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Persbericht samenwerking Dyami en Instituut voor Veiligheid Dyami Academy en Instituut voor Veiligheid bundelen krachten: nieuwe trainingen tegen statelijke en maatschappelijke dreigingen nu beschikbaar Nieuwegein, … april 2025 – Dyami Academy en het Instituut voor Veiligheid (IVV) kondigen met trots hun samenwerking aan. Vanaf vandaag zijn via Dyami Academy twee nieuwe trainingen beschikbaar: de training Counter Terrorism, Extremism and Radicalisation  (CTER) en de ééndaagse training Spionage & Sabotage – Bewustwording voor iedereen die opereert in het veiligheidsdomein.  In een wereld waarin zowel statelijke actoren als binnenlandse extremistische bewegingen toenemende risico's vormen, is versterking van bewustwording en handelingsbekwaamheid essentieel. Met deze samenwerking maken Dyami Academy en IVV cruciale kennis en praktische vaardigheden toegankelijker voor veiligheidsprofessionals. Twee trainingen, één gezamenlijke missie: vergroten van veiligheid en weerbaarheid CTER-training :Deze training richt zich op het proces van polarisatie, radicalisering, extremisme en terrorisme. Deelnemers krijgen inzicht in de signalen en drijfveren die kenmerkend zijn voor mensen die radicaliseren, en leren hoe vlaggen, symbolen en gedragingen kunnen wijzen op radicale bewegingen. De training gaat in op de manieren waarop extremisme zichtbaar wordt binnen zowel extreemlinkse als extreemrechtse stromingen, en hoe politieke en religieuze motieven mensen kunnen aanzetten tot extremistische daden. Spionage & Sabotage-training :In deze ééndaagse praktijkgerichte training krijgen deelnemers inzicht in actuele statelijke dreigingen zoals spionage en sabotage. Ze leren hoe landen als Rusland, China en Iran opereren binnen Nederland, hoe spionage- en sabotage signalen te herkennen, en krijgen praktische handvatten om effectief te melden en binnen hun eigen rol en bevoegdheden actie te ondernemen. Beide trainingen zijn praktijkgericht, bevatten interactieve scenario's en worden verzorgd door ervaren professionals met achtergronden bij de politie, AIVD, Defensie en internationale veiligheid. Meer informatie en inschrijven kan hier: https://www.instituutvoorveiligheid.nl/trainingen/spionage-en-sabbotage/ Charlotte Bakker en Theo Oskam Charlotte Bakker, directeur van Dyami Academy, zegt hierover: "De dreigingen waarmee we vandaag worden geconfronteerd, zijn divers en complex. Door deze samenwerking kunnen we professionals nog beter toerusten om deze uitdagingen aan te gaan en de veiligheid in Nederland te versterken." Theo Oskam, directeur IvV, zegt hierover: “De wereld verandert snel, en dat vraagt om samenwerking. Met deze stap bundelen Dyami en de Coöperatie Instituut voor Veiligheid hun krachten om professionals op te leiden die met een brede blik en stevige basis bijdragen aan een veiligere samenleving.” Over Dyami Academy Dyami Academy ondersteunt professionals wereldwijd bij het herkennen en beheersen van dreigingen. Door middel van hoogwaardige trainingen, advisering en dreigingsanalyses draagt Dyami bij aan een veiligere samenleving. Over het Instituut voor Veiligheid Het Instituut voor Veiligheid (IVV) verzorgt opleidingen en trainingen binnen het veiligheidsdomein, gericht op bewustwording, signalering en handelingsbekwaamheid op het gebied van nationale veiligheid en crisisbeheersing. Meer informatie en inschrijven Bezoek:   www.dyami.academy Of neem contact op via: info@dyami.academy

Date:   25/04/2025 Where:  Jammu and Kashmir Region, Anantnag District Who’s involved: India, Pakistan What happened: On 22/04/2025 , a group of armed militants conducted a terrorist attack in the town of Pahalgam, Anantnag district, Jammu and Kashmir region. The attack resulted in 26 deaths (25 Indian nationals and 1 Nepalese national). The Resistance Front (TRF), likely a Lashkar-e-Taiba-affiliated organization, has since claimed responsibility for the attack. Lashkar-e-Taiba is a Pakistani Islamic terrorist organization and a designated terrorist group by several countries, including the EU. On 23/04/2025 , India suspended the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960, which allows for the sharing of the waters of the Indus River system, which is especially important for Pakistan’s agricultural sector. India also closed the Integrated Check Post Attari, one of the critical checkpoints along the Pakistani-Indian border in the Punjab region, and the main (and only) hub for cross-border land trade between the two countries. On 23/04/2025 , India banned Pakistani nationals from travelling to India under the SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) Visa Exemption Scheme visas (SVAS). Moreover, all the previously issued visas are now invalid. All Pakistani nationals residing or otherwise located in India under SVAS visas were given 48 hours to leave the country. India also scaled down the contingent of Pakistani diplomats and reduced the Pakistani High Commission staff from 55 to 30 members.  On 23/04/2025 , India declared the Defence/Military, Naval and Air advisors in the Pakistani High Commission persona non grata. They were given a week to leave India. India will also withdraw its advisors from the Indian High Commission in Islamabad. On 24/04/2025 , the Pakistani Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) issued a Notice-to-Airmen (NOTAM) stating that the Pakistani airspace, OPLR/Lahore FIR and OPKR/Karachi FIR, is closed to all Indian operators, in response to the actions taken by India following the Pahalgam attack.  This means all Indian-registered airlines are prohibited from flying over Pakistani airspace and must take alternative routes. It is not the first time Pakistan has closed its airspace to Indian carriers. The previous instance followed the 2019 Pulwama attack. Islamabad also suspended trade with India and warned that any attempt by India to divert water from the Indus River would be considered an act of war.  As of 24/04/2025 , the Pakistani CAA issued a NOTAM warning of a live-fire exercise by the Pakistani Navy in the Arabian Sea. India’s INS Vikrant (CV-R11) and INS Surat (DDG-D69)are also in the area. INS Surat conducted a live-fire exercise of its own, while INS Vikrant, previously due in port, is now circling in the Arabian Sea, likely acting as an added contingent in the area. On 24/04/2025 , a brief exchange of gunfire between Pakistani and Indian forces took place on the border between India-administered Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistani-administered Azad Kashmir. The United Nations has called for maximum restraint from both countries, emphasizing the importance of resolving issues peacefully through meaningful engagement.  Analysis :  The Kashmir conflict is a long-standing territorial dispute between India and Pakistan, over the region of Jammu and Kashmir. Both countries claim the regions in full but only control in parts. The conflict traces back to 1947, when British India was partitioned into India and Pakistan, with both nations claiming the entirety of the former state. This led to the first war, followed by additional wars and military skirmishes over the years.  The current tensions are reminiscent of the 2019 escalation that followed the Pulwama attack of 2019, in which 40 Indian Central Reserve personnel were killed. However, the Pahalgam attack carries a higher diplomatic and socio-political weight, as in this case, the victims were civilians. The timing of the attack is also crucial; Indian Prime Minister Modi was visiting Saudi Arabia and U.S. Vice President Vance was visiting India. Moreover, the attack occurred less than a week after a speech by the Pakistani Army Chief, General Asim Munir, which, among other things, focused on the need for Kashmir to be Pakistani.  India will likely conduct a retaliatory campaign against targets in Pakistan, as the domestic pressure on the government is intense. The scope of this campaign will likely be limited, but the risk for further escalation is significant . In addition to closing the airspace, Pakistan also suspended trade with India. It warned that any attempt by India to divert water from the Indus River would be considered an act of war. Conclusion:  The current tensions are reminiscent of the 2019 escalation that followed the Pulwama attack on Indian Central Reserve Force personnel. Given the current trajectory, the coming days may witness increased diplomatic isolation, suspensions of bilateral agreements, and potential military skirmishes. A larger retaliatory campaign by India on targets located in Pakistan is likely; in that case, Pakistan is likely to respond with a limited campaign of its own. The risk of further escalation beyond limited military campaigns exists, but is not expected. The situation remains volatile, and it is recommended to refrain from conducting any operations in the Kashmir region.

Date: 14/03/2025 Location:   Goma, North Kivu Province, DRC; Nyabibwe, South Kivu Province, DRC; Kalehe, South Kivu Province, DRC; Bukavu, South Kivu Province, DRC. Kinshasa, Kinshasa Province, DRC. Bunia, Ituri, DRC. Ground Security: For those in North and South Kivu, as well as Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), exercise extreme caution and leave the country as soon as possible. If leaving is not an option, stay indoors as much as possible and closely monitor local media for updates. A ceasefire may or may not be declared next week following talks between M23 and the DRC, but do not take any announcement at face value—especially unilateral ones. If a ceasefire is declared, remain vigilant and continue monitoring the situation. Note: The Dutch embassy in Kinshasa is temporarily closed to the public. If in need of help, contact the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at  +31 247 247 247. Airport/Overflight Security: Goma International Airport (GOM/FZNA) and Bukavu Kuvumu Airport (BKY/FZMA) have been  seized by M23, rendering Air Traffic Control (ATC) and Airfield Services unavailable.  It is NOT  possible to land/takeoff or divert to Goma International Airport. The airport and runways were damaged during the fighting. Avoid landing in Goma Airport and Bukavu Kavumu Airport, even in emergencies. There are two NOTAMS issued related to FIR KINSHASA (FZZA): United Kingdom: it is recommended not to enter FIR KINSHASA (FZZA) within 100 NM of the eastern boundary, between the 1st parallel north and the 2nd parallel south, below FL250. Canada: it is recommended not to enter FIR KINSHASA (FZZA) below FL260. This means that overflying traffic at higher altitudes is generally not at risk under normal operations. However, those descending or diverting below FL260 within FIR KINSHASA face significant exposure to small-arms fire and MANPADS. Therefore, it is recommended to take precautionary measures by planning the route, avoiding alternate airports in the DRC in case of an emergency, and maintaining an altitude above FL260 in FIR KINSHASA (FZZA) .  On 11/02/2025, the DRC prohibited any aircraft registered in Rwanda from overflying, landing or otherwise utilising Congolese airspace.  What happened: On 28/01/2025, the March 23 Movement ( Mouvement du 23 Mars, hereafter M23) fighters captured the eastern city of Goma , North Kivu Province, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), marking a significant escalation of the decades-long conflict which reignited in 2022.  On 04/02/2025, Uganda sent soldiers to the DRC north of Goma. Uganda has deployed an estimated 4,000–5,000 troops in eastern DRC, primarily to combat the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an Islamist militant group, rather than solely engaging M23. The UN has earlier accused Rwanda of supporting M23.  On 17/02/2025 Eastern Congo’s second largest city, Bukavu, fell to M23 . They also gained control over Kavumu Airport in the north of the city. On 08/03/2025,  Group Kabido, an armed group previously allied with the DRC government, announced its alignment with M23. This appears to be part of a broader pattern: several other armed groups, including the 2,000-strong Force des Patriotes pour la Paix/Armée du Peuple (FPP-AP), abandoned their support for Forces d'Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo (hereafter FARDC) and joined M23. In  March, M23’s advance continued in all directions. On 09/03/2025  M23 captured Nyabyiondo, and began advancing toward the strategically located town of Walikale, which contains an important industrial tin mine (Alphamin) crucial to DRC government finances. On  09/03/2025, the DRC government offered a $5 million bounty for assistance in arresting one of the M23 leaders, Corneille Nangaa, Bertrand Bisimwa and Sultani Makenga. All three leaders had been tried in absentia and sentenced to death in August 2024. On 10/03/2025,  Reports emerged that the US and DRC were in talks for a potential deal: DRC would provide the US with access to minerals and strategic benefits in Africa, while the US would help the FARDC combat M23. On 11/03/2025 , Angolan President João Lourenço announced that peace talks will begin next week in Luanda. This marks a historic shift, as the DRC government had previously refused direct negotiations with M23, labeling it a terrorist group, and instead sought talks with Rwanda, which consistently declined. On 12/03/2025 , M23 captured Idjwi Island, the largest island in Lake Kivu bordering Rwanda.  On 12/03/2025, FARDC raided Nangaa's family home in Isiro as part of a broader crackdown amid the ongoing M23 conflict. On 13/03/2025:   The South African Development Community Mission to the Congo, mainly consisting of soldiers from South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania, announced a decision for a "phased withdrawal" from the DRC after suffering heavy losses, including at least 19 casualties and reportedly hundreds wounded. The mission had been present in the DRC since December 2023. On 18/03/2025, direct peace talks between M23 and the DRC scheduled to begin in Luanda, Angola.

Date:  14/03/2025 Where:  Syria, Kiswah - city south of Damascus Syria, Quneitra and Dara’a Province Syria, Tartous and Latakia Province Syria, Aleppo, Raqqa and Hassakah Province Who’s involved: Syria, Israel, Turkey, Pro-Assad insurgency cells What happened? Following the fall of Assad’s regime on 08/12/2024 and   Al-Sharaa's assumption of office on 29/01/2025 , Al-Sharaa and the Syrian transitional government have been working to unify Syria , establish state institutions, and revive the struggling economy. As part of these efforts, the Syrian administration has been rebuilding the country's armed forces and security agencies, while also engaging with foreign nations, such as Russia and the EU. On 27/01/2025 , the EU approved to lift sanctions and unfreeze assets of entities like banks and Syrian Arab Airlines, whilst Russian oil export tankers arrived at the coast of Syria on 06/03/2025  following new economic arrangements between Syria and Russia.   On 12/02/2025 , Al-Sharaa declared the formation of the Preparatory Committee for the National Dialogue Conference. The committee held consultations across Syria, leading to the quick organization of the National Dialogue Conference on 24/02/2025 . The conference concluded with a final statement outlining the foundation for a new constitution .  On 24/02/2025 , Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu demanded  the complete demilitarization of southern Syria  and affirmed that Israel would not permit any Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) or Syrian forces to enter the area south of Damascus. Following this, Israel conducted a new wave of airstrikes  in Kiswah, south of Damascus, and in the southern province of Deraa on 25/02/2025 . In response, protests erupted across multiple regions in Syria from 24-02-2025  to 25-02-2025 . Meanwhile, Israeli forces remain active in the Southern Quneitra  in the Golan Heights and continue to establish logistical infrastructure whilst also conducting more airstrikes on military bases in the Tartous region in Northern Syria ( 03/03/2025 ), emphasizing Israel’s ongoing strategic presence. During a meeting in Amman on 26/02/2025 , Jordan's King Abdullah and Syria's President Al-Sharaa agreed to work together to secure their common border against arms and drug trafficking. On 06/03/2025 , pro-Assad insurgent cells carried out coordinated attacks on Syrian military checkpoints and patrols in Jableh, Beit Ana, and Daliyah in Latakia Province . After several smaller clashes from pro-assad insurgents, this marked the first major instance of their open armed rebellion against the new regime, signaling lingering resistance from loyalists of the former government. The newly formed Syrian army deployed armored units, helicopters, and drones between  07/03/2025  and 10/03/2025 . Syrian government forces have secured most of the region’s larger towns, but still have not fully eliminated insurgent cells in the provinces of Tartous and Latakia . Despite the conclusion of clearing operations on 10/03/2025 ,  insurgents remain active in western Syria.  Their ability to operate without uniforms and blend with the population makes them difficult to eradicate in single operations.  In addition to the separate insurgency cell attacks, the Syrian Popular Resistance (SPR), a pro-Assad insurgent group formed in December 2024, announced on 07/03/2025  that it had seized control of several villages in Jabal al-Alawiyin and expanded its operations to Masyaf in the Hama countryside, highlighting the ongoing fighting and instability in different regions. On 09/03/2025 , reports of massacres in coastal Alawite communities , allegedly due to poorly executed counter-insurgency operations by transitional government forces, prompted President Sharaa's office to announce the formation of an independent committee to investigate the clashes and killings by both sides. The committee’s aim is to identify the perpetrators and alleviate the growing fear among Syria’s ethnic minorities , specifically Alawites. In the aftermath of the killings, many minority group members attempted to flee the country, and by 13/03/2025 , approximately 9,000 people sought refuge from the sectarian violence at the Russian air base in Hmeimim, Syria. In Northern Syria, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) have been clashing with the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)  positions since before the toppling of Assad’s regime. However, the conflict intensified after the fall of Assad and has seen both sides exchange heavy artillery fire, with Turkey and SNA forces also launching significant strikes on SDF positions in the provinces Aleppo, Raqqa and Hassakah. However, a potential turning point emerged when an agreement was reached between the Syrian transitional government and the SDF on   10/03/2025 , outlining the integration of SDF forces into the national army. Although the SNA temporarily halted its attacks following the ceasefire, the SNA resumed attacks on SDF positions along the M4 highway in Aleppo and Hasakah  provinces on 11/03/2025  and 12/03/2025.  Turkish President Erdogan expressed cautious support for the ceasefire on 11/03/2025  but reiterated Turkey's commitment to fighting terrorism, evidenced by continued Turkish strikes on SDF positions  from 10/03/2025  to 12/03/2025 . Furthermore, the SNA's ongoing attacks on the SDF suggest that the Syrian transitional government has limited control over the SNA , which began integrating its forces into the Syrian transitional Defense Ministry on   29/12/2024 after talks between Al- Sharaa and SNA leaders. On 12/03/2025 , Al-Sharaa issued a decree establishing the country's National Security Council. The council, which was absent during the rule of Assad, will be responsible for making decisions concerning national security and addressing the challenges facing the state. On 13/03/2025 , Al-Sharaa signed a draft constitution that initiates a five-year transition period and ensures a separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.

Date: 13/03/2025 Location:   South Sudan; Uganda South Sudan - context: South Sudan achieved independence in 2011, becoming the world's newest country after years of struggle with Sudan. Yet its early years as a nation have been troubled by civil conflict, government instability, and economic challenges. The political scene  revolves around President Salva Kiir and his former vice president Riek Machar . Their power struggle has intensified ethnic tensions, particularly between Dinka and Nuer communities. Kiir is from the Dinka community, while Machar is a Nuer. From 2013 to 2020, civil war claimed over 400,000 lives and forced millions to flee their homes. Though a peace agreement in 2020 created a unity government, the relationship between Kiir and Machar remains strained, putting the peace process at risk.  Recent developments have heightened tensions across the young nation, suggesting the civil war might not be over yet. Latest developments: On 14/02/2025 , tensions between Kiir and Machar escalated as clashes broke out between the South Sudanese army and an "armed youth militia," as described by Human Rights Watch in the Upper Nile province of South Sudan On 04/03/2025, the defense forces of Sudan liquidated Tor Gile Thoan Meen, commander of the ‘Nuer White Army’ militia. On 04/03/2025 , the ‘White Army Militia’, composed of the Nuer people, claimed control of Nasir, a town in South Sudan’s Upper Nile province close to Ethiopia, after clashing with government forces. That same day , Machar’s top allies were arrested in Juba, the capital, as a response to the developments in Nasir, threatening the fragile unity government. On 06/03/2025, Kenyan President William Ruto engaged with both Kiir and Machar, expressing his support for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. On 07/03/2025, a UN-helicopter evacuating government soldiers, Russian crew and civilians was shot down by the White Army Militia close to Nasir, killing more than 20, including a general and UN crew member. Reportedly, this was a retaliation for the killing of Tor Gile Thoan Meen. On 08/03/2025, the US ordered its non-essential personnel to leave the country, citing the deteriorating security situation. On 11/03/2025, Uganda deployed its special forces to South Sudan. Kampala’s military chief announced on Tuesday that the troops had been sent to help ‘secure’ Juba. In a  post on X ,  he mentioned: “We only recognize ONE President of South Sudan, H.E. Salva Kiir [...] Any move against him is a declaration of war against Uganda!”. On  12/03/2025 , the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a bloc of eight East African nations, called for the South Sudanese government to release the officials who were detained at the beginning of March and restore “standard security arrangements”  to prevent escalating factional tensions. Analysis South Sudan continues to struggle with severe interethnic conflict , primarily between the Dinka and Nuer, two of the country's largest ethnic groups. In 2018, the Revitalised Agreement on Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) was signed , marking the end of a 5-year civil war between the factions of Kiir and Machar. The peace deal aimed to unify armies, draft a new constitution, hold elections, conduct a census, and disarm armed groups, but none of these reforms have been implemented . The peace in South Sudan has been fragile since its inception and as fighting erupted in Upper Nile province on 14/02/2025, worries of another civil war increased.  Sudan’s conflict has deepened South Sudan’s crisis by cutting off its main revenue source —oil exports—after fighting damaged the pipeline near Khartoum in 2024. This fiscal strain has weakened Kiir’s patronage network, fueling unrest and making South Sudan more vulnerable to external interference.  Burhan’s military is suspected of arming Nuer militias to destabilize Kiir and reclaim border regions, while the RSF, backed by the UAE, has drawn Juba closer, worsening tensions.  At the moment, hostilities are confined to the north-eastern province, but violence is likely to escalate. The Nuer White Army appears to be poorly trained and lightly armed , primarily equipped with Kalashnikov rifles, a few light machine guns, and a limited number of technicals, such as pick-ups with mounted machine guns. In contrast, the  South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF) are better equipped , possessing more advanced weaponry and limited air support. However, despite their advantage, the SSPDF is limited by the UN Security Council’s ongoing arms embargo on South Sudan , which prohibits the import of weapons. This embargo, aimed at curbing violence and ensuring stability, has impacted the country’s military capabilities, preventing both the government and opposition forces from acquiring new weapons. Uganda has significant interests in the South Sudan conflict.  President Museveni maintains a close alliance with South Sudan and a personal relationship with President Kiir, providing support to South Sudan's government during the civil war. The Ugandan government has experienced recurring tensions with Sudan, with both countries seemingly using South Sudan as a battleground for proxy conflicts,  evidenced by their support of opposing factions during the civil war. Additionally, South Sudan represents one of Uganda's most important trading partners . As Uganda has reinstated support for President Kiir, it is highly likely that a conflict in South Sudan would include a number of Ugandan troops.  Conclusion The escalating tensions in South Sudan represent a dangerous deterioration of an already fragile peace agreement. With Uganda's recent military deployment to support President Kiir, the conflict risks expanding into a regional conflict involving Sudan, Uganda, and potentially other neighboring states. The arrest of Machar's allies, combined with the Nuer White Army's territorial gains, suggests the unity government may be collapsing. International stakeholders including the UN and regional powers like Kenya are attempting diplomatic interventions, but with limited success thus far. The situation threatens not only South Sudan's stability but potentially regional security across East Africa, especially given Uganda's explicit military commitment to Kiir's government and the ongoing parallel conflict in Sudan. Airport/Overflight Security: The situation in South Sudan is unstable and can escalate at any moment. Juba airport (HJJJ) may be closed at short notice. The UK, France and Germany advise against overflying South Sudan below FL250 due to the risk by anti-aircraft weaponry. Air navigation services are suspended above FL245.  We advise against overflying South Sudan. Ground Security: The security situation in South Sudan is becoming increasingly unstable, with rising tensions and localised violence in several regions. While the situation has not reached the severity of a full-scale conflict, it is essential to remain vigilant. Avoid travel to South Sudan For those in South Sudan: exercise extreme caution, avoid unnecessary travel, and stay indoors as much as possible, especially in high-risk areas . Monitor local media and official sources for updates on the security situation and stay informed about any developments. Prioritise personal safety and be prepared for potential evacuations .

Date:  28/02/2025 Where: South-Eastern Australia, off the coast of Tasmania and New South Wales. Who's involved: China, Australia, New Zealand What happened: On 21/02/2025, the Task Group conducted a live-fire exercise . The exercise was criticized by both Australian and New Zealand officials. Canberra and Wellington, while recognizing that China is entitled to do so under international law, were concerned with the lack of advanced notification of the firing, which also lacked a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM), that caused "several commercial aircraft to divert course" , a New Zealand Defence Force report stated. Another live-fire exercise was conducted on 22/02/2025. On 19/02/2025, a Chinese Navy (hereafter PLAN; People's Liberation Army Navy ) task force first entered Australia's Exclusive Economic Zone  (EEZ). The flotilla, referred to as Task Group 107,  consists of Renhai -class cruiser Zunyi (107), Jiangkai -class frigate Hengyang  (568) and Fuchi -class replenishment oiler Weishanhu  (887). The Australian Defence Force (ADF) was first alerted to the Chinese live-firing exercise at 10:08  (UTC+10) on 21/02/2025, 38 minutes after China's exercise had started at 9:30.  This was after a Virgin pilot transmitted mid-flight warnings to Airservices Australia, Australia's civil aviation authority.  Analysis : This is the most recent example of China's ambitions in the Pacific. China often violates the EEZ of Taiwan and The Philippines and the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) of the former. In the past few weeks, both the Philippine and Australian navies have reported dangerous incidents involving Chinese aircraft. On 18/02/2025, a PLAN Z-9 helicopter flew deliberately close (within 3 meters) of a Philippine government aircraft.  For years, these two countries have been locked in an escalating series of confrontations over disputed waters in the South China Sea. On 11/02/2025, a Chinese Air Force (PLAAF; People's Liberation Army Air Force ) J-16 fighter released flares 30 metres in front of an Australian Air Force (RAAF; Royal Australian Air Force ) P-8 Poseidon surveillance aircraft. The deployment of Task Group 107 came as Australia was receiving Admiral Samuel Paparo, the head of the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). China justified the deployment by saying its actions were "entirely in accordance with international law." In line with the latter, Australia, unlike China, is limited to the 12 (nautical) mile line where it can exercise its sovereignty. With its nine-dash line, China claims much larger territorial waters.  These are not recognized by international law, but China often uses them to justify deployments and grey zone actions.  As it already did with Taiwan and the Philippines, China could try to normalize these kinds of actions around Australia , especially insofar as the Australian government has lacked a proper response, at least publicly.  China may also use these deployments to test the Australian Navy's  (RAN; Royal Australian Navy ) response and try to keep it closer to home to limit the help it could provide to its allies in the Pacific, such as Taiwan, Japan and the United States. In the case of Taiwan, the previously mentioned head of INDOPACOM, Adm. Samuel Paparo, has already mentioned the Chinese escalation in demonstrations of force toward Taiwan, which are "not exercises, they are rehearsals". According to Paparo, China is showing "clear intent and capability" to attack Taiwan. Recent satellite imagery showing a flotilla of specially-built barges, eerily suitable for a Taiwan landing, also points to real intent on China's side.  Conclusion:  The recent PLAN deployment near Australia and New Zealand shows the PLAN's rapidly growing power and reach . It is likely meant to normalize the Chinese Navy's presence in the region. During the deployment, the PLAN likely monitored Canberra's and Wellington's response and their naval response regarding readiness, tactics and resolve. After cementing its reach and presence in the South China Sea, a body of water China has long claimed as its own, Beijing appears to be projecting its power further away from its coasts. Since the helicopter event of 18/02/2025 was highly likely aimed at the Philippine government, no similar actions against commercial flights are anticipated during the Chinese deployments .

Date:  21/02/2025 Where:  Israel Who’s involved: Israel, Gaza, West Bank, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria What happened? Israel-Palestine: Israel and Hamas reached a Gaza ceasefire deal that took effect on 19/01/2025. The agreement is aimed at increasing humanitarian aid, the gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces, and the release of Israeli captives in exchange for Palestinian prisoners. On the first day of the ceasefire, Hamas released the first three Israeli hostages as part of the agreement, while Israel freed 90 Palestinian prisoners. By 22/01/2025 , more than 2,400 aid trucks had entered Gaza.  On 21/01/2025 , Israeli security forces raided the West Bank city of Jenin,  killing at least nine Palestinians. Additionally, thousands of Palestinians waited at roadblocks to return home to northern Gaza on 26/01/2025 , following a refusal to open crossing points by Israel.  Hamas agreed to hand over three Israeli hostages, and Israel opened roadblocks the following day. On 09/02/2025 ,  the Israeli military completed its withdrawal from Gaza’s Netzarim Corridor  as part of the ceasefire deal. On  10/02/2025,  the Israeli military continued attacks on Jenin , in the West Bank, resulting in the deaths of three Palestinians, including a pregnant woman. On the same day, Hamas temporarily suspended the release of 76 hostages , citing Israeli violations of the ceasefire by allowing heavy machinery back into Gaza.  On  13/02/2025, Hamas announced   that it would proceed with the planned releases, after threats from Trump and Netanyahu to escalate violence if hostages were not freed by 15/02/2025. On 17/02/2025, Netanyahu instructed Israeli negotiators to travel to Cairo to discuss the stalled second phase of the ceasefire . The delegation will be led by Secretary of Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer, replacing Mossad chief David Barnea, who led the January negotiations that resulted in the current deal. Whether Barnea will continue as part of the Israeli negotiating team remains unclear. So far, no progress has been reported , and  Israel continues to block the entry of tens of thousands of mobile homes and tents  into Gaza, despite this being a condition of the truce. On 17/02/2025, threats of a direct attack on Israel were revived  by senior commanders from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), also known as the Iranian Revolutionary Guards , likely in an attempt to deter a potential Israeli strike on Iran and influence Israeli decision-making. On 18/02/2025 , Hamas proposed releasing all Israeli captives at once in exchange for a complete end to the war.  Israel has not yet issued an official response to this permanent truce. Syria: Since the fall of Assad’s regime on 08/12/2024, Al-Sharaa has been named Syria’s interim president  on 29/01/2025. Since then, Al-Sharaa has met with Saudi-Arabian crown prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud ( 02/02/2025 ), Turkey’s president Erdoğan ( 04/02/2025 ) and had  a phone conversation with Russian president Putin to establish support (12/02/2025). Additionally, the EU has agreed to lift some of the sanctions against Syria  to help stabilize Damascus  ( 27/01/2025). As of 18/02/2025,  the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) , the last major armed group not to have integrated with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) forces, appears  willing to do so soon. However, there are still several unresolved issues in the negotiations between the SDF and the Syrian interim government, especially regarding the scope of the SDF dissolution.  On 24/01/2025 , satellite imagery showing a new construction   by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the demilitarised buffer zone with Syria was released. It is also reported three Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) brigades are set to remain indefinitely in southern Syria  near the Golan Heights-Jordan border. Lebanon: On 9/01/2025 , Joseph Anon was elected as Lebanon’s president, ending a three-year power vacuum. On 02/02/2025,  Israel announced plans to establish  permanent military outposts adjacent to each northern community along the Lebanon border , as part of a new defense strategy against Hezbollah. Despite a renewed withdrawal deadline for  18/02/2025 , the IDF has announced it will keep soldiers stationed in 5 locations in southern Lebanon . On 02/02/2025, Hezbollah’s leader Naim Qassem announced that a funeral for former Hezbollah leaders Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safiedine will be held in Beirut on   23/02/2025 . The high-profile funeral is expected to draw officials from Hezbollah’s allies, including Iran, Hamas, and the Houthis, as well as Hezbollah fighters and civilian supporters. The first visitors attending the funeral have been documented, and many Baghdad-Beirut flights are fully booked ahead of the Hezbollah leader's funeral, prompting MEA to schedule additional flights. As previously advised, avoid Beirut and southern Lebanon on the days around the funeral for precautionary measures. If possible, temporarily relocate to northern Lebanon until 25/02/2025. On 13/02/2025 , Lebanon denied an Iranian plane permission to land at Rafic Hariri International Airport following Israeli accusations that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was using civilian flights to funnel funds to Hezbollah. This decision led to pro-Hezbollah protests on 15/02/2025 . On  21/02/2025 ,  the Israeli army launched air strikes on sites along the Syria-Lebanon border, claiming that Hezbollah was using them to transfer weapons into Lebanon. Egypt: On 27/01/2025 , President Trump suggested that Jordan and Egypt take in large numbers of Palestinians from besieged Gaza. Both countries have rejected this idea.  The Egyptian government is formulating a plan to rebuild Gaza while ensuring the Palestinian population remains in place, offering an alternative to U.S. President Donald Trump’s proposal to forcibly relocate its residents and take over the territory. The leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Jordan, the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and the Palestinian Authority will gather in Saudi Arabia on 04/03/2025  to discuss the proposal.

Date: 14/02/2025 Location:   Goma, North Kivu Province, DRC; Nyabibwe, South Kivu Province, DRC; Kalehe, South Kivu Province, DRC; Bukavu, South Kivu Province, DRC. Kinshasa, Kinshasa Province, DRC.  Ground Security: For those in Goma  and the Kivu Lake regions  (North and South Kivu) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): pay extreme caution and try to relocate outside the country as soon as possible . The same applies to those in Kinshasa; pay extreme caution and leave the country as soon as possible. If you are unable to leave or have to stay in-country, stay indoors as much as possible and monitor local media for updates. Do not trust ceasefires at face value, especially unilaterally announced ones. If one is announced, monitor the news for updates and keep a cautious approach.  Note: The Dutch embassy in Kinshasa is temporarily closed to the public. If in need of help, contact the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at  +31 247 247 247. Airport/Overflight Security: Goma International Airport (GOM; FZNA) has been  seized by M23, rendering Air Traffic Control (ATC) and Airfield Services unavailable.  It is NOT  possible to land/takeoff or divert to Goma International Airport. The airport and runways were damaged during the fighting. Thus, landing on Goma Airport runways should be avoided even in emergencies. There are two NOTAMS issued related to FIR KINSHASA (FZZA): United Kingdom (NOTAM EGTT V0046/24): it is recommended not to enter FIR KINSHASA (FZZA) within 100 NM of the eastern boundary, between the 1st parallel north and the 2nd parallel south, below FL250. Canada (NOTAM CZUL H0401/25): it is recommended not to enter FIR KINSHASA (FZZA) below FL260. This means that overflying traffic at higher altitudes is generally not at risk under normal operations. However, those descending or diverting below FL260 within FIR KINSHASA face significant exposure to small-arms fire and MANPADS. Therefore, it is recommended to take precautionary measures by planning the route, avoiding alternate airports in the DRC in case of an emergency, and maintaining an altitude above FL260 in FIR KINSHASA .  On 11/02/2025, the DRC prohibited any aircraft registered in Rwanda from overflying, landing or otherwise utilising Congolese airspace.  What happened? On 25/01/2025, The DRC Armed Forces ( Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo, hereafter FARDC) announced that the governor of North Kivu province, Maj. Gen. Peter Cirimwami Nkuba, was killed by an M23 sniper in Sake, close to the local frontline.  On Monday, 27/01/2025 , March 23 Movement ( Mouvement du 23 Mars, hereafter M23) fighters captured the eastern city of Goma , North Kivu Province, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), marking a significant escalation of the decades-long conflict which reignited in 2022.  M23 is one of several armed groups operating in eastern DRC , seeking control over mineral mines. The UN accused both Rwanda and Uganda of supporting M23 with claims of Rwandan and Ugandan troops present in eastern DRC.  On 28/01/2025 , protesters demanding action against M23 attacked several embassies in Kinshasa , the DRC’s capital. The affected embassies are those of the United States, France, Belgium, Uganda, Rwanda, and Kenya, as well as the UN’s Permanent Mission of the DRC.  On Monday, 03/02/2025 , M23 announced a unilateral ceasefire to start on Tuesday, 04/02/2025 , citing "humanitarian reasons." However, on Wednesday, 05/02/2025 , M23 violated the ceasefire   and captured the town of Nyabibwe.  On 04/02/2025 , Reuters reported that Uganda had sent 1,000 more soldiers to the east Congo , north of Goma. This deployment brings the total number of Ugandan soldiers in the region to an estimated 4,000 to 5,000. However, Uganda’s involvement extends beyond confronting the M23 rebel group. The troops are mainly supporting the Congolese government in addressing a separate security threat by pursuing militants of Ugandan origin with ties to the Islamic State group , suggesting that not all of these forces will be directly engaged in the fight against M23. On 07/02/2025, The Guardian reported, citing diplomatic and high-ranking intelligence sources, that the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) have suffered hundreds of casualties since they began actively supporting M23 in 2022.  The same report, citing UN experts, states that the RDF is in “de-facto control” of M23 . Rwanda keeps denying that its forces have crossed into the DRC.  On 08/02/2025, the DRC and Rwanda signed an “immediate and unconditional ceasefire” agreement.  The DRC also agreed to begin direct negotiations with M23. The DRC has previously refused to directly negotiate with M23 after designating them a terrorist group in January 2025. On 09/02/2025, Reuters reported that at least 75 FARDC soldiers are to stand trial for desertion, looting and violence against civilians, including murder and rape. This incident points to   On 10/02/2025, Reuters reported that South Africa had added 700-800 soldiers to the garrison already present in DRC. South African troops in DRC are now believed to be around 2000 personnel strong.  On 11/02/2025, the DRC prohibited any aircraft registered in Rwanda from overflying, landing or otherwise utilising Congolese airspace.  On 12/02/2025 , M23 captured Ihusi and Kalehe. M23 is swiftly approaching the capital of South Kivu province, Bukavu .  Conclusion The situation in eastern DRC is dire. Rwanda’s support of M23 is resilient, and the group’s advance does not appear to be slowing down. The group’s advance is getting dangerously close to the Burundian border. If the Tutsi-led M23 were to violate the Burundian border - a state with a social and political Hutu majority -  the risk of reviving the ethnic-based conflict between Hutu and Tutsi would reach levels not seen in 30 years. Despite the DRC-Rwanda agreement on a ceasefire, M23 has kept its advance going, further undermining the swift and stable crisis resolution.

Date: 19/02/2025 Location:   Goma, North Kivu Province, DRC; Nyabibwe, South Kivu Province, DRC; Kalehe, South Kivu Province, DRC; Bukavu, South Kivu Province, DRC. Kinshasa, Kinshasa Province, DRC. Bunia, Ituri, DRC. Ground Security: For those in North and South Kivu  in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): pay extreme caution and try to relocate outside the country as soon as possible . The same applies to those in Kinshasa; pay extreme caution and leave the country as soon as possible. If you are unable to leave or have to stay in-country, stay indoors as much as possible and monitor local media for updates. Do not trust ceasefires at face value, especially unilaterally announced ones. If one is announced, monitor the news for updates and keep a cautious approach.  Note: The Dutch embassy in Kinshasa is temporarily closed to the public. If in need of help, contact the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at  +31 247 247 247. Airport/Overflight Security: Goma International Airport (GOM/FZNA) and Bukavu Kuvumu Airport (BKY/FZMA) have been  seized by M23, rendering Air Traffic Control (ATC) and Airfield Services unavailable.  It is NOT  possible to land/takeoff or divert to Goma International Airport. The airport and runways were damaged during the fighting. Avoid landing in Goma Airport and Bukavu Kavumu Airport, even in emergencies. There are two NOTAMS issued related to FIR KINSHASA (FZZA): United Kingdom: it is recommended not to enter FIR KINSHASA (FZZA) within 100 NM of the eastern boundary, between the 1st parallel north and the 2nd parallel south, below FL250. Canada: it is recommended not to enter FIR KINSHASA (FZZA) below FL260. This means that overflying traffic at higher altitudes is generally not at risk under normal operations. However, those descending or diverting below FL260 within FIR KINSHASA face significant exposure to small-arms fire and MANPADS. Therefore, it is recommended to take precautionary measures by planning the route, avoiding alternate airports in the DRC in case of an emergency, and maintaining an altitude above FL260 in FIR KINSHASA (FZZA) .  On 11/02/2025, the DRC prohibited any aircraft registered in Rwanda from overflying, landing or otherwise utilizing Congolese airspace.  Latest update: On 17/02/2025 Eastern Congo’s second largest city, Bukavu, fell to M23 . They also gained control over Kavumu Airport in the north of the city. On 18/02/2025, in response to growing instability along their border, Ugandan forces entered Bunia, the capital of Ituri province , north of the Kivu region, citing growing border instability as a reason. At the same time, M23 appears to be regaining momentum in its northward advance, an offensive that had previously seemed to stall.  Meanwhile, in the south, reports suggest that the Burundian army is retreating from the DRC following M23’s continued advance  in that direction. Its official spokesman denies these claims at the time of writing. Conclusion The situation in eastern DRC is growing increasingly dire, with Rwanda’s support for M23 remaining unwavering and the group’s advance continuing unchecked. Reports indicate that M23 is nearing the Burundian border, likely escalating tensions with Burundian authorities, as Bujumbura—the country’s economic powerhouse and former capital—lies in close proximity. Meanwhile, Uganda is also feeling the strain of the conflict and has deployed troops to the Congolese city of Bunia, north of Goma. To access more updates and our analysis of the situation, please contact info@dyami.services or peter@dyami.services .

Date: 07/02/2025 Where: Lebanon, Beirut - Sports City Stadium Lebanon, Beirut, near the Imam Khomeini Center (33° 50’ 45” N, 35° 29’ 45” E) Lebanon, Deir Qanoun En Nahr Who’s involved: Lebanon, Hezbollah, Israel, Iran, Hamas,  Houthis What happened: On 02/02/2025, Hezbollah announced that it would hold the funeral of Hassan Nasrallah  on 23/02/2025 in Beirut . Beirut will also be Nasrallah's burial location. The former leader of Hezbollah was killed by an Israeli airstrike on 27/09/2024, but a formal funeral was delayed due to the extent of the hostilities at the time. Hezbollah had, until now, only resorted to a temporary burial due to security concerns. The planned funeral procession will be held for both Nasrallah and Hashem Safieddine , another senior Hezbollah official who replaced Nasrallah after his death. Safieddine was himself killed by an Israeli airstrike on 03/10/2024.  Saffieddine will instead be buried in his hometown, Deir Qanoun En Nahr . This was also announced on 02/02/2025. A previously agreed-upon ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel is supposed to begin on 18/02/2025. Analysis : Given the high profile of the funeral, several officials from Hezbollah’s allies are to be expected . The speech given by current Hezbollah leader Nair Qassem  suggests that the group expects a large gathering of “political forces, parties, officials and other concerned parties”. Iran  has announced it will send a delegation to the funeral , but it has yet to disclose who is going to be a part of the delegation. Hamas and Houthis officials are also expected to attend . Given past Hezbollah funerals, it is also expected that the procession will be attended by Hezbollah fighters as well as civilian supporters. The likely presence of a large number of armed Hezbollah fighters and the magnitude of this funeral could make for a particularly volatile situation . Unconfirmed images place the burial location in southern Beirut , near the Imam Khomeini Center (33° 50’ 45” N, 35° 29’ 45” E). The most recent ceasefire deadline between Israel and Hezbollah is 18/02/2025,  meaning that the procession will take place five days after the truce is to commence. This delay could likely serve as a buffer period to see if the ceasefire holds. Crucially, the ceasefire deal requires  Hezbollah to surrender its weapons . This is unlikely to happen, meaning that the ceasefire’s observance is already at risk.  Given the expected significant presence of senior officials  from Hezbollah’s state and non-state allies, Israel will likely hold off from attacking the procession. The risk of killing state officials  is significantly high  and could lead to an escalation that Israel is unprepared and/or unwilling to explore. Nevertheless, Israel will likely observe and follow  the procession closely. There could be a strategic reason behind Hezbollah’s information disclosure regarding the funeral as well as the disclosure occurring so far in advance. Hezbollah’s aim could be to create enough media coverage and attention so as to nullify any Israeli covert attempt to strike or otherwise interfere with the procession. Moreover, the disclosure and its timing could serve as a way of making sure that the event is as big as possible. The funeral marks a crucial opportunity for Hezbollah’s leadership to rally support for the group and make sure that they will retain political and military relevance. Since the death of Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s power has progressively waned. This power vacuum has opened the opportunity for the Lebanese Armed Forces and Parliament to properly challenge Hezbollah’s dominance for the first time in years. The recent appointment of President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam is a testament to the Lebanese Parliament's will to challenge Hezbollah.  It is likely that if Hezbollah does not prevent this from happening now, it may not gain back its power. Conclusion:  The funerals of former long-standing Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and his immediate successor, Hashem Safieddine , will be held on  23/02/2025 in Beirut. For precautionary measures, it is advisable to avoid Beirut and southern Lebanon on the days around the funeral. If possible,  temporarily relocate to northern Lebanon until 25/02/2025. Given the alleged burial location’s vicinity to the airport, it is also advised to  avoid flying to and from Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY/OLBA) on the days around the funeral.

Date Published: 04/02/2025 Location:   Goma, North Kivu Province, Eastern DRC; Kinshasa. What happened? On Monday 27/01/2025 , M23 armed group rebels captured the eastern city of Goma , in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), marking a major escalation of the decades-long conflict which reignited in 2022. Hundreds of thousands of people fled Goma. The M23 is one of several armed groups operating in eastern DRC, seeking control over mineral mines. The DRC and the UN accuse Rwanda of supporting the M23 rebel group, with claims of Rwandan troops present in Goma. In a new development, on Monday 03/02/2025 , the AFC/M23 rebel coalition announced a unilateral ceasefire starting Tuesday 04/02/2025, citing "humanitarian reasons."  This decision comes after a week of intense fighting and territorial gains. The DRC government in Kinshasa has not yet commented on the ceasefire announcement , and it remains unclear if the country's military will respect it. Despite earlier statements of marching on to the capital, the M23 rebels, following their capture of Goma, stated they have no intention of capturing further settlements such as Bukavu  (a city some 100 km away from Goma and around 200 accounting for road limitations) or other areas.  In Goma, some economic activities are resuming, but schools and banks remain closed, and food shortages persist. The situation on the ground remains tense, with ongoing health risks and humanitarian concerns. On 04/02/2025 , Reuters reports that Uganda has sent 1,000 more soldiers to east Congo , north of Goma. This would raise the number of the Ugandan troops deployed to about 4,000-5,000. Uganda also reportedly backs M23. In Kinshasa, the U.S. reduced its embassy staff and urged all American citizens to leave the country following last week's attacks on embassies  of nations accused of collaborating with Rwanda. The targeted embassies included those of France, the United States, Belgium, the Netherlands, Uganda, Kenya, and Rwanda itself. What to do  The UK and Canada have issued formal airspace warnings so far. Overflying traffic at higher altitudes is generally not at risk under normal operations. However, descending or diverting aircraft face significant exposure. Avoid flying in the region, especially below FL260. FZNA/Goma airport has been captured. For those in Kinshasa, remain vigilant and stay informed about potential protests or unrest. Stay indoors, seek shelter, and monitor local media for updates. All individuals in affected areas should closely monitor the implementation of the ceasefire and follow instructions from local authorities and international organizations providing humanitarian assistance. For Dutch citizens in Kinshasa, you can contact the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at +31 247 247 247

Date Published: 01/02/2025 Location:   North Kivu, DRC. On Monday, 27/01/2025, the M23 rebel group  announced it had captured Goma , a key city in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) . The takeover prompted hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee , worsening an already dire humanitarian crisis. Goma serves as a critical security and humanitarian hub , hosting thousands of displaced people who had previously fled conflict elsewhere. The M23 is one of many armed groups  operating in eastern DRC, competing for control over mineral-rich territories . The Congolese government and the United Nations  have accused Rwanda  of backing M23, with reports indicating the presence of Rwandan troops in Goma . On Sunday, January 26 , DRC’s Foreign Minister declared that Rwanda’s military crossing into Congolese territory was a "declaration of war,"  further announcing that Kinshasa was severing all diplomatic ties with Kigali . The situation is still developing. M23 rebels have seized control of Goma and they are reportedly moving rapidly south toward Bukavu. The DRC military has set up a defensive line on the road to Bukavu.   DRC President Félix Tshisekedi has vowed a strong military response but refuses to negotiate directly with M23, insisting on engaging only with Rwanda. President Paul Kagame warned that Rwanda is ready for confrontation if necessary. The international community calls for a peaceful de-escalation of tensions. UN, EU, US, and China calling on Rwanda to withdraw from the DRC. The UK and Germany have threatened to cut aid to Rwanda over its alleged support for M23. Further scenarios Military Escalation . The Congolese army (FARDC), backed by Southern African Development Community (SADC) forces, launches a counteroffensive to reclaim Goma, resulting in heavy clashes. Rwanda officially deploys troops to reinforce M23, turning the conflict into a regional war involving multiple nations. Cross-border attacks escalate, with increased shelling between DRC and Rwanda, potentially drawing in Uganda and Burundi. Prolonged stalemate . M23 consolidates control over Goma and southern areas but faces resistance near Bukavu. The DRC fails to dislodge M23, leading to a de facto partition of eastern Congo, similar to past conflicts. Diplomatic efforts intensify, but without a clear resolution, a prolonged stalemate leads to increased militia activity. A peace agreement . Under mounting international pressure, Tshisekedi agrees to engage in direct talks with M23, mediated by Angola or an international body. A ceasefire is brokered, and M23 gains some political concessions. Regional tensions ease, and humanitarian aid flows resume, but the peace remains fragile. In the past, there have been numerous failures of previous deals and for an agreement to come into place, significant diplomatic pressure would be required. Considering Tshisekedi’s stance and the DRC military’s recent actions (including cross-border shelling into Rwanda), the military escalation scenario  seems more probable in the immediate future. However, if M23 successfully holds Goma and advances further south, Kinshasa may be forced into negotiations under duress  in the coming months. Impact on Resources and Trade The DRC is one of the world’s most resource-rich nations, particularly in minerals like cobalt, coltan and gold, essential to the global technology supply chains. With the ongoing conflict, illegal mining and smuggling is likely to increase, with non-state armed groups using mineral wealth to fund their operations.  The conflict escalation could also lead to border closures and heightened insecurity which could reduce the movement of goods, affecting economies dependent on cross-border trade. Food prices have already risen in Goma, as food is scarce. Humanitarian Impact The civilian population is heavily affected by the ongoing conflict. The United Nations estimates that at least 700 people have been killed since Sunday 26/01. Over 500,000 people have already been displaced and this number could grow with an increase in the conflict's escalation. Refugee camps are also plagued by sexual violence, hunger, and disease, and hospital are overwhelmed and under equipped. Multiple human rights agencies call warring parties to prioritize civilian protection.