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Date: 08/06/2023 Location: The Middle East Parties involved: Iran, Israel, Syria, Saudi-Arabia, Yemen, United States. The Events: On 10/03/2023, in an historic first, Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed to restore their diplomatic ties, which have been in a bad state for decades. In many areas both countries have been opponents of each other and the two countries have supported opposing parties in multiple conflicts, like for instance in Yemen and Syria. The deal can be seen as a first sign of the decrease in tensions. The improvement of diplomatic relations between the two countries provides an opportunity for Iran to step out of a relatively isolated position on the world stage that it has held for the past years. For Saudi Arabia, the deal provides a way to protect itself, as well as other Gulf States, against attacks from Iran, as there will be more possibilities to negotiate over disagreements that will likely pop-up in the near future. On 12/04/2023 it was reported by news agency Reuters that Iran had been smuggling weapons and military equipment to Syria under the disguise of relief aid for the Syrian regions affected by February earthquakes. The deliveries were meant to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and to strengthen Iran’s defense capabilities against Israel in Syria. According to Reuters, the secret deliveries went on for 7 weeks. On 05/05/2023 Iran and Syria renewed their diplomatic and military relations emphasizing that Syria is an important ally to Iran. Israel then accused Iran of delivering more and more weapons to Syria and to Syria aligned terrorist organizations like Hezbollah in recent months. On 07/05/2023 the Foreign ministers from the Arab League member states voted in favor of the reinstatement of Syria’s membership, after Syria was suspended from the Arab League for more than 10 years. The return to the Arab League is a political victory for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, as the allowance to return signals the acceptance by regional actors that Assad's government has survived in Syria. On 14/05/2023 Iran summoned the Iraqi ambassador to complain about the lack of effort on the Iraqi side on combating terrorist organizations that target Iran. Though not mentioned specifically, it is believed that Iran has problems with the Kurdish organizations in the North of Iraq. According to Iran the Iraqi Kurds are directly responsible for domestic attacks in Iran. On 26/05/2023 Israel’s National Security Advisor warned that Israel will do a pre-emptive strike on Iran if it continues with the development of a nuclear warhead. Iranian leaders in return have warned that they will make sure that Israel will face a multi-front war if it dares to attack Iran, suggesting that Iran and Syria will attack from the east and Hezbollah will attack from Lebanon in the north. Countering this threat, Israel’s prime-minister Netanyahu emphasized that it is prepared for a multi-front war. On 29/05/2023 Israel allegedly launched a series of airstrikes on Iranian IRGC (Islamic Republican Guard Corps) targets in and near Damascus, Syria. The airstrikes are part of an ongoing campaign against weapons convoys and caches, IRGC compounds and installations, and Hezbollah camps. On 29/05/2023 Israel launched an extensive military drill in the north of Israel called “Operation Firm Hand”. The IAF and IDF (Israeli Air Force and Israeli Defense Forces) will simulate attacks deep behind enemy lines and simulate how to fight a multi-front war. This drill is seen as a message to the Iranian government to back down on its threatening rhetoric. On 06/06/2023 the Iranian government unveiled a new, allegedly hypersonic, missile called the Fattah. According to Iran the missile can reach speeds up to Mach 15 and can hit Israel in 400 seconds whilst outmaneuvering air-defense systems and even destroying those systems. Analysis: It is likely that Iran will continue to expand its influence on the Middle-East. The IRGC is a semi-autonomous military entity within Iran and is responsible for fighting Iran’s proxy wars against Israel and the West in general. The IRGC is likely to increase its activities in Syria in the coming months. This will undoubtedly lead to more airstrikes from Israel on Syrian soil and retaliatory strikes from IRGC affiliated Syrian and Palestinian militants. Iran and Israel are not likely to decrease their rhetoric towards each other in the coming weeks or months. With Israel getting Operation Firm Hand under way and Iran unveiling its new Fattah hypersonic missile, it seems that the two countries are headed for an actual confrontation in the near future. Peace negotiations are taking place behind closed doors with the US and Saudi-Arabia leading the talks. But it seems that neither Iran or Israel are inclined to back down on their rhetoric with both countries also trying to deflect national- and international attention away from internal political struggles. The right-wing government of prime-minister Netanyahu of Israel is under a lot of scrutiny for trying to pass a judicial reform bill that would essentially grant the sitting government unilateral power to pass decisions with the Supreme Court not being able to interfere. This reform bill has led to massive protests across the country. These protests forced Netanyahu to freeze the bill for the time being. The protests however have continued with the demand that the bill be taken out instead of frozen for now. Netanyahu and his ministers and advisors have been trying to deflect attention away from the domestic troubles by focusing on Iran’s development of a nuclear warhead. In Iran there has been a constant wave of protests against the strict Islamic rulership in the country. With the deaths and detentions of many protestors, whose demand is that the Islamic regime stops enforcing strict Islamic laws on, especially, women, the protests continue to this day. The Iranian regime has cracked down on the protests with unprecedented violence, but still the protests continue. It is unlikely that they will diminish anytime soon. The Iranian government has, not unlike the Israeli government, tried to deflect attention away from their domestic problems by focusing on its rivalry with Israel. An open confrontation between Iran and Israel will lead to a multi-front war in the Middle-East with countries like Syria and Lebanon being pulled into the conflict. It is unclear whether other Arab nations will stay neutral or will support one of the sides in such a conflict. Historically Arab nations have banded together to form a bloc against Israel, but in recent years Israel has signed, or will sign, multiple treaties with Arab countries like the UAE and Saudi-Arabia. Historically there is peace with Egypt and Jordan. The United States will undoubtedly try to use its influence in the region to calm all parties involved, but it seems that more and more the Arab nations and Israel no longer blindly follow the United States lead. Conclusion: With tensions running high between the two countries it is not likely the rhetoric on both sides will die down in the coming weeks or months. It is likely Israel will continue its air-strikes on IRGC targets in Syria as Iran will increase its IRGC presence in the same country. There is a chance of Israel initiating a pre-emptive strike against Iran’s presumed nuclear capabilities in the near future. This could lead to a regional conflict in the Middle-East with countries like Syria and Lebanon being sucked into a multi-front war against Israel. The past negotiations, initiated by the United States and its Arab allies, have led to cooler heads on both sides of the conflict, but it seems that Israel and Iran want to make independent decisions, ignoring international pressure. With domestic political problems in both countries on an all time high, leaders of both countries are more than happy to draw attention away from their political struggles and draw attention to the conflict between the two countries. Any such conflict will be devastating for the region as both countries have professional and well-equipped armies. There is no clear indication as to who would be victorious in such a conflict, but there is no doubt that it will have an enormous impact on the people, economy and environment of the countries involved and affected by such a war.

Dyami Insights Analysis Following the lifting of the arms embargo on the Republic of Cyprus by the United States in September 2022, the two countries have been enjoying closer relations than ever in the realm of defense and security. Cyprus’ position in the East Mediterranean is becoming of increasing interest to the US since it offers a strategic vantage point to project power in the region, especially regarding Russian activities from its military bases in Syria. However, whilst this strengthens NATO’s ability to further isolate Russia, given its ties with Cyprus, it has caused divisions within the Alliance. Turkey has vehemently condemned the lifting of the arms embargo as well as US-Cyprus security cooperation, claiming that Washington is losing its impartiality in the dispute surrounding the divided island. At the same time, Romania’s role within NATO is increasing as the Allies rush to modernize its military bases to NATO’s highest operational standards. Indeed, NATO’s backbone may be shifting towards Eastern Europe and that may occur at Turkey’s expense. With Turkey proving an unreliable ally, could this signify a shift in Turkey’s geopolitical position in the alliance? Growing Cyprus-US Cooperation When the Republic of Cyprus became an attractive destination for the illicit funds of Russian oligarchs, the US decided to intervene and incentivize the Greek island-state’s realignment with the West by offering its most coveted service: security. Previously, Russia had been a close military partner and a major arms exporter to Cyprus, with the Russian Navy even being granted access to Cypriot ports. The Republic has been wary of the security situation on the island due to the ongoing Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus, welcoming Russia’s support to build up its National Guard. The United States thus saw an opportunity to step in and outmatch Russia’s assistance to Cypriot defense in the hope that this would minimize its political influence in the region. In 2020, the Cyprus Center for Land Open Seas and Port Security (CYCLOPS) training facility opened in Larnaca after the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Cypriot governments, marking the start of official cooperation in the security domain. The US State Department’s Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program provided the know-how, technology, and funding for the center, bolstering security capacity-building in the wider Eastern Mediterranean region in non-military areas such as customs control, maritime security, and cybersecurity. Once the arms embargo was lifted, a close military collaboration between the two nations quickly ensued. The former Minister of Defense, Charalambos Petrides, declared that Cyprus will be spending close to €200 million in 2023 on armaments alone, pushing to replace its old Soviet-era arsenal acquired from Russia with modern Western weaponry. Furthermore, the National Guard of the Republic of Cyprus signed its first Bilateral Defence Cooperation Programme with the US in January 2023. This is a step forward for the Cyprus National Guard after becoming paired with the New Jersey National Guard as part of the National Guard Bureau’s State Partnership Program. Several bilateral military trainings and exercises have also taken place, such as Silver Falcon 2023 and Proteas 2023, as well as demining trainings for Ukrainian personnel together with Irish military experts. Most recently, on the 16th of May 2023, the USS Arleigh Burke arrived at Limassol Port for a symbolic visit formally displaying the American-Cypriot military partnership. The Arleigh Burke is part of the NATO Forward Deployed Naval Forces-Europe (FDNF-E) routinely operating throughout the waters of Europe and Africa in support of NATO’s Integrated Air Missile Defense architecture. According to Declassified UK, cooperation may run so deep that there is a significant American military deployment at RAF Akrotiri, one of the British Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) in Cyprus. Souring Relations with Turkey When the whole Although an expanding foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean and the gradual removal of Russian political influence from the Republic of Cyprus would appear to benefit NATO, this has caused divisions among the alliance’s members. Turkey has strongly objected to US security cooperation and arms sales with the Republic of Cyprus, accusing the US of disrupting the balance of power on the island at the expense of Turkish Cypriots. Indeed, the Cyprus issue persists to be a longstanding source of tension between NATO partners Greece and Turkey, as well as other territorial disputes. The Turkish President, Erdoğan, reinstated his commitment to take all necessary steps to ensure the security of the Turkish Cypriot people and protect the sovereignty of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which only Turkey recognizes as a legitimate state. The ceremonial landing at Limassol Port of the USS Arleigh Burke and the nuclear-powered submarine USS San Juan in the previous month has considerably inflamed US-Turkey relations which deteriorated in recent years. After an accumulated number of crises, starting with Turkey’s acquisition deal for the Russian S-400 missile system, NATO has begun to see Turkey as an increasingly disruptive ally. Turkey continues to block Sweden’s membership in NATO on the pretext that Sweden is sympathetic to the Kurdish nationalist movements and harbors followers of Fethullah Gulen. In light of the dire security environment caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Turkey’s anti-Western foreign policy has undermined NATO’s interests and democratic governance regarding the admission of new members into the alliance. Furthermore, Turkey’s precarious geopolitical balancing act has led to questions being posed on whether NATO should explore ways to eject Turkey from the alliance considering the widening discrepancy in political values. These developments have led to speculations on whether the US is actually planning to leave Incirlik Air Base in Turkey where a substantial amount of its nuclear assets are stationed. Evidently, Turkey’s strategic importance to NATO has been diminished due to Erdoğan’s foreign policy choices and his gamble on Turkey’s strategic position as an indispensable NATO member. Turkey has therefore become a problem to be managed, and how NATO will manage this will likely produce some significant geopolitical power shifts. The results of the recent election hold tremendous weight since Erdoğan will tilt Turkey further away from Europe while practicing his authoritarian and populist politics. Overall, not all is well on the South Eastern flank of the alliance. Not All Quiet on the Eastern Front Blossoming US-Cyprus cooperation and tensions with Turkey may be indicative of other developing power dynamics within the Trans-Atlantic alliance. Due to the war in Ukraine, Romania’s strategic significance for NATO has been increasing exponentially. Its position in South Eastern Europe and the Black Sea Region offers NATO an auspicious vantage point on the frontline in the Donbas as well as Russia’s ongoing hybrid warfare campaign in Moldova. Since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO expanded its permanent air policing peacetime mission to reinforce its borders in South-Eastern Europe. Consequently, the NATO Security Investment Programme approved a significant renovation plan in 2015 for the Mihail Kogalniceanu military base, located in proximity to the Black Sea port of Constanta, to be led by Romania in coordination with NATO allies. The budget for upgrading the capacity and infrastructure of the base is estimated at more than EUR 2.5 billion, with USD 21.6 million being allocated by the US Army in 2019 alone. Following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States relocated a Stryker squadron of about 1 000 service members from Vilseck, Germany, to Romania. Moreover, the 2nd Brigade Combat Team of the 101st Airborne Division has been deployed for the first time since the Second World War, functioning as the most forward-based American unit in Eastern Europe. NATO has also formed a multinational battlegroup based at the newly built Cincu military base in the centre of the country. Nevertheless, Kogalniceanu is set to become the biggest military base in Eastern Europe overlooking the Black Sea. Such military commitment demonstrates NATO’s robust defence and deterrence presence in the region, as well as its increased readiness to react if Russia directs its aggression towards any NATO allies in its vicinity. Indeed, Romania has become a very active zone for NATO with more and more troops moving in and military exercises constantly happening throughout the year, such as Defender Europe 23, Sea Shield 2023, Dacian Spring 2023, Junction Strike 2023, and Sabre Guardian 2023. As Romania’s role within NATO grows simultaneously with deepening US-Cyprus relations, geography can provide clues to the changing strategic landscape in Eastern Europe. Looking at the geo-strategic position of Romania and Cyprus, it may appear that the US may be trying to circumvent Turkey and conduct its military operations in the region without the need for its knowledge or approval. Erdoğan’s presidential victory has sealed Turkey’s fate since his foreign policy is proving detrimental to NATO interests. Therefore, Cyprus’ location in the Eastern Mediterranean supplants Turkey’s connection to the Middle East, allowing the US and UK, as NATO members, to assert their presence in the area via seapower and airpower. Strategically speaking, seapower and airpower can deny the adversary the ability to exercise control over his forces, thus diminishing the influence of hostile actors threatening Trans-Atlantic security. On the other hand, a military build-up on the island poses the risk of aligning Turkish and Russian security interests against the Republic. There may be a possibility that the region could become destabilized if a cautious defense policy is not pursued or if land power assets are not deployed to act as a deterrent to any aggression on the island. Yet it is likely that NATO’s center of gravity may shift towards Romania due to its position in Eastern Europe, having access to the Black Sea and bordering Ukraine. In light of Russia’s renewed belligerence, NATO has reoriented its focus on its member states in the East that better fit its strategic objectives. Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states have taken exponential measures to reinforce NATO’s Eastern flank against Russia, proving to be reliable and resourceful allies through their military as well as humanitarian response to the crisis. Whilst Cyprus compensates for Turkey’s position adjacent to the Middle East, Romania replaces its outlook towards the Black Sea. Thus, NATO may be trying to quietly and incrementally exclude Turkey from its inner workings without causing any open contention on the matter. Turkey’s control over the Bosporus strait is still significant, but it is diminished by the existence of the port of Constanta and the Galati shipyard in Romania, which can allow for the effective exertion of seapower in the Black Sea. Moreover, the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft indicated that the US may be revising its military presence abroad, drawing down in certain places and building up others. As Romania and Cyprus are experiencing a build-up, Turkey may be experiencing a drawdown with most personnel and equipment being moved out of Turkey to these locations. Arguably, Romania has a better strategic position to combat the security threat presented by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its bid for political influence in Europe. Kogalniceanu Air Base, in particular, may be expanding in order to act as a strategic replacement for Incirlik Air Base in the future. Cyprus, on the other hand, may become an unstable geopolitical battleground as multiple actors will jockey for power in the region. Developments in the security situation of this popular holiday destination must be closely monitored since the frozen conflict on the island risks being absorbed into the reignited Russo-American rivalry. To conclude: there are certainly great power shifts happening in Eastern Europe fomented by the war in Ukraine. These shifts are indeed represented by current military movements as Turkey’s commitment to NATO is being questioned due to Ankara’s ties with the Kremlin and its anti-Western rhetoric. NATO’s dependence on Turkey, nevertheless, is in the process of decline as Cyprus and Romania present viable geostrategic alternatives while Eastern Europe’s political significance is on the rise.

Written by Leonardo Wanderley, Contributing Analyst Colombia Security risk: Moderately High Since President Petro’s reforms have faced resistance from moderate and right-wing sectors in Congress, the left-wing president has remained pragmatic in his negotiations. In early May 2023, legislators finally approved President Petro's four-year development plan expanding Colombia’s social protection network. On May 8, the National Police captured 6 members of a criminal organization dedicated to the laundering of assets valued at over USD 1.1 million. In a simultaneous operation in the departments of Huila, Cundinamarca, Risaralda and Valle del Cauca, the National Police dismantled the organization, which employed legally constituted companies to generate fictitious exports and ship drugs to Belgium or Spain. Colombia-Ecuador On May 25, an international criminal organization involved in cocaine trafficking between South America and Europe was dismantled following an operation involving Ecuadorian and Colombian authorities, and US homeland security personnel. The organization shipped cocaine from the port of Cartagena in Colombia to Barcelona and from Guayaquil in Ecuador to Valencia. The drugs were seized in containers in the Spanish ports of Barcelona and Valencia. Ecuador Security risk: Moderate Political turmoil ensues as the president dissolves Congress. President Guillermo Lasso dissolved the opposition-controlled parliament amid an impeachment trial launched on grounds that Lasso allegedly engaged in embezzlement. He faced an imminent vote that could have ousted him from office. Lasso now has up to six months to govern by decree before fresh general elections are held. An upsurge in organized crime has been reported as the country is facing an unprecedented level of violence. This is linked to the drugs trade and criminal gangs vying for territorial control of transport routes. Public authorities have largely been unable to address the problem due to corruption and political instability. Brazil Security risk: Moderate Petroleum company, Petrobras, filed a request with the federal environment agency (IBAMA) to analyse the license for oil exploration in a sensitive Amazonas basin area. The state-owned oil company seeks to reverse IBAMA’s ban to start drilling the exploratory well in block FZA-M-059 located in deep waters, 175 kilometres off the coast of the Amapá state; The Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (Mapa) confirmed three more cases of highly pathogenic avian influenza in the country, bringing the number of cases to 13. Nine of the cases were registered in the Espírito Santo state, while Rio de Janeiro has three cases and Rio Grande do Sul notified one case of avian flu. The Federal Police (PF) carried out Operation Uru Praesidium, inside the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Indigenous Land in Rondônia, to combat land grabbers, illegal loggers and miners. The operation was supported by the Federal Highway Police, the Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA) and the federal agency for the protection of indigenous peoples (FUNAI). Meanwhile, the Federal Police seized 928.9 kg of cocaine at Guarulhos airport (SP), the largest and busiest airport in the country, in the first four months of 2023. Chile Security risk: Moderate Conservatives won control of the Constitutional Council in a blow to President Boric’s coalition. José Antonio Kast’s far-right Republican Party now holds more than three-fifths of the committee needed to approve articles for a new constitution. A nationwide referendum is set to be held on December 17, 2023, to determine whether the public agrees with a new political constitution drafted by the Constitutional Council. This shift to the right could be explained by the security concerns faced by the Chilean public as they demand a tougher stance on crime. Causes for the rise in violent crime include human trafficking, drug trafficking as well as theft of natural resources. Chile’s relative affluence makes it a tempting target for transnational crime syndicates, especially as a destination for migrants and narcotics. On May 19, mining company, Codelco, announced the creation of Salares Chile, a subsidiary that will oversee the company’s lithium activities, including operations in Salar de Atacama, a salt flat in northern Chile. Paraguay Security risk: Moderately Low The Colorado Party’s candidate, Santiago Peña was elected President of Paraguay gaining 42.7% of the votes. He will take office on August 15, 2023. The runner-up, Efraín Alegre, from the opposition coalition, Concertación Nacional, had 27.4% of the vote. The “Colorados” also won 15 of the country's 17 departments and most seats in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Alegre questioned the result and protests were seen in the streets of Asuncion by supporters of the third-placed Paraguayo Cubas, a former far-right senator, who received 23% of the votes. Cubas was in turn arrested and held in preventive detention under an order by the attorney general’s office that is accusing him of breaching the peace. Venezuela Security risk: High Frequent power failures throughout the country are once again a concern for citizens and experts, who fear a wide-scale general blackout. The power cuts are allegedly due to both a lack of maintenance of a deteriorated system and to electric overloading. Rural areas have been disproportionally affected as a consequence of the government’s effort to ensure a steady supply of power to urban areas. The Committee of People Affected by Blackouts has registered a continuous increase in the number of failures, going from 3,296 cuts in January to 10,013 in the month of May. The increasing frequency of power cuts have strangled the economy in the countryside and pushed rural residents further into poverty. Power failures can take place any time and can go on for several hours. Blackouts have been reported in at least 13 of the 23 states, from Zulia, Falcón and Lara, in the West, to the Andean states (Táchira, Trujillo, Mérida), the Capital District and the eastern towns, including Nueva Esparta and Anzoátegui. On May 29, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva welcomed Venezuelan President Maduro to a regional summit in Brasília, taking his side against Washington. Lula dismissed charges of human and civil rights abuses against Maduro and condemned U.S. sanctions on his government as “worse than war.” Maduro may be gaining a stronger position in South American political relations as the region shifts leftwards. About the author: Leonardo Wanderley Leonardo is a Brazil-based security threat analyst helping businesses operate and thrive in Latin America. Leonardo holds a BA in Business and has done research into Latin America integration, defense industry and hemispheric security. He speaks Portuguese, Spanish and English. You can reach Leonardo at leowanderley81@gmail.com. This publication was edited by Diana Coman.

Written by Anneloe Brakel, Iris de Boer, Jacob Dickinson, Alessia Cappelletti Russia-Ukraine update: Fighting continues, Ukraine loses Bakhmut, and drone attacks on Russian soil. Sudan: Fighting in Sudan continues, leading to concerns about the stability of the wider region. Ethiopia: Extensive protests in Tigray and eruption of violence in Amhara region. Somaliland: Fighting between Dhulbahante clan militias and government forces. Serbia-Kosovo: Violent clashes between ethnic Serbs, local police, and NATO troops following a boycotted election in north Kosovo. Pakistan: Clashes and mass unrest after the arrest of former Prime Minister Imran Khan. Iran-Afghanistan: Shooting between Taliban fighters and Iranian forces on the border between Afghanistan and Iran, following tensions over water rights. Ecuador: President dissolves National Assembly, enacting a constitutional mechanism that allows him to rule until the next general election. Myanmar: Junta launches airstrikes and further ground assaults against resistance forces, leading to major civilian casualties. Armenia-Azerbaijan: Large-scale protests near the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, both countries currently engage in peace talks. Conflicts, May 2023 1. Russia-Ukraine After months of heavy fighting between Ukrainian and Wagner forces for the city of Bakhmut, Wagner leader Prigozhin claimed on May 20 that his forces had taken full control of the city. Whereas Ukrainian officials first contested this claim, they acknowledged a few days later that Bakhmut had indeed been lost. On May 22, Wagner stated that the city would be handed over to the Russian Army and would fully withdraw from the city on June 1. According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) Russian Movements in and around Bakhmut are low, which leaves openings for an Ukrainian offensive. Over the course of May, there has been a spark in attacks on Russian soil. Footage of a drone that targeted the Kremlin was released on May 3. Video footage shows two drones flying above the Kremlin, of which one hit the roof. It’s still unclear who was responsible for the attack. Kyiv has denied any involvement, despite accusations made by the Kremlin. On May 22, the Freedom of Russia Legion (FRL) and the Russian Volunteer Corps (RVC), which both consist of Russian-nationals, crossed the international border between Russia and Ukraine and conducted an incursion into Belgorod Oblast. Russian authorities started a “counterterrorism” operation, which resulted in heavy fighting between the FRL and Russian Forces. It is reported that Russian forces employed thermobaric artillery, which are widely condemned by nongovernmental organizations because of the disproportionate destruction that they cause. On May 23 Russia claimed that the FRL was defeated. However, on June 1, it was reported that the RVC started new cross-border incursions into Belgorod Oblast, during which heavy fighting took place near the town of Shebekino. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, “the attack involved up to 70 militants, five tanks, four armored vehicles, seven pick-up trucks and a Kamaz truck”. Russia claimed that the Russian Forces killed over 50 fighters during their attempts to repel the attacks. Ukrainian officials denied any involvement of the Ukrainian Forces in the incursions. On May 30, Moscow suffered from the biggest drone strike since the start of the Russian invasion. According to Russian authorities the attack involved eight drones of which five were shot down. Three drones managed to strike and hit multiple buildings, all in south-west Moscow, where residences of Putin and his inner-circle are located. There were no casualties reported. During the night of May 29 to May 30, Russia conducted a drone strike on Kyiv, likely as a response to the first incursion in Belgorod Oblast. The drone strike killed one citizen and injured another one. Two high rise buildings in Kyiv caught fire as a result of the attack. 2. Sudan On April 15, 2023, a crisis emerged in Sudan as violent clashes erupted between competing military factions. The conflict is primarily between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their respective leading generals Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemeti. The immediate cause of the conflict is the disagreement over the absorption of RSF forces in the SAF and the disagreement on a timetable for a transition to democratic government after the 2021 coup. As of the end of May, the fighting and airstrikes still continue and have so far killed 866 civilians and wounded thousands. Almost 1.4 million people have been displaced, of which 300,000 people fled to neighboring countries. In general, the conflict is being fought in the capital Khartoum, other urban areas, and in Darfur. Since the start of the conflict, there have been seven ceasefire attempts, yet none of them was carried out. The ongoing conflict in Sudan also leads to concerns about the stability of the wider region. Refugee flows to neighboring countries have increased since the start of the fighting, which pressures countries like Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, and South Sudan in which basic resources and humanitarian aid are scarce. There is a risk of tensions between host communities, displaced populations, and new arrivals that have to compete for limited resources. Additionally, the fighting in Sudan also makes the supply routes for commercial and relief goods less accessible, hindering the distribution and availability of aid. 3. Ethiopia As mentioned in Dyami’s previous conflict monitoring report, political instability increased in the disputed area of Tigray and its bordering Amhara region. In Tigray, there have been extensive protests throughout April and May, with thousands of people demonstrating against the presence of Eritrean forces. In the Amhara region, violence erupted in April after the government decided to dissolve regional paramilitary groups, causing fear amongst the Amharan population that they might lose disputed territory to Tigray’s administration. Ethiopia has experienced a devastating civil conflict since November 2020, which was centered in and around the Tigray province. The conflict was fought between the federal government, ethno-regional militias (TPLF; Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front), and the Eritrean army. Formally, the conflict ended in November 2022 with the signing of a peace deal that halted the fighting and bombing by the government. One of the agreements of the deal was the withdrawal of foreign forces, referring to the Eritrean and Amhara troops. However, Eritrean troops have not yet withdrawn, sparking demonstrations. Another violent non-state actor operating in Ethiopia is the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), which has been fighting for control over the Oromia region off and on for decades. In April 2023, the Ethiopian government and OLA began peace negotiations in Tanzania. The peace attempts concluded on May 3, without reaching an agreement. Importantly, hostilities from both sides increased heavily in May, jeopardizing any conflict resolution. According to local news sources, a second round of peace talks is highly unlikely. Amid this increasing violence between OLA and the federal government, one sugar factory was attacked by militants on May 20, killing 14 civilians. Lastly, as Ethiopia borders Sudan, the country might witness economic, social, and humanitarian spillover effects of the recent conflict. 4. Somaliland Somaliland, a breakaway region of Somalia that has been relatively stable since the late 1990s, has been confronted with armed conflict since 2022. After a Dhulbahante local politician was assassinated in December 2022, protests erupted during which 20 people were killed by the Somaliland security forces. In light of the protests, the Dhulbahante clan stated that they wanted to rejoin Somalia. However, this is not in line with the objectives of the government of Somaliland, which wants to become an independent, internationally recognized state. Clashes between clan militias and government forces erupted, and both parties are now mainly fighting over the town of Lascanood. Presidential elections planned for November 2022 have been postponed because of contestations and no new date has been set yet. A ceasefire between the two parties that was announced in February 2023 was violated by both sides. According to the UN, over 185,000 people have left their homes because of the clashes. Amnesty International stated that over 100 people have been killed and over 600 were injured since the outbreak of the violence. The rising conflict poses a threat to the political future of Somaliland, as the ongoing fighting will likely weaken the case for recognition of Somaliland by the international community. Alerts and developing situations, May 2023 1. Serbia-Kosovo On May 28, tensions between Serbia and Kosovo escalated after Kosovo’s police raided Serb-dominated areas in Zvecan, a town in the north of Kosovo. Ethnic Serbs attacked NATO peacekeepers in Kosovo, which resulted in violent clashes between ethnic Serbs, local police, and NATO troops. This comes after a disputed election in north Kosovo, in which ethnic Serbs boycotted the vote for four municipalities. The final turnout was very low at 3.5%. The EU-negotiated agreement between Kosovo and Serbia informally agreed on April 27, 2023, which aimed to ease tensions in exchange for EU membership, appears to be unsuccessful. Serbia has increased the combat readiness of its military near the Kosovo border and refused to tolerate further attacks on Serbs in Kosovo. With China and Russia backing Serbia’s position and NATO supporting Kosovo, the conflict is also being perceived as another fault line in the geopolitical competition in Europe. The situation has sparked concerns about a potential resurgence of the Kosovo-Serbia conflict that occurred between 1998 to 1999. 2. Pakistan On May 9, former Prime Minister Imran Khan was arrested by Pakistani paramilitary units over corruption charges along with key figures from his party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). Khan was subsequently released on May 11, after Pakistan’s Supreme Court deemed his arrest as unlawful. However, clashes and mass unrest erupted across the country and thousands of his supporters were detained by authorities. A nationwide crackdown on the PTI followed Khan’s arrest and more than 80 senior members of the PTI quit the party, allegedly pressured by authorities. Pakistan has been in a long-running political crisis since Khan was removed from power as Prime Minister in May 2022, which he labeled as a ‘coup’. This prompted months of protests against the Pakistani coalition government led by Shebhaz Sharif. Polls have confirmed that Khan is the most popular politician in the country and he has therefore been demanding early elections, but the government has vehemently resisted calling any election until October 2023. In May, Pakistan’s annual inflation rate rose to 38%, an all-time high. The country also has one month to satisfy the IMF’s demands before its stalled support program expires, raising the risk of debt default. 3. Iran-Afghanistan On May 27, there was a shooting between Taliban fighters and the Iranian forces on the border between Afghanistan and Iran after tensions over water rights emerged. Two Iranian border guards and one Taliban fighter were reportedly killed in the shooting. Iran claimed that the Taliban restricted the water flow from the Helmand river to the eastern regions of Iran. The Taliban denied the accusation. Since the Taliban took control of Afghanistan in 2021, there have been disagreements between them and Iran over the alleged mistreatment of Afghan refugees and other border clashes. The severe drought in Afghanistan has led to major displacement, food insecurity, and climate-related disasters in recent years. Iran has also been suffering from widespread drought since 2021. It is likely that both countries will thus try to claim the scarce water resources that are available in the area, which could possibly lead to more violent disputes over water rights and add to existing tensions. 4. Ecuador On May 17, President Guillermo Lasso dissolved the National Assembly enacting a constitutional mechanism that allows him to rule by decree until the next general election, marking the first time that this power has been used in Ecuador. The unilateral decision comes after he threatened to use this power if he faced an impeachment trial for corruption charges, which began on May 16. Later on May 17, the Ecuadorian military released a statement in support of Lasso and the day after Ecuador’s electoral authority set August 20, 2023, as the date for snap general elections. Lasso does not plan to run for the presidency, given widespread protests against a stagnant economy, record levels of violence, opposition gains, the loss of an eight-proposal referendum in February, and a generally low approval rating. Follow-ups on previous conflict monitoring reports 1. Myanmar Since on April 11 an airstrike killed 170 civilians, there have been multiple reports of smaller-scale deadly air and ground assaults by the junta. According to local news reports, resistance forces are fighting back and killing junta soldiers. A UN report claimed that since February 2021, the military junta has imported at least $1 billion in arms, equipment, and materials from China and Russia, and to a lesser extent from companies in India, Singapore and Thailand. Amid the civil war, Myanmar experienced the devastating effects of cyclone Mocha in May. Myanmar’s shadow government stated that 400 people lost their lives to the cyclone, whereas the military junta reported a total of 145 deaths. More information about the civil war in Myanmar can be found in Dyami’s previous conflict monitoring report. 2. Armenia-Azerbaijan As mentioned in Dyami’s previous conflict monitoring report, the opening of a checkpoint by Azerbaijan on the Lachin corridor in April sparked violent clashes between the countries, causing at least three casualties. On May 20, thousands of Armenians protested near the border with Azerbaijan against the blockade of the Lachin corridor and the checkpoint. The two countries are currently engaged in peace talks, yet aggressive rhetoric may jeopardize the success of these talks. About the authors Alessia Cappelletti Alessia is Intelligence Analyst and Project Coordinator at Dyami. She has field experience in South America, Colombia especially, and has experience in researching organized crime and conflicts. Her academic background includes conflict analysis, international humanitarian law, and criminology. Anneloe Brakel Anneloe is currently enrolled in the masters Conflict Studies & Human Rights at Utrecht University and completed her Bachelor's in History and International Relations from Historical Perspective, equipping her with skills to contextualize (historical) events and to acknowledge both the uniqueness and similarities between certain events. She is an experienced researcher in the field of disinformation and is very keen to learn more about (cyber) espionage. Iris de Boer Iris has a background in Human Geography and has developed a broad interest in geopolitics and armed conflict during her academic career. She is currently enrolled in the Master’s degree Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University, during which she developed conflict mapping and conflict analyzing skills. Her previous research focused on the polarized display of the United States presidential elections in 2020 within Dutch media. Jacob Dickinson Jacob studied Global Political Economy at Leiden University. He is passionate about international development and is looking to expand his expertise in geopolitics and crisis management. Curious about other cultures, he has traveled in Europe and Asia for both academic study and professional purposes. His expertise includes the geopolitics of oil and industrial upgrading in the electronics global value chain. He is particularly interested in the evolving political and economic relationships between China and ASEAN, and the consequences for regional development and security.

Written by Maxwell Markel India has attempted to “de-dollarize” its foreign trade by deciding to increase its trade in rupees, amid wider fears, and hopes, of the fall of US dollar hegemony. The US dollar losing its position as a global reserve currency would mark a massive recalibration of the global economy and weaken the impact of US sanctions on states threatening the security of the international system. However, India does not want to leave the dollar system entirely. India’s push towards trading in rupees is being done to avoid the economic cost of trading in dollars, which is necessitating a host of policy initiatives done for essentially domestic economic purposes. Attempting its own rupee trade reveals India’s unique diplomatic and economic conditions as well as the power of the dollar in the global trade system. India's Diplomatic Position and the Rupee After the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, Russia was faced with wide-ranging sanctions and isolation from the rest of the global economy. This put countries still wanting to trade with Russia in a difficult bind, as they could either trade in dollars and face intense sanctions too, or cut off a major trading partner. Given its historic links with Russia, India faced this dilemma more than many countries. India also maintains a desire for neutrality between Russia and the United States to benefit from both relationships: aligning themselves with US interests against China, but still getting most of its military equipment from Russia. So India’s strategic non-alignment is an important context to understand the Modi Government's recent moves to “internationalize” rupee trade. By trading in rupees, India can continue to trade with Russia, Iran, and other countries sanctioned by the US, thus maintaining its traditional diplomatic relationships. As part of this push to avoid trading in the dollar, India hopes to make the rupee on par with other reserve currencies, i.e. a currency held in reserve by banks and business to conduct business in. Therefore India has made moves in recent months to make agreements with its neighbors, from the UAE to Bangladesh, to complete trade agreements in the rupee. This is part of a larger strategy to “disaster-proof” both the Indian economy and other regional economies. Instead of being vulnerable to US monetary policy, which has recently made the dollar more expensive due to rising interest rates, countries would conduct a degree of their trade in the rupee, while still keeping a reserve of the dollar in case of emergencies. The appetite other countries have for this policy is indicative of the continued power of the US dollar as countries look to diversify their assets, but not leave the dollar system entirely. This geostrategic desire to maintain Indian neutrality, improve its regional economic power, and avoid the drawbacks of a world dominated by the dollar thus explain why India would want to trade in the rupee, but domestic economic incentives have forced India’s hand in this direction. The Rupee's Woes However, no amount of dollar-free trade will empower a weak rupee or resolve India’s trade deficit. Since the War in Ukraine, the rupee has fallen by 10% and is one of the worst performing currencies in Asia. This is due to both India’s large trade imbalance weakening the rupee, and the strong US dollar making investors want to invest in the dollar and not riskier regional currencies like the rupee. The Central Bank of India claims that India has a stable deficit, but the knock-on effects of its trade imbalance has weakened, and even undercut, its ability to actually make the rupee a reserve currency. Part of the rupee’s problems come from its dependence on importing cheap Russian oil. This has widened its trade imbalance, which is undermining the Modi government’s rupee trade push: India might try to avoid dollar trade, but a weak currency undercuts those efforts even among the countries that also want to avoid the dollar. So the Indian government has responded by attempting to promote exports. By increasing exports, the idea is that it will make the rupee more valuable, and thus more countries would want to trade in the rupee, which would boost the currency, offset India’s trade imbalance, and avoid the costly dollar. This is where the term “disaster-proof” used earlier comes from, as the Indian Commerce Secretary Sunil Barthwal explicitly couched this goal in those terms. To accomplish this goal, the Modi government has undertaken a variety of initiatives. It is racing to complete stalled-out free trade agreements in the hope that countries will buy more Indian products once tariff barriers are decreased, and release a much-delayed Trade Policy paper focused on a targeted investment strategy to boost exports. This multifaceted strategy is all done to boost the rupee so that the policy of trading in rupees and avoiding a strong dollar can be viable in the first place. If the rupee does not strengthen as a currency, then it is unlikely this push to avoid dollar trade will be able to get off the ground. The Dollar Remains India and its rupee diplomacy does not desire to displace the dollar, but to decrease the risks associated with dollar dependence. Its efforts to conduct trade in rupees have mostly failed due to the weakness of the rupee itself, but this does not mean that the general project is a failure. India’s rupee trade initiative does provide a sanctions-free trade lifeline to Russia, Iran, and other countries sanctioned by the US. The frequent use of sanctions by the US has created quite a large economic block of countries still needing to trade, and so countries like India aim to exploit this niche. Consequently, this weakens the power of US sanctions and thus the coercive diplomatic power the US can wield to punish global actors, but only by degree. However, the dollar is still the overwhelming favorite in global trade, so India’s trade with Russia is a lifeline, but not a substitute for lost European and American buyers. Most notably, India has the power in this case: if it doesn’t want to buy Russian oil, Russia won’t have any other customers. This is why the US isn’t exactly angry with India buying so much Russian oil, since Russia is still selling less oil at lower prices than before the Ukraine War. In that respect, the fears that this change in currency trade regime will empower Russian aggression are misplaced. Yet India’s rupee trade push will be felt regionally. India’s neighbors, from Bangladesh to Sri Lanka, will be most affected by this rupee push. Additionally, they are the most receptive to this strategy given their substantial links to India and their own dollar shortages, so it is likely that the region will see more currency integration. As a result, India’s rupee push will likely empower its regional economic hegemony, and thus increase Indian security commitments in the region to protect its economic partners along with the value of its trade. This raises the stakes for India’s regional competition with China, especially in fragile countries like Sri Lanka and its long-time rival Pakistan. China will likely step up its diplomatic efforts in the region to offset growing Indian influence, which will understandably raise the temperature of its already hot border dispute with India. In conclusion: India’s recent rupee diplomacy will mostly have regional rather than global implications. Fears about the end of the hegemonic US dollar and the rise of a multipolar currency regime are therefore misplaced. The hegemony of the dollar is so pronounced that recent events that have caused it to strengthen as a currency have caused other countries to react proactively. India has done so by attempting to create the rupee as a reserve currency, but until a time comes when the rupee truly becomes one, India shall remain dependent on the dollar, just as the rest of the world is. About the author: Maxwell Markel Maxwell is currently a Master’s Student at Leiden University studying Comparative Politics with a focus on South Asian Politics. He graduated Summa Cum Laude from the College of William and Mary in the United States and is the author of an award winning thesis on Indian State Politics.

Date: 17/05/2023 Location: Tunisia Parties involved: Tunisian government and security forces, Muslim Brotherhood, Israeli government, European tourists, Jewish pilgrims. The Event: On 09/05/2023 a Tunisian security officer opened fire on colleagues and Jewish pilgrims near a synagogue on the Island of Djerba killing 5 people (3 security officers and 2 Jewish pilgrims). The attacker was then killed by security forces. Tunisia is a fragile democracy and President Saied has been accused by opposition parties of becoming too authoritarian. One of the recent measures by the President was to crack down on a political party associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, a radical religious and political organization. On 15/05/2023, Rached Ghannouchi, one of the main opponents of President Saied was sentenced to a year in prison. He is among more than 20 of Saied's political opponents to be arrested since February 2023. The Jerusalem Post reported that the Israeli government is planning to re-home Tunisian Jews that want to leave the country because of a rise in anti-semitic attacks. There are about 1800 Jews living in Tunisia, with over 5000 Jews visiting the island of Djerba on a yearly pilgrimage. There is a history of attacks on the Jewish population in Tunisia. On 24/06/2022, two security officers were injured in a knife attack by an assailant near a synagogue in central Tunis. In the past five years, there have been a string of other attacks targeting tourists and security forces across the country which have been linked to radical Islamist organizations or individuals. There is a large influx of refugees coming from East and Central Africa to Tunisia. This has led to tensions between the Tunisian people and the refugees, who are mostly black Africans. President Saied gained international attention for blaming Sub-Saharan refugees for the rise of crime in the country, which resulted in a significant rise in racist attacks towards them. This has also led to refugees searching for alternative countries or forming groups to defend themselves. When leaving the country, however, refugees face a similar fate in neighboring countries. Libya, Algeria and Morocco are also known to crack down on refugees coming into the country. Tunisia is a popular tourist destination because of its beautiful beaches and low cost of living. Therefore, Tunisia is heavily reliant on the tourism industry. An uptick in violence towards foreigners has previously led to a crash in this industry, especially after a terrorist attack in the capital Tunis in 2015 and before that, the troubles coming from the Arab Spring in 2011. Analysis and implications: The recent attack on Jewish pilgrims on the island of Djerba and the rise in racist attacks on black Africans and Jewish Tunisians has led the Israeli government to make plans to transport any Tunisian Jew that wishes to come to Israel and give them a home there. Because Djerba is a popular tourist destination, such an operation will attract international attention and will highlight safety concerns for other foreigners in the country, especially concerning tourism. A terrorist attack like the one on 09/05/2023 might encourage other lone wolves or more organized terrorist groups to engage in attacks. It is not unlikely that European tourists may be targeted in these attacks, considering Tunisia is an attractive holiday destination. According to the Tunisian National Tourist Office (O.N.T.T), European tourists dominate the number of overnight stays in Tunisian hotels. However, since security is now focused on Jewish pilgrims due to the most recent attack, European tourists may become easier targets for terrorism. The political situation in the country is not stable with president Saied taking a more authoritarian stance since he dissolved the Tunisian parliament in July 2021. Human Rights Watch has called attention to the Tunisian government’s moves to systematically silence and dismantle the country’s largest opposition party. This may lead to unrest in the country as seen before during the Arab Spring in 2011 or even terrorist attacks from radicalized muslims who feel like their voice is no longer heard in parliament. Any unrest will also lead to a decline in tourists coming to Tunisia, which in turn will have a significant impact on the economy. The COVID-19 Pandemic decimated the Tunisian tourism sector whose revenue more than halved between 2019 and 2020, which severely affected the Tunisian economy. Any further instability due to violence is likely to slow the recovery of the tourism industry and its contribution to the Tunisian economy. Security in the country may therefore decline due to unfavorable economic conditions, since a deterioration in the quality of life of the Tunisian population may increase the likelihood of people joining criminal organisations or becoming radicalized. The influx and subsequent bad treatment of black refugees can also lead to more unrest in the country with refugees organizing groups to defend themselves against racist attacks. might also lead to more refugees trying to take boats to the European mainland which could also destabilize the political situation in the EU due to spillover effects. The sight of refugees getting on boats, clashes between local Tunisians and refugees and possibly even drowned people washing up on the shores may lead to a decline in tourists coming to Tunisia. Concluding notes: The situation in Tunisia is one of declining stability. There is a chance that terrorist attacks on Jewish people and European tourists may increase. With president Saied taking a tougher stance on the political groups aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, tensions may spill from the political arena over into the streets in the form of large protests or even terrorist attacks. It is advisable to keep an eye on current events and be weary of the changing political landscape in the country. It is also encouraged to think of the security situation for tourists if there is a rise in terrorist attacks in places like Djerba, Tunis or other popular tourist destinations in Tunisia.

Date: 10/05/2023 Location: Chad, Sudan, the Sahel Parties involved: Provisional military government of Chad, Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Sudan, Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Wagner Group, United States, Russia, tribal groups. Executive Summary: The situation in Chad is unstable largely due to a large influx of refugees from Sudan. The conflict between the RSF and the SAF in Sudan could devolve into a full-out civil war. This could lead to an even bigger flow of refugees into Chad. The World Food Program has warned that they will run out of food if there are no measures taken by the international community. Meanwhile the Chadian military regime has promised it will support general elections in 2024 and presidential elections in 2025 and this is one of the reasons why the United States is still supplying the regime with money and weapons. The other reason the United States supports the regime is the fight against Islamic terrorism in the surrounding countries and in the west of Chad. It is believed that the Russian mercenary Wagner Group could capitalize on Chad’s political instability, though this prospect is limited. Like Wagner Group’s operations in the wider Sahel, their operations typically focus on invitations by military regimes to supply and train fighters, whatever their human rights record, in exchange for mineral contracts. The Events: Due to the outbreak of violent conflict between the RSF and the SAF, thousands of refugees from Sudan have fled to neighboring country, Chad. It is estimated that about 20,000 refugees have crossed the border to join 500,000 others that were already in Chad and a further 80,000 refugees might join them in the near future. A large contingent of RSF fighters crossed the border with Chad and were disarmed by the Chadian regime. The RSF was founded and trained in the Chadian refugee camps before they went back to Sudan to form a military provisional government in Khartoum with the SAF. Chad is currently run by a provisional military government not unlike Sudan was before its crisis. The provisional government has said it will organize local elections in 2024 and presidential elections in 2025. On this premise, the United States has been giving money and other forms of aid to Chad. Even though the policy of the US is not to support military regimes, it has remained a staunch ally of Chad because of the military governments support in the fight against Islamic terrorist groups, Boko Haram in the east of the country and in countries bordering Chad. The World Food Program (WFP) has said that a shortage of food and supplies could lead to further destabilization of the country. The large influx of refugees can put pressure on humanitarian aid infrastructure and put pressure on food prices. If the situation in Sudan turns into a full scale civil war, which would include the southern region of Darfur, it is believed that the spill-over effect into Chad might lead to unrest there. The Wall Street Journal posted, in February 2023, that the Russian mercenaries of the Wagner Group are planning to destabilize the country in a bid to expand their influence in the Sahel. Wagner is aligned with the RSF in Sudan and rebel groups in the Central African Republic and Mali. The German ambassador was expelled from Chad on 07/04/2023 by interim president Déby because the ambassador had critiqued the interim military government. Implications and scenarios: The situation in Chad is volatile. The influx of refugees from Sudan has had an important impact on the stability of the country. It is probable that hundreds of thousands Sudanese refugees reside in Chadian camps. It is also reported that Sudanese RSF troops have fled Sudan and are now residing in the camps. With the influence of the Wagner group on the RSF, it is believed that they may be recruiting in these camps as happened in the Central African Republic. The risk posed by the Wagner Group taking part in a coup in the Chadian army is limited, however. Wagner’s activities across Central Africa are mostly focused on protecting military regimes, rather than toppling incumbent military governments. Agreements negotiated between the Wagner Group and military governments on gold and other critical minerals are conducted on the basis of regime protection, as opposed to promoting coup d’etats. Regimes violating human rights sometimes look to Russia and the Wagner Group for training and equipment, to avoid penalties by the international community. However, Chad's military regime has close security ties with the US and plays a role in counter-terrorism operations in the broader region. There are few incentives to invite Wagner Group to provide support to the military regime, given its poor human rights record and close ties to the US. On the other hand, there is a chance of destabilization of Chad due to the conflict in Sudan. If food runs out in the refugee camps and people start to protest it is possible that the military regime will clamp down on the population as they have done in the past. The regime’s reaction to protests has been very violent. If there is another incident of the Chadian military government killing protestors, the United States might retract its support for the regime. This then could lead the regime to look for support elsewhere – perhaps the Wagner Group – and for the regime to postpone the elections indefinitely.

Date: 12/05/2023 Location: Turkey Parties involved: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (People’s Alliance), Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu (National Alliance), Sinan Oğan (Ancestral Alliance), Muharrem İnce (Homeland Party) The Events: On 14/05/2023 general elections will be held in Turkey. Turkish citizens are able to vote for the presidential and legislative elections. Although three candidates are running in the presidential elections, the main contenders are current president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. Election polls expect that Erdoğan will receive 46% of the total votes during the first round of elections, while Kılıçdaroğlu is expected to receive 50% of the votes. Third candidate Sinan Oğan will receive 3% of the votes according to the polls. Muharrem İnce, a fourth candidate that would participate in the elections and was expected to receive 2% of the votes, withdrew from the presidential race on 11/05/2023. If none of the candidates receives the 51% of the votes that is needed to become elected president, there will be a second round of voting two weeks later in which only the two candidates with the highest number of votes in the first round will participate. It’s thus possible that the voting this Sunday is the first out of two rounds at the ballot box. Kılıçdaroğlu, Erdoğan’s biggest opponent, is the leader of the secularist Republican People’s Party (CHP) and represents an alliance of six opposition parties drawn from secularists, Islamic conservatives, and Turkish nationalists. He wants to become more aligned with the West and reform Turkey’s economy. He has promised to restore the independence of the central bank and to reverse previous economic policies. He also wants to restore the previous parliamentary system in order to decrease the president's centralized power in the executive. Besides, Kılıçdaroğlu has promised to bring back press freedoms and to delegate more authority to the parliament. Kılıçdaroğlu also talked about plans to send back Syrian refugees that live in Turkey as well as the improvement of the relations with Western countries. Another promise made by Kılıçdaroğlu is the return of Turkey to the U.S. led F-35 fighter jet programme, which Turkey was removed from after buying the Russian-made S-400 missile system in 2019. Erdoğan promised Turkish voters to solve the problem of inflation in the country and to boost growth. Erdoğan talks about a strong, multilateral Turkey under his rule and plans to create six million jobs. On 09/05/2023, just five days before the presidential and parliamentary elections, Erdogan announced a ‘last-minute’ pay rise that will increase wages of public workers by 45%. In recent years Erdogan was regularly criticized because of a soaring inflation rate and the decline in the value of the Turkish Lira. Another key political issue that plays a role during the election is the approximately 5.5 million refugees that live in Turkey, most of them coming from Syria. All parties that are participating in the elections promised to send Syrians back. The fragile housing and poor aid response to the devastating series of earthquakes that struck southern Turkey and northern Syria in February 2023 is also a key political issue. However, polls taken after the quakes only show a minor drop in support for Erdoğan. The current president has promised an ambitious reconstruction programme to help the communities affected by the earthquakes. The Kurdish community, who make up about 20% of Turkey’s population, could play a key role in the election results. Erdoğan has lost popularity among Kurdish voters. After the 2016 coup, Erdoğan cracked down on Kurdish parties and the conflict with the PKK continued. HDP politicians and former parliamentarians were jailed on terrorism charges and recently Turkey arrested 110 HDP top officials, pro-Kurdish lawyers, journalists and artists. Furthermore, there has been an intensification of Turkish military offensives against Kurdish armed groups. Kılıçdaroğlu can count on support from the HDP and he has promised to release HDP politicians from prison if he were elected president. He also called for a political solution for the Kurdish issue. It is expected that many Kurds that are in favor of the HDP will eventually choose to vote on Kılıçdaroğlu instead of Erdoğan. Analysis: According to election polls Erdoğan has a chance of losing the elections, and the opposition may win this Sunday. Whether Erdoğan accepts the result of an election in the event of defeat is highly uncertain. Given Tunisia’s and Israel’s authoritarian turn in recent years, the Turkish election holds significant implications for the state of democracy in the region, and indeed the world. However, as both candidates are expected to be extremely close with respect to the amount of votes they will receive, the Turkish voters could also decide to give Erdoğan another mandate. The outcome of the elections will not only influence the course of Turkey’s internal politics, but it will also define the path that the country will follow during the coming decade with respect to its foreign relations. A change of leadership could influence the relationship between Turkey and the EU. With Erdoğan in power, the relationship between Turkey and the EU has deteriorated over the last few years due to democratic backsliding in Turkey, a number of bilateral disputes between Turkey and several EU member states and disagreements over foreign policy. Kılıçdaroğlu promised that he would push for closer relations to the EU by implementing democratic reforms and defreezing EU accession talks. However, it is unclear whether his agenda can be fully implemented because of the ideological disparity within the opposition. Furthermore, it is the question whether the opposition would revise the 2016 migration deal between the EU and Turkey, which is more likely to stay in place if Erdoğan would win. Turkey’s tense relationship with Greece and Cyprus over minerals and border disputes also presents difficulties for re-establishing constructive relations with the EU. Even though a change of power in Turkey opens up the opportunity for the improvement of Turkey-EU relations, it also poses some reason for insecurity among EU member states. A change of leadership could influence Turkey’s standpoints in NATO. Over the course of last year Erdoğan has allowed Finland to join NATO, but has resisted endorsing Sweden over their alleged support for what Turkey deems as terrorist groups. Kılıçdaroğlu has stated that he would allow Sweden to join NATO, taking another course than Erdoğan has done so far. However, it’s not ruled out that Sweden could eventually still join NATO if Erdoğan remains president of Turkey, since he has not entirely closed the door for Sweden’s accession yet. A change of leadership could influence the relationship between Turkey and the U.S., as Kılıçdaroğlu stated that he wants to return to the U.S. led F-35 program. Turkey was kicked out of this program in 2009 after buying the Russian made S-400 missile system in 2009. It is likely that Kılıçdaroğlu would try to improve Turkey’s relationship with the U.S. in order to make the return to the F-35 program happen. A change of leadership could influence Turkey’s relationship with Russia and Turkey’s role in the war in Ukraine. Since the start of the 2022 war in Ukraine Erdogan has been talking with Ukrainian President Zelensky as well as Russian President Putin and offered to mediate between the two countries. Turkey has been delivering weapons to Ukraine, but also refused to sanction Russia. Furthermore, Erdoğan played an important role in brokering the UN grain export deal that was signed in Istanbul on 27/07/2022. It is expected that Kılıçdaroğlu would put more weight on Turkey’s status as a NATO member, which would likely not be beneficial for the relationship between Turkey and Russia. Even though Kılıçdaroğlu has stated that he would like to act as a mediator between Ukraine and Russia, it is questionable whether Kılıçdaroğlu will have the same influence in international diplomacy as the well-known and longstanding current President Erdoğan has. A change of leadership could influence Turkey’s relationship with Syria and the way Turkey deals with Syrian refugees. The accommodation of approximately 4 million Syrians, many who fled the war in Syria, is a contentious political issue in Turkey. Turkey is a supporter of the Syrian opposition that controls northwest Syria and has tried to hinder the Syrian army from re-taking control over the region. Over the years Turkey set up multiple military bases and deployed thousands of troops in northern Syria. However, on 10/05/2023 the foreign ministers of Turkey, Syria, Russia and Iran met in Moscow to talk about rebuilding ties between Turkey and Syria. Kılıçdaroğlu has promised Turkish voters that he would work on a plan to send back Syrian refugees back safely on a voluntary basis. However, it is likely that Assad will specify certain conditions, like he did with Erdoğan in the past, to make this dialogue happen. It is unclear whether Kılıçdaroğlu would listen to Assad’s request to withdraw all Turkish military operations from Syria. The election results might lead to political unrest in Turkey. This is especially the case if there is a suspicion of unfair elections or if Erdoğan would reject the results. Unrest and a possible escalation could lead to a disruption of aviation traffic. In a worst case scenario, scenes comparable to the 2016 attempted coup could re-emerge in Turkey. Istanbul is a major air traffic hub for civil aviation. This can lead to military activity in the air, presenting a direct risk to civilian air traffic both directly in the sky as from the ground directed at the sky. The consequences for civil aviation would be multiplied compared to 2016, since the war in Ukraine has now forced almost all air traffic to route over Turkey when flying between Asia and Europe. Concluding notes: The outcome of the general election carries substantial implications for the state of Turkey’s democracy and the wider region. If the result of the general election is respected, Kılıçdaroğlu could reverse Turkey’s descent in authoritarianism. He could also improve Turkey’s relationship with the EU, U.S., and NATO by supporting Sweden’s accession to NATO and adopting a more NATO-friendly foreign policy. In the highly uncertain event that Erdogan respects the vote, Kılıçdaroğlu still faces obstacles to implementing a more pro-western foreign policy. Ongoing tensions between Turkey and Greece, the question of whether he will revise the 2016 migration deal and the unstable coalition of six very different parties, could eventually hinder Kılıçdaroğlu’s plans to improve the relationships between Turkey and the West. In addition foreign policy priorities, whether the Turkish elections will result in a reversal of Turkey’s slide to authoritarianism remains to be seen.

Further specialization of STI services with regard to risk management for business travel Schiphol, 8 May 2023 As of June 1, 2023, Schiphol Travel International (STI) is Dyami's exclusive TMC partner. Dyami Strategic Security Services is an expert in strategic international security. The partnership enables STI to provide the most advanced Duty of Care services to its clients. These services include up-to-date destination analyses and tailor-made travel advice. This involves looking at the local and geopolitical situation and various security risks including, for example, espionage threats. Based on this, the traveller can receive advice for optimal preparation for the trip. The collaboration also offers Travel Managers the opportunity to audit their travel policy on the basis of an individual risk assessment. In order to be able to offer this specialist service to all STI relations, Dyami will share knowledge and provide awareness training for the STI Account Managers, after which they are certified. Dyami Strategic Security Services founder & Director - Eric Schouten: “Strategic security is a means for companies to do business safely and successfully. We notice, however, that many companies underestimate the risks for their travelling employees, while there is a growing need for reliable information regarding security risks for business travel. The cooperation with Schiphol Travel as an exclusive TMC partner will make a positive contribution to an active awareness of security risk management." Schiphol Travel International Commercial Director - Arlette van Bezu: “In these unstable times with geopolitical tensions in the world, we notice that our customers are faced with complex security issues for their travellers. Schiphol Travel takes Duty of Care and, therefore, the duty of care towards its customers very seriously. In addition to our own emergency team and traveller tracking system, the addition of real-time Dyami intelligence to further perfect our Duty of Care services. After following the training sessions and with the daily support of the Dyami team, we are even better able to send our travellers safely on their journey. We see a huge added value in our services, especially at this time. For more information Schiphol Travel International Phone: +31-20-4055275 Email: info@schipholtravel.com About Dyami Dyami is a strategic security provider with a hands-on mentality. We have a team of in-house analysts and experts in all areas of international security. Our background includes intelligence services, defence, foreign affairs, travel industry and aviation. By offering our security-as-a-service subscriptions, we help companies conduct business safely, securely and successfully. Eric Schouten - +31-30-207 2120 eric@dyami.services About Schiphol Travel International Schiphol Travel is an exclusive 5-star business travel organization specialized in professional services to medium and large multinationals. Schiphol Travel offers an exclusive product through personal services supported by innovative IT solutions and (video) reports and is affiliated with the Global Network of Travel Leaders. For more information: Arlette van Bezu – +31-20-4055275 Arlette.van.Bezu@schipholtravel.com

The Dyami Academy is putting together its training calendar for 2023. Dyami has been providing information and briefs about the war in Ukraine since the start and its impact on the countries surrounding it. Dyami has also been active in assisting NGOs and humanitarian organisations in their Ukraine response and therefore has decided to launch its HEAT courses in Rzeszow, Poland. Interested in joining our training? Contact our Head of Training, Sophie Buur, at sophie@dyami.services or via our form Read more about how we help NGOs and Non-Profits make the world a better place, safely Upcoming training dates for the HEAT in Poland are:

As written in our latest Intelligence Briefs on Moldova, the country seems to have become the next target of the #Kremlin. Last week protests in the capital of Moldova organized by the pro-Russian Shor party continued, and tensions between Russia on one side and Moldova and Romania on the other side have increased. What do these developments mean for the safety of Moldova and the broader region? Read our update on Moldova to find out more about the latest events and their effects.

Date: 30/03/2023 Where: Israel The Events: As of 27/03/2023, protests in Israel against the proposed reforms of the judicial system by Prime Minister Netanyahu have escalated. Following the sacking of a Defense Minister who showed opposition to the proposed reforms, thousands of protestors have taken to the streets. On 27 March, striking workers joined the protests and declared a nationwide strike against the proposed reforms. Protests and strikes throughout Israel. Deliberate disruptive acts have been employed, including blocking main major thoroughfares, such as Highway 20 in Tel Aviv. Highway 20 is an intra city highway that runs through all main roads in the city. Confrontations between the police and the protestors occur when protests are being overly disruptive. Clashes between protestors and Netanyahu supporters are also widespread. Freezing of judicial reform bill. After the freezing of the vote on the judicial reform bill until the end of parliamentary recess, it is expected that the protests will continue until the end of April and the beginning of May without significant reversal of the proposed reforms. Supporters are visible on the streets for the proposed reforms. Members of the government are putting pressure on Netanyahu to drop the bill, but he is also being pressured by his coalition partner to carry out the reforms. Without them, he could be vulnerable politically. Judicial reforms are seen as an attack on Israel’s democracy. The anti-judicial reform protests in Israel began on 07/03/2023, during which 20,000 protesters went to the streets to express their concerns on the plans of Netanyahu’s government. The protests continued throughout the course of January, February and March, with often over 100,000 people on the streets. The judicial reforms would give the government more power while decreasing the power of the Supreme Court. For example, it would become easier for the government to overrule court decisions by just needing one single majority vote in the parliament. The opponents of the judicial reforms have called them an attempt to weaken the judicial system and an attack on the democracy of Israel. The reforms are widely supported by Israel’s right wing community. Despite the critique, there is also strong support for the judicial overhaul, especially by the right-wing community in Israel. They mainly see the supreme court as a constrainment to building a more religious and nationalist state. The judicial reform would make it more difficult for the supreme court to block certain plans that are in line with those religious and nationalist beliefs, such as the creation of more Israeli settlements in the West Bank and a removal of the military service for ultra-Orthodox Jews. The United States, who has been a partner of Israel for a long time, sees Israel as a vital security partner in the Middle East. Many U.S. officials see sustaining good ties with Israel as a way to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The U.S and Israel also rely upon each other with respect to intelligence sharing and national security. Throughout the course of May, U.S. President Biden emphasized his role as a friend of Israel when talking about the unrest in the country. He has been careful with criticizing the judicial overhaul and only briefly expressed his concerns about the situation. However, on 28/03/2023 Biden finally urged Netanyahu to walk away from the judicial reforms. This request by Biden was met with a strong reaction by Netanyahu, who stated that the decisions that Israel makes would “not be based on pressures from abroad”. Israeli settler and Palestinian unrest. During the month of March there have been a string of attacks from Palestinian terrorists on settler communities and also retaliatory attacks from settlers on Palestinian villages, like on 26/03/2023 in the Palestinian village of Huwara, where dozens of cars were set on fire and people were injured. Airstrikes on Syria. In the past month there have been a number of airstrikes on Syrian soil against targets affiliated with the Islamic Republican Guard Corps of Iran. Israel has not openly admitted that it has executed the airstrikes but it is widely believed that the Israeli Air Force is behind them. Israel blames Iran for sponsoring, training and arming Palestinian and Hezbollah terrorists. One of the airstrikes targeted Aleppo Airport in the north of Syria causing nationwide disruption for airline companies. Damascus Airport has been the target of Israeli strikes in February. The latest Israeli airstrike was on 29/03/2023 and targeted Damascus. The area close to the border of Syria, including Lebanon and Israel, is also known for its jamming and disruption of avionics in commercial airliners. Analysis and Implications: Protests in Israel will likely continue in the future. Even though Netanyahu delayed the reforms to ‘give time for a broad agreement’, it is the question whether such an agreement will be reached any time soon. The protests clearly show the divide between people who are in favor of a more religious and nationalistic Israel on one hand and people who want a more modern and democratic Israel on the other hand. The tensions between those two camps will likely remain persistent within Israel’s society, which increases the risk of the continuation of protests regardless of the final decision that Netanyahu will make with respect to the judicial reforms. Israel’s right-wing community will push for the implementation of the judicial reforms. A significant number of people from the right-wing community participated in a counter-protest on 27/03/2023 to show their support for the judicial reforms. In some locations these counter-protests led to violent clashes with the people that protested against the reforms. It is likely that the right-wing community will not support the recent decision of Netanyahu to postpone the judicial reforms and that this community will also be unhappy if the government decides to listen to the critiques on the judicial reforms. This could then lead to violent protests from Israel’s right-wing community. The United States is limited in its influence over the situation. The United States finds itself in a difficult position with respect to the judicial reforms and the tensions within Israel. Speaking up against Netanyahu is seen as a big risk because of U.S. dependence on the country with respect to intelligence, national security and stability of the overall region. Netanyahu seems aware that this dependency gives him the ability to reject any of the already small amount of critique on the judicial reforms by the U.S. It is thus unlikely that the U.S. will be able to push Netanyahu towards a revision or total abandonment of the judicial reforms. Palestinian violence likely to increase. Even though there has been an uptick in violence coming from Palestinian terrorist organizations it is not certain that it has anything to with the judicial overhaul. There is however a likely chance that terrorist groups will want to take advantage of the situation. Response by the protestors. It is likely that the pro-democracy protests will continue until the reform bill has been totally withdrawn. There is a chance that there will be more violence at these protests if the bill is not withdrawn. The response from the right-wing and nationalist pro-reform protestors is likely to increase and may involve a rise in violence toward anti-reform protestors. The continuation of the protests and the refusal of the government to withdraw the reform bill is likely to increase the political instability of the country. If prime-minister Netanyahu decides to withdraw the bill there is a likelihood that his government will fall. If he does not withdraw the bill it is likely that the country will come to a standstill due to protests and strikes across the board. It is likely that the continuation of the protests will have an impact on national security. Hundreds of reservists from the Army, Navy and Airforce have refused service and have gone on strike to protest the reform bill. The IDF (Israeli Defense Forces) are heavily reliant on the reservists. Without them there will be gaps in the national security defence and it is likely that Palestinian terrorist organizations will try to take advantage of the situation. Concluding Notes The situation in Israel is volatile after the government of Netanyahu has introduced a judicial reform bill that will weaken the influence of the Supreme Court on the government’s decision making. This bill has led to mass protests and strikes across the country shutting down highways and, for a short time, Ben-Gurion Airport. Due to the strikes of a large number of IDF reservists the national security could be in jeopardy if Palestinian terrorist groups decide to take advantage of the situation.