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China’s espionage campaigns are an ongoing concern for Europe’s security. As China-Europe relations are set to become tense over geopolitics and trade, espionage cases are likely to rise in the future. This also presents challenges for counter-espionage. As intelligence agencies grapple with the threat posed by Russia, terrorism, cyber attacks, China’s ambitious espionage activities may go undetected. Senior officials from intelligence agencies are worried that they have not managed to keep up with the challenge from China and have fallen behind in counter-intelligence and intelligence capabilities. The challenges posed by China’s espionage efforts in political influence campaigns, industrial espionage are likely to escalate in the future. Political influence operations in Europe All countries spy on one another. Yet the exposure of China’s espionage campaigns in Europe is different. According to the international intelligence sharing group, the Five Eyes, what makes China’s spying operation different is the scale of ‘theft of intellectual property.’ What is new is that some European intelligence agencies are discovering more cases targeting their political systems and are more willing to call them out. Recent allegations accuse China’s espionage services of targeting Europe’s politics. In April 2024, German authorities arrested multiple individuals suspected of spying for China. This included an aide to the far-right Alternative for Germany MEP, and a couple accused of smuggling sensitive military technology. In the UK, two individuals were also accused of espionage. One was a parliamentary researcher to a lawmaker in the Conservative Party. They have both been charged in breach of Britain’s Official Secrets Act. In May 2024, British authorities arrested three men who were accused of working with Hong Kong’s intelligence service. They were  accused of monitoring, surveillance and harassment of pro-democracy activists in the UK, something the Hong Kong diaspora has been facing harassment from. Beijing accused the UK of false accusation, stigmatization and arbitrary arrests. The accused former Royal Marine was found dead in a park a week later, with the police saying the death was treated as ‘unexplained’. China’s intelligence services allegedly were conducting covert operations on the UK and Germany, two of continents strongest supporters of constructing positive ties with China. Beijing has rejected the claims of espionage under plausible deniability. Instead, in a recent show of unlikely public accusation, China’s intelligence service publicly accused MI6 of recruiting two Chinese state workers as spies. They apparently worked in a “core” confidential department in a Chinese state agency and leaked information to MI6. Xi’s ambitions to remake the world order These covert operations are part of a large-scale and long-term security strategy, which has assisted in achieving multiple goals of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). By attempting to control the narrative and the perception of China held by the nations China invested in, China is able to build a stronger foundation for economic development and opportunity domestically and internationally, forge stronger political ties with nations across the globe, and create an international manufacturing dependency, due in part to the immense man-power China has to offer. With Xi Jinping at the head of the CCP and therefore China’s road ahead, a major shift in the CCP’s focus has taken place in recent years. Somewhat covert, but increasingly visible, Xi’s China is a rapidly emerging self-sufficient nation. By profiting off of China’s earlier status as a predominantly manufacturing destination, China can and is utilizing its man-power and know-how to nestle itself among the world’s leading nations by responding to demand. China’s political system sees espionage as a key means to achieve Xi’s vision for China. Whereas Chinese leaders such as Deng Xiaoping previously prioritized economic growth, Xi instead prioritizes national security. When he came to power in 2012, Xi called for a policy of “comprehensive national security” for China’s party-state. The intelligence body of China (Ministry of State Security, MSS) received the increasingly multifaceted responsibility of gathering this intel to pursue Xi’s bold foreign policy strategies. Using this large database better enables the CCP to continue to influence China’s perception abroad, socially re-engineer the Chinese population domestically and abroad, sway public opinion on China, and compete intellectually and practically with current leading competitors. In a widely cited front-page article in the Study Times, the Communist Party school’s official newspaper, the head of the MSS suggested they should organize a ‘powerful offensive’ in response to the spying accusations in Europe and the US. Xi’s focus on security in part has to do with his goal of self-preservation as CCP leader. By enabling stricter control over the party members and the Chinese population in the name of national security, Xi simultaneously prevents usurpers from gaining too much traction. However, national security also aids Xi in maintaining his power and position. Xi profits from satisfied citizens as it strengthens his reputation. However, any dissatisfaction expressed on a large scale publicly is met with repercussions. New challenges for counter-espionage For European intelligence agencies used to Russian intelligence tactics, China’s espionage activities present new challenges. While Russian intelligence operations are often targeted and clumsily carried out with no ‘plausible deniability’ the MSS uses a ‘whole of society’ approach. This describes a 2017 law passed in China where all organizations and citizens should ‘support and cooperate with national intelligence efforts’. That makes conventional ‘spying’ by agents difficult to spot. Such activities can lead to another tool for the MSS, building a culture of fear in society and potentially leading intelligence agencies to encroach on civil liberties by collecting data on ethnic Chinese citizens falsely accused of espionage. The US counter-espionage efforts since 2016 have led to the National Director warning against such practices in the US. Another way in which this threat is unfolding, is that Xi’s focus on national security reaches beyond its own borders. Conferences such as the “Peaceful China” summit not only inform its (foreign) visitors on how China deals with security issues, it is also a way in which the CCP can normalize its ideological presence in the security systems of other nations. Using the vast database available to the CCP through espionage, China is able to influence local policy. China’s espionage activities are also difficult to detect as the MSS operations utilize a whole range of agents with loose connections to main state institutions. That makes finding an espionage operation that has been planned with the hand of the state difficult. More importantly, China’s influence is overt, through its economic power, its public investments and interactions with industry, rather than covert activity carried out by intelligence officers. They are therefore harder to point out than under the radar spying operations. As Xi doubles down on his relationship with Putin and becomes a major source of trade and investment in Russia’s economy, the relationship with Europe could become worse. The CCP is also paranoid of espionage within China, clamping down on sensitive information from being sent out of the country. The MSS has detained and arrested multiple pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong as the new national security law was implemented in 2024. Xi’s vision for China’s new security state and political influence operations against European countries reveal the risk of espionage to European interests and values. Raising awareness for the future Europe’s intelligence agencies have revealed that Europe is increasingly being targeted in political influence and dissident campaigns from China. Espionage cases will most likely be revealed more in the future. Europe is becoming increasingly wary of China’s economic competition, espionage attempts and China’s neutrality toward Putin’s war against Ukraine. China’s espionage attempts to influence politics and views in Europe to favorable views of China will therefore likely increase in the future. However, China’s espionage activities are difficult to counter effectively. European intelligence agencies face threats from Russia, monitoring terrorism, and the scale of China’s espionage activities have not been recognised sufficiently. Distinguishing between overt and covert Chinese power is hard to detect. More importantly, detecting MSS espionage attempts must not be used to encroach on ethnic Chinese civil liberties. Protecting the dissidents who have found refuge from the Chinese Communist Party is highly important.

Date: 13/06/2024 Where: Sudan Who’s involved: Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), paramilitary group Rapid Support Forces (RSF), regional and international actors What happened? More than a year after fighting broke out between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary group Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on April 15, 2023, the brutal civil war in Sudan is escalating. The conflict is exacerbating one of the world's worst humanitarian crises. According to the UN, the conflict already resulted in more than 15,000 confirmed casualties and 10 million people displaced, both internally and in neighboring countries. The intensity of the war and the seizure of crucial aid hubs by both warring factions are hampering the distribution of aid to civilians. The UN estimates that at least 25 million people are currently in urgent need of aid in Sudan. At first, fighting erupted in the capital Khartoum and its outskirts and then spread across the country, mainly to the provinces of North and West Kordofan and Western Darfur region. In recent weeks, SAF and RSF fighting has escalated in the area of the city of Al-Fashir (or El Fasher), the capital of North Darfur State. In early May 2024, Al-Fashir city, controlled by the SAF and a refuge for more than 1 million displaced people, was besieged and repeatedly attacked by RSF. On June 10, South Hospital, the main hospital of Al-Fashir and the only medical facility capable of handling mass casualty events, was attacked by RSF and taken out of service. Between May 25 and June 3, the hospital had been attacked three times. Since mid-April 2024, several attacks targeting non-Arab villages and communities by RSF and its allied Arab militias have been reported in North Darfur. The rise of ethnically motivated violence and intercommunal conflict in the region is reminiscent of the ethnic cleansing campaign of the Darfur War (2003-2020), which claimed nearly 400.000 victims. On May 21, the UN  warned that the deteriorating situation in North Darfur and in Sudan, exhibits all the signs of genocide and call for immediate international action to prevent further atrocities. Concerning levels of sexual and gender-based violence are also reported. Beyond Darfur, hostilities between the warring parties are escalating in other regions. On June 5, 2024, a massacre by the RSF was reported in the village of Wad Al-Noura in Gezira State, central Sudan. Over 150 people were killed in the attacks. Sudanese political and civil groups are mobilizing to promote dialogue. On May 8, the SAF-aligned political coalition “Coordination of National Forces,” which includes 48 political parties and civil society organizations, signed a political charter in Cairo proposing a three-year transitional government. Yet, Sudan's de facto governor, Gen. al-Burhan, repeatedly rejected any process that did not secure the RSF's surrender. International efforts to facilitate an end to the conflict in Sudan have not been successful. In late May 2024, the Sudanese government rejected the US request to resume negotiations with the RSF. Moreover, concerns about violence spillover, growing regional instability, and increasing foreign interference in the conflict are rising. In recent weeks, it was reported that Sudan and Russia are close to signing a 25-years military cooperation and port deal. Allegedly, the Sudanese army will grant Moscow a naval base in the Red Sea in exchange for military support and the cessation of the Wagner group's supply of the RSF. It has been reported that the Wagner group recently supplied missiles to the paramilitary group. Analysis: The two warring parties of the conflict, the SAF and the RSF militia, were previously allies, having joined forces in 2019 to overthrow three-decade dictator Omar al-Bashir. SAF leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan replaced him as the de facto head of state. In 2021, the RSF, led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, backed al-Burhan in the coup to topple Sudan's interim government. However, tensions started to escalate in February 2023 over the integration of the RSF into the Sudanese army and culminated on April 15, 2023, initiating the conflict. The ongoing conflict has deep roots. Sudan has experienced prolonged instability and violence in the past decades. In 2011, following two civil wars between the central government and southern regions, South Sudan gained independence, while from 2003 to 2020 a protracted conflict, marked by ethnic-motivated violence, war crimes and state-sponsored violence, plagued the state of Darfur. The Darfur conflict began as a result of uprisings by non-Arab tribes, suppressed by al-Bashir with the support of the Janjaweed, a collection of Arab militias. In 2013, the Janjaweed were reorganized as Rapid Support Forces (RSF), under the command of Hemedti. Throughout the conflict, the RSF perpetrated atrocities against civilians and were accused of ethnic cleansing against the Masalit, Fur, and Zaghawa communities. The displacement crisis is also fuelling the risk of regional instability. Approximately 2 million displaced Sudanese have been seeking refuge in neighboring countries, including Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, and South Sudan, which are struggling to handle the influx of refugees on top of their already volatile political and economic situations. According to the UN, Sudan's neighboring countries need assistance to cope with the flow of refugees. Chad, currently hosting some 900,000 Sudanese refugees, closed its border in April 2023. Although Sudan's border with Egypt remains open, Egypt is facing difficulties due to domestic and regional tensions. Moreover, concerns are growing over the regional security implications of the conflict in Sudan and neighboring countries fear the risk of conflict spillover and militia infiltration. The interference of external actors and foreign support for both sides is another critical issue. Since July 2023, there has been evidence of a closer alignment and military support between SAF leader al-Burhan's and Iran. Despite al-Burhan's denial of granting Iranian warships access to Port Sudan, this alliance could have implications for Iran's power over the Red Sea. Iranian support for al-Burhan could also be a response to the United Arab Emirates' (UAE) alleged military support for the RSF. In early May, tensions flared between the Sudanese government and Saudi Arabia over alleged Saudi support and military training to the RSF. Also, the Wagner Groups military support to RSF has been confirmed in recent months. Yet, the latest negotiations between the Sudanese government and Moscow regarding the concession of a naval base suggest Russia’s switch of sides in favor of the SAF. Despite efforts by the international community, including at least sixteen US-Saudi-led failed ceasefires and peace process attempts by regional actors such as the African Union, the mitigation and resolution of the conflict is far from being achieved. Conclusion: Despite several peace efforts and attempts of ceasefire by Sudanese political and civil groups and the international community, the conflict between the Sudanese army and the paramilitary RSF militia is not easing. More than a year into the fighting, Sudan is experiencing the world's worst humanitarian crisis, with alarming levels of food insecurity and indicators of ethnic cleansing and genocide. The escalation of violence in recent weeks is worsening an already highly volatile situation, and the risk of regional destabilization is escalating. Currently, the two warring factions are not open to any negotiation, and the interference and interests of foreign actors make finding common ground for dialogue even more unlikely. Moreover, despite the dramatic toll of the conflict, the crisis in Sudan is going somewhat unnoticed by the international community, which is committed to easing the ongoing Israeli-Hamas and Russian-Ukrainian conflicts. Without intervention from the international community and more humanitarian aid, the situation in Sudan is expected to worsen rapidly. The escalation of violence in North Darfur and Al-Fashir city is likely to worsen in the coming weeks. Should the town fall to the RSF paramilitaries, the army will lose the sole town left under its control in the region.

Date: 07/06/2024 Where: Ecuador, El Salvador Who’s involved:  President Nayib Bukele, President Daniel Noboa, Gangs, Drug cartels What happened? On May 31, 2024 El Salvador President Bukele met with Ecuador’s President Daniel Noboa to discuss security issues. Allegedly, Noboa and Bukele discussed their respective security strategies to “build closer ties on this topic and potential avenues for bilateral cooperation”. This could be part of Noboa's political and security agenda ahead of Ecuador's 2025 elections. On June 1, 2024 El Salvador’s President Bukele was sworn in for a second term. Despite the Constitution prohibiting re-election for a Presidential mandate, Bukele won re-election on February 4, 2024, allowed by a ruling by the El Salvador's Supreme Court in September 2021, that allowed presidents to serve two consecutive terms. President Bukele, in power in El Salvador since June 2019,  became popular in the country and in the region due to his repressive anti-crime approach, known as Mano Dura (Iron Fist), to reduce gang-related violence. In March 2022, Bukele declared a state of emergency, extended for 20 consecutive months, allowing the implementation of stringent security measures that drove violence to the lowest historic levels in El Salvador recent history. Under the state of exception, over 75,000 people have been detained in the country. In late April 2024, Ecuador's President Daniel Noboa, elected in October 2023, gained significant support from the population, as Ecuadorian voted in favor of a referendum over a range of restrictive security measures to combat criminal gang violence in the country. The new security policies are part of Noboa's so-called Phoenix Plan, an anti-crime strategy to address the security crisis in the country. Over the past years, drug-related violence in Ecuador has escalated significantly, hitting its highest point in January 2024 following the prison escape of one of the leaders of Los Choneros gang and a series of coordinated attacks by gangs. In response, Noboa announced a state of "internal armed conflict" and imposed a 60-day state of emergency, extended in April and May, authorizing the deployment of large military forces and the restriction of some civil liberties. Between May 27 and 31, 2024 the Ecuadorian police conducted a major operation, arresting over 200 people suspected of participating  in organized crime activities. Analysis: The term Mano Dura refers to zero-tolerance anti-gang policies implemented by Central American governments since the mid-2000s. Mano dura approaches typically involve militarizing national security, enhanced police powers, institutionalized violence with thousands of military troops deployed, massive incarcerations for illicit association, and raising sentences for gang membership and gang related crimes. These policies usually produce a decline in homicide rates and violence in the short term. They also raise long-term concerns as they erode democracy, the rule of law and civil liberties. The best known exponent of hard-line policies is surely El Salvador President Nayib Bukele, elected in 2019 with a political agenda based on his “Territorial Control Plan” to curb criminal gangs violence in the country. Since he took office, the homicide rate decreased drastically and his crackdown on crime neutralized street gangs that previously controlled the territory, gaining massive support by the population. As a result, El Salvador is now perceived as one of the safest places in Latin America. Yet, Bukele’s approach also led to the restriction of civil liberties and freedoms. In March 2022, the government declared a state of emergency that suspended basic civil liberties and constitutional guarantees and increased police presence in the country. During the prolonged state of emergency, El Salvador’s incarceration rate has soared to 1.7% of the population, meaning 1 out of every 60 residents is imprisoned. This has made El Salvador’s incarceration rate the highest in the world. Human rights organizations have criticized the government for using the state of emergency to  bypass human rights obligations, such as the presumption of innocence and the right to defense. This led to arbitrary or illegal detentions and overcrowded prisons. Moreover, another important concern of the state of exception is the excessive use of force and violations being carried out by armed forces. Despite criticism of Bukele's approach and its impact on democracy and human and civil rights, his hard-line approach against crime is often described by the media as the only effective model for fighting gangs. Across the region, countries have employed different strategies to counter organized crime, with varying degrees of success, but none have matched the success of the Salvadoran model. This is why, in response to the unprecedented wave of violence in Ecuador, it appears that President Noboa is considering taking the country down the same path as El Salvador. Given the dire increase in violence in Ecuador, it is unsurprising the support garnered by the new President Noboa and his tighter anti-crime policies. The majority of Ecuador’s citizens appear ready for a mano dura approach to counter the gangs. Ecuador has been grappling with an unprecedented rise in violence in the past few years. In 2023 the homicide rate registered a 74.5% increase over the previous year. In response, Noboa declared a state of emergency in January 2024, and deployed a large number of troops onto Ecuador’s streets to combat a surge in violence.  Thousands of people have been arrested and Noboa has been talking about building new maximum security prisons, following the Salvadoran model. However, it is unclear whether the Bukele-like Mano Dura approach will work in Ecuador as it did in El Salvador. Ecuador is larger and more difficult to control, with 22 active gangs involving tens of thousands of people, compared to El Salvador's two main gangs. Ecuadorian criminal networks are wealthier, more sophisticated, and better armed, making them more difficult to combat and more capable of corrupting the state. Moreover, given Ecuador's key role as a transit hub for cocaine trafficking and the involvement of Mexican and Colombian cartels in the criminal economies, the war on drugs in Ecuador will be particularly challenging. Also, the adoption of the Bukele model could have counterproductive effects such as increased fragmentation of criminal power and diversification of resources among these drug networks. Finally, unlike El Salvador, Ecuador is a democracy. Adopting Mano Dura policies, such as increasing arrests, violating human rights, and cracking down on freedom of the press, would mean shifting toward more authoritarian measures, which could be challenged by democratic institutions or weaken them. The risk with this “tough on crime” security model is to erode the rule of law, militarizing the law enforcement and legitimize violation of fundamental rights, without addressing the root causes and challenges that are fuelling the instability in the first place. Conclusion: The presence, power, and violence of gangs and criminal groups is a deeply rooted issue in Latin American. The surge in violence in recent years has caused citizens of democratic countries such as Ecuador to  surrender some of their freedoms to more restrictive governments in exchange for greater security. The positive results of the April 2024 referendum on tightening security in Ecuador suggest that the population might favor a more repressive approach, even at the expense of civil liberties. However, Ecuador's geography, gang history, and political system present obstacles to effectively adopting Bukele's model. Although the crackdown on violence implemented by President Noboa is beginning to show results, and his popularity is rising, new concerns are emerging about the state of human rights and democratic institutions in the country. It remains unclear to what extent Noboa is willing to follow the example of El Salvador's President. For Ecuador, an alternative approach based on addressing the root causes of violence, fighting corruption, strengthening institutions, and protecting civilians could be more effective and sustainable in the long run to address the security crisis while preserving the integrity of democracy, the rule of law, and democratic values and rights.

Date: 5/6/2024 Where: Kenya Who’s involved: Kenyan government, US government, EU authorities What happened? In a recent report, the Kenyan government alleged that the country experienced over 971 million cyber incidents from December 2023 to March 2024 with a significant rise in ransomware attacks on businesses. In the past several weeks, Kenya has strengthened several strategic and economic agreements, bringing it closer to the US and EU respective to cooperation in cyberspace. These agreements were highlighted in a 23 May meeting between Kenyan President William S. Ruto and US President Joe Biden regarding furthering the training of Kenya’s cybersecurity specialists and general hardening of its information infrastructure. On 14 May, President Ruto signed the Economic Partnership Agreement with the EU, which includes a full integration into Europe’s data protection infrastructure, a process that began in 2019 as the country adopted the standards of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). On 1 June, the website of a Kenyan municipality was targeted by a Yemeni threat actor, “Team R70”, who typically choose their targets in reaction to geopolitical events. On 3 June, a database from a major Kenyan financial firm was leaked, containing text messages, personal documents, users’ personal data, photo IDs, and loan applications. Analysis As a key western ally and one of the continent’s largest economies, Kenya has found itself on the front line against some of Africa's most serious cybercrime and cyber espionage. Many of these incidents have been related to factors of Kenya’s strategic and economic partnerships. A major Chinese espionage campaign was conducted against Kenya in May of 2023, targeting sensitive information related to its debt to the Chinese government. Part of the agreements included improvements to Kenya's military infrastructure and aviation capabilities at strategic locations like the Manda Bay airfield, which has been critical for counter-insurgency and anti-terrorism operations. In recent years, Kenya has made significant strides in developing its cyber capabilities. The government has established institutions such as the National KE-CIRT/CC (Kenya Computer Incident Response Team Coordination Center) to enhance its cybersecurity posture. Additionally, Kenya has enacted legislation like the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act to combat cyber threats effectively. The U.S. government provides technical assistance and training to Kenya through programs like the Africa Regional Cyber Crime Conference (ARCCC) to support the country in combating cybercrime effectively. Conclusion Kenya's intensified focus on cybersecurity, demonstrated by its recent agreements with the US and EU, is a critical response to a rising tide of cyber incidents. These partnerships not only provide much-needed technical support and training but also integrate Kenya into a broader framework of international cyber resilience. The alignment with EU data protection standards and the enhancement of military and civilian cyber defenses signify a strategic pivot towards a more secure digital infrastructure. However, this integration also brings new challenges, and may increase the likelihood of cyber attacks linked to geopolitical backlash associated with its deepening connections to Europe and the US. The Kenyan government's commitment to advancing its cyber capabilities, through both legislative measures and the establishment of specialized institutions, shows a clear understanding of the multifaceted nature of cyber threats. As Kenya continues to fortify its cybersecurity posture, the balance between leveraging international support and developing autonomous capabilities will be crucial.

Executive Summary The past two months have shown the risk of (last minute) military exercises, which by design or on accident hinder aviation. Digital interference continues to hinder aviation over many parts of the world, with interference areas now showing up over Asia. Quickly escalating conflicts or unrest have shown how quick security situations on the ground can change, and how these impact the operations of (international) airports. Global 1.1. Digital Interference The level of digital interference continues to be problematic for aviation. However, for the first time in months, no new forms of interference have surfaced. This allows operators to adapt more and more to the status quo, and get used to combat different forms of interference when possible. 1.2. Drug trafficking Drug trafficking continues to be a relevant risk in any form of aviation, including business/private aviation. This is especially the case in Latin America and India. Whereas India has a strongly booming trafficking activity, in Latin America the established market has shown an increased interest in using business/private style aircraft for their operations. In the Western world, airport and airline employees get arrested every now and then for being involved in drug trafficking. 1.3. Human trafficking Human trafficking is a lingering threat to business aviation, as the privacy over commercial aviation makes the operation easier. Other factors that come with operating business aircraft also count as a benefit to traffickers. 1.4. Military exercises The amount of military exercises around the globe are on a rise. With these come last minute or even ad hoc airspace closures, whether intended by the executing nation(s) or not. Europe 2.1. Climate activism An increase in climate activism is expected as the summer approaches. Both climate activism actions as well as responses to actions have increased in severity. 2.2. Digital Interference Russian digital interference has not resided in the past months. In fact, it is active in such a way that a couple of flights had to return to their departing airport, as their navigation systems became too unreliable. Middle East 3.1 . Digital interference The region that is still in the lead when it comes to digital interference variations. Most variations of interference can be found here, and there’s no sign of stopping. 3.2. Overflight Risks An array of countries in the region provide an overflight risk. These come from both state- as well as non-state actors. Not taking these risks seriously can have serious consequences. 3.3.     Israel - Hamas  war A severe escalation in the war happened at the hands of Iran, causing last minute airspace closures over multiple countries, heavily disrupting traffic. This is a great example of how fast airspace situations can change over a country, even if not (directly) involved in a conflict. 3.4.     Rising conflict Israel - Hezbollah The tensions between Israel and Hezbollah continue to rise, as the latter continues its actions against Israel. Asia 4.1. Overflight of Myanmar The intensity of the conflict keeps increasing. With the junta forces increasingly using aircraft against the rebel forces, the need for anti-air weapons increases for the latter. This is a major conflict, situated right under and very near busy air routes, which barely gets any attention in  most media sources. 4.2.    Taiwan tensions A military drill was conducted by China, in a response to a statement made by the Taiwanese president. This drill fully surrounded the island nation, triggering the latter to (partially) set up its defenses. 4.3. Digital interference A new interference region emerged recently. GPS jamming has been reported over the sea west of the Korean peninsula. Africa 5.1. Overflight risks An array of countries in the region provide an overflight risk. These come from both state- as well as non-state actors. Not taking these risks seriously can have serious consequences. North America 6.1       Gang violence in Haiti The gang violence in Haiti is ongoing, and [MTPP] airport has been a target of the violence before. An international intervention mission is struggling to start up, and a return of the peace seems far away. South America 7.1.  Drug trafficking Drug trafficking is a continuous threat in this region. Any operator of business/private aircraft should be aware of the possible implications of the drug trafficking industry on their operation. Oceania 8.1.  New Caledonia Unrest started on the island on the 15th of May. With chaos establishing, the international airport [NWWW] was quick to shut down. France, who is the owner of the island, responded by deploying forces to the island. The airport has not reopened yet. [This is the end of the light version for REBASE, for the full version, feel free to contact us]

Date: 03/06/2024 Location: The European Union Who’s involved: European citizens and national political parties from all 27 EU member states How do the European Elections work? The European Elections will take place between June 6 and 9. Over 373 million people from all 27 European member states are able to vote for the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Together, they will choose 720 MEPs in total. The number of MEPs from each country is determined by the size of a country’s population, so more populated countries like Germany and France get more seats in the European Parliament in comparison to less populated countries like Luxembourg or the Netherlands. The European Parliament has various responsibilities: it has to agree on the annual EU budget together with the Council of the EU, it is responsible for the adaptation of EU legislation together with the Council of the EU, and it oversees the work of EU institutions. The European Parliament is the only EU body that is directly chosen by EU citizens. EU citizens vote for a national political party, but once elected, the MEPs from the national political parties will join transnational political groups based on their shared political views. The European Parliament currently consists of 7 transnational political groups, that vary from left wing to right wing and pro-European to Eurosceptic, and unaffiliated MEPs. What will happen after the results are in? After the elections, all of the groups will hold meetings and there will probably be a reshuffling of some groups, especially among right leaning groups. Some parties or individuals will likely change groups or join one, if they were previously unaffiliated. During the first plenary session, the Parliament will elect the president and other bodies and will form committees dedicated to specific topics. Later on, MEPs will vote for the President of the European Commission, previously chosen by the leaders of European countries. The President, along with EU countries, will then proceed to choose Commissioners, who will also be dependent on the votes of the Parliament. If any candidate, including the President, is not accepted by the Parliament the process will be repeated until an agreement is found. What are the main issues at stake? Defense is the hot topic of these elections, which became especially prominent with the war in Ukraine. The last year has seen a focus on improving European defense capacities after decades of decreased spending on this area. Many groups in the center and in the right, including the far right, agree on the urgence of bigger investments on the European industry of defense to foster strategic independence along with national security and mechanisms for common procurement. Although common procurement is already practiced, it remains a small-scale initiative. This has been one of the main points of the campaign for many candidates to the European Commission, with Von der Leyen even proposing the establishment of a Defence Commissioner in the next European Commission. However, it remains a contentious issue as higher investments in the defense sector are not really appreciated in the leftist groups, which instead tend towards demilitarization. Climate change is also one of the main issues during the European Elections. Over the past few years, millions of people all across Europe have been demonstrating to urge governments and polluting companies to do more to fight climate change. In addition, a ‘green wave’ was visible during the European elections in 2019, during which many voters decided to choose for parties that were part of the Greens/EFA. In the same year, the European Commission launched the European Green Deal (EGD), which was approved in 2020. The EGD consists of a set of policy initiatives focussing on climate change with the goal of making the EU climate neutral in 2050. However, many parties have expressed concerns about the costs of this green transition. European farmers have also voiced their discontent with new rules and regulations that were put in place to reach the EGDs goals. In the most recent series of protests in 2024, farmers from a majority of EU member states went on the streets in different European cities, including Brussels, which eventually led to the European Parliament voting for a watered-down law to restore nature. The EPP is known for actively campaigning against EGD proposals and also pitches itself as a ‘farmers’ party’ during its election campaign. However, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and Identity and Democracy Group (ID) have also increasingly focussed on the farmers’ discontent to gain support in the run-up to the European elections. On the other side, the Greens have been pushing for reforms in agriculture to benefit the environment, while other parties remain divided internally over agricultural reforms and the EGD. Migration is the most controversial topic of this election, especially with the recent surge of (far) right, anti-immigration parties in many parts of the European continent. Migration, especially illegal migration, is increasingly considered negatively by many European citizens and governments who would prefer to allocate financial resources for their own nationals. After years of negotiations, on May 14 the EU adopted the controversial New Pact on Migration and Asylum, which is intended to reduce the number of arrivals and outsource the management of migrants. This will also try to speed up the processing of asylum requests and establish mandatory burden sharing for countries less affected by the influx of migrants. This reform has been at the center stage of electoral campaigns. Most parties on the right, including the center-right EPP, are advocating for strengthening the controls established by the new European legislation and the transfer of migrants to third party countries while their applications are processed, along the lines of the deal that the Italian government signed with Albania. This last point is rejected by leftist groups as they stress the importance of humanitarian assistance. What are the expected results and formations? The current ruling coalition is formed by groups closer to the center, including the center-right EPP, the center-left S&D and the liberal Renew Europe (RE). According to the most recent electoral polls, both EPP and S&D will likely lose seats and have to rely on an increasingly strained majority. Their numbers have progressively been eroded in recent years as the right and far right has gained more seats. RE will also likely lose seats. The Dutch party VVD will probably be expelled from the group due to its alliance to far right parties in the new Dutch government, which is considered by many RE members as unacceptable. The next European Parliament will likely experience a significant rightward shift, as the two main right wing groups, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and Identity and Democracy Group (ID), will gain seats, following the same trend that characterized recent elections in many European countries. This might give the ECR and ID a considerable influence over many topics, especially defense, green policies and migration, which might bring them closer to the EPP. Even though the two groups sometimes disagreed on specific issues, some members recently expressed the intention of merging, in order to gain more leverage. In particular, the ECR and ID will likely mount a stronger front, together with the EPP, against green policies. As they will hold more seats, they will be able to undermine green policies and in some cases even stop them. A wild card on the far right front will be the German Alternative für Deutschland, which was recently expelled from ID and isolated by other members for their apologetic comments about Nazism. The same counts for the Hungarian Fidesz, which pulled out from the EPP after clashes due to its policies disregarding judicial independence. Previously, the results of European elections were more predictable, as the EPP and S&D always retained a very strong majority. As their numbers are shrinking, current scenarios for the day after are more uncertain. The two groups came to terms with the increasing influence of right wing groups, which include some current governing parties. As a consequence, EPP signaled the possibility of cooperating with some members of the ECR on a number of issues that created problems with the S&D in the current legislature. This move sparked anger among the S&D, as they promised to never cooperate with right wing parties. Divisions between EPP and S&D were already growing, especially after the S&D backed the European law on nature restoration, which the EPP, along with other right wing parties, strongly opposed citing concerns about the livelihood of farmers. At the moment, the likely scenario is a repetition of the current ruling coalition, which will have less numbers than before. Moreover, on divisive topics the coalition might split. The EPP and the S&D have shown differences during the last legislative session and this might push the EPP to cooperate more often with right wing groups in opposition to leftist policies. Although an alliance between the EPP and right wing parties is very unlikely it cannot be completely ruled out. Conclusion These European elections will be fundamental as the new Parliamentary composition will greatly influence the course of European policies for the years to come. With the rise of hard right and far right parties across the whole continent, there will likely be a rightward shift in the new policies. This will likely entail also a review of old policies to adapt them to the new composition, especially in regards to migration and climate policies.

Written by Elena De Mitri, Arianna Lucà, Mickey Beckmann, Jacob Dickinson, Marnix Van ‘t Hoff, Sara Frisan  Russia-Ukraine: Russia opened a new offensive toward Kharkiv. Western aid is finally improving for Ukraine, which is scrambling to take the momentum away from Russia. Israel-Hamas:  Despite the international community’s warnings to halt its offensive on Gaza, the IDF attacked two designated safe zones in Rafah, killing dozens of civilians.  Myanmar: Ethnic armed groups continue to make advances against the military junta.  Sudan:   Fighting between SAF and RSF has intensified, especially in Al-Fashir, SAF's final stronghold, as the humanitarian crisis worsens. New Caledonia: Violence erupted after the central government proposed to extend local voting rights to mainland French citizens. Tensions remain high.  Ethiopia: The renewed fighting between Tigray and Amhara militias in northern Ethiopia escalates risks of turmoil and conflict in the country.  Mali: As the military junta in Mali extends its rule until 2027, opposition politicians in exile form a rival transitional government.   Colombia: Caught amid protests and setbacks in the peace process, Petro's government faces instability and rising violence.  Taiwan: China conducts military exercises after the inauguration of new Taiwanese president Lai China-te, significant protests against KMT-proposed legislation. Georgia:  The presidential veto on the foreign agent law was overturned by the Parliament, as protests continued throughout the month. DRC: A new government has been formed amidst escalating conflict in the eastern DRC between the Congolese Army and Rwandan-backed M23 rebels.   Haiti: As Haiti is gripped by gang violence and the worsening humanitarian crisis, the appointment of a new PM rekindles hopes for long-awaited international support North Korea: North Korea continues to test missiles in the Sea of Japan Conflicts, May 2024  Russia-Ukraine In early May 2024,  Russia opened up a new offensive from the Russian-Ukraine border to Kharkiv.  This new offensive gained ground quickly in the opening days but now seems to have crashed against Ukraine’s first layer of prepared defensive positions. Russia has, since the start of this new offensive, targeted civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv, resulting in a significant rise in civilian casualties in the city. The aim of this offensive, as claimed by Russia, is to establish a ‘sanitary zone’ to prevent Ukraine from shooting into Russia from near the border. An alternate aim for this offensive could be to force Ukraine to redirect manpower from the other fronts in the East and South. In response to the mass targeting of civilians in Kharkiv, western countries are discussing the option of allowing Ukraine to use their donated weapons against targets on Russian soil.  As new Western aid bills are passing, with the most notable being the US aid bill for $61 billion, Ukraine seems finally able to dampen the momentum Russia has had in the past months. In some locations, Ukraine has even managed to gain back recently lost ground. The renewed vigor in Western support, although still lacking in numbers and pace, will possibly allow Ukraine to once again turn the tide .  Israel-Hamas   Despite months of talks and efforts by Egypt, Qatar, and the US to carry out negotiations between Israel and Hamas, the situation remains stalled. Both sides accuse each other of obstructing agreements to prolong the conflict. Hamas demands a permanent fire and Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. Israel seeks the release of hostages held by Hamas, and it does not agree to a full withdrawal of its forces from the Gaza Strip as part of any ceasefire deal.  On May 26 and 28 , 2024, bypassing a landmark ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ordering Israel to halt its offensive in Gaza, the IDF conducted deadly airstrikes targeting designated safe zones in north of Rafah , where thousands of displaced civilians were sheltering. Israel denied targeting humanitarian areas, claiming it was aiming at senior Hamas operatives. Following the attack, the White House announced that the US would not change its policy and support toward Israel, as the recent strikes on Rafah did not constitute a "major ground operation" and Israel's actions did not cross any' “red lines." In response to the Israeli strike on Rafah, Hamas informed mediators they would not participate in negotiations.  The recent escalation has made it nearly impossible for humanitarian groups to import and distribute aid to southern Gaza . Currently, the humanitarian situation remains highly dire in Gaza, with millions of people displaced and living in extreme famine conditions. Moreover, over the past days, the Israeli forces took operational control of the “Philadelphi corridor” , a long corridor along the Gaza Strip that borders only Egypt, giving them more control over the Palestinian territory. On May 27, a shooting took place between Israeli and Egyptian personnel near the crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, killing a member of the Egyptian personnel.  The escalation in Rafah is receiving condemnation and reactions from the international community . Spain, Ireland, and Norway have formally recognized the Palestinian state . On May 20, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for two Israeli leaders, including PM Netanyahu, and three Hamas leaders. Even though several countries, including Israel, do not recognize the ICC’s jurisdiction, it was the first time the Court took action against leaders of a nation closely allied with the US and Europe, suggesting Israel's growing isolation over its campaign in Gaza.  Myanmar  The fighting in Myanmar’s civil war has been intense throughout the month, seven months after the beginning of a combined offensive by ethnic armed groups and pro-democracy forces called Operation 1027. The resistance has gained 55 towns around Arakan State since the start of the offensive and controls around 60% of the territory of Myanmar. The military junta, otherwise known as the State Administration Council, has faced mass desertions from junta soldiers, yet it has not crumbled.  The junta has increased the use of drones for surveillance and airstrike spotting to target resistance forces.  The civil war is raging across the country on the border with Thailand, on the border with China. The situation on the border of India is seeing intense fighting between the junta troops and the Arakan Army (AA), an ethnic group fighting for more autonomy for the Rakhine ethnic population in the state. The UN estimates that 45,000 out of 600,000 Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh,  where one million Rohingya already live with the ongoing genocide of the Rohingya in Myanmar since 2016. Reports have emerged of forcible conscription of the Rohingya by the AA and the military junta.   The ruling military junta is on the back foot around the country, yet it is showing few signs of weakening. Given the ongoing ability of the SAC to hold on to the country’s major cities, such as Yangon and Mandalay,  the conflict is likely to continue longer than some had predicted.   Sudan  Sudan is experiencing a severe humanitarian crisis due to ongoing conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). In the past year, the conflict has resulted in over 15,000 casualties and approximately 8 million internally displaced people. Al-Fashir (or El Fasher), the capital of North Darfur, has become the epicenter of the conflict, with RSF fighters encircling it for a final assault on the army's final stronghold. Nomadic Arab militias support the RSF, while non-Arab Darfuri armed groups support the army, escalating the risk of ethnically motivated violence and genocide in the region . According to the UN, the escalation of violence in Al-Fashir is rapidly deteriorating the humanitarian situation of around 800.000 people. In the last two weeks, fighting in the area resulted in over 130 fatalities and over 1200 displaced people. On May 28, the army intensified airstrikes in targeting the town of Kutum in North Darfur to disrupt RSF reinforcements headed to Al-Fashir. Medical facilities are being targeted, and hospitals are running out of medical supplies, with both the army and RSF obstructing aid delivery. While the army restricts UN agencies' assistance delivery in RSF-controlled areas, escalating clashes led to the shutdown of a key humanitarian corridor with Chad in early May, with the latest violence halting aid convoys coming through Chad's Tina and Adré border crossings. The UN reports that 25 million people need humanitarian assistance, with four million facing famine.  Over a year into the conflict, Sudan's security situation is highly volatile, with fighting showing no sign of easing.  The humanitarian crisis is worsening, with dramatic levels of violence against civilians, food insecurity, and sexual violence.  The conflict in Sudan has far-reaching consequences, fueling cross-border instability and the risk of spillover into the region and creating an opportunity for jihadist groups to gain a foothold in the country.  Alerts, May 2024  New Caledonia  Protests erupted in New Caledonia on May 13, 2024, as lawmakers in mainland France discussed a new constitutional amendment , later adopted on May 14, which will give citizens of mainland France who have lived in New Caledonia for ten years the right to vote in provincial elections. Locals opposed this amendment as they feared that the votes of the French people would quell the desires of the indigenous Kanak population. Moreover, this would break the terms of the 1998 Nouméa Accord, which granted the Kanak more representation. Buildings were torched and looted, while many roads were barricaded, including connections to the local airport, creating difficulties in the provision of food and medicines. Demonstrators, supported by Azerbaijan, clashed with local police, resulting in a few casualties . French authorities declared a state of emergency and, in a very criticized move, banned TikTok, which was allegedly used to coordinate violence. The ban was lifted on May 29. Police reinforcements were deployed to calm the situation. Relations between locals and mainland France have been tense as part of the local population has strived for independence. While neighboring countries have organized evacuations for their citizens, French President Macron briefly visited New Caledonia to try to de-escalate the situation. The state of emergency was lifted on May 27, as Macron decided to delay the constitutional reform vote attempting to reach a political deal with local leaders. Even though the situation is currently calmer, the government is set on eventually passing this reform, which might cause demonstrations to return. In the meantime, New Caledonia's international airport will remain closed at least until June 2.  Ethiopia Nearly two years after the end of the so-called Tigray War (2020-2022) between Ethiopian government forces and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), recent escalations of violence are threatening the fragile peace in northern Ethiopia. Despite signing a peace agreement in Pretoria in November 2022, tensions between the Tigray and Amhara regions persist over a territorial dispute . The disputed area, located on the Ethiopian border with Sudan, was controlled by the Tigray administration until its seizure by Amhara forces in 2020. The Amhara administration has long-standing claims to the territory, claiming it was forcibly annexed to Tigray in the 1990s. The Amhara forces have been accused of ethnic cleansing which forced hundreds of thousands of ethnic Tigrayans to flee the region, allegations denied by the Amhara regional government. Since February 2024, a resurgence of armed clashes between TPLF and the Fano militia, respectively from the Tigray and Amhara regions, has been reported. The latest clashes caused over 50.000 displaced people and raised humanitarian concerns . In April 2024, the TPLF took control of the Raya Alamata district, in the Amhara region. The Amhara regional government denounced the Tigraryan "invasion." On top of recent clashes, Tigray is willing to speed up the process of return of ethnic Tigrayans displaced during the conflict in the contested region, as agreed in the peace deal. In early May 2024, the Tigray administration and the Ethiopian government finalized a plan to return the internally displaced people by July 7. Moreover, in May 2024, clashes between the Ethiopian National Defense Force and Fano militia intensified in the Amhara region. Several civilians have been killed in government airstrikes.  Along with the resumption of fighting in northern Ethiopia, other conflicts and instability persist in the country, increasing the risk of a humanitarian crisis and a large-scale conflict escalation. Clashes between the government security forces and local militias are reported in Oromia and Gambela regions. In the Oromia region, the government is intensifying the anti-insurgency efforts against the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA). In Gambela, civilian casualties are rising due to fighting between the state police and unidentified armed groups.  Mali While the humanitarian crisis is deepening in northern Mali due to besieging major towns by armed groups linked to the Islamic State, the country is experiencing a time of political turmoil and increasingly authoritarian turn . In early April 2024, the authorities suspended all politically oriented activities by civil society and political parties, banned all media coverage of political parties, and announced an indefinite suspension of elections. Elections in Mali were initially scheduled for February 2024, but postponed by the military junta for "technical reasons". Since December 2023, the military junta has been carrying out an initiative known as the Mali National Dialogue or Inter-Malian Dialogue to address the country's multiple challenges, including political transition, national reconciliation, and security. Following the junta's restriction of political rights, the opposition and many civil society organizations boycotted the talks. On May 10, 2024, it was reported that the participants of the dialogue recommended the extension of the transition period from 12 to 36 months, which could mean the extension of the military junta's power until 2027 . In response, on May 25, Malians opposition politicians announced the formation of a transitional government in exile to rival the military junta  and foster the mobilization of Malians residing in the country.  Meanwhile, the military junta is concentrating its efforts on limiting dissent. On May 27, an ally of Mali's civilian Prime Minister Kaiga, chosen by the junta but whose room for maneuver appears very limited, was arrested for openly criticizing the military regime.  Colombia Colombia's fragile peace process, known as Paz Total (Total Peace), suffered setbacks in May 2024.  Negotiations with two of the main armed groups in the country, the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Estado Mayor Central (EMC), are currently stalled. On the one hand, despite the resumption of talks between the government  and the ELN, the group announced in early May the lifting of the suspension of kidnappings stipulated in the December 2023 ceasefire. On the other hand, the government partially suspended the ceasefire with the EMC in some departments due to violence against civilians, indigenous leaders, and security officials. Indeed, despite the government's efforts, levels of violence and conflict in the country remain high, suggesting that President Petro's stabilization strategy is not working.   The Petro administration is also facing massive protests . Delays in implementing the pledged socio-economic reforms, repeatedly blocked by the opposition, are spawning widespread popular dissatisfaction and eroding the President's popularity. Currently, the situation in Colombia remains unstable as a result of the political crisis and the fragmentation of the peace process, which raises the risk of new escalations of violence and a worsening humanitarian situation.   Taiwan Taiwan’s new president, Lai Ching-te, took office on 20 May . He announced in his inaugural speech that he would be open to dialogue with China, but stated that China must respect the sovereignty of Taiwan’s democracy. Beijing sees Lai as a ‘separatist’, and responded with two days of military exercises around Taiwan and its islands near the mainland, Matsu and Kinmen. The military drills were intended to simulate a blockade of Taiwan in the event of an invasion and an attempt to threaten what China terms 'secessionist forces’ in Taiwan. Moreover, Taiwan’s domestic politics were upended after legislation passed by the more pro-China parties in Taiwan’s legislature requiring business people, security officials, and politicians to answer questions  under the threat of financial penalties. Supporters of the bill, including the Kuomintang (China Nationalist Party), said that the reforms were necessary to refine Taiwan’s democracy. However, thousands of protesters have taken to the streets against the new legislation, calling the measures anti-democratic and against the interests of Taiwan’s national security . Critics fear that officials could be called to reveal sensitive national security information. With a strong culture of protest in the country and the passage of the deeply divisive bill, the protests are likely to continue in the coming months.   Updates, May 2024 Georgia Protests against the “foreign agents bill” in the capital, Tbilisi, and other major cities, have continued throughout the month.  On May 14, 2024, the controversial bill was adopted as violent clashes erupted inside and outside the parliament. Activists are worried that this law may be used to silence dissent, as it happened with a similar Russian law. Many allies of Georgia, including European countries and the US, have spoken against the bill, stating that it will hamper Georgia’s path to access the European Union.  The EU is considering freezing accession talks with Georgia , and the Council of Europe asked Georgia to withdraw the law. More measures will likely be taken by the EU in June. In the meantime, the US imposed visa restrictions on the members of Georgian Dream, the main party in the government, and announced a review of its relations with Tbilisi. Police violently cracked down on protests with water cannons, intimidation, and arrests.  Even though Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili vetoed the law on May 18, the parliament rejected the veto on May 27. On May 28, protesters gathered around Georgia’s parliament as the lawmakers overrode the veto. It is expected that the protests in Georgia will continue on a daily basis in the upcoming weeks.  Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) The humanitarian situation in the country is deteriorating,  especially in the regions of North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri. Since the beginning of 2024, nearly 358,000 people have been internally displaced, and many have died in the heavy fighting. Clashes persist between the Congolese army and the M23 rebel group . M23 rebels reportedly attacked refugee camps near Goma on May 3, causing 12 fatalities and over 30 injured. The attack on refugee camps received international condemnation as a violation of humanitarian law and human rights. The UN and the US blamed both M23 and Rwanda, widely accused of backing the M23, for the deadly attacks. Moreover, international observers denounce the fight for control and exploitation of mineral resources as a root cause of violence  and likely the primary reason for  Rwandan backing of M23. On May 1, the M23 forces seized Rubaya, a key coltan mining town in eastern DRC.  After months of negotiations and political uncertainty since the re-election of President Tshisekedi on December 31, 2023,  the Democratic Republic of Congo announced a new government on May 29, confirming Judith Sumonwa Tuluka, as DRC’s first female PM.   The formation of the government came a few days after what the Congolese Army called an “attempted military coup”. On May 19, 100 armed men attacked several sites in central Kinshasa, including the president’s official residence. Three people died, including two Congolese security officials and the attackers' alleged leader, Christian Malanga, a diaspora opposition figure. About 50 people were arrested, including three U.S. citizens.  Haiti  May 2024 has been a tumultuous month for Haiti. After appointing Fritz Bélizaire as interim prime minister on April 30, the transition council reversed its decision due to internal disagreements about the president's functions. On May 28, the council appointed former PM Garry Conille,  who was in office for seven months in 2012, to resume this role and use his experience at the UN to stabilize the country. However, political stability remains elusive as gangs lay siege to Port-au-Prince.  From January to March 2024, over 2,500 people were killed or injured, and 1.4 million Haitians faced famine due to the lack of essential supplies and limited aid deliveries. While the seaport remains closed, the Toussaint Louverture International Airport reopened on May 20, raising hopes for the deployment of the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission. By May 16, U.S.-funded contractors were working with Haitian officials to prepare for the MSS. On May 21, 200 Kenyan police officers arrived in Haiti to assess the situation and meet the Haitian police and the transitional council. However, logistical issues, including unfinished bases and a lack of resources, forced the Kenyan officers to return home, delaying deployment by three weeks, according to Kenyan President William Ruto.  Despite the appointment of a new Prime Minister rekindling hopes for the deployment of the long-awaited international support and the political transitional process, the situation in Haiti remains volatile. Due to widespread violence, the rate of displaced persons, and scarcity of aid, the country is experiencing a dramatic humanitarian crisis.  Moreover, it is not yet clear whether the decision of the transition council will trigger gang backlash and result in a new escalation of violence.  North Korea Tensions on the Korean Peninsular continued throughout May 2024. N orth Korea continued missile testing, firing several missiles into the Sea of Japan . North Korea has increased missile testing significantly over the past few years and improved military collaboration with Russia in exchange for missile development. The US, South Korea, and Japan have also stepped up military exercises around the Peninsular in an attempt to deter North Korean missile attempts.  On 28 May, China, South Korea, and Japan held discussions for the first time in four years as they sought to revive regional cooperation. Among other regional security issues, they discussed the North Korean missile launches. On May 30, North Korea launched 10 short-range ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan, a couple of days after a North Korean spy satellite attempted to launch but quickly exploded shortly after take-off. The risks of an incident are raising tensions and further instability in the region.  About the authors  Elena de Mitri  Elena is a highly motivated person with a strong interest in international security. She holds a Master's degree in International Studies from the University of Turin, where she focused on regime changes and human rights. Her academic journey also includes a Bachelor's degree in Foreign Languages and Cultures, with a focus on the MENA region and muslim societies. Additionally she pursued a Minor in Gender Studies, enhancing her understanding of the intersectionality of various issues in international contexts. During her previous traineeship at the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission she conducted research on terrorist groups, especially on jihadist groups and right-wing extremists. Arianna Lucà Arianna is a new intern at Dyami, covering the role of Research Intelligence Analyst to enrich her background knowledge in International Relations with topics involving security and conflict. She holds an MA in International Relations from Leiden University and an LLM in European Criminal Justice from Utrecht University. During her academic career, she has volunteered for different NGOs, mainly Amnesty International, and Emergency and ActionAid, embracing humanitarian and conflict security causes, and addressing issues like famine and lack of security in different regions of the world. With Dyami, she is contributing to joint publications, writing articles, and keeping up to date with key regional developments. Mickey Beckmann Mickey is currently enrolled in the master’s program Conflict Studies & Human Rights at the University of Utrecht. As of a young age she felt the need to help people in dire circumstances, which evolved into a deep interest and drive to address sociocultural and political issues related to conflict. Motivated to make the world a safer and more accessible place, she completed a bachelor in ‘International Relations in Historical Perspective’ at Utrecht University. Eager to broaden her knowledge of geopolitical conflict and security, during her internship at Dyami she will actively participate in writing collaborative publications and authoring articles, with a main focus on the region North and Sub-Saharan Africa. Iris de Boer Iris works as a Global Intelligence Analyst at Dyami, leveraging her background in Human Geography. Additionally, Iris holds an MA degree in Conflict Studies and Human Rights from Utrecht University, specializing in conflict analysis, peace processes, and geopolitics. Her MA thesis delved into the securitization of the war in Ukraine by the Heads of State, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and Ministers of Defense of the Netherlands and Poland. Within Dyami, Iris is actively involved in security risk management, travel security, and geopolitical analysis. Her enthusiasm for addressing topics in international security extends across a diverse spectrum of countries and regions. Sara Frisan  Sara joined Dyami as a Junior Intelligence/Research Analyst post-graduate intern to deepen her passionate interest in conflict analysis and security. Sara recently completed her MA in Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University and held an MA degree in International Sciences and Peace Studies. During her academic career, she conducted research in South America, primarily Colombia, on the dynamics of collaboration and resistance between civilians and non-state armed groups in violent settings. In her previous internship at the investigative think-tank InSight Crime, Sara developed some expertise on transnational organized crime and political-criminal alliances.

Article written by Chris Dalby, Director of World of Crime Mexico is a country of contrasts. On the one hand, its beaches, forests, resources, and workforce attract millions of tourists and billions of investment dollars. On the other hand, it continues to suffer tens of thousands of violent deaths a year from cartels who operate with almost total impunity. Elections are always a moment to pause, assess the past few years, and take stock of what challenges a country faces ahead. For Mexico, any such assessment paints a bleak picture. Mexico Ahead of June 2024 Elections The 2018 presidential election was a moment of great optimism for many Mexicans, especially those with poorer incomes. Andrés Manuel López Obrador, better known as AMLO, won the presidency, having broken a two-party duopoly that had ruled for decades. He promised his new party, MORENA, would begin to entrenched networks of corruption and collusion. He promised a break with the past, vowing to approach cartels with “hugs, not bullets.” Although AMLO said on the campaign trail that he would refrain from using the Mexican army to go after drug traffickers, he found himself relying increasingly on their support during his mandate, leading some to claim he was building an authoritarian regime. No break with the past has come. While the annual homicide rate has dipped slightly, over 30,000 people were murdered in Mexico in 2023. At least 174,000 people have been killed and another 114,000 have disappeared during AMLO’s presidency. Kidnappings and extortion have risen at an alarming rate nationwide, posing a serious threat to both Mexican and foreign travelers. And the crisis of fentanyl, a devastatingly lethal opioid largely made in Mexico, has consumed the United States, killing at least 336,000 people in six years. The past is very much the present. Yet AMLO remains hugely popular. He’s losing out his presidency with approval ratings of over 60 percent. He has been praised for his ability to reduce poverty, doubling the minimum wage, improving pensions and creating infrastructure projects. His hand-picked successor, Mexico City mayor Claudia Sheinbaum, is the clear polling favorite to win presidential elections on June 2. This electoral campaign has been marred by violence. While official statistics state 20 political candidates have been killed, human rights organizations say the number is closer to 40. Hundreds of other candidates have suffered attempted murders, kidnapping, death threats, and physical attacks. Most of these happen at the local and city level. Controlling mayors, police chiefs, and governors is hugely lucrative for Mexico’s cartels. This not only allows them to act with impunity, but also to steal a large portion of government budgets and access state databases about different economic sectors to learn who to extort. Every election provides an opportunity for them to reassert this criminal governance, force new candidates into line, or brutally remove those who resist. Security Landscape Despite Mexico’s troubled reputation, investments and tourism continue to go up. Foreign direct investment reached over 33 billion euros in 2023, up 2.2%, while over 21 million tourists arrived from abroad, also a record. Dutch travelers have not been deterred, with hundreds of thousands visiting Mexico every year. This is despite the occasional tragic event, including the shooting of one Dutch woman in the popular Caribbean tourist resort of Tulum in 2021. So what is the security panorama ahead of elections? Which areas of Mexico are most affected? There are three levels to this answer. Traveling in Mexico At the first level, while most of Mexico carries with it some level of criminal danger, the overwhelming majority of foreign travelers, whether going for business or pleasure, do so utterly unmolested. Mexico City itself continues to provide endless options for discovery, cuisine, and culture. The beach resorts of the Riviera Maya on the Caribbean Coast Oaxaca to the south, and Puerto Vallarta on the Pacific bring in families, students, and retirees for whom cartel violence goes unnoticed. The second level overlaps with the first. All of the areas mentioned above are rife with criminal activity, with the tourism trade at the heart of it. While most tourists are not bothered, the entire industry surrounding them has become a criminal bonanza. In Cancun, Puerto Vallarta, and other beach towns, restaurants and hotels are routinely extorted to the tune of thousands of dollars a month, often by several different criminal groups competing to control the “plaza” or the area. Fishermen selling seafood to restaurants which cater to foreign visitors are forced to sell their catch to vendors approved by the cartels, at prices set by the cartels. Refusal means death. While many travelers sample Mexico’s tequila, they may not know that tequila producers are often under the boot of the feared Jalisco Cartel New Generation, or CJNG, and see their profits drained. Areas to Stay Away From There are times when the second level clashes brutally with the first. Earlier this year, three Australian and American surfers were killed in the northern state of Baja California. Shootouts at beach resorts happen with increasing regularity, with some assassins even riding up on jet skis, killing their target, and disappearing across the waves. The third level happens in those parts of Mexico where tourists rarely go but businesses do. In Guanajuato, a central industrial area with a vast oil refinery and a booming automotive industry, a fight between the CJNG and the local Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel has made the state the deadliest in Mexico. Their battle has lasted longer than World War II. Mexico’s two largest criminal groups, the CJNG and their enemies, the Sinaloa Cartel, are fighting from north to south. Tijuana, the main entry point for drugs into the US, has become one of Mexico’s most violent cities. And all the way to the south, the once-peaceful state of Chiapas has been transformed over the past two years. Tens of thousands of people have been displaced as both groups seek to control the flow of migrants and drugs entering Mexico from Guatemala. Trucks carrying cargo from across Mexico to the US border are now routinely hijacked, their merchandise stolen, the vehicles taken away, and the drivers sometimes shot. Mexico’s cartels have also been quick to jump on the profits to be made from the thousands of migrants entering the country from Central and South America, as well as China and African nations. With the US pressuring Mexico to stop migrants crossing the border, thousands of people are left at the mercy of kidnapping, extortion, sexual violence, forced recruitment, and murder. Positive Outlook? The above description paints a highly pessimistic picture, one where the mechanisms of criminality are so entrenched in Mexico that it becomes impossible to stop them. So are there any areas of hope? In the presidential election campaign, not many. Sheinbaum and her opposition rival, Xochitl Galvez, have provided very few details about their security plans. There is a fear among observers that Sheinbaum, like her political mentor, AMLO, will disregard security while focusing on poverty reduction and infrastructure. Yet, for all this violence, all this institutionalized corruption, there are pockets of optimism. A few years ago, the state of Baja California Sur, a popular tourist destination south of the US border, was riven by violence. Today, it has become Mexico’s most peaceful state. Similarly, the southern state of Yucatan, along the Gulf of Mexico, has the benefit of not being along major drug trafficking or migrant smuggling routes. As a consequence, it offers travelers and locals a safe haven. The challenge will be to make these isolated havens of peace grow to reclaim more parts of the country. Looking ahead past the election, there seems little chance of that happening. About the author: Chris Dalby is the director of World of Crime, a consultancy helping governments and companies make sense of urgent criminal challenges. He is based in Maastricht, the Netherlands, but spent seven years in Mexico as an organized crime journalist. He recently published his latest book, “CJNG – A Quick Guide to Mexico’s Deadliest Cartel.”

Written by Arianna Lucà and Sara Frisan Edited on the 28/05/2024 Date:  27/05/2024 Where: Colombia Who’s involved: President Petro, Opposition parties and elites, Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) Introduction: The Colombian President and his administration is facing a number of challenges that could undermine its ambitious political plan for stabilization and peace in Colombia. Gustavo Petro, a former member of M-19 left-wing guerrilla group and mayor of Bogota, won the 2022 elections with a progressive political agenda, aiming to reform health, pension and labor systems. He pledged to transform Colombia by promoting socio-economic justice and peace in a country scarred by decades of violence, corruption, and inequality. However, due to a combination of political and economic setbacks, the first left-wing President in Colombian history is struggling to implement his socio-economic reform project and faces stiff resistance from the political opposition and broad segments of the Colombian population. Political Crisis and Mass Protests Petro’s coalition, the Historic Pact for Colombia, does not have a majority in both chambers of Congress, which is making it difficult to achieve his political objectives. In recent months, most of Petro's socio-economic reforms, including the health reform proposal, were rejected by the opposition. In March 2024, Petro blamed the traditionally conservative institutions and legislature for obstructing his social reform agenda and declared his intention to amend the 1991 Colombian Constitution to spur social reforms and address the country's inequalities. Since Petro took office, demonstrations have been regular, although they have intensified since the President proposed the constitutional amendment. In April 2024, hundreds of thousands of people marched in the streets of Bogota, Medellin, Cali and Barranquilla to protest against Petro’s government economic and social reforms. Petro reacted to the protests by calling them a “soft coup” organized by conservative elites to obstruct reforms. Yet, also some of his supporters took part in the demonstrations, frustrated by the lack of tangible improvements in their socio-economic conditions. Tensions between the opposition and Petro’s coalition have also worsened, due to allegations of corruption and illegal financing of Petro's 2022 election campaign. Following the scandal, on May 8, 2024 two out of nine magistrates in Colombia’s National Electoral Council requested an investigation of Petro’s 2022 electoral campaign over alleged financing violations. Despite Petro's attempts to distance himself from the scandal, the Colombian House of Representatives recently accepted a proposal by the far-right Democratic Center party to suspend "debate and vote on all ordinary and statutory bills and draft legislation" submitted by the Petro administration. The suspension threatens to sink the government's pension reform project, preliminary approved in late May 2024, which was due to become law by June 20. In response, Petro denounced the "structural corruption" of Colombia's institutions. Peace Process’ Setbacks On top of the political crisis, in the past few months, the Petro’s administration peace process known as “Paz Total” (Total Peace), a plan to achieve peace by conducting talks with all the armed groups in the country, has been facing numerous challenges and setbacks. After six rounds of talks, several negotiations and ceasefires with armed groups have stalled, and levels of violence and  conflict remain high in the country. Several attacks and massacres by armed groups targeting civilians, indigenous leaders and security officials were reported in rural areas in recent weeks. Despite the Colombian government and the ELN reaching an agreement on one of the key issues of the peace process on May 25, 2024 the situation remains uncertain. On May 6, the National Liberation Army (ELN), the oldest insurgent group active in Colombia and one of the main interlocutors in the negotiations, announced that it would resume abductions, as the government has failed to fulfill agreements taken during talks. The rebel group has criticized the delays in the creation of a multi-donor peace fund to support the group’s livelihood. In response, the government clarified that the fund was never intended as an incentive to halt abductions but to strengthen efforts in the peace process. More friction is likely to occur in the future rounds of talks, as President Gustavo Petro’s administration made it clear that the ELN suspension of kidnapping is an imperative condition for reaching an agreement. The end of the kidnapping suspension is the latest tension between the government and ELN. In April 2024, the ELN's Central Command had frozen talks with institutions following parallel negotiations between the government and some of the ELN’s factions active in the Nariño department in the west of Colombia. The ELN blamed the government for carrying on these negotiations with smaller groups “behind the back” of the Central Command. Following the announcement of the suspension of kidnappings, one of these factions, the ELN Southern Community Front (Frente Comuneros del Sur), announced on May 7, 2024, its split from ELN Central  Command and its willingness to pursue negotiations. Moreover, negotiations between the government and the EMC (Estado Mayor Central), an organization that encompasses factions of the former FARC that rejected the 2016 peace agreement, are currently experiencing setbacks. In March 2024, due to the EMC’s attacks targeting indigenous leaders and police officers, the government partially suspended the ceasefire with the EMC in Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and Nariño. Increasing tensions with the government led to splits within the EMC; some blocs are willing to continue dialogue with the government, while others refuse any negotiation until a new national ceasefire is established. In the wake of strained relations with the government, the group escalated violence against security forces. On May 20, 2024, attacks by the EMC militia group claimed at least 4 lives in southwestern Colombia. Analysis: Beside the initial popular favor, President Petro has not yet advanced on his radical reform agenda and the President’s approval rates have been decreasing drastically over the past year. Several factors have exacerbated his recent unpopularity such as political scandals, rejection of reforms due to limited influence in Congress, economic challenges, security concerns and backsliding in the peace process. The lack of improvement in the socio-economic condition of citizens is fostering growing dissatisfaction and distrust of Petro's work. Due to the opposition’s holdout, the President is seemingly unable to gain the support needed to push through the pledged social reforms. More protests and social unrest are likely. Currently, Petro’s government is under mounting pressure due to the series of scandals involving corruption allegations, which have triggered a drop in the President’s popularity. Moreover, his proposal of constitutional changes is raising concerns not only from the opposition, alarmed that Petro is seeking to ensure himself the possibility of staying in power after the end of his term in 2026, but also from elites and lobbies. Business groups have warned the President that a constituent assembly could disadvantage businesses and investors to the country. Although Petro claimed that the proposed changes will not affect the independence and integrity of the Constitution, the opposition believes it is a strategy to divert attention from the failures of his administration. However, a constitutional reform in Colombia would require majority support in Congress, approval of the courts, and a popular referendum. Given the lack of support in Congress and its declining popularity, Petro's proposal is unlikely to get the necessary support. Moreover, failures in implementing Paz Total's policy are further discrediting the image and agenda of President Petro. Indeed, the “Paz Total” was a central pillar of Petro’s election campaign. Unlike previous peace processes, it envisaged the opportunity to set a legal framework for the government, and carry out simultaneous negotiations with all armed groups active in the territory, while finally fulfilling commitments made in the 2016 peace agreement with FARC. Yet despite government negotiations, and ceasefire agreements with several groups, levels of violence and conflict are not decreasing in the country, with the rate of abductions rising, frequent clashes between security forces and non-state armed groups, and a worsened security situation in some rural areas. Petro’s hope to hold multiple negotiations with the different groups at the same time is proving difficult. The latest setbacks in the peace talks, such as the fragmentation of the EMC and the ELN's decision to resume kidnappings, are a clear demonstration of the far-reaching complexity of the Paz Total project. Petro's strategy is not achieving the expected results. Nearly two years into negotiations, the peace process is unable to curb the violence in the country. Clashes between armed groups and security forces and violence against civilians have been frequent in recent months. So far a stable and lasting scenario of Paz Total, as envisioned by President Petro, is unlikely to be achieved in the short term. Conclusion: Despite early public support, President Petro's progressive campaign for socio-economic reforms and peace is failing to achieve the promised outcomes. The lack of a majority in Congress and fierce resistance from the opposition to his policies are preventing the pledged reforms. Almost two years into his term, the Petro administration faces a volatile and uncertain scenario, with the President's reputation and credibility undermined by scandals and failures. Moreover, the government's ongoing political crisis and fractures are reflected in the intermittent and partial peace negotiations with major armed groups in Colombia. Intra-group splits, setbacks in peace talks, and the increased violence targeting population in rural areas make the achievement of the long-awaited Paz Total quite far-fetched. To prevent further escalation of violence and displacement crises, it is imperative for the government to develop a strategy to ensure the security and address the multiple challenges of conflict-affected communities. However, Petro's government seems to lack the necessary means and ability to improve neither the unstable political scenario nor the volatile security situation in Colombia, at least in the short term.

Date: 23/05/2024 Who’s involved: China’s People Liberation Army (PLA), Republic of China (Taiwan), President Lai Ching-te, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). What happened? On 23/05/2024, China’s PLA began two-day military exercises around Taiwan and several islands. The drills come three days after the inauguration of Lai Ching-te, leader of the DPP, who stated in his presidential address that he would protect Taiwan’s sovereignty and uphold Taiwan’s democracy. Beijing strongly objects to his presidency and the DPP’s view on Taiwan’s independence. After the announcement of military exercises, China’s Global Times stated that the exercises are intended to ‘punish Taiwanese independence secessionist forces and to send a stern warning to belligerent external forces’. China’s PLA exercises are conducted by a joint force of the army, navy, air force and rocket force and will take place in the Taiwan Strait, the north, the south and east of the islands. There are also exercises taking place around the islands of the Taiwan territories of Kinmen, Matsu, Wuqiu and Dongyin near the coast of mainland China. These are in addition to the PLA’s already sending aircraft and ships almost daily to wear down Taiwan’s defense and apply pressure to the island. China has not yet revealed how many aircraft or ships it was deploying in the exercise. Taiwan has scrambled jets and put missile, naval and land units and put on high alert in response. Taiwan’s military and officials have been expecting some show of military force after the inauguration on Monday. Taiwan’s ministry of defense said China’s actions had caused ‘harm to global peace and stability’. The opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT), a party generally seen as pro-China, also condemned China’s actions. Analysis: China’s military exercises are intended to send a message to what China believes are ‘secessionist’ forces in Taiwan. Beijing has not ruled out using force to reunify the islands. The last time China held major drills took place in April 2023, after a visit from the US Republican and speaker of the House of Representatives, Kevin McCarthy. Beijing opposes meetings between the US and Taiwanese representatives. The drills are significant and increase the risk of escalation, yet they are smaller than in August 2022. After the visit of Nancy Pelosi to the island the PLA fired missiles near and over the island of Taiwan and lasted for over four days, in what has been called the ‘Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis’. The exercises provide lessons for the PLA on how to conduct a blockade of the island by the sea and restrict air access. The main difference in the current exercise is that there is a focus on the smaller islands closer to the Chinese mainland, which could provide training to the PLA to seize one of those islands. It is likely that there are more exercises planned for this year. The name of China’s current operation is Joint Sword 2024A, suggesting that there may be another round of B and C in Beijing’s plans for this year. President William Lai said in his speech that he will continue his predecessor's strategy of not overtly provoking China while at the same time improving ties with the US and other regional partners such as Australia, the Philippines and Japan. He said that he is open to dialogue with Beijing, and will avoid conflicts that could draw in regional partners or the US. Japan’s Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa also said that 'Japan and Taiwan share the same values and is listed as an extremely important partner'.

Date: 23/05/2024 Where: European continent Who’s involved Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Germany, UK and other European countries Russian secret services, Russian military intelligence, Russian-affiliated cyber actors (Fancy Bear, Cozy Bear and others), European citizens What happened? On 20/05/2024, Polish authorities arrested nine people, including Belarusian citizens, in connection with acts of sabotage committed in the country on the order of Russian services. The acts included beatings, arson and attempted arson, both in Poland and Lithuania. According to the authorities their plans might have also affected Latvia and possibly Sweden. At the beginning of May 2024 the German federal government lashed out at the Kremlin for an espionage campaign which targeted emails belonging to the Social Democratic Party, the party of German Chancellor Scholz, and defense and aerospace firms. The campaign was conducted in 2022 and 2023 by Fancy Bear, an cybercriminal actor strongly tied to Russia which also targeted Polish and Czech institutions and political parties. Espionage campaigns have also been conducted by Cozy Bear, which is also affiliated with the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. Cozy Bear conducted phishing campaigns in 2024 to collect intelligence against German political parties but also European diplomatic entities, including in Latvia and Czech Republic. On 29/04/2024, Finnair announced the suspension of all its flights to Tartu, Estonia, until 02/06 to GPS interference in the area of the airport, which is situated around 40 km from the border with Russia. On 25 and 26 April Finnair airplanes had to divert back to Finland as GPS interference prevented landing in Tartu. Different approach methods were implemented in cooperation with the airport to avoid reliance on GPS systems. On 18/04/2024, two German-Russian nationals were arrested in Germany for planning sabotage attacks, including bombings and arson attacks against infrastructure and US military bases in the country, to undermine weapons and aid delivery to Ukraine. A few weeks earlier the Czech Republic’s transport minister warned that Russia was trying to interfere with the European railways network, especially with cyberattacks, in order to destabilize critical infrastructure. Attacks were more frequently targeting railway companies in the Baltic states. Another group was discovered in March of the previous year in Poland, which was collecting intelligence on railways and transport routes along the border with Ukraine to disrupt European aid to Ukraine. These are only the latest incidents that have been part of a widespread campaign conducted at the same time of military operations in Ukraine. At the beginning of April 2024, after independently conducting an investigation, Der Spiegel reported that the two main members of the German far-right party Alternative für Deutschland accepted payments from media portal Voice of Europe, which had been used by Russia to spread pro-Kremlin propaganda in Europe. On 03/03/2024, state-controlled media Russia Today leaked a recording of a telephone conversation between four German military officers discussing the provision of aid to Ukraine, including potentially the much debated Taurus missiles and possible targets for their use. The delivery of Taurus missiles at the time was the subject of a very heated debate as German authorities were very cautious due to the possibility of using them to target Russian territory. On 20/02/2024, Estonian authorities arrested ten people suspected of sabotage to create fear in the country on the orders of Russian intelligence agencies. The group carried out various activities, including attacks against politicians and journalist properties and possibly against memorials. Analysis Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the subsequent European support of Kyiv, Russia has increased malicious activities in the continent to hamper Western efforts to help Ukraine. Disruptive activity has targeted especially those countries who have been particularly vocal and active against Russia, including many Eastern European and Baltic countries but also Germany and the United Kingdom. While in the past the Kremlin rarely carried out covert activities in European countries, Russian operations are now more ambitious, more frequent and in some cases even more open. European countries haven’t been able to bring about significant consequences for Russian disruptive actions, although they have stepped up preventive measures in order to stop plans from actualizing. Russian subversive activities have employed different strategies, as it has become harder for Russian agents to infiltrate European territory with the current travel restrictions. Russian agents often partner up with local organized crime networks and other local actors. Countries hosting delivery lines for military aid to Ukraine have been experiencing sabotage plots against their railways and transportation routes to slow down weapons shipments, which are vital for Ukraine to oppose Russian advances in the eastern part of the country. On the other hand, countries like Germany, where certain weapon shipments have been more controversial, have experienced increased propaganda operations through subtle means, like the leaking of the phone conversation on the possible shipment of Taurus missiles. These moves were intended to put pressure on governments and sway the public opinion to decrease support for weapon shipments to Ukraine. Propaganda campaigns have been aided by prominent pro-Russian parties in many countries, mostly in the far right, especially with European elections approaching. These elections will be important as the composition of the next European Parliament and, as a consequence, the next European leadership will be able to influence the course of EU policy for the next few years. Due to physical travel restrictions and sanctions, cyberspace has gained importance for Russian destabilizing efforts. Russian secret services are now relying on a network of actors, such as Cozy Bear and Fancy Bear, to collect political and military intelligence. The information collected has often been leaked strategically to depict European institutions and governments negatively and turn public opinion against them. These cyber threat actors are also able to attack critical infrastructure, including transport-related infrastructure. For example, they’ve shown their ability to take down telecommunication networks but also to remotely control machinery at foreign water facilities. Aviation has also been affected by Russian operations in the Baltics and over the Black Sea. Northern European countries bordering with Russia have experienced a surge in GPS jamming since the start of the war, which also affected emergency aircrafts and land vehicles. Reports about interference along the Norwegian-Russian border are coming in almost every day since the start of 2024. While GPS jamming does not pose a severe danger per se, it can be extremely disruptive in emergency situations. Conclusion While Russia always had the capabilities to conduct covert operations on European territory, operations have recently become bolder, more public and more sophisticated. As Ukraine’s efforts to stop Russian advancements in its territory get increasingly dependent on Western military aid, Russia has stepped up its attempts to stop shipments of military aid, both through damage to critical infrastructure and propaganda campaigns aimed at reducing public support for Ukraine. On the other hand, European countries have expanded their counter-intelligence efforts, resulting in more and more malicious plots being stopped from taking place. Nonetheless, current events show an increased and more overt malicious activity in the continent that will likely remain as long as hostilities continue.

Date: 21/05/2024 Who’s involved: The African National Congress (ANC), Democratic Alliance (DA), uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MK), Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) What happened? On 29/05/2024 elections are scheduled in South Africa. With a turbulent, contested period prior to these elections, it is probable that demonstrations and protests will take place around the election date. The ruling African National Congress (ANC) might get below 50 per cent of the ballots for the first time since 1994, when Nelson Mandela won the first election after abolishing Apartheid - the system of institutionalized racial segregation that operated in South Africa and present-day Namibia between 1948 and 1990. If this happens, a coalition government could be initiated after three decades of ANC being in power. ANC’s loss of popularity is mainly due to unprecedented unemployment rates, widespread poverty, a lack of basic services, and corruption scandals. The enduring impact of racism and segregation also still remains evident, with black communities continuing to suffer disproportionately from poverty. Other parties are running on the promise of improving such conditions. The main opposition party, the progressive centrist Democratic Alliance (DA) strives to address unemployment, creating a fair and free climate with opportunities for everyone. The party is expected to gain around 18% of the national vote. Another party contending is the leftist, pan-Africanist Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). It describes itself as a radical and militant economic emancipation movement, empowering marginalized communities. They are likely to secure about 11% of the national ballot. Unrest between the ANC and left-wing populist uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MK) overshadows this election. In December 2023, Jacob Zuma, former South African president between 2009-2018 on behalf of ANC,  caused surprise by announcing his support for the newly formed MK Party.  In January 2024, ANC expelled Zuma, whereupon he switched to MK, appearing as the leader and campaigning vigorously. Additionally, ANC sued MK for using the name and logo of its former armed wing. On 22/04/2024, ANC lost that court bid. In March 2024, South Africa's Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) disqualified Zuma, citing the constitution's ban on parliamentary seats for those with prison sentences of 12 months or more. In 2021, Zuma received a 15-month jail sentence - of which served only three due to health reasons - for corruption allegations. This sparked widespread protests, riots, and looting, resulting in over 350 fatalities. On 09/04/2024, the Electoral Court overruled IEC’s decision. The South African Constitutional Court decided on 20/05/2024 to bar Zuma from running for parliament. Despite the ban, the MK will continue to campaign. At the same time, the party is under police investigation for allegedly forging supporters' signatures to register for the national elections. The verdict of this case holds implications for the forthcoming election as well, with potential security concerns. Opinion polls indicate that MK is likely to secure around 14% of the national vote, and over 40% of the provincial vote in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), establishing itself as a significant force in Zuma’s home province. A local source indicates that during the last months, there has been concern about unrest in the province, with people outside the province perceiving the provincial vote in KZN as a tribal issue for Zulus. The recent ban of Zuma may provoke unrest and potential violence. Overall, Zuma’s ban could diminish MK’s election prospects if members joined the party primarily out of loyalty to Zuma. Concurrently, it could turn out positively as MK supporters might garner sympathy and support arguing that the courts are against Zuma and MK. Analysis: If the ANC loses its majority, it is likely to lead to a period of unstable coalition government. Considering the opposition is quite fragmented, with circa 70 political parties and 11 independent candidates contesting, the ANC is expected to maintain the largest party in parliament. Yet, a coalition formation seems unavoidable, with its support dwindling rapidly due to issues such as corruption, poverty, pollution and a deteriorating business climate. In recent months, there has been a surge in political violence both within the ANC as well as within other parties, with 10 politically motivated assassinations being recorded in the period January - April 2024. Members are vying for powerful positions granting self-enrichment, including access to local government budgets. Diverse officials and politicians have engaged in corruption practices, resulting in the disappearance of social initiatives and funds intended for the population. An exacerbating issue is the staggering unemployment rate, which is exceeding 32%, one of the highest globally. This dire situation has ensnared millions in poverty, causing intense dissatisfaction  forcing them to depend on social grants for sustenance. Coalition governments are not a typical form of power sharing. Previous coalitions have often been viewed as ineffective, marked by brief alliances that empower political figures and encourage patronage practices. This track record has heightened concerns about the stability of a potential national coalition. According to a local source, coalition formation will be difficult, especially considering the second-largest party, the DA, has campaigned on an anti-ANC mandate. Besides, the ANC might only want to govern with smaller parties they can control. Speculations are currently causing unrest in both politics and society, and this is likely to intensify after the elections. The political shift will have implications throughout the Southern African Development Community (SADC), a region comprising 16 African member states, sparking uncertainty regarding potential changes in South Africa's foreign policy, besides the regional agenda. Relations with key global players like Russia, China, and the United States are likely to undergo review and potential recalibration. South Africa's relationship with Russia dates back decades. Since the onset of the war, South Africa has been cautious about condemning Russia’s invasion, even abstaining from supporting a UN resolution on the issue. ANC members maintain close ties with Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party and the Chinese Communist Party, engaging in "party-to-party diplomacy" and attending fully funded training sessions in Russia and China, alongside joint military (naval) exercises. The elections could prompt a reassessment of the country’s stance in Russia's conflict with Ukraine, and their relations with China and the US. Another significant factor that could sway voters on 29/05/2024 is the contrasting stances of the ANC and DA regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict. Whereas the DA maintains a neutral stance on the Gaza conflict, the ANC has voiced strong support for Palestine, having filed a genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice. However, their foreign policy last year has been inconsistent, scrutinizing the human rights records of certain countries, while seemingly turning a blind eye to those of others, making the US questioning its bilateral cooperation with South Africa. The result of the elections potentially affects the relationship with Israel. Conclusion South Africa faces a pivotal election on 29/05/2024 amid political turbulence and uncertainty. The ANC may lose its majority for the first time since Apartheid, potentially leading to coalition governance, signaling a significant shift in South Africa’s political landscape. Legal battles over Zuma’s parliamentary eligibility have raised security concerns and uncertainty about the election outcome. Additionally, deep-seated issues such as corruption, poverty, and unemployment continue to weigh heavily on the populace, stoking discontent and raising the likelihood of protests both during the elections and their aftermath. The election results will not only shape domestic policies but also hold the potential to impact its foreign relations and regional dynamics.