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Historically considered the “the backyard” of Australia, New Zealand and the United States, the Pacific regions of Melanesia, Polynesia, and Micronesia have recently sparked new international interest. These regions contain multiple small island nations, states, and territories that bear the markings of troubled colonial pasts, civil unrests, and economic potentials. The islands’ territories, in fact, are rich in natural resources, but they remain underdeveloped. They rely on maritime trade to acquire advanced goods, especially from the aforementioned Western nations. Over the past two decades, other Asian countries such as the Philippines have increasingly invested within the region. However, a third player, China, has been setting off alarm bells. Following the leaking of an agreement between the Solomon Islands and China, it has become clear that the latter has intentions of providing military and policing support to the growingly unpopular pacific government. This has stoked concerns in both Canberra and Wellington that China is attempting to increase its military presence in the region. Which begs the question, why? Whereas the Pacific Islands remain outside the geographic focus of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, previous engagement with countries such as Equatorial Guinea indicates that China may be planning to expand its sphere of influence in the region. One Belt, One Road Following the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party [CCP] spent almost half a century reengineering China from a feudalistic society to one of the most technologically developed countries in the world; at an enormous cost to human life. Within the same period China also successfully exported its communist vision to countries departing from their colonial progenitors; often through the supplementation of economic and military support. The success of these internal and external policies allowed for the creation of pro-Chinese states in Africa and Asia, such as communist Vietnam, Tanzania, and Angola. However, it was established in the early 2000s that China’s rapid growth put its population in a precarious situation. Having almost tripled its population in a single generation, it was forecasted that China’s domestic resources would not be able to satiate its population's demands in the near future. In addition, while many pro-western and neutral countries across all continents of the globe became good trading partners with China in the years after the end of the Cold War, they also came to distrust its government due to their prior escapades across the developing world. This status quo led the CCP to hold a forum in 2006 to explore the viability of a single strategy that would promote both Chinese economic and political interests abroad. Fast forward to 2013 and this strategy became what is known as the concurrently running “One Belt, One Road initiative”, otherwise known as the BRI. The strategy involves an estimated four to eight trillion dollars worth of investments by Chinese over the next four decades into countries that are roughly demarcated by the Silk Road, which operated from the 1st century BCE to the 15th century AD [the Road]. Additionally, a new maritime route was also designated in 2013 which was deemed favorable for Chinese cargo shipping [the Belt]. On paper, host nations receive large sums of money to build ports, roads, electricity power grids, and all the factories involved in the creation of said systems. But unlike many aid packages from the West, these loans on paper are meant to come with zero strings attached. This has led the BRI to receive the accolade of “Benign, Win-Win Cooperation”, but this is seldom the case. Security Concerns with the BRI Under Chinese law, all private Chinese commercial entities are obliged to cooperate with the CCP, its military, and its security services. This means that all the digital and physical infrastructure created with Chinese money/companies is accessible by the Chinese state and is built to military standards; both domestically and abroad. But while this “totalitarian” policy has led to disastrous human rights issues within China, a benefit felt abroad from said strategy comes in the form of combating the unwillingness of foreign governments to host Chinese military infrastructure. Through providing large loans to governments that are perceived as unlikely to repay them, the Chinese state is effectively able to bend their will into accepting alterations in the security dynamics of their borders. A recent example of this security overlay to Chinese debt can be seen in Sri Lanka. In 2016, the financially unviable Hambantota International Port was leased to the Chinese-owned company CMP for a 99-year period in exchange for 1.15 billion dollars of loans to the Sri Lankan government. But within 24 months, said government defaulted on its debts to China. This was awfully convenient for the CCP, as due to its “civil-military fusion” the port can service not just tankers and cargo vessels, but Chinese Navy ships as well. While this has yet to occur, the Chinese government has on paper acquired a replenishment station for its Navy’s patrolling operations in the Bengali bay and the Arabian Sea portion of the Belt route. When factoring in the weakened bargaining position of the Sri Lankan government, if the CCP decides to make a move on said port, there will be little in the way to stop them from carrying out said wishes. Based on the logic that the Pacific Islands geographically fall outside of the scope of the Belts and Roads initiative would indicate that they are safe from such geopolitical maneuvers. However, the case of Equatorial Guinea highlights the causes for alarm. Covering the Flanks Far outside of the reach of either the Belt or the Road, Equatorial Guinea hosts the built port of Bata. Falling in line with the BRI initiative, investment within the country goes much further than the port itself, winding its way through the construction of road networks, telecommunications, and electrical grids. But unlike Hambantota International Port, the Chinese government has voiced its intentions of hosting a Chinese naval base within the confines of the port. The rationale for this move according to the CCP is that Equatorial Guinea forms part of its “Pan-African” policy. Unveiled in 2021, the Chinese government claims once more “a Partnership of Equals” and “Mutual Support” with participating states within the African continent. Much like commentators on the Belt and Roads initiative, foreign affairs analysts have highlighted the militaristic inclinations of the policy. In essence, Bata will allow for the Chinese Government to widen the scope of security apparatus around the flanks of its Belts and Roads initiative in the coming years. In relation to the Pacific Islands, the deal between the Solomon Islands and China seems to be following a halfway point between Bata and Hambotana. The forecast for the Pacific Islands and China While the Solomon Islands prime minister has publicly stated that his government has no intentions of allowing China to build a military base in the region, the leaked agreement does state that Chinese Warships will be able to dock within the Solomon Islands waters. Although this is not expected to occur in the short term, this move seems to be the beginning of what one could refer to as the beginning of a “pan-pacific” approach to BRI. What is expected in the coming years is that neighboring countries to the Solomon Islands will be targeted for Sri Lankan-style loans. Evidence has already arisen for such plans when the island of Samoa backed out of a 100 million dollar deal to turn its wharf of Vaiusu Bay into a deep water port. But with corruption rampant within the region, it is highly likely that further attempts in the coming years will be made to create a “friendly port” for the Chinese Navy ships.

Written by Facundo E. Saponara On the 26th of August 2021, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP, the Islamic State’s Afghan-Pakistani affiliate) detonated a suicide vest at Abbey Gate, on the perimeter of the Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKAI) in Kabul. Claiming the lives of 180 people and wounding hundreds more, the day of this piece’s publication marks one-year since the attack and the rise to power of the Taliban. To highlight this occurrence, this piece will review the current security scene within Afghanistan one-year on, and what implications this may have for the region. The current terrorist threat On the 18th of August 2022, unknown terrorist actors detonated explosives at the Abu Bakr al-Sadiq mosque, Kabul, killing 21 and wounding tens more. Hours later, a different attack took place in Kandahar, where over 2,500 Taliban officials were congregating. These attacks, which form part of a long string of over 220 attacks by ISKP since the Taliban took power in August of 2021, highlight the severity of the current terrorist threat within Afghanistan. But while public hangings, executions, and humiliations, have been used by the Taliban to deter the ISKP movement, it seems that number and size of terror attacks are increasing. In part, this is a the result of the weakened financial state of the Taliban Government; which due to international sanctions, has struggled to maintain its military operations against ISKP. However, a greater contributor has been the inter-tribal dynamics that have long existed prior the arrival of Western forces to the region. This dynamic has been navigated effectively by ISKP to gain a stronger foothold in the country and position itself as a viable opposition and a genuine threat to Taliban rule. But while there would be an international vested interest in aiding the Taliban to combat ISKP, the recent liquidation of the prominent Al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri in Kabul by the US Air Force highlights a concrete connection between the two groups. This is in direct contradiction to the Doha Agreement, in which the Taliban committed to not cooperating with known terrorist groups. As long as such actions by the Taliban continue, it is unlikely that any financial or military assistance will be provided by the international community to aid in the current deteriorating security situation. Political and social security On the political and social front, the first year of Taliban rule has been characterized by a series of challenges. Firstly, the failure to consolidate – or begin the process of consolidation of – an inclusive national government. Although the Taliban label their government as such, the inclusiveness is not derived from a diverse pool of political affiliations, but rather from the distribution of political positions to Talib from different ethnical backgrounds (Uzbeks, Hazarans, etc.). This has given the Taliban ground to place their officials in the most strategic positions, while refusing any sort of representation to those in the political opposition. Secondly, the oppression of women’s rights has fueled political and social instability in the country, particularly regarding basic female rights to freedom of mobility, access to education, and the labor market; despite the Taliban’s initial reassurance. Local authorities have provided several reasons that justify the closure of girl schools in the country (mainly being cultural and religious sensitivities), but these haven’t been able to pacify the Afghan society. Thirdly, the lack of internal consensus within the Taliban has been palpable since their takeover, and could prove to be especially destabilizing for the country if not managed appropriately. Religious rigor, the creation (or reinstitution) of the Islamic Emirate, the adoption of the Taliban white flag as the national flag, the imposition of a Taliban-controlled government, and the openness and insertion of the international community are major hurdles that the Taliban will have to address in the near future. Overall, these political factors find themselves positioned on the backdrop of a full blown economic and humanitarian crisis. Since the fall of Kabul, the international community has questioned whether the Taliban would be capable of avoiding a famine. First estimates predicted that, within six months of the fall, an unprecedented food catastrophe in the country would take place. Thankfully, through humanitarian aid provided by a plethora of non-governmental organizations, such a catastrophe was avoided. Nevertheless, the need for humanitarian assistance continues to be of paramount importance since the crumbling state of the economy reduced the annual food production and the shortages caused by the war in Ukraine continue to put pressure on the food supply chain. Looking ahead Overall, Afghanistan is in a delicate state of affairs which is likely to degrade without further international assistance. ISKP’s ability to lure in disgruntled Taliban and al Qaeda members is a critical factor, as al Qaeda will soon need to name its new leader and the Taliban continue to show disunity. The unopposed growth of ISKP in Afghanistan will unequivocally have broader regional consequences as the group is currently present in Pakistan and – albeit in small numbers – in India. Such growth may also allow for the establishment of a new safe haven from which terrorist groups will be able to operate regionally; allowing them to exploit historical tensions between neighbouring countries (such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, or more worryingly India and Pakistan). Additionally, al Qaeda’s need to name a new leader may alter their relations with the Taliban. If the newly appointed leader is not of Afghan origin or does not seek refuge in Afghanistan, this might be the first step in distancing the organization from the de facto rulers of Afghanistan. This would be a necessity for the Taliban factions that aspire to gain international recognition. That being said, the international community should remain watchful over the Taliban-al Qaeda relationship, as the historical links between the groups were instated decades ago and are not likely to fade in the near future. Tackling Afghanistan’s decaying economy (shrinking between 20 and 30% since August 2021) should be considered a matter of national security for Western mandataries’ policies. The price of basic commodities has more than doubled in the last two months, and the shortage of inputs of the agricultural industry, such as fertilizer and fuel, has also doubled in the same margin of time. If not properly addressed, the economic and humanitarian crises will continue to affect an ever-growing number of individuals. Seeking to reduce the extent to which the Afghan civilian population is exposed to a humanitarian crisis, political violence at the hands of the Taliban, or of more radicalized parties, should be the main focal points of the international community’s approach. As an inability to do so will lead to a greater global terror threat. To avert this, the international community will need to pursue an active policy of engagement with the Taliban authorities; which would likely involve partially enabling the access of the Afghan Central Bank to its frozen foreign assets, while assisting the Taliban in creating and implementing effective procedures for counter-terrorism policies. About the author: Facundo E. Saponara Facundo, originally from Argentina, is currently enrolled in the master’s degree in Strategy and Geopolitics at the Escuela Superior de Ejército. Counting with a background in international relations, he has specialized in the analysis of interstate and intrastate conflicts and terrorism. This article was edited by Alessia Cappelletti. Annick Dingemans contributed with valuable insights from her first hand experience.

Written by Daan Vegter, Alessia Cappelletti, Adriaan Kolkman – December 2022 October and November’s conflicts and alerts/developing situations highlighted: Conflicts Russia-Ukraine: Ukrainian forces push back on Russian troops Yemen: Failed extension of the ceasefire Ethiopia: Peace agreement in Tigray, but fighting started in Oromia Turkey-Syria: Istanbul bomb attack and Turkish offensive into Kurdistan Iran: Anti-government protests following the death of Mahsa Amini Brief alerts China: Anti-government protests following harsh Covid lockdowns Iran-Azerbaijan: Heightened tensions between the countries as Iran closes ties with Armenia Pakistan: protests following Khan’s assassination attempt Colombia: Colombian government and ELN resume peace talks in Caracas World Conflicts – October-November 2022 The Russia-Ukraine War In early October, the Ukrainian army completed their counter-offensive towards Lyman, capturing the town with little resistance. The capture of Lyman posed a major loss to Russian forces as the city acted as their logistics and transportation hub. A week later, a substantial explosion partially destroyed the Kerch bridge, the sole land connection between mainland Russia to Crimea. Not only was the explosion on the bridge a logistical setback for Russia, but it also was a symbolic loss because the bridge represents the ‘reunification’ between the two lands. Russia responded to this attack by barraging Ukraine with missiles on October 10, striking cities and important (energy) infrastructure. Throughout the rest of October, Russia kept targeting more Ukrainian infrastructure with missiles. In November, the Ukrainian armed forces continued to push their counter-offensive in the south of Ukraine. This led to the retreat of the Russian army from Kherson and the Ukrainian army recaptured the city. Although the recapturing of Kherson itself went with little resistance, the fighting prior to this was heavy. On November 15, Russia launched its largest missile attack yet on the whole of Ukraine. Major cities and energy facilities were hit. During the midst of the attack, missiles also landed across the border in Poland, killing two Polish citizens near the border with Ukraine. Since Poland is a NATO country, a response by organization was feared. However, preliminary research showed that the missiles were likely to have been surface-to-air missiles used by the Ukrainian armed forces. These missiles were fired due to the large-scale Russian attack, and are likely to have missed their target, landing in Polish territory. The repeated attacks by Russia on the Ukrainian energy infrastructure show that Russia is willing to ‘weaponize the winter.’ Without sufficient energy supplies, not only the Ukrainian armed forces but also Ukrainian civilians will either freeze or starve to death as temperatures in the country keep dropping. Russia hopes that this will slow down the Ukrainian armed forces or create a strong sentiment against the war among the citizens of Ukraine, turning the war into a war of attrition. Images by Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project retrieved from Critical Threats. Yemen In April 2022, Yemen’s Government, backed by a Saudi-led coalition, and Houthi rebels called for a two-month truce, which was then extended two times until October 2nd, 2022. However, the negotiations for a further extension failed and the truce ended. Since then, Houthi rebels have targeted oil terminals and ports controlled by the Yemini Government. Clashes between Saudi-backed militias and Houthi rebels have also reportedly killed eight people. Although a full-fledged conflict has not developed at the time of writing (06/12/2022), the failed truce extension and the new attacks by Houthi rebels have raised fears that frontline fighting will resume in the country. The UN special envoy for Yemen is pushing for new talks and a new ceasefire, it is unlikely that a new truce will happen in the near future. Ethiopia On November 2, 2022, the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in the north of Ethiopia, signed a peace agreement after two years of war. The deal was brokered by the African Union and mediated by former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo. In the agreement, both parties agreed to the permanent cessation of hostilities, protection of civilians, and provision of humanitarian access and the demobilization of the TPLF as the most important points. The agreement comes at a time when millions of people have been displaced and are in need of humanitarian assistance. However, although the fighting between the Ethiopian government and Tigray has settled, fighting in the Oromia region, south of Addis Ababa, has increased. In the first week of November, several dozen have reportedly been killed by government drone strikes, the victims being mostly civilians. Oromia is the largest Ethiopian state and has steadily been growing their army, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), which is the military wing of the opposition party. With fighting ending in Tigray, the government can now shift its focus on Oromia, which will likely lead to further hostilities in the region. Turkey-Kurdish Forces On November 13, 2022, a bomb explosion in Istanbul killed six people and injured more than eighty. Although Kurdish groups denied responsibility, the Turkish government has blamed the Kurdish separatist organizations, PKK and YPG. In retaliation, the Turkish government carried out air attacks in Syria and Iraq on Kurdish positions. The Turks claim they killed 184 Kurdish militants, although the Kurds say only civilians were killed in the attacks. Since then, Turkish President Erdogan has announced that Turkish forces are planning a ground offensive against the Kurds in Syria. The international community is calling for Turkish restraint. Russia, long-standing ally of Bashar al-Assad, urges Turkey to de-escalate because it does not want the situation in Syria to deteriorate. Given Moscow’s support to the Syrian regime and the war in Ukraine, if the conflict in Syria escalates due to the Turkish offensive, Russia will most likely not be able to contain the conflict. The United States is also calling for Turkey to stop their offensive. The US has worked for years with Kurdish militias to quench Islamic State fighters; attacking Kurdish forces could therefore jeopardize years of progress in counter-terrorism operations. The Turkish airstrikes are also threatening US troops working in the region, with recent airstrikes landing as close as 300 meters from US military personnel. Iran On the 16th of September, 2022, Mahsa Amini died in custody at the hands of the Iranian Morality Police. Following her funeral on the 17th, protests erupted in her home city of Saqez, the Kurdish city of Sananda, and in Tehran. While the protests were initially peaceful, the strong handed approach of the Iranian Police and Revolutionary Guard Corps in subduing social unrest caused the death of a few dozen civilians in the first weeks. These events led to an aggressive expansion of protests over the month of October, predominantly in the western Kurdish region of Iran. Like the protests in September, they resulted in civilian deaths. Although these protests started out as anger due to the death of Amini, they have since developed into general anti-government protests, with the Iranian people demanding more freedoms and a regime change. While deadly protests are not a novelty to Iran, the manner in which these recent protests are being put down is creating a socio-political climate that is likely to tip into armed revolt against the regime in Tehran. However, the opposition/protesters are not currently unified or organized in a conventional manner and, short of a handful of incidents, the vast majority of Iranian Government security forces/militias remain loyal to the regime in Tehran. While the long-term prospects for the Iranian Government are currently unknown, it is likely that there are many more violent days to come. Brief Alerts – October-November 2022 China Since January of 2020, Chinese citizens have been living under some of the harshest Covid-19 lockdown measures under what is known as the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ‘Zero Covid Policy.’ While small scale protests have occurred since the policy’s implementation, in the last weeks of November, a large outburst of anti-Zero Covid protests have occurred in major Chinese cities. Additionally, in late November, factory employees' protests against low pay and harsh conditions quickly escalated into an outcry against the state. All the demonstrations have been met with violence by Chinese security forces, and vigils were organized in multiple cities – which have also been suppressed. The harsh treatment of mourners, plus Covid-19 protestors, have jointly started chanting for the resignation of the CCP’s president, Xi Jinping. However, it is unlikely that the unrest will prompt change in the Chinese government. Instead, it is plausible that a harsh and swift response will be applied by the various governments of cities across China, and perhaps some political figures are moved in order to quell criticism. Azerbaijan-Iran In the Southern Caucasus, Iran has been increasingly siding with Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, heightening tensions with Azerbaijan. In mid-October, Iran’s military conducted a large-scale drill close to its border with Azerbaijan, even practicing crossings of the river dividing a large portion of their border. In early November, Azerbaijan started military drills in the south of the country and detained 19 people suspected of espionage on behalf of Iran. The drills and arrests come as Iran has been critical of Azerbaijan’s intentions for establishing a new transport corridor that would connect Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan exclave. This corridor would pass along Armenia’s border with Iran and block Tehran’s connection with Yerevan. While escalation to war is unlikely, the two countries have increasingly been using hostile rhetoric and carrying out military drills in the border region. If Iran continues to support Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, a military response/action cannot be ruled out. Pakistan On November 3, Imran Khan, Pakistan’s former prime minister was shot and wounded in a failed assassination attempt that killed a supporter and injured a dozen others. Khan staged protests and marches against the government of Shehbaz Sharif, who took office in April of this year after a no-confidence motion against Khan. At the end of October, Khan announced a march on Islamabad to ask for snap elections in which analysts believed Kahn would be the favorite to win. Sharif and the current government want elections to be held in accordance with the constitution, after August 2023. Whereas the former PM has been calling for protests since April, the rhetoric used in October has been more provocative and tensions rose even further in the aftermath of the shooting. Due to the havoc these protests created, Khan called them off on November 26 and announced that his party, ‘Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)’, would resign from all provincial assemblies to push for early elections. However, it is unclear whether protests and riots will resume. If so, Pakistan may witness more violence which will further hinder the fragile state of its economy. Colombia-ELN On 21 November, new peace talks started in Caracas between the Colombian Government and the left-wing National Liberation Army (ELN). After the former peace talks were suspended in 2019, newly elected left-wing President Gustavo Petro pushed for new talks. The peace talks are part of the ‘total peace’ policy run by President Petro that promotes negotiating with rebels and criminal groups to end nearly sixty years of war in the country. Both the ELN and Colombian Government say they are willing to build a democratic peace as they stated in a joint declaration. Negotiations do not mean that military actions against the rebels will cease. About the authors Daan Vegter Daan interns as an intelligence analyst at Dyami. He is currently pursuing a Masters in Peace and Conflict Studies at Uppsala University. Experienced in analyzing large datasets and doing research on international terrorism, civil wars and emerging security threats. Although originally Dutch, Daan has also lived in the United States and Sweden. Alessia Cappelletti Alessia is Intelligence Analyst and Project Coordinator at Dyami. She has field experience in South America, Colombia especially, and has experience in researching organized crime and conflicts. Her academic background includes conflict analysis, international humanitarian law, and criminology. Adriaan Kolkman Adriaan is a contributing analyst at Dyami. He is currently pursuing a Masters in Global Studies at Gothenburg University in Sweden. Previously, Adriaan completed a Bachelor in Safety & Security Management in the Netherlands. He has experience working in the private security industry in South-America, and while having Dutch and Swedish nationality, he also lived in Suriname and several countries in the Middle-East.

Written by Daan Vegter In April of 2022, a person named Viktor Muller Ferreira was apprehended at Schiphol Airport by Dutch authorities and declared Unacceptable for admission into the country. The reason? The AIVD, in collaboration with other parties, identified the individual as a Russian GRU Intelligence Officer named Sergey Vladimirovich Cherkasov. The man possessed a Brazilian Passport which claimed that he had been born in 1989, he was the son of an Irish father, and that his mother originated from Rio de Janeiro. However, the scope of this person’s constructed identity spans further than just a false travel document. Cherkson worked as a travel agent in Brazil before commencing his bachelor’s study in 2014 at Trinity College, Dublin. He later moved to Washington DC in 2018 to pursue a Master’s at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Cherkasov’s decision to apply for the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2020 led to his apprehension by the Dutch intelligence services. Following a successful application as an intern at the ICC, his arrival to the Netherlands was postponed due to Covid. During this time, the AIVD was able to detect and investigate Ferreira, discovering beyond reasonable doubt that he was a GRU intelligence officer. Upon arrival in the Netherlands, Cherkasov was informed about the predicament he was in, was ordered to leave the country, and was placed on the first flight back to Brazil. Why does espionage happen? Due to Russia’s involvement in the 2008 Georgian War, its protracted mission in Syria, and most recently, its invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Government is eager to know the inner workings of the ICC. But to fund such a long and extensive operation, an additional concrete threat to Russian citizens, military personnel, and politicians must have existed and worried the Russian intelligence apparatus. Especially in cases concerning matters of (real or perceived) national security, the world of espionage does not stop at placing individuals in strategic positions for gathering sensitive information. Stealing, sabotaging, or even destroying information and/or equipment falls within the responsibility of international intelligence. Famous examples are China stealing the blueprints of Lockheed Marin’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and Israel digitally sabotaging an Iranian Uranium enrichment site. Both the stealing of the F-35 blueprints and sabotaging of the Uranium enrichment site are examples of cyber espionage. Cyber espionage is the practice of stealing or sabotaging sensitive or classified data and intellectual property, to gain an advantage over a rival entity, through digital means such as cyber-attacks and data breaches. When people are used to do this, it is called human intelligence (HUMINT). Here, intelligence is gathered through means of interpersonal contact. Either a spy goes undercover and steals sensitive information, or people who are close to the information gather it for a thrid party. These activities serve the primary function of international intelligence, or to search for angles/leads that will eventually help protect or advance the interest of their governments. For this reason, any individual, company, government, and non-governmental organization that deals with sensitive information could be a target of international intelligence gathering campaigns. While highly dependent on the profile of the company, typical targets for said campaigns are technology, agriculture, security, medical, and aviation sectors. What can be done to prevent (industrial) espionage? Awareness is key. Companies and organizations need to be aware that they might be a target of espionage. As said above, not only governments deal with espionage threats. Certain companies and organizations might also have valuable information useful to outside actors. To assess whether or not an organization is at risk, questions need to be asked internally such as: what type of business is this; where does the organization operate; who is hired and what actors the organization deals with on a day-to-day basis. For example, an innovative high-tech company or international NGO with government contacts is more likely to be a target than a small bed and breakfast in the countryside. Insider threats are real and need to be identified. One threat that organizations need to recognize is that people in crisis tend to be more susceptible to committing espionage. It is essential for companies to be aware of personal crises at an early stage to minimise the risk of employees being lured into espionage. Potential indicators of people committing espionage include, but are not limited to, drastic changes in behaviour, efforts to avoid security measures, financial hardship, unreported and excessive foreign travel, after-hours access to company buildings and classified documents. All employees need to be aware of these indicators and feel comfortable sharing their concerns about colleagues. Be on the offensive, do not sit and wait for something to happen. In the cases of information leaks or personnel being identified as working for foreign actors, the damage is often already done. However, when State counter-espionage campaigns miss outside actors entirely, the situation can be far more worrying. For this reason, it is essential that companies gain the relevant skills to protect their data, intellectual property, and their staff, which fall under their duty of care. Dyami offers solutions. We provide counter-espionage trainings, risk assessments, and help revising, designing, and implementing tailor-made security measures and policies. We work closely with former employees of, among others, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (BZ), the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to make organizations resilient against espionage and aware of the threats they may face. About the author: Daan Vegter Daan interns as an intelligence analyst at Dyami. He is currently pursuing a Masters in Peace and Conflict Studies at Uppsala University. Experienced in analyzing large datasets and doing research on international terrorism, civil wars and emerging security threats. Although originally Dutch, Daan has also lived in the United States and Sweden.

Date: 09/03/2023 Location: Tbilisi, Georgia Parties involved: Georgia’s parliament, Georgia’s President Salome Zourabichvili, rights groups, Georgian civilians, Russia, European Union The Events: On 07/03/2023, protests erupted in Georgia’s capital city Tbilisi. Thousands of protesters gathered outside the parliament building, where politicians had just passed the first reading of a draft law despite heavy criticism domestically and abroad. The law would require any organization that receives more than 20% of its funding from abroad to register as a “foreign agent,” which could have negative effects on the image of foreign-funded companies, NGOs and media outlets. According to the protesters and rights groups, this draft law cuts back on basic freedom rights and represents an authoritarian shift in Georgia. Protesters also fear that the law would halt Georgia’s ambition to join the EU - which is held by over 80% of Georgia’s population, according to the BBC. The EU issued a statement on 07/03/2023 that the law would be “incompatible with EU values and standards” and could have “serious repercussions on our relations.” Protesters demonstrated their EU-ambition by waving EU flags. The protests turned violent as protesters threw stones and petrol bombs to security forces, who responded with tear gas and water cannons. Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili openly supports the protesters and claims that she will veto the law. However, due to constitutional reforms in the past decade, the role of the President is nowadays merely ceremonial, which means that the parliament could overcome the presidential veto. On 08/03/2023, protesters gathered in front of the parliament building, and again the protest turned violent. On 09/03/2023, the Georgian parliament led by the Georgian Dream party announced that it will revoke the draft law. However, the party also stated that it will attempt to clarify the importance of the law after the protests have calmed down. It is thus likely that the parliament will try to install the draft law again in the (near) future. The main demand of the protesters as of 09/03/2023 is that the Georgian ruling party will formally denounce the law. Context: Georgia gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 and the relationship between Russia and Georgia has been tense since. At the center of this dispute are the two breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which seceded Georgia in the 1990s with the backing of Russian forces. In August 2008, Russian forces occupied the breakaway regions, marking the start of the Russo-Georgian War. The war was fought between Georgian forces on one side, and Russian forces and the forces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the other. The war led to the deterioration of Russian-Georgian relations, as Russia established military bases in the regions and formally recognized the breakaway states. In 2016, Georgia recognized Abkhazia as an autonomous state, but not South Ossetia. Another crucial factor for the tense relationship is the Georgian bid for NATO and EU membership, a course Georgia has been pursuing since the 2003 “Rose Revolution”. The majority of the Georgian population is in favor of joining the EU. In March 2022, Georgia applied for EU membership. In June of the same year, the EU said it was ready to grant Georgia the status of membership country. The “foreign agents” draft law might jeopardize this process of joining the EU, as the statement by the EU on 07/03/2023 shows. Over the past 18 months, Georgia’s ruling party Georgian Dream has made moves into illiberal direction, away from the EU. It is likely that this shift has aggrieved pro-European civilians over the past months, and led to the eruption of protests in March. However, Georgian Dream openly denies that the draft law signifies a shift towards Russia and away from the EU. In 2012, Russia passed a law that is similar to this “foreign agents” law in order to suppress Western-funded NGOs and media. The Georgian Dream party emphasizes that the Georgian “foreign agents” law does not resemble the Russian law. Georgia has experienced more large-scale protests in the past. In 2019, thousands of people protested outside the parliament building against the presence of Sergei Gavrilov, a communist party member of the Russian Duma, who delivered a speech about the Orthodox brotherhood of Georgia and Russia. The government forces brutally cracked down on the protest, which aggrieved the protesters even more. 240 people were injured during the protests, of which 80 were policemen. Dyami’s 2020 article on Georgia contains more information on the background of the country. Analysis and implications: The events in Georgia resemble the recent events in Moldova, on which Dyami published two intelligence briefings in February and March. Both countries are in the vicinity of Russia and have pro-Russian breakaway regions with Russian military presence. Both countries are in the process of becoming a (candidate) member of the EU. Both countries have recently experienced protests, however Moldova’s protests were of pro-Russian nature whereas Georgia’s protests were of pro-EU and ani-Russian nature. The pro-Russian protests in Moldova were allegedly fuelled by Russia, as part of the hybrid warfare campaign against Moldova. Russia aims to block Moldova’s move towards EU-membership, and it is likely that Russia has a similar interest in Georgia. The recent protest in Georgia resembles anti-Russian sentiment that has been spreading among countries close to Russia. As the geopolitical stage is transforming into a two-block-sphere (Russia and ‘the West’), it is then in the interest of Russia to prevent its neighboring countries from joining the block of the West. Russia might attempt to prevent Georgia from joining the Western block through hybrid warfare/ influence on the Georgian Dream party, as mentioned above. The Georgian Dream party will have to make concrete moves to adhere to EU values and standards in order to be accepted as a member of the EU. At the moment, the draft law does not meet these requirements. It is therefore unlikely that pro-EU Georgian civilians will change their stance on the law once its importance is clarified. Tensions may escalate further if Georgian Dream continues to steer the country’s politics away from the European Union and it is unlikely that the current protesters will settle for anything less than a permanent revocation of the draft law. Concluding notes: The majority of the Georgian population remains in favor of EU membership and people have protested before against the Russia-leaning ruling party. Voting in favor of the ‘foreign agents’ law, the parliament’s put in jeopardy Georgia’s bid to EU membership and caused protests to erupt in Tbilisi. The tension between the government and the civilians is therefore likely to remain –or escalate– as long as Georgian Dream party does not take concrete actions to push the country toward EU membership. For more in-depth Sitreps, analyses, or bespoke advice on the aviation security and safety concerns regarding this region, or other areas across the globe, please contact Dyami at+31 30 207 2120 or through our webpage.

Date: 06/03/2023 Location: Belarus Parties involved: Parties: Lukashenko and Belarussian government, Putin and Russian government, Belarussian partisans, Ukrainian government, Chinese government, Western governments. The Events: Belarus has mingled in the war between Russia and Ukraine by allowing Russia to use Belarus as a staging area. Belarus has used its own troops on multiple occasions throughout the last year to mimic the staging phase of an invasion of Ukraine. News spread recently that a document was found which described a Russian plan to annex Belarus by the year 2030. In the early morning of the 27th of February 2023, a Beriev A-50 (IL-76 AWACS) was severely damaged while parked at the Machulishchy Air Base in Minsk. Reportedly, damages included the aircraft’s critical radar as well as its avionics. The aircraft departed Machulishchy days later and made its way to Russia probably to receive repairs. In response to the attack, mass arrests have occurred targeting anyone remotely related to the attack. The attack was executed using a commercial drone, modified to drop explosives, being a popular weapon of choice in the war in Ukraine. The executors of the attacks are thought to be Belarussian partisans fighting against Lukashenko’s regime. Lukashenko has made threatening declarations that if Belarus were to be attacked by a neighboring country, its response would be “the cruelest''. Ukraine has fully entrenched, fortified, and placed landmines throughout the whole area along the Belarussian border, expecting either a Belarussian or a Russian assault originating from their northern neighbor. Lukashenko visited China this week together with Putin to discuss the possibility of ‘lethal aid’ to Russia from China, as well as solidifying the relationship between the countries. Belarus endorsed China’s position on a “Political solution” to the war in Ukraine. China’s position on this matter does not include Russia withdrawing its troops from Ukrainian territory. Belarus jailed a Polish journalist for eight years in prison on the 9th of February. This further worsened the relationship between the two countries, prompting Poland to close its most used border crossing with Belarus. Analysis and implications: Belarus’ actions demand that Ukraine, but also Western governments, stay on their toes in regard to it suddenly joining the Ukraine war. This would drain combat capacity from Ukraine, preventing it from being used against the invading Russian force. Additionally, it is not unlikely that Russia may retry an attack on Ukraine from Belarussian territory. Besides this, the staging by Belarus is already a nuisance for Ukraine as it forces Ukraine to dedicate more troops to their Northern border as a precaution, not allowing those troops to be used on the eastern front. At the same time, these actions can be used to test Ukrainian response to a possible threat from the Belarussian army itself. Russia’s plan to annex Belarus has a strong foundation. Seeing that throughout the full-scale war in Ukraine, relations between the Russian and Belarussian governments have become closer than ever before, this plan has a real chance to be legitimate in both planning as well as initial execution. However, it must be noted that most Belarussian people will probably be very resistant to a Russian annexation attempt. Despite probable success, it is very likely that this will further increase the presence of Russian troops in Belarus. The attack on the Russian AWACS may have great implications for Russian airpower, considering that Russia only has a handful of airworthy A-50s. Additionally, damaging one of the few functioning A-50s within a friendly state is a major blow to Russia’s reputation, as this sends a message that Russia even in befriended states cannot keep their most valuable assets safe. Lukashenko’s declarations could threaten Ukraine with the perspective of a false flag attack on Belarus, where either Russia or Belarus would perform an attack on Belarussian soil under the Ukrainian flag, thus dragging Belarus into the war. This is indicative of the puppet relation between Lukashenko and the country actually in charge: Russia. The Belarussian endorsement of China’s position will intensify the divide between the Russia, China, Belarus partnership and the Ukraine-sided Western nations. The effect of this can for instance influence the already tedious situation around Taiwan, and other geopolitical situations where China and the West collide. This comes directly after relations between the US and China have deteriorated following the shooting down of a potential spy balloon by the US which originated from China. The US has also warned China of the consequences of providing lethal aid to Russia in support of its war in Ukraine. Concluding notes: It is plausible that the annexation of Belarus might occur sooner than expected, as per indication of the Russian timeline. In order for Putin to compensate for his failures in Ukraine, he may therefore attempt a successful annexation of one of the other neighboring former USSR nations. This would drastically increase the tensions within Belarus itself, as a majority of its population does not support Lukashenko as president and see his position of power as fraudulent. Consequently, this is very likely to incite new riots like those seen in 2020, which may even possibly escalate to a full-scale rebellion by the Belarussians. Additionally, annexation of Belarus would extend the border area between Ukraine and Russia by approximately 450 km, which can then be freely used by Russia to open a new front if it has the capacity to do so. This possible annexation would also increase the direct borders between NATO and Russia, increasing tensions between the two even further.

Date: 04/03/2023 Where: Moldova Who’s involved: Moldovan Government, Romanian Government, Russian Government, Ukrainian Government, separatist movement in Russian-speaking Transnistria, European Union, NATO The Events: In light of Russia’s attempts to destabilize the Republic of Moldova, Moldovan Prime Minister, Dorin Recean, visited Romania on 01/03/2023 as his first official visit abroad since entering office. Romanian Prime Minister, Nicolae Ciuca, has reassured Moldova of Romania’s unwavering support for the preservation of Moldovan sovereignty and territorial integrity. He has also pledged Romania’s assistance for Recean’s ambitious reforms to consolidate the Moldovan economy and the resilience of state security, as well as advancing Moldova’s pro-EU agenda. This echoes Romanian President Klaus Iohannis’ announcement at the B9 Summit in Warsaw on 22/02/2023 that Romania is not only willing but prepared to back Moldova whatever the circumstances. On 28/02/2023 there were more protests in Moldova’s capital city, Chișinău, instigated by the pro-Russian ȘOR Party. Thousands of protesters marched through the streets demanding the resignation of President Maia Sandu and denouncing possible involvement in the war in Ukraine. Amid threats of a Russian coup d’état, Russian political agitators have been discovered posing as protesters by Moldovan journalists. The municipality of Chișinău has therefore temporarily restricted mass gatherings. Pavel Verejanu, the Mayor of Orhei and a prominent member of the ȘOR Party, along with other figures of the Moldovan political underworld have paid a visit to Russia between 22-26 February. Russia hosted a series of meetings on cooperation where allegedly the protests in Chișinău and Moldovan local elections were discussed. Chișinău has called on the European Union to adopt sanctions against Moldovan oligarchs with ties to the Russian government. Moreover, Chișinău has also asked for help to consolidate its defenses. The Moldovan Parliament is debating 2 draft laws which are meant to increase the Intelligence and Security Service’s powers to combat Russian disinformation campaigns and counter foreign intelligence activities. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has officially declared that tensions in the region are being deliberately stoked up by Kiev. Moscow has thus accused Kiev of transporting radioactive materials around Odessa in order to stage an attack on the break-away region of Transnistria. Tiraspol has launched a recruitment campaign in Transnistria for an apparent “peacekeeping” mission. This is a paramilitary contingent formed of Russian soldiers, Moldavian soldiers, and Transnistrian separatist forces. All able-bodied men under the age of 55 have been called upon to register for military service. Tiraspol has also announced a three month military exercise beginning on 01/03/2023 for its “peacekeeping” contingent. Ukraine has confirmed sending an adequate number of troops along the Transnistrian border to prevent a possible Russian attack on Moldovan territory. Out of security concerns, Moldova’s air space briefly closed on 14/02/2023. As of 27/02/2023, Wizz Air announced that it will suspend its flights to Moldova from 14/03/2023. Analysis: Moldova has emphasized its special relationship with Romania after Prime Minister Recean’s most recent visit to Bucharest. Following pledges of support from both the Romanian President and Prime Minister, a Russian military attack on Moldova is highly unlikely because that would also trigger a Romanian military response and draw NATO into the conflict. So far, Russia has shown no intention of wishing to provoke NATO into a direct military confrontation because such a scenario would be too much of a risk considering Russia’s current strategic position. Moreover, the implications for international security would be disastrous On the other hand, Russia may be using hybrid warfare to cause instability in Moldova as a deceptive tactic to encourage Kiev to divert its troops away from the Donbass. Therefore, by creating security threats on the Transnistrian border using its bellicose political rhetoric, Russia may be trying to weaken Ukrainian defenses in the East since Ukraine will now have to build up its forces in the Odessa region. Russia may have no intention of opening up a second front West of Ukraine but rather to blur the boundary between war and peace so that it can create chaos and confusion so that it may open up strategic opportunities to break through Ukrainian lines in the Donbass. The most probable scenario is that the ȘOR Party may be plotting a violent uprising in the hopes of launching a Russian-backed coup d’état. Considering that Russia interprets hybrid warfare as the Western way of war, Russia may be trying to emulate a CIA-style orchestration of foreign regime change. Verejeanu’s visit to Russia right before the start of the second round of protests in February 2023 suggests that the leaders of the ȘOR Party may have received instructions directly from the Kremlin on preparing the ground for a strike against Moldova’s pro-Western government. Indeed, Russia may try to install the fugitive Russophile Ilan Shor in power, so that it may redress the balance of power in Eastern Europe by thwarting Moldova’s progression towards the European Union and severing its ties with the West. Moldova has renounced its position of passive neutrality and has taken proactive steps towards the defense of its peoples and territory. Responding to Russia’s strategy of hybrid warfare, the Moldovan government is taking steps to increase the resilience of the Moldovan informational space. The Moldovan Intelligence and Security service should have more powers enshrined in law which would improve its effectiveness at identifying and exposing Russian subversive narratives aimed at manipulating the Moldovan population. Hopefully, Moldova will succeed in clearing its political sphere of Russian-backed oligarchs by sanctioning and removing these actors from its territory with the help of the EU. Tensions between Chișinău and Tiraspol are likely to rise throughout the duration of the Russo-Ukrainian War. The recent recruitment campaign and military activity in the area implies that the Tiraspol government is on high alert, harboring suspicions of an attack. As Transnistria feels increasingly isolated due to the war in Ukraine, the frozen conflict in Moldova may become active. Transnistria is home to the Cobasna ammunition depot which is the largest ammunition depot in Eastern Europe containing a significant amount of Soviet-era weapons. Moreover, Russia also maintains a consistent military presence in Transnistria, enough to pose a serious security threat to both Moldova and Ukraine. Concluding notes: Russia is conducting a hybrid warfare campaign in Moldova, however, this is mainly done via indirect action. Therefore, the likelihood of a military incursion on Moldovan territory is very low. The most likely scenario, nevertheless, is that Russia may attempt to stage a coup d’état in Chișinău in order to establish a pro-Russian government that would expand its sphere of influence in the region. Over the next few months, considerable social unrest and a deterioration of the security situation can be expected in Moldova due to spillover effects of the war in Ukraine in light of Russia’s aggressive political agenda. For more in-depth Sitreps, analyses, or bespoke advice on the aviation security and safety concerns regarding this region, or other areas across the globe, please contact Dyami at+31 30 207 2120 or through our webpage.

Russia-Ukraine update: Russian troops close on Bakhmut, higher Russian casualties in February 2023, and Belarus and Russia reaffirm close ties. Turkey-Syria: Turkish strikes in northern Syria continue despite the deadly earthquake, but talks between the countries took place in December 2022. Peru: Deadly protests continue and a state of emergency in three departments has been extended until at least mid-March. Israel-Palestine: Violence has increased and led to worries of a renewed escalation of the conflict, amid protests in Israel over Netanyahu's judicial reforms. Sahel belt: While the security situation in the Sahel worsens, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea propose a trilateral partnership. Haiti: Canada is set to send troops amid worsening of the humanitarian crisis. Moldova: President Sandu openly accused Putin of destabilizing Moldova and anti-government protests erupted, likely fueled by pro-Russian factions. Suriname: Anti-government protests erupted and crowds stormed the National Assembly Cameroon: The conflict between separatist Anglophone forces and the Cameroon government is deteriorating. Azerbaijan-Iran: Political tensions rose after embassy attack. Ethiopia: Tigray peace agreement’s progress and fighting surge in Oromia region. Conflicts January-February 2023 1. Russia - Ukraine As written in our intelligence brief, the recent Russian strategy has been to break through the frontline to create an opportunity for a spring offensive. In January and February, Russian forces continued to attack positions across the frontline close to the cities of Donetsk and Bakhmut. Russian attacks around Bakhmut were met with resistance by Ukrainian forces, which resulted in heavy fighting around Bakhmut. In January, the Russian forces gained control over the area south and north of Bakhmut, especially in the area of Soledar. Throughout February, the Russian forces succeeded in gaining more terrain surrounding the city, and on February 26, Russian forces managed to push Ukrainian forces out of the towns north of Bakhmut, which eventually resulted in the fall of the Ukrainian defense line. This means that the city might be captured by the Russian forces soon. Even though Ukrainian forces are holding the city, a tactical withdrawal may be the best option for the Ukrainian forces. This would mean that the city of Bakhmut will fall, but it would spare the Ukrainian forces military resources that could be significant in the future. For Russia, taking over the city of Bakhmut after almost a year of heavy fighting would be of symbolic importance. However, because of the size of the city, a Russian take-over of Bakhmut would not be the major breakthrough Moscow had hoped for in preparation for the spring offensive. Since Bakhmut has been on the brink of a Russian take-over already since the fall of Soledar, the Ukrainian forces have been able to prepare for a withdrawal. It is expected that such a withdrawal will happen without too many difficulties. Throughout January and February, fighting also intensified in the region south of Vuhledar, where the Russians took serious terrain gains. However, around February 19, Ukrainian forces started a successful counterattack in which Russian forces suffered several casualties and were pushed back to the southern bank of the Kashlahack River. The Russians didn’t manage to force a breakthrough in other parts of the defensive line, which prevented a huge spring offensive until the end of February. It was reported by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense that the number of casualties on the Russian side was higher in February than at any time since the first week of the invasion. There are no official numbers on Ukrainian forces’ fatalities, but they are estimated to be three times lower than the Russians’. The attempt of the Russian forces to break through the Ukrainian defense line thus came at a high cost and without much success. 1.1. Russia and Belarus relations Throughout February Russia maintained close relations with Belarus. President Alexander Lukashenko is known to be a firm ally of the Kremlin and backer of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. On February 16, 2023, Lukashenko stated that Belarus would join Russia in the war if Belarus was attacked. Russian and Belarussian military forces conducted joint drills with the formation of a joint military grouping. On February 21, a Russian document called “Strategic Goals of the Russian Federation in Belarus” was leaked. This document, which is thought to be authentic, shows the Russian plan to annex Belarus by 2030. This has led to growing concerns, especially in neighboring Poland. On February 23, Poland’s foreign ministry spokesperson stated that Poland will expel the defense attaché of Belarus. However, Russian influence over Belarus is contested within Belarus. On February 27, a Russian military aircraft was destroyed near Minsk. Belarusian partisans, who are trying to resist the Russian military activities in Belarus, have claimed responsibility for the attack. It is likely that Russia will try to increase its influence over Belarus in the future and consequently this will lead to a spike in violence by groups opposing Moscow’s influence in the country. 2. Turkey-Syria In November 2022, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that Turkey would start a new ground offensive against the Kurds in Syria, which was heavily criticized by the US and its allies. However, the offensive has yet to begin. On December 28, 2022, the defense ministers of Russia, Syria, and Turkey met for talks in Moscow for the first time since 2011. According to the Russian Defense Ministry, the representatives of the three countries discussed ways to resolve the Syrian crisis as well as concerns about refugees and extremist groups. It seems that the Governments of Turkey and Syria are making efforts to improve their relationship which has deteriorated since the start of the Syrian Civil War. Despite the absence of a Turkish ground offensive and the talks between Turkish and Syrian officials, Turkey has continued to attack fighters of the PKK and YPG. Istanbul claims the death of 261 fighters of these groups since the beginning of January. Despite the deadly earthquake that happened on February 6, 2023, in southern and central Turkey and northern Syria, Turkish operations and attacks have continued. On February 24, 2023, Turkish forces killed the alleged mastermind behind the deadly street bombing in Istanbul in November 2022 during an operation in northern Syria. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights the Turkish airstrike also led to civilian casualties and the wounding of a local Kurdish police officer. It is expected that Turkey will continue its attack in northern Syria during the coming months. With the presidential elections in June 2023 in mind, it is hoped that those attacks will help to achieve domestic political gains for Erdogan. 3. Peru Unrest in Peru continued after protests broke out in early December 2022. At least 60 people have died and 1,200 have been injured during clashes with security forces, marking the country’s worst outbreak of violence in over 20 years. Protests began on December 7 with the ousting of then-President Pedro Castillo after he attempted to illegally dissolve Congress and avoid an impeachment trial. Then-Vice President Dina Boluarte replaced Castillo as President. The demonstrators have been demanding the resignation of Boluarte and early elections, which are currently still planned for 2026. To appease the protestors, Boluarte proposed to hold elections in October 2023, however, Congress rejected this proposal, further aggrieving the protestors. Long-standing grievances about high levels of poverty and discrimination, as well as the violent crackdown of the protests by security forces, have also fueled the current unrest in Peru. Protesters have been blocking crucial roads, especially in the copper-rich southern Andes, disrupting the traffic and truck transit from mines. The roadblocks are causing huge economic impacts on mining and tourism. Tourist sites such as Machu Picchu were closed in January 2023, but reopened on February 15, albeit for an indefinite period. Arequipa’s Alfredo Rodríguez Ballón International Airport also reopened in February, but the Inca Manco Cápac International Airport in Juliaca, Puno remains closed. Peru has extended the state of emergency in Amazonas, La Libertad, and Tacna departments through at least March 18, 2023. This measure permits armed forces to carry out law-enforcement tasks and suspends some constitutional rights. As of February 28, 2023, Peru’s government announced the launch of projects on road infrastructure, energy, and sanitation worth nearly $9 billion, presumably with the aim of easing down the protests. However, the response of Peruvian authorities and law enforcement has been criticized by Amnesty International for violating international human rights and using disproportionate levels of violence against protestors. The protests are expected to continue as long as Boluarte remains in power, as her resignation is one of the main demands of the protestors. Meanwhile, infrastructure disruptions might cause food and fuel shortages. Even though tourist attractions and airports are open as of February 2023, it is possible that they will close again if the unrest continues or intensifies. 4. Israel-Palestine Violence in Jerusalem and the West Bank has strongly increased in the last couple of months, reaching its highest level in years. On January 26, 2023, nine people were killed in a raid by the Israeli military in the Jenin refugee camp in the West Bank. The operation was aimed at arresting several members of a terrorist organization that was suspected of planning an attack. The military action was described by inhabitants of the Jenin refugee camp as a “massacre”. The raid has been the deadliest Israeli military operation since 2005. On January 27, Palestinian militants fired six rockets toward southern Israel, which was followed by Israeli bombings of two military sites in Gaza overnight. On February 26, two Israeli settlers were killed in the West Bank, which led to revenge attacks by Israeli settlers against Palestinians. The violence throughout January and February may lead to an escalation of the conflict in the coming months. The increase in violence between Israel and Palestine comes at the same time as major political unrest in Israel. Protesters are fighting plans of Netanyahu’s government to reform Israel’s judicial system. The reform package is controversial because they would allow the parliament to overrule any supreme court decision with a smaller majority. According to Netanyahu, the changes will lead to a restoration of ‘balance’ between branches of the government and boosting business. If the Supreme Court of Israel is weakened, it would also be easier to establish more settlements on Palestinian territory. Economists and legal experts warn these reforms could push Israel toward authoritarian rule and weaken Israel's economy. On January 7, 2023, protests against the judicial reforms started in different places around Israel. It is stated that 130,000 to 160,000 people joined protests on February 25 in Tel Aviv and tens of thousands in other places around the country. On March 1, the protests reached its record during a ‘national day of disruption’ in multiple places in Israel. Thousands of protesters filled the streets of Tel Aviv, while trying to block roads and trains. The protests during the ‘national day of disruption’ were the first in a series of protests that turned violent after the police cracked down. It is reported that around twenty protesters have been arrested during the ‘national day of disruption’ and that several protesters were hospitalized. Alerts and developing situations January-February 2023 1. Sahel: Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea Since 2020, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea have experienced military coups and are now ruled by military juntas. As a result, all three countries were suspended from the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which also imposed sanctions. In early February 2023, the three countries criticized the measures taken by the ECOWAS and AU, asking to lift their suspension, and proposed a trilateral regional partnership to foster rural development, facilitate trade, and combat insecurity in the Sahel. Despite the worsening security situation and increasing political instability, the international organizations reaffirmed the suspension and existing sanctions. In the past decade, insurgencies linked to Islamic State and al Qaeda spread throughout West Africa, staging several deadly attacks and killing thousands. On February 25, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for an attack that killed more than 70 soldiers in northern Burkina Faso. As French troops’ operations in Burkina Faso are officially over (as of February 19, 2023), Russia and the Wagner group are likely to be the country’s newly selected partners for the fight against terrorism. Mali also cut ties with France after nine years in favor of closer relations with Russia’s military in May 2022, but despite the junta’s claims of pushing back on terrorism, the security situation remains highly complex. For the Sahel region, if Mali, Burkina Faso, and potentially Guinea continue to welcome Wagner group troops and crack down on the population, violence and human rights abuses will escalate in the upcoming months. 2. Haiti Haiti is currently experiencing a severe humanitarian crisis due to the increasing power of armed gangs since the assassination of former Haitian President Jovenel Moise in July 2021. Armed gangs are controlling and terrorizing villages in the countryside and large sections of key cities, including 60 percent of the capital city, Port-au-Prince. An estimated 200 armed groups operate in the criminal network that engages in kidnappings, homicides, drug trafficking, and money laundering. The humanitarian crisis is marked by the blockade of supplies of fuel and clean water and the collection of garbage, leading to the spread of cholera. Moreover, the gang’s tight grip on Haiti is disturbing the services of hospitals and schools. Haiti’s Prime Minister Ariel Henry and the United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres have previously requested military assistance from the international community to tackle the violence. However, this request was met with dissatisfaction by some Haitians who have not forgotten Haiti’s long history with foreign intervention. Nevertheless, Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced on February 17 that Canada will send navy vessels to the coast of Haiti that will conduct surveillance and gather intelligence. It remains unclear how many vessels Canada will send and how long they will stay. 3. Moldova In February 2023, Moldovan President Maia Sandu openly accused President Putin of attempting to sabotage and destabilize the pro-European government of Moldova, as mentioned in our previous briefing. The country that lies between Ukraine and EU-member Romania is currently experiencing heightened attention on the geopolitical stage for being the potential next victim of Putin’s (hybrid) warfare. On February 28, 2023, new protests took place in Moldova’s capital city Chișinău, with thousands of protesters demanding the resignation of President Sandu and denouncing possible involvement in the war in Ukraine. Interestingly, the protests were supported by the Shor Party, led by the exiled oligarch Ilan Shor who is an ally of Putin. Hence, the protests are likely to be fueled by pro-Russian sources, which means that the protests might be part of Russia's hybrid warfare campaign against the pro-European Moldovan government. Out of security concerns, Moldova’s air space briefly closed on February 14. As of February 27, Wizz Air announced that it will suspend its flights to Moldova from March 14. 4. Suriname On February 17, protests broke out in the capital city of Suriname, Paramaribo. The initial peaceful demonstration turned violent as protesters stormed the National Assembly. Part of the crowd clashed with police forces, throwing bricks and bottles and engaging in acts of vandalism. At least 119 protesters were arrested. The reasons for the unrest is dissatisfaction with government austerity measures and high inflation. As of February 28, the situation in Suriname has stabilized, but increased security measures remain in place. President Chandrikapersad Santokhi aims to de-escalate the tensions in the country by means of dialogue with civil society organizations. 5. Cameroon The conflict between separatist Anglophone forces and the Cameroon government has deteriorated since January 2023. The conflict has been ongoing since September 2017, and so far over 6,000 people have died. The separatist forces are fighting for the creation of a breakaway state in the country’s minority English-speaking regions in the North West and South West. The surge in hostilities followed Canada’s Foreign Minister announcement in January 2023 that claimed it would facilitate peace talks between the Cameroon government and the separatist groups. However, Cameroon’s government denied this announcement, stating that it has not requested help from a foreign party to act as a mediator. Hostilities will likely continue as long as Cameroon’s government denies engaging in peace talks. Follow-ups on previous conflict monitoring reports 1. Ethiopia The most recent Dyami Conflict Monitoring Report focused on the November 2022 peace agreement between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian Government. This peace agreement put an end to the two-year conflict in the Tigray region, during which both parties were suspected of carrying out mass atrocities. Eritrean forces, which allied with Ethiopian government troops during the war, have been accused of committing mass atrocities in Tigray during the conflict too. The aim of the peace deal was to end the fighting within the region as well as the assault on civilians. The peace process has made progress over the months of January and February; heavy weapons were handed in by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Eritrean forces withdrew from the major cities within the region. However, it is reported that fighting between security forces and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) has continued in Oromia. On January 1, five people died and 480 hostages were freed during an attack on a prison in Southern Oromia by the OLA. The government of Ethiopia has continued to use of force against the OLA. It is likely that the violence in Oromia will continue in the upcoming months. Additionally, the peace agreement between the TPLF and the Ethiopian Government has not led to an end to risks for civilians in Tigray. Women, health workers, and aid organizations have reported that assaults on civilians have continued since November 2022. As stated by BBC, the assaults in Tigray are committed predominantly by Eritrean troops. However, assaults by militias from the Amhara region as well as the federal government forces were also reported. Meanwhile, the Ethiopian government has been trying to stop a U.N.-mandated inquiry into atrocities that happened during the war, calling for the findings not being published anymore. The request has not yet been formally submitted to the U.N. Human Rights Council. 2. Azerbaijan-Iran In October and November 2022, tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan increased as a result of Iran’s support for Armenia, military drills in the border areas, and the new transport corridor that would connect Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan exclave. Azerbaijan also enjoys friendly relations with Israel of which Iran is weary. In January 2023, tensions escalated after the Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran was attacked. Azerbaijani officials blamed Iran for the attack, closed the embassy, and warned its citizens against visiting Iran. Tehran denied the accusations and claimed that the assailant acted for personal motives. Despite the increasing tensions, it is unlikely that the situation will develop into a military conflict, and will probably be solved diplomatically instead. If a conflict were to begin, however, it would quickly include NATO member Turkey, as the country has a mutual defense pact with Azerbaijan. About the authors: Alessia Cappelletti Alessia is Intelligence Analyst and Project Coordinator at Dyami. She has field experience in South America, Colombia especially, and has experience in researching organized crime and conflicts. Her academic background includes conflict analysis, international humanitarian law, and criminology. Anneloe Brakel Anneloe is currently enrolled in the masters Conflict Studies & Human Rights at Utrecht University and completed her Bachelor's in History and International Relations from Historical Perspective, equipping her with skills to contextualize (historical) events and to acknowledge both the uniqueness and similarities between certain events. She is an experienced researcher in the field of disinformation and is very keen to learn more about (cyber) espionage. Iris de Boer Iris has a background in Human Geography and has developed a broad interest in geopolitics and armed conflict during her academic career. She is currently enrolled in the Master’s degree Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University, during which she developed conflict mapping and conflict analyzing skills. Her previous research focused on the polarized display of the United States presidential elections in 2020 within Dutch media.

Written by Diana Coman On the 24th of February last year, the world held its breath as Russian ground forces invaded Ukraine on four main fronts after building up over 150 000 troops at different points along the border. However, what was supposed to be a swift victory, turned into a blundering stalemate. Failures occurred at all levels of warfare, from the strategic to the tactical, resulting in the Ukrainian Defence Forces launching a counteroffensive that succeeded in recapturing 54 percent of occupied territories. Both sides are thus wrestling to gain the strategic initiative in the war. Yet as the staging for the much anticipated Russian Spring Offensive has already begun in the Luhansk Oblast, the world finds itself holding its breath once more. Could Moscow potentially recover from its initial strategic errors? Whilst Russia’s performance on the battlefield has displayed gross ineptitude in effective force employment, NATO must abstain from underestimating Russian military capability. Revisiting the 2022 Invasion Using psychological operations to pervert the Western principle of the “Responsibility to Protect”, the Kremlin cited a genocide against the Russian ethnic minority in Ukraine as a casus belli in order to launch a “special military operation” to “de-Nazify” Ukraine. Russia’s strategic aims were to install a puppet government in Kiev and capture as much territory as possible to counter NATO expansion into what it deems as its “sphere of influence” in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, none of these aims have materialized due to Russian military shortcomings and fierce Ukrainian resistance backed by extensive Western support. Following the 2014 successful annexation of Crimea, panic in the West regarding the concept of Russian “hybrid warfare” may have led to dangerous presumptions being made by the Russian General Staff. Heralding cyber-attacks, electronic warfare, and psychological operations that would paralyze their adversary, Russian military leaders overestimated the efficacy of these tactics beyond their immediate impact in the opening of the offensive. The cognitive domain was essentially captured by British and American intelligence agencies who exposed Russian disinformation strategies meant to place the blame on the victim, rallying Western favor for the Ukrainian defense forces. As for the more conventional elements of the invasion, Russian strategy was excessively concentrated on seizing Kiev and decimating the Zelensky government, assuming that Ukraine would immediately capitulate if its capital fell. Russian paratroopers descended upon Hostomel Airport, attempting a lightning coup de main attack meant to be reinforced by the rapidly advancing armored vehicles from the Belarussian border in a blitzkrieg style assault. Ultimately, the initial offensive failed. Instead of gaining a foothold into Ukrainian territory, Russian paratroopers became an isolated target as the armored element advanced faster than its respective logistical support. A serious lack of coordination between Russian ground forces and the air force is therefore evident. Lacking substantial air cover as well as infantry support, Ukrainian forces were able to destroy a significant number of Russian vehicles using highly mobile Javelin and NLAW missile systems supplied by Britain and the US. Furthermore, the extent of Russia’s poor logistics went as far as deficits in food supplies, repair and medevac capabilities, as well as a viable refueling system, resulting in many tanks and armored vehicles being left abandoned whilst troops resorted to looting for food. Considering that military success depends on the ability to reassess and adapt to the dynamics of warfare, Russia’s attempt to salvage its initial offensive proved equally as disastrous. The same mistakes were repeated when the 64-kilometer Russian armored column progressed in only one direction. Russian operational military planning simply decided to forgo the meaning of rough and urban terrain which would mainly restrict them to roads that could easily be blocked by defenders. Consequently, the Russian advance was critically impeded since military trucks carrying equipment and supplies were stuck for nearly two weeks north of Kyiv. The ominous looking convoy thus served more as a feeble attempt at a show of force in order to consolidate ongoing PSYOPs meant to degrade Ukrainian morale rather than a concrete military operation meant to capture a strategic geographical objective. Arguably, the fault for the inauspicious course of the invasion can be attributed to the strategic level. The Kremlin has pursued a confused strategy, disregarding its own military doctrine and endeavoring erratic emulations of what it believes to be a Western operationalization of “hybrid warfare”. Its initial goals to seize the capital and try its hand at foreign imposed regime change (FIRC) was a political gamble inspired by Western interventions in the Middle East and Latin America and endorsed by Soviet successes in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Kabul in 1979. Emboldened by its triumph in Crimea, Moscow placed all of its hopes on its strategy to capture Kyiv without preparing any alternative plans. Strategic confusion ensued when Russia simultaneously moved into Ukraine along multiple axes, attempting to incapacitate Ukraine via overwhelming force. However, Russia underestimated the military capacity necessary to be able to secure victory which left every element of its invasion lacking adequate air defense, close-air support, and electronic warfare capabilities. Because resources were directed towards seizing Kyiv, Russian forces did not open the offensive with extraordinary firepower for the purpose of obliterating the enemy’s defenses, as their military doctrine prescribes. Hence, firepower was used to disorientate the enemy, relegating to a mere tactical function rather than its intended strategic purpose. Lessons in Contemporary Warfare Hybrid Warfare The term “hybrid warfare” has been used to signify the amalgamation of conventional and irregular methods of warfare to subvert an opponent’s social fabric and shape the battlefield according to one’s will. In modern Russian strategic thought, this has been equated with the Gerasimov Doctrine which advocates for the adoption of military and non-military measures to control the information space of a campaign. Yet there is little evidence that hybrid methods played a significant role in Russian strategic planning with the exception of the initial attack. The sloppiness of the application of hybrid methods may suggest that more traditional blood-fire-and-steel doctrines were utilized to achieve strategic effects. On the contrary, Russia interprets hybrid warfare as Western conception of war employing non-military subversive activities meant to erode the Russian political system and civilization. This stems from the Marxist-Leninist belief of the Soviet era that democratic social movements are the product of Western information warfare orchestrated by covert forces. In trying to dominate the information sphere, Russia is trying to emulate what it conceives to be a Western concept. Foreign analysts must therefore refrain from trying to ascribe Western theories of contemporary warfare to Russian military strategy. Far from encouraging a better understanding of the opponent, such attempts only create misleading assumptions of what is truly happening on the ground. Logistics and interoperability Modern operations rely on the interoperability of distinct combat specialties for the maneuvering of military arms. When various combat areas of expertise (i.e. infantry, tanks, artillery, attack aviation…) operate in a unified and complementary effort at the tactical level, then lethality and survivability are increased, hence leading to greater operational effectiveness. Russian forces, though, centered on amassing as much firepower as possible without accounting for the synchronization of tactical effects. By yielding to a war of attrition, Russia raised serious questions regarding their capacity to conduct combined arms maneuver warfare. For example, Ukrainian anti-tank guided munitions could have been suppressed had Russia thought outside pure tactics and coordinated with close air support. Moreover, it has become clear that logistics are the backbone of military operations. Thought to be the arbiter of strategic opportunity, logistics can be defined as “the practical art of moving armies and keeping them supplied”. Nevertheless, logistics are an inherently difficult affair since they involve the synchronization of all maneuver units in order to sustain the desired tempo of offensive action. By attacking on multiple axes, the Russian military already placed their supply lines under enormous strain, quickly becoming overstretched as it advanced further into hostile territory. Additionally, logistics convoys were not properly secured. Being located at the rear of the advancing combat forces, logistics vehicles suffered heavy fire from Ukrainian forces. Command and Control (C2) As illustrated by the high concentration of armored vehicles during the initial invasion, dispersion and mobility are crucial elements to be mastered for ensuring survivability in contemporary warfare. The emerging technology environment in the practice of intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) at the tactical level has created additional vulnerabilities for land forces. Concealment has become incredibly difficult due to the pervasive layering of multiple sensors so troops have to rely on becoming an uneconomical target through dispersion. On the other hand, dispersion poses serious challenges for command and control since commanders must be able to maintain a palpable presence throughout their unit. Therefore, considerable strain is placed on tactical commanders to conduct beyond line of sight C2 when dealing with small subunits. However, rigid hierarchies are characteristic of the armed forces of autocratic states, generating great challenges for the development of effective beyond line of sight C2 tools. Seeing that an example of these tools would be incorporating essential leadership skills into every soldier’s training, this would run contrary to the highly centralized authoritarian decision-making tradition. Indeed, the very command structure of Russian battalion tactical groups (BTGs) assigns insufficient trained personnel to manage subordinate conscripted elements. This makes effective dispersion impracticable because troops are dependent on direct instructions, which in turn transforms them into vulnerable targets. The Urbanisation of Warfare Historically, the city has always represented a strategic objective for armies coveting its wealth and power. But contrary to the sieges of medieval warfare where mass armies would surround and exhaust a city’s resources, war in the 21st century has essentially been forced into the city’s streets. Cities in Ukraine have become the primary tactical and operational focus of the war due to their critical infrastructure, concentration of political power, and transport nodes. The reduced armies of today are no longer able to pursue a war of fronts, thus battles occur in urbanized terrain in the form of micro-sieges where belligerents fight over buildings, streets and districts. So far, the Russians have pursued a strategy of heavy bombardment, intending to destroy the city’s infrastructure and weaken Ukrainian morale, subsequently having troops move in to clear any remaining combatants. Yet this model of warfare does not take into account the asymmetric advantage offered to Ukrainian forces in defensive positions. Heavy bombardments have actually weakened the Russians’ ability to conduct an offensive operation into urban terrain because concrete rubble and debris become versatile materials for the construction of barricades and hiding explosives. Ukrainian forces have exploited this advantage well, using cities as urbanized fortresses to perform ambushes on the flanks and rear of Russian attackers via close defense and deep strikes. The Russian Spring Offensive In light of the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive last autumn, Russia has been forced to recalibrate its strategic ambitions to the Donbass region in Eastern Ukraine. Currently, Russia has regained the strategic initiative in the conflict with attacks escalating along the Svatove-Kreminna line in the Luhansk Oblast for the past 2 weeks. Overall, Russia has made advances all along the frontline on 6 distinct axes, namely: Vuhledar, Marinka, Avdiivka, Bakhmut, Bilohorivka, Kreminna, and Kupiyansk. Most fierce fighting has been concentrated around Bakhmut as it sits at an important transport node on Highway M03 which would grant Russia access to the longest state highway in Ukraine, linking Kyiv with Dovzhansky on the border with Russia. Ukrainian forces are likely going to retreat from Bakhmut as their position is no longer tenable after being under heavy fire and facing a Russian encirclement maneuver. This may be the axis that Russia will try and exploit in order to advance towards Kharkiv and recover the territory it has lost during the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Breaking through Ukrainian lines in Luhansk would bring Russian forces closer to the city of Kramatorsk which serves as a key Ukrainian military hub. Conquering Kramatorsk is likely to absorb a lot of Russian combat power because of its substantial fortifications. Bearing in mind the critical losses incurred at Vuhledar, it is doubtful that Moscow is competent enough to sustain such large-scale ground assaults. Recent observations indicate that Russia is engaging in a war of attrition by amassing as many forces and firepower to wear down the defending Ukrainian Joint Forces. Therefore, it is vital that Ukrainian forces benefit from a greater flow of military weapons and equipment from the West so that they may withstand Russian offensive efforts. Consequently, these developments display an underwhelming offensive campaign which is likely to increase in intensity but not in scope. Moscow has revaluated its objectives and shifted its offensive operations towards Eastern Ukraine in a desperate but intelligent strategic move. To some degree, Russia has learned from its previous mistakes and is attempting to solve its logistical problems through this change in area of operations. By attacking along fewer axes and in much closer proximity to the Russian border, resupply distances, convoy security requirements and logistics support are much easier to manage. Russian forces have fortified and reinforced some railheads, bridges, and roads, facilitating the delivery of spare parts, munitions, fuel, and other materiel to forward-deployed Russian forces. However, many of the aforementioned shortcomings of the Russian military are structural, and thus it can be presumed that Russia will still underperform despite undertaking a somewhat easier mission. Furthermore, the Russian Army’s operational readiness will be subject to steady degradation the longer it remains in continuous combat in Ukraine. According to Clausewitz, offence is inherently weaker than defence as it proceeds into hostile territory, resulting in the rapid expenditure of resources causing the offensive spearhead to lose strength. This is especially true in the case of urban warfare occurring in Ukraine where offensive action reinforces defensive potential. The widespread destruction of Russian military equipment would have certainly diminished mobilization readiness. Offensive campaigns will probably be hindered by readiness problems considering that Western sanctions have impacted the Russian defence industry’s capacity to replace military material fast enough to conserve the requisite combat power. Observers have already noted that Russian forces may be rationing artillery. Indeed, Russian military planners have employed faulty strategic assumptions, forgetting that policy affects the attacker more than the defender in achieving the desired outcome. Russia may have rushed taking the strategic initiative through offensive action. Sergey Surovikin, the former commander of Russian Joint Forces in Ukraine, stabilized the situation by pursuing a defensive strategy. He intended to wait for the summer to launch a big offensive which would allow Russia more time to mobilize and plan its campaign. Moreover, if Russia would have waited longer, it would have ceded the initiative to Ukraine to continue the offensive it has started in the autumn of 2022, so Russia would have absorbed the vast majority of Ukrainian offensive potential. Nevertheless, the Russian political leadership is impatient to prove the resolve of its military might despite Russia not being sufficiently mobilized in time for the one year anniversary of the invasion. The principal architect of the present offensive, Valery Gerasimov, obtained control of Russian forces in Ukraine claiming he would be able to correctly allocate the mobilized personnel and manpower, rebuild formations and supply combat specialty arms to achieve victory. Yet he is under tremendous pressure to achieve results before the beginning of the muddy season that would impede armored manoeuver operations in Ukraine. Even more significantly, Gerasimov must act fast enough before Ukraine’s combat power is augmented by its newly promised armaments from the West, including Leopard 2 tanks, Himars rocket launcher systems, and air defence systems. In light of this, Ukraine might resort to tactical retreats so as to take the initiative later down the line with a low risk of counteroffensives after the Russians have exhausted themselves with their ongoing endeavours. Above all, it is important to understand the wider implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine for international security. Russia’s employment of “hybrid” strategies against the West threaten the stability of the established liberal world order whilst Russia attempts to impose a distinct sphere of influence around its borders that would restore the imperial status it reveres. Disinformation and cyberattacks, as well as economic and diplomatic challenges disrupting Europe’s energy security, are the main means with which Russia is attempting to erode social trust in Western democratic institutions. To withstand these threats, NATO must strive to track and counter Russian information operations through its Joint Intelligence and Security Division, exposing Russian plans and narratives as they have done at the start of the invasion. Lastly, Western strategic analysts must recognize Russia’s historical perspective and cultural idiosyncrasies within its own strategic thought without forcing it to fit into Western logics of military affairs. The war in Ukraine is likely to remain protracted. Russian President Putin has no intention of giving up his imperial ambitions of turning Russia into a regional hegemon dominating Eastern Europe. On the other hand, Ukraine is unlikely to concede its sovereignty to Russia in return for an oppressive peace. Therefore, the conflict is likely to eventually become frozen along a line of control that neither side accepts given the strong incentives on both sides to continue the fight. Instability in the region will remain for a prolonged period of time, compelling NATO to revise its strategy of deterrence so as to secure its Eastern flank and strengthen its political cohesion. In conclusion, the invasion of Ukraine may have been a grand strategic error for Putin’s regime, and it may be too late now to right the course in Russia’s offensive campaign. However despite serious military shortcomings, Russia still poses a serious threat to NATO as the conflict in Ukraine may persist for an extended period of time. Russian “hybrid” methods might have proved ineffective in the face of a conventional military confrontation, yet they are nonetheless a destabilizing force to Western societies and their respective democratic institutions. About the author: Diana-Alexandra Coman Diana is a passionate irregular warfare researcher, focusing on military strategy and civil-military interaction. Currently, she is undertaking a Master’s degree at Leiden University in International Relations. Her research mainly concerns the changing character of warfare in the present information age where cognitive dynamics drive strategy. As an intern at Dyami, Diana is responsible for editing and contributing publications due to her experience in academic research writing.

Date: 24/02/2023 Where: Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Netherlands Who’s involved: Government of the Netherlands, Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, Dutch Intelligence and Security Service, Dutch Coastguard, Dutch Navy, Government of Russia, Russian Navy What happened? On 20/02/2023 the Dutch military intelligence service (MIVD) and Dutch intelligence and security service (AIVD) stated that Russia has tried to gain information on critical infrastructure in the North Sea with the goal to sabotage. A Russian ship that tried to collect data on an offshore windmill park in the Dutch part of the North Sea was detected in previous months. The Dutch marine and coastguard adequately took care of the incident by escorting the ship out of the North Sea. On 09/09/2021 the former Minister of Defence of the Netherlands Ank Bijleveld already stated that the presence of Russian submarines in the North Sea is a cause for concern because of the risk of data theft and sabotage. On 08/11/2021 The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) published a report on the value of and threats to (economic) activities in the North Sea. The report analyzes in great depth the potential risks of hybrid threats by external state actors, such as gathering intelligence through espionage and by acts of sabotage or by cyber attacks. Importantly, the report concludes that the current security of the North Sea activities is insufficient and should be improved, as the increase of (economic) activities will lead to an increase in security risks. The report suggests establishing a ‘North Sea Authority’, and that “the division of maritime security responsibilities and mandates between the various public, private and public-private stakeholders must be fundamentally revisited”. On 11/11/2021 Dutch politician Derk Boswijk submitted a motion on the development of a strategy to protect the critical infrastructure in the North Sea. This motion was accepted and eventually led to a first plan to improve the protection of the undersea infrastructure. However, the plan lacks concrete measures for improvement. In short, even though the potential threats to the activities in the North Sea have been known for a while, concrete measures to improve the security of the vital undersea infrastructure have not been taken and the current protection of the Dutch exclusive economic zone remains insufficient. Context: Activities in the North Sea are vital to the Dutch economy. Cables and pipelines that lie on the seafloor are crucial for energy supply and telecommunication. Hence, protecting these activities is a national responsibility. The amount of critical underwater infrastructure in the North Sea will increase over the next decades: due to the energy transition, wind power production capacity will increase greatly and since the Netherlands is a digital node for Europe, data telecommunications are also expected to increase. This means the amount of critical underwater infrastructure in the North Sea will grow. It is expected that one-fifth to onehalf of the Dutch North Sea floor will be covered with telecom and electricity cables by 2050. This increase in underwater infrastructure in combination with the risks of espionage, sabotage and cyber attacks makes the security of the North Sea more pressing than ever. The incident on the Dutch part of the North Sea follows sabotage events in Norway. In November 2021 4.3 kilometers of high-tech communication cables disappeared from a seabed in Norway. Pieces of those cables were later found more than 11 kilometers away from the original location, which ruled out a natural cause. On 07/01/2022 undersea cables that connected Norway with an Arctic satellite station were damaged. It turned out that the cables were cut, which points to sabotage. On 26/09/2022 the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines from Russia to Western Europe were sabotaged by the use of explosives. It is suspected that Russia is responsible for this act of sabotage, but there were also allegations made towards the U.S. However, there is no concrete evidence so far in either direction. Even though investigations are still running and both countries deny any involvement, the sabotage of cables in Norway and of the Nord Stream pipelines demonstrate the vulnerability of undersea infrastructure. Compared to other European countries surrounding the North Sea, the Netherlands is falling behind with respect to the security of undersea infrastructure: The United Kingdom is building two special, multi-role, underwater surveillance ships. France published a ‘Seabed Warfare Strategy’ in February 2022, which aims at broadening the capabilities of anticipation and action of the French Navy up to 6,000 m depth. Belgium has a ‘minister of Justice and the North Sea’: Vincent van Quickenborne. According to Van Quickenborne, Belgium witnessed suspicious movements close to their windmills and telecom and gas pipelines in November 2022. In response to these threats, Belgium invested in software to better locate ‘spy-ships’ and adopted a law to “better protect critical infrastructure”, according to Van Quickenborne. Analysis: The opportunity window for espionage, sabotage and cyber attacks of the critical underwater infrastructure will stay open as long as the Dutch government does not take action to level up the security of the Dutch exclusive economic zone.. Because of this opportunity window and the continuing hostilities between the West and Russia, it’s expected that the number of incidents containing espionage, sabotage and cyber attacks of the underwater infrastructure by Russia will expand in the future. The risk of such acts is smaller in the case of China. The country has major economic interests in the North Sea and espionage, sabotage or cyberattacks on the underwater infrastructure would thus not be beneficial for Beijing. Even though the urgence to level up the protection of the Dutch exclusive economic zone has become evident for the Dutch government, it is unclear which authorities should be responsible for the protection. The government plans to expand the tasks of the Dutch coastguard with respect to the protection of the exclusive economic zone. However, it is the question whether the ships of the coastguards are being employable enough to perform such tasks. Besides, it seems impossible to secure every single meter of underwater infrastructure all the time because of the enormous length of the total number of cables in the Dutch exclusive economic zone. The Dutch government thus faces a major challenge with respect to the protection of the underwater infrastructure. However, efforts to protect the North Sea by other countries in the region, such as France, Belgium and the UK, might serve as an example for future steps that can be taken. Other steps can be the establishment of a ‘North Sea Authority’, as proposed by the HCSS. The aim of sabotaging Dutch undersea infrastructure is part of Russia’s broader non-military hybrid warfare against the West, aiming to divide, disrupt and destabilize Europe. Russia engages in this campaign to strengthen its own geopolitical position in the world. Hybrid warfare is a more accessible way to increase its position than through military campaigns, and therefore it is likely that Russia will continue or even increase its hybrid warfare against the West. For more in-depth Sitreps, analyses, or bespoke advice on the aviation security and safety concerns regarding this region, or other areas across the globe, please contact Dyami at +31 30 207 2120 or through our webpage. 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Date: 17/02/2023, 17:00 Where: Moldova Who’s involved: Moldovan Government, Moldovan President Maia Sandu, Russian Government, Ukrainian president Zelensky, separatist movement in Russian-speaking Transnistria, European Union What happened? On 09/02/2023 during a meeting with members of the European Union in Brussels, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said that Ukraine intercepted plans by Russian secret services to destabilize Moldova. According to Zelensky, the intercepted documents contained information on “the who, when and how of the plan to break the democracy of Moldova and establish Russian control over the country.” On 10/02/2023, a Russian missile launched from the Black Sea violated Moldova’s airspace. On 10/02/2023, just hours after the Russian missile was launched, the Moldovan prime minister Natalia Gavrilita resigned after 18 months in power. She claimed her resignation was due to the economic turmoil caused by the war’s spillover effects. Dorin Recean replaced Gavrilita as the new prime minister of Moldova. Recean previously served as Maia Sandu’s defense and security adviser. In a statement, he declared that he will continue Moldova’s journey toward EU integration and promote regional security. On 13/02/2023, Moldova’s President Maia Sandu accused Russia of planning to sabotage and destabilize the Moldovan government, with the aim of bringing down the Moldovan leadership and preventing Moldova from joining the European Union. According to Sandu, the Russian plan involved citizens of Russia, Montenegro, Belarus, and Serbia entering Moldova to initiate protests in an attempt to “change the legitimate government to an illegitimate government, controlled by the Russian Federation to stop the EU integration process. [...] The plan included sabotage and militarily trained people disguised as civilians to carry out violent actions, attacks on government buildings, and taking hostages,” Sandu told reporters. The accusations were not backed with evidence. Russia denied the accusations. On 14/02/2023, Moldova temporarily closed its airspace because of a presumed air balloon that entered its territory. The government did not specify what happened to the balloon or where the balloon originated. However, Moldova’s quick decision to close its airspace shows that the country is highly alert for possible threats. Context: Moldova has had a pro-EU government since 2020, led by President Maia Sandu. Since the Russian invasion in February 2022, Moldova has backed Kyiv. Moldova separates southern Ukraine from NATO and EU-member Romania, giving Moldova strategic importance to the war in Ukraine as a buffer zone between NATO and Russia. Moldova is one of the poorest countries in Europe and has a small army of 6500 soldiers. Because of its long shared border with Ukraine, the country depends on Ukrainian air defense. However, due to the war, Moldova requested help from Western countries to strengthen its air defense capabilities in January 2023. Along the Moldova-Ukraine border is the breakaway region of Transnistria, which split off from Moldova in 1992 - although other countries do not recognize it. This region is mainly inhabited by Russian-speaking people and Russia has about 1500 soldiers stationed there. Moldova is facing severe spillover effects of the war in Ukraine. Missile attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure cause power blackouts and energy shortages on a regular basis, and the energy crisis has led to high inflation. Missile debris landed on Moldovan ground a few times and Russian missiles have violated the Moldovan airspace multiple times since the start of the war. Analysis: Given that the new prime minister Recean is a former defense and security advisor, it is likely that Moldova will pursue a tougher defense strategy than under his predecessor. Recean will also likely tighten relations between the EU and Moldova. Even though in the initial phase of the war in Ukraine it was feared that Moldova would fall victim to the expansionist aggression of Russia, it is not likely that Moscow will act in open conflict against Moldova anytime soon, for several reasons: Invading Moldova will bring Russia closer to NATO territory, increasing the likelihood of an incident that might catapult NATO into war. This is not in Russia’s interests for as long as it does not hold a clear military advantage. For a successful military attack on Moldova, the Ukrainian city of Odesa is a key element for Russia. However, not only has this city not seen any major conflict since the start of the war, but it has also bolstered its defenses against invasion, mining and fortifying defensive positions. Taking this city would require Russia to either push the frontline to the city, which is very unlikely, or execute a successful amphibious assault on the city and then hold the beachhead while part of their troops moves into Moldova. This scenario is very unlikely too. An airborne assault on Moldova also is improbable, because the Russian air assault (VDV) has already suffered significant losses in the war. Additionally, an airborne invasion would require crossing heavily defended NATO or Ukrainian airspace. If somehow Russia were to successfully do this, the constant supply needed for their troops would face the same issues over and over again. It is likely that Russia might attempt to install a pro-Russian government in Moldova at the expense of the current pro-EU government. Russia has tried to destabilize foreign governments before, such as during the 2020 U.S. elections when Russia used ‘troll farms’ to reach millions of American voters. Gaining control over Moldova is of strategic importance for Moscow as the country serves as a buffer zone between Ukraine and NATO-member Romania. However, it appears that NATO is strengthening its relationship with Moldova. During a NATO meeting in Bucharest in November 2022, officials of NATO member countries promised support to Moldova and offered help with security and defense training in light of Russian pressure on the country. Albeit unlikely at the moment, this may lead to Russian retaliation, if Moscow feels threatened by NATO’s perceived expansion eastward. Concluding notes: Even though the Russian destabilization plan for Moldova is still unclear, it is expected to focus on promoting or installing a pro-Russian government in Chișinău. In addition to being an advantage for Moscow, this would benefit a significant group of Moldovan citizens living in the self-declared statehood of Transnistria. Moscow strongly supports the de-facto government of Transnistria and Russian forces are already present in the region. However, the good relationship between Transnistria and Russia does not mean that support for Russia is widespread in Moldova, or that the plan would easily remain in place if successful. The Russian plan to install permanent forces in Transnistria in 2004 was highly contested by many Moldovan citizens and led to protests within the country. If the suspected Russian plan to destabilize Moldova succeeds, it is likely that it will be highly contested and lead to social unrest. This will not only result in increased tensions within Moldova but would also further hurt the already troubled relationship between Russia and the West. For more in-depth Sitreps, analyses, or bespoke advice on aviation security and safety concerns regarding this region, or other areas across the globe, please contact Dyami at +31 30 207 2120 or through our webpage. 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Be aware that the security situation in #Peru is deteriorating by the hour amid political unrest. Roadblocks and the closure of several airports due to rioting have caused people to get stuck without supplies coming in, creating a dangerous situation for all that may spiral out of control soon. Our team at dyami | strategic security services produced a short report on the situation, including tips and support for travellers stranded.