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Infographic by Alessia Cappelletti

Infographics By Chiara Longmore

An opportunity or a curse? By Alessia Cappelletti Taliban leaders pledged not to turn Afghanistan into a narco-state, but whether the fight on opiates and illegal poppy farming is just another piece of the group’s rhetoric remains to be seen. With a long history of involvement in the narcotics business, the current economic struggles of the country, and the dependence of thousands of livelihoods on poppy and other illicit crops, eradicating the production of such a profitable endeavor will not be met without challenges. On the other hand, not showing efforts to address the issue will lessen the probability of the Taliban getting international recognition. The Taliban and Opium Poppy Production The Taliban did not always have an interest in the drug trade, says Brookings expert Dr. Felbab-Brown. In the mid-1990s, the group pledged to ban opium poppy cultivation, and for a time, it did in fact crack down on the production and consumption of drugs. However, such a hardline on narcotics did not last long. The Taliban allowed production to run again already in 1996 and began to tax farmers and traffickers, offering protection for their operations. The taxes ended up being worth between $45 million to $200 million a year in the late 1990s. At the turn of the millennium, however, the Taliban issued yet another ban on opium poppy that resulted in a 75% fall in the world’s supply of heroin. The ban severely affected Afghanistan’s rural population, whose support for the Taliban was then lost, but barely touched the traffickers. It is likely that the Taliban were trying to win international legitimacy by banning the cultivation, yet it was not interested in interfering with the trafficking. The ban may have also been strategic. France24 reports this crackdown was a move to ramp up the price of heroin, as it declined after the 1990s production boom. According to the newspaper, Taliban groups had stored large amounts of opium, which was then sold for ten times the price amid their own ban. Since the Taliban’s spokesman Mujahid announced that Afghanistan will not ‘turn into a narco-state,’ opium prices tripled briefly. After the Taliban regime collapsed in 2001, the UNODC observed a divide in poppy production in the country, in which the provinces controlled by the Taliban were also the provinces where poppy cultivation was increasing, meaning that the group was no longer opposed to the illicit trade. Additionally, a DEA operation presented in 2013 shed light on the reach of the Taliban’s involvement in the opium trade. After 2001, the ties between the Taliban and the drug traffickers were consolidated, Politico reports, and the group methodically assumed more control over the process, leading the DEA investigation right at the top of Taliban leadership. Individuals of such alleged leadership are now part of the Taliban’s government announced in August 2021. According to the UNODC, Afghanistan is the largest producer of opium in the world, accounting for 83% of global production (2015-2020). In 2020, opium poppy was cultivated on 224,000 hectares in Afghanistan, a 37% increase from the year prior. Additionally, drug production in Afghanistan is not limited to heroin but includes hashish and Ephedra, a plant used for the extraction of ephedrine, a key component of methamphetamine. Its market could become as large as heroin’s, according to a 2020 EMCDDA report. However, the Taliban’s spokesman reassured that opium production will be zero under their rule, as it had been in 2000-2001. This promise comes with conditions, as the Taliban requested international assistance in order to be able to contain the drug trade and implement alternative crops substitution plans. The Taliban's Dilemma As opium and other drugs represent a lucrative market for Afghanistan, it will be hard for the Taliban to suppress their production without impoverishing an entire nation. Like in any other country where plants essential for drug production grow (see Colombia, Peru, Bolivia with coca plants), cultivating the crop is a profitable business and farming becomes a stable source of income for marginalized communities. Especially in areas with scarce access to education and employment opportunities, and where the State is not present, the cultivation of illegal crops often becomes the only way locals can support their families. In fact, in 2000, the ban on poppy cultivation brought problems to the Taliban themselves, as it removed the livelihoods of many farmers throughout the country. The current economic conditions of the country do not favor a harsh crackdown on illicit crops. With the mass emigration witnessed in mid-August, the internal displacement soaring by 73%, the severe cash shortages that occurred before the fall of Kabul, and the overall dire situation left by the COVID-19 pandemic and the end of a twenty years old war, Afghanistan is on the brink of collapse. The previous government relied heavily on foreign assistance (around 75% of its budget), but the Taliban administration has been restricted access to the Afghan central bank’s assets and denied funding by the IMF and the World Bank. In addition, the various groups that compose the Taliban vary in ideological and governance orientation, and some may need material incentives to remain loyal to the leaders in Kabul. Taking these challenges into account, it might be close to impossible for the Taliban to completely eradicate poppy and other illicit cultivations, nor would it be politically desirable to do so. That is not to say that the drug trade is the only source of income of the Taliban (it is estimated it represents 9%) as they tax a wide array of licit and illicit activities, but it is a significant one, nevertheless. The group’s spokesman mentioned the need for a crop substitution plan which would require international assistance. Similar plans could curb illicit production while still providing a livelihood to local farmers who relied on the opium trade; however, the implementation of substitution plans will be impossible unless the Taliban regime is recognized as legitimate. It is thus likely that the Taliban’s promise to curb drug production will only be used to leverage international aid and political recognition of their government, but little indicates that it will lead to effective change. Policy Implications The rapidly changing situation in Afghanistan makes many policy research documents already obsolete. In June 2021, the UNODC suggested strengthening international cooperation with Afghanistan while supporting the country to provide sustainable alternative crops and build better governance and security. Now that the Taliban are governing, cooperation, aid, and assistance will hardly be options. For Europe, this means that the drug flow of opium and methamphetamines from Afghanistan will continue. Without trustworthy cooperation with the Taliban, efforts should be focused at the regional level rather than at the national. The UNODC suggests that countries in the region need advanced investigative support to track financial crimes and scale-up interdiction of drugs and precursor chemicals. Other research also points at interdiction as being a viable solution that does not directly affect local livelihoods. About the Author: Alessia Cappelletti Alessia is Global Security Analyst and Project Manager of DEWIS. She has field experience in South America, Colombia especially, and has experience in researching organized crime and illicit flows. Her academic background includes conflict analysis, international humanitarian law, human rights protection, and criminology.

Inside the Operations Room during Kabul Evacuation Efforts On Sunday the 15th of August, amid the Taliban takeover of Kabul, part of Dyami's team started working to support people evacuating the city. With a conference speaker always on and surrounded by whiteboards, multiple screens, and a myriad of papers, the team worked tirelessly day and night to make sure people weren’t left alone in a city that went from hospitable to hostile overnight. Crisis management has been the keyword. Who to call, where to stay, what to look out for, and what security measures to keep in mind. The responsible team made an effort to keep in contact with both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the people on the ground in Kabul, who had been anxiously waiting for instructions for days, sharing easy security tips with them, maintaining the information flow, and offering mental support in an indubitably stressful situation. Crisis Management When confronted with a crisis, it is important to identify what exactly needs to be done to bring structure to chaos. A very important first step is to define and understand the crisis in detail. Gathering information and critically assessing how the crisis could evolve is essential to be ready as the situation unfolds. The team that would later work on the evacuation started to gather information on the 14th of August when Kabul had not fallen yet. No one had been notified or approached for help, but the team was already monitoring the situation so that when the crisis escalated, in less than 24 hours, they were ready to respond to the initial requests. Once the information is gathered and everyone involved has a clear overview of the situation, the team can start defining who are the stakeholders. Who is in need of help? Who can assist us in delivering help? Who’s in control? And more specifically to this case, who is responsible for the airport and airlifts? Which parts of the city are already controlled by the Taliban? Where are the checkpoints? Etc. The team went through their contact list, got in contact with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and understood what was needed to leave Kabul. In the meanwhile, Dyami’s management got asked to join and support a family in a WhatsApp group that was created, and in just a few days, that group grew exponentially with people in need of assistance. Lastly, practical steps. Identify the actions that need to be taken to reach the goal and understand how they can be fulfilled. In this case, what was revealed to be essential in the evacuation procedure was to get Dutch citizens in Afghanistan on the Foreign Affairs list of people to evacuate. Dyami got all the contacts and information to put on such a list, and people started to receive official communication from the Ministry. Mental navigation Unfortunately, receiving official communication is often not enough. On the weekend, the take over of the city had been relatively calm, and the eyes of the world were on Kabul and the Taliban. However, on Wednesday the 18th of August, the situation became tense, and the Taliban started to increase their use of violence. By then, Foreign Affairs had all the information of the evacuees but did not communicate effectively with them. Normally, the Ministry only sends emails with essential information, such as where to go and when but not how to reach the indicated location, or what to look out for on the way there. In a situation of panic, in which emotions are heightened and where people’s lives are at stake, that is often not enough. Dyami made an effort to keep in close contact with whoever reached out, asking how they were coping and listening to their needs. Mental navigation was essentially ‘filling the gap’ between the people and Foreign Affairs; listening to people’s stories and worries and helping them to handle the situation as calmly as possible. Mental navigation is also giving security tips, such as erasing WhatsApp conversations, writing their own phone numbers on the children’s arm, and making sure to be easily reachable while on route to the airport. Dyami guided people through Kabul, through Taliban checkpoints, and in the surroundings of the airport. Lastly, the team helped to get the paperwork in order before leaving the safehouses. Bringing the correct documentation is essential, and in the chaos, one can easily forget. Intelligence and information collection The last essential step is gathering information and intelligence. That is an effort that brings together different sources, from human intelligence to open source information, and that needs to be verified and cross-referenced. Once a piece of information is corroborated, one should connect it to other pieces and get ‘intelligence,’ or interpreted information. Since the team was in contact with many people in the city, cross-referencing information was fairly simple, which gave Dyami a solid information position on Kabul - from an office in Leidsche Rijn. Because of this vantage point, the team was able to identify more suitable places to access the airport, thanks to on-the-ground sources who often checked the situation at Hamid Karzai Airport. In similar circumstances, keeping close contact with local people helps to understand the context and the cultural and social habits of the region in which one is operating, which in turn facilitates risk mitigation. When possible, the information received was promptly verified through open-source research. Kabul a month after the Taliban takeover A month has just passed since the fall of Kabul, and to date, Dyami has helped 121 people to evacuate the city. However, much is yet to be done. NOS reports that the people who remained behind after August 31 received little or no help from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the situation has worsened. People are running out of medication and general supplies, there is little or no money circulating and banks imposed a withdrawal limit to preserve their liquidity. Those who are hiding are about to finish the small amounts of cash they were able to put together, but they need the money to pay those who are helping them hide. The World Food Programme has also warned their supplies may run out by the end of the month. In the chaos, many have started to distrust each other, as they desperately try to find a way to leave the country. Approximately, there are still 150 people linked to the Netherlands who are still waiting for support to evacuate the country, but it is unclear when or how the situation may develop. Written by Alessia Cappelletti

Hongkongers in the Netherlands share their stories by Esmeralda Vane – August 2021 “It is a sad reality, a sad truth. I feel restricted in the freedom that I can exercise here [in the Netherlands]. If I go to a protest, it may not lead to immediate safety threats, but there are other consequences given what we have seen in the news.” Katy[1], a Hongkonger residing in the Netherlands, shares that she exercises her freedom with caution, as she fears becoming subject to the repressive activities of the Chinese Government. Freedom House reports that “China conducts the most sophisticated, global, and comprehensive campaign of transnational repression in the world.” With transnational repression, authoritarian states reach across borders to silence dissent among diasporas and sometimes others who criticize them. It encompasses a spectrum of tactics, such as threats, exile, assassinations, prosecution, surveillance, and family intimidation. The Chinese Government is not new to these practices, as it represses Tibetans, Mongolians, Uyghurs, Taiwanese, Hongkongers, Falun Gong practitioners, journalists, human rights defenders, and others who criticize it. Twenty-one stories from Hongkongers in the Netherlands were collected, and from these accounts concerns over democracy grow. Hong Kong national security law reaches beyond national borders To secure Chinese sovereignty and security, the Chinese Government passed the Hong Kong National Security Law (NSL) in June 2020. The law criminalizes any act of subversion (undermining the authority or power of the central Government), secession (breaking away from the country), terrorism (using intimidation or violence against people), and collusion with external or foreign forces. In other words, the NSL punishes political speech, limits foreign contacts, and targets individuals opposed to the Chinese Government. Such a law applies to anyone on Earth, regardless of nationality or location, making it legal for the Chinese Government to target individuals outside of its borders. Hongkongers in the Netherlands describe the law as repressive due to its vagueness and extraterritorial reach. They believe that the Chinese Government leaves the description of the NSL broad and vague so that they do not know when their actions cross the red line. Sophia, also a Hongkonger living in the Netherlands, explains that as a result of this “People are just afraid and people self-censor.” Andrew agrees. He raises concern about how the NSL connects to other repression methods, such as prosecution, family intimidation, or harassment: “The way the NSL is written applies to anybody in the world, regardless of nationality. […] If they know who you are, they may arrest you when you are visiting Hong Kong, or they might put your family or anything in danger. Even if you are here in the Netherlands, there is also a presence of the Chinese Government […]. So, you might get harassed or things like that.” Similar to Andrew, other Hongkongers believe there is a presence of the Chinese Government in the Netherlands. It is argued that Chinese patriots abroad work for the Chinese Government and collect information for it. There is a shared belief that Chinese businesses and Dutch-Chinese residents in the Netherlands support the NSL, which can result in surveillance by those who support the law. Hongkongers also point out that the Chinese Government is capable of surveilling individuals abroad through, for example, Huawei or social media. As Andrew says, if they know who you are, you may face prosecution, family intimidation, or harassment. Hongkongers often base their stories on the experiences of others who faced Chinese repression, such as Uyghurs or well-known Hong Kong activists abroad. One person said fear started to creep in after reading a BBC article with stories about Uyghurs experiencing repression abroad. The article included the story of Qelbinur Sedik, an Uyghur residing in the Netherlands who received a threatening phone call from a Chinese policeman after she spoke up about China’s detention camps. Another story scaring various Hongkongers is that of activist Gwyneth Ho, their fellow national. She studied journalism at the University of Amsterdam, though now she is being prosecuted under the NSL. For Hongkongers abroad, these stories are a constant reminder of the reach of the NSL, making the possibility of falling victims to Chinese repression enough to self-deprive of the democratic freedoms granted to them in the Netherlands. Self-deprivation of democratic freedoms Katy is one of the Hongkongers that constrains herself in the democratic freedoms granted her by the Netherlands. Katy is afraid of speaking up about the Chinese Government in public because she believes that the Government and its supporters may be watching her wherever she goes. Katy says that news stories about the intimidation of family members of Uyghurs abroad make her worry about the safety of her family members in Hong Kong. She also fears that if she speaks up, she would be unable to re-enter Hong Kong without suffering any consequences. Similar to Katy, other Hongkongers living in the Netherlands voice that the Chinese Government threatens their freedoms in the Netherlands. This results in Hongkongers restricting themselves in their freedom of expression and assembly. They share that they feel constrained to talk about home-country politics, online and offline. They avoid political demonstrations and conversations and are careful with exposing their views on Hong Kong and the Chinese Government on social media or during online conversations. Some Hongkongers who study in the Netherlands feel restricted in their academic freedom too. They are afraid to talk about Hong Kong politics in the classroom or to make their academic work on their homeland available to a broader public. This self-deprivation particularly happens when Hongkongers are in circles with other co-nationals, as exposing yourself to supporters of the Chinese Government could have serious consequences. However, when interviewed, they were also careful not to provide detailed personal information or answer questions about the Chinese Government or external or foreign forces, attributing these feelings to the NSL. The threat to democracy Even though there is no clear evidence that transnational repression tactics are employed, Hongkongers in the Netherlands prefer to keep their political views to themselves and avoid speaking freely and assembling. Even the mere possibility of falling victim to China’s repressive methods, therefore, is enough to prevent criticism. China is not alone in using transnational repression tactics. Other authoritarian states also expand their reach beyond national borders, such as Rwanda, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Russia. Authoritarian states do not only target diaspora members, but sometimes also foreign nationals abroad. The Dutch Government strongly opposes these practices and states that home-country governments that recognize and repress dissident voices can form a threat to the Dutch state, as it can harm its democratic values. By threatening the basic civil rights of their diasporas by preventing them to voice their opinions, China and other authoritarian governments are eroding the democratic freedoms granted to individuals residing in democracies around the world. This directly harms the values of democratic states, undermining the very way in which they function. Therefore, transnational repression should be given more attention and it should occupy a larger space in democratic countries’ agendas. [1] All the names used in this article are pseudonyms to guarantee full anonymity and security for Hongkongers in the Netherlands that agreed to share their story. About the author: Esmeralda Vane Esmeralda Vane is a Conflict Studies and Human Rights master’s student at Utrecht University. She worked as a research intern at the Dutch Ministry of Defence and did literature research into state threats. For her bachelor’s in Cultural Anthropology and Development Sociology, she has lived abroad in Sri Lanka and Hong Kong. Throughout her career, she has been interested in and focused on international relations regarding China. Therefore, she wrote her thesis on resistance and submission by Hongkongers in the Netherlands to Chinese authoritarian repression.

El Salvador’s president, Nayib Bukele, has been a disruptive leader since the day he took office in 2019. While attempting to deliver on his promises to be tough on crime and be different from the previous political elites, he has taken unorthodox and unprecedented measures which have been met with polarizing opinions. Many claim he is the salvation that the country needed, others fear we might be witnessing the birth of another autocratic government in Central America. After a successful term as San Salvador’s mayor, the capital city of El Salvador, Bukele won the presidency, breaking for the first time in 30 years the alternation of the two major political parties (FMLN and ARENA) of El Salvador. The 39-year-old ‘millennial’ president has had high approval ratings throughout his presidency - which is a rare occurrence in El Salvador. In a country tired of the political elite, as an ‘outsider’, Bukele promised to do things differently than previous administrations. On that, he has not disappointed. The millennial president Throughout his presidency, Bukele has maintained a high approval rate. Over his mandate he has enjoyed for most of the time an approval rate above 85%, making him one of the most popular presidents in the Americas.[1] After two years in government, Bukele’s administration has managed to place El Salvador in the spotlight of Latin American politics, and for moments, the world. His government has been defined by taking actions that were long overdue in El Salvador: from raising teachers' salaries, modernizing public schools equipment, to raising the minimum wage. The many measures the government has taken to boost the economy are working: the IMF and the World Bank predicted a 4.9% economic growth for El Salvador in 2021. The average economic growth in recent years has been 2.3%.[2] He has also been known for his unorthodox methods. In his first week as president of El Salvador, Bukele made headlines by using Twitter – his favorite method of communication – to fire several family members of the previous president who held public positions.[3] Criticism of his lack of regard for the use of official channels was quieted down by a supportive crowd that was tired of the nepotism and corruption in the previous administration. The president’s recent law to make Bitcoin a legal currency in El Salvador has been a topic of discussion worldwide. While many see it as a dangerous move given Bitcoin’s volatility, others claim this will be a game-changer and will open a new avenue for remittances coming from abroad. Remittances currently form 20% of El Salvador’s gross domestic product, amounting to $4 billion USD a year.[4] Whether this will be a brilliant move or a significant blow to the country’s economy remains to be seen. A source of praise to Bukele has been the management of the COVID-19 crisis. From the start, strict lockdowns were introduced in the country, the borders were closed and a COVID hospital was built to double the ICU capacity in the country.[5[ Economic relief was also provided: the payment of electricity, water, and the internet was suspended for three months, and the government handed out stimulus checks to families who lost their income during the pandemic. El Salvador managed to maintain a low rate of infections and COVID-related deaths in comparison with other countries in the region. One of his biggest accomplishments so far has been the significant reduction of violence. One of the most violent countries in the world, El Salvador had a rate of homicides as high as 103 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2015, one of the highest in the world.[6] His strategy consisted of deploying larger numbers of police and military personnel to the streets, attack the gang's finances and structures, recuperate the city centers in the country – a known territory of the major gangs – and modernizing the equipment and capacity of public security forces. It seems to be paying off: in 2020 the homicide rate of El Salvador had been reduced to 20 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, a 45% reduction from 2019.[7] A firm hand or abuse of power? The implementation of his security strategy, however, has not gone without controversy. When violence in the streets rose again after conflicts between the main gangs, Bukele ordered that imprisoned members of rival gangs MS-13 and Barrio 18 be put together in jail cells, a known place from where gangs impart orders. While the measure did stop the rise in street violence, the overcrowded facilities (especially in the COVID times) and the potential for violence outbreaks in prisons raised concerns among the international community. His security strategy caused controversy again when the Legislative Assembly refused to meet to block the approval of a 109 million USD loan requested by Bukele to the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (BCIE) to be used in public security equipment and training. At the refusal of representatives to join the session, Bukele took over the Assembly by force with the help of the military. Unsurprisingly, this move was deemed an attack on democracy by local and international organizations. In February 2021 Bukele’s political party, Nuevas Ideas, won by a wide margin the majority in the Legislative Assembly’s election. With an absolute majority in the Assembly, the party took the controversial decision to destitute the 5 Supreme Court Justices and the Attorney General. Bukele’s party claimed they did not have El Salvador’s best interest at hand and cited occasions in which the Supreme Court blocked Nuevas Ideas-backed emergency measures during the COVID crisis. This was his most controversial move yet, and it was met with fierce criticism, from local organizations to international leaders (such as Kamala Harris, the EU, and human rights organizations) citing concern over the fundamental need of an independent judicial system in order to maintain democracy. Bukele responded by saying El Salvador has opened doors for the international community to trade, cooperate, and work together, but in El Salvador “we are cleaning house… and that is none of your business”.[8] While some interpret these moves as an abuse of power, others believe that a firm hand is what the violence and corruption-ripped country needs. Despite the criticism, his government is delivering results: the pandemic has been contained, violence and crime have decreased, and the country is growing economically. But, do the ends justify the means? And more importantly, are we witnessing the beginning of an authoritarian regime? What to watch out for The recent 2021 midterm elections where a new Legislative Assembly was elected marked a big win for the current president. His political party, Nuevas Ideas, won 56 out of the 84 seats available which gave his party an absolute majority over the legislative. This gives Bukele a wider margin for action, which he has already used in a controversial way by removing the Supreme Court Justices. It will be important to look out for new developments on this front. Presidential elections will take place again in El Salvador in 2024. Under Salvadoran constitution, reelection for continuous periods is not possible. In the next few years, it will be crucial to observe if Bukele or his party will attempt to amend the electoral law in the country. So far no steps have been taken in that direction. About the Autor: Isabel Oriol Isabel Oriol Llonin is a contributing analyst at Dyami. She holds a bachelor’s degree in International Relations and has a post-graduate degree in Public International Law from Utrecht University. She has expertise in the Latin American region and the public international law implications of conflict analysis.

The Growing Industry of Loitering Munitions In the Fall of 2020, a full-scale state-on-state conflict unfolded in Nagorno-Karabakh (also known as Artsakh), a contested region between Armenia and Azerbaijan. After six weeks, a ceasefire was called, and Armenia ceded several areas to Azerbaijan. The utilization of drone technologies, including an increased reliance on so-called “Loitering Munitions,” was considered one of the critical factors in Azerbaijan’s victory. Occasionally referred to as a “kamikaze drone”, this specific class of unmanned aerial vehicle demands the world’s attention as they become increasingly affordable and sophisticated, while demonstrably altering the outcome of terrestrial engagements. With the conflict between the two nations threatening to spark again, Loitering Munitions could make another appearance. It May Seem Like Science Fiction Imagine a battlefield wherein whole swarms composed of hundreds of independently-thinking and precision-guided explosives are just waiting to drop on combatants and vehicles from overhead. Most of them are only slightly visible from the ground (if at all), but are still capable of destroying the heaviest armor most ground forces can bring to bear. Their automated systems have them programmed to attack quickly, quietly, and accurately at anything below that emits an electronic signal. They fly too low for traditional air defenses to engage with them, and yet appear silently and too swiftly to effectively counter them with small arms. This nightmare battlespace, a coalescence of innovations in unmanned flight and artificial intelligence, is very close to the reality facing contemporary ground forces. The technology is already here, embodied in a little-discussed class of drone weaponry known as the Loitering Munition. What is a Loitering Munition? Often, the term “drone warfare'' conjures images of the Predator or Reaper series of unmanned aircraft favored by the United States in places like Pakistan, Yemen, or Somalia where they’ve targeted suspected terrorists. Reapers are typically remote-operated, are nearly as large as a conventional aircraft, and are relatively expensive. They are depicted as weapons of assassination and precision. The legitimacy of their use in conflict is still a matter of intense debate. However, with the rise of Loitering Munitions, this image of drone warfare is already starting to appear dated. A Loitering Munition is a weapon system that fills in a tactical niche between the traditional conception of drone weaponry and a guided missile. Often called “kamikaze” or “suicide” drones in the media, Loitering Munitions can be either autonomously or remotely piloted flying vehicles that collide with ground-based targets and are themselves the weapon (self-destructing on impact). In aviation, “loitering” is the word used to describe aircraft hovering over a small area in order to provide quick reaction times for close support. This need for continual replacement incentivizes manufacturers to build them cheaply and in large numbers. The concept is remarkably simple, and with expendability as part of the design, they can appear primitive, but this is deceptive. Loitering Munitions are reliant on extremely sophisticated cameras and sensors that simply weren’t cost-effective only a few years ago. These technologies enable a human operator on the ground, or in an armored vehicle platform, to pilot the Loitering Munition in any weather or lighting conditions. Of even more concern is their implementation of automated and algorithmic flight, formation, and decision-making softwares. These allow for ever more complex and widespread adoption of the weapons, and indicates that they’ll be even further divorced from human hands in the future. Organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross have sounded the alarm over this sort of automation in warfare for several years. Affordable, Sophisticated, and Effective The low cost and learning curve for these weapons has propelled rapid adoption in several countries that may have previously been unable to invest in state-of-the-art air assets. While Israel has historically been cited as the developer of affordable Loitering Munitions systems, more recently, Ukraine and Poland have come out as innovators in this space. Ukraine-based weapons developers CDET and Athlon Avia have been showcasing their extremely versatile RAM and somewhat more powerful ST-35 “Silent Thunder” Loitering Munitions platforms at various international events. Athlon Avia claims that the ST-35 can launch, loiter, ascertain targets, approach, and dive for an attack without the input of a human operator. Both systems offer anti-tank, fragmentation, and incendiary options for warheads. Poland’s WB Group has developed their own system known as WARMATE. WARMATE can be deployed and operated by a single soldier, and is incredibly hard to detect. Though faster to deploy (estimated ten minutes), it carries a smaller payload than its Ukrainian counterparts. It is also developed for compatibility with automated systems. Massive improvements continue to be researched for the software utilized by these automated systems. These updates can impact the lethality and complexity of attacks, even by legacy units. Recent research in swarm information sharing has shown that Loitering Munitions will only continue to increase in sophistication. Azerbaijan’s recent victories over Armenia demonstrated the effectiveness of Loitering Munitions in the context of a full-scale, state-on-state conflict. Many of these drones were sold to them by Israel, and Azerbaijan is now licensed to manufacture their own derivative variations. As the uneasy ceasefire continues to be tested, accurate numbers of material loss are elusive. That said, open-source intelligence efforts continue to chronicle the effectiveness of the Azeri drone campaign, particularly their use of the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 UAV and various Loitering Munitions. This conflict showed that traditional infantry tactics and defenses are extremely vulnerable to these weapons systems. Having Opened Pandora’s Box Participants in conflict, international regulators, and informed consumers of media have to understand the massive implications Loitering Munitions are having on 21st century warfare. If unregulated, their automated systems will validate many fears about the use of artificial intelligence in combat (and in many ways already are). Many of the proposed tactical countermeasures are expensive, and seem to only contribute to the escalation of the sophistication of these technologies. Some of these suggestions include new implementations of laser and microwave-based weaponry, automated counter-munitions, and other obvious proliferation rabbit holes. Legal recourse must be implemented sooner rather than later in regards to Loitering Munitions. As more states (and non-state actors) find that they’re able to facilitate their manufacture and deployment, there is a sense that it will only get harder to turn away from this troubling direction. Recommendations by the Netherlands-based organization Pax for Peace, highlight the urgency of reaching out to these new actors in drone production, as most are not participants in existing arms trade agreements and treaties. A regulatory framework, including a re-examining of the widely-accepted definition of what makes a platform a “drone”, and a discussion of why these technologies are so enticing to the actors moving on them, must be brought to the scrutiny of regulatory bodies and media discourse. The safety of civilian populations, the direction in which we take the development of artificial intelligence technologies, and the integrity of human rights in armed conflict will be adversely affected by a failure to recognize the changes in warfare embodied in Loitering Munitions. About the author: Mark Bruno Mark Bruno is a noncommissioned officer in the United States military, where he serves as a Combat Medic and a Public Affairs Representative. He is currently a Master’s Student of Information Assurance at the University of Maryland’s Global Campus, and holds a Bachelor of Science in Communication. Aspiring to a career in Conflict Journalism, his areas of security interest are in military medicine, information security, and weapons technology. Any analysis or views expressed in this article are personal and do not represent any positions or policies of the US Department of Defense.

By Chiara Longmore On 28 June, the ongoing and devastating war in the Tigray region of northern Ethiopia arrived at a unilateral ceasefire. Government forces evacuated from Tigray’s capital Mekelle due to increasing international pressure, giving hope of greater peace and stability after eight months of conflict between the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian government. Despite this optimism, Ethiopia has arrived at a dangerous crossroads, with reports of the TPLF advancing into neighbouring Amhara region; an escalating humanitarian crisis; and evidence of ethnically targeted violence. The path Ethiopia will take at this juncture appears to be one of renewed conflict, turning its back on peaceful solutions. The Tigray War Tigray, a region in northern Ethiopia, is one of ten provinces that constitute the country. Despite being a minority group, Tigrayans have historically dominated Ethiopia’s political landscape for almost 30 years. The Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) represented the region of Tigray and was a dominant political and military force in Ethiopia, leading Ethiopia’s war against Eritrea 1998 – 2000. In 2018, Abiy Ahmed came into power and sought a more centralised political system for Ethiopia, reducing the power of regional groups such as the TPLF. As Abiy’s policies reduced their political power, the TPLF also felt that they were being disproportionately targeted by Abiy’s government for their past political and military dominance. As such, the TPLF broke away from the centralised government’s coalition of parties and in September 2020 held their own elections. Violence recently erupted in early November 2020 when President Abiy’s government suspended the elections in Tigray, declaring them unlawful. Months of intense conflict between the TPLF and Ethiopian government and military followed, with devastating consequences. Reports of mass civilian killings, rape, and torture have emerged, implicating both sides but in particular Eritrean troops which intervened to support the Ethiopian military. Tigray is facing an extreme humanitarian crisis as a consequence of war, with the UN Secretary General announcing the region is on “the brink of famine”, an issue compounded by the 1.7 million people who are currently internally displaced. Path to Potential Peace? The months of fighting which have devastated the region of Tigray and its population came to a halt with the announcement of a unilateral ceasefire on 28 June. President Abiy described the ceasefire and withdrawal of government troops from Tigray as a “moment of reflection”. Motivations behind the decision to withdraw government troops from Tigray can be linked to the increasing international pressure placed on President Abiy’s government. For instance, at the end of May, the US introduced sanctions on economic and security aid to Ethiopia over the conflict in Tigray. The UN has called for the respect of the ceasefire in order for humanitarian aid to reach the millions at risk of famine. With government troops withdrawing from the Tigray region and the instigation of a ceasefire, a tentative path to political peace has presented itself. Or at the very least, the country has reached a significant pause for breath and an opportunity for greater political dialogue between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF. Yet despite the initial appearances of a potential peaceful solution, the reality seems far from hopeful, and Ethiopia appears to be turning towards a renewed path of conflict. The Road to a Renewed War Despite the recent ceasefire, rhetoric from both sides of the conflict remains hostile and inflammatory. On the one side, Lieutenant-General Bacha Debele of the Ethiopian army stated in a news conference that the army could “march on Mekelle even today”, and the government currently refuses to engage in dialogue with the TPLF and Tigrayan leaders. On the other side, The TPLF and the region’s leaders claim the government is blockading Tigray. Indeed, when government troops withdrew from Tigray communication lines were cut, with phone lines and internet access down. Furthermore, the bridge on the Tekeze River which operates as a key access point into Tigray was destroyed, with both the TPLF and the government attributed to this. Aid trucks entering Tigray have also been subjected to numerous checkpoints, with a World Food Programme (WFP) spokesperson outlining how disruptive this was to the international humanitarian effort. As a consequence, the UN has called for unobstructed access for aid trucks to deliver the assistance needed to the millions of people at risk of famine in Tigray. Whilst the TPLF has accepted the ceasefire the group has set out certain conditions for peace. These include re-instating the Tigrayan government, as well as the withdrawal of Eritrean forces alongside fighters from neighbouring Amhara region. Soon after these conditions were released, the Guardian UK reported that the TPLF was in fact mobilising for a new conflict against Amhara militias. There were sightings of long convoys heading westwards from Tigray, reportedly to position themselves to advance on the Amhara province. Consequently, despite the recent appearance of military de-escalation in Tigray, a new conflict may emerge along a different frontline in the Amhara province. If fighting escalates between the TPLF and Amhara militias, this may provide a new opportunity for the Ethiopian government to re-engage in conflict with the TPLF whilst evading international pressure over the current humanitarian situation in Tigray. The Next Rwanda? A concerning dimension of the Tigrayan conflict concerns ethnic group identity. Tigrayans are a minority ethnic group in Ethiopia, constituting around 6% of the population and recent reports have described discrimination and violence being perpetrated against Tigrayans across Ethiopia. Tigrayans have reported losing their jobs, being harassed, arrested, having their bank accounts frozen, and being prevented from leaving the country. A recent report by Reuters outlined how families of Tigrayan soldiers have been detained in detention camps, and around 300 Tigrayans were held in a warehouse on the outskirts of Addis Ababa in reportedly crowded conditions. There are currently no official figures of how many Tigrayans are being detained by the federal police or military. However, according to a Tigrayan living in Addis Ababa, “the hate is escalating”, and a recent report of three Tigrayans being murdered by a mob in the Amhara region is a worrying sign of the potential escalation of violence along ethnic lines. Such evidence of ethnically targeted violence in Ethiopia draws similarities with the Rwandan genocide in 1994, where around one million Tutsis were systematically targeted and killed by the Hutu population in twelve weeks. It is important to be cautious when drawing comparisons between two distinct cases. Failing to regard context-specific issues can risk oversimplifying our conceptions of the incredibly complex dynamics at hand. Nevertheless, whilst current violence may not have escalated to the same extreme levels of Rwanda in 1994, what we are seeing in Ethiopia are the beginnings of politically driven discrimination against a specific group. This increasing division between ethnic groups in the country is shadowed by the country’s historical context, with grievances between groups apparent previously, however, the divisions appear to be becoming more entrenched. Despite the brief hopes that the ceasefire brought, it is becoming increasingly clear that Ethiopia is facing a future of conflict - one which is taking on a worryingly ethnic dimension. In Rwanda 1994 the international community infamously turned a blind eye to the genocide which unfolded. It is vital that history does not repeat itself in Ethiopia as the country seemingly turns its back on peace and heads down a path of renewed violence. For references, please download the PDF version below. About the author: Chiara Longmore Chiara is originally from Scotland; however, she has moved to the Netherlands to complete a master’s at Leiden University in International Relations and Diplomacy. With an interdisciplinary background, her bachelor’s was in Liberal Arts, she has analysed situations of violence and conflict with a multi-disciplinary framework, in particular with Political Science, Anthropology, and Sociology.

Environmental ideology in far-right Telegram Groups It has long come to public attention that secluded online forums, such as Telegram chats and channels, serve as a safe space for extremism to foster, where individuals can recruit and radicalize new members. In these online spaces there is a constant flux of ideas and, recently, the far-right re-focused their interest on the connection between environmentalism and white supremacy, or so-called ‘ecofascism.’ As paradoxical as the idea of ‘nature-loving' Neo-Nazis may seem, far-right environmentalism has a long history dating back to the Green Wing of Hitler’s NSDAP in the early 20th century. The ideology is a double edge-sword able to easily resonate with people amid today's climate crisis. As such, online ecofascist content is able to pose new security threats, appealing to a broader audience via a universally shared ‘environmental protection’ sentiment. Ecofascism – the far-right green ideology with long roots Ecofascism is an ideology that combines the belief in the importance of environmental protection with the need to combat overpopulation, often through violent means and especially against immigrant populations. The basis for this doctrine is a conviction that there is a spiritual connection between races and their designated lands with which they form an integrated whole, and which must be defended against outsiders at all costs. While this ideology may seem obscure and bizarre at first glance, it has nonetheless been able to inspire several recent terrorist attacks such as the Christchurch and El Paso attacks in 2019, and arsonist attacks in Sweden in 2019. Such events are not simply the product of lone terrorist actors but are best understood as ‘the tip of the iceberg’ of a larger, more invisible process of radicalization that takes place predominantly online. White identity, nature, and online forums Ecofascist content can easily be found on public Telegram channels, popular mainly throughout the US and Europe. Taking a closer look at some of these channels reveals a peculiar blend of white supremacist content and a romanticization of national landscapes. Noteworthy in this is the fusion of century-old fascist ecology with a modern context. Posts often specifically make references to current events such as globalization, immigration, refugee crises, and climate change which are then merged with racist rhetoric. For example, content creators often call for the murder of immigrant groups as a ‘practical’ solution to overpopulation and climate change. In this way, these groups are able to give the old ideology a new spin while simultaneously being able to resonate with their audience in innovative ways. These channels build a white racial identity by placing its roots in the natural landscapes of their nation as well as in European nature. The idealization of rural living and a ‘return to nature’ materializes in the search for one’s spiritual roots that have supposedly been lost through a consumerist society and homogenizing globalization. This rhetoric therefore appeals to people that may feel increasingly lost in a world of urban concrete landscapes, alienating 9 to 5 office jobs, and a perceived loss of cultural values through globalizing forces. Their message is powerful and equally dangerous: It suggests that it is possible to ‘rediscover’ one’s imagined cultural roots in nature and that violence is a form of self-defense to protect these roots against the forces of capitalism and globalization. Unsurprisingly, these justifications often turn into actual calls for violence against anything that is perceived to be a threat to these ideals. Easily accessible calls for violence and terrorism In these channels, overpopulation, immigrants, or the consumerist, capitalist system at large are usually scapegoated for a loss of cultural identity as well as for the destruction of nature in which this identity is rooted. Calls for violence and terrorism are seen as solutions to either directly lower population numbers of specific immigrant groups or to destabilize the entire system and bring about a violent revolution. These calls for violence oftentimes appeal to traditional masculinity. The perceived loss of ‘traditional manhood’ and men as the center of the nuclear, reproductive family unit has long been a concern for the far-right. Similarly, some channels conjure a nostalgic image of traditional manhood through images of muscular and heavily armed men against a backdrop of natural scenery. The suggestion is that a wild and aggressive man as being closer to his natural roots and imagined ancestral identity. This invocation of more traditional masculinity also represents violence as a ‘natural’ response to a loss of habitat. With this, some channels specifically appeal to a male audience some of which may feel alienated by changing gender roles and family structures. Since these groups specifically aim at appealing to popular problems, it is fair to wonder in which ways these channels pose a security threat as they share extremist content that potentially facilitates radicalization. Additionally, ecofascist Telegram channels are easy to access. Often unsecured, they can be publicly previewed, and anyone with a mobile phone number can join them. This differentiates these channels from other far-right forums which often require intricate knowledge of specific jargon and meme culture in order to accept new members. Such channels can then function as potential gateways to more private chat groups. Despite their public availability, ecofascist Telegram groups are still somewhat obscure and hard to track: Barely any channel exists longer than two months before presumably being deleted for violating Telegram’s code of conduct. New ecofascist channels sprout immediately, like the hydra that grows two new heads for each one that is cut. While it is simple to join these channels anonymously, keeping track of their developments from a security viewpoint is challenging. Something to worry about? Given that ecofascist ideology has already inspired some acts of terrorism, it is important to take the security threat it poses seriously. It is worthwhile to understand that and how eco-fascism can respond in unique ways to peoples’ concerns over globalization and climate change. By framing environmental destruction and protection as a matter of identity, roots, and race, this rhetoric is potentially able to spread its tentacles where others failed, while simultaneously providing justifications for acts of violence. Specifically, public Telegram channels are fertile ground for member recruitment and radicalization due to ease of access and thus deserve our concern. About the author: Abra Heinrich is a student currently enrolled in the last year of the MA program Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University. Her research interests cover the extreme right, far right ecologism as well as Latin American studies, with a focus on qualitative methodologies and discourse analysis. She is writing her thesis about the emotional appeal of far right ecologism in white supremacist Telegram channels. She has previously published in Leiden University's journal Medusa.

Why Disillusioned QAnon Conspiracy Theorists Might Become a Serious Security Threat By: Ruben Pfeijffer With Donald Trump losing the 2020 presidential elections and the mysterious ‘Q’ going silent, followers of the popular conspiracy movement QAnon are going through a severe test of faith. While some keep clinging to the hope that there is yet a plan waiting to unfold that will see Trump reinstated as president, others have become increasingly disillusioned by the long list of Q’s failed predictions. The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) now warns that their disillusionment might soon turn into anger, and perhaps even violence. On 28 October 2017, an anonymous user going by the name of ‘Q clearance patriot’, or simply ‘Q’, started posting on 4chan (a controversial online imageboard) in a thread titled ‘The Calm Before the Storm’. The username of the anonymous poster implied they were an insider from the US Department of Energy with Q level clearance. This was not the first time a self-proclaimed whistle-blower started posting anonymously on 4chan. Before Q, there had already been FBIAnon, CIAAnon, and WH Insider Anon. None, however, gained the attention QAnon would accumulate over the years. The real identity of Q remains unknown until this day. Analyses of Q’s posts suggest that multiple persons with divergent writing styles have likely posted as Q at different times. The true motives behind the movement remain therefore similarly unknown. However, it should be noted that Russian bots played a significant role in the movement’s spread during its infancy. Q’s first posts were all a direct reference to another conspiracy theory that had previously originated on 4chan, known as ‘Pizzagate’. The premise of this conspiracy theory was that alleged code words in the leaked emails of John Podesta (Hillary Clinton’s campaign manager) indicated that several pizzerias in Washington D.C. were secretly facilitating the satanic ritual abuse of children. Clinton and other prominent Democrats, like former President Barack Obama, were accused of being involved. Although Pizzagate was immediately debunked by the media, many conspiracy theorists remained convinced that certain members of the American elite were part of a satanic cabal of child abusers. Q used Pizzagate as a base and expanded the conspiracy theory by including the recently elected Donald Trump as a ‘saviour’ that would ultimately bring ‘the Cabal’ to justice in an event called ‘the Storm’. Q claimed that a ‘plan’ had been secretly set in motion by patriots within the government and military to expose the crimes of the Cabal to the world in a process called ‘the Great Awakening’. As the movement grew throughout the years, QAnon’s conspiracy theory continued to expand further, often absorbing other popular pre-existing conspiracy theories. The success of QAnon as a conspiracy movement is unprecedented. While other relatively large conspiracy movements have existed before (flat-earthers, crop circle researchers etc.), they were usually centred around specific topics and restricted to isolated parts of the internet. Conspiracy theorists were often perceived as stereotypical tin-foil hats wearing basement dwellers. QAnon has changed that. It has become the first modern conspiracy movement to have a real impact on mainstream society. An estimated 30 million Americans now believe in QAnon. Worldwide this number is believed to be even higher, being particularly popular among conservative Christians and the alt-right. This can be explained by the movement’s inclusion of themes that typically resonate with these demographics. However, the movement’s central premise of fighting against child abuse has also attracted a lot of followers that normally don’t fit this bill. A further impulse to the movement’s popularity was given by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. By including narratives about the pandemic’s origin in its conspiracy theories, QAnon has gained a lot of support among opponents of lockdown measures. Perhaps the most staggering thing about QAnon’s popularity is the amount of failed predictions the movement has survived. Q’s very first prediction, namely that Hillary Clinton would be arrested in October 2017, never became a reality and it was followed up by countless other predictions about the onset of the ‘Storm’ that similarly never happened. There are multiple explanations for why all QAnon’s failed predictions never really seemed to affect the popularity of the movement. First of all, Q’s posts were generally very cryptic, leaving followers to interpret the posts themselves. Failed predictions could therefore often simply be attributed to ‘faulty interpretations’. Another explanation is Q’s repeated efforts to encourage his followers to simply ‘trust the plan’ and his constant words of reassurance that ‘patriots are in charge.’ Finally, Trump’s presidency was often seen by the movement as proof that the Plan was still working. As long as he remained in charge, the window for the predicted Storm to happen remained open. If it didn’t happen at a certain time, it was often simply assumed it would happen later during his presidency. The US elections of 2020 were an incredibly hard time for a lot of QAnon followers as once again they were promised something that did not materialize. They believed that Trump would win in a landslide victory. When Biden won, some started seriously questioning their beliefs. Others doubled down and remained convinced that Biden winning was actually just all part of ‘the Plan’, and that they needed Biden to cheat in the elections in order to finally bring him to justice. Trump’s refusal to concede the elections and the widespread allegations of voter fraud strengthened this belief. Although Q himself went silent on 8 December, QAnon followers continued speculating on when the promised Storm would take place. A new date was determined: 6 January 2021. On this day, Congress would convene in the Capitol building to confirm the electoral vote in favour of president-elect Joe Biden. In what would go down as one of the darkest days in American democracy, thousands of Trump supporters, including QAnon followers, stormed the capitol, participating in what they believed to be ‘the Storm’. They did this after Trump held an inciting speech outside the capitol in which he encouraged his supporters to march towards the Capitol building. When all rioters were removed from the capitol building, congress reconvened and formally confirmed Joe Biden as the 46th president of the United States. Ending all hope for QAnon followers that the results of the elections could be legally overturned. The Capitol attack was a shocking wake-up call for the world to the potential security threat large conspiracy communities like QAnon can pose. The storming of the capitol building was seen as a genuine attempt to overthrow American democracy. As a result, security measures were significantly tighter for Biden’s inauguration on January 20. Q’s enduring absence and the long list of unfulfilled predictions have plunged the movement into a deep crisis of faith. Since Q is no longer there to convince them to ‘trust the plan’, QAnon followers might feel increasingly inclined to handle matters themselves. As more and more time passes without any sign of ‘the Storm’, the risk that QAnon decides to create another Storm of their own making becomes greater. With tens of millions of Americans believing their country is ruled by a satanic cabal, conspiracy theorists might become one of America’s most dangerous security threats for the coming years. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group. About the author: Ruben Pfeijffer is a graduated anthropologist who currently follows the MA program Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University. While working on his bachelor thesis in the Netherlands during the early stages of the COVID-19 outbreak, Ruben gained experience with conducting ethnographic research under the challenging circumstances of the pandemic, and has learned to be adaptable with his research methods.

Quick Money and Slow Violence: What lingers underneath the surface in the aftermath of post-conflict societies? By: Bob Rehorst Countries that have suffered through political turmoil are increasingly attractive as emerging markets. However, underneath all that potential, hidden risks may linger in the shadows of the country’s turbulent past. This first part focuses on the risks of prolonged environmental degradation and the notion of slow violence in post-conflict societies. To understand this, let us first examine the example of South Lebanon. Well-over a decade ago, a war raged in the south of Lebanon between Israel and the Hezbollah-led ‘Lebanese Resistance’. Six years after the war, the inhabitants of Lebanon’s southern regions, which posed the battleground for the 2006 ‘July War’, insistently spoke about their infertile lands, failed harvests, and dying bodies[1]. Such stories continued to emerge in the long aftermath of the war, long after the UN-brokered a ceasefire and most troops went home. Although difficult to prove, the blame is commonly directed towards the remains of Israeli weapons in the region, including shrapnel, phosphorus and other toxic remnants. The question is, why is this so difficult to prove? Lebanon is, unfortunately, not unique. Vietnam has experienced similar toxicity in the aftermath of its American war in the 60’s and 70’s due to a toxin called Agent Orange. It is this slow, lingering, and often invisible, type of violence that will be explored here. Violence is normally expressive and visible. ‘Normal’ violence is generally defined as an ‘act of physical hurt’[2], and characterised to be immediate in time, explosive and spectacular. Slow violence, on the other hand, is a phenomenon that is described to occur gradually, and out of sight. It is defined as a type of 'delayed destruction' that is spread out across space and can take place over long periods [3]. Examples of this can be the gradual deterioration of soil, health, and ecosystems due to human pollution. Then what are the effects? Because of its gradual nature, slow violence is severely underrepresented in mass media. We live in an era where the black mirrors of our phones and laptops have become, not only part of our daily life, but also a general ecosystem of constant distraction. It seems that we systematically fail to keep focus, beating through our everyday lives with continuous partial attention. News is fast; Twitter is faster, articles get smaller and messaging has become shorter. In this milieu of speeded up time, and brief narration, generating awareness towards the hidden, lingering aftermath becomes tougher. To briefly illustrate this point, let us take a closer look at the Vietnamese case. Agent Orange, used controversially as a defoliant by the Americans during the Vietnam war, caused leaves of jungle trees to die, making it easier to detect enemy positions. However, humans exposed to the substance were at risk of poisoning. In Vietnam, it is estimated that as many as four million people suffered from dioxin poisoning as a result of Agent Orange. More so, babies are reported to be born with defects. Through biomagnification, dioxins build up in the fatty tissues of ducks and fish, pass from nature into everyday life in Vietnam. There is very little attention to this, because attempts to scientifically prove the correlation between Agent Orange and birth defects, for example, failed in U.S. Courts. Contested scientific evidence also occurs in Lebanon. Various actors, pushing deviating political agendas, have opted for fluctuating scientific support or deniability regarding the causal relationship between the remnants of war and its victims. Numerous scientific sources argue that this fluctuation of ‘evidence’ is by design. The common consensus is that there is an active production of doubt, which makes it possible to shift responsibility away from the perpetrators and prolong the circulation of hazardous products.[4] In other words, it is a smokescreen, actively designed to refute blame. Such active creation of doubt around scientific evidence is not only produced by political actors. For several large corporations, this smokescreen provides a perfect stage to continue unsustainable business practices. In sectors such as tobacco or mining corporations, there is money to be made in sustaining doubt surrounding environmental factors to prolong the consensus that their business is, without a doubt, unsustainable. In this way, doubt becomes profitable. The question is then, at what cost? Understanding the deliberate manufacturing of doubt as a factor for prolonged slow violence, as explained in the cases of Vietnam and Lebanon, we can see how this contributes to environmental deterioration, as well as violations of human rights. Businesses aspiring to access emerging markets in post-conflict societies should take note of the existence of slow violence. Because slow violence is not visible on the surface, and the smokescreen of doubt can create confusing surroundings, one should tread carefully. Lack of awareness about such turbulent factors carries the risk of operating in, or contributing to, unsustainable environments. In order to minimise risk and conduct sustainable business, it is advisable to generate an understanding of one’s operational environment. References [1] Touhouliotis, V. (2018). Weak seed and a poisoned land: Slow violence and the toxic infrastructures of war in South Lebanon. Environmental Humanities, 10(1), 86-106. [2] Riches, D. (1986). “The phenomenon of Violence” in D. Riches (Ed.) The Anthropology of Violence, Oxford: Blackwell. [3]Nixon, R. (2011). Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor. Harvard University Press. [4] Touhouliotis, V. (2018), p.92. This article is part one of a series highlighting the potential risks of doing business in post-conflict countries. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author: Bob Rehorst is a Global Security Analyst at Dyami. He has extensive field experience in the Levant-Middle East region, North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. He holds a Graduate Degree in Conflict Studies and Human Rights, and an Undergraduate Degree in Cultural Anthropology, both from Utrecht University. Bob specializes in geopolitics, conflict development and global crises.

By: Isabel Oriol Llonin After the COVID-19 pandemic hit the world, the race to develop a vaccine began. It was expected that the US, Europe, or China would lead. Russia emerged as an unexpected force developing one of the first vaccines to be approved worldwide: the Sputnik V. Named after the USSR’s world’s first satellite, the Sputnik V claims a 91% efficacy after the second dose. After the Sputnik V’s trial phases results were published, many international health experts were skeptical of the early approval of the vaccine, thus questioning the scientific rigor used in the trials and the safety of the vaccine. The official Twitter account for the Sputnik V dismissed the criticisms, claiming it was ‘big pharma lobby’ and ‘anti-Russian propaganda’.[1] Figure I: Sputnik V doses arriving to Argentina on March 2021 (Argentinian Health Ministry). Today, the Sputnik V has been registered in 60 countries around the world, approximately half of them have purchased doses. Latin America is one of the first regions to seriously incorporate the Russian vaccine into their vaccination strategies, with 9 countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Venezuela) having purchased collectively 60 million doses so far.[2] But how did the Sputnik V vaccine become so on-demand in Latin America? Unequal worldwide vaccine distribution When vaccines began to be approved for mass use and deliveries began towards the end of 2020, numerous health organizations and world leaders, including the WHO, warned about the potential unequal distribution of vaccines around the globe. Several months into vaccination rollouts the warnings were correct: until March 2021 high-income countries, which represent 19% of the global population, had purchased 54% of the globally available doses.[3] High-income countries were accused of ‘hoarding’ vaccines at the expense of the rest of the world, including Latin America. The Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Marcelo Ebrard, called out the inequitable vaccine distribution worldwide at the UN Security Council, of which Mexico is a non-permanent member. Further on, the production delays faced by many western pharmaceuticals exacerbated the unequal distribution of vaccines by prioritizing the supply of high-income countries. Latin America, just like many other non-western regions of the world began to seriously ponder alternative suppliers to the western-produced Pfizer-BioNTech, AstraZeneca, Moderna, and Johnson & Johnson. This is where the Russian Sputnik V, and other vaccines like the Chinese Sinovac, began to be more attractive for Latin American leaders. Argentina led the way by being the first country in the region to approve the emergency use of the Sputnik V vaccine in the country, followed by a negotiation with Vladimir Putin for an initial 5 million dose purchase. Many other Latin American countries followed. Sputnik V: a soft power move by Russia? Sputnik V is providing Russia with much more than just the profit gained from producing and selling the vaccine. A once distanced world power from Latin America has managed to be featured in the front pages of Latin American newspapers, to hold highly media-covered negotiations, to receive the praise of Latin American presidents and leaders, and to be overall, once again talked about. An old-fashioned soft power move. Soft power is an international relations concept coined by Joseph Nye in 1990. Understanding power as ‘the ability to affect others to get the outcomes one prefers’, Nye sees soft power as ‘the ability to obtain preferred outcomes by attraction rather than coercion or payment’.[4] Soft power has been used to describe the type of influence that some nations have that is not based on military force or economic power or the threat of them (hard power), but rather the positive and attractive ideological or cultural influence of a country. In a world that is so desperately looking for a way out of the pandemic, with mass vaccination at its core, Russia is capitalizing on the failures of the west by providing life-saving affordable vaccines to millions. While the past few decades the influence of Russia in Latin America has been unremarkable, with the exception of a few countries, current developments point out a shift in dynamics. Vladimir Putin has received praise from many Latin American presidents for Russia’s role in supplying the region with Sputnik V doses. Mexico’s López Obrador publicly thanked Putin after the initial agreement to purchase 24 million doses while extending him an invitation for an official visit, media outlets were quick to point out that other leaders such as Joe Biden have not yet received such invitation. After being vaccinated himself with the Sputnik V, Argentina’s Alberto Fernández reassured his confidence in the vaccine and thanked Putin for his commitment to supply vaccines to Argentina. Moreover, citizens of diverse countries in Latin America are increasingly favoring the Russian vaccine. Polls show that the Sputnik V vaccine is the most trusted vaccine in Argentina and Peru, the second most trusted in Mexico, and the fourth in other countries such as Brazil or Chile.[5] While Russia continues to hold negotiations with Latin American leaders regarding the vaccine supply, most recently with Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro, its widespread use is becoming more accepted among Latin American citizens. The Russian objective of being seen once again as a world power, through scientific leadership and cooperation, could be making its way into the region. While the US remains the dominant world power in the region, Russia is capitalizing on a power vacuum generated by both the pandemic and the recent Republican American leadership, and while Latin American countries need not choose between one or the other anymore, Russia’s approach should be a cautious one. While the situation is still developing and the Russian Sputnik V vaccine has the potential to be the opening door for closer, more substantive economic and cultural relations with Latin America. This could mark the beginning of a new period for Russian-Latin American relations. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group, as part of the ‘Russian Strategic Interests in Latin America’ research project led by Alessia Cappelletti and Isabel Oriol. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the author: Isabel Oriol Llonin is a contributing analyst at Dyami. She holds a bachelor’s degree in International Relations and has a post-graduate degree in Public International Law from Utrecht University. She has expertise in the Latin American region and the public international law implications of conflict analysis.