Search dyami insights
474 results found with an empty search
- Beyond water scarcity: How the GERD challenges stability in North-East Africa
Written by Annette Bross As the world’s population increases, so does the demand for resources. Water scarcity is becoming a greater danger and with global rivers drying, water security poses a unique and difficult dilemma for global governance. In North-East Africa, the Nile represents both a precious resource and a point of contestation. On Sunday the 20th of February, the Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam (GERD), a 4 million dollar hydropower project, started operating in Ethiopia’s border with Sudan. Although currently only using one-third of its turbines, the activation has been enough to elevate the already rising tensions in the region. The GERD had been almost a decade in the making and it is said to be a key piece in ‘Ethiopia’s transformation.’ The dam is located on the Blue Nile, the main tributary of the Nile river that flows downstream to Sudan and Egypt. The two countries have openly raised concerns regarding the GERD, repeatedly claiming it is a potential threat to their water supplies. Due to competing interests, the negotiations over the dam have been extremely difficult and no consensus has been reached. Whether this represents a potential threat of international conflict remains to be seen. Lake Tana, Ethiopia, by schizoform licensed under CC BY 2.0 National pride regarding the Nile The GERD project has rekindled a long-running controversy about who ‘owns’ the Nile. In 1906, a Tripartite Agreement was signed between Great Britain, France and Italy, ensuring the former that no work that considerably changed the water flow would be undertaken upstream. Ethiopia opposed the agreement and notified the Italian and British governments of its disagreement. Later, the Nile Waters Agreement, signed in 1929 when Britain was still a colonial power in the region, gave Cairo the ability to veto projects farther up the Nile that would damage its water allocation. In 1959, without involving Ethiopia,the Sudan-Egypt agreement was signed, allocating Egypt 55 billion cubic meters of Nile water per year and Sudan 18.5 billion cubic meters. This decision, in combination with past agreements signed between colonial powers, exacerbated Ethiopia’s sense of historical injustice which clashes with Egypt’s rooted cultural ties to the Nile. The Nile has held an important position in Egypt’s history and national identity. Ancient Egyptians referred to it as ‘a gift from the Gods’ by the ancient Egyptians and it is interwoven in Egyptian history and identity, despite only 23% of the river is within its borders. Today, Egypt tends to claim sole cultural identity on the waterbody. On the other hand, the Nile’s main tributary holds a prevalent role in Ethiopian history and culture. The country is likely to consider the GERD as redressing the historic exclusion from Nile’s water exploitation for development, as past treaties had outlined Egyptian hegemony over them. Competing parties mean competing interests The GERD project brings many opportunities to Ethiopia. The East African country sees the dam as an opportunity to grow its economy since it will offer enough power for future investments. Specifically, Ethiopia has been keen to expand in manufacturing due to its low labor and power costs; even so that the Dam is owned and partly built by local Ethiopian companies. The GERD holds 74 million cubic meters of water with a surface of 1680 km2 - for some perspective, the Greater London Area is 1,569 km2. The project is owned by the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCO) which is working closely with Alstom, a French manufacturer, and the Metals & Engineering Corporation (METEC), an Ethiopian arms and machinery company that supplies the turbines, generators and all electromechanical equipment. This project will be a game changer for Ethiopia since nearly 65% of the country’s population is not linked to the electrical grid. The country currently produces roughly 4000 megawatts of energy, but with the activation of the GERD it is expected to increase to around 6000 megawatts, allowing it to meet its needs while also potentially becoming an exporter. The initiation of electricity generation, according to Sudan and Egypt, is a violation of the Declaration of Principles agreed by the three countries in 2015, which prevents the signatories from adopting unilateral actions regarding the Nile River’s water use. Egypt has a population of about 100 million people, 90% of whom rely on the Nile for their freshwater supply. Their greatest fear is that during droughts, Ethiopia will hold too much water in its reservoirs, jeopardizing the flow downstream. This would leave Egypt’s farmers unable to irrigate their crops, resulting in significant food losses. All of this comes while Egypt’s agriculture is already being squeezed by the consequences of climate change. “Each drop of 2% water protects a million people.” warns UNDP's Randa Aboul Hosn regarding Egypt’s crucial relationship to the waterbody. Sudan is stuck in the middle. It initially was in favor of the dam but since Egypt opposed it, the Sudanese government raised concerns as well. The impact on Sudan appears to be mixed, as the GERD’s operations may imperil Sudan’s own Nile dams. The country, however, sees Ethiopia as a source of inexpensive energy and as a possible regulator of water flows that have caused severe flooding in the past. Why is it so hard to settle the dispute? Ethiopia justifies the construction of the dam as it was not consulted on the 1929 veto agreement between Sudan and Egypt. However, in 2015, a new deal was established to settle the Nile issue, since GERD fears were on the rise. By joining a multilateral treaty, all countries have the same right and control over what is spoken, yet Ethiopia continued to build the dam under the flag of it being beneficial for the entire region. The importance of the world’s longest river can hardly be overstated since it is essential for over 280 million people’s livelihoods living along its banks. The Blue Nile’s waters flow from Lake Tana towards Sudan and joins the river’s other tributary at Sudan’s capital, Khartoum, before heading to Egypt. As stated before, the GERD gives Ethiopia considerable control on how much water flows downstream, making the stakes really high for all parties involved. Even the African Union had been involved in the negotiation process, but since no consensus was reached, Ethiopia took action by continuing with the dam’s construction. The talks have been stuck in a stalemate defined by mistrust. In a televised conference between then-Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi and political advisors in 2013. One of the advisors, Ayman Nour, suggested fomenting domestic unrest to divert Ethiopia's attention away from the dam project. “We should engage in their internal issues, we should influence Ethiopian decision-making,” Nour said. “To a considerable extent, their civilization is worn out.” Ethiopia accused Egypt in June 2020 of supporting cyberattacks to derail the project, prompting Ethiopia to take unilateral steps to treat GERD. For years, negotiations over the dam’s operations have dragged on. Egypt and Ethiopia have hinted at probable military action over the project, with Sudan trapped in the middle. Efforts to establish a final comprehensive agreement have come to a halt. Egypt and Sudan seek a legally binding pact, whereas Ethiopia is against it. Despite this, the issue has been raised before the United Nations Security Council. Here, Egypt and Sudan expressed their concerns about the effects of a drought, while Ethiopia rejected third-party arbitration in the event of a drought fueling the other parties' unsettlement regarding the dam, leaving the issue still unresolved. Future outlook The dispute arising from the Grand Ethiopia Reinassance Dam activation comes as the ripple effect of the conflict against Tigrayian forces in the north of Ethiopia is having a devastating impact on human security. Researchers from Ghent University estimate that the conflict and its subsequent famine have killed as many as 500,000 people. The Ethiopian government is therefore in need of an effective and productive win to counterbalance the situation. The GERD project has clear benefits for the country but its opening has raised tensions with its northern neighbors. Despite a more inclusive agreement since 2015, Egypt and Sudan clearly feel threatened and to some extent, strong-armed by the GERD’s implementation. The longer the impasse remains unresolved, the more confrontational and polarizing the countries appear to be getting along the length of the Nile. About the author: Annette Bross Annette holds a bachelor's degree in History from Universidad Iberoamericana in Mexico City. She has now moved to the Netherlands to pursue a master’s at Leiden University in International Relations and Diplomacy. She is passionate about development, climate action, public policy and security challenges with a strong commitment to social justice. She has experience in researching topics like the influence of Soft Power in Latin America and the Middle East. The article was edited by Alessia Cappelletti.
- Conflict Monitoring Report - February 2022
Written by Sietske Moshuldayev This report outlines the most serious threats to international security that took place over the past month and their possible future spillovers. The stability of European geopolitics severely aggravated in past weeks as Russia invaded Ukraine on the 24th of February, 2022. As the situation continues to escalate, this months’ DEWIS Conflict Monitoring Report provides an exclusive focus on this crisis. Additionally, three new or escalating situations are discussed. Challenges to finalising the Iran nuclear deal, as well as recent increases in political violence in Zimbabwe and Libya, require close monitoring in order to identify risks in advance. 1. Russia-Ukraine Crisis Tensions in Ukraine intensify daily as both Russian and Ukrainian forces continue to vie for control over the latter's territory. Three rounds of negotiations between Ukraine and Russia have thus far been held but have not indicated possible scenarios of de-escalation. Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure are being demolished, with an estimated 1.506 civilian casualties as of March 9th. Exact figures are expected to be higher. Additional pressure is felt internationally with attacks endangering the safety and security of nuclear power plants located in Ukraine. In the meantime, reports indicate that more than 2.5 million Ukrainian refugees have fled their home country. Western actors are implementing retaliatory measures against Russian entities. Initially targeting the functioning of the Russian aviation industry, new sanctions are predominantly economic in nature. Russian banks have been restricted in their access to international payment methods and Russia’s Central Bank can no longer access its foreign reserves. The United States banned the import and export of Russian oil, while an increasing number of commodity, commercial and service-oriented multinational companies have halted or withdrawn their activities in Russia. Meanwhile, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is bolstering up its defences around the Ukrainian, Russian and Belarusian borders. With no intent of engaging militarily as that would result in a conflict of a much larger scale, the member states are forced to balance their responses amidst perpetual Russian threats. 1.1 Conflict in Context The main driver behind this conflict has been discontentment by Russia over the eastward enlargement of NATO, a US-led organisation set up in 1948 as a collective defence alliance against the former Soviet Union. NATO expansion has been persistently scrutinised by Russia as it brought the alliance closer to its Western borders and traditional Soviet sphere of influence. In a balancing act, Russia set up its own defensive alliance in 1992 with some former Soviet states, known as the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Though the accession of Ukraine to NATO was not imminent prior to Russia’s invasion, the country was increasingly set on becoming a member. Ukraine’s shift to the West has led to previous tensions with Russia, including the annexation of Crimea by Russia (2014) and fighting following claims for independence by the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) in Ukraine’s Donbas region (2014 - present). After months of concerns by Western powers about increased Russian military mobilization along its borders with Ukraine, an important turning point came as President Putin officially recognized the independence of the DPR and LPR on February 21st, 2022. He subsequently sent in ‘peacekeeping’ forces into the pro-Russian region in a bid to provide support. However, President Putin quickly portrayed Ukraine as a threat and called for a demilitarization of its neighbour. This culminated in Russian troops deploying further into Ukraine on the 24th of February under the auspices of conducting a ‘special military operation’. 1.2 Upcoming Challenges The ongoing conflict is expected to have far-reaching humanitarian, economic and geopolitical impacts. With more than 2 million refugees and dire basic provisions in Ukraine, the conflict has led to a humanitarian disaster. Ukraine’s neighbouring countries have seen a surge in refugees, calling for increased resource allocation and adequate action. For those who remain in Ukraine, the security of water, food and energy supplies is threatened as fights continue. It remains unclear how this humanitarian crisis will evolve and what will be required to lessen its severity. Simultaneously, the conflict affects soaring global oil and gas prices and disrupts global food supply chains. Directly impacting energy costs for transportation and heating, increased oil and gas prices will furthermore be felt through higher commodity prices and inflation levels - among other things. Interrupted Russian and Ukrainian grain and oilseed exports signify increased threats to food supplies for the importing countries. This will likely negatively impact the malnourishment levels of lower-class populations, especially in North Africa and the Middle East. With additional sanctions against Russia to come, further disruptive economic impacts are to be expected. The conflict in Ukraine concurrently pressurises global and regional geopolitical relations. As Russia continues to be isolated from Western economic and financial institutions, it may seek to enhance its relationship with other partners, such as China. In the meantime, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have applied for European Union membership and Finland and Sweden have strengthened their cooperation with NATO. Even though nothing is concretized, these new forms of cooperation see the West encroaching even closer to Russia’s borders. It remains to be seen how, and together with whom, Russia reacts. 2. Iran - Nuclear Deal Complications Progress in ongoing talks between Iran and various global powers concerning regulations on the former’s nuclear program remains uncertain. A nuclear nonproliferation deal - the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action - was claimed to be in its final stages after months of negotiations. However, Russia has recently demanded an explicit assurance that its economic trade with Iran will be exempt from US sanctions imposed on Russia since the invasion of Ukraine. Western negotiators warned Russia, claiming the crisis in Ukraine is not related to the nuclear deal and should not be used for external purposes. These developments provide new challenges in reaching a consensus on the deal, further postponing the finalisation. 3. Libya - Contested Political Handover Political tension amongst opposing factions in Libya has recently increased. Following the indefinite postponement of elections that were planned for December 2021, the House of Representatives has sworn in Fathi Bashagha as the new Prime Minister to lead a new government. This directly challenges the incumbent interim Prime Minister, Abdulhamid al-Dabaiba, who claims he will not cede power until elections are held. Mobilization of armed troops around Libya’s capital Tripoli has been observed, followed by UN warnings for potential clashes. With the possibility of the re-establishment of two opposite governments in the country, these developments carry further repercussions for Libya’s oil exports, as well as regional involvement in the conflict. 4. Zimbabwe - Electoral Violence With upcoming legislative and municipal by-elections scheduled for March 26th, political violence has erupted in Zimbabwe. The main opposition party Citizens Coalition for Change led by Nelson Chamisa has accused ruling party ZANU-PF and the police of instigating and carrying out attacks against their supporters. As these allegations have been denounced by ZANU-PF, an increase in political violence amongst these different parties is likely as the elections approach. 5. Conclusions This past month, the Russia-Ukraine crisis has captivated the attention of a global audience. As further Russian aggression is expected and the full impacts of West-imposed sanctions are yet to play out, this remains a crisis to watch. As humanitarian, economic and geopolitical consequences mount up, regions beyond merely Ukraine and Europe are impacted. What occurs in Ukraine, for instance, may come to further impact progress on Iran’s nuclear talks. Likewise, the domestic instabilities in Libya and Zimbabwe are (internal) conflicts with the potential of further escalation and, therefore, require close monitoring in the upcoming weeks. About the author: Sietske Moshuldayev Sietske Moshuldayev has an international background and is inherently intrigued by the causes and consequences of geopolitical events. She has completed two bachelors at the University of Leiden (International Studies, BA & Political Science, BSc) and currently pursues a masters in International Security at Sciences Po, Paris. Having specialized in East Asian affairs for her undergraduate studies, she now focuses on global risks and risk management. The article was written with help from Sytske Post and edited by Alessia Cappelletti.
- Geopolitical & Aviation Report for the Dutch Caribbean territories
With a special focus on the effects of #Russian influence in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba on the #aviation sector in Aruba, Bonaire, Curaçao, and Saint-Maarten. With the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, businesses around the world are curious to find out how the conflict will affect their operations. For the Caribbean and central Latin American region, the geographic distance involved means that the effects of what happens in the war-torn streets of Kyiv, Lviv, and similar Ukrainian cities are not direct. Instead, the ripple effect from this war materialised within the Caribbean region through their links to Russia, which has been widely sanctioned by countries and multinational corporations the world over. Download as PDF For more in-depth Sitreps, analyses, or bespoke advice on the aviation security and safety concerns regarding this region, or other areas across the globe, please contact us.
- Dyami partners with Pro-Intell
As we encounter a changing world. Businesses conducting operations in the global economy require more insights to survive and thrive successfully. To support our clients in this complex environment, Dyami Strategic Security and Pro-Intell are combining their capabilities and resources. Both companies are based in The Netherlands, however, their combined network of sources have a global reach. The partnership delivers a diverse set of security solutions ranging from Geopolitical Analyses, Emergency Evacuations to Security Consultancy & Training. The Dyami and Pro-Intell partnership deliver human-centric security solutions that give you the actionable insight you need to ensure your operations can survive and thrive in this uncertain and challenging world. For organisations that want to protect their people, property and performance against risks, The Dyami - Pro-Intell partnership delivers experienced human-led resilience solutions which identify relevant threats, warn those affected and prescribe what action to take. For more information contact us or visit www.dyami.services www.pro-intell.eu
- Russia Alert
The British, United States and Dutch governments have advised all their citizens to leave Russia immediately. This is following the mass censorship bill that the Russian government has passed which will allow its authorities to imprison people for up to 15 years if they “misreport” on the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. While under peacetime conditions air travel would be the obvious route out of the country, the recent closure of airspaces, banning of airlines, and poor relations between immigration authorities have all caused this method to become a no-go. Land crossings are the implied alternative, however there is considerable evidence to suggest that the Russian government is planning on implementing a state of emergency to limit the ability of westerners to leave the Russian border. So if you have no urgent reason to stay in the country or are already planning on leaving, time is of the essence.
- Sanctions, Shortages and Turbulence:
The long-term consequences of Russian aggression on air cargo transport Written by Jacob Dickinson and Alessia Cappelletti In the last decades, the advancement of technology created an interconnected, globalized world. Transportation and communication costs reduced dramatically, and building anything from cars to computers requires combining materials, technology, and manufacturing capacity from several different countries. Aviation has been the key driver of such a globalized economy, with shipping costs shrinking 78% from 1970 to 2019. In the age of great power competition, the US and China are already questioning the benefits of extensive global supply chains, viewing critical infrastructure as a matter of national security. However, in a highly interconnected and globalized world, a hindrance in global supply chains brings major consequences for businesses, workers and consumers everywhere. As the world has witnessed in the past week, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has convulsed the security order, bringing short and long-term social and economic repercussions. According to Lars van Abs, an expert aviation cargo supervisor, the war between the two countries could derail global aerospace. Adding to the humanitarian disaster brought about by the war and the increased geopolitical tensions between NATO and Russia, the disruption of commercial aerospace will cause issues with maintaining and manufacturing aircraft, products sourcing, leases and flight reroutes, which are likely to create further price instability and product shortages in European economies. Escalation and Targeted Sanctions on the Aircraft Industry Western countries have responded to the Russian invasion of Ukraine by isolating the country’s economy from international flows of goods and finance. Russia has been banned from SWIFT Interbanking Communications, making international payments and transactions almost impossible. The European Commission has placed sanctions on aircraft equipment and key technology exports to Russia. In addition to economic sanctions, Western states have upped military support to Ukraine. NATO allies have sent aircraft, weapons and assistance. With immediate effect, airspace bans for both European and Russian aircraft have been enforced, resulting in carriers rerouting or canceling their flights. The low transportation costs for European businesses achieved in the last five decades cannot continue with the package of sanctions announced by the EU and the United States, and prices will surge for cargo shipments and commodities. These developments hold important implications not only for the air transport industry and cargo transport but also for European businesses trading with East Asia, as Russia serves as a key route for long cargo flights between the continents. Maintaining: Issues with Antonov and Volga-Dnepr Group On the 25th of February, heavy fighting throughout Ukraine has led to the destruction of Hostomel airport, a key production facility owned by Antonov Airlines. The Ukrainian airline operates and manufactures two models of the largest cargo carriers in the airfreight industry with unique capabilities, the An-174 and the An-225 Mriya. The An-174 specializes in transporting large cargo such as jet engines and satellites, while the An-225, capable of carrying 250 tons, played a crucial role in delivering humanitarian assistance to disaster zones and shipping COVID-related supplies, making Antonov’s aircrafts a critical node in international cargo freight. Ukrainian officials confirmed that Russian troops destroyed the An-225 located at Hostomel airport on the 27th of February. For the still intact aircraft, Antonov will face difficulties maintaining flights because repairs and maintenance are located in production facilities within Ukraine. The destruction of Antonov aircraft is exacerbated by the cancellation of Russian cargo airliners flying through Ukraine and Russia. Russian airspace is vital for connections between Europe and Asia. Due to Russian airspace bans, European airlines are canceling flights to China, Japan and Korea, and vice versa. Rerouted flights go through the Middle East and potentially high-risk areas, adding additional fuel pressures with an average of 1,5-2 extra hours flight time and insurances concerns, van Abs says. Volga-Dnepr Group, which includes AirBridgeCargo, the largest Russian freight airliner and one of the largest in the world, stopped all operations to Europe. Outside of the specialist cargo and freight, according to Flexport supply chain services, both Antonov and Volga-Dnepr Group represented less than 0.5% of global airfreight carried in 2019. However, there are few substitutes for shipping large, specialized cargo and airfreight. Without Antonov and key Russian airliners transporting specialized goods, heavy-lift cargo around the world will become increasingly difficult in an industry already in distress. Aircraft leases, flight routes and insurances The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced sanctions restricting the ability of Russian companies to purchase aircraft, spare parts and equipment for Russian airlines. Western leasing companies will not be able to sign new leasing contracts and existing one need to be terminated within 30 days. Russian airlines lease the majority of their fleet from Western leasing companies, which in turn acquire planes from Airbus and Boeing. It is estimated that there are 515 lessor-owned aircraft operating with Russian airliners, with a market value of $10bn. EU sanctions on key technologies and spare parts have led European lessors to recall aircraft from Russia but leased planes cannot be returned over EU and Russian airspace. This effectively shuts off key sources of revenue for lessor firms and leading European manufacturers. Financially, the collapse of the value of the Russian Ruble and the exclusion of Russian banks from SWIFT payments adds considerable uncertainty to payment schedules for leased aircraft. Moreover, Moscow could refuse calls for returns of leased aircraft in retaliation for Western sanctions. Without maintenance, EU lessors face degradation of aircraft assets and declining revenues, expert Lars van Abs says. This will cause severe financial problems for lessors in Europe and the US and effectively shut off important assets for EU airliners and manufacturers. Lastly, EU-wide airspace bans restrict the options for returning lessor planes to non-Russian companies. For now, European companies are finding ways around this problem as they seize leased aircraft from outside of Russia, such as Istanbul. The problem will not end quickly, however. The usual and crucial routes are unlikely to become available soon, as overflight problems usually last beyond ceasefires. In the case of Libya, even after its airspace ceased being a no-fly zone, insurance premiums remained considerably high. For key cargo airliners, insurance premiums will be almost unaffordable and companies face a risk of losing aircraft and revenues. Manufacturing and products sourcing The escalation in Ukraine had dramatic consequences for oil and gas prices. On the first day of the Russian invasion, headlines had already reported oil prices rising above $100 barrel for the first time since 2014. Even without explicit sanctions to the energy sector, oil, gas and coal exports will be curtailed as a result of the existing sanctions, since companies fear association with Russia and subsequent Western retaliation. Similarly, the price of LNG will further increase as more countries are looking for alternatives. The hiking of energy prices, especially oil, will add to the costs of longer-haul flights caused by Russian and EU member states airspace bans, as flights between Asia and Europe reroute. The Ukraine crisis also leads to an acute shortage of several key minerals for the aviation industry. Titanium, a chemical element used for aircraft structures and landing gears, has been one of the first alarm bells rang by aviation experts. Boeing and Airbus are heavily reliant on Russian supplies of titanium, sourcing up to 35% and 65% respectively from Russian defense company VSPMO. Embraer is 100% reliant on VSMPO’s titanium. While Boeing and Airbus have approached other suppliers of titanium in Japan and the US, these airliners will find it difficult to find alternatives, and once they do, it will potentially take years to certify other suppliers. A fragile global economic recovery Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has upended the European security order underpinning economic globalization. Aviation will face severe challenges both in recovering from the COVID pandemic and the immense political and economic instability set in motion by Russia’s actions. Globalization is underpinned by low transportation costs that allow businesses, ideas and people to move anywhere in the world. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Western response to it have severely disrupted its mantra, and this will have serious consequences in the medium, and possibly longer, term. About the authors: Jacob Dickinson Jacob studies Global Political Economy at Leiden University. He is passionate about international development and is looking to expand his expertise in geopolitics and crisis management. Curious about other cultures, he has travelled in Europe and Asia for both academic study and professional purposes. His expertise includes subjects like the geopolitics of energy, China’s international political economy, and the implications of globalised supply chains for industrial policy. He is particularly interested in the evolving political and economic relationships between China and ASEAN, and the consequences for regional development and security. Alessia Cappelletti Alessia is Intelligence Analyst and Project Manager of DEWIS. She has field experience in South America, Colombia especially, and has experience in researching organized crime and illicit flows. Her academic background includes conflict analysis, international humanitarian law, human rights protection, and criminology.
- Fighting fake news: the case of Sweden’s counter-disinformation agency
Written by Sytske Post Since the Russian meddling in the American presidential elections and the Brexit referendum in 2016, worry over disinformation campaigns has gained increased attention and its threats to democracy and stability have been widely discussed. Disinformation can be used as a strategic tool by states and non-state actors alike to create division, weaken trust in governing institutions, and instil fear amongst populations. According to the European Commission, Russia is behind most disinformation campaigns interfering in foreign affairs. This has prompted several nations to adopt and develop counter-disinformation measures, Sweden being one of the latest. The Scandinavian country established a new government body which will be a ‘psychological defence’ agency and will provide tools to help counter (the effects of) disinformation in the long run. The agency was installed shortly after tensions between Russia and Ukraine built up and in light of the upcoming general elections scheduled for September 2022. As Russia invaded Ukraine on the morning of the 24th of February citing dubious arguments that have been dismissed as propaganda, it is clearer than ever that disinformation is a tactic not to underestimate when it comes to preserving European stability and security. Disinformation campaigns In the context of international relations, disinformation is defined as the deliberate dissemination of false or distorted information by foreign and domestic actors with the primary goal of confusing and misinforming people and fostering disagreement and instability. Disinformation or information manipulation is not a new phenomenon and can be traced as far back as Roman times. However, today’s technology has provided a cheaper, faster, and less risky way to spread untrustworthy information, with algorithms encouraging and automating the distribution of media content. In addition, our global and interconnected society provides malicious actors with a wider and more accessible network of potential victims. After repeated foreign interferences in countries' domestic affairs, particularly during election campaigns, public awareness of the dangers of media manipulation increased in recent years. Such manipulation is perceived as especially dangerous in today's contemporary status of democracy, as political polarization, a loss of faith in representative democracy's institutions, and the growth of strongmen politics increase the potential influence of disinformation campaigns and their effect on liberal democracy. However, the actual effects and impacts of disinformation campaigns are still under-researched. It is difficult to argue whether these campaigns are creating divisions or are merely exploiting existing tensions and concerns. Regardless, the potential disruptiveness of disinformation on democratic practices has encouraged various countries to adopt counter-disinformation campaigns and effectively treat the issue as a national security threat. The challenges of countering disinformation European countries responded to the threat of disinformation with various strategies, as an analysis by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace illustrates. One of the most popular and widespread approaches is regulating online platforms. The Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA) proposed by the European Commission offer new regulations to improve platform openness and accountability, as well as researchers' access to their data. If tech companies fail to comply with these regulations, fines can apply. However, Carnegie Endowment mentions, these rules spark debate on the potential infringements of individual rights, such as freedom of expression, they might bring if state-enforced. However, a recent press release by the European Parliament acknowledges countries still lack efficient measures and sanctions to effectively combat disinformation campaigns. Solely focusing on regulating companies responsible for the distribution of false information overlooks the main cause of the problem – a widespread lack of trust in the mainstream media and the government. In order to maintain one’s identity and political activism, individuals actively seek content that confirms their ideological beliefs. Therefore, governments’ media campaigns and other (semi-)official institutions’ initiatives may be ineffective. It is reasonable to assume that those populations prone to foreign disinformation are difficult to reach and persuade by their national governments, and even less so by international organizations such as the European Union. As foreign influence campaigns are mainly aimed at increasing tensions and polarization in the targeted countries, the most efficient counter-strategy would be investing resources into identifying and taking away the causes of these problems. In this context, counter-disinformation strategies should invest in identifying why individuals seek disinformation content in the first place. At the other end of the spectrum, counter-disinformation strategies should also provide insights into the aims of the foreign states interfering in domestic affairs. Identifying both receivers' and culprits’ motives to engage in disinformation campaigns might provide insightful knowledge on ways to combat this threat. An example of such a bilateral approach is the Swedish 'psychological defence' agency. The Swedish ‘psychological defence’ agency On the 1st of January 2022, Sweden launched their ‘psychological defence’ agency aimed at combating disinformation and strengthening the population's resilience in the face of potential ‘information influence.’ With upcoming general elections in September 2022, Magnus Hjort, deputy director of the agency, mentions that the decision to establish this new government agency gained renewed attention as the tensions between Russia and Ukraine have put Sweden on alert, the Guardian reports. As Hjort mentions, polarization in the region could bring security and defence at the centre stage of the election, attracting more interest from foreign powers “to make sure that Sweden takes the ‘right measures’ in the way [they] see it.” The agency will work preventively and operationally both in peacetime and war. Psychology can provide insightful data for a country’s defence (e.g., information-processing biases, attitudes, and interpersonal and intergroup connections) to explain why people think, feel, and act the way they do. Strengthening personal connections, sustaining self-worth, accomplishment, and agency, and building meaningful worldviews are all protective strategies that could influence the effectiveness of disinformation. However, the most important role in psychological defence is to educate the public by providing tools against trusting disinformation. This awareness-raising practice tries to address counter disinformation with long-term strategies offering support to agencies, municipalities, regions, companies, and organizations and educating the general population on how to verify facts. In the Swedish approach, cooperation between public and private actors at the national, regional, and local level is strongly encouraged. This collaboration is essential because direct government involvement might be counter-productive as mistrust of institutions is a contributing factor to the prevalence of disinformation. For example, local civil society networks often have more credibility in the eyes of the citizens but lack the resources and data the government enjoys. Therefore, involving them can help better identify the communities most prone to disinformation and try to understand the reasons behind their susceptibility. Then, with help of trusted members, discussion and awareness on the topic can take place. Risk-assessment and a way forward Disinformation continues to pose a security threat to democracies as it fuels instability, fosters fear, and can increase violence and hate crimes. As it was shown by Russia’s attack on Ukraine, disinformation campaigns can also be used as a powerful tool to escalate tensions and even mobilize populations. In addition, new technologies are constantly being developed providing more advanced means of disseminating disinformation. However, counter-disinformation campaigns are often still narrow-focused, whereby little attention and insight is being paid to addressing the root causes of the issue. Governments should reassess what role they play in creating distrust in institutions and context-specific approaches should be investigated. ‘Psychological defence’ could provide insightful knowledge to fill these gaps. About the author: Sytske Post Sytske is a graduate of International Studies and is currently enrolled in the Master's degree Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University. This educational background has provided her with an interdisciplinary understanding of violent conflict and security. Currently, she is particularly interested in the intersection of technology and conflict, ranging from digital disinformation to the shifting nature of warfare powered by artificial intelligence. The article was written with help from Annette Bross and edited by Alessia Cappelletti.
- Ukraine Situational Reports
As a service to our readers, we have made our Ukraine Situation Reports available as open-source documents. Feel free to use them as a source in your risk assessments. Our priority is to promote safe and secure aviation operations. If you have any questions feel free to contact us for advice and in-depth analysis. 23/02/2022 SITREP 1.5 17/02/2022 SITREP 1.4
- New DEWIS analysts
On February 15 our new batch of trainees started. Five analysts for Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) en two for Dyami | strategic security solutions. The Dyami office is full of good vibes with these new members of Team Dyami. Their interesting experience and background blends in with our seasoned veterans. The field of international security and intelligence is all about gaining and sharing experiences. We try our best to be part of this mindset.
- AUKUS: Australia's rational behind the pact and its implications on its relations with the EU
Written by Pablo Martín Duprat Edited by Ruben Pfeijffer and Thomas Courtier Australia sits at the centre of the Indo-Pacific region, a dynamic strategic environment that is home to the world's third largest Exclusive Economic Zone. The country’s economic growth is based on international trade and the export of goods, particularly natural resources. The distance and relative geographical isolation of Australia means that it relies heavily on shipping lanes for its economic security, especially when shipping accounts for 99% of Australia’s total merchandise trade by mass. Depending on the threat, these sea lines of communication are vulnerable to disruption, and Australia's small population of just over 25 million is incapable of sustaining a navy large and strong enough to protect its economic interests in the Pacific Ocean, let alone the wider Indo-Pacific region. This is why Canberra has had close alliances with global maritime powers throughout its recent history; which have evolved from the cancelled 2016 French-Australian submarine deal (worth 57 billion euros) to the recent trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (under the nomenclature AUKUS). But while this recent lateral move has inflamed relations between the European Union and Australia, Canberra’s rationale is both immediate and complex. Growing perception of Chinese threat The 2020 Defence Strategic Update states that the drivers shaping Australia's strategic environment identified in the 2016 Defence White Paper not only persist but have even accelerated faster than anticipated. Australia now faces an environment of increasing strategic competition between the US and China; the introduction of more capable military systems enabled by technological change; and the increasingly aggressive use of diverse grey-zone tactics to coerce states under the threshold for a conventional military response. The main driver for this increased tension between China and Australia is a direct by-product of growing strategic competition between China and the United States. Naturally, Australia is concerned about China's active pursuit of greater influence in the region, seeking to exert influence through actions that undermine the stability of the rules-based global order, which is the post-WWII status quo that is based on the promotion of democracy, free trade, and market economy and that constitutes the basis of Australia's security. Although Australia's largest economic partner is China, accounting for around 40% of its exports and 25% of its imports in 2019, Beijing's increasingly assertive posture poses a threat to Australia's economic security. Chinese military build-up of its blue-water navy and missile capabilities, along with the step-up in its ‘Grey Zone’ activities such as the use of paramilitary forces, militarization of disputed territories and the use of political and economic influence for coercive means directly threaten Australia's seaborne supply lines. This increasing strategic concern held by the Australian government was the rationale behind Canberra's decision to ditch the agreement it had signed with Paris in 2016 for twelve diesel-powered versions of the French nuclear-powered Barracuda-class submarine. Allies, not just ships Canberra considered the issue of buying submarines not in the light of a simple trade deal, but as a method of also acquiring an additional ally within the region. France simply did not fit this profile, being considered by Australia as incapable and unwilling to assist Canberra in the event of a major conflict against Beijing. However, the United States proved a better candidate as the two countries are bound together by not only a deep degree of political and cultural cooperation, but through similar geopolitical objectives within the region. Brokered through the aid of the United Kingdom, Australia was able to successfully tie itself in as part of the United State’s vision of deterrence across the Indo-Pacific region under the AUKUS deal, which entails the planned construction of eight nuclear-powered submarines worth between 44 to 73 billion euros. Revival of the nuclear debate in Australia The AUKUS submarine deal has reignited the debate around the desirability of a civilian nuclear program. While in Australia it is currently illegal to build or operate a nuclear reactor (apart from research purposes like the OPAL reactor), the Royal Australian Navy will operate several nuclear-powered vessels which will require highly enriched uranium to function. So, if the navy can power submarines on nuclear energy, pressure will build up for Australia to reconsider its ban on civil nuclear energy, in particular through the development of small modular reactors, and thus accelerate the path to becoming a zero-carbon economy. Another aspect related to the operation of nuclear-powered vessels by the Royal Australian Navy will be the repercussions it has on New Zealand, a long-standing ally of Canberra. Currently, Wellington has a zero-nuclear zone policy which prevents nuclear weapons and also nuclear-powered ships from entering into its territory. New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Adern, while welcoming the new trilateral agreement in the Indo-Pacific, stated that her country would continue to apply its no-nuclear policy, showing a rift between two very close allies. Less (to zero) strategic autonomy for Australia AUKUS proves to be a landmark deal as the United States has only shared its submarine technology with the United Kingdom since the signing of the 1958 US–UK Mutual Defence Agreement. However, it seems there is no current intention to build the nuclear reactors for said submersible vessels in Australia. While this situation might help prevent a flare-up of nuclear proliferation in the wider Indo-Pacific region, it will make Australia heavily dependent on the United States and the United Kingdom for the daily running and maintenance of its nuclear submarine fleet. As a result, a complete alignment of Australian policy decisions with American interests is highly expected. AUKUS shows that Canberra has reassessed the threat level posed by China and has chosen to reduce its room of manoeuvre on the international stage over the need to ensure its maritime security. Future EU-Australia Free Trade Agreement now at risk? The EU was Australia's third largest trading partner in 2020, after China and Japan and before the US. However, after Canberra's decision to cancel a 57 billion Euro submarine contract with France, the EU, in solidarity with Paris, questioned whether it should continue free trade talks with the country. The cancellation of the contract with Naval Group angered France, which accused both Australia and the United States of stabbing it in the back, prompting the Élysée Palace to recall its ambassadors from both Canberra and Washington (but interestingly not from London). The timing of the AUKUS announcement was also not ideal for Brussels, as it was announced on the same day in which the EU had scheduled to unveil its Indo-Pacific strategy; which ended up being eclipsed by the trilateral new partnership instead. A new round of talks between the EU and Australia will reportedly take place in February 2022, but if both parties do not manage to put in place measures to build back the lost confidence and to channel the frustration, the Free Trade Agreement will be a highly unlikely future scenario. About the author: Pablo Duprat Pablo Duprat comes from Argentina and currently attends two master programs, one remotely in Strategic Intelligence at Universidad Nacional de la Plata and the other one in Relazioni Internazionali at Università degli Studi di Milano. Pablo is passionate about international security, geopolitics and future scenarios.
- Energy Diplomacy: Is EastMed Pipeline Project collapsing
Written by Paraskevi Soultatou On the 10th of January, the US Embassy in Greece released a non-paper announcing the US will focus more on gas and renewable resources and vital energy markets in the Eastern Mediterranean subregion (EastMed). While they stated they will continue to support the efforts of “physically interconnecting EastMed energy to Europe”, the US characterized the EastMed gas pipeline project as a non-vital and unclear energy technology. This statement is yet another blow to the already geopolitically shaky energy project signed between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus. The withdrawal of American support may make the project unfeasible, as the pipeline ties with longstanding tensions in the region. The East Med project and the importance for the alliance The Eastern Mediterranean is a subregion of the Mediterranean Sea that has generated great geopolitical interest the recent years because of its large hydrogen supply and Turkey’s ambitions to become the controlling power in the region. Diplomacy in the EastMed has been given structure through the EastMed Gas Forum created in 2019, which includes Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, Italy, and Jordan. The EastMed project was signed at the beginning of 2020 by Greece, Israel, and Cyprus. The purpose of this gas pipeline project was to supply the involved countries and South Europe with natural gas from the Levantine Basin. The fact that Turkey was not involved in this project or in the EastMed Gas Forum meant that the Turks were excluded from both the energy benefits of the project and the energy-related diplomacy in the region. In the same year, Turkey signed an EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) with Libya that disputed the sovereign rights of several Greek islands in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially the Kastelorizo Complex. The Greeks responded to this move with a partial EEZ delimitation with Egypt. The EastMed Project has had several serious issues that could have ended the project from the beginning. Firstly, the region is too politically unstable for such a big project to succeed. Due to Turkey’s security threats and the unsolved Cypriot Problem, the environment is currently not attractive for investors. Secondly, Turkey and Libya’s EEZ created a problem for the EastMed project, as - if it is to be continued - they need to give permission to go through their delimitation. Because Greece does not recognize their EEZ, it would never ask Turkey and Libya to give their permission, as this would mean that Greece accepts the legitimacy of their EEZ. This would have consequences for Greece’s sovereignty over the disputed islands. The role of the US and EU in this project Trump’s administration supported the EastMed project because the EU was looking to turn its energy dependence away from Russia and other players in the market. The support of Trump’s administration for the EastMed project was noteworthy since, during his presidency, Trump maintained close ties with Turkey. When Biden’s administration took control in 2021, there were no clear signs that the US would abandon the project, as US relations with Turkey were weakening, especially after Biden publicly recognized the Armenian genocide. Even the EU, who were initially divided in their support for the gas pipeline, eventually funded its research and supported the initiative as a stepping-stone to establishing European energy independence. However, lately, Turkish-American relations have started to improve again. In this light, the US’s most recent statement on the EastMed project did not come as a surprise. Other countries involved in the project started to quietly abandon it as well. The new government of Israel, for example, has recently started to improve its relations with Turkey, which is likely the reason why they haven’t yet spoken out against the US statement. Greece has also seemingly lost its will to continue the project, as the government didn't seem overly discontent with the US' non-paper, and had also lost Exxon Mobil and Total’s interest to start mining operations on the island of Crete. The EastMed project was too expensive and complicated. Combined with the political instability in the region, this resulted in an overall lack of investments. The three states involved in the project likely knew about this risk from the beginning. This is the reason why they developed cooperative energy diplomacy through the EastMed Gas Forum. It now seems, without the hoped result of creating a more viable climate for investment. More puzzling is the stance of the EU. Given Europe’s current energy crisis following the political tensions between Russia and Ukraine, it is unexpected that the EU does not support the continuation of the EastMed project. Even though the EU has been divided on this project from the beginning, the EastMed project could be a way for European governments to get a handle on the current gas crisis and to absorb some of the economic damage for their citizens. Nevertheless, it seems that the EU is struggling to formulate a united strategic energy plan, and it currently does not include the EastMed project. The effect in the Eastern Mediterranean As aforementioned, the Eastern Mediterranean subregion has historically been politically unstable. Therefore, careful diplomacy is important for security in the region. Turkey’s regional ambitions, however, have resulted in an increasingly aggressive stance towards neighboring countries. The extensive energy wealth that exists in the Eastern Mediterranean, therefore, cannot attract enough investors because of the region’s ongoing geopolitical instability and disagreements over sea rights. From a geopolitical perspective, Turkey seems to have ‘won’ the diplomatic battle over the collapsing project. The Turkish relations with Israel seem to be better than they were before and this is a serious threat for both the future of the EastMed project and Greece’s and Cyprus’ diplomatic influence in the region. For the foreseeable future, the Cypriot Problem has no prospect for resolution, and this is the biggest obstacle for Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus to create a fruitful environment for energy cooperation and better diplomatic relations. Last but not least, the energy diplomacy of the EU seems to be generally sluggish, and it is even more apparent in this region. The EU’s focus on green energy is commendable, but it needs to be combined with projects that are to a lesser extent green in order to satisfy Europe’s energy needs. While the EU’s diplomatic relations with Turkey are currently in a good state, it is not enough to help Greece and Turkey overcome their disagreement in order for an energy diplomatic cooperation in the subregion. In the end, the fact that the EastMed project would lose the support of the US was an overall predictable outcome. What was not predictable, however, is the fact that even the states involved didn’t show a substantial effort in keeping the project alive. The energy diplomacy of the EastMed hasn’t yet succeeded in creating a stable environment for investors and the geopolitical tensions are still an obstacle to hard to overcome for the moment. About the author: Paraskevi (Evi) Soultatou Paraskevi (Evi) is passionate about international security and cooperation and is specialized in nuclear strategy and intelligence. She holds a Sociology bachelor from the University of Crete and two masters, an MSc in International and European Affairs from the University of Piraeus and an MA in Security,. Paraskevi at the moment is a Research Intern at IDIS Institute of Athens, she lives in the Netherlands and cooperates with three more think tanks
- Dyami Aviation start werkzaamheden in het Caribisch gebied
Vooruitlopend op het plan van het Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Waterstaat om vliegen in het Caribisch deel van het Koninkrijk betaalbaarder en betrouwbaarder te maken zet Dyami Aviation stappen om haar diensten in deze regio beschikbaar te stellen. Daarom kondigt Dyami de strategische samenwerking met het op Curaçao gevestigde PMC Global aan. De gezamenlijke missie van Dyami Aviation en PMC Global is het ondersteunen van nationale en regionale overheden, luchtvaartautoriteiten, luchthavens en luchtvaartmaatschappijen bij de veilige implementatie van luchtvaartbeleid en -activiteiten om duurzame groei en uitbreiding mogelijk te maken. Door middel van competentiegerichte training en advies helpen we het veiligheids- en beveiligingsbeleid op een duurzame wijze te verbeteren en sociale en economische belangen te beschermen. Dit doen we door de gekwalificeerde expertise van onze luchtvaart professionals beschikbaar te stellen aan de betrokken partijen in het Caribische gebied. De oprichter van PCM Global, Cliff Belfor, is een luchtvaartspecialist met meer dan 25 jaar ervaring in de luchtvaartindustrie. Cliff is ook een ISO-gecertificeerde interne auditor en ICAO-gecertificeerde trainingsmanager en -ontwikkelaar, en strateeg voor capaciteitsopbouw in de luchtvaart. Dyami, opgericht door Eric Schouten, bestaat uit ruim 30 experts en trainers uit meerdere disciplines, waaronder veiligheid (safety), beveiliging van de burgerluchtvaart (security), operations, kwaliteitsmanagement en vluchtuitvoering. Meer informatie: >> https://dyami.services/aviation >> https://www.pmcglobal.cw/partners Eric Schouten: eric.schouten@dyami.services 030-2072120 #avsec#training#security#aviation#securitytraining#airportsecurity#securitysolutions#securitymanagement#airportoperations #aocondersteuning












