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Written by Sytske Post Since the Russian meddling in the American presidential elections and the Brexit referendum in 2016, worry over disinformation campaigns has gained increased attention and its threats to democracy and stability have been widely discussed. Disinformation can be used as a strategic tool by states and non-state actors alike to create division, weaken trust in governing institutions, and instil fear amongst populations. According to the European Commission, Russia is behind most disinformation campaigns interfering in foreign affairs. This has prompted several nations to adopt and develop counter-disinformation measures, Sweden being one of the latest. The Scandinavian country established a new government body which will be a ‘psychological defence’ agency and will provide tools to help counter (the effects of) disinformation in the long run. The agency was installed shortly after tensions between Russia and Ukraine built up and in light of the upcoming general elections scheduled for September 2022. As Russia invaded Ukraine on the morning of the 24th of February citing dubious arguments that have been dismissed as propaganda, it is clearer than ever that disinformation is a tactic not to underestimate when it comes to preserving European stability and security. Disinformation campaigns In the context of international relations, disinformation is defined as the deliberate dissemination of false or distorted information by foreign and domestic actors with the primary goal of confusing and misinforming people and fostering disagreement and instability. Disinformation or information manipulation is not a new phenomenon and can be traced as far back as Roman times. However, today’s technology has provided a cheaper, faster, and less risky way to spread untrustworthy information, with algorithms encouraging and automating the distribution of media content. In addition, our global and interconnected society provides malicious actors with a wider and more accessible network of potential victims. After repeated foreign interferences in countries' domestic affairs, particularly during election campaigns, public awareness of the dangers of media manipulation increased in recent years. Such manipulation is perceived as especially dangerous in today's contemporary status of democracy, as political polarization, a loss of faith in representative democracy's institutions, and the growth of strongmen politics increase the potential influence of disinformation campaigns and their effect on liberal democracy. However, the actual effects and impacts of disinformation campaigns are still under-researched. It is difficult to argue whether these campaigns are creating divisions or are merely exploiting existing tensions and concerns. Regardless, the potential disruptiveness of disinformation on democratic practices has encouraged various countries to adopt counter-disinformation campaigns and effectively treat the issue as a national security threat. The challenges of countering disinformation European countries responded to the threat of disinformation with various strategies, as an analysis by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace illustrates. One of the most popular and widespread approaches is regulating online platforms. The Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA) proposed by the European Commission offer new regulations to improve platform openness and accountability, as well as researchers' access to their data. If tech companies fail to comply with these regulations, fines can apply. However, Carnegie Endowment mentions, these rules spark debate on the potential infringements of individual rights, such as freedom of expression, they might bring if state-enforced. However, a recent press release by the European Parliament acknowledges countries still lack efficient measures and sanctions to effectively combat disinformation campaigns. Solely focusing on regulating companies responsible for the distribution of false information overlooks the main cause of the problem – a widespread lack of trust in the mainstream media and the government. In order to maintain one’s identity and political activism, individuals actively seek content that confirms their ideological beliefs. Therefore, governments’ media campaigns and other (semi-)official institutions’ initiatives may be ineffective. It is reasonable to assume that those populations prone to foreign disinformation are difficult to reach and persuade by their national governments, and even less so by international organizations such as the European Union. As foreign influence campaigns are mainly aimed at increasing tensions and polarization in the targeted countries, the most efficient counter-strategy would be investing resources into identifying and taking away the causes of these problems. In this context, counter-disinformation strategies should invest in identifying why individuals seek disinformation content in the first place. At the other end of the spectrum, counter-disinformation strategies should also provide insights into the aims of the foreign states interfering in domestic affairs. Identifying both receivers' and culprits’ motives to engage in disinformation campaigns might provide insightful knowledge on ways to combat this threat. An example of such a bilateral approach is the Swedish 'psychological defence' agency. The Swedish ‘psychological defence’ agency On the 1st of January 2022, Sweden launched their ‘psychological defence’ agency aimed at combating disinformation and strengthening the population's resilience in the face of potential ‘information influence.’ With upcoming general elections in September 2022, Magnus Hjort, deputy director of the agency, mentions that the decision to establish this new government agency gained renewed attention as the tensions between Russia and Ukraine have put Sweden on alert, the Guardian reports. As Hjort mentions, polarization in the region could bring security and defence at the centre stage of the election, attracting more interest from foreign powers “to make sure that Sweden takes the ‘right measures’ in the way [they] see it.” The agency will work preventively and operationally both in peacetime and war. Psychology can provide insightful data for a country’s defence (e.g., information-processing biases, attitudes, and interpersonal and intergroup connections) to explain why people think, feel, and act the way they do. Strengthening personal connections, sustaining self-worth, accomplishment, and agency, and building meaningful worldviews are all protective strategies that could influence the effectiveness of disinformation. However, the most important role in psychological defence is to educate the public by providing tools against trusting disinformation. This awareness-raising practice tries to address counter disinformation with long-term strategies offering support to agencies, municipalities, regions, companies, and organizations and educating the general population on how to verify facts. In the Swedish approach, cooperation between public and private actors at the national, regional, and local level is strongly encouraged. This collaboration is essential because direct government involvement might be counter-productive as mistrust of institutions is a contributing factor to the prevalence of disinformation. For example, local civil society networks often have more credibility in the eyes of the citizens but lack the resources and data the government enjoys. Therefore, involving them can help better identify the communities most prone to disinformation and try to understand the reasons behind their susceptibility. Then, with help of trusted members, discussion and awareness on the topic can take place. Risk-assessment and a way forward Disinformation continues to pose a security threat to democracies as it fuels instability, fosters fear, and can increase violence and hate crimes. As it was shown by Russia’s attack on Ukraine, disinformation campaigns can also be used as a powerful tool to escalate tensions and even mobilize populations. In addition, new technologies are constantly being developed providing more advanced means of disseminating disinformation. However, counter-disinformation campaigns are often still narrow-focused, whereby little attention and insight is being paid to addressing the root causes of the issue. Governments should reassess what role they play in creating distrust in institutions and context-specific approaches should be investigated. ‘Psychological defence’ could provide insightful knowledge to fill these gaps. About the author: Sytske Post Sytske is a graduate of International Studies and is currently enrolled in the Master's degree Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University. This educational background has provided her with an interdisciplinary understanding of violent conflict and security. Currently, she is particularly interested in the intersection of technology and conflict, ranging from digital disinformation to the shifting nature of warfare powered by artificial intelligence. The article was written with help from Annette Bross and edited by Alessia Cappelletti.

As a service to our readers, we have made our Ukraine Situation Reports available as open-source documents. Feel free to use them as a source in your risk assessments. Our priority is to promote safe and secure aviation operations. If you have any questions feel free to contact us for advice and in-depth analysis. 23/02/2022 SITREP 1.5 17/02/2022 SITREP 1.4

On February 15 our new batch of trainees started. Five analysts for Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) en two for Dyami | strategic security solutions. The Dyami office is full of good vibes with these new members of Team Dyami. Their interesting experience and background blends in with our seasoned veterans. The field of international security and intelligence is all about gaining and sharing experiences. We try our best to be part of this mindset.

Written by Pablo Martín Duprat Edited by Ruben Pfeijffer and Thomas Courtier Australia sits at the centre of the Indo-Pacific region, a dynamic strategic environment that is home to the world's third largest Exclusive Economic Zone. The country’s economic growth is based on international trade and the export of goods, particularly natural resources. The distance and relative geographical isolation of Australia means that it relies heavily on shipping lanes for its economic security, especially when shipping accounts for 99% of Australia’s total merchandise trade by mass. Depending on the threat, these sea lines of communication are vulnerable to disruption, and Australia's small population of just over 25 million is incapable of sustaining a navy large and strong enough to protect its economic interests in the Pacific Ocean, let alone the wider Indo-Pacific region. This is why Canberra has had close alliances with global maritime powers throughout its recent history; which have evolved from the cancelled 2016 French-Australian submarine deal (worth 57 billion euros) to the recent trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (under the nomenclature AUKUS). But while this recent lateral move has inflamed relations between the European Union and Australia, Canberra’s rationale is both immediate and complex. Growing perception of Chinese threat The 2020 Defence Strategic Update states that the drivers shaping Australia's strategic environment identified in the 2016 Defence White Paper not only persist but have even accelerated faster than anticipated. Australia now faces an environment of increasing strategic competition between the US and China; the introduction of more capable military systems enabled by technological change; and the increasingly aggressive use of diverse grey-zone tactics to coerce states under the threshold for a conventional military response. The main driver for this increased tension between China and Australia is a direct by-product of growing strategic competition between China and the United States. Naturally, Australia is concerned about China's active pursuit of greater influence in the region, seeking to exert influence through actions that undermine the stability of the rules-based global order, which is the post-WWII status quo that is based on the promotion of democracy, free trade, and market economy and that constitutes the basis of Australia's security. Although Australia's largest economic partner is China, accounting for around 40% of its exports and 25% of its imports in 2019, Beijing's increasingly assertive posture poses a threat to Australia's economic security. Chinese military build-up of its blue-water navy and missile capabilities, along with the step-up in its ‘Grey Zone’ activities such as the use of paramilitary forces, militarization of disputed territories and the use of political and economic influence for coercive means directly threaten Australia's seaborne supply lines. This increasing strategic concern held by the Australian government was the rationale behind Canberra's decision to ditch the agreement it had signed with Paris in 2016 for twelve diesel-powered versions of the French nuclear-powered Barracuda-class submarine. Allies, not just ships Canberra considered the issue of buying submarines not in the light of a simple trade deal, but as a method of also acquiring an additional ally within the region. France simply did not fit this profile, being considered by Australia as incapable and unwilling to assist Canberra in the event of a major conflict against Beijing. However, the United States proved a better candidate as the two countries are bound together by not only a deep degree of political and cultural cooperation, but through similar geopolitical objectives within the region. Brokered through the aid of the United Kingdom, Australia was able to successfully tie itself in as part of the United State’s vision of deterrence across the Indo-Pacific region under the AUKUS deal, which entails the planned construction of eight nuclear-powered submarines worth between 44 to 73 billion euros. Revival of the nuclear debate in Australia The AUKUS submarine deal has reignited the debate around the desirability of a civilian nuclear program. While in Australia it is currently illegal to build or operate a nuclear reactor (apart from research purposes like the OPAL reactor), the Royal Australian Navy will operate several nuclear-powered vessels which will require highly enriched uranium to function. So, if the navy can power submarines on nuclear energy, pressure will build up for Australia to reconsider its ban on civil nuclear energy, in particular through the development of small modular reactors, and thus accelerate the path to becoming a zero-carbon economy. Another aspect related to the operation of nuclear-powered vessels by the Royal Australian Navy will be the repercussions it has on New Zealand, a long-standing ally of Canberra. Currently, Wellington has a zero-nuclear zone policy which prevents nuclear weapons and also nuclear-powered ships from entering into its territory. New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Adern, while welcoming the new trilateral agreement in the Indo-Pacific, stated that her country would continue to apply its no-nuclear policy, showing a rift between two very close allies. Less (to zero) strategic autonomy for Australia AUKUS proves to be a landmark deal as the United States has only shared its submarine technology with the United Kingdom since the signing of the 1958 US–UK Mutual Defence Agreement. However, it seems there is no current intention to build the nuclear reactors for said submersible vessels in Australia. While this situation might help prevent a flare-up of nuclear proliferation in the wider Indo-Pacific region, it will make Australia heavily dependent on the United States and the United Kingdom for the daily running and maintenance of its nuclear submarine fleet. As a result, a complete alignment of Australian policy decisions with American interests is highly expected. AUKUS shows that Canberra has reassessed the threat level posed by China and has chosen to reduce its room of manoeuvre on the international stage over the need to ensure its maritime security. Future EU-Australia Free Trade Agreement now at risk? The EU was Australia's third largest trading partner in 2020, after China and Japan and before the US. However, after Canberra's decision to cancel a 57 billion Euro submarine contract with France, the EU, in solidarity with Paris, questioned whether it should continue free trade talks with the country. The cancellation of the contract with Naval Group angered France, which accused both Australia and the United States of stabbing it in the back, prompting the Élysée Palace to recall its ambassadors from both Canberra and Washington (but interestingly not from London). The timing of the AUKUS announcement was also not ideal for Brussels, as it was announced on the same day in which the EU had scheduled to unveil its Indo-Pacific strategy; which ended up being eclipsed by the trilateral new partnership instead. A new round of talks between the EU and Australia will reportedly take place in February 2022, but if both parties do not manage to put in place measures to build back the lost confidence and to channel the frustration, the Free Trade Agreement will be a highly unlikely future scenario. About the author: Pablo Duprat Pablo Duprat comes from Argentina and currently attends two master programs, one remotely in Strategic Intelligence at Universidad Nacional de la Plata and the other one in Relazioni Internazionali at Università degli Studi di Milano. Pablo is passionate about international security, geopolitics and future scenarios.

Written by Paraskevi Soultatou On the 10th of January, the US Embassy in Greece released a non-paper announcing the US will focus more on gas and renewable resources and vital energy markets in the Eastern Mediterranean subregion (EastMed). While they stated they will continue to support the efforts of “physically interconnecting EastMed energy to Europe”, the US characterized the EastMed gas pipeline project as a non-vital and unclear energy technology. This statement is yet another blow to the already geopolitically shaky energy project signed between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus. The withdrawal of American support may make the project unfeasible, as the pipeline ties with longstanding tensions in the region. The East Med project and the importance for the alliance The Eastern Mediterranean is a subregion of the Mediterranean Sea that has generated great geopolitical interest the recent years because of its large hydrogen supply and Turkey’s ambitions to become the controlling power in the region. Diplomacy in the EastMed has been given structure through the EastMed Gas Forum created in 2019, which includes Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, Italy, and Jordan. The EastMed project was signed at the beginning of 2020 by Greece, Israel, and Cyprus. The purpose of this gas pipeline project was to supply the involved countries and South Europe with natural gas from the Levantine Basin. The fact that Turkey was not involved in this project or in the EastMed Gas Forum meant that the Turks were excluded from both the energy benefits of the project and the energy-related diplomacy in the region. In the same year, Turkey signed an EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) with Libya that disputed the sovereign rights of several Greek islands in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially the Kastelorizo Complex. The Greeks responded to this move with a partial EEZ delimitation with Egypt. The EastMed Project has had several serious issues that could have ended the project from the beginning. Firstly, the region is too politically unstable for such a big project to succeed. Due to Turkey’s security threats and the unsolved Cypriot Problem, the environment is currently not attractive for investors. Secondly, Turkey and Libya’s EEZ created a problem for the EastMed project, as - if it is to be continued - they need to give permission to go through their delimitation. Because Greece does not recognize their EEZ, it would never ask Turkey and Libya to give their permission, as this would mean that Greece accepts the legitimacy of their EEZ. This would have consequences for Greece’s sovereignty over the disputed islands. The role of the US and EU in this project Trump’s administration supported the EastMed project because the EU was looking to turn its energy dependence away from Russia and other players in the market. The support of Trump’s administration for the EastMed project was noteworthy since, during his presidency, Trump maintained close ties with Turkey. When Biden’s administration took control in 2021, there were no clear signs that the US would abandon the project, as US relations with Turkey were weakening, especially after Biden publicly recognized the Armenian genocide. Even the EU, who were initially divided in their support for the gas pipeline, eventually funded its research and supported the initiative as a stepping-stone to establishing European energy independence. However, lately, Turkish-American relations have started to improve again. In this light, the US’s most recent statement on the EastMed project did not come as a surprise. Other countries involved in the project started to quietly abandon it as well. The new government of Israel, for example, has recently started to improve its relations with Turkey, which is likely the reason why they haven’t yet spoken out against the US statement. Greece has also seemingly lost its will to continue the project, as the government didn't seem overly discontent with the US' non-paper, and had also lost Exxon Mobil and Total’s interest to start mining operations on the island of Crete. The EastMed project was too expensive and complicated. Combined with the political instability in the region, this resulted in an overall lack of investments. The three states involved in the project likely knew about this risk from the beginning. This is the reason why they developed cooperative energy diplomacy through the EastMed Gas Forum. It now seems, without the hoped result of creating a more viable climate for investment. More puzzling is the stance of the EU. Given Europe’s current energy crisis following the political tensions between Russia and Ukraine, it is unexpected that the EU does not support the continuation of the EastMed project. Even though the EU has been divided on this project from the beginning, the EastMed project could be a way for European governments to get a handle on the current gas crisis and to absorb some of the economic damage for their citizens. Nevertheless, it seems that the EU is struggling to formulate a united strategic energy plan, and it currently does not include the EastMed project. The effect in the Eastern Mediterranean As aforementioned, the Eastern Mediterranean subregion has historically been politically unstable. Therefore, careful diplomacy is important for security in the region. Turkey’s regional ambitions, however, have resulted in an increasingly aggressive stance towards neighboring countries. The extensive energy wealth that exists in the Eastern Mediterranean, therefore, cannot attract enough investors because of the region’s ongoing geopolitical instability and disagreements over sea rights. From a geopolitical perspective, Turkey seems to have ‘won’ the diplomatic battle over the collapsing project. The Turkish relations with Israel seem to be better than they were before and this is a serious threat for both the future of the EastMed project and Greece’s and Cyprus’ diplomatic influence in the region. For the foreseeable future, the Cypriot Problem has no prospect for resolution, and this is the biggest obstacle for Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus to create a fruitful environment for energy cooperation and better diplomatic relations. Last but not least, the energy diplomacy of the EU seems to be generally sluggish, and it is even more apparent in this region. The EU’s focus on green energy is commendable, but it needs to be combined with projects that are to a lesser extent green in order to satisfy Europe’s energy needs. While the EU’s diplomatic relations with Turkey are currently in a good state, it is not enough to help Greece and Turkey overcome their disagreement in order for an energy diplomatic cooperation in the subregion. In the end, the fact that the EastMed project would lose the support of the US was an overall predictable outcome. What was not predictable, however, is the fact that even the states involved didn’t show a substantial effort in keeping the project alive. The energy diplomacy of the EastMed hasn’t yet succeeded in creating a stable environment for investors and the geopolitical tensions are still an obstacle to hard to overcome for the moment. About the author: Paraskevi (Evi) Soultatou Paraskevi (Evi) is passionate about international security and cooperation and is specialized in nuclear strategy and intelligence. She holds a Sociology bachelor from the University of Crete and two masters, an MSc in International and European Affairs from the University of Piraeus and an MA in Security,. Paraskevi at the moment is a Research Intern at IDIS Institute of Athens, she lives in the Netherlands and cooperates with three more think tanks

Vooruitlopend op het plan van het Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Waterstaat om vliegen in het Caribisch deel van het Koninkrijk betaalbaarder en betrouwbaarder te maken zet Dyami Aviation stappen om haar diensten in deze regio beschikbaar te stellen. Daarom kondigt Dyami de strategische samenwerking met het op Curaçao gevestigde PMC Global aan. De gezamenlijke missie van Dyami Aviation en PMC Global is het ondersteunen van nationale en regionale overheden, luchtvaartautoriteiten, luchthavens en luchtvaartmaatschappijen bij de veilige implementatie van luchtvaartbeleid en -activiteiten om duurzame groei en uitbreiding mogelijk te maken. Door middel van competentiegerichte training en advies helpen we het veiligheids- en beveiligingsbeleid op een duurzame wijze te verbeteren en sociale en economische belangen te beschermen. Dit doen we door de gekwalificeerde expertise van onze luchtvaart professionals beschikbaar te stellen aan de betrokken partijen in het Caribische gebied. De oprichter van PCM Global, Cliff Belfor, is een luchtvaartspecialist met meer dan 25 jaar ervaring in de luchtvaartindustrie. Cliff is ook een ISO-gecertificeerde interne auditor en ICAO-gecertificeerde trainingsmanager en -ontwikkelaar, en strateeg voor capaciteitsopbouw in de luchtvaart. Dyami, opgericht door Eric Schouten, bestaat uit ruim 30 experts en trainers uit meerdere disciplines, waaronder veiligheid (safety), beveiliging van de burgerluchtvaart (security), operations, kwaliteitsmanagement en vluchtuitvoering. Meer informatie: >> https://dyami.services/aviation >> https://www.pmcglobal.cw/partners Eric Schouten: eric.schouten@dyami.services 030-2072120 #avsec#training#security#aviation#securitytraining#airportsecurity#securitysolutions#securitymanagement#airportoperations #aocondersteuning

Written by Facundo E. Saponara The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant appears to have fallen out of relevance from the international security scenario as more urgent matters clutter the international agenda. Since 2020, a year after the group's last bastion of resistance of its physical caliphate had fallen, actions against the group were reduced to a menial task, applying minimal pressure on a defeated insurgency with a small dedicated following. But, three years later, can we still say that ISIL has been defeated? The Iraqi Case As Iraq continues to rebuild after the war on IS, the security context in the country continues to be complicated. First, the ever-growing influence of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) is not to underestimate as a negative factor. The PMUs are an Iranian-backed group of militias that had a central role in the war against IS in Iraq, placing them in the favorable view of a considerable part of the population. Their growing influence over Iraqi politics could prove as an example of how delicate and easily fractured Iraqi sectarian relations can be. Not many years ago, al Zarqawi, the founder of what would later become ISIS, used a similar context – Iranian interference – to artificially deepen the divide between Sunni and Shia populations. This divide dragged Iraq into an even deeper state of civil war, which by 2006 had the additional obstacle of a sectarian facet that facilitated the growth of al Qaeda in Iraq (IS’s predecessor). The growing role of the PMUs in Iraq’s public sphere presents Daesh with the opportunity to use the group's social engineering skills. If ISIL was to pursue a terror campaign on the Shia, PMUs and other Shia armed groups would retaliate on Sunni minorities with little to no opposition from the overstretched and underequipped national security apparatus. If this course of action materializes, new individuals would boost the Islamic State's lines following ideological or religious ideals or merely as means of protection from a numerically superior enemy. Second, the lack of State control over large swaths of the territory is another variable that has allowed IS to feed its wish for territorial expansion within Iraqi borders. Baghdad continues to lack the necessary resources to achieve a meaningful presence in the more deserted regions of Iraq unless it relies on the assistance of non-state actors like the PMUs to provide security – which are not welcomed in Sunni predominant areas. Such state absence, combined with the now restricted role of US troops in Iraq and their partial withdrawal from the country, has allowed ISIS to create safe zones from which to launch progressively more complex offensive operations. This has enabled the group to attack a larger array of targets. Recently, ISIL began targeting the energy infrastructure in central and northern Iraq, showing their strategic approach to wear down the Iraqi government’s ability to provide basic services and debilitate its governance. The Syrian Case In Syria, ISIS finds itself in a less mature state than its Iraqi counterpart, unable to devote the same amount of resources to its operations. The limited number and the generally low complexity and lethality of their attacks exemplify such limitations. However, the US Defense Intelligence Agency has stated that the current downward trend in the number of attacks claimed in Syria could prelude the group's launch of the next stage of its local insurgency. On a territorial level, ISIL is constrained by a plethora of actors that identify Daesh as an enemy, making it difficult to expand its holdings. However, the group's survival in the country is not being threatened by its lack of resources nor by the pressure applied by its rivals. Rather, limited coordination and conflicting interests between opposing factions have and will continue to enhance ISIS's chances of survival in Syria. As rebel and regime forces continue to face each other on the battlefield and neglect Daesh’s threat, the Islamic State will be given the space needed to regain some of its lost strength. Since the fall of the caliphate, ISIL has focused on signaling that it still is a functioning organization through the continuity of its attacks. Daesh’s targets have mainly been regime-aligned forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). ISIS has exploited gaps within the regime’s territorial holdings (particularly in the desert) in two ways. First, to reinstate some of its previous border crossings to Iraq to provide safe passage for its fighters and collect taxes from trade and oil routes. And second, it allowed ISIS to gain a safe foothold from where to launch small-scale attacks, as the group's Iraqi counterpart. ISIS’s campaign in Syria is not restricted to the military field, but it also focuses on civilian propaganda campaigns. In July 2021, the UN highlighted the Islamic State’s penetration of the al Hol camp in northern Syria. The camp currently holds over 55,000 individuals, 42% of whom are between 5 and 17 years old, making them a prime target for ISIS’s indoctrination and radicalization programs, intended to replace the non-existent education these children receive. If Daesh’s operations in the camp continue to go improperly counterbalanced, al Hol may produce the next generation of ISIL militants. Moreover, the group made clear its desire to liberate thousands of its fighters from Kurdish prisons in northern Syria. If ISIL manages to successfully free prisoners, or if they were to be freed under other circumstances, the group’s capabilities could increase significantly, bringing it back at the center of international attention. Daesh in Europe Daesh’s limited resources mean that it is still incapable of sponsoring terrorist attacks on the West. This has made the group rely heavily on individuals vulnerable to radicalization – inspired by the group’s online propaganda – to take up arms and attack Western societies from within. The ingress of over a million refugees to Europe from Syria alone may have paved the way for what’s known as Battlefield Migration. Through this process, ISIS-trained and battle-hardened combatants may now be settled within Western societies, bringing with them the possibility of a new series of attacks, the radicalization of more individuals, and the creation of underground networks. Forecast: where to go from here? Overall, ISIL should be considered as a persistent multifaceted threat that is still emerging from Iraq and Syria, as the group finds itself in a healing and recovery phase accelerated by the local context. The continuity of the Syrian Civil War, lack of State resources, easily exploitable sectarian tensions, and disillusionment with local governments will continue to facilitate the survival of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Despite the organization’s inability to capture and hold vast areas of territory, if such context continues to favor the group's growth, in a few years Daesh may be capable of a new substantial offensive, particularly if major players continue to withdraw from the Middle East. Whether it be through the reconstruction of the physical caliphate, the enflaming of a new jihadist insurgency, or successful social engineering, the ISIL threat should be tackled as a matter of regional stability and (inter)national security for the members of NATO. The North Atlantic alliance should prioritize avoiding an influx of new fighters from entering Syria and Iraq, alleviating sectarian tensions in both countries, pursuing an active policy regarding ISIS penetration of refugee camps, limiting external meddling in Iraq, staying on the lookout for any indicators of IS activities in Europe, and searching and destroying the group's financial assets, weapons depots, and leadership. NATO should tackle these issues simultaneously to successfully reach Operation Inherent Resolve's foundational objectives: degrade and destroy Daesh through a sustained and comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. About the author: Facundo E. Saponara Facundo E. Saponara, originally from Argentina, is currently enrolled in the master’s degree in Strategy and Geopolitics at the Escuela Superior de Ejército. Counting with a background in international relations, he has specialized in the analysis of interstate and intrastate conflicts and terrorism.

As you might know, our aim is to provide high-end aviation expertise to the aviation industry by offering a holistic array of unique aviation services. That is why it is our pleasure to announce that Hans de Best has joined Team Dyami. Hans has served with the Royal Dutch Marechaussee for 41 years. He has extensive experience within aviation security. He is a specialist in secure cargo operations, audits, ACC3 and European law- and regulations. During his career, he fulfilled several management roles within the aviation security unit. He was an advisor on the use of explosive detection dogs and was involved with the start of the High-Risk Flight operation at Amsterdam Schiphol Airport. His experience within a government authority and passion for this field of work makes him fit right in with our experts at the dyami | strategic security solutions team. Are you interested in how we can help you run your aviation operation safely and securely? Feel free to contact Eric Schouten or Tom Franke now! #security #aviation #training #avsec #acc3 #cargo #dyami #aviationsecurity #cargoairline #marechaussee #ecac

By Ruben Pfeijffer

The working group Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) offers INTERNSHIP OPPORTUNITIES for young researchers and analysts. Do you want to develop your analytical skills? Gain experience in applied intelligence and conflict analysis? Work in a young and growing environment? Then DEWIS is the place for you! Who are we? Dyami is a full-service strategic security provider. Our focus lies in providing strategic security solutions to interested parties like governments, NGOs, and the private sector. Our team consists of dedicated experts from different fields, including Intelligence, Foreign Affairs, Aviation Security, and Crisis Management. What is the DEWIS Working Group? DEWIS is Dyami’s think-tank, aimed at identifying and analyzing present and future security risks. The DEWIS team keeps track of current security issues, explores trends, and keeps information circulating by publishing articles and infographics on relevant topics. People working within DEWIS should be inherently interested in early-warning, geopolitics, and have a keen eye for important developments in the world as well as understand the consequences of these developments on a local and operational level. Ultimately, DEWIS serves to inform stakeholders and the general public by providing them with different types of high-quality analyses. The candidate: Working at DEWIS requires independent critical thought, the ability to present results and forecasts clearly, as well as a substantial interest in international security issues. We are especially interested in interns with experience or strong interest in the following topics: Environmental Conflict, Aerospace & Defense, Global Economics, Conflict and Civil Uprisings Monitoring. Additionally, the ideal candidate should have excellent writing skills and excellent English proficiency (any other language is a plus). Master-level interns are preferred. Intern responsibilities: Contribute to joint publications, or write your articles and create engaging infographics. Keep up to date with key regional developments. Write briefs on current or developing situations around the globe. Contribute to the analyses of particular case studies. Assists in the day-to-day operations of a start-up company. What we offer: A practical learning opportunity to apply analytical capabilities to real-world situations. An opportunity to develop professional analytical writing skills. Substantial feedback on your work by a variety of experienced veterans from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Security and Intelligence service, military special forces, and professional security analysts. Workshops on intelligence and security and risk management research methodologies. Exposure as an analyst on our website, social media, and through the extensive network of our team. The publication of your work on the website and Dyami’s social media channels. The opportunity to work in a young and growing company. Interested? If you are interested in applying for a position at the DEWIS working group, please send the following documents: A CV - maximum of two pages mentioning relevant experience. A brief cover letter that mentions your main topic(s) of interest (max one page). An article pitch on early warnings in one of the themes mentioned above (150-200 words). Please send your application to: dewis@dyami.services, with the topic “Application DEWIS Internship (YOUR NAME)” before the 31st of December 2021. The internship will start in February 2021. Flexible starting and ending dates and working hours can be discussed accommodating the intern’s academic needs.

As you might know, Dyami's roots lay in providing Aviation Security Services. Our aim is to provide high-end aviation expertise through partnerships and the combination of many years of operational knowledge in this field. That is why it is our pleasure to announce that Dyami will be partnering with John Korver from ProAvsec International, to offer his aviation security expertise through our holistic array of authentic services. John Korver has been at the forefront of the aviation security industry for over 30 years with wide executive-level experience in airport security. He was responsible for upgrading airport security and modification the airport's security concept at Amsterdam Schiphol Airport, to effectively meet present and anticipated threats. An important aspect of John Korver's career was to continuously ensure strict compliance with all international and local security requirements. Formerly he was responsible for global security operations in addition to heading up quality, audit, and training activities. He was responsible for the security process of high-risk flights at Amsterdam Schiphol Airport, in close relation with the Ministry of Justice, Netherlands, and the TSA. He has extensive experience developing and implementing airport security concepts, conducting audits, risk assessments, managing people in the security environment, and client relations. John is committed to finding the optimum efficient and effective solutions. Passionate about aviation security he fits right in the Dyami team. Are you interested in how we can help you run your aviation operation safely and securely? Feel free to contact Eric Schouten or Tom Franke now!

Ethics and integrity, keywords you hear about more and more in the news. As a company, you can no longer avoid setting up an integrity program. Especially if you are going to do business internationally, you will run into a lot of issues. Dyami is proud to announce that Andrew Hoffmanns has joined Team Dyami. Andrew has gained extensive international experience as an Ethics & Compliance Manager at Basrah Gas Company (Iraq), North Caspian Operating Company (Kazakhstan), Shell, and ExxonMobil. And recently started his company EthXCom. At Dyami, Andrew will help companies with their ethics and integrity issues, together with Ron Geraets and Willem de Bruin. This can be done, for example, with a quick scan of your integrity program, so that you immediately know where you stand, what your risks are, and what you can do about it. This is how Dyami and reisvoorbereid.nl supports your organization with safe business operations.