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Date: 11/01/2024 Location: Ecuador Who’s involved: Ecuadorian President Noboa, Los Choneros gang, Narcotraffic cartels The Events: On Sunday 07/01/2024, Adolfo Macias, known as Fito, leader of the Ecuadorian Los Choneros gang, escaped from prison before he was set to be transported to another highly secure facility. His escape prompted the Ecuadorian government to call for a 60-day national state of emergency and include a curfew from 23:00 until 5:00. A man-hunt has also begun. In response to the state of emergency, drug gangs attacked several police officers, rioted in prisons and took guards hostage, set off explosive devices around the country, and invaded a national TV station during a live broadcast. The Ecuadorian security forces ultimately arrested all the hostage-takers at the TV station. President Noboa then called the situation in Ecuador an “internal armed conflict” and enlisted 22 gangs as terrorist organizations, ordering their neutralization through a massive mobilization of security forces. President Noboa, who took office in November 2023 after winning the election on 15/10/2023, gained widespread popular support for his policy agenda focused on significant security sector and justice system reforms, including high-security prison vessels to mitigate prison overcrowding and massacres and expansion of military authority, reminiscent of El Salvador's President Bukele's "mano dura" security measures. On 03/01/2024, Noba announced a referendum on imposing tighter security measures based on militarization and restrictive anti-crime policies to eradicate gang-related violence in the country. On 04/01/2024, the construction of two "Bukele-like" prisons was announced. In September 2023, a few weeks before the final presidential run-off, gangs attacked several locations around the country, using explosives and taking police officers hostage for a day. Schools in the most affected parts of the country were closed for a few days to reduce exposure to electoral violence. Context: Ecuador has been grappling with an unprecedented rise in violence in the past few years. The country has shifted from being the most peaceful in the region to now registering the fourth-highest homicide rate in Latin America.  Between 2016 and 2022, Ecuador's homicide rate spiked by nearly 500%. The homicide rate in 2023 reached an unprecedented peak. In 2023, the port city of Guayaquil recorded an 80 percent increase in homicides and gang-related violent crimes. The security crisis has been triggered by the rise of gangs and criminal groups taking advantage of Ecuador's increasingly key role in the cocaine trafficking chain to Europe. Colombian, Mexican, Venezuelan, and Albanian drug trafficking networks compete to control Ecuador ports to exploit banana trade routes, of which the country is the world's largest exporter, to smuggle drugs, mainly to Europe. The Covid-19 pandemic has largely contributed to the deterioration of security in the country. The crisis and high unemployment rate facilitated recruitment by drug cartels and criminal organizations. Meanwhile, once fragmented and not very influential, local organized crime has gained much power through drug trafficking. In recent years, Ecuadorian gangs have undergone a process of sophistication and affiliation with foreign cartels and organized crime groups, becoming more structured and violent. The country records numerous prison gangs, which control most detention facilities from which they orchestrate criminal activities and forge relationships with international drug trafficking networks. The most prominent local gangs in Ecuador are Los Choneros and Los Lobos. The prison system in Ecuador is experiencing a major crisis burdened by a lack of state control, corruption, and overpopulation. Gangs control most of the prisons, and government-appointed wardens and guards are forced to pledge allegiance to the drug cartel leaders. New prisoners or prison officers bring in weapons and drugs, and the violence against other inmates has risen sharply since 2018. The spike in prison violence can be connected to President Correa's 2007-2017 administration's crime reduction initiatives based on the construction of mega-prisons, which led to the counterproductive effect of increasing the prison population and facilitating gang organization. Ecuador has recently undergone a violent election. In August 2023, presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio was murdered after he had been vocal about Los Choneros. His murder has been linked to the now escaped drug lord Macias. The six Colombians who were arrested in relation to the assassination have since been murdered in Ecuadorian prisons. In recent years, Ecuador's administrations have frequently resorted to declaring states of emergency to counter the spiraling out-of-control increase in violence in the country and deal with the rapidly deteriorating security and criminal landscape. However, President Noboa's declaration of armed conflict against gangs is an unprecedented event. Analysis: The situation in Ecuador is likely to escalate in the coming days as the military cracks down on organized crime in a counter-terrorism operation. However, the government may be unprepared to handle this sort of offensive. The significant mobilization of armed forces and expected clashes with criminal groups are likely to trigger even more violence and instability in the country, increasing the risk to the civilian population. Indeed, hard-line approaches to crime often have fueled the backlash of gangs rather than appeasing them. Moreover, President Noboa has not provided further details on the conduct of the internal armed conflict nor a strategy to de-escalate the operation. The risk is that should the conflict against the gangs protract longer than expected by the presidency, Ecuador's government and armed forces may lack the capacity and resources to endure and manage the spike in violence. Evidence in countries like Mexico and El Salvador proved that military crackdowns, although they might curb criminality in the short term, have led to more violence and corruption in the long run. Indeed, “mano dura" policies, based on zero tolerance against drug crimes, militarization, and mass incarceration of gangs and criminals, often proved counterproductive in the long run. Conservative policies foster human rights violations, impose restrictions on freedoms, grant forceful authority to the military, erode the rule of law, and reinforce the power of elites. Moreover, mass incarcerations lead to prison overcrowding and facilitate the reorganization and strengthening of criminal groups and gangs. The current strategy of "war on gangs" could, therefore, result in increased power on the part of criminal organizations. It is also possible that criminal gangs will try to gain more influence on national and regional politics, as demonstrated by the assassination of the presidential candidate who vowed to crack down on corruption and the influence of drug cartels in Ecuador. Following Noboa's declaration of internal armed conflict, Peru also declared a state of emergency along its shared border with Ecuador. Colombia, Brazil, Bolivia, Argentina, and Chile have expressed support for Ecuador’s administration and population. On  10/01/2024, the United States condemned the rising violence in Ecuador, while China closed its embassy and consulates in the country. Finally, Ecuador needs increased support and intervention from the international community to address the ongoing security crisis. Specifically, governments in the region, including Colombia and Peru, should coordinate counterinsurgency strategies against the transnational networks of these influential criminal organizations. Finally, should Noboa lose the war against the gangs, Ecuador could, in the worst-case scenario, also convert into a full-fledged narco-state, affecting not only the stability of the region but also altering the routes and patterns of drug trafficking globally. Conclusion: After the assassination of presidential candidate Villavicienco in August 2023, the newly elected president Noboa vowed to smash the drug cartels in Ecuador; however, given the influence and power of gangs, it is proving to be a challenging goal. The escape of Los Choners’ leader Macias from prison and the uncontrollable escalation of violence that has spread through the country demonstrated the actual magnitude of these organizations in Ecuador. Although the announcement of a new national emergency plan to eradicate drug cartels, there is a chance that Ecuador will devolve into a security crisis that can be compared to the ongoing situation in Mexico, where drug cartels are seemingly more powerful than the government. Moreover, Noboa's hard-line counterinsurgency strategy based on militarization and the deployment of extreme measures to curb gang-related violence could backfire and spawn even more instability and violence in the country. Indeed, in the long term, the widespread tendency for Latin American states to turn to mass incarcerations or violent crackdowns by the military could constitute a direct threat to human rights, the rule of law, and democratic institutions. At the moment, there is not enough information to predict the development of the security crisis in Ecuador. Yet, it is arguable that Ecuador cannot face the "war" against gangs without support from the international community. The rise of so-called narco-states and the spread of the "war on drugs" policies will be a major test of the ability of the international community to address the global challenge posed by transnational drug trafficking and drug-related violence without allowing a deterioration of democracies.

Date: 09/01/2024 Location: Taiwan Who’s involved: Taiwan (Republic of China), China, William Lai Ching-te (DPP), Hou Yu-ih (KMT), People’s Republic of China, United States. The Events: On 13/01/2024, Taiwan (Republic of China) will hold elections to elect a new legislature and a new president at a vital juncture in regional geopolitics. The current president Tsai Ing-Wen from the Democratic People’s Party (DPP) is stepping down due to the two term limit on presidential terms in the Republic of China’s constitution. Thus far, polls show that the election could be tightly contested, but the DPP candidate is expected to win albeit with a smaller majority. Political issues have revolved around the correct approach to maintaining cross-strait stability, though it is not the sole concern. The cost of living is a pressing issue on the island, as is the rapid rise in the cost of housing. Nevertheless, the PRC’s growing military and economic power pose existential problems for Taiwan and is an essential part of its political cleavages. The governing Democratic People’s Party (DPP) candidate is William Lai Ching-te, the current Vice President. He is broadly perceived as the ‘continuity’ candidate from president Tsai as well pushing for closer security ties with the US and its allies Japan, South Korea and the Philippines. The main opposition Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang (KMT), is fielding Hou Yu-ih, a former high-ranking police official who is generally in favor of closer ties with the PRC. The more incendiary claim is that he accuses the DPP of provoking cross-strait relations to the point of war with the PRC. There is a third candidate, Ko Wen-je, a member of the new Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), who is focusing on domestic governance issues. Under Xi Jinping, the hardline policies pushed by the PRC include further military exercises around the island, proliferation of disinformation campaigns, and refusing to renounce the use of force. The Chinese Communist Party minister for Taiwan said that this election is a choice between peace and war, clearly pointing to Beijing’s preferred candidate. Analysis: Predictions have suggested that William Lai (DPP) is likely to win given that he is ahead in the polls. However, there are a few days of campaigning left and he is likely to face challenges. No ruling party has won three elections consecutively in Taiwan since its first elections in 1996, and the cost of housing and living remain important sticking points for a continuity candidate. Taiwan’s presidential election is crucial for cross-Strait relations and the regional security situation in the Asia-Pacific. The return of the DPP’s William Lai to Taiwan’s presidency could see more military exercises from China over the coming weeks. It is also likely to raise tensions in the medium term given Xi Jinping’s hardline policies toward the island. William Lai is likely to seek more military support from the US, assurances on economic security and pursue regional partnerships with Japan and South Korea. Whether Taiwan’s military deterrence is sufficient is an open question, but William Lai will continue to push for an external relationship. If the KMT candidate is elected, there could be a short-term reduction in tensions given China’s preference for their party, but even the KMT has ruled out the ‘one country two systems’ model pushed by Beijing. Xi’s aggressive policies to reunify Taiwan with the mainland has prioritized hard military exercises and shows of force to intimidate Taiwan, reflecting the state of US-China relations and China’s domestic politics. China’s acute economic challenges and social tensions suggest that Beijing will maintain high pressure on the island, but will hopefully stop short of an invasion. Xi’s centralization of power in the military since 2015 and his chairmanship of the Central Military Commission demonstrates his accumulation of power in the PLA structure. The latest overhaul of the People Liberation Army’s leadership, including three senior officers and one new Central Committee member to replace dismissed Lin Shang, suggests that despite 12 years in power, Xi’s confidence in the PLA’s ability to fight and win wars is not complete. The US-China war scare between August 2022 and March 2023 is still acute. While most war games have focused on an amphibious invasion of Taiwan, Beijing could take a range of measures that require a response and up the pressure on Taipei’s allies. Blockades of the island, parts of the island, and other provocative actions short of invasion could raise the pressure immensely. There is at least a floor under the US-China relationship with the meeting of Biden and Xi in San Francisco in November 2023, but the longer term trajectory is one of intensifying competition across political, military, economic and security fields. With the US in an election year and Xi’s apparent grip on power in the Chinese Communist Party, this is expected to worsen in the coming years. Conclusion: Taiwan’s upcoming election holds significant implications for security of the Indo-Pacific. A victory from William Lai (DPP) or Hou Yu-ih (KMT) will shape cross-Strait tensions in short and long term, including Taiwan’s society and its delicate relations with an assertive China. While there is little indication of an imminent full-scale invasion of the island, Xi could up the pressure further. The US’ commitment to Taiwan’s security and sovereignty would be tested if the PLA conducted actions short of an invasion. The evolving dynamics in the Indo-Pacific and the crucial role of Taiwan requires attention.

Date: 08/01/2024 Where: Ukraine, Russia Who’s involved: Ukraine: BLACKJACK hacktivist group, SSU operators Russia: Solntsepyok hacktivist group, GRU “Sandworm” operators Kyivstar Telecommunications Rosvodokanal Water What happened: On 12/12/2023, a “hybrid” cyber-exchange between Ukraine and Russia significantly impacted critical infrastructure in both countries. The Russian hacktivist entity, Solntsepyok, allegedly assisted by GRU cyberwarfare unit, Sandworm, targeted Ukraine’s largest mobile communications provider, Kyivstar. Both sides utilized a “frontline” of civilian volunteers while having support from offensive intelligence services. Solntsepyok claimed responsibility through a 13/12/2023 post on the Telegram messaging app, accompanied by screenshots purporting to show their penetration into Kyivstar's servers. The attack cut off over 24 million Ukrainians’ internet access for several days. In some localities, this meant no banking access or payment card services. Ukraine’s SBU investigation found the hackers probably attempted to penetrate Kyivstar in March and had a way into the telecommunications provider’s network since at least May. Kyivstar's CEO, Oleksandr Komarov, said on 20/12/2023 that all the company's services had been fully restored throughout the country. During this time period, water utilities in parts of Russia started suffering from their own similar service outages. It was revealed on 20/12/2023, that a pro-Ukrainian threat actor BLACKJACK, with alleged help from agents of Ukraine’s Security Service, had attacked Rosvodokanal, the largest private water company in Russia providing water to over 7 million Russian citizens, in retaliation for the attack on Kyivstar. Analysis: This exchange is remarkable for both the impact of the cyber attack on critical infrastructure, and the tactics utilized. This is one of the most public uses of both civilian and military assets within a cyber operation. The method of the attack on Kyivstar was through a compromised employee account, a significant detail, as it indicates potential for either an insider threat or possible social engineering attempts. More details will need to be revealed. The swift response from BLACKJACK is indicative of both an incredibly skilled operation, and either intelligence or direct access provided by Ukrainian intelligence. Solntsepyok, while ostensibly a hacktivist organization working for Russian interests similar to groups like KillNet and Anonymous Sudan, has been tied to units of the Russian GRU before. Ukrainian authorities have accused the group of effectively being a deniability screen for Sandworm. BLACKJACK is a pro-Ukrainian threat actor that specializes in data theft and wiping. The attack against Rosvodokanal impacted over 6000 devices in a critical sector, and allegedly provided 1.5 terabytes of data to Ukrainian authorities for analysis. The attack by BLACKJACK on Rosvodokanal was particularly extensive, resulting in the erasure of over 50 terabytes of data. Conclusion: The involvement of both state-sponsored units like GRU's Sandworm and non-state hacktivist groups like Solntsepyok and BLACKJACK in these cyber exchanges highlights a blurring line between state and non-state actors in cyber warfare. The method of attack on Kyivstar through a compromised employee account underscores the critical need for robust insider threat management programs. Security professionals must focus not only on external threats but also on potential vulnerabilities from within their organizations, including rigorous employee vetting, continuous monitoring, and comprehensive security awareness training. The attacks on both Kyivstar and Rosvodokanal demonstrate that critical infrastructure sectors are prime targets in cyber warfare with the intention capability to cause significant disruptions to civilians. This calls for heightened security measures in such sectors, including regular security audits, adoption of robust cybersecurity frameworks, and emergency response planning.

Date: 05/01/2024 Where: Argentina Who’s involved:  Newly elected President of Argentina Javier Milei, Argentinian Congress Security Minister Patricia Bullrich, Argentinian civil society, workers unions and activists What happened? On 20/12/2023, Argentina’s new President Javier Milei, who officially took office only in December 2023 after being elected on 19/11/2023, issued a 366-article Decree of “Necessity and Urgency” (DNU) to radically deregulate Argentina’s economy. He claims that this will boost the country’s exports,  investment, and international trade. The DNU technically took effect on 28/12/2023. However, the measures are currently under review by the Argentinian Congress. The revision, which started on 26/12/2023, will last until the end of January 2024. The DNU must be approved by at least one of the two chambers to remain in force. The DNU is the first step of the "shock therapy" to revive the Argentine economy promised by Milei in his electoral campaign. The DNU proposes lowering income tax for high earners, eliminating dozens of state regulations, devaluing the national currency - already devalued by 50 percent since Milei took office - to open the door to the dollarization, and the privatization of several state-owned companies, including Aerolíneas Argentinas, the oil company YFP, and the country's largest bank, Banco de la Nación. Moreover, the decree announces the establishment of a "state of public emergency in economic, financial, fiscal, pension, defense, tariff, energy, health, administrative and social matters until December 31, 2025." President Milei’s DNU provides about $20 million in cuts to public expenses and services, like education, transport, and healthcare. It also abolishes fixed prices for essential goods and the price ceilings of the Tenancy Law, which are expected to severely affect the lower-income working class. A key section of the DNU is dedicated to regressive labor reforms which would result in substantial restrictions on workers' protections, benefits, and rights. Also, the decree provides for a ban on the right to strike in the sectors of "essential services," including health care, education, banking, energy, transportation, exports, industries, and hospitality. The decree also reinforces the new anti-protest protocol issued by Security Minister Patricia Bullrich, which authorizes security forces to shut down protests that block the streets and increases detention penalties for protesters. Additionally, Milei threatened to reduce the social benefits for anyone who violated the new anti-protest measures. From 22/12/2023, thousands took to the streets of Buenos Aires and major cities to demonstrate against the DNU, perceived to be unconstitutional and undemocratic.  The General Confederation of Workers (CGT) has announced that protests will continue until the repeal of the decree and has called a general strike for 24/01/2023. The DNU is spawning strong opposition nationwide, so much so that even more moderate members of Milei's coalition have expressed concerns about the mega-decree. Analysis: Decrees of necessity and urgency (DNUs) are exceptional mechanisms under the Argentine Constitution that allow the executive to enact or amend laws in a situation of emergency, without prior debate by Congress. Milei declared that the economic crisis and inflation in Argentina justify using the measure. In deference, the opposition objected that the DNU does not meet the requirements of the Constitution. The DNU is currently in force, but to remain in law, it needs to pass several legislative hurdles. The DNU must first be evaluated by a permanent bilateral committee of Parliament to assess the requirements of "necessity and urgency." Next, the DNU will be examined in the Chamber of Deputies and Senate plenary sessions. However, the two chambers of Parliament can only reject or accept the DNU but cannot amend or modify it. The DNU will finally enter into force if only one of the chambers approves it by an absolute majority. Given Milei's party's lack of a majority in the chambers -40 out of 257 seats in the Chamber and 7 out of 72 votes in the Senate - it is likely that the decision will be postponed until 01/03/2024, which will guarantee sufficient time to create a majority consensus. Milei’s DNU 70/2023 represents an unprecedented use of executive power by Argentine administrations, as there has never been a decree of this kind containing as many measures. Also, the DNU presents several critical and controversial aspects. First, if approved, this DNU declares the extension of the two-year emergency period, implying that the Milei government could introduce extraordinary measures, holding both legislative and executive power until the end of 2025, bypassing the legislature even on issues usually entrusted to Congress. This would jeopardize the rule of law and the functioning of Argentina's democracy. The DNU includes substantial restrictions on the civil rights of minorities and workers. Particular attention should be paid to the heavy restrictions on the right to strike and the new repressive capabilities envisioned by the state apparatus. In addition, the DNU includes restrictions on forming and operating social organizations, thus altering the social democratic framework and affecting the Argentine population's freedom of expression,  participation, and opposition. Not surprisingly, the DNU measures, which directly impact the working class, are fomenting fervent protests. Despite the deterrent of the new anti-protest laws, it is very likely that the resistance from the opposition will persist at least until Congress decides on the validity of the decree. The core of Miles's DNU is the deregulation of trade, industries, and services to revitalize Argentina's economy, based on the dubious idea of the creation of a system of free competition that allows and values private free decision and the initiative of individuals. Currently, Argentina's economy is experiencing a deep crisis, with inflation exceeding 160% and 40% of the population living in a condition of poverty. Whatever the economic effect in the long-term, the implications of this measure will likely be destructive for the Argentinian people, especially for the working class. Not only could deregulation create greater disarray instead of boosting the country's economy, but the drastic cuts in government subsidies and services could push more of the population into poverty. Conclusion: Milei's DNU appears to be the first step in Latin America’s most radical economic reform in recent decades. The outcome of such radical reforms is likely to cause major disruptions to Argentine politics and society. Despite the tightening of anti-protest laws, the decree will likely continue to foment strong opposition and resistance from Argentinian civil society organizations. The protesters consider the decree unconstitutional and directed at demolishing the democratic foundations of the Argentine state, and is likely to cause considerable unrest in the coming weeks.

December 2023 1. Challenges to Democracy In 2024, the future of democracy is on the ballot 2024 will be a record-breaking year for elections, with over two billion voters heading to the polls for more than 70 elections - national, regional, and local- scheduled in over 40 countries. Yet, many of these elections will also be held in states with doubts over the fairness and transparency of the electoral process. For 2024, election-related violence will be a major security concern. In contested and unstable contexts, polarization and militarization are likely to escalate in combination with the elections. In 2023, there were further challenges to democracy around the world. Many countries hold regular elections, but the respect for the rule of law, free speech, and pluralism suffered a decline in 2023. According to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), in 2023, 85 out of 173 countries suffered a recession in democratic performance. In Europe, the rise of populist far-right leaders and movements, like Italian President Meloni's attempt to refashion Italian media institutions and the anti-democratic “Reichsbürger'' movement, which rejects the legality of democratic authorities and system in Germany, suggest a widespread decline of tolerance and faith in democratic values. In West Africa, military-led coups ousted democratic leaders in Niger, and Gabon, joining other military governments in Burkina Faso. In Central America, the suspension of the presidential transition in Guatemala and President Bukele seeking a second term in El Salvador's February 2024 elections, despite constitutional prohibition, reflect the broad democratic backsliding in the Latin American region. 2024 will be a crucial year to evaluate the global state of democracy, given that two of the world's largest democracies in the world will head to the ballot box. In the United States, incumbent Joe Biden will likely run against front-runner Donald Trump, who  rejects the legitimacy of the 2020 presidential result. Trump’s support among the wider US Republican Party has raised questions about its commitment to the electoral process itself. Halfway across the world, India will hold elections over a four month voting process. Incumbent Prime Minister Modi is running for re-election campaigning for a third term in power. While supporters have lauded his efforts to confront Pakistan and China and achieve high economic growth, his critics accuse him of undermining India’s secular nationhood by limiting Muslim rights, shutting down independent media organizations, and failing to confront rising inequality in the country. There are also elections in countries with little freedom of speech but with significant geopolitical relevance. In February 2024, Pakistan will likely hold a highly contested general election, and Russian elections will take place in March, likely setting Putin in power again until 2030. During this time, opportunities for reconciliation with the West will be scarce. The high tensions around elections could produce further unrest in these countries and may lead to dramatic policy shifts. Election Cybersecurity With the amount of important elections happening around the world in 2024, questions will be posed, also, regarding the security, reliability, and integrity of these elections. In 2024, the cybersecurity threats surrounding elections, particularly the U.S. Presidential Election, are expected to intensify. Key concerns include a significant increase in election-related scams and disruptive threats. A notable development will be the extensive use of generative AI and synthetic media by both malicious and non-malicious actors. These technologies are anticipated to be employed to create persuasive and effective content, thereby exacerbating the challenges posed by the spread of misinformation and disinformation. This evolving threat landscape underscores the critical need for enhanced cybersecurity measures and vigilant monitoring to ensure the integrity of electoral processes in 2024​. 2. Tensions in Global Governance World Trade and the Drive towards Economic Security Governments around the world see interdependence as a vulnerability, with trade and investment perceived as a  national security issue. In 2023, the Biden administration doubled down on high-tech trade and investment sanctions intending to prevent China’s military from getting hold of advanced weaponry. The  semiconductor supply chains which ran through a China-centered manufacturing are likely to be reshaped in 2024 despite weaknesses in enforcing sanctions. In China, Xi Jinping’s push to securitize all aspects of governance has led to a crackdown on ‘foreign espionage’, with security services investigating companies attempting to talk down the country’s financial system or publishing economic information. Despite ongoing trade flows, governments are intending to reshape globalization for the purposes of national security. The drive for economic security is likely to accelerate in 2024 with rising tensions between the major blocs of the world economy. With the US political establishment broadly agreeing on seeing China as an existential threat to US hegemony, the 2024 election race could ramp up rhetoric from both Joe Biden and his rival to be ‘tough on China’. China’s president Xi Jinping is likely to remain firm on regime security above all else, and push for self-sufficiency in indigenous technology development. EU-China relations could deteriorate further in 2024 given the widening trade deficit with China, the Communist Party’s clampdown on information, and its continuing tacit economic support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. The geopolitical situation suggests that supply chains will continue to face calls to meet national security priorities in 2024. For the World Bank and the IMF, the new competition over supply chains will lower efficiency gains and shrink world GDP. Yet, economic security priorities have also pushed geopolitical relevance to countries looking to gain a foothold in high-tech supply chains. Southeast Asia is attracting companies looking to diversify away from China. For example, Vietnam welcomed new trade deals and visits from both US President Biden and President Xi this year alone. The growth of swing states who are looking to maximize advantages of the drive away from China will become more strategically important. Whether those countries can leverage intensifying US-China competition without being forced to choose sides remains a vital question. Spread Thin, Will The US Withdraw Regional Support? The trope of the US as “World Police” has come into conversation again with more seriousness, both as a point of criticism and an expectation in the face of numerous global conflicts. Despite accusations of over-extension, and critique from various political factions, the US has found itself entering 2024 supporting conflicts in four theaters, while facing its largest military recruitment shortages since the beginning of the Global War on Terror, and $31 trillion of combined debt being used as a tool in electoral politics during a Presidential election season. In 2023, US domestic politics continues to place strains on support for US allies. US Republicans blocked Biden's request for another $106 billion in aid to Ukraine and Israel. Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the US has been the largest single donor of aid to Ukraine, but some Republicans say the US-Mexico border should be better secured first, with thousands of illegal migrants now crossing the border. Republicans have rejected a $20 billion Democratic aid package with demands for increased funding at the US-Mexico border. Shalanda Young, director of the White House budget office has said that if it is no longer possible for the US to supply Ukraine with aid, it may encourage and allow Russia to further extend the conflict to other US allies in Europe, which Putin denies. In order to continue aid to Ukraine, both the Senate and the House will have to compromise on a spending bill, with Biden indicating that he is "open to compromise." The delicate interplay between US domestic politics and international commitments presents a formidable challenge in 2024. The impasse over aid to Ukraine and Israel, the potential for intervention between Venezuela and Guyana, the US' efforts to bolster allies in the Asia-Pacific, and heightened US naval activity in the Middle East add further layers of complexity. With the upcoming presidential election in 2024, the strategic challenges facing the US and its allies alike are likely to become more acute. Challenges and rising tensions in the Arctic In 2024, the Arctic region is anticipated to experience heightened military activity and geopolitical tensions. Russia’s bolstered military presence, aimed at securing its strategic interests in the Arctic, rich in natural resources and of strategic importance, is expected to persist. This development is largely a response to the activities of other nations, especially the United States, which encompass resource exploration and navigation rights. The US, through its National Strategy for the Arctic Region, emphasizes national security, economic development, infrastructure, and environmental concerns, highlighting the military dominance of Russia and the increasing influence of China in the region. The situation is complicated by Russia's growing cooperation with non-Arctic states, notably China, and the cessation of cooperation with Russia in the Arctic Council, impacting a third of the council's projects and crucial activities like climate change research and emergency response preparations​​​​​​. In 2024, environmental concerns and economic opportunities will be prominent themes in the Arctic. The reduction in Arctic ice is expected to open new trade routes, such as the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage, enhancing commercial shipping and economic activities. However, these opportunities are coupled with environmental challenges, including the risk of pollution and the complexities of managing oil spills in unique Arctic conditions. Territorial disputes, such as those over the Lomonosov Ridge and the Northwest Passage, will play a significant role in the dynamics of resource extraction and environmental protection in the region. Domestic naval forces of NATO-aligned countries will have a new role in asserting Arctic sovereignty and managing response capabilities will be crucial for navigating these emerging risks and opportunities, balancing the interests of various nations and entities involved in the Arctic's future​​​​​​. UN Peacekeeping Challenges UN peacekeeping missions around the world will continue to face pressure in 2024.  Two of the largest and longest-running U.N. operations, in Mali and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), are soon coming to an end. Both operations display long-standing complexities and challenges. Numerous casualties, as well as tense relations with the Malian government after the military coup in 2020, led the government to call for the withdrawal of the UN Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in June 2023.  Similarly, the Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or MONUSCO, has sparked widespread protests against the ineffectiveness of the mandate and its failure to protect civilians. The ongoing MONUSCO withdrawal is expected to be completed in 2024. At the same time, the East African Community regional force also began its withdrawal from Eastern DRC in  December 2023. While some UN peacekeeping missions have been extended in September 2023, they still face multiple challenges. The tensions in the UN Security Council prevent further funding from being allocated to carry out the missions more effectively. Deployment of more peacekeeping missions also slowed, which is problematic for rapidly changing conflict dynamics. They also face issues from local legitimacy; some UN peacekeeping missions face accusations of failing to provide protection to civilians and bias with foreign forces. This resulted in popular protests and anti-UN positions by some local governments, which often decided to turn to other security partners such as private military contractors . At this time, the future of peacekeeping missions remains uncertain. Currently, there are 12 ongoing peacekeeping operations with approximately 75,000 security personnel. While some will continue, the missions in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and South Sudan (UNMISS) could terminate soon. While peacekeeping operations will not disappear completely, they may reduce in favor of alternative forms of intervention. For example, the non-UN multinational force in support of Haiti, whose deployment is currently under negotiation, or regional forces coalitions may play a greater role in 2024. Climate change and food security Irregular rainfall and extreme weather conditions can fuel competition for food between people. The effects of climate change, such as floods, droughts, and irregular weather patterns, mean that farmers can no longer rely on weather forecasts or a stable water supply. Crops can therefore be damaged or even destroyed, leaving populations with little or no food. In Africa, for example, 80% of food production depends on smallholder farmers. If it becomes impossible for these small farmers to predict weather conditions, their crops become vulnerable. This can lead to competition for food and water, loss of income for these farmers, and more people being forced to leave their homes due to droughts, floods, storms, and rising sea levels. Every year, about 20 million people have to move because of this. Food insecurity amplifies already existing fragile security situations. For example, the Sahel is one of the most vulnerable regions to climate change. People are fleeing to other parts of the region due to unrest and conflict, which means that farmers are also leaving their land. Climate change is also playing a big part in this, as variable and extreme weather conditions make it harder to grow crops in the Sahel and feed the growing population in the region. The conflict between Ukraine and Russia, major exporters of staple foods, intersects with climate change, severely impacting global food security. Climate-related issues like droughts and temperature fluctuations have drastically reduced essential food crop yields in these regions. This decline contributes to rising food prices and increased vulnerability to shortages. Additionally, the conflict disrupts key Black Sea trade routes, vital for grain and oilseed trade, exacerbating the global food security threat. The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) warns of rising food prices due to these factors, emphasizing the significant impact on the world's strained food systems. The Israel-Palestine conflict is similarly exacerbated by climate change, with water scarcity and public health issues becoming more prominent. Predictions of rising temperatures and decreased precipitation threaten to worsen the water crisis, deepening community divides. Israeli control over most fresh water sources and consumption disparities between Israeli and Palestinian households intensifies this imbalance, with Gaza facing severe public health challenges. Efforts to adapt and mitigate climate change impacts are hindered by complex politics. Israel has begun a national adaptation plan, but the Palestinian Authority struggles with its limited resources. Worsening climate conditions in 2024 could signify more unrest and perhaps even conflict due to, among other things, food insecurity. While climate change is unlikely to lead directly to conflict, it can increase the risk of conflict by exacerbating existing social, economic and environmental factors. 3. Cyber Threats and Trends in 2024 Ransomware The use of ransomware is expected to increase, with malware being coded in more uncommon languages such as Rust and Golang. These languages can make malware more difficult to detect and offer unique advantages for attackers, such as control over intellectual property and minimization of reuse by other actors. There's also an expectation of more targeted ransomware attacks against sectors like schools, hospitals, and critical infrastructure, which have more to lose by not resolving the issue quickly. Another attack vector that will likely be exploited more in 2024 are locations that are essential to global supply chains and logistical hubs, as they have proven to be weak points for disruption to organizations around the world. Artificial Intelligence The influence of AI on cybersecurity, broadly, has been profound, with both defenders and attackers leveraging this technology. Given the intense technological competition over developing the technology, AI will likely become more widespread in 2024. AI tools have been used by cybercriminals for malicious activities. AI-enabled chatbots can be used to improve the writing and language of phishing emails, making them more persuasive. It also helps would-be hackers improve their programming, though safeguards for many of the prevailing models are getting better at preventing this. There's some reason to be skeptical, however. The complexity of AI that is attainable for everyday users is overblown in most fields. The same goes for how it’s ended up in the cybersecurity realm. As it stands, language learning models are the primary type of AI that is being developed for the public. A number of the “malicious” AI chatbots have turned out to be inferior to existing models, even for nefarious purposes. Both Google’s Gemini and X’s Grok, upon their release, offer nothing new to the field. As it stands, AI seems more a device for augmenting current capabilities and risks, rather than creating something entirely novel, though this could, and likely will, change in 2024. State Affiliations with Cybercrime In 2024, nation-state actors are expected to intensify their relationships to cybercrime activities. They will likely use blended ransomware attacks and wiper tools, not just for financial gain such as we’ve seen with North Korea’s Lazarus Group, but also as a means of destruction and obfuscation. There's a predicted shift towards activities fronting as 'hacktivism', where cyberattacks serve dual purposes of political messaging and revenue generation. Ransomware is anticipated to become more sophisticated, shifting focus from consumers to businesses, with state actors increasingly adopting cybercriminal tactics and code for sale to conceal their involvement, thereby making these attacks more complex and multifaceted. About the authors: Jacob Dickinson Jacob studied Global Political Economy at Leiden University. He is passionate about international development and is looking to expand his expertise in geopolitics and crisis management. Curious about other cultures, he has traveled in Europe and Asia for both academic study and professional purposes. His expertise includes the geopolitics of oil and industrial upgrading in the electronics global value chain. He is particularly interested in the evolving political and economic relationships between China and ASEAN, and the consequences for regional development and security. Roos Nijmeijers Roos works as a junior intelligence/research analyst. She is also currently doing the Bachelor of Security Studies at Leiden University. She has always loved the security field and she immediately got the right feeling when meeting Dyami's team for the first time. With the wide range of knowledge she accumulated thanks to her bachelor’s program, she brings new aspects to the intelligence department and helps us write insightful products. Sara Frisan Sara joined Dyami as a Junior Intelligence/Research Analyst post-graduate intern to deepen her passionate interest in conflict analysis and security. Sara recently completed her MA in Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University and holds an MA degree in International Sciences and Peace Studies. During her academic career, she conducted research in South America, primarily Colombia, on the dynamics of collaboration and resistance between civilians and non-state armed groups in violent settings. In her previous internship at the investigative think-tank InSight Crime, Sara developed some expertise on transnational organized crime and political-criminal alliances. Mark Bruno Mark is a non-commissioned officer transitioning out of the United States military, where he served as a Combat Medic and a Public Affairs Representative. He is currently a Master’s Student of Cybersecurity and Information Assurance at Western Governors University, and holds a Bachelor of Science in Communication. Aspiring to a career in Conflict Journalism, his areas of security interest are in military medicine, information security, and weapons technology. Alessia Cappelletti Alessia is a skilled Lead Analyst at Dyami, where she excels in researching and analyzing security threats at both operational and geopolitical levels. She has experience in managing investigations, identifying security-related issues in volatile environments, and analyzing recent (international) security trends. She has field experience in South America, where she has conducted research on security shifts. Alessia also holds a MA degree in Conflict Studies from Utrecht University. Adriaan Kolkman Adriaan is currently enrolled in the master Global Studies program at Göteborg University in Sweden. At Dyami, Adriaan is undertaking his internship and thesis in which he will be researching the Dutch, Danish and Swedish government enterprise agencies approaches on how to deal with doing business in non-western states. Previously, Adriaan completed a bachelor in Safety & Security Management at Avans University of Applied Sciences. Diana Coman Diana is a passionate irregular warfare researcher, focusing on military strategy and civil-military cooperation. Currently, she is undertaking a Master’s degree at Leiden University and the University of St Andrews in International Relations and Military Strategic Studies. As an intern at Dyami, Diana is responsible for contributing and editing publications, using her academic research background and experience as a writer to assist in the provision of security services.

Written by Daan Vegter & Adriaan Kolkman Date: 20/12/2023 Location: Courthouse at Wulfinghstraat no 5, Paramaribo Parties involved: NDP party Mr Desiré Delano Bouterse Suriname Judicial Courthouse Suriname Police Protest groups (pro Bouterse/NDP) General looters/criminals The Event: On 20/12/2023,  the final court hearing of the case against Mr Bouterse and fellow suspects in the 8 December Process will be held. Within society there are concerns that any outcome of the court ruling may cause social unrest. Analysis and implications: On 20/12/2023, the Wulfinghstraat in Paramaribo will probably be closed for traffic due to the court hearing at the courthouse in the same street. Closing of the main road, ‘Henck Arronstraat’, is also possible but not expected. On 20/12/2023 police will be on high alert because of chances of social unrest or looting. The police will deploy static and dynamic roadblocks on strategic points in and around Paramaribo. These will be on the main roads and bridges leading to the capital. Extra security measures will also be taken at utility state companies such as SWM (water management company), Telesur (Telecommunication), EAS (energy company). Concluding notes: Both case outcomes of guilty and not guilty are possible in the verdict and both may have consequences for social unrest. Individual actions of any supporters or opposition always remain unpredictable. Therefore, the chances for social unrest are present but hard to predict.

“Shock” Victory Most international news outlets expressed shock and surprise regarding the Partij voor de Vrijheid’s (PVV) performance in the November 2023 general elections in the Netherlands. The election results are presented as unprecedented for a socially liberal country, where the PVV, achieved their greatest ever number of seats in the House of Representatives since the inception of the party. With such a significant shift in political attitudes in the Netherlands, the recent election results are bound to have implications for Dutch security and foreign policy. Ascent of the Right in Europe However, certain news outlets, such as Al-Jazeera and Reuters have remarked that the PVV’s election results follows a broader shift to the right in Europe. All across Europe, far right parties seem to be making political gains. Far-right parties have been elected in Italy and Slovakia, extended their rule in Hungary, earned a coalition role in Finland, become de facto government partners in Sweden, entered Parliament in Greece, and made striking gains in regional elections in Austria and Germany. The ascent of the far right in Europe can be explained by an increase in voter dissatisfaction with mainstream pro-establishment politicians. The international media explains the PVV’s election results as a consequence of energy inflation due to souring relations with Russia over the Ukraine war. As such, Wilders used his anti-immigration political strategy to appeal to disenchanted voters affected by the cost of living crisis. A Dutch “Donald Trump” Wilders’ has often been likened with former US President, Donald Trump due to his anti-immigration policies and combed-back, dyed blond hair. Parallels have been drawn with Trump’s particular brand of populism rooted in nativist and anti-establishment rhetoric. Wilders promoted politics of division similar to those of Trump, promising to put Dutch people first and opposing multiculturalism. The international media has been comparing the 2016 US Presidential election and the Brexit referendum to Wilders’ ability to mobilise moderate right wing-voters towards the far right. Bad news for the European Union European news outlets, in particular, are discussing the potential impact a Wilders-led cabinet may have on the Netherlands’ foreign policy towards the EU. There is a consensus that the election results present potentially negative prospects for Dutch-EU relations. There is widespread agreement in the media that a “Nexit” referendum is unlikely to happen as Dutch public opinion is against leaving the EU after Brexit seems to have had an unfavourable outcome for the UK. However, this does not mean that tensions with Brussels should not be expected. If Wilders does succeed in forming a government coalition, the EU will find itself with a much more difficult partner than it did with former Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte. A seat for Wilders around the EU summit table would transform the dynamic, as he will align himself with other far-right and nationalist leaders already in post. The international press warns that such an alignment is likely to affect EU-wide policies on asylum, climate change, and aid to Ukraine. Furthermore, regarding the issue of Ukraine, the PVV promised to cut “scarce military and financial resources” and use them to bolster the Netherlands’ own national security. The PVV manifesto also does not mention sanctions or other punitive measures in relation to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. With talks beginning on Ukraine’s accession to the EU, it is likely that a Wilders-led government will attempt to block Ukraine’s entry into the EU due to declared migration concerns from Eastern Europe. Times of Uncertainty Most news outlets highlight the structural constraints of the Dutch political system. As the Netherlands has a multi-party proportional representation electoral system, no single party is able to secure an overall majority of votes in the lower house of Parliament. Normally, several parties must cooperate in order to form a coalition government. Whilst the PVV may be the largest party in the Dutch Parliament, it has only managed to secure 37 of the total 150 seats available. A government would need 76 seats to have a majority. There are significant doubts that Wilders will be able to garner enough support to achieve a government coalition after the PVV has been excluded in the past by mainstream Dutch political parties. If no government coalition can be formed, the Netherlands may have to hold another round of elections. Protests have been held in cities such as Utrecht and Amsterdam with a significant portion of the Dutch population expressing discontent with the results of the general election. The international media suggests that the Netherlands may be heading towards a period of political instability and division. Fears for the Muslim Community A large part of the Muslim community expressed fear and disappointment towards the election results. Due to Wilders’ anti-Islam rhetoric, many Muslims may feel uncertain about their future in the Netherlands. The international press has gathered statements from a number of Muslim organisations and politicians in the Netherlands. They are hoping that the PVV will respect the rule of law as the party has promised to work within the constitution and not pursue a ban on Islam and mosques in the Netherlands, as stipulated by the PVV’s manifesto. Many believe the PVV to be a threat to Dutch democracy and tolerance. Due to the growing support for the far right in the Netherlands, the Muslim community is concerned that they will be facing increasing discrimination and may be portrayed as “second-class citizens” by a Wilders-led government. There are significant fears for the safety of Muslims and asylum-seekers in the country. Conclusion The international coverage of Geert Wilders has focused on his surprise victory and the consequences it has for communities in the Netherlands. While the coalition negotiations are ongoing, the international media has depicted the win as a dilemma for international security. Regarding European security, Wilders is thought to be more sceptical of funding for Ukraine and the possible enlargement of European Union membership. The agenda setting power of the Dutch prime minister in the European Council will likely influence the direction of EU foreign and domestic policy. With far-right leaders making gains across Europe, a crackdown on migration and stricter asylum policies are likely to be pursued.

Enhancing aviation security solutions Press Release Date: December 14, 2023 Utrecht, December 14, 2023 — Dyami, Corposec, and Tarmak Aviation are excited to announce a strategic partnership aimed at integrating their extensive expertise in aviation security to offer one-stop-shop solutions. This collaboration will bring together the unique strengths and capabilities of each company to provide comprehensive and innovative security solutions to the aviation industry. All three companies share the vision that security needs to come with a personal touch. About the Companies Dyami offers a comprehensive one-stop aviation security solution designed to assist airlines, aircraft operators, and airports in enhancing their capabilities and capacity, streamlining operations, and bolstering security measures. Founded in 2019 by Eric Schouten, a former aviation liaison officer at the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service, Dyami aims to make aviation more secure by providing accessible and cost-effective security & intelligence services to the aviation sector. Corposec is a proven expert in aviation and supply chain security and compliance, providing a range of cutting-edge security solutions from trusted partners. Founded in 2015 by security veteran Elad Gadot, Corposec focuses on developing innovative solutions to ensure the security of businesses, customers, employees, and partners, from targeted consulting to practical implementation & overall management of the company’s security operations and compliance system. Tarmak Aviation, based in Belgium, and founded by Thomas De Maertelaere, who started his aviation career in 2015, specializes in providing all-round consulting in the cargo aviation industry. They aim to act as a one-stop shop, bringing together experts to assist in overcoming various challenges in the industry, offering tailor-made consulting under one roof, ranging from IATA Dangerous Goods and ground operations training to auditing and beyond. Strategic Collaboration This partnership will leverage the combined knowledge, experience, and innovative solutions of the three companies to address the increasing security challenges in the aviation landscape, including emerging threats and complex regulatory requirements. The collaboration will focus on ensuring the safety and security of passengers, crew, cargo, and assets and providing a holistic approach to security risk management, resulting in more secure and efficient airline or charter operations. In a world where security is paramount, this strategic partnership represents a significant step forward in creating a safer and more secure aviation environment. By combining their expertise, Dyami, Corposec, and Tarmak Aviation are poised to deliver unparalleled security solutions, contributing to the resilience and protection of the aviation sector. For more information, please contact. Eric Schouten; eric@dyami.services | www.dyami.services Elad Gadot; elad.gadot@corposec.at | https://www.corposec.at/ Thomas De Maertelaere; thomas.dm@tarmak-aviation.com  | https://www.tarmak-aviation.com/

Trojan horses en mass The western market has experienced a sharp increase in the sales of Chinese produced cars in recent years. While Chinese cars used to be almost unavailable on the western market due to safety standards, by failing them horribly, the newest products are not held back by this. Brands such as Build Your Dreams (BYD), Xpeng, Nio and Great Wall all have seen a surge in sales in for example Europe, ranging from +100% to over +400% sales. The Polestar brand has already been popular in Europe for the past years, but these days both itself as well as the Volvo parent company are Chinese owned. Another example is the brand MG, with a heritage of British sports cars, the brand is now in Chinese ownership. While the safety of the vehicles is not up to question anymore, the data security they (don’t) provide should be very much so. You can only fear, what you can imagine What implies Chinese cars would be used for spying? Last year, China banned Teslas from driving in and around certain locations or events. Additionally, government officials and employees were prohibited from owning and driving Teslas. The reason? China accused the cars for potentially being used as espionage equipment. The accusation itself is enough to raise suspicion on any new car China produces and exports to Europe, the US or anywhere else in the world. This is because if China can imagine that Teslas could be used for such a purpose, China can certainly imagine using their cars for such means abroad. Precedence (is extensively discussed on pg.4, two examples found here) Huawei: Chinese phone company Huawei has already been banned or restricted across the EUand the US, because of security concerns related to the personal data of users being distributed to Chinese intelligence. This was preceded in multiple nations with a ban on Huawei use for government officials. Tesla: Ironically, Tesla has actually been caught for spying on their customers. However, data was not being used for government purposes (as far as publicly known). Tesla employees were caught intersharing private moments/conversations of people’s lives which were deemed entertaining to watch, caught by the exterior and interior cameras of their vehicles. Additionally, it was discovered that the videos were geolocated and linked to customers. European brands: Although there is no publicly known precedence on this, it is more likely than not that these brands are used for spying by European actors. What is very important in this is awareness of which brands were previously European, but are now Chinese owned (as discussed on pg. 1). Thank you for all your data Modern luxury cars come with an array of gadgets and instruments on board. The most interesting for the subject at hand being both out- and inward facing cameras, microphones, gps systems, internet connection and phone connectivity. Cameras and microphones Modern cars come equipped with outboard (and some even inboard) cameras. These are not only used for safety systems on board, but also as recording devices. The recording function is marketed as a replacement for traditional dashcams, being able to deliver both video as well as audio in case of for example a crash. This function can easily be used to record people, events and locations out and inside of the car, which it can then share elsewhere for further analysis. Classified government conversations, classified locations or even corporate secrets can be revealed, located and analyzed as a consequence. GPS systems GPS systems are a standard built in feature in modern luxury cars. These systems are always on, even when not used for navigation. Just like phones, these systems will be able to establish behavioral patterns and important locations visited by persons of interest, even if these are not inserted into the GPS system manually. Internet connection Most modern EVs come with internet connection, not only for the operator of the vehicle, but also for ‘over the air’ updates for the vehicle itself. This connection to the internet can not just download data to the car for an update, but just as easily upload data to the factory of the car. In the case of Chinese built cars, sensitive information could be shared to Chinese government departments. This can range from GPS data, audio and video footage to phone data. Which brings us to the last option: Phone connectivity Connecting a phone to a car in order to be able to listen to your own music, call handsfree or send texts through voice control functions may seem innocent enough. However, this function gives the car access to all of the phone's communication data, and sometimes even the photo gallery. The security risk then does not only fall on the operator of the car, but also anyone who communicates with that person. Chat history can be shared, and phone calls recorded. This can then be shared to whoever is interested in the data in China. Balancing act An obvious first response to counter this security threat would be to ban Chinese cars outright, however, this is not a realistic solution. German car manufacturers have a very big market share in China itself, and any ban on Chinese cars would be very likely to automatically invoke a counter ban on European cars in China.  This will bring not only significant short and long term monetary damage to those car manufacturers, but also hurt diplomatic and trade relations with China. A more realistic approach could be for governments and corporations to place a ban on Chinese cars for their own employees. This is comparable to the ban on Huawei phones governments had for their employees, before the outright nationwide ban on the phones. One way to possibly ban certain models or brands, could be to investigate model by model whether the cars are capable or are in fact actually sharing data with their companies, beyond what is allowed under local law. In the EU, the GDPR law would then be able to stop certain cars from being sold. This however would be a time consuming feat. Is There Really A History Of Chinese Spying? Recent history is rife with allegations against Chinese companies regarding surveillance and espionage, not all unfounded. The narrative intertwines actual incidents with geopolitical tensions and industries tied to Chinese manufacturing, such as surveillance equipment, telecommunications, and robotics. Concerns are amplified by China's ambiguous intellectual property laws and the presumption of state involvement in corporations. Key players in these allegations include Lenovo, Huawei, ZTE, and DJI. Lenovo faces scrutiny for its devices in government networks, and DJI for its drones used in government operations. Huawei and ZTE, while consumer favorites, are also under suspicion. These companies' state affiliations vary: Lenovo has indirect state connections, Huawei is a state-owned enterprise with private oversight, ZTE is not CCP-owned but is government-dependent, and DJI asserts its independence. However, evidence, mostly classified or leaked, is sparse. Hikvision and Dahua, implicated in potential data leaks to the Chinese government, faced a UK ban. TikTok, a ByteDance product, is scrutinized for data privacy and potential misuse for Chinese state purposes. An internal ByteDance investigation revealed unauthorized access to US user data. Chinese laws notably influence these concerns. The National Intelligence Law of 2017, for instance, obligates all Chinese organizations and citizens to support state intelligence work. This law intensifies fears that companies could be compelled to assist in intelligence operations or surrender data if requested by the government. Critics argue this law effectively blurs the lines between corporate operations and state intelligence objectives. The concerns about Chinese corporate espionage are multifaceted, rooted in legal obligations, product nature, ownership structures, and broader geopolitical tensions. While Taiwanese companies like Foxconn face less suspicion despite delegating some operations to China, Chinese firms are scrutinized for potential collaboration with the Chinese government, highlighting a complex landscape of security concerns and international relations. At this point, many of the concerns regarding Chinese surveillance via electronic devices can be validated by the explicit actions of the Chinese threat actors through various cyber campaigns, and less through the quiet subterfuge of “Trojan Horse” devices. What is wisdom? In the current world where not just the Chinese, but every new (electric) car is outfitted with cameras, microphones, internet connection and phone connectivity, it is a matter of choosing not IF you’re going to be spied on, but by who. Whether governmental or corporate, it is important to be aware of the capacities and capabilities of modern cars. While it is difficult for governments to outright ban certain car brands from the market, it is more plausible to forbid governmental employees to drive specific brands. For companies, this can be more difficult, depending on the local employment laws.

The US failed to agree on an extra budged to support Ukraine in its war against Russia, among other things. What does this mean for Ukraine?

Date: 08/12/2023 Where: Cumbria, UK Who’s involved: Sellafield Nuclear Site, The Guardian news organization, unnamed Chinese and Russian threat actors, UK Government What happened: As part of a broader investigation by The Guardian, a series of claims were published in early December 2023 suggesting that the Sellafield nuclear site, which engages in nuclear fuel reprocessing, nuclear waste storage, and weapons decommissioning, had been compromised by cyber threat actors affiliated with Russia and China. The report alleged that these groups had successfully hacked the site's computer systems, leaving malware undiscovered for years​. Cybersecurity issues at the site have been documented for over a decade. A 2012 report warned of "critical security vulnerabilities"​​. The accusations by The Guardian’s report say that breaches were first detected as far back as 2015, with sleeper malware embedded in Sellafield's computer networks​​​​. This is a type of backdoor in a computer system or network that is intended to activate when a certain future condition is met. As the reports are currently unspecific, it’s unclear if the malware has been eradicated or the full extent of any data loss or ongoing risks. The hack possibly compromised sensitive activities like radioactive waste monitoring and fire checks​​. On 4/12/2023, the UK government, including Sellafield Ltd and the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), issued statements strongly denying the Guardian's report. They asserted that there were no records or evidence of a successful cyberattack by state actors at the Sellafield site. Part of the denial emphasized that critical networks essential for safe operations at Sellafield were isolated from their general IT network, likely referring to a practice known as “Air Gapping”, ensuring that an attack on the IT system would not penetrate these critical systems​. While denying the cyberattack, the ONR acknowledged that Sellafield was not meeting certain high standards of cybersecurity required by them and had placed the plant under significantly enhanced attention but did not comment on breach details or cover-up claims​​. Despite the challenges, Sellafield insists that it takes safety seriously, with continuous measures and reporting on nuclear, radiological, and conventional safety​​. Analysis: While significant, these claims have not yet been independently verified. Not enough details regarding the claims have been made public. Despite having a reputation as a major news source, security practitioners still have to take The Guardian’s findings at their word for the time being as of 07/12/2023. The lack of details in the claims may be coming for a future report, or may be an effect of The Guardian doing its diligence to not implicate the identity of their source. Sellafield, with a history of incidents, contains significantly more radioactive material than Chernobyl​​. An accident at Sellafield could lead to a plume of radioactive particles affecting neighboring countries, raising significant international concerns​​. There is a history of criticism regarding the site's basic safety requirements, long-term dangers, and alleged cover-ups​​. In the past, leaks and safety issues have caused tensions with Norway and Ireland, with concerns about potential radioactive contamination​​. The ONR's latest review indicated the need for improvements in safety, fire safety, and cybersecurity​​. The specific claims need to be weighed against these factors: The strong denial by the UK government and Sellafield Ltd, the lack of direct public evidence, and the challenges in independently verifying such claims make it difficult to definitively assess their validity without further corroborative evidence. Conclusion: The Guardian's unconfirmed allegations about a security breach at Sellafield nuclear power plant underscore the need for stringent safety and cybersecurity measures in critical infrastructure, particularly those with hazardous materials. These sites are prime targets for both state-backed and criminal threat actors, impacting national security and public safety. The UK Government claims to have adequate cybersecurity measures in place at Sellafield, possibly relying on precautions like Air Gaps, which require physical presence for a breach. However, the UK's history of limited disclosure in cyber incidents warrants scrutiny. This incident's timing is crucial as the UK aims to significantly boost nuclear power by 2050, where Sellafield's security concerns could hinder these plans. The Guardian's confidence in its report, despite lacking detail, suggests protection of a sensitive information source. The ONR's comments about Sellafield's cybersecurity shortcomings highlight the need for ongoing improvements in security protocols for critical infrastructure.

Date: 06/12/2023 Where: Guyana Essequibo - Venezuela - Guyana Who’s involved: Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, Guyana President Dr Mohamed Irfaan Ali, International Court of Justice (ICJ), Brazilian National Army What happened? On Sunday, 03/12/2023, Venezuelans voted in favor of claiming sovereignty over the oil-rich Essequibo region, long contended with Guyana, in a referendum. According to Venezuelan authorities, over 95% of the voters supported the claim. Yet, the transparency and credibility of the results is questionable. The president of Venezuela's National Electoral Council (CNE) celebrated the massive popular support for the referendum due to a "historic turnout" that exceeded 10 million votes out of the approximately 20 million eligible voters. However, according to available data and photographs of empty polling stations posted by social media users, it is suspected that the actual referendum participation was remarkably low. Several opposition figures have said that the low turnout is a clear demonstration of the regime's failure, despite claims of success by the Maduro government. In the referendum, Venezuelans were asked if they agreed with the creation of a new state in the Essequibo region, granting its population Venezuelan citizenship. However, the referendum was initially described as consultative, and no indication was given of how Maduro would implement the outcome of the vote. On 05/12/2023, President Maduro ordered the “immediate” exploitation of oil, gas, and mines in the Essequibo region by granting operational licenses to the state-owned oil companies PDVSA and CVG. Moreover, Maduro announced the creation of a special military division focused on the disputed area called the Comprehensive Defense Operational Zone (Zodi). The President also told foreign oil companies in the disputed area that they have three months to withdraw their operations. On the same occasion, the new official Venezuelan map was released, redrawn with the Essequibo as the 24th proclaimed state of Venezuela, which will immediately replace the former one and be included in all school books. Despite the initial skepticism about Maduro’s intention to invade Guyana’s territory, Guyana’s President Ali said on 05/11/2023 that the recent actions of Venezuelan authorities are posing an “immediate and direct threat to Guyana's territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence.” President Ali also announced a high alert for the Guyana Defense Forces (GDF) and contingency plans to deal with an escalation of the situation. Guyana’s President said that the dispute would be reported to the UN Security Council. Despite the concern that the Venezuelan referendum served as a “pretext to annex” the Essequibo region, the Guyanese President stressed that the dispute would be resolved through international law, following the ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), with the assistance of the international community. He also reassured foreign investors that Guyana remains a safe and democratic country for investment and business. On 05/12/2023, Brazil reinforced its northern border with Guyana and moved armored vehicles and more troops to the city of Boa Vista. Earlier in the day, the Guyana Defence Force (GDF) released a statement announcing the strengthening of bilateral ties and cooperation, including on defense and strategic affairs, between Guyana and Brazil. Scenarios: President Maduro's decision to hold a national referendum regarding the disputed area of Essequibo could be a political move to distract the population from domestic issues, foster national cohesion, and gain support. However, recent developments suggest that Maduro may be preparing to proceed with the military annexation of the Essequibo region. Several incentives and deterrents for military action can be identified. Incentives for action: The referendum results could justify Venezuela's attempt at annexing the Guyanese-controlled Essequibo region. Several factors could prompt this. Venezuela has claimed the Essequibo territory for almost two centuries based on historical rights. The dispute can be traced back to 1815 when the border between Venezuela and the former colony of British Guyana was established by the colonizers. Venezuela has significantly more military capability than Guyana, if Guyana does not receive any military support from other countries. The disputed territory is rich in natural resources, which makes it attractive for Venezuela. The annexation could be used as a political tool to distract public and international opinion from the upcoming 2024 elections and delay electoral and democratic concessions granted by the government. Authoritarian leaders have started conflicts in the past to remain in power. Recently, other countries have annexed land successfully with little international intervention. Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and Eastern Ukraine in 2021, and Azerbaijan re-took control of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. Maduro might use these examples as an incentive for his actions. Deterrents for action: While there are incentives present for Venezuela to escalate the conflict with military actions, other factors may discourage a military invasion of Essequibo. Although Venezuelan military power overpowers that of Guyana, its military appears to be obsolete and poorly organized, which makes it difficult to launch an effective and unified offensive into Guyana. The Maduro government lacks full control over territories close to the border with Guyana. Non-state armed and criminal groups have increased rapidly in the region. Therefore, the Venezuelan military may not be able to launch an offensive from these territories. Any Venezuelan military operation will result in some kind of regional and international response ranging from the reinstatement of recently eased sanctions to military intervention or peacekeeping missions in support of Guyana. International military intervention, as well as the establishment of sanctions, could act as a deterrent. In recent weeks, the Venezuelan government achieved the easing of U.S. sanctions by granting political and electoral reforms, including allowing the opposition to participate in the 2024 election. However, the U.S. is likely to re-impose the sanctions if Venezuela invades Guyana-Essequibo. The risk of jeopardizing the country's recently improved economic and diplomatic situation could make Maduro reconsider any annexation plan. Conclusion: In conclusion, the prospect of Venezuela annexing the Guyanese-controlled Essequibo region is marked by a complex interplay of incentives and deterrents. While historical claims, military capabilities, and the allure of natural resources provide motives for such action, significant hurdles, including the weaknesses in the Venezuelan military, the presence of non-state armed groups, and the threat of an international response, act as formidable deterrents. Moreover, recent diplomatic gains and the easing of U.S. sanctions hinge on the Maduro government's adherence to political and electoral reforms, making the risk of jeopardizing these advancements a crucial factor that could sway the decision-making process. The many options and quick developments make the situation hard to predict. However, with Maduro issuing a directive for the "immediate exploitation" of oil, gas, and mining resources and the creation of the “Zodi” special military division in the contested area, the likelihood of imminent military action has increased. As the situation can change rapidly, it is recommended to have preparatory evacuation plans in case armed conflict would break out.