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Written by Arianna Lucà and Sara Frisan Edited on the 28/05/2024 Date:  27/05/2024 Where: Colombia Who’s involved: President Petro, Opposition parties and elites, Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) Introduction: The Colombian President and his administration is facing a number of challenges that could undermine its ambitious political plan for stabilization and peace in Colombia. Gustavo Petro, a former member of M-19 left-wing guerrilla group and mayor of Bogota, won the 2022 elections with a progressive political agenda, aiming to reform health, pension and labor systems. He pledged to transform Colombia by promoting socio-economic justice and peace in a country scarred by decades of violence, corruption, and inequality. However, due to a combination of political and economic setbacks, the first left-wing President in Colombian history is struggling to implement his socio-economic reform project and faces stiff resistance from the political opposition and broad segments of the Colombian population. Political Crisis and Mass Protests Petro’s coalition, the Historic Pact for Colombia, does not have a majority in both chambers of Congress, which is making it difficult to achieve his political objectives. In recent months, most of Petro's socio-economic reforms, including the health reform proposal, were rejected by the opposition. In March 2024, Petro blamed the traditionally conservative institutions and legislature for obstructing his social reform agenda and declared his intention to amend the 1991 Colombian Constitution to spur social reforms and address the country's inequalities. Since Petro took office, demonstrations have been regular, although they have intensified since the President proposed the constitutional amendment. In April 2024, hundreds of thousands of people marched in the streets of Bogota, Medellin, Cali and Barranquilla to protest against Petro’s government economic and social reforms. Petro reacted to the protests by calling them a “soft coup” organized by conservative elites to obstruct reforms. Yet, also some of his supporters took part in the demonstrations, frustrated by the lack of tangible improvements in their socio-economic conditions. Tensions between the opposition and Petro’s coalition have also worsened, due to allegations of corruption and illegal financing of Petro's 2022 election campaign. Following the scandal, on May 8, 2024 two out of nine magistrates in Colombia’s National Electoral Council requested an investigation of Petro’s 2022 electoral campaign over alleged financing violations. Despite Petro's attempts to distance himself from the scandal, the Colombian House of Representatives recently accepted a proposal by the far-right Democratic Center party to suspend "debate and vote on all ordinary and statutory bills and draft legislation" submitted by the Petro administration. The suspension threatens to sink the government's pension reform project, preliminary approved in late May 2024, which was due to become law by June 20. In response, Petro denounced the "structural corruption" of Colombia's institutions. Peace Process’ Setbacks On top of the political crisis, in the past few months, the Petro’s administration peace process known as “Paz Total” (Total Peace), a plan to achieve peace by conducting talks with all the armed groups in the country, has been facing numerous challenges and setbacks. After six rounds of talks, several negotiations and ceasefires with armed groups have stalled, and levels of violence and  conflict remain high in the country. Several attacks and massacres by armed groups targeting civilians, indigenous leaders and security officials were reported in rural areas in recent weeks. Despite the Colombian government and the ELN reaching an agreement on one of the key issues of the peace process on May 25, 2024 the situation remains uncertain. On May 6, the National Liberation Army (ELN), the oldest insurgent group active in Colombia and one of the main interlocutors in the negotiations, announced that it would resume abductions, as the government has failed to fulfill agreements taken during talks. The rebel group has criticized the delays in the creation of a multi-donor peace fund to support the group’s livelihood. In response, the government clarified that the fund was never intended as an incentive to halt abductions but to strengthen efforts in the peace process. More friction is likely to occur in the future rounds of talks, as President Gustavo Petro’s administration made it clear that the ELN suspension of kidnapping is an imperative condition for reaching an agreement. The end of the kidnapping suspension is the latest tension between the government and ELN. In April 2024, the ELN's Central Command had frozen talks with institutions following parallel negotiations between the government and some of the ELN’s factions active in the Nariño department in the west of Colombia. The ELN blamed the government for carrying on these negotiations with smaller groups “behind the back” of the Central Command. Following the announcement of the suspension of kidnappings, one of these factions, the ELN Southern Community Front (Frente Comuneros del Sur), announced on May 7, 2024, its split from ELN Central  Command and its willingness to pursue negotiations. Moreover, negotiations between the government and the EMC (Estado Mayor Central), an organization that encompasses factions of the former FARC that rejected the 2016 peace agreement, are currently experiencing setbacks. In March 2024, due to the EMC’s attacks targeting indigenous leaders and police officers, the government partially suspended the ceasefire with the EMC in Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and Nariño. Increasing tensions with the government led to splits within the EMC; some blocs are willing to continue dialogue with the government, while others refuse any negotiation until a new national ceasefire is established. In the wake of strained relations with the government, the group escalated violence against security forces. On May 20, 2024, attacks by the EMC militia group claimed at least 4 lives in southwestern Colombia. Analysis: Beside the initial popular favor, President Petro has not yet advanced on his radical reform agenda and the President’s approval rates have been decreasing drastically over the past year. Several factors have exacerbated his recent unpopularity such as political scandals, rejection of reforms due to limited influence in Congress, economic challenges, security concerns and backsliding in the peace process. The lack of improvement in the socio-economic condition of citizens is fostering growing dissatisfaction and distrust of Petro's work. Due to the opposition’s holdout, the President is seemingly unable to gain the support needed to push through the pledged social reforms. More protests and social unrest are likely. Currently, Petro’s government is under mounting pressure due to the series of scandals involving corruption allegations, which have triggered a drop in the President’s popularity. Moreover, his proposal of constitutional changes is raising concerns not only from the opposition, alarmed that Petro is seeking to ensure himself the possibility of staying in power after the end of his term in 2026, but also from elites and lobbies. Business groups have warned the President that a constituent assembly could disadvantage businesses and investors to the country. Although Petro claimed that the proposed changes will not affect the independence and integrity of the Constitution, the opposition believes it is a strategy to divert attention from the failures of his administration. However, a constitutional reform in Colombia would require majority support in Congress, approval of the courts, and a popular referendum. Given the lack of support in Congress and its declining popularity, Petro's proposal is unlikely to get the necessary support. Moreover, failures in implementing Paz Total's policy are further discrediting the image and agenda of President Petro. Indeed, the “Paz Total” was a central pillar of Petro’s election campaign. Unlike previous peace processes, it envisaged the opportunity to set a legal framework for the government, and carry out simultaneous negotiations with all armed groups active in the territory, while finally fulfilling commitments made in the 2016 peace agreement with FARC. Yet despite government negotiations, and ceasefire agreements with several groups, levels of violence and conflict are not decreasing in the country, with the rate of abductions rising, frequent clashes between security forces and non-state armed groups, and a worsened security situation in some rural areas. Petro’s hope to hold multiple negotiations with the different groups at the same time is proving difficult. The latest setbacks in the peace talks, such as the fragmentation of the EMC and the ELN's decision to resume kidnappings, are a clear demonstration of the far-reaching complexity of the Paz Total project. Petro's strategy is not achieving the expected results. Nearly two years into negotiations, the peace process is unable to curb the violence in the country. Clashes between armed groups and security forces and violence against civilians have been frequent in recent months. So far a stable and lasting scenario of Paz Total, as envisioned by President Petro, is unlikely to be achieved in the short term. Conclusion: Despite early public support, President Petro's progressive campaign for socio-economic reforms and peace is failing to achieve the promised outcomes. The lack of a majority in Congress and fierce resistance from the opposition to his policies are preventing the pledged reforms. Almost two years into his term, the Petro administration faces a volatile and uncertain scenario, with the President's reputation and credibility undermined by scandals and failures. Moreover, the government's ongoing political crisis and fractures are reflected in the intermittent and partial peace negotiations with major armed groups in Colombia. Intra-group splits, setbacks in peace talks, and the increased violence targeting population in rural areas make the achievement of the long-awaited Paz Total quite far-fetched. To prevent further escalation of violence and displacement crises, it is imperative for the government to develop a strategy to ensure the security and address the multiple challenges of conflict-affected communities. However, Petro's government seems to lack the necessary means and ability to improve neither the unstable political scenario nor the volatile security situation in Colombia, at least in the short term.

Date: 23/05/2024 Who’s involved: China’s People Liberation Army (PLA), Republic of China (Taiwan), President Lai Ching-te, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). What happened? On 23/05/2024, China’s PLA began two-day military exercises around Taiwan and several islands. The drills come three days after the inauguration of Lai Ching-te, leader of the DPP, who stated in his presidential address that he would protect Taiwan’s sovereignty and uphold Taiwan’s democracy. Beijing strongly objects to his presidency and the DPP’s view on Taiwan’s independence. After the announcement of military exercises, China’s Global Times stated that the exercises are intended to ‘punish Taiwanese independence secessionist forces and to send a stern warning to belligerent external forces’. China’s PLA exercises are conducted by a joint force of the army, navy, air force and rocket force and will take place in the Taiwan Strait, the north, the south and east of the islands. There are also exercises taking place around the islands of the Taiwan territories of Kinmen, Matsu, Wuqiu and Dongyin near the coast of mainland China. These are in addition to the PLA’s already sending aircraft and ships almost daily to wear down Taiwan’s defense and apply pressure to the island. China has not yet revealed how many aircraft or ships it was deploying in the exercise. Taiwan has scrambled jets and put missile, naval and land units and put on high alert in response. Taiwan’s military and officials have been expecting some show of military force after the inauguration on Monday. Taiwan’s ministry of defense said China’s actions had caused ‘harm to global peace and stability’. The opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT), a party generally seen as pro-China, also condemned China’s actions. Analysis: China’s military exercises are intended to send a message to what China believes are ‘secessionist’ forces in Taiwan. Beijing has not ruled out using force to reunify the islands. The last time China held major drills took place in April 2023, after a visit from the US Republican and speaker of the House of Representatives, Kevin McCarthy. Beijing opposes meetings between the US and Taiwanese representatives. The drills are significant and increase the risk of escalation, yet they are smaller than in August 2022. After the visit of Nancy Pelosi to the island the PLA fired missiles near and over the island of Taiwan and lasted for over four days, in what has been called the ‘Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis’. The exercises provide lessons for the PLA on how to conduct a blockade of the island by the sea and restrict air access. The main difference in the current exercise is that there is a focus on the smaller islands closer to the Chinese mainland, which could provide training to the PLA to seize one of those islands. It is likely that there are more exercises planned for this year. The name of China’s current operation is Joint Sword 2024A, suggesting that there may be another round of B and C in Beijing’s plans for this year. President William Lai said in his speech that he will continue his predecessor's strategy of not overtly provoking China while at the same time improving ties with the US and other regional partners such as Australia, the Philippines and Japan. He said that he is open to dialogue with Beijing, and will avoid conflicts that could draw in regional partners or the US. Japan’s Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa also said that 'Japan and Taiwan share the same values and is listed as an extremely important partner'.

Date: 23/05/2024 Where: European continent Who’s involved Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Germany, UK and other European countries Russian secret services, Russian military intelligence, Russian-affiliated cyber actors (Fancy Bear, Cozy Bear and others), European citizens What happened? On 20/05/2024, Polish authorities arrested nine people, including Belarusian citizens, in connection with acts of sabotage committed in the country on the order of Russian services. The acts included beatings, arson and attempted arson, both in Poland and Lithuania. According to the authorities their plans might have also affected Latvia and possibly Sweden. At the beginning of May 2024 the German federal government lashed out at the Kremlin for an espionage campaign which targeted emails belonging to the Social Democratic Party, the party of German Chancellor Scholz, and defense and aerospace firms. The campaign was conducted in 2022 and 2023 by Fancy Bear, an cybercriminal actor strongly tied to Russia which also targeted Polish and Czech institutions and political parties. Espionage campaigns have also been conducted by Cozy Bear, which is also affiliated with the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. Cozy Bear conducted phishing campaigns in 2024 to collect intelligence against German political parties but also European diplomatic entities, including in Latvia and Czech Republic. On 29/04/2024, Finnair announced the suspension of all its flights to Tartu, Estonia, until 02/06 to GPS interference in the area of the airport, which is situated around 40 km from the border with Russia. On 25 and 26 April Finnair airplanes had to divert back to Finland as GPS interference prevented landing in Tartu. Different approach methods were implemented in cooperation with the airport to avoid reliance on GPS systems. On 18/04/2024, two German-Russian nationals were arrested in Germany for planning sabotage attacks, including bombings and arson attacks against infrastructure and US military bases in the country, to undermine weapons and aid delivery to Ukraine. A few weeks earlier the Czech Republic’s transport minister warned that Russia was trying to interfere with the European railways network, especially with cyberattacks, in order to destabilize critical infrastructure. Attacks were more frequently targeting railway companies in the Baltic states. Another group was discovered in March of the previous year in Poland, which was collecting intelligence on railways and transport routes along the border with Ukraine to disrupt European aid to Ukraine. These are only the latest incidents that have been part of a widespread campaign conducted at the same time of military operations in Ukraine. At the beginning of April 2024, after independently conducting an investigation, Der Spiegel reported that the two main members of the German far-right party Alternative für Deutschland accepted payments from media portal Voice of Europe, which had been used by Russia to spread pro-Kremlin propaganda in Europe. On 03/03/2024, state-controlled media Russia Today leaked a recording of a telephone conversation between four German military officers discussing the provision of aid to Ukraine, including potentially the much debated Taurus missiles and possible targets for their use. The delivery of Taurus missiles at the time was the subject of a very heated debate as German authorities were very cautious due to the possibility of using them to target Russian territory. On 20/02/2024, Estonian authorities arrested ten people suspected of sabotage to create fear in the country on the orders of Russian intelligence agencies. The group carried out various activities, including attacks against politicians and journalist properties and possibly against memorials. Analysis Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the subsequent European support of Kyiv, Russia has increased malicious activities in the continent to hamper Western efforts to help Ukraine. Disruptive activity has targeted especially those countries who have been particularly vocal and active against Russia, including many Eastern European and Baltic countries but also Germany and the United Kingdom. While in the past the Kremlin rarely carried out covert activities in European countries, Russian operations are now more ambitious, more frequent and in some cases even more open. European countries haven’t been able to bring about significant consequences for Russian disruptive actions, although they have stepped up preventive measures in order to stop plans from actualizing. Russian subversive activities have employed different strategies, as it has become harder for Russian agents to infiltrate European territory with the current travel restrictions. Russian agents often partner up with local organized crime networks and other local actors. Countries hosting delivery lines for military aid to Ukraine have been experiencing sabotage plots against their railways and transportation routes to slow down weapons shipments, which are vital for Ukraine to oppose Russian advances in the eastern part of the country. On the other hand, countries like Germany, where certain weapon shipments have been more controversial, have experienced increased propaganda operations through subtle means, like the leaking of the phone conversation on the possible shipment of Taurus missiles. These moves were intended to put pressure on governments and sway the public opinion to decrease support for weapon shipments to Ukraine. Propaganda campaigns have been aided by prominent pro-Russian parties in many countries, mostly in the far right, especially with European elections approaching. These elections will be important as the composition of the next European Parliament and, as a consequence, the next European leadership will be able to influence the course of EU policy for the next few years. Due to physical travel restrictions and sanctions, cyberspace has gained importance for Russian destabilizing efforts. Russian secret services are now relying on a network of actors, such as Cozy Bear and Fancy Bear, to collect political and military intelligence. The information collected has often been leaked strategically to depict European institutions and governments negatively and turn public opinion against them. These cyber threat actors are also able to attack critical infrastructure, including transport-related infrastructure. For example, they’ve shown their ability to take down telecommunication networks but also to remotely control machinery at foreign water facilities. Aviation has also been affected by Russian operations in the Baltics and over the Black Sea. Northern European countries bordering with Russia have experienced a surge in GPS jamming since the start of the war, which also affected emergency aircrafts and land vehicles. Reports about interference along the Norwegian-Russian border are coming in almost every day since the start of 2024. While GPS jamming does not pose a severe danger per se, it can be extremely disruptive in emergency situations. Conclusion While Russia always had the capabilities to conduct covert operations on European territory, operations have recently become bolder, more public and more sophisticated. As Ukraine’s efforts to stop Russian advancements in its territory get increasingly dependent on Western military aid, Russia has stepped up its attempts to stop shipments of military aid, both through damage to critical infrastructure and propaganda campaigns aimed at reducing public support for Ukraine. On the other hand, European countries have expanded their counter-intelligence efforts, resulting in more and more malicious plots being stopped from taking place. Nonetheless, current events show an increased and more overt malicious activity in the continent that will likely remain as long as hostilities continue.

Date: 21/05/2024 Who’s involved: The African National Congress (ANC), Democratic Alliance (DA), uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MK), Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) What happened? On 29/05/2024 elections are scheduled in South Africa. With a turbulent, contested period prior to these elections, it is probable that demonstrations and protests will take place around the election date. The ruling African National Congress (ANC) might get below 50 per cent of the ballots for the first time since 1994, when Nelson Mandela won the first election after abolishing Apartheid - the system of institutionalized racial segregation that operated in South Africa and present-day Namibia between 1948 and 1990. If this happens, a coalition government could be initiated after three decades of ANC being in power. ANC’s loss of popularity is mainly due to unprecedented unemployment rates, widespread poverty, a lack of basic services, and corruption scandals. The enduring impact of racism and segregation also still remains evident, with black communities continuing to suffer disproportionately from poverty. Other parties are running on the promise of improving such conditions. The main opposition party, the progressive centrist Democratic Alliance (DA) strives to address unemployment, creating a fair and free climate with opportunities for everyone. The party is expected to gain around 18% of the national vote. Another party contending is the leftist, pan-Africanist Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). It describes itself as a radical and militant economic emancipation movement, empowering marginalized communities. They are likely to secure about 11% of the national ballot. Unrest between the ANC and left-wing populist uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MK) overshadows this election. In December 2023, Jacob Zuma, former South African president between 2009-2018 on behalf of ANC,  caused surprise by announcing his support for the newly formed MK Party.  In January 2024, ANC expelled Zuma, whereupon he switched to MK, appearing as the leader and campaigning vigorously. Additionally, ANC sued MK for using the name and logo of its former armed wing. On 22/04/2024, ANC lost that court bid. In March 2024, South Africa's Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) disqualified Zuma, citing the constitution's ban on parliamentary seats for those with prison sentences of 12 months or more. In 2021, Zuma received a 15-month jail sentence - of which served only three due to health reasons - for corruption allegations. This sparked widespread protests, riots, and looting, resulting in over 350 fatalities. On 09/04/2024, the Electoral Court overruled IEC’s decision. The South African Constitutional Court decided on 20/05/2024 to bar Zuma from running for parliament. Despite the ban, the MK will continue to campaign. At the same time, the party is under police investigation for allegedly forging supporters' signatures to register for the national elections. The verdict of this case holds implications for the forthcoming election as well, with potential security concerns. Opinion polls indicate that MK is likely to secure around 14% of the national vote, and over 40% of the provincial vote in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), establishing itself as a significant force in Zuma’s home province. A local source indicates that during the last months, there has been concern about unrest in the province, with people outside the province perceiving the provincial vote in KZN as a tribal issue for Zulus. The recent ban of Zuma may provoke unrest and potential violence. Overall, Zuma’s ban could diminish MK’s election prospects if members joined the party primarily out of loyalty to Zuma. Concurrently, it could turn out positively as MK supporters might garner sympathy and support arguing that the courts are against Zuma and MK. Analysis: If the ANC loses its majority, it is likely to lead to a period of unstable coalition government. Considering the opposition is quite fragmented, with circa 70 political parties and 11 independent candidates contesting, the ANC is expected to maintain the largest party in parliament. Yet, a coalition formation seems unavoidable, with its support dwindling rapidly due to issues such as corruption, poverty, pollution and a deteriorating business climate. In recent months, there has been a surge in political violence both within the ANC as well as within other parties, with 10 politically motivated assassinations being recorded in the period January - April 2024. Members are vying for powerful positions granting self-enrichment, including access to local government budgets. Diverse officials and politicians have engaged in corruption practices, resulting in the disappearance of social initiatives and funds intended for the population. An exacerbating issue is the staggering unemployment rate, which is exceeding 32%, one of the highest globally. This dire situation has ensnared millions in poverty, causing intense dissatisfaction  forcing them to depend on social grants for sustenance. Coalition governments are not a typical form of power sharing. Previous coalitions have often been viewed as ineffective, marked by brief alliances that empower political figures and encourage patronage practices. This track record has heightened concerns about the stability of a potential national coalition. According to a local source, coalition formation will be difficult, especially considering the second-largest party, the DA, has campaigned on an anti-ANC mandate. Besides, the ANC might only want to govern with smaller parties they can control. Speculations are currently causing unrest in both politics and society, and this is likely to intensify after the elections. The political shift will have implications throughout the Southern African Development Community (SADC), a region comprising 16 African member states, sparking uncertainty regarding potential changes in South Africa's foreign policy, besides the regional agenda. Relations with key global players like Russia, China, and the United States are likely to undergo review and potential recalibration. South Africa's relationship with Russia dates back decades. Since the onset of the war, South Africa has been cautious about condemning Russia’s invasion, even abstaining from supporting a UN resolution on the issue. ANC members maintain close ties with Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party and the Chinese Communist Party, engaging in "party-to-party diplomacy" and attending fully funded training sessions in Russia and China, alongside joint military (naval) exercises. The elections could prompt a reassessment of the country’s stance in Russia's conflict with Ukraine, and their relations with China and the US. Another significant factor that could sway voters on 29/05/2024 is the contrasting stances of the ANC and DA regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict. Whereas the DA maintains a neutral stance on the Gaza conflict, the ANC has voiced strong support for Palestine, having filed a genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice. However, their foreign policy last year has been inconsistent, scrutinizing the human rights records of certain countries, while seemingly turning a blind eye to those of others, making the US questioning its bilateral cooperation with South Africa. The result of the elections potentially affects the relationship with Israel. Conclusion South Africa faces a pivotal election on 29/05/2024 amid political turbulence and uncertainty. The ANC may lose its majority for the first time since Apartheid, potentially leading to coalition governance, signaling a significant shift in South Africa’s political landscape. Legal battles over Zuma’s parliamentary eligibility have raised security concerns and uncertainty about the election outcome. Additionally, deep-seated issues such as corruption, poverty, and unemployment continue to weigh heavily on the populace, stoking discontent and raising the likelihood of protests both during the elections and their aftermath. The election results will not only shape domestic policies but also hold the potential to impact its foreign relations and regional dynamics.

Utrecht - Dyami, een toonaangevend consultancybedrijf op het gebied van security risk en intelligence management, heeft vandaag een nieuwe samenwerking aangekondigd met Securo Beveiliging, een prominent beveiligingsbedrijf in Nederland. Deze samenwerking markeert een significante stap in het versterken van de beveiligingscapaciteiten, training en diensten in Nederland en daarbuiten. Door deze samenwerking zullen Dyami en Securo hun expertise bundelen om geïntegreerde veiligheidsoplossingen te bieden aan zowel overheidsinstanties als private sector klanten. De gecombineerde krachten van beide organisaties zullen leiden tot verbeterde risicoanalyses, crisismanagement en de fysieke beveiligingsdiensten. "Dyami is verheugd om samen te werken met Securo, een bedrijf dat bekend staat om zijn hoogwaardige beveiligingsdiensten en diepgaande kennis van de veiligheidsindustrie," zegt Eric Schouten, CEO van Dyami. "Deze samenwerking zal ons in staat stellen om een nog uitgebreider aanbod aan kwalitatieve veiligheidsdiensten te leveren”. Vanuit Securo voegt de directeur toe: "Onze samenwerking met Dyami reflecteert onze toewijding aan innovatie en uitmuntendheid in security risk en intelligence management. Samen zullen we de veiligheidsnormen herdefiniëren en onze klanten een ongeëvenaarde bescherming bieden." De samenwerking gaat onmiddellijk van start, met verschillende gezamenlijke projecten die reeds in de planning staan. Voor meer informatie kunt u contact opnemen met: Dyami: Eric Schouten, eric@dyami.services Securo: Amerik van Duin, avanduin@securobeveiliging.nl Over Dyami Security Intelligence Dyami is uw partner in security risk en intelligence management. Wij bieden diensten om uw organisatie weerbaar te maken en ondersteunen met geopolitieke duiding en travel risk management. Onze academie traint u en uw personeel in veiligheidsbewustzijn, reisveiligheid, spionage awareness en meer.https://www.dyami.services/ Over Securo Beveiliging Securo Beveiliging is een gerenommeerd beveiligingsbedrijf in Nederland dat in het hoog segment beveiligingsdiensten aanbiedt, van High end Retail tot Persoonsbeveiliging. Met de focus op kwaliteit en door te ontzorgen streeft Securo voor lange termijnrelaties met al haar klanten. https://securobeveiliging.nl

Written by Mickey Beckmann and Kevin Heller Around the globe, people are increasingly facing the dire repercussions of environmental crises. Sub Saharan Africa is in a tough spot at the moment, experiencing an accelerated warming compared to the global average. This is reflected in the manifestation of extreme weather phenomena causing food insecurity, land disputes and mass displacement. Conflict and political instability are colliding with climate change, causing a high-stakes situation, which is defining the fate of millions of people in the region. With an increasingly risky living environment, the search for a better life is driving people from these countries across Europe, leaving policymakers struggling for solutions. Extreme weather events Food insecurity Sub-Saharan Africa is facing some serious challenges because of climate change. The region is warming faster than the rest of the world, which causes extreme weather events. In recent months, devastating rains resulting in floods took place due to the El Niño phenomenon, especially in the Horn of Africa. In May 2024, floods and landslides across Kenya, Tanzania, and Burundi, claimed hundreds of lives. On the other hand, other nations experience a lack of rainfall, resulting in extreme droughts which are turning once-fertile land into desert wastelands, making it tough for farmers to grow food. Agriculture remains important to Sub Saharan Africa both from a food security and economic perspective. Most food farming in the region relies heavily on rainfall, forcing farmers to migrate to places where they can still grow their crops. This not only hurts local livelihoods and the availability of food, but also makes certain parts of land overcrowded. Combined with rapid population growth, it causes disputes over land and leads to urban unemployment. The extreme weather events lead to alarming levels of food insecurity, as resources run out faster and agricultural production declines. With less food available, food prices soar and result in inflation. This affects isolated communities in particular and people who are already struggling. Currently, Africa confronts one of its severest droughts in over four decades, with an estimated 25 million people in Southern Africa confronting acute hunger. United Nations agencies warn that nearly 55 million people across West and Central Africa will grapple with food insufficiency in the coming months. Clashes herder and farmer communities SSA experiences growing conflict between herders and farmers. Droughts and floods are making it harder for herders to move their animals around like they used to. As land becomes scarcer, competition with both farmers and other herders for what's left is getting fiercer, especially when it comes to water and grazing areas. In December 2023, a clash in Central Nigeria killed over 100 people, and in February 2024, fights between two herder groups in South Sudan left around 40 dead and 50 injured. Part of the problem is that these groups often carry weapons, which can quickly turn disagreements into deadly fights. Additionally, these conflicts often escalate into broader communal strife when one of the two groups gets help from armed groups to kick the other out of disputed areas. These clashes exacerbate food insecurity and make the overall conflict situation worse. Weak governance and insurgency groups In SSA, climate vulnerability is converging with state fragility and instability. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies indicates that in the period 2021-2023 about 82 percent of the 149 million Africans facing acute food shortages, lived in conflict-affected countries. A lot of countries in SSA have trouble with governance and the presence of militant insurgency groups, causing widespread conflict. This is both fuelled and exacerbated by the impacts of climate change. Although US and European counterterrorism and government stabilizing efforts have taken place since the early 2000s, there seems to be little change in the number of conflicts happening in the region. Jihadi attacks and clashes between militant groups have killed tens of thousands of people, made millions flee their homes, and left many others in need of humanitarian assistance. Conflict between governmental security forces and rebel groups is both a cause and a result of weak governance, having enormous impact on civilians. In areas where people are dissatisfied with how the government handles problems such as unemployment and corruption, on top of a bad delivery of basic services, discontent gives rebel groups a chance to grow. When the government can't or doesn’t want to protect people in isolated areas, rebel groups step in and promise to keep them safe from criminality. Militant groups like Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, Group to Support Islam and Muslims, and Islamic State, have used the chaos in these countries to attack both the government and regular people. Meanwhile government forces are also known for committing atrocities. In February 2024, soldiers of Burkina Faso’s army killed about 220 people, including kids, in its northern Yatenga Province, allegedly to take revenge on locals that helped jihadist groups. Meanwhile, private security actors like the Wagner Group are behaving violently as well, trying to get more power in the region. The group helps both weak regimes and rebel groups to deal with insecurity, in return for access to resources and diplomatic backing. Climate change plays a significant role in shaping the decisions on recruitment of armed groups. These groups use means like money and food to get people to join them, especially in areas where climate change has had a major impact. For instance, in central Mali, the Katiba Macina group has capitalized on issues exacerbated by climate change, such as disputes over land rights and social inequalities among herders, to garner local backing and support. Besides, the current extreme heat waves expose the struggle of junta-led countries, such as Chad, Mali and Burkina Faso, to guarantee basic services when the need for water, food and electricity is most acute. Recent service disruptions have fueled discontent among the population towards the military leadership, increasing social tensions in and between both countries. In addition, fighting between Boko Haram and security forces has cut access to waters that people need for farming and fishing. In general, such conflicts cause infrastructure destruction, further jeopardizing food security. Overall, political instability and violent conflict undermine community resilience to the effects of climate change, and make locals more dependent on militant groups to survive. Mass Displacement In Sub-Saharan Africa, mass displacement is caused by a mix of climate disasters, insecurity, and conflicts. The worsened conditions force people to migrate in search of safety and resources. The connection between migration and conflict is complicated and influenced by many social, political, and economic factors. When people move into new areas, they might compete for resources or clash with different ethnic or religious groups, leading to more tension and conflict. Recent events show how serious the displacement crisis is in SSA. In Somalia, about 1.4 million people had to leave their homes because of drought in April 2024. Similarly, floods and landslides in Kenya have killed around 250 people since March 2024, with hundreds of thousands forced to flee. Conflict adds to the problem. In Sudan, the one-year-long ongoing fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces has caused 580,000 Sudanese people to seek refuge in Chad. This high number of refugees creates challenges for hosting countries and aid groups, as they struggle to keep up with the demand for food, medicines, and safety in general. Implications for Europe The mass displacement doesn’t only affect countries in SSA, but also has consequences for Europe. Over the past years, Europe has been politically divided on how to handle the influx of migrants. European countries are taking a careful look at their migration policies, considering the political pressure and increasingly upcoming unrest and conflict with their own citizens. At the end of 2023, France had a heated debate over a law that would make it harder for migrants coming into the country. Germany is also discussing its migration policy after receiving nearly a third of all asylum requests of the EU in 2023. Italy plans to build two centers in Albania to accommodate up to 36,000 migrants each year, after seeing over 145,000 migrants reaching its shores from North Africa in 2023. Similarly, the Netherlands is currently collaborating with other EU nations to organize accommodation for asylum seekers in non-EU nations, however, such joint initiatives are regularly causing serious political discussions The displacement presents another major security issue as well – the journey migrants have to undertake to arrive in Europe. Many people died while attempting to cross the African continent, and eventually the Mediterranean, crossing conflict zones in poor safety conditions. Worldwide, 2023 was the deadliest year on record for refugees and migrants crossing migration routes, with the Mediterranean crossing between North Africa and Europe remaining the deadliest route. This situation might worsen in the coming years, as many nations are tightening restrictions on legal pathways for migrants, leaving them with scant alternatives but to embark on increasingly perilous journeys to find safety. Conclusion The challenges faced by Sub Saharan Africa, including extreme weather events, food insecurity, clashes between herder and farmer communities, weak governance, insurgency groups, and mass displacement, present complex and interconnected issues that require urgent attention. Looking ahead, climate change is likely to exert a lasting influence on security conditions in SSA, presenting significant security implications for both the region and Europe. It is expected that tens of millions of people across the region will keep struggling because of extreme hunger and insecurity in the coming months, if not years. To address these complex issues, innovative and proactive efforts from both regional and international actors seem necessary, with a focus on sustainable solutions that mitigate the impact of climate change and promote overall resilience in the region. Until measures are taken, the situation is likely to get only harder for people living in Sub Saharan Africa.

Date: 13/05/2024 Where: Indonesia, South Asian region Who’s involved: Indonesian government, i nvestigators with Amnesty International, Haaretz, Inside Story, and others. What happened? On May 2nd, Amnesty International’s Security Lab released the preliminary details of its findings regarding the import and availability of cyber-weapons and highly invasive spyware being facilitated by the Indonesian government. The investigation promises to release details on the sales and deployment of spyware and other surveillance technologies that were conducted from 2017-2023 to various government and non-government entities. Pegasus (developed in Israel, largely owned by a UK finance company), FinFisher (developed in the UK and Germany), and Predator (developed in Greece and North Macedonia) were among the tools found exchanged in these transactions. Amnesty publicly named the Indonesian National Police (Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia) and the National Cyber and Crypto Agency (Badan Siber dan Sandi Negara) in the release. Many of these cybersecurity vendors change hands and operate under various trade names in different jurisdictions, which clouds the process of tracing them and the implementation of regulations. Analysis: The types of spyware being tracked by Amnesty International’s Security Lab have the capability to read all of the data on a user’s phone, utilize all of their applications, and activate their phone and camera without the user’s knowledge. Most manufacturers of this spyware claim that it’s only being sold to governments, for the specific use against terrorists and criminals. These types of spyware are largely illegal for use with very specific exceptions for most of the countries that manufacture them, particularly within NATO and the European Union. The involvement of Q-Cyber Technologies and NSO Group increases the profile of the case, as their infamous “Pegasus” and “Phantom” spyware products have been verifiably used to track journalists and human rights defenders rather than terrorists and criminals. Pegasus was involved in the abduction and eventual murder of Saudi-American journalist, Jamal Khashoggi. Pegasus was allegedly used in the summer of 2020 by the Indonesian government when monitoring protests, despite there being no suspected terrorist or criminal activity. Its use was confirmed by two members of the Indonesian parliament. Despite Indonesia having ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and acknowledging the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association, personal security, and protection from arbitrary detention, the nation lacks legislation specifically regulating the lawful use of spyware and surveillance technologies. Conclusion: The investigation by Amnesty International’s Security Lab sheds light on how Indonesia has become a significant hub for global spyware, revealing a troubling paradox where European and Israeli companies are providing foreign governments with tools of repression, despite stringent regulations in their home countries. While these tools are illegal for non-specific uses within NATO and the European Union, loopholes in international regulations and domestic laws enable their proliferation elsewhere. European investment, through companies like Q-Cyber Technologies and others, is playing a supporting role in arming oppressive regimes with advanced surveillance capabilities, thereby undermining human rights protections enshrined in frameworks such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Indonesia’s lack of specific legislation regulating spyware usage only exacerbates the issue, leaving journalists, activists, and political opponents vulnerable to unwarranted surveillance.

Date: 03/05/2024 Hamas-Israel The situation in Gaza is tense. Israel is preparing for a new military operation in Rafah to defeat Hamas infra- and command structure. It is expected that the operation will begin in the coming weeks. According to the IDF, nearly 80% of the Hamas command structure has been neutralized and thousands of Hamas fighters have been killed or arrested since October 7, 2023. On May 1, Israel reopened the Erez checkpoint border crossing in the northern edge of the Gaza Strip, allowing aid trucks to pass through it, and pledged to allow the use of the Ashdod port. Despite increasing aid arriving inside the Gaza strip, the situation is still dire and the World Food Program has warned of an imminent famine. Iranian allies The Islamic Resistance, an Iraqi militant group with military and logistical support from Iran, have continued their attacks on Israel, US military installations, and merchant shipping lanes the past month. They have also launched drones and rockets at Israel and at military installations run by the US in Iraq and the surrounding areas. The Houthi rebel group in Yemen has also continued their attacks on Israel, the US and UK navies, and merchant ships in the Red and Indian Sea. Most of the drones and missiles launched by the Houthi have been intercepted, but a number of merchant vessels were damaged by the attacks. The role of Iran in providing support to the Houthi and Iraq based groups has diminished severely since the beginning of April 2024 after pressure from the US. Iran has called back its electronic surveillance vessel that was anchored near the coast of Yemen and was likely giving intelligence to the Houthi. Iran has also recalled a large number of IRGC advisors across the region for fear of being targeted by Israeli drones and missiles. Israel internal politics Netanyahu’s government is facing a major crisis. A centrist bloc in Israel’s government formed, adding pressure to Prime Minister Netanyahu. Former Justice Minister Gideon Saar left Netanyahu’s right wing Likud party to join forces with former Defence Minister Benny Gantz, announcing the establishment of a separate center-right bloc in Parliament. This move might not have an immediate effect on internal affairs, but it signals a fracture in Israeli politics. Gantz is the favorite to become Israel’s next Prime Minister in the 2026 elections, and in March 2024 he had already carried out a visit to  Washington and London without the approval of Netanyahu, upsetting his right-wing and religious nationalist coalition partners. Moreover, a poll by Channel 12, one of Israel’s main television channels, showed growing support for early elections immediately or after the war in Gaza is over, with 50% of right-wing voters being in favor. The war cabinet of Netanyahu is under pressure from both the left and the right, split by ongoing political disagreements. The left criticizes the government’s inability to negotiate a release for the remaining hostages held by Hamas, while the right-wing calls for more forceful reactions. Gantz’s voice has emerged as a voice of moderation during talks about a possible Israeli response, managing to de-escalate tensions. Protests in favor of a hostage deal in the streets of Tel Aviv are growing and are likely to continue in the coming months. Hezbollah, IRGC, Lebanon, Syria During the month of April 2024, the situation regarding Hezbollah, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Lebanon and Syria has seen significant developments in the conflict with Israel. On April 1st,  a strike, widely attributed to Israel, demolished a building next to the Iranian consulate in Damascus killing seven high ranking officers, including two generals from Iran’s IRGC. Among them, there was the Iranian commander of the elite Quds Force in Lebanon and Syria, Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi. Two weeks later, on April 13, Iran launched an unprecedented drone and missile attack on Israeli soil, most of which were intercepted (99%) either outside Israeli airspace or over the country itself, lightly damaging an Israeli air military base. Israel’s war cabinet decided on responding to the Iranian attack, which was carried out with mini drones. They hit an army base in Isfahan, a significant Iranian military infrastructure, including a large airbase, a major missile production complex and several nuclear programmes. Iran did not respond to the limited attack, preventing a cycle of action and counter reaction that would escalate dangerously. Meanwhile, the intense fighting between the IDF and Hezbollah continued to escalate. Thousands of residents in Northern Israel and in Southern Lebanon areas have left their homes in a mass evacuation, due to the escalating cross-border hostilities. On April 24, the Israeli military said artillery and fighter jet strikes had hit around 40 targets in Southern Lebanon in the Ayta al-Shaab area, including storage facilities and weapons in a region it said was used extensively by Hezbollah forces. These strikes came a day after Hezbollah launched a drone attack on Israeli military bases in the north of Israel. The attack used drones designed to keep Israeli air defenses busy, while others laden with explosives targeted Israeli bases. US, UK, France, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, UAE The US, UK, France, the UAE and Jordan played significant roles in defending Israel from the Iranian missile and drone attacks. The participation of the Jordanian army raised some criticisms within the country, due to the Jordanian internal political criticisms of Israel’s actions in Gaza. However, the Jordanian army only shot down drones that violated its airspace. Since February 2024, France has merged its diplomatic initiatives with the US to focus on reaching a ceasefire, and has been trying to act as intermediary between Israel and Hezbollah. On April 30, France’s Foreign Minister Stephane Sejourne asked Israel to make public its position on a proposal put forward by France, and modified during a visit to Lebanon earlier in the week, aimed at defusing tensions between Israel and Lebanon. Earlier this year, Sejourne presented a proposal to both sides that entailed Hezbollah’s elite unit pulling back 10km from the border, and Israel halting strikes in Southern Lebanon. The US has been supporting Israel both militarily and diplomatically, playing an important role in the normalization accords between Israel and the Arab States, and in negotiations in general. However, recently US President Joe Biden warned that Washington’s policy could shift if Israel fails to take steps to address civilian harm and humanitarian needs arising from the ongoing conflict. Analysis The Israeli military operation in Gaza is likely to continue the coming months. Netanyahu and high-ranking members of the IDF are convinced that they are close to completely neutralizing the capabilities of Hamas. The final part of the operation is likely to be a full-scale attack on Rafah which is believed to house several large groups of well-trained and armed Hamas soldiers. However, Rafah is also the main hub for humanitarian aid and due to the attacks in the north, thousands have fled to the city. Any attacks put civilian lives at risk and will severely affect the humanitarian situation in the strip. Israel planned to relocate Gazans to camps outside of Rafah by the Israeli military, but it is unclear if it will actually implement them. On the other hand, Israel could recall troops from Gaza and refrain from attacking Rafah under the conditions that Hamas disarms itself and that all hostages are released. These negotiations are, however, slow and very fragile. Prior to the recent attacks, Israel and Iran had been engaged in a shadow war, in which Israel prioritized halting the cross-border flow of Iranian weapons shipments from Syria to Lebanon and IRGC related installations in Syria. Iran has invested greatly in the production of missiles and drones, but has also been supplying significant amounts to its partners; the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon. It is also believed to be cooperating with Russia in building air defense systems and drone production. Further escalation from Israel against IRGC targets in Syria would dramatically heighten tensions, causing the risk of an escalation of violence across the region. Israel’s tensions with Iran, and the increased conflict with Hezbollah, have increased  the possibility of a war between Israel and Hezbollah. Since October 7, the Israel-Lebanon border has been a major flashpoint, with cross-border fire occurring nearly daily. The violence has significantly affected both sides, displacing thousands of people in both countries. On April 21, Benny Gantz, a member of Israel’s emergency war cabinet declared that Israel’s border with Lebanon now constitutes its “operative front” and “its greatest and most urgent challenge”. A possible Israeli attack on Lebanon would be catastrophic for the country, which is ill-prepared for a major war, with a collapsed health sector and in the grips of a financial crisis. If war between Israel and Hezbollah breaks out, Israel would likely suffer significant military and civilian losses. Israeli forces are stretched out across two fronts and Hezbollah is more powerful than Hamas. An Israeli attack on Lebanon would likely draw more Iranian-affiliated groups in support of Hezbollah, creating a full escalation at a regional level. Western forces would likely get more involved, in particular the US as their bases throughout the Middle East may be targeted. However, as long as the conflict in Gaza is ongoing, there are little prospects of de-escalation on the Israel-Lebanon border. US efforts to prevent a full scale war continue. In mid-April, the CIA director met with the Head of Turkey’s intelligence agency to ask for help mediating between Israel and Iran. Negotiations have been taking place for the past year, but Hezbollah has maintained its position that until there will be a cease-fire in Gaza, they will not collaborate in the negotiations. On May 1, Antony Blinken met in Jerusalem with Netanyahu, to discuss Israel’s planned military operation in Rafah. The US asked to facilitate the delivery of aid to Gaza, and said it will not support a military operation in Rafah without an effective plan to ensure civilian safety. However, Netanyahu remains determined to destroy the remaining Hamas fighting formations in Rafah, and it is likely that Israel will not follow the advice of the US. The truce deal proposed by Egyptian mediators would see a release of 33 Israeli hostages, in exchange for a large number of Palestinian prisoners, and a cease-fire in Gaza. Blinken has urged Hamas to accept the deal, who said they were still pondering the proposed deal, but expressed the belief that the proposal would not be enough to end the war. Moreover, Israel is postponing sending a delegation to Cairo for follow-up talks, and has refused the option of halting war efforts. Despite the international pressure Netanyahu is facing, it is unlikely that he will accept any truces involving a ceasefire in Gaza. Negotiations have not stopped, but a conclusion has not been reached yet. Conclusion Negotiations between Israel and Hamas for a truce are unlikely to be successfully concluded any time soon, and the Israeli military operation in Gaza is likely to continue in the coming month. The US retracted its support for a full-scale attack on Rafah, unless precautions were taken to prevent civilian casualties. However, Netanyahu remains determined to carry out his plan to fully neutralize the remaining Hamas fighting formations. The offensive is likely going to happen in the coming weeks, and it would put the lives of thousands of civilians  in Gaza at risk. In that case, an escalation of attacks between Hezbollah and Israel is likely. A possible war in Lebanon would be catastrophic for all the parties, because more actors would be involved, including more Western forces, and it could dangerously escalate to a regional level. In the meantime, until a ceasefire in Gaza is reached, it will be difficult for the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict to de-escalate.

Written by Elena De Mitri, Arianna Lucà, Mickey Beckmann, Iris de Boer, Jacob Dickinson, Kevin Heller, Sara Frisan Russia-Ukraine: As fighting between Russia and Ukraine continues, Ukraine is waiting for the arrival of the pledged US aid package to prevent further Russian advances.  Israel-Hamas: With peace negotiations stalling, Israel is ramping up its military campaign in Gaza with a Rafah offensive likely coming next month. Myanmar: Fighting intensifies as the military junta and resistance seek control of a key trading hub on the border with Thailand.  Sudan: One year into the conflict, clashes between RSF and SAF have intensified on the outskirts of El-Fasher in North Darfur, a key humanitarian hub.  Georgia: Protests erupted across the country in opposition to the foreign agent bill, which the opposition say could endanger civil society and free press.  Niger: The junta strengthens military cooperation with Russia as protestors demand immediate withdrawal of US troops from the country.   Somalia: Amid a dispute between the Somali government and the Puntland administration over constitutional reforms, al-Shabaab attacks against security forces persist.  Serbia-Kosovo: Tensions between Serbia and Kosovo are soaring, as Kosovo prepares to enter the Council of Europe and diplomatic talks falter. Haiti: With the new transitional government officially in power, gangs demand a seat at the table, threatening more violence. Mexico: As June general elections approach, Mexico experiences extreme levels of political violence and widespread protests.  Ecuador: As gang-related violence continues, Ecuador declares a state of emergency due to internal armed conflict in five provinces.  China-Philippines: Tensions in the South China Sea between China and the Philippines rise, as further maritime incidents occur and countries conduct naval military exercises.  North Korea-South Korea: While North Korea is shifting towards a more confrontational policy, both countries are deepening ties with allies and internationally aligned countries. Conflicts, April 2024 Russia-Ukraine The delivery of Western aid to Ukraine slowed down in recent months. As Ukraine waited for the approval of a 61 billion dollar aid package from the United States, the situation on the frontline has deteriorated and Russia has mainly taken advantage of the current Ukrainian weapon and equipment shortages in Donetsk Oblast. Throughout April, Russia gained territory northwest of Avdiivka, forcing Ukraine to withdraw from multiple tactical positions . Heavy fighting is currently taking place in the Chasiv Yar area, an operationally significant location for the Russian forces from which they could launch an additional offensive if captured. Ukraine's top commander, Oleksandr Syrksii, warned of a possible future Russian offensive against the city of Kharkiv as an increasing number of Russian forces are regrouping in the area. Russia has continued its airstrikes on Ukrainian cities, changing its usual tactics and complementing its nighttime attacks with daytime attacks. In addition, both Russia and Ukraine continued attacks on each other's energy sectors, leading to damaged oil refineries in Russia and damaged power plants in Ukraine. Ukrainian drones managed to hit an oil refinery and factory almost 1300 kilometers away from the border. As fighting between Russia and Ukraine continued, the US aid bill for Ukraine was eventually passed on April 24, 2024, after which US President Biden promised that weapons and equipment would be sent to Ukraine "right away." However, Ukrainian President Zelensky stated on April 27 that the aid delivery needs to happen faster to prevent further Russian territory gains. The arrival of the US aid package is expected to enable the Ukrainian Armed Forces to stop additional Russian advances. Minor Russian advances along the frontline will likely happen in May, but Western aid is expected to arrive on time to prevent a significant Russian breakthrough. Israel-Hamas   The Israel-Hamas conflict reached a new phase in March 2024. Israel ramped up its campaigns in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria. The IDF and IAF neutralized dozens of Hamas, Hezbollah, and IRGC (Islamic Republican Guards Corps from Iran) commanders. According to Israeli numbers, Hamas has been reduced to 80% less capacity than before October 7, 2023, Hezbollah military leadership has been halved due to airstrikes, and the IRGC is relocating its command staff back to Iran after successful targeting campaigns by Israel. On April 13, 2024, Iran and Hezbollah retaliated against Israel with a massive barrage of at least 300 drones, dozens of cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. Most of the projectiles were intercepted by US, UK, Jordanian, Saudi Arabian, French, and Israeli aircraft and missiles before they reached the Israeli border. Those that did get through the protective umbrella landed in deserted regions, severely wounding a young Bedouin herder. Israel, in reaction, launched missiles at an Iranian air base in Isfahan, which houses drone battalions and is close to the Iranian nuclear program facilities. Meanwhile, as Hezbollah increased its attacks on the north of Israel, the IDF and IAF continued to target Hezbollah installations and commanders.  In Gaza, the humanitarian situation is somewhat improving after international pressure on Israel forced it to open more border crossings to enable the provision of food and medicine. Still, the situation is very dire for Gaza civilians and foreign aid workers, several of whom were killed by Israeli forces. Peace negotiations between Israel and Hamas have failed as neither side seems to be able to present terms that are acceptable to the other.  In the coming month, the IDF and IAF will intensify their campaigns against Hamas in the border town of Rafah, Gaza, and will seek to rid southern Lebanon of Hezbollah forces to allow Israeli civilians to return to northern Israel. It is unclear what Iran will do in the coming month since it has to evaluate its military capabilities, which seem not to be as effective as propagated in Iranian media. Myanmar  Myanmar’s civil war intensified in April 2024, building on the assault from the combined forces of ethnic armed groups and the military opposition, which began in October 2023. At the beginning of the month, a resistance group loyal to the National Unity Government launched drone attacks against the airport in Myanmar’s capital, Naypyidaw. While there were no casualties, it demonstrates the weakness of the military’s capabilities. In the east of the country, the military junta and the ethnic group Karen State battle for a key trading town for the junta, Myawaddy. Fighting intensified due to its strategic significance for the junta; losing the town would mean the loss of the second key source of income after losing the Laukauing, another key trading post between China and Myanmar. The change in control would be another blow to the junta, which is on the backfoot across the country. The humanitarian situation has worsened considerably for people fleeing the conflict internally and to neighboring countries. Refugees who have fled the fighting into India and Thailand have been sent back to Myanmar, with authorities claiming that the fighting has calmed down.  Sudan   April 15, 2024, marked one year since the beginning of the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Over the past 12 months, the conflict caused over 15,000 casualties, including many civilians, and approximately 8 million internally displaced people. Most of the civilian casualties occurred in the states of Khartoum and Darfur. Sudan is currently experiencing one of the world's worst hunger crisis, with nearly 18 million people facing severe food insecurity and in need of immediate humanitarian assistance. Warring factions continue to clash in several regions, especially in Darfur. In the past few weeks, deadly clashes between the RSF, supported by allied Arabs nomadic militias, and the Sudanese army and its aligned tribal armed groups - known as “non-Arabs” - raised concerns of ethnically motivated and intercommunal massacres in North Darfur.  Also, in recent weeks, fighting between SAF and RSF has resumed, after nearly a year of truce, in the proximity of El-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur State, the only major town in the Darfur region not yet under RSF control. On April 28, the UN Security Council urged the RSF to end the violence and the siege in El Fasher and called on all parties to take urgent steps to de-escalate. The UN began raising the alarm of an "imminent large-scale massacre" in El Fasher earlier this month after the RSF and SAF had been reinforcing their military presence in the region for weeks. According to North Darfur State, since early April, at least 11 villages on al-Fashir's outskirts have been destroyed, causing numerous civilian casualties, and more than 7,000 people have been displaced. Moreover, the escalation of violence in the area could have severe consequences for civilians and humanitarian assistance, as El-Fasher is a long-standing humanitarian hub, and increased fighting in the region could severely undermine aid delivery throughout the country.  Alerts, April 2024 Georgia    Since mid-April 2024, widespread protests have erupted across the country as the Georgian Dream party, the pro-Russia ruling party, has been trying to introduce the so-called Foreign Agent Law for the second time. The party attempted to pass a similar law in 2023 to combat foreign-imposed values but eventually dropped due to protests. The proposed bill would require organizations that receive more than 20% of their funding from abroad to register as organizations pursuing the interests of a foreign power. According to the opposition, this is a strategy to target and silence pro-democracy organizations. Opposition parties also compared the bill to a Russian law currently used to curb dissent. The bill, resubmitted on April 3, 2024, is expected to be passed in May. Massive protests began as soon as the bill was formally registered in Parliament. Police clashed repeatedly with protesters in an attempt to clear them from outside Parliament. The EU openly stated that this law would be incompatible with European values and would likely hinder Georgia's accession to the EU, which is strongly desired by the majority of the population. Media organizations in the country condemned the bill in a joint statement, fearing it would be used to prosecute journalists. The president of Georgia, Salome Zourabichvili, immediately condemned the bill as unconstitutional and promised to veto it. However, the ruling party has enough votes to overrule the presidential veto. During Parliament discussions on April 29, seven opposition lawmakers were expelled, and others were cut short during their speeches. The final reading is scheduled for May 17, 2024, and the bill is expected to pass without being affected by the presidential veto. Protests will likely continue throughout May.  Serbia-Kosovo Progress in the normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo has been stalling as European mediators lament that the two sides are unwilling to compromise and comply with the 2023 Ohrid Agreement. Tensions between the two countries have been growing in the last months and will likely continue on this path. On April 16, 2024, the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe recommended that Kosovo become a member of the Council of Europe, with the final decision set for May. This ignited protests by Serbian authorities, as the country does not recognize Kosovo's independence. Serbia expressed the intention of leaving the Council of Europe if Kosovo is accepted. On April 22, 2024, EU foreign affairs ministers decided to make Serbia's accession to the EU reliant on the country's normalization of its relationship with Kosovo to quell Serbian opposition to Kosovo's accession to international organizations. As tensions soar, Serbia has conducted an extensive military drill near the southern border with Kosovo, which prompted Kosovo to double the military budget and triple the armament budget to enhance the country's defense forces. Local elections were held in Kosovo in late April as part of the normalization process. Still, the polls were boycotted by the main Serb-Kosovar party, which is affiliated with the governing party of Serbia and is generally opposed to Kosovo's independence. The elections aimed at fixing the result of a previous election held in 2023, which was also boycotted by the Serbian minority in the country. In addition, Kosovar Serbs are boycotting the new population census to be held in April and May 2024 and the recent introduction of the euro as the only official currency.  Niger In support of Niger's junta termination of the military agreement that allows US troops to operate in the country, massive anti-US protests are taking place in the country. On April 13, 2024, hundreds took to the streets of Niger's capital, pushing for the departure of US troops.  Their withdrawal is still under negotiation and the US sent a delegation to Niger on April 25 to discuss the withdrawal of some 1000 troops. Niger has been a crucial security ally for France and the US in combating Islamist insurgency in the Sahel region. However, following the military coup in July 2023 and Niger's exit from the regional political and economic bloc ECOWAS in January 2024, Niger's military junta joined neighboring Mali and Burkina Faso in ending military ties with Western allies, favoring closer cooperation with Moscow. In January 2024, Niger signed an agreement to step up security cooperation with Russia. On April 10, it was reported the arrival of Russian military instructors and equipment to reinforce Niger's air defenses and to train local security forces. The US has expressed concern about Russia's growing economic and military influence in the area, which could allow the Kremlin to strategically threaten Europe and the US through energy coercion, migrant influx, and military pressure. International observers are concerned that the withdrawal of Western forces and the increased influence of an authoritarian government such as Russia may lead to greater instability and a rise in security threats, including an increase in extremist violence following the breakdown of international counterterrorism, and a deterioration of human rights and civil liberties in Niger.  Somalia The constitutional reform process is exacerbating tensions between the Somali central government and the semi-autonomous Puntland administration. On March 30, 2024, the Somali Parliament approved a controversial series of new amendments to the Constitution, aimed at strengthening the role of the President, abolishing the prime minister, and replacing the current clan-based indirect voting system with universal suffrage. On March 31, the Puntland administration rejected the amendments and announced its withdrawal from the federal system, declaring itself independent from Somalia until the Constitution is approved by referendum. The dispute deepened following a meeting on April 3 between representatives of Puntland and Ethiopia to discuss trade cooperation. The Somali government, whose relations with Addis Ababa are currently strained over the separatist region of Somaliland, responded by expelling the Ethiopian ambassador from Mogadishu and declaring the closure of Ethiopian consulates in Puntland and Somaliland – a decision rejected by local governments.  On top of the current dispute with Puntland and widespread dissatisfaction with constitutional amendments that risk weakening the federal system, the Somali government also has to deal with ongoing violence by the militant group al-Shabaab. In April 2024, there were several co-ordinated attacks in the Lower Shabelle region, where al-Shabaab targeted government security forces.  Updates, April 2024 Haiti In the wake of the extreme escalation of violence in Haiti, a transitional council was officially installed on April 25, 2024 to address the widespread insecurity until the next elections.  Moreover, the appointment of the new transitional government might speed up the deployment of the delayed Kenya-led multinational security mission. The council, which took power following the official resignation of former PM Ariel Henry, has a non-renewable mandate until 2026 and consists of seven voting members and two observers. On April 30, the council appointed former Senate President Edgard Leblanc as head of the body and named Fritz Belizaire, who served as interim PM since Henry's resignation, as the new Haitian Prime Minister. Beliziare's nomination has yet to be confirmed by a declaration in Haiti's official gazette.  Since February 2024, over 2,500 people have been killed or wounded due to the escalation of gang violence carried out by an alliance of Haitian gangs , led by Jimmy Chérizier, which took control of the capital and urged for Henry's resignation. In the last few months, gangs have prevented humanitarian aid from getting to Haiti. While Henry's resignation marks a victory for the Haitian gangs, they voiced anger over their exclusion from the transitional negotiations, threatening further violence unless they get a seat at the table and their demands are met by the council. Their demands include the grant of amnesty for their crimes and the creation of reintegration programs for young gang members.  Mexico  Mexico's general elections are scheduled for June 2, 2024. Recent polls indicate that Claudia Sheinbau, a candidate from the ruling Morena party, is the frontrunner in the election. She is followed by Xóchitl Gálvez, but her lead raises the likelihood that Mexico will have a woman president for the first time. As the June 2 elections approach, Mexico is experiencing a significant wave of election-related and political violence. Since the beginning of the electoral campaign, electoral violence claimed over 400 victims, including 30 political candidates. Over 170 attacks and 11 kidnappings against politicians have been reported, with the highest levels of political violence being recorded in Michoacán, Guerrero, and Chiapas. International observers are concerned that the widespread violence and the infiltration of organized crime into polling stations could decrease voter turnout in the elections. As well as the upcoming elections, Mexico is experiencing alarming rates of murders, cartel and drug trafficking-related violence, kidnappings, and human trafficking in April. Mexico is experiencing protests over the disappearance of 43 students at Ayotzinapa College. The protests escalated to the torching of a government building and vehicles in Guerrero. Other protests are also taking place in Mexico City over unexplained water contamination.  On top of the escalation of violence,  in April 2024, diplomatic relations between Mexico and Ecuador broke down after the raid by Ecuadorian security forces on the Mexican Embassy in Quito , to arrest the former Ecuadorian vice president Glas seeking refuge in the embassy. The incident sparked regional outrage; Mexico filed a request to suspend Ecuador's UN membership and the International Court of Justice is set to hear the case on April 30 and May 1.  Ecuador  Ecuador has been experiencing an unprecedented wave of gang-related violence. Due to the deteriorating security situation, President Noboa, who took office in November 2023, declared a 60-day state of emergency and the deployment of armed forces to combat gangs in five coastal provinces on April 30, 2024. Last January, due to escalating violence and a series of violent gang attacks, the government declared Ecuador to be in a "state of internal conflict''. On April 21, the citizens approved tighter security measures through a referendum. These measures, aimed at curbing gang violence, are part of a trend of militarization and hard-line policies implemented by the Ecuadorian government. Besides the internal security crisis, Ecuador is facing a diplomatic dispute with Mexico, which has resulted in the withdrawal of diplomats from Quito by some countries in the region, including Mexico, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic.  At the same time, the country is experiencing an energy crisis due to power shortages caused by a drought. The energy crisis has been aggravated by the decision of Colombia, which is also struggling with power cuts and droughts caused by the El Nino weather phenomenon, to halt energy exports to Ecuador to prioritize its domestic energy needs. On April 16, President Noboa declared a state of emergency and implemented electricity rationing measures. The government also deployed security forces to guard energy infrastructure and launched an investigation into possible sabotage, accusing some officials of being corrupt and attempting to sabotage power plants to prevent the April 21 referendum from taking place. China-Philippines The maritime dispute over the Scarborough Shoal escalated in April 2024, indicating the heating up of a major flashpoint in the South China Sea. The Chinese Coast Guard began construction of a 380 meter floating barrier to prevent the Philippines Coast Guard resupply missions to Sierra Madre,  a WW2 ship grounded on the reef in 1999, in an attempt to control access to the disputed islands. The Philippines Coast Guard claimed that two vessels were harassed by Chinese coast guard ships, using water cannons and their ships to intimidate ram Philippine vessels. The Philippines repeatedly called out China’s actions in the reef, highlighting the UNCLOS arbitration which ruled in favor of the Philippines’ control of the Scarborough Shoal in 2016. In response to the heightened tensions, the US and the Philippines conducted extensive military drills, which, for the first time, rehearsed taking specific islands within Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. China has stepped up combat patrols around the Scarborough Shoal. China’s foreign ministry has hit out at Ferdinand Marcos Jr., President of the Philippines for performing “illegal actions” in the South China Sea. Ferdinand Marcos Jr., has not yet invoked the 1951 US mutual defense treaty, but US President Joe Biden has reaffirmed that its support for the Philippines is “Ironclad” in the event of an armed attack in the South China Sea. North Korea-South Korea After the country's policy shift regarding reunification with South Korea, North Korea is starting to strengthen its relationships with internationally aligned countries. As Russia is more openly supporting North Korea, the two countries have vowed to cooperate in the agriculture sector, which could help North Korea avoid the recurring food shortages exacerbated by the UN sanctions. Moreover, North Korea has pledged to expand diplomatic exchanges and ties with Russia and China. Deeper cooperation was also discussed with Belarus and Iran, especially in terms of bilateral trade. As North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un has ordered the military to be prepared for an occupation of its southern neighbor , military drills have been ramped up throughout the month. Towards the end of April, North Korea conducted drills related to its nuclear trigger management system along with ballistic missile tests.  On the other side, South Korea has shifted towards a more hard-line policy towards North Korea. The country is seeking to strengthen its security cooperation with its allies, especially the US and Japan. The three countries held a two week long joint military drill in the country, focused on air capacity. As Russia's March 2024 veto stopped the renewal of the group of experts monitoring enforcement of UN sanctions against North Korea for its nuclear weapons programme, the US and its allies are seeking new ways of ensuring and monitoring the sanctions enforcement, with a solution expected by next month.  About the authors  Elena de Mitri  Elena is a highly motivated person with a strong interest in international security. She holds a Master's degree in International Studies from the University of Turin, where she focused on regime changes and human rights. Her academic journey also includes a Bachelor's degree in Foreign Languages and Cultures, with a focus on the MENA region and muslim societies. Additionally she pursued a Minor in Gender Studies, enhancing her understanding of the intersectionality of various issues in international contexts. During her previous traineeship at the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission she conducted research on terrorist groups, especially on jihadist groups and right-wing extremists. Arianna Lucà Arianna is a new intern at Dyami, covering the role of Research Intelligence Analyst to enrich her background knowledge in International Relations with topics involving security and conflict. She holds an MA in International Relations from Leiden University and an LLM in European Criminal Justice from Utrecht University. During her academic career, she has volunteered for different NGOs, mainly Amnesty International, and Emergency and ActionAid, embracing humanitarian and conflict security causes, and addressing issues like famine and lack of security in different regions of the world. With Dyami, she is contributing to joint publications, writing articles, and keeping up to date with key regional developments. Mickey Beckmann Mickey is currently enrolled in the master’s program Conflict Studies & Human Rights at the University of Utrecht. As of a young age she felt the need to help people in dire circumstances, which evolved into a deep interest and drive to address sociocultural and political issues related to conflict. Motivated to make the world a safer and more accessible place, she completed a bachelor in ‘International Relations in Historical Perspective’ at Utrecht University. Eager to broaden her knowledge of geopolitical conflict and security, during her internship at Dyami she will actively participate in writing collaborative publications and authoring articles, with a main focus on the region North and Sub-Saharan Africa. Iris de Boer Iris works as a Global Intelligence Analyst at Dyami, leveraging her background in Human Geography. Additionally, Iris holds an MA degree in Conflict Studies and Human Rights from Utrecht University, specializing in conflict analysis, peace processes, and geopolitics. Her MA thesis delved into the securitization of the war in Ukraine by the Heads of State, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and Ministers of Defense of the Netherlands and Poland. Within Dyami, Iris is actively involved in security risk management, travel security, and geopolitical analysis. Her enthusiasm for addressing topics in international security extends across a diverse spectrum of countries and regions. Jacob Dickinson  Jacob studied Global Political Economy at Leiden University. He is passionate about international development and is looking to expand his expertise in geopolitics and crisis management. Curious about other cultures, he has traveled in Europe and Asia for both academic study and professional purposes. His expertise includes the geopolitics of oil and industrial upgrading in the electronics global value chain. He is particularly interested in the evolving political and economic relationships between China and ASEAN, and the consequences for regional development and security.  Kevin Heller  Kevin has over a decade of experience in the world of counter-terrorism as a consultant, trainer, and analyst. His background is in military Close Quarter Battle/Combat and Krav Maga for Military and Law Enforcement agencies. As a Global Intelligence Analyst, he writes Intel Briefs on conflict zones and terrorism. He has extensive knowledge of conflicts, politics, and other events happening in the Middle East. Kevin also has a background in Journalism and International Affairs/Conflict Studies. Sara Frisan  Sara joined Dyami as a Junior Intelligence/Research Analyst post-graduate intern to deepen her passionate interest in conflict analysis and security. Sara recently completed her MA in Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University and held an MA degree in International Sciences and Peace Studies. During her academic career, she conducted research in South America, primarily Colombia, on the dynamics of collaboration and resistance between civilians and non-state armed groups in violent settings. In her previous internship at the investigative think-tank InSight Crime, Sara developed some expertise on transnational organized crime and political-criminal alliances.

Date: 12/04/2024 Parties involved: Israel, Iran, United States, Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds division, Iranian proxy terrorist groups operating in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. Events: The killing by Israel of senior Iranian military commanders who resided in the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Syria, marks an escalation in regional tensions. Iran has vowed to respond, though the exact response remains unclear. After the attack by the terrorist organization Hamas on 07/10/2023 on Israeli soil Israel started a war in Gaza in an attempt to neutralize Hamas. Iran, who has openly backed Hamas and other pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel organizations threatened to intervene if Israel did not stop its attacks in Gaza. From that day on Iran has urged its proxy groups (Hezbollah, Houthi and Iraq-based Shia militants) to attack Israel. Attacks against Israel and Israeli interests have been coordinated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Division which is an Iranian special forces group with advisors spread out throughout the region that has the task to arm, train and support groups that serve Iranian interests. Throughout its existence the IRGC has been responsible for dozens of terrorist attacks against Israeli and American interests. Several of its commanders have been assassinated by the US and Israel. The latest bomb attack on the Iranian Consulate in Damascus killed the primary commander of the IRGC responsible for operations concerning Israel. Israel is known for killing Hezbollah and Hamas commanders and bomb makers outside of Israel. The IRGC has also been a main target for Israeli forces. But bombing the Iranian consulate in Damascus is a deviation from normal tactics and raises concerns about the Iranian response to this attack. Alerts of imminent Iranian response: US and Israeli intelligence agencies have released alerts on 12/04/2024 stating that there is a very large likelihood that Iran will execute its plan of retaliation against Israel within the next 48 hours. American government personnel have been told to not leave Tel Aviv in the coming days. Israel has put all its security forces on high alert and civilians have been warned to expect an Iranian attack. There is no clarity on what kind of attack Iran has in mind and what sort of weapons or troops are involved or if an attack is going to be on Israeli soil or somewhere else against Israeli interests. Israel has let it known that if Iran does attack, directly or indirectly, it is ready to retaliate against Iran. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) has trained extensively in how Israel will respond to an Iranian attack and it involves the use of stealth fighters like the F-35 that will circumvent Iranian air-to-air capabilities. There is the added risk of the nuclear option both countries allegedly have. It is an open secret that Israel possesses American made nuclear weapons that can be delivered by F-35 and F-15E fighter jets. Officially Iran does not yet possess nuclear weapons but it is believed it could take them only a matter of days to produce one. It is known that Iran has the delivery capabilities. Aviation alerts: Out of the two European airliners flying to Iran, Lufthansa has suspended all flights to Iran pending another decision on 13/04/2024, citing concerns over an Iranian attack on Israel. Austrian Airlines have adjusted flight times to avoid overnight stops in Iran. Other major carriers with connecting flights in Iran to North America, such Emirates’ Qatar Airways and Turkish Airlines, have so far not made any decisions on suspending flights. Iran’s new agency stated that Iran’s airspace was closed until 14/04/2024 due to military drills, but shortly after removed the message. It then denied that it had made such a claim. The IDF and Iran have picked up GPS spoofing and interference. The IDF has picked up spoofing in an attempt to ward off Iranian guided missiles or airstrikes. This has also disrupted daily operations flying over the Middle East. The foreign ministries of the US, Germany, France, the UK, India and Russia have issued warnings against traveling to Iran or Israel until further notice. Analysis and possible scenarios: It is highly likely that Iran will not be looking to engage Israel in open warfare knowing that it is at a disadvantage militarily. There is also the fact that the United States will help Israel in an open war between the two countries. It is more likely that Iran will encourage its proxies to attack Israel or that Iranian agents will attack an Israeli embassy or consulate somewhere in the world. If Iran does decide to engage in open warfare with Israel there is the likelihood that the entire region will be involved in such a conflict. Iranian proxies, the United States and other Western countries will be sucked into the war and it will force the Arab states to take a stance for or against Iran. Any open warfare will undoubtedly affect oil prices across the globe. The Middle East region is already incredibly unstable, but open warfare will most likely disrupt all forms of cargo and oil shipping in the region. It is more likely that Iran will direct a proxy group to attack Israel. Lebanese based Hezbollah and Yemen based Houthi are the most likely candidates to execute such an attack. But it is unknown how this would evolve and it is expected that Israel will be ready to engage Hezbollah in Lebanon as it will depend on the US and its allies to deter the Houthi in Yemen. Cities like Beirut and Damascus or Aleppo will not be safe from Israeli attacks. There are speculations that Iran will launch hundreds of drones and missiles at Israel in a show of force and retaliation but will refrain from further engagement. It is however unlikely that Israel will not retaliate if such an attack does happen. Conclusion: The coming 48 hours are going to be tense in Israel, the Middle East and around the world. Security forces around the globe are on standby to deal with possible attacks on Israeli embassies and consulates just as security forces in the Middle East will be ready for dealing with an Iranian or Iranian sponsored attack. Countries like the United States and organizations like the EU and the UN are putting pressure on all sides to refrain from engaging each other. It is unknown if these diplomatic discussions will have an effect on the decision making in either Iran or Israel, both countries are seemingly not willing to back down or show any sign of perceived weakness. Open war will very likely impact all forms of aviation in the Middle East as electronic warfare will disrupt avionics and anti-aircraft capabilities are on full alert and misidentification of civilian airliners by such systems could result in tragedy.

Date: 26/4/2024 Where: China, Europe, North America, Asia-Pacific Who’s involved: State and non-state Chinese threat actors Various international governments and businesses What happened? Chinese threat actors, both those linked to the government, as well as various criminal entities, have been increasing in activity, with numerous cyber campaigns being exposed since the end of 2023. On April 19th, China formally announced the formation of its Information Support Force, effectively a cyber operations branch of its military. On April 18th, the director of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation issued a warning that Chinese hackers were a major risk to national security. The emphasis of the warning was on the risk to critical infrastructure. The warning claimed to be pointed at both criminal and government threat actors. On April 20th, German media investigations by Der Spiegel and ZDF announced that sensitive data on various intellectual properties and trade secrets had been stolen from Volkswagen via malicious access to the company’s networks between 2010 and 2015. On April 11th, BackBerry Threat Intelligence researchers found evidence of a renewed Chinese deployment of its LightSpy spyware throughout Southern and Southeast Asia, including India and Singapore. On March 26th, New Zealand’s Government Communications Security Bureau announced that it had found a Chinese Advanced Persistent Threat Actor present in parliamentary networks as far back as August 2021. Analysis: The threat to critical infrastructure has escalated, with China positioning its cyber capabilities to potentially disrupt critical systems in geopolitical adversaries, especially the United States. The CISA, along with other U.S. and international cybersecurity bodies, has identified and issued warnings about Chinese state-sponsored actors, such as Volt Typhoon, which have compromised systems across multiple critical infrastructure sectors including communications, energy, and water systems​. Many of these revelations have been coming out in the past several weeks. This correlates with promises of increased cooperation from The Philippines and Japan with the US, as well as a recently decided US aid package to Taiwan. The LightSpy Spyware was prominently used on Hong Kong activists in 2020. The latest version discovered by Blackberry was shown to be capable of stealing files and data from apps broadly considered safe, such as Telegram and the iCloud Keychain, as well as web browser history from Safari and Google Chrome. This data includes contacts, text messages, location data, and sound recordings. In February, a massive data leak from Chinese government and military contractor, I-Soon, showed that the company had been hired to compromise targets within at least 14 different governments. I-Soon was also contracted to spy on Chinese Universities,  political organizations in Hong Kong, and offices of NATO. There is an evident strategic shift in Chinese cyber activities, with a growing focus on positioning for potentially disruptive actions against global targets. This evolution reflects both a response to international cybersecurity defenses and an alignment with China’s broader geopolitical strategies, such as those seen in the South China Sea and Taiwan tensions​ Economic difficulties within China, including impacts from the COVID pandemic and internal financial strains, are likely influencing a ramp-up in cyber espionage activities as a means to quickly gather valuable foreign technologies and intelligence that could bolster domestic industries​. Conclusion: Chinese cyber operations have intensified. The recent formation of China's Information Support Force marks a significant formalization of its cyber capabilities, reflecting a deep commitment to integrating cyber operations within its national defense strategy. Concurrently, global incidents—from the infiltration of Volkswagen’s networks to the targeting of Southeast Asian entities with advanced spyware—demonstrate the operational reach and sophistication of Chinese cyber activities. These developments have not only heightened tensions but have also prompted a stronger international response, with increased cybersecurity cooperation among China's geopolitical rivals and heightened alerts about the threats to critical infrastructure. The revelations from the I-Soon leak further complicate the landscape, exposing the depth and breadth of China's targeting, which includes government, corporate, and even academic spheres. However, it’s important to recognize that the actions taken by China’s neighbors and economic rivals  in response to these revelations may have a spiraling effect. As more campaigns get uncovered, the risk of penalties to China increases, further incentivizing nefarious activities to maintain a competitive edge in the intelligence and economic domains.

Date: 19/04/2024 Who’s involved: Convicted terrorists that have been or are going to be released from prisons across Europe; European security services. What happened? In March 2024, the Danish government-appointed Bjelke Gruppen published a report on commission from the Danish Justice Department on the consequences of the release from prison of people who have been convicted of terrorist activities in the past decade. The Bjelke Gruppen gives recommendations in the report on how to monitor those who are released and how to prevent them from recidivism. According to the report, the coming years will see dozens of individuals who have been jailed for terrorist activities being released from several European prisons. There is a concern amongst politicians, security services and the general public that these people will return to a life of terrorism. Research groups across Europe and the United States have shown in the past years that there is little to no need for concern about recidivism by released terrorists. In 2020, the ICCT (International Centre for Counter Terrorism in the Hague) released a report similar to the Bjelke Gruppen warning politicians and security forces to not believe in the “hype” created around released terrorists. One example that has circulated in security circles and is muddying the waters is the Streatham attack in London in 2020, which was done by a released terrorist. Nevertheless, according to scientific research, the likelihood of re-engaging in terrorist activities after being released from prison is remarkably low compared to other criminals. Only between 2 and 5% of former terrorists return to their past life while most of them live quiet lives in Europe or in their country of origin. This differs radically from, for instance, sex-offenders who have a recidivism rate of 80% and higher or “ordinary” criminals who have a recidivism rate of around 40%. Deradicalization and disengagement programs have been set up by several governments in different countries, and often are compulsory or strongly suggested for convicted terrorists. These programs are credited for deradicalizing and reintegrating former terrorists in society. Analysis: Security agencies across Europe have put extra measures in place to monitor former terrorists through different electronic means and/or by deporting them to their home countries. However, beside the fact that such monitoring could be evaded, it can also upset the individual for being unjustly targeted by the government. Human rights groups also question these practices because they may infringe on the ex-convict’s rights. Terrorism is a persistent risk in Europe, and several groups or individuals from different backgrounds have planned or executed attacks in the last two decades. Some of them had been imprisoned before for terrorist activities, but most of them did not. A lot of terrorists do have a criminal record, but those crimes are mainly connected to petty crime, theft or robberies. Especially “Lone Wolf” terrorists are often on some form of watchlist for their radical beliefs but have never acted on them, which makes it hard for security agencies to stop their attacks before they happen. Conclusion: Due to recidivism concerns, security agencies are keen to monitor formerly-convicted and now-released terrorists. However, research proves that the chance of recidivism is low which means that security issues resulting from the release of these prisoners do not pose a threat. Monitoring could disway or further radicalize individuals so its effectiveness is questioned. When social workers, local police, and/or other authorities notice a person moving toward radical ideals, a de-radicalization plan will be more effective in countering future terrorist activities. De-radicalization programs, therefore, may be more effective in curbing the issue, both in prison and outside.