no re-routing and no airspace closure occur, operators should keep into account a heightened overflight risk stemming from surface-to-air systems and possibly cruise missiles and rockets, especially on approach and take off in airports in the region. High levels of GPS jamming are also to be expected. A thorough risk assessment would be needed before operating in the mentioned FIRs. Consequences of an escalation for maritime traffic: At the time of writing, no significant modifications of maritime traffic patterns through the Middle East were seen on open-sources. However, a potential escalation could impact shipping routes, especially around the Arabian peninsula. During previous escalations, the closure of the Persian Gulf was a serious concern. This would lead to supply chain disruptions and an increase of shipping prices, also affecting commodity prices. Caution is advised when operating in the Gulf of Oman, Strait of Hormuz, and Persian Gulf. GPS interference can also be expected. The closure or avoidance of the Persian Gulf would also increase traffic in the Red Sea and Suez Canal. In case of an escalation, the Houthis are likely to carry out missiles and drone strikes aimed at Israeli and American ships and potentially those of other Western states throughout the Red Sea. Recommendations: Review and communicate crisis management plans. Establish reliable communication with stakeholders, partners and staff. Monitor official advisories issued by foreign diplomatic missions in the country where you are located. Prepare for possible operational disruptions, applying contingency plans as needed.  Prepare for a quick departure.

Persbericht samenwerking Dyami en Instituut voor Veiligheid Dyami Academy en Instituut voor Veiligheid bundelen krachten: nieuwe trainingen tegen statelijke en maatschappelijke dreigingen nu beschikbaar Nieuwegein, … april 2025 – Dyami Academy en het Instituut voor Veiligheid (IVV) kondigen met trots hun samenwerking aan. Vanaf vandaag zijn via Dyami Academy twee nieuwe trainingen beschikbaar: de training Counter Terrorism, Extremism and Radicalisation  (CTER) en de ééndaagse training Spionage & Sabotage – Bewustwording voor iedereen die opereert in het veiligheidsdomein.  In een wereld waarin zowel statelijke actoren als binnenlandse extremistische bewegingen toenemende risico's vormen, is versterking van bewustwording en handelingsbekwaamheid essentieel. Met deze samenwerking maken Dyami Academy en IVV cruciale kennis en praktische vaardigheden toegankelijker voor veiligheidsprofessionals. Twee trainingen, één gezamenlijke missie: vergroten van veiligheid en weerbaarheid CTER-training :Deze training richt zich op het proces van polarisatie, radicalisering, extremisme en terrorisme. Deelnemers krijgen inzicht in de signalen en drijfveren die kenmerkend zijn voor mensen die radicaliseren, en leren hoe vlaggen, symbolen en gedragingen kunnen wijzen op radicale bewegingen. De training gaat in op de manieren waarop extremisme zichtbaar wordt binnen zowel extreemlinkse als extreemrechtse stromingen, en hoe politieke en religieuze motieven mensen kunnen aanzetten tot extremistische daden. Spionage & Sabotage-training :In deze ééndaagse praktijkgerichte training krijgen deelnemers inzicht in actuele statelijke dreigingen zoals spionage en sabotage. Ze leren hoe landen als Rusland, China en Iran opereren binnen Nederland, hoe spionage- en sabotage signalen te herkennen, en krijgen praktische handvatten om effectief te melden en binnen hun eigen rol en bevoegdheden actie te ondernemen. Beide trainingen zijn praktijkgericht, bevatten interactieve scenario's en worden verzorgd door ervaren professionals met achtergronden bij de politie, AIVD, Defensie en internationale veiligheid. Meer informatie en inschrijven kan hier: https://www.instituutvoorveiligheid.nl/trainingen/spionage-en-sabbotage/ Charlotte Bakker en Theo Oskam Charlotte Bakker, directeur van Dyami Academy, zegt hierover: "De dreigingen waarmee we vandaag worden geconfronteerd, zijn divers en complex. Door deze samenwerking kunnen we professionals nog beter toerusten om deze uitdagingen aan te gaan en de veiligheid in Nederland te versterken." Theo Oskam, directeur IvV, zegt hierover: “De wereld verandert snel, en dat vraagt om samenwerking. Met deze stap bundelen Dyami en de Coöperatie Instituut voor Veiligheid hun krachten om professionals op te leiden die met een brede blik en stevige basis bijdragen aan een veiligere samenleving.” Over Dyami Academy Dyami Academy ondersteunt professionals wereldwijd bij het herkennen en beheersen van dreigingen. Door middel van hoogwaardige trainingen, advisering en dreigingsanalyses draagt Dyami bij aan een veiligere samenleving. Over het Instituut voor Veiligheid Het Instituut voor Veiligheid (IVV) verzorgt opleidingen en trainingen binnen het veiligheidsdomein, gericht op bewustwording, signalering en handelingsbekwaamheid op het gebied van nationale veiligheid en crisisbeheersing. Meer informatie en inschrijven Bezoek:   www.dyami.academy Of neem contact op via: info@dyami.academy

Washington, DC Military Parade Celebrating the US Army’s 250th Anniversary, June 14th, 2025 Executive Summary A major military parade is planned for 14 June this year in Washington, DC for the 250th anniversary of the US Army’s founding. The parade, which coincides with US President Donald Trump’s birthday, although with no official connection to it, will see him actively participating in the event with a speech to the nation. The event is expected to see the participation of 200,000 spectators, 7,000 troops, 150 military vehicles, including 50 helicopters flying over the city.  The political significance of the event, along with the diversity of actors involved (public, military, political leaders), will require some of the most significant planning, risk assessment and counter-threat measures by different US government agencies, possibly comparable to presidential inaugurations in the country. These types of events are not common in the US, with the last military parade of this kind taking place in 1991 to mark the victory of Operation Desert Storm. Airspace, land, and river routes will be closed during the event, and possibly in the days leading up to it, causing significant disruptions to flights, traffic, and other non-event-related activities, including those of major companies and logistics providers. Participating According to numerous news reports and quotes from officials, approximately 150 military vehicles are expected to participate in the parade. This includes 28 M1A1 Abrams tanks, 28 Bradley and 28 Stryker armoured personnel carriers, 4 Paladin self-propelled artillery, unspecified number of towed artillery pieces, dozens of other ground vehicles, historical military vehicles such as the M4 Sherman tank, eight bands, 36 horses, in addition to around  7,000 troops marching the streets.  Airspace in the immediate area during the event will be closed, with at least 50 military helicopters (AH-64 Apache, UH-60 Black Hawk and CH-47 Chinook) flying over the capital, in addition to historical aircraft such as the B-17 bomber, P-51 fighter, and C-47 transport aircraft. An unspecified number of the US Army’s Golden Nights paratroopers will parachute down towards the end of the parade to present President Donald Trump a flag.  A total of around 200,000 people are expected to attend the event, gathered around the immediate area of where the parade, around the National Mall.  Expected Schedule The events are expected to last over 12 hours, and include events prior to the parade itself, such as exhibits of military hardware to the public. A large concert is planned after the parade at The Ellipse, a large open area adjacent to the White House. According to different reports, including official notifications, the following events are expected:  08:00 hours  - Guest entry for the Army Fitness Competition and Festival, which is expected to be in the National Mall area, a series of parks along Constitution Ave,  housing the Washington Monument, Lincoln Memorial and other historical landmarks.  14:00 hours  - Guest entry for the parade  18:30 hours   -  Parade and celebration begin 19:30   hours - Parade ends 19:30 hours - Concert at The Ellipse starts 21:30 hours  -  Event ends 21:45 hours  - Fireworks show Locations and areas affected   Before, during, and after the event, land, sea, and air routes are expected to be affected. As such, all air, land and sea traffic will require rerouting and should expect delays while travelling through the Washington, DC area and its surroundings.  Airspace Airspace in and around the capital is expected to be closed during the event as around 50 AH-64 Apaches, UH-60 Black Hawks, and CH-47 Chinooks military helicopters will be taking off from Joint Base Andrews (18 km southeast of the capital), flying in formation over the parade itself. The route takes the aircraft west over the Potomac River, where they are expected to turn north, then east over Constitution Avenue, to presumably return to the same airbase.  Presumed affected airspace above Washington, DC and surrounding areas on June 14th, 2025 Land routes Land routes into the Washington, DC area will also be affected, given the high number of military vehicles and personnel participating in the event. Military personnel and hardware are expected to depart from an area between the Pentagon and Arlington National Cemetery, head across the Arlington Memorial Bridge, northbound on 23rd St and turn onto Constitution Ave, presumably turning right heading south through the 14th St bridge (reported closed on 14 June) into Virginia as they exit the parade grounds. The parade will pass through Constitution Ave (between 15th and 23rd streets), which suggests the streets will be closed at least several days before the event, as will other streets involved in the event. Additionally, metro stations will also be affected, with confirmation that the NW entrance of the Smithsonian Metro Station is closed. The public will convene along the parade route or the Washington Monument Grounds just before the event.  Land routes affected during the parade  River routes As it usually occurs with major events, traffic through the Potomac River is expected to be closed during at least part of of the 14th of June.  While no explicit mention of closures was identified at the time of writing, maritime traffic near the 14th St Bridge, which was closed during the event, will presumably be halted. Overall, the Potomac River may experience maritime traffic disruptions between Theodore Roosevelt Island and Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, as bridges are used by military vehicles during the parade.  Expected Potomac River closure during the event Risk Assessment   Due to the diversity of actors involved in the event, whether as participants or the general public, disruption risks remain high, both before, during, and after the event. Physical security challenges in the form of terrorism (group or lone-wolf), protests, radio interference (e.g. spoofing) and structural deficiencies (e.g. bridges, overpasses) will need to be thoroughly addressed.   Before the event The days leading up to the event will likely see heightened security in the Washington, DC area, including locations that receive and house military personnel and equipment (e.g., West Potomac Park). Areas where participants and spectators are expected during the event will also come under scrutiny. Blind spots, infrastructure and areas of protest convergence will need to be secured. Security at this stage should focus on securing and protecting priority areas, such as routes and troop housing areas, as well as uncovering planned disruptions (attacks, protests). Troops are expected to be brought into the capital around 11 June, housed at the Department of Agriculture and General Services Administration building. Additional reports state they will be sleeping on military cots, possibly at specific areas outside of those buildings.  During the event The physical security of not only the US president, but also the 200,000 civilians, 7,000 troops, and 150 military vehicles participating in the event, will remain essential. Risks such as mechanical failure, unintentional collisions and electrical jamming, in addition to planned protests or a domestic terrorism attack (firearms, IED, vehicle ramming, drone attack, etc.), aiming to disrupt the event, will remain priorities on the security list during the day.  Protests during the event, as had occurred during the last parade in 1991, are common in the Washington, DC area and also pose a disruption risk. The following open-source information on planned protests during the event was available at the time of writing: An anti-parade rally by the Refuse Fascism group is scheduled to start at 13:00 hours at Logan Circle and proceed towards the White House. The group has 78,221 followers on Facebook, with the rally announcement receiving 105 likes, 70 shares and seven comments at the time of writing.  Protests against US President Trump are planned at unspecified highways and overpass bridges between 10:00 and 12:00 hours.  Reports indicate that between 10,000 and 20,000 individuals will participate in nationwide protests at unspecified locations related to the military parade.  Protests by “No Kings” activists are reportedly not expected to take place near the parade event.  After the event  After the event, all military hardware and personnel will return to their initial areas of deployment, via air and land. Domestic terrorism attacks, traffic accidents or incidents related to loading military hardware onto larger vehicles or trains cannot be ruled out. They will require the surveillance of security and other personnel. While protests at this stage can be ruled out as serious threats, domestic terrorism on military assets remains, although less likely than during the event itself.  Traveler advice   Visitors in Washington, DC will notice heightened security in and around the city. This will be more notable in the days immediately before the military parade. One may expect longer queues in public transport hubs, possible police searches at metro stations, areas and street segments near the National Mall closed off, along with the presence of armed security forces in those areas. Visitors should keep their identity documents with them at all times and adhere to instructions given by law enforcement.  Washington, DC’s mayor has warned that flight schedules on 14 June may be paused while the parade is underway, although definitive details will not be available until the Department of Defense releases its final flyover timetable. While Ronald Reagan National, Baltimore/Washington International, and Washington Dulles all have numerous departures that day, none are currently slated for the precise parade window. Travelers should therefore check directly with their carriers for the latest status of flights in and around 14 June. Traffic heading into Washington, DC, is likely to be heavy, due to road closures and the influx of military convoys, especially around the Theodore Roosevelt Bridge, Arlington Memorial Bridge, I-395, and 14th Street bridges. In addition, streets leading to the National Mall are expected to be closed, requiring detours. Motorists should monitor real-time traffic advisories and allow extra travel time, as congestion could extend well beyond the immediate parade zone. Conclusion Overall, the 250th Army anniversary parade presents a particular convergence of risk-ridden factors, including large crowds, close formation of flights over Washington, DC, heavy military equipment alongside approximately 7,000 troops, the presence and participation of the US president and other senior politicians, among others. The most probable disruptions may come from protest groups and unforeseen incidents (collisions, technical issues). In contrast, the highest-risk disruptions, low in probability, are attacks using firearms or explosives by lone-wolf or groups against individuals at the event. Effective mitigation relies on the coordination of various government agencies and everyday citizens to report any unusual findings. A layered approach would be an effective method to counter potential threats, involving continuous monitoring and surveillance of high-risk elements.

When:  01/06/2025 What:  On 01/06/2025 , Mexico will hold its first judicial elections . Mexican citizens will directly elect nine Supreme Court justices, two magistrates for the Superior Chamber of the Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judiciary, 15 magistrates for the Regional Chambers of the Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judiciary, five members of the Judicial Disciplinary Tribunal, 464 circuit court magistrates, and 386 district court judges. This reform is unprecedented in scale: no other country in the world elects all its judges by popular vote. Mexico has never appointed judges by direct vote . Before the judicial reform, judges were appointed through a formal institutional process involving both the executive and legislative branches. Supreme Court justices were nominated by the President and confirmed by a two-thirds vote in the Senate. Federal judges were selected through a merit-based process overseen by the Federal Judicial Council, involving exams and career progression. State-level judges were appointed through varying state-specific procedures, often involving governors and local legislatures. In  this new system, candidates must first be evaluated and nominated by committees representing the executive, legislative and judicial branches, but the final selection is entirely in the hands of voters.  The promoters  of the judicial reform, which was first presented in February 2024 by former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) and will be implemented by his successor President Claudia Sheinbaum, argue that direct elections favor accountability and combat corruption and nepotism . Advocates also highlight high levels of impunity and delayed justice within the existing system.   The reform, however, has also drawn much criticism  from opposition figures, judicial institutions, the US State Department, the Organization of American States, and the United Nations. Thousands also participated in protests against the reform. Critics highlight that the reform makes the judiciary susceptible to corruption and can compromise the independence of the branch, as judges may be concerned with public approval, potentially seeking future office. The influence of criminal organizations in the elections is also a concern for many.  Analysis :  The 2024 Presidential elections were the most violent  in Mexico’s history. Despite the current election having recorded less violence in comparison, the primary risk remains violence and threats from cartels to both candidates and voters . At least four candidates have received threats and stopped running. Organized crime groups are expected to exert influence, particularly in regions where they hold substantial power.  Another risk stems from a potential erosion of judicial independence . Despite regulations prohibiting party endorsements and campaign donations, political groups have likely attempted to sway voting behavior. Mexico’s electoral authority is currently investigating  claims that political parties have tried to influence voters in Nuevo Leon and Mexico City. This creates risks of politicizing the judiciary and undermining its independence.  The absence of strong vetting processes for judicial candidates could lead to the election of individuals lacking the necessary qualifications or integrity . In January, the selection committee had 18 days to interview 10.887 eligible candidates .   The ballot includes candidates with questionable qualifications, in some instances  candidates with no experience, well beyond retirement age, or with links to the business or political world. In other cases , candidates have criminal links or previous criminal charges. While the full impact on the judiciary remains uncertain, the questionable qualifications of some candidates have already raised doubts about the new system’s integrity. Mexico is also the first country to attempt direct elections for all judicial posts at every level, making the process unpredictable and logistically challenging. Polls indicate  low voter turnout, with only about a third of eligible voters expected to participate. Aside from that, the majority of people polled did not know any of the candidates on the ballot. The general public’s lack of knowledge about candidates increased the likelihood of unqualified or controversial figures being elected. But most importantly: the reform’s intention may backfire, as this new system creates a dynamic in which judges are reliant on the public for approval. This dynamic exposes them to political pressures, populist sentiment and possible intimidation by Mexico’s powerful criminal organizations.  Recommendations: Mexico has witnessed significant protests over the judicial reform, including an incident last year where demonstrators stormed the Senate building to disrupt the debate on the overhaul.  If you are traveling in Mexico around the elections on 01/06/2025, exercise caution and steer clear of protest areas. Monitor local news and government travel advisories for updates on protest activity and security risks in your area. Avoid travel to high-risk regions such as Colima, Guerrero, Michoacán, Sinaloa, Tamaulipas, and Zacatecas, as these areas experience elevated levels of crime and violence. Be aware that security checkpoints and increased police or military presence are common during times of heightened tension; comply with authorities and carry identification at all times.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Geneva, 21 May 2025 Axturis Flight Services and Dyami Security Intelligence are proud to announce a strategic agreement signed today during EBACE 2025 in Geneva. The partnership will enhance Axturis’ client offering by integrating Dyami’s cutting-edge aviation risk intelligence into its flight support services. Under the agreement, Axturis will leverage Dyami’s bespoke threat assessments, geopolitical monitoring, and aviation-specific intelligence to provide clients with real-time insights into emerging risks. This collaboration aims to ensure that flight operations remain safe, secure, and well-informed—no matter the region or complexity of the mission. “Our clients expect us to stay ahead of developments and ensure their safety at all times,” said Katharina Reinisch , Managing Director of Axturis Flight Services. “By partnering with Dyami, we’re taking a major step forward in how we assess and mitigate risks in global aviation.” Eric Schouten , CEO of Dyami Security Intelligence, added: “We’re excited to work with Axturis, a company known for its high standards and commitment to operational excellence. This partnership reflects our shared mission: to turn intelligence into action and support flight operators with timely, tailored security insights.” The agreement was formalized at EBACE 2025, the premier event for the European business aviation community. For more information, please contact: Dyami Security Intelligence info@dyami.services www.dyami.services/ebace Axturis Flight Services info@axturis.com www.axturis.flightservices.com In the accompanying photo: Dyami CEO Eric Schouten ., Axturis Managing Director Katharina Reinisch and Axturis CEO Ludwig Reiter.

Date:  21/05/2025 Where:  Israel, Ben Gurion Airport (TLV/LLBG), Iran, Strait of Hormuz Who’s involved: Israel, Houthis (Yemen), Iran, US Context: On 17/03/2025, Israel resumed its airstrikes on Gaza, violating the ceasefire, which triggered retaliatory airstrikes from both the Houthis and Hamas. This escalation has worsened the airspace security in the region, particularly in the LLLL/Tel Aviv FIR.  Due to the renewed fighting and expanding Israeli operations in Gaza, the conflict between Israel and the Houthis also flared up. Between 04/05/2025 and 18/05/2025, the Israelis and the Houthis have exchanged missiles, as a result of a missile hit near Ben Gurion Airport (TLV/LLBG) on 04/05/2025.   Following the strike on 04/05/2025 , the Houthis declared its intent to enforce a total aerial blockade on Israel , primarily through the deployment of missiles directed at Israeli airports, Flights to Tel Aviv were cancelled by international airlines the same day. Subsequently, Israel launched  retaliatory airstrikes on Sanaa International Airport (SAH/OYSN) on 06/05/2025.  These were followed by more strikes on different locations in Hodeidah, Yemen, in the days following. On  15/05/2025 , Israel closed TLV/LLBG after a missile launch from Yemen was detected, underscoring the heightened tensions amid continued missile exchanges between the two sides. What happened:  On 19/05/2025 , Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthis announced a maritime blockade on Israel’s Haifa Port , in response to Israel’s ongoing conflict in Gaza. At the same time, the Houthis continue to  fire missiles at Ben Gurion Airport  (TLV/LLBG), with its most recent strikes targeting the airport on 18/05/2025 .  The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that several vessels experienced Global Positioning System (GPS) interference in the Strait of Hormuz for several hours on  18/05/2025 . This incident suggests that Iran may be engaging in electronic jamming of navigation systems, potentially marking the early stages of a broader threat or escalation campaign targeting international shipping. In addition, on 21/05/2025, unverified reports by CNN highlight US intelligence indicating that Israel may be preparing strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.  CNN cited US officials and reported that the new intelligence was derived from both public and private communications involving senior Israeli officials, intercepted Israeli messages, and observations of Israeli military movements that may indicate a potential strike. Analysis :  Reports of a possible Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities — though still unconfirmed — are concerning and warrant close monitoring. The likelihood of a strike may be tied to whether the US-Iran deal proceeds without requiring the complete removal of Iran’s uranium stockpile. Amid a shift in US foreign policy priorities away from Israel - illustrated by the successful negotiation for the release of Hamas-held hostage Edan Alexander, which involved direct US-Hamas dialogue without notifying Israel- Israel may be more willing to pursue its own strategic objectives, even if they diverge from Washington’s focus on maintaining regional stability.  That being said, it is also possible that Israel purposefully ‘leaked’ this threat as a strategic move  to prompt renewed engagement with the US, potentially encouraging Washington to make concessions in exchange for de-escalation.  However, if Israel does proceed with an attack on Iran, a strong response from Tehran is highly likely , especially considering Iran’s prior retaliatory missile strikes following the Israeli airstrike on its consulate in Damascus in April 2024 and the assassination of Hamas leader Haniyeh in Tehran in October 2024. Retaliation concerns furthermore exist over Iran blocking oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, which it has threatened to do during times of heightened tensions in the past. Regional tensions, as well as the credibility of Iran’s leadership, hinge on its hardline position toward Israel.   The regime is unlikely to remain unresponsive or inactive in the face of such aggression, as doing so could undermine its perceived strength.

Date:  12/05/2025  - update of previous version posted on 09/05/2025 Where:  Jammu and Kashmir Region, Anantnag District, Indian-Pakistani border area. Who’s involved: India Pakistan General overview of the latest developments:  On 10/05/2025,  India and Pakistan agreed to a U.S.-brokered ceasefire to halt escalating hostilities. However, the truce was fragile; reports of artillery fire and drone incursions emerged shortly after its implementation, with both sides accusing each other of violations. As of today, 12/05/2025 , reports indicated a relative calm along the India-Pakistan border, with no overnight firing in the heavily militarized regions, including Jammu and Kashmir. Both nations are scheduled to hold talks between top military leaders about the next steps. Both nations began to ease airspace restrictions. On 12/05/2025 , India reopened 32 airports   that were temporarily shut due to security concerns, allowing civil aviation operations to resume.  However, airports warn that changing airspace dynamics and newly mandated security protocols from India’s Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS) could lead to potential schedule changes and longer wait times at checkpoints. Pakistan reopened its airspace on 10/05/2025  following a closure implemented earlier that morning. On 07/05/2025, India launched ‘Operation Sindoor’, striking multiple coordinated airstrikes against ‘terrorist camps’ in Pakistan in retaliation for a deadly terrorist attack on Hindu tourists in India-administered Kashmir on 22/04/2025. Since then, tensions between the two South Asian neighbours have been escalating, and the conflict has led to the worst fighting between India and Pakistan in nearly 3 decades . Both countries have exchanged cross-border fire and shelling, and fired missiles and drones at each other. For the first time since the full-scale war of 1971 between India and Pakistan, India has attacked places in Pakistan outside of Kashmir.  Historic Context: The Kashmir conflict, a territorial dispute between India and Pakistan, dates back to 1947, following the partition of British India.  Both nations claim Jammu and Kashmir in full. The Line of Control (LoC) became the border between the Indian- and Pakistani-controlled parts of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. An uneasy peace followed, with frequent skirmishes between the neighbours over the years. On 22/04/2025, militants attacked Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir, killing 26 people. The Resistance Front (linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba) claimed responsibility.  Retaliatory measures followed suit. On 23/04/2025, India suspended the Indus Waters Treaty, endangering Pakistan’s crucial water supply. India also closed the Attari trade checkpoint, banned travel under the SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme, and expelled Pakistani diplomats. Both countries are barred from entering each other’s airspace. Latest updates:  On 09/05/2025 , fighting intensified along the Line of Control (LoC) and parts of the international border. Both sides engaged in heavy artillery shelling, with exchanges reported in Poonch, Rajouri, and Kupwara sectors.  Cross-border infiltration attempts were also reported, with India claiming it intercepted several armed militants attempting to cross into Jammu and Kashmir. Civilian areas on both sides came under fire, resulting in multiple casualties and the continued displacement of local populations. Indian Air Force jets were seen conducting low-altitude flights near the LoC, while Pakistan reportedly moved additional air defense assets closer to the border. On 09/05/2025,  India issued a series of Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) announcing the temporary closure of 32 airports across northern and western regions, effective from 5:29 AM local time on 15/05/2025 .  On 10/05/2025 , the Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority (PCAA) announced a complete closure of Pakistani airspace at 3:15 AM local time, initially set to remain in effect until at least 12:00 PM local time on 11/05/2025 .  Later that same day, a U.S.-brokered ceasefire was announced  following high-level diplomatic efforts. In response to the ceasefire, the PCAA reopened Pakistani airspace at 5:05 PM local time. However, artillery exchanges and drone activity continued overnight, casting doubt on the truce’s effectiveness. Civilian areas near the LoC and in Punjab were hit by shelling, with casualties reported on both sides.  On 11/05/2025 , India claimed that its airstrikes had eliminated over 100 militants in precision attacks on Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) sites deep inside Pakistan-administered territory. Pakistan denied the casualty figures and insisted that civilian and military infrastructure was targeted. Simultaneously, Pakistan reported retaliatory strikes on 26 Indian military sites. The death toll continued to rise, with close to 70 confirmed dead by evening. On  12/05/2025 , both countries began showing signs of de-escalation. India reopened 32 airports previously closed, and commercial flights resumed with caution. No new cross-border attacks were reported overnight. Military officials from both sides held initial talks via secure channels, with plans for further discussions. However, border villages remain evacuated due to fears of unexploded ordnance and renewed conflict. Since the attack on 22/04/2025, airlines are still avoiding overflying the border between the two countries, and most international carriers are avoiding flying over Pakistan (OPLR/Lahore and OPKR/Karachi FIRs) altogether.

Date:   07/05/2025 - update of previous version posted on 25/04/2025 Where:  Jammu and Kashmir Region, Anantnag District Who’s involved: India, Pakistan What happened:  On 07/05/2025 , India started ‘Operation Sindoor’, conducting several coordinated airstrikes against Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) militant camps in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. India claims only terrorist infrastructure was hit and India’s Ministry of Defense described the operation as ‘focused, measured, and non-escalatory.’ Pakistan denies that the attacks only hit terrorist infrastructure, claiming that they hit civilian infrastructure, and stated it considers this an ‘act of war’. In retaliation, Pakistan claims it shot down five Indian Air Force jets and one drone. As of now, reports state that three Indian fighter jets were shot down (possibly 1x Su-30, 1x Mirage 2000 and 1x Rafale). The confirmation of the lost aircrafts comes from the Indian authorities, which state that three jets have ‘crashed’. Another unnamed Indian official has mentioned that an additional unknown aircraft crashed in Punjab (likely another IAF aircraft, for a total of four fighters lost). Unconfirmed reports state that Pakistan lost one aircraft (likely a JF-17). Cross-border shelling continues along the Line of Control (LoC). Pakistan reports 26 fatalities and over 46 injuries after the airstrikes. Indian authorities claim at least 10 deaths and numerous injuries in Indian-administered Kashmir resulting from alleged Pakistani firing. Airlines are avoiding overflying the border between the two countries, and most are avoiding flying over Pakistan (OPLR/Lahore and OPKR/Karachi FIRs) altogether, such as KLM, Air France, Thai Airways, Korean Air and Lufthansa and its subsidiaries. Flight operations were suspended at Islamabad, Lahore, and Karachi, but were restored shortly after. Air India has cancelled flights to and from Jammu, Srinagar, Leh, Jodhpur, Amritsar, Bhuj, Jamnagar, Chandigarh and Rajkot. The U.N. Secretary General urged India and Pakistan to ‘avoid a military confrontation,’ while Qatar, the UAE, the US, China, Turkey and the EU called for restraint and to avoid further escalation. Israel’s ambassador to India expressed support for ‘India’s right to self-defence.’ On 07/05/2025, the Pakistani Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif, announced that the Pakistani Armed Forces have been authorized to undertake "corresponding actions” against India. On X (formerly Twitter) , he also stated that “a resolute response is already underway”. Context: On 22/04/2025 , a group of armed militants conducted a terrorist attack in the town of Pahalgam, Anantnag district, Jammu and Kashmir region. The attack resulted in 26 deaths (25 Indian nationals and 1 Nepalese national). The Resistance Front (TRF), likely a Lashkar-e-Taiba-affiliated organization, has since claimed responsibility for the attack. Lashkar-e-Taiba is a Pakistani Islamic terrorist organization and a designated terrorist group by a number of countries, including the EU. On 23/04/2025 , India suspended the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960, the treaty allows for the sharing of the waters of the Indus River system, which is especially important for Pakistan’s agricultural sector. India also closed the Integrated Check Post Attari, one of the critical checkpoints along the Pakistani-Indian border in the Punjab region, and the main (and only) hub for cross-border land trade between the two countries. On 23/04/2025 , India banned Pakistani nationals from travelling to India under the SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) Visa Exemption Scheme visas (SVAS). Moreover, all the previously issued visas are now invalid. All Pakistani nationals residing or otherwise located in India under SVAS visas were given 48 hours to leave the country. India also scaled down the contingent of Pakistani diplomats and reduced the Pakistani High Commission staff from 55 to 30 members.  On 23/04/2025 , India declared the Defence/Military, Naval and Air advisors in the Pakistani High Commission persona non grata. They were given a week to leave India. India will also withdraw its advisors from the Indian High Commission in Islamabad. On 24/04/2025 , a brief exchange of gunfire between Pakistani and Indian forces took place on the border between India-administered Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistani-administered Azad Kashmir. The United Nations has called for maximum restraint from both countries, emphasizing the importance of resolving issues peacefully through meaningful engagement.  Analysis :  The Kashmir conflict is a long-standing territorial dispute between India and Pakistan, over the region of Jammu and Kashmir. Both countries claim the regions in full but only control parts of it. The conflict traces back to 1947, when British India was partitioned into India and Pakistan, with both nations claiming the entirety of the former state. This led to the first war, followed by additional wars and military skirmishes over the years.  The current tensions are reminiscent of the 2019 escalation that followed the Pulwama attack of 2019, in which 40 Indian Central Reserve personnel were killed. However, the Pahalgam attack carries a higher diplomatic and socio-political weight, as in this case, the victims were civilians . The timing of the attack is also crucial; Indian Prime Minister Modi was visiting Saudi Arabia and U.S. Vice President Vance was visiting India. Moreover, the attack occurred less than a week after a speech by the Pakistani Army Chief, General Asim Munir, which, among other things, focused on the need for Kashmir to be Pakistani.  The Indian response to the attacks also differs.  After the Pulwama attack, India launched a single airstrike towards a JeM camp. In response, Pakistan shot down an Indian Air Force jet. Both India and Pakistan’s current attacks and retaliations are more severe, driving tensions and heightened sentiments on both sides. However, India avoided Pakistani military targets and stayed out of its airspace, echoing previous limited strikes and suggesting a strategy of measured retaliation. Historical precedents also show capacity for de-escalation after limited attacks, and international pressure to avoid a conflict should incentivize the two countries to contain the crisis.

Date: 14/03/2025 Location:   Goma, North Kivu Province, DRC; Nyabibwe, South Kivu Province, DRC; Kalehe, South Kivu Province, DRC; Bukavu, South Kivu Province, DRC. Kinshasa, Kinshasa Province, DRC. Bunia, Ituri, DRC. Ground Security: For those in North and South Kivu, as well as Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), exercise extreme caution and leave the country as soon as possible. If leaving is not an option, stay indoors as much as possible and closely monitor local media for updates. A ceasefire may or may not be declared next week following talks between M23 and the DRC, but do not take any announcement at face value—especially unilateral ones. If a ceasefire is declared, remain vigilant and continue monitoring the situation. Note: The Dutch embassy in Kinshasa is temporarily closed to the public. If in need of help, contact the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at  +31 247 247 247. Airport/Overflight Security: Goma International Airport (GOM/FZNA) and Bukavu Kuvumu Airport (BKY/FZMA) have been  seized by M23, rendering Air Traffic Control (ATC) and Airfield Services unavailable.  It is NOT  possible to land/takeoff or divert to Goma International Airport. The airport and runways were damaged during the fighting. Avoid landing in Goma Airport and Bukavu Kavumu Airport, even in emergencies. There are two NOTAMS issued related to FIR KINSHASA (FZZA): United Kingdom: it is recommended not to enter FIR KINSHASA (FZZA) within 100 NM of the eastern boundary, between the 1st parallel north and the 2nd parallel south, below FL250. Canada: it is recommended not to enter FIR KINSHASA (FZZA) below FL260. This means that overflying traffic at higher altitudes is generally not at risk under normal operations. However, those descending or diverting below FL260 within FIR KINSHASA face significant exposure to small-arms fire and MANPADS. Therefore, it is recommended to take precautionary measures by planning the route, avoiding alternate airports in the DRC in case of an emergency, and maintaining an altitude above FL260 in FIR KINSHASA (FZZA) .  On 11/02/2025, the DRC prohibited any aircraft registered in Rwanda from overflying, landing or otherwise utilising Congolese airspace.  What happened: On 28/01/2025, the March 23 Movement ( Mouvement du 23 Mars, hereafter M23) fighters captured the eastern city of Goma , North Kivu Province, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), marking a significant escalation of the decades-long conflict which reignited in 2022.  On 04/02/2025, Uganda sent soldiers to the DRC north of Goma. Uganda has deployed an estimated 4,000–5,000 troops in eastern DRC, primarily to combat the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an Islamist militant group, rather than solely engaging M23. The UN has earlier accused Rwanda of supporting M23.  On 17/02/2025 Eastern Congo’s second largest city, Bukavu, fell to M23 . They also gained control over Kavumu Airport in the north of the city. On 08/03/2025,  Group Kabido, an armed group previously allied with the DRC government, announced its alignment with M23. This appears to be part of a broader pattern: several other armed groups, including the 2,000-strong Force des Patriotes pour la Paix/Armée du Peuple (FPP-AP), abandoned their support for Forces d'Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo (hereafter FARDC) and joined M23. In  March, M23’s advance continued in all directions. On 09/03/2025  M23 captured Nyabyiondo, and began advancing toward the strategically located town of Walikale, which contains an important industrial tin mine (Alphamin) crucial to DRC government finances. On  09/03/2025, the DRC government offered a $5 million bounty for assistance in arresting one of the M23 leaders, Corneille Nangaa, Bertrand Bisimwa and Sultani Makenga. All three leaders had been tried in absentia and sentenced to death in August 2024. On 10/03/2025,  Reports emerged that the US and DRC were in talks for a potential deal: DRC would provide the US with access to minerals and strategic benefits in Africa, while the US would help the FARDC combat M23. On 11/03/2025 , Angolan President João Lourenço announced that peace talks will begin next week in Luanda. This marks a historic shift, as the DRC government had previously refused direct negotiations with M23, labeling it a terrorist group, and instead sought talks with Rwanda, which consistently declined. On 12/03/2025 , M23 captured Idjwi Island, the largest island in Lake Kivu bordering Rwanda.  On 12/03/2025, FARDC raided Nangaa's family home in Isiro as part of a broader crackdown amid the ongoing M23 conflict. On 13/03/2025:   The South African Development Community Mission to the Congo, mainly consisting of soldiers from South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania, announced a decision for a "phased withdrawal" from the DRC after suffering heavy losses, including at least 19 casualties and reportedly hundreds wounded. The mission had been present in the DRC since December 2023. On 18/03/2025, direct peace talks between M23 and the DRC scheduled to begin in Luanda, Angola.

Date:  14/03/2025 Where:  Syria, Kiswah - city south of Damascus Syria, Quneitra and Dara’a Province Syria, Tartous and Latakia Province Syria, Aleppo, Raqqa and Hassakah Province Who’s involved: Syria, Israel, Turkey, Pro-Assad insurgency cells What happened? Following the fall of Assad’s regime on 08/12/2024 and   Al-Sharaa's assumption of office on 29/01/2025 , Al-Sharaa and the Syrian transitional government have been working to unify Syria , establish state institutions, and revive the struggling economy. As part of these efforts, the Syrian administration has been rebuilding the country's armed forces and security agencies, while also engaging with foreign nations, such as Russia and the EU. On 27/01/2025 , the EU approved to lift sanctions and unfreeze assets of entities like banks and Syrian Arab Airlines, whilst Russian oil export tankers arrived at the coast of Syria on 06/03/2025  following new economic arrangements between Syria and Russia.   On 12/02/2025 , Al-Sharaa declared the formation of the Preparatory Committee for the National Dialogue Conference. The committee held consultations across Syria, leading to the quick organization of the National Dialogue Conference on 24/02/2025 . The conference concluded with a final statement outlining the foundation for a new constitution .  On 24/02/2025 , Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu demanded  the complete demilitarization of southern Syria  and affirmed that Israel would not permit any Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) or Syrian forces to enter the area south of Damascus. Following this, Israel conducted a new wave of airstrikes  in Kiswah, south of Damascus, and in the southern province of Deraa on 25/02/2025 . In response, protests erupted across multiple regions in Syria from 24-02-2025  to 25-02-2025 . Meanwhile, Israeli forces remain active in the Southern Quneitra  in the Golan Heights and continue to establish logistical infrastructure whilst also conducting more airstrikes on military bases in the Tartous region in Northern Syria ( 03/03/2025 ), emphasizing Israel’s ongoing strategic presence. During a meeting in Amman on 26/02/2025 , Jordan's King Abdullah and Syria's President Al-Sharaa agreed to work together to secure their common border against arms and drug trafficking. On 06/03/2025 , pro-Assad insurgent cells carried out coordinated attacks on Syrian military checkpoints and patrols in Jableh, Beit Ana, and Daliyah in Latakia Province . After several smaller clashes from pro-assad insurgents, this marked the first major instance of their open armed rebellion against the new regime, signaling lingering resistance from loyalists of the former government. The newly formed Syrian army deployed armored units, helicopters, and drones between  07/03/2025  and 10/03/2025 . Syrian government forces have secured most of the region’s larger towns, but still have not fully eliminated insurgent cells in the provinces of Tartous and Latakia . Despite the conclusion of clearing operations on 10/03/2025 ,  insurgents remain active in western Syria.  Their ability to operate without uniforms and blend with the population makes them difficult to eradicate in single operations.  In addition to the separate insurgency cell attacks, the Syrian Popular Resistance (SPR), a pro-Assad insurgent group formed in December 2024, announced on 07/03/2025  that it had seized control of several villages in Jabal al-Alawiyin and expanded its operations to Masyaf in the Hama countryside, highlighting the ongoing fighting and instability in different regions. On 09/03/2025 , reports of massacres in coastal Alawite communities , allegedly due to poorly executed counter-insurgency operations by transitional government forces, prompted President Sharaa's office to announce the formation of an independent committee to investigate the clashes and killings by both sides. The committee’s aim is to identify the perpetrators and alleviate the growing fear among Syria’s ethnic minorities , specifically Alawites. In the aftermath of the killings, many minority group members attempted to flee the country, and by 13/03/2025 , approximately 9,000 people sought refuge from the sectarian violence at the Russian air base in Hmeimim, Syria. In Northern Syria, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) have been clashing with the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)  positions since before the toppling of Assad’s regime. However, the conflict intensified after the fall of Assad and has seen both sides exchange heavy artillery fire, with Turkey and SNA forces also launching significant strikes on SDF positions in the provinces Aleppo, Raqqa and Hassakah. However, a potential turning point emerged when an agreement was reached between the Syrian transitional government and the SDF on   10/03/2025 , outlining the integration of SDF forces into the national army. Although the SNA temporarily halted its attacks following the ceasefire, the SNA resumed attacks on SDF positions along the M4 highway in Aleppo and Hasakah  provinces on 11/03/2025  and 12/03/2025.  Turkish President Erdogan expressed cautious support for the ceasefire on 11/03/2025  but reiterated Turkey's commitment to fighting terrorism, evidenced by continued Turkish strikes on SDF positions  from 10/03/2025  to 12/03/2025 . Furthermore, the SNA's ongoing attacks on the SDF suggest that the Syrian transitional government has limited control over the SNA , which began integrating its forces into the Syrian transitional Defense Ministry on   29/12/2024 after talks between Al- Sharaa and SNA leaders. On 12/03/2025 , Al-Sharaa issued a decree establishing the country's National Security Council. The council, which was absent during the rule of Assad, will be responsible for making decisions concerning national security and addressing the challenges facing the state. On 13/03/2025 , Al-Sharaa signed a draft constitution that initiates a five-year transition period and ensures a separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.