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Written by Giulia Corradetti, Abigail Mikhail, Yusuf Babayusuf, Thijmen Kaspersma, Marnix  Van ‘t Hoff, Iris de Boer, Jacob Dickinson, Britt Verregghen,   Sara Frisan Russia-Ukraine : Ukraine destroys mass ammunition storages, as Russia is expanding on its Pokrovsk salient.  Israel: The focus of Israel is shifting from Gaza towards Lebanon, where it started a ground operation. The region is on the verge of a full-scale conflict. Myanmar: The Junta seeks a peace deal despite the resistance forces gaining ground and the worsening humanitarian crisis due to the conflict and a recent typhoon.  Sudan:   While fighting between the army and the RSF persists in several regions, the SAF launched a major offensive in Khartoum. Tunisia: As the October 6 elections approach, the government intensifies its crackdown on the opposition.  Mali: Following a major attack in Bamako, concerns over the expansion of Islamist militant groups in the region are rising.  Afghanistan: The Taliban further violates international human rights law as it prohibits women and girls from  letting their voices be heard in public.  Mexico: As violent intra-cartel clashes intensify in Sinaloa state, new judicial reform sparks nationwide protests. Colombia: The suspension of negotiations between the government and the ELN jeopardizes the Colombian peace process. DRC: While the M23 violence persists, trial hearings between DRC and Rwanda begin.  Venezuela: While crackdown on dissent intensifies, the arrests of foreign nationals strained diplomatic relations between Venezuela and Western countries.  China-Taiwan: Tensions keep rising between China and Taiwan because of increasing military actions of the PLA and growing interference from Western countries.  China-Philippines: China and the Philippines ended a standoff in the Sabina Shoal in the South China Sea following months of tensions over the Second Thomas Shoal.  Conflicts, September 2024  Russia-Ukraine The most notable event of the war in the past month is the first (publicly known) use of the recently announced Ukrainian ‘Palianytsia’ drone. This indigenously designed and produced drone was used in three separate attacks on some of Russia’s mass ammunition storage . The secondary explosions at these locations caused approximately 80% destruction among the stored munitions. It is likely that amongst these munitions were recently delivered North Korean and Iranian missiles , which were supposed to be used to strike Ukraine. The largest of these storages kept around 30.000 tons of munitions, which set off light earthquake warnings in the Baltic states as it detonated. There are six of such storage facilities within range of these new drones, two of which are situated near Moscow . The Russian advance towards Pokrovsk has slowed down significantly, but has expanded its salient southward , capturing significant portions of territory. Russia managed to all but encircle the Vuhledar stronghold, which Ukraine has been holding since the start of the war in 2014 and a focus point for Russian forces since the beginning of the full-scale invasion.   The US devoted another aid package , likely the last under the Biden administration, worth $8 billion. The future of US aid packages to Ukraine hangs in the balance as the US elections are approaching.  Israel The conflict between Israel and Hamas is ongoing . Despite the international urge for a ceasefire and the Israeli protests in the country, PM Benjamin Netanyahu seems to have shifted his focus.  Israel now appears less interested in a ceasefire and securing the hostages and more concentrated on attacking the Lebanon front , which is experiencing a rapid escalation of hostilities over the past few weeks, and is on the verge of a ground war. This month has seen the continuation of strikes and raids in the Gaza Strip and West Bank , where the killing of an American-Turkish protester and the closure of the Al Jazeera bureau have signaled a stringency in the   media repression , which has seen the death of more than 100 journalists since the start of the conflict. The  IDF also succeeded in eliminating the Hamas leader Fatah Sharif , which represents another defeat for the Palestinian group that has experienced severe losses in recent months. The past weeks have seen a rapid escalation of hostilities between Israel, Hezbollah, Iran, and its proxies . Heavy airstrikes and attacks were launched from both sides, culminating with the explosion of dozens of walkie-talkies and hundreds of pagers  belonging to the armed group Hezbollah, which resulted in severe losses for the Hezbollah and Iranian-backed allies. Despite the international call for a 21-day of ceasefire, attacks have continued, and most of the Hezbollah command has been killed. Lebanon has been severely damaged in terms of territory and political power, and it is not impossible that it will see the fall of the Hezbollah group.  The recent death of Hezbollah leader  Hassan Nasrallah has left the group very disorganized and has signaled a turning point in the conflict, leaving Hezbollah highly vulnerable.  This event is a blow to Iran’s influence as well. It is likely to weaken Hezbollah's Iran-backed allies, which have suffered severe losses in their operational commands by Israeli attacks. After warning the residents of the southern part of Lebanon to evacuate late on September 30, the Israeli military has begun what the IDF has called a “limited localized and targeted” ground operation against Hezbollah , which will probably become a proper ground invasion  of the southern part of the country.  Given the latest events, the possibility of de-escalating the conflict seems far from happening : Israel is shifting the balance of power in its favor, and with the Lebanon front severely damaged and the conflict against Hamas still ongoing,  Israel appears not to be close to accepting any ceasefire , and the whole region is likely to become a warzone. Myanmar  With increased hostilities and a rising humanitarian disaster further destabilizing Myanmar, September 2024 saw ongoing major issues in the country’s civil war. The military junta made an unexpected peace proposal  and started arrangements for a national census while confronting growing opposition to its authority. A possibly major change came from the military junta's unexpected offer for peace talks with ethnic armed organizations and resistance forces. But  the opposition responded with cynicism and conditional acceptance  and demonstrated the deep mistrust and significant political aspirations differences that still limit chances for a solution. At the same time as the junta's declaration of a national census, which indicates a possible path towards elections,  the viability of carrying out a credible census and election in a conflict-torn area is yet unknown. Combat continued in several areas during September , leading to ongoing civilian fatalities and displacement. In early September Typhoon Yagi   worsened the humanitarian situation   by leaving hundreds of thousands of people in need of immediate aid. Rising  violence in Rakhine state caused a fresh migration of Rohingya refugees to Bangladesh , therefore taxing resources and posing questions about regional stability. Sudan  Fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has intensified in the capital Khartoum. The RSF tried to attack various SAF strongholds in north Khartoum in September , among which a major SAF base. The SAF succeeded in repelling this attack. Other parts of the city also remained contested, and the SAF has targeted RSF locations in Khartoum with airstrikes from time to time. Around September 26, the SAF launched a new major offensive in Khartoum and took  control over three of the city’s main bridges. This is seen as a significant win for the SAF, as it cuts off supply routes used by the RSF. On September 30, the SAF was accused of bombing the diplomatic post of the UAE  in Khartoum. The SAF has denied the accusations and blamed the RSF. The government of Sudan has earlier blamed the UAE for supporting the RSF in the war, partially by providing weapons to the RSF. Fighting between the RAF and RSF also took place in the southeastern city of Sennar. Local NGOs reported dozens of civilian casualties , partly due to the RSF shelling a market in Sennar on September 8, Fighting also continued in the region of Darfur, where the RSF conducted a drone attack on RAF strongholds in el-Fasher on September 8. A few days later, on September 12, the SAF claimed to have thwarted an attack by the RSF in el-Fasher that killed dozens of RSF members. On September 13, Doctors Without Borders reported that the RSF has been blocking access roads to the Zamzam camp for internally displaced people  in the parts of el-Fasher it controls. This hinders the camp’s supply of food, drinking water, and medicines. High number of civilian casualties and alleged atrocities committed by the RSF were reported in September 2024.  September 2024 also marks the further stagnation of the humanitarian situation in Sudan as heavy rainfall continued causing floods   across 15 states in the country . The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that approximately 491,100 people have been affected. The floods have been a breeding ground for a cholera outbreak in 10 states in Sudan , with over 15,000 cases and 473 deaths reported by the health ministry.  Alerts, September 2024 Tunisia The past month has seen the rise of oppressive measures against political freedom from the Tunisian government in light of the upcoming presidential election  that will be held on October 6th. This has led to a rise of turmoil in the Tunisian population, which has begun to protest against the current government. Since the current Tunisian President Kais Saïed expressed his willingness to seek a new mandate, the country has experienced an intensification of media repression , together with a series of arrests of the opposition members, in order to prevent its leaders from running. Many candidates have been left off the ballot based on the government’s claim that their campaign fillings were incomplete. After a recent judicial order to reconsider some candidates as eligible, the Tunisian parliament amended a law to take decisional powers from the judicial courts. With the recent imprisonment of the opposition leader  Ayachi Zammel, the elections will see only one candidate facing Saïed, which is Zouhair Magzhaoui, member of People’s Movement, one of the parties supporting the exceptional measures imposed by Saïed since 2021, which has seen the president centralizing the political power.  The political environment in which the election will take place will probably be characterized by repression and opacity. It is likely that Saied will win the next mandate , and will try to strengthen his political control of the country, thereby making the possibility of a definitive authoritarian turn of the regime more likely.  The democracy of the country is at risk, and a new series of protests should be expected after the elections , the results of which will determine a turning point for the political regime of the country. Tension in Tunisia is high, and the risk of a civil revolution cannot be excluded.   The elections are likely to have an impact on the neighboring regions as well.  Mali  On September 17, a major jihadist attack occurred in the Malian capital, Bamako , marking a significant escalation in the ongoing conflict. This assault on the gendarmerie training center in Falidie district and Modibo Keita International Airport resulted in substantial human and material losses, with fires set to military, government, and UN aircraft. This was the first high-scale attack on the capital since 2015, when Mali was under civilian rule with French troop support. Militant Islamist groups are expanding their territorial control in Mali.  These groups have taken advantage of the power vacuum left by the  withdrawal of Western forces  following the departure of the French, US, and Germans. Italy is an exception, with around 300 troops in the area. This situation has led to increased instability and security concerns across the region. Many residents have fled the areas due to fears of violence and intimidation. However, some communities have formed self-defense groups to protect themselves against Islamist attacks. The Bamako attack highlights growing concerns about the increased capabilities of militant groups to reach southern Mali from strongholds in northern and central regions. There is potential for escalation of threats across the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and risk of cross-border attacks.  The rising number of displaced persons may also strain resources in bordering countries. These developments underscore the complex security landscape in Mali and its impact on the broader region as military-led governments pursue alternative alliances and strategies to address longstanding security challenges. Since moving away from Western forces, the three military juntas are   strengthening their relations and cooperation with Russia and China . In addition, the AES has launched a new biometric passport to facilitate movement within the alliance, solidifying its estrangement from the ECOWAS bloc .  Afghanistan   The living conditions for women and girls in Afghanistan have strongly deteriorated over the course of September 2024 as the Taliban started enforcing new laws that ban women and girls from letting their voice be heard in public . While the Taliban has defended the new restrictions as being in line with Sharia law, many human rights organizations and international bodies have condemned the new laws as they strongly contribute to the complete removal of women and girls from public life in the country. Women in Afghanistan have started an online campaign in which they record themselves singing and publish the videos on social media. The new laws add to earlier implemented laws that deny women  the right to education and employment. In addition, women are only allowed to leave the house with a male guardian and force them to cover their entire body and face in public. On September 25, Canada, Australia, Germany and the Netherlands announced at the UN general assembly to take the Taliban to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for gender discrimination . This is the first legal move taken against the Taliban since it took power in 2021. While the Taliban does not acknowledge the authority of the ICJ, supporters of the ICJ case against the Taliban are positive about the deterrent effect of the case on states that try to normalize their relationship with the Taliban. Human rights organizations have accused the international community and the UN of not speaking out against the Taliban’s violations of the international human rights law.  On   September 24, a spokesperson of the Taliban stated that the group has requested to join the upcoming BRICS economic forum in Russia  in October 2024. There has been no response from Moscow yet. While Russia established ties with the de facto government in Afghanistan and bilateral talks on trade were held in recent months, Russia did not recognize the Taliban as a legitimate government yet.  Mexico  The final weeks of outgoing Mexican President Lopez Obrador’s term , replaced by his ally and successor Claudia Sheinbaum on October 1, were marked by a tense political climate. In recent weeks, the approval of a judicial reform  that will allow voters to elect judges to the Supreme Court and other courts has sparked massive protests nationwide. Judicial workers called for demonstrations and strikes  in coming days and weeks to oppose the new judicial legislation, claiming it would undermine the independence of the judiciary and would jeopardize judges’ impartiality   while strengthening the power of the ruling Morena party . During the Senate vote, protesters broke into the building. In response, Lopez Obrador justified the reform, which officially went into effect on September 15. Obrador has presented the reform to be a necessary measure to eliminate corruption from the judiciary and make judges more accountable. Nonetheless, along with rising concerns on the legality and potential impacts of the reform on the rule of law and judiciary independence, Lopez Obrador’s new legislation could have implications on Mexico’s capability to comply with international obligations , especially with the United States. A weakened and politicized judiciary could  discourage foreign investment and affect Mexico's diplomatic relations.   Violence has been spreading in Mexican western Sinaloa state since fighting between two factions of the Sinaloa cartel erupted in the city of Culiacan on September 9. The trigger for the conflict dates back to the arrest in the US of Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada, top leader of one of the main factions of the Sinaloa cartel, allegedly after being kidnapped and handed over to authorities by a member of the rival faction, Los Chapitos. In the past three weeks, intra-cartel fighting resulted in at least 53 people killed and over 50 people missing.  As Mexican authorities tighten security, deploying additional 600 soldiers in the area, and intensify arrests of members of both cartel factions, the recent escalation of violence is spurring diplomatic tensions between Mexico and the US after the Mexican President claimed that the US should be considered "co-responsible" for the spiral of violence in Sinaloa state. The US administration ensured deep cooperation with the incoming Sheinbaum government to address armed violence and drug trafficking. The intra-cartel dispute in Sinaloa state is raising concern over potential spill-over of violence in other Mexican states .  Colombia  A new setback in peace negotiations jeopardizes Colombian President Petro's ambitious plan for stabilization and peace, known as “Total Paz”. Following a deadly explosive attack on September 17 targeting a military base in Aracua province, the government suspended negotiations with the National Liberation Army (ELN) , the largest guerrilla group in the country. Violent attacks targeting security forces and infrastructure and clashes involving the ELN have increased since the ceasefire with the government expired in early August. The latest attack came just a day after the Colombian government authorized the negotiations with ELN dissident faction Comuneros del Sur. In the last few months, the talks with ELN have been stalled after the government opened parallel negotiation in February 2024 with the faction Comuneros del Sur without the approval of the central command of the ELN, causing the split of the group from the guerrilla. The indefinite suspension of peace talks with the ELN raises fears of increased violence in the country and could undermine President Petro's political agenda credibility  as the "Total peace" policy loses one of its main components. Updates, September 2024 Democratic Republic of Congo Violence from armed rebel groups remains a pressing concern, particularly from the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group, who want to maintain political and economic influence in the mineral-rich eastern DRC. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring center, the M23 conflict caused 73% of the displacements in the DRC in 2024. Despite the government signing a cease-fire agreement with the M23 rebels  in July, the fighting persists. On September 27, HRW accused Rwanda’s army and the M23 rebel group of shelling camps for displaced people in eastern Congo, only deeping the humanitarian crisis. A day prior to this, the public hearing began by the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights regarding  DRC accusing Rwanda of violating its sovereignty, violating international law and committing atrocities against civilians.  In addition to the court case, the Congolese President called for sanctions to be placed on Rwanda for its support of the M23 rebel group. UN MONUSCO is still active in deploying troops, transporting civilians and providing emergency responses across the area. There have however been anti-MONUSCO protests . Despite their presumed withdrawal in the coming months, reports have claimed that the mission will continue past December 2024 due to fears that a security vacuum will occur if the mission ends. Amid the dispute with Rwanda and M23 violence, the government is dealing with other challenges, including addressing the Mpox outbreak in the region. Moreover, on September 2, there was an attempted mass breakout from the largest prison in the DRC that killed over 120 people. Due to significant overcrowding issues and poor conditions, authorities released over 2000 prisoners in the last few weeks. Also, in recent weeks the country’s military tribunal sentenced 37 people to death for their alleged involvement in a foiled coup last May , including three US citizens.  Venezuela  The recent presidential elections in Venezuela have triggered a deep domestic political crisis and international controversy . Although the Maduro regime claims victory in the polls, opposition forces and several Western nations dispute the results and denounce the manipulation, lack of transparency, and credibility of the electoral process. Available data from polling centers reportedly record an estimated 67% of the votes for the leading opposition candidate González Urrutia. Nonetheless, the regime of President Maduro, who has been in office since 2013, is increasing its grip on the country's electoral, judicial, and military bodies. On September 17, the UN reported a sharp deterioration of the repression in Venezuela , including crimes against humanity of politically motivated persecution. The report described Maduro's government strategy to silence the opposition as “one of the most acute human rights crises in recent history”. Reportedly, in the past two months,  at least 25 protestors were killed and nearly 2500 arbitrarily detained with the accusation of terrorism.   On top of the political crisis, diplomatic relations between Caracas and Western countries are souring. The Venezuelan government escalated its repression,  targeting foreign nationals and ordinary citizens.  In recent weeks, seven foreign nationals - four US nationals, two Spaniard and a Czech citizen - have been arrested for allegedly participating in plots to assassinate President Maduro. The arrests come just days after the  imposition of 16 new US sanctions on Venezuelan entities  - including the President of Venezuela’s Supreme Court, the director of the electoral council, and several military and intelligence officials - and rising diplomatic strains between Spain and Venezuela . In September, Spain granted asylum to opposition leader González and recognized his victory in the Venezuelan elections. The EU also formally recognized González as the legitimate winner. Tensions are also mounting between Maduro and some regional leaders, including Argentine President Milei, who asked Interpol to arrest the Venezuelan president. Neighboring country leaders fear severe repercussions for the region , especially for a likely aggravation of the migration crisis. The imposition of new sanctions could also have severe implications on the Venezuelan population and regional dynamics, aggravating the economic crisis and spurring mass exodus. Currently, no indicators suggest a resolution of Venezuela's political crisis.  China - Taiwan  Tensions keep rising between China and Taiwan because of increasing military actions  by the People’s Liberation Army of China surrounding territorial waters and the Taiwanese airspace. An increase in military drills seems to be the case every September for the last five years. China is trying to gain more power, for example, by executing joint landing exercises directly across the Taiwan Strait. This results in many Chinese military aircraft operating around the island and them breaching Taiwanese airspace multiple times. Another way the  CCP is trying to gain power is through meddling in the access to the Taiwanese Strait.  Since China is claiming Taiwan as its own territory, including the Taiwan Strait, they view countries that cross the Strait as provocative. For example, German warships that were passing through on September 13. Western countries (and Taiwan) say the Strait is an international waterway and are using it as a major trade route. By passing through, Germany wanted to show Beijing that they are standing with the Western allies during this time of rising tensions between China and Taiwan. The Kinmen island owned by Taiwan and located 3km from China is under pressure, because they want to be on good terms with China as well as Taiwan.  On September 16, another arms deal took place for Taiwan under the Biden administration . China claims that closer relations between the US and Taiwan and more interference from the US will only lead to the  destruction of ‘Taiwanese separatist forces’ . In addition, China has reacted to the arms sale by freezing the assets of nine US companies. However, the US interference grows with the bill stating that information will be published of CCP officials’ ‘illicit’ financial assets if China begins the invasion of Taiwan .  China - Philippines  On September 15, 2024, China and the Philippines ended a standoff in the Sabina Shoal in the South China Sea  after months of tensions over the Second Thomas Shoal.  The Philippines National Maritime Council said the Philippine Coast Guard flagship BRP Teresa Magbanua was leaving the Shoal, and China withdrew a mixture of coast guard and military forces from the disputed Shoal. China’s claims over most of the South China Sea as its immediate neighborhood have led to repeated clashes with the Philippines over the past few years, which have flared up over the past year.  China also launched criticisms of the Philippines and the US to keep mid-range missile systems deployed in April 2024 in the northern Philippines to boost deterrence in the South China Sea and against the prospect of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The Philippines and the US have stepped up joint training exercises , also in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines. The South China Sea has also seen rising military equipment build-up and naval exercises . At the end of September, the Philippines, the US, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand took part in military exercises in Manila’s exclusive economic zone to improve their naval and military coordination in the South China Sea. At a meeting at the Quad summit on September 22, the US, Japan, Australia and India met to discuss tensions in the East and South China Seas, in which they have not mentioned China explicitly.  About the authors  Giulia Corradetti Giulia is a new intern at Dyami as junior intelligence analyst. She holds a BA in International Studies from the university of Trento, and she is currently studying Security Risk Management at the University of Copenhagen. During her academic career, she has collaborated with the University Journal “L’Universitario”, covering topics regarding international and security issues, such as conflicts involving the Asian region and human rights violations. With Dyami, she is contributing to joint publications, writing articles and briefs on current or developing security situations around the globe, and keeping up to date with key regional developments Abigail Mikhail Abbie is one of Dyami’s newest Security Analyst interns, bringing a strong academic foundation and international experience. She recently earned her Master's degree in Crisis and Security Management, with a focus on Intelligence and National Security. During her studies, she tackled a range of complex security issues, from the inner workings of the Chinese Intelligence Community to the repression in Iran. Her most notable project, conducted for the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), involved investigating the repatriation of foreign fighters and offering key recommendations. Having lived across multiple countries, with 11 years in Beijing, China, Abbie draws on her rich cultural and global background. She is eager to deepen her expertise in conflict analysis and global security threats, making a valuable contribution to Dyami’s research and intelligence efforts. Yusuf Babayusuf Yusuf is a Safety and Security Management student at The Hague University of Applied Sciences, eager to apply his academic knowledge to real-world security challenges. He is particularly interested in geopolitical analysis, risk management, and the unique dynamics of Eastern Europe, Turkey, Central Asia and the Caucasus. Drawing from his cultural background and language skills in Turkish and Bulgarian. Yusuf is excited to learn from the experienced professionals at Dyami and contribute to their mission of creating a safer world. Thijmen Kaspersma Thijmen is currently in his final year of his bachelor's degree in Safety & Security Management at Avans University of Applied Sciences, 's-Hertogenbosch. During his education, he conducted assignments regarding public safety topics and raising security awareness in The Netherlands. Due to his recent completion of the Integral Safety and International Conflicts & Security minor, he is now eager to contribute to security internationally. Next to his research product, he will expand his expertise by joining the tasks of geopolitical conflict monitoring and writing analyses about various international security-related topics.  During the internship, he will focus his research product on the threat of rail sabotage. He is providing insights into the origin of this topic and the developments we can anticipate going into the future, aiming to make the target group more resilient. Marnix Van ‘t Hoff Marnix Van 't Hoff is an experienced Aviation Security Consultant & Trainer with a background in Aviation Studies from the Amsterdam University of Applied Sciences. He has a strong background in aviation security and has worked as a security risk and threat assessments (SRTA) specialist for aviation clients. He is an experienced crisis team leader and a HEAT trainer. His knowledge and expertise in these areas make him well-equipped to provide training, guidance and support to Dyami clients in ensuring the safety and security of their operations. Iris de Boer Iris works as a Global Intelligence Analyst at Dyami, leveraging her background in Human Geography. Additionally, Iris holds an MA degree in Conflict Studies and Human Rights from Utrecht University, specializing in conflict analysis, peace processes, and geopolitics. Her MA thesis delved into the securitization of the war in Ukraine by the Heads of State, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and Ministers of Defense of the Netherlands and Poland. Within Dyami, Iris is actively involved in security risk management, travel security, and geopolitical analysis. Her enthusiasm for addressing topics in international security extends across a diverse spectrum of countries and regions Jacob Dickinson  Jacob studied Global Political Economy at Leiden University. He is passionate about international development and is looking to expand his expertise in geopolitics and crisis management. Curious about other cultures, he has traveled in Europe and Asia for both academic study and professional purposes. His expertise includes the geopolitics of oil and industrial upgrading in the electronics global value chain. He is particularly interested in the evolving political and economic relationships between China and ASEAN, and the consequences for regional development and security.  Britt Verregghen Britt is currently a Security Management student at Saxion University of Applied Sciences. During her education, she conducted an assignment on behalf of the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence regarding the creation of security awareness around stability policing.. During the internship, she focused on researching Chinese interference with malicious intent in Dutch companies and organizations. Britt is interested in raising awareness about this subject and making this target group more resilient.  Sara Frisan  Sara works at Dyami as a Geopolitical Intelligence Analyst, leveraging her background in Peace and Conflict Studies. Sara joined Dyami after completing her MA in Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University and held an MA degree in International Sciences and Peace Studies. During her academic career, she conducted research in South America, primarily Colombia, on the dynamics of collaboration and resistance between civilians and non-state armed groups in violent settings. In her previous internship at the investigative think-tank InSight Crime, Sara developed some expertise on transnational organized crime and political-criminal alliances.

Date: September 10, 2024 Who’s involved : Al Qaeda, ISIS/ISIL/Daesh/ISKP/ISS, Al Shabaab, Haqqani network, Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslim (JNIM) and others. Jihadist-based terrorism has been on the world map since the late second part of the twentieth century but gained notoriety due to the Al Qaeda attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 . And even though other forms of terrorism, like White Nationalism-inspired terrorism, have grown exponentially in the West, Jihadist-inspired terrorism represents a global challenge . According to several studies, in 2023, the epicenter of Jihadist terrorism seems to have shifted away from the Middle East and to the Central Sahel region of Sub-Saharan Africa, with Islamic State (IS) and Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) being the most active terrorist organizations. According to the Global Terrorism Index, socio-economic factors such as unemployment, military expenditure, lack of confidence in the media and governmental institutions, and lower inequality-adjusted life expectancy are strongly associated with an increase in terrorism. Jihadist groups tend to recruit people in countries where there is a high resentment against the government and where the socio-economic conditions are very poor. It is worth noting that people in countries impacted by climate change are also vulnerable to terrorist recruitment;  in Mali, terrorist groups have exploited growing tensions between herders and farmers to recruit followers, and in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has exploited water shortages in the country.  Most influential Jihadist terrorist groups active in 2024 Islamic State (IS) (also known as Daesh, IS in the Levant, IS in Khorasan Province, IS in the Sahel and many other sub-groups) The Islamic State (IS) is a Sunni extremist group that emerged as an Al-Qaeda affiliate in Iraq and Syria in 1999. Following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, IS participated in the Iraqi insurgency. In 2014, the group declared itself a worldwide caliphate. IS adheres to a global jihadist ideology, following an anti-Western interpretation of Islam and promoting violence against those who do not align with their ideology. Although the original aim of IS was to establish a Salafist-oriented Islamic state spanning Iraq, Syria, and other areas of the Levant, it then expanded into other parts of the world. IS uses affiliate groups to promote its ideology, including the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISK) in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the Islamic State West Africa (ISWA), which operates in the Sahel region. The group has grown interest in the areas of Mali and Niger, where it is expanding its control driven by the security vacancy created by the withdrawal of UN and French military forces. Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) JNIM was formed in 2017 in the Sahel region of sub-Saharan Africa as a coalition of Salafi-jihadist insurgent groups. Since its emergence, JNIM has expanded across the Central Sahel,  committing acts of violence against civilians, local security forces, and counterterrorism operations, including international militaries and UN peacekeepers. In 2023 alone, the group was responsible for more than a thousand deaths.  JNIM tries to incite Muslims to oppose oppression, expel occupying powers from the Sahel region, and implement Islamic governance,  and the organization’s leaders have declared France and allied countries as enemies. Counterterrorism efforts against JNIM over the years have not succeeded at expelling the group from the countries affected by their actions. JNIM operates within existing conflict zones , and most of its attacks are targeted against the military. However, the largest increase in targeted deaths occurred amongst the civilian population , with the number of civilian casualties from JNIM attacks being 416 in 2023.  Al Qaeda Al Qaeda is probably the most well-known militant Islamist group that has been active for over 40 years. Founded by Osama bin Laden in the late 1980s in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda is mostly known for carrying out the attack on the United States on   September 11, 2001, but has a wide range of devastating attacks across multiple continents to its name .   The organization began as a logistical network to support Muslims fighting against the Soviet Union during the Afghan war.  On several occasions, the group has declared war on the United States, Israel, European countries, and Arab leaders who are seen as collaborating with the West. After the death of Osama Bin Laden in 2011, Al Qaeda seemed to have splintered and lost some of its power to groups like ISIS and others. But with the reinstallment of the Taliban government in Afghanistan in 2021, Al Qaeda has been able to restructure and reinvent itself.  Osama Bin Laden’s son, Hamza, who was believed to have been killed in 2019 in Iran, took over the reins of power in the organization in 2024. Al Qaeda is now considered to be a renewed threat to the West and Arab states again. Experts believe Al Qaeda could be preparing another 9/11-style event. Al Shabaab The Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin (Al Shabaab) is a Salafist militant group active in East Africa. It is an Al Qaeda affiliate based in Somalia and Kenya and pursues the Islamist statehood aspiration in Somalia. The group sustains control over strategic locations by recruiting regional sub-clans and their militias , using guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics against the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeepers, and nongovernmental aid organizations. It gained global recognition after several deadly attacks in the Somali capital city of Mogadishu, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda. Al Shabaab usually targets the military and utilizes bombs and armed assaults as the main mode of attack . The group does not have a centralized agenda and is characterized by constant infighting among leadership . It unites several members from different clans, it is interested in the nationalistic battle against the FGS and does not support global jihad. Al-Shabaab’s senior leaders remain affiliated with Al-Qaeda.  Haqqani network                        The Afghanistan-based Haqqani network was founded in the 1980’s by Jalaluddin Haqqani, a charismatic leader and dedicated Jihadist. Osama Bin Laden was amongst his closest friends during the war against the Soviets and in the years after fighting the Afghan government. The Haqqani network provided the Taliban with men and weapons and was known for its ruthless attacks against anyone who opposed them. The wide use of suicide bombers made the Haqqani network a feared and unpredictable enemy . After the fall of the Afghan government in 1996, several high-ranking Haqqani men took up important positions in the new Taliban government.  During the Allied military operations to restore the Afghan government, the Haqqani network worked closely with the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces. Part of the strength of the Haqqani network is that they have a significant presence and governance across the border in Pakistan.  The Pakistani Army and secret services have been accused by Western countries of being in league with the Haqqani network, and there are accusations that Pakistan has delivered weapons and money to the Haqqani network. Pakistan has denied any involvement but has also been unable to neutralize the Haqqani network’s influence in Pakistan and Eastern Afghanistan.  Since the death of Jalaluddin in 2018, his son Sirajuddin has taken over control of the organization and continues to have close ties with the Taliban government. Several intelligence agencies have stated that since the “Fall of Kabul” and the reinstatement of the Taliban government in 2021, the Haqqani network and Al Qaeda have opened dozens of training camps for Jihadists who want to join the global Jihadist struggle. How do they fund their operations? Terrorist groups have revenues from several activities, which include  state sponsorship, illicit activities and business funds , such as smuggling of drugs, oil and weapons, and donations from individuals and institutions supporting a terrorist cause for political, economic, or religious interests. Drug smuggling is one of the most profitable activities . In this context, terrorist groups usually provide protection and play the role of brokerage.  An example is the smuggling of opium and methamphetamines in Afghanistan . The Taliban supply opium to the entire Afghan region and beyond, using the Balkan route from Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey to Europe. Another key drug smuggling route is the so-called “Highway 10” , which goes from South America to West Africa and enables the trafficking of drugs all the way up to Europe. Highway 10 is exploited by jih adist groups, which act as facilitators and broker the export of the drug to North Africa and Europe. Oil smuggling  is another highly profitable source of revenue for terrorist organizations, by smuggling it for cheaper than market prices. In Turkey , for example, oil has been smuggled at a cheaper price by neighboring countries Iran, Iraq, and Syria through moles. Terrorist organizations such as ISIS often directly participate  by confiscating the oil from these countries and then selling it in conjunction with  smugglers. How do they recruit? To capture, recruit followers, and consolidate their control, terrorist groups exploit political instability and local dissatisfaction with local governments, poor economic and social conditions  in the regions of interest.  Among the recruiting systems used by these organizations, there is propaganda , which includes both offline and online campaigns, supporting media, and translation outlets to break down language barriers and reach a broader audience to recruit, incite to commit terrorist acts, and self-train. For example, IS utilizes Telegram to recruit personnel and send videos and information to their followers. JNIM uses propaganda to focus on highlighting the group’s operations, which includes the release of infographics listing their attacks, the spoils of war and casualties. Another way terrorist groups use propaganda is by undermining their perception of a specific government.  Al Qaeda, for example, has always criticized and manipulated the narrative of the United States.  Terrorist organizations are usually supported by their own networks, which produce and ensure the flow of information . For example, Al Qaeda launched the al-Nusra Foundation for  Media Production on the 21st anniversary of the 11 September 2001 attacks. The self-professed mission of this media outlet is to support Muslims against declared enemies worldwide, by disseminating the true news about the “mujahidin”. Other media outlets, such as Thabat News Agency, report Al Qaeda and its affiliates' activities. These networks play a recruiting role by urging followers and Muslims to carry out operations against the West . An example is the HAT Guardians of Monotheism, which in 2022 issued a series of magazines in English urging readers to attack the West from within their own homeland.   What will the future bring? JNIM and the Sahel: JNIM is considered one of the most active militant groups in the wider Sahel region, having staged numerous attacks in Mali and Burkina Faso. On September 17, 2024,   JNIM carried out a terrorist attack in Bamako,  the Mali capital, targeting a military police training school and several other areas in the city, including the Modibo Keita International Airport, killing 77 people and injuring around 200. A month before, on August 25, 2024,  the terrorist organization attacked the region of Barsalogho, opening fire against teams of people digging trenches designed to protect security outposts. They then posted videos of the attack on social media. It was mainly civilians that were attacked , and it led to the death of 200 people. Burkina Faso and Mali have been asking the Russian mercenary group Wagner, now known as the African Corps, to help fight the group. The terrorist attacks seem to be getting closer and closer to the respective capitals and it is not unlikely that more and more cities and villages will fall into the hands of the Jihadists in the remaining months of 2024. Al Shabaab in Somalia, Kenya, Mozambique and Tanzania: Al Shabaab has been expanding its terrorist activities in 2023 and 2024 to incorporate more East African countries despite the efforts of the African Union to form a consolidated coalition against the group. Distrust of the government, economic hardship and the impact of climate change is paving the way for Al Shabaab to recruit , mostly, poor people from the countryside to their ranks. With the United States retreating further from East African countries and leaving the counter-terrorism efforts to the African Union,  it seems that there is a lack of training, experience, and coordination within the Union to effectively strike against Al Shabaab. 2024 will see a further rise of Al Shabaab activities ISIS in Pakistan: In 2024, ISIS and its affiliates have been carrying out several attacks through suicide bombings and well-coordinated military-like assaults in Pakistan. In the 10 days between the attack on the northern border with Afghanistan on March 16, 2024 and on  March 26, 2024 , Pakistan witnessed five different attacks , three in its northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and two in its southwestern Balochistan province, resulting in the deaths of at least 18 people. All five attacks were suicide bombings linked to ISIS.   On September 29, 2024,  more than 50 people were killed and many others injured in bomb attacks near a mosque in Mastung city. On the same day, a mosque in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, in the country’s northwest, was attacked by a suicide bomber as well. Although none of these attacks have been openly claimed by ISIS it is likely that the organization is behind the recent events.  ISIS in the Sahel: ISIS is also spreading its operations in the Sahel region , where after the departure of the last French soldiers from Mali in October 2022 , it has been targeting civilians and carrying out an offensive against rival Jihadist organization JNIM , which has seen the last stage with the capture of Tidermène, a locality located north of Ménaka on April   12, 2024. In its attacks against civilians,  ISIS especially targets farmers, stealing their cattle to retrieve fundings for the organization.  ISIS focuses on rural areas, where the population is threatened by the development of agricultural crops and feels neglected by the central State, and therefore is characterized by violence and resentment against the government. It is likely that ISIS will continue its attack in the rural areas of the Sahel region , recruiting as many followers as possible, to spread propaganda against the government and the rival organization JNIM, to outgrow it and become the predominant organization in the region. ISIS, Al Qaeda, and the Haqqani network worldwide: Overall, the most concerning terrorist trend in Europe and the United States is the one coming from Al Qaeda and the Islamic State.  These organizations recruit young people, mostly young Muslim men with an immigrant background that feel disenfranchised by what they perceive to be racist government policies, through online propaganda, and are for example using the conflict between Israel and Hamas to call for violent action in the countries they reside.  Meanwhile, the Haqqani network seems to focus mostly on creating spaces in Afghanistan where terrorist groups can train for future attacks on their perceived enemies.   Conclusion Even though Jihadist terrorist groups have suffered some severe setbacks in the 2000s and 2010s, it seems that they are slowly, but surely, recovering and returning to their former strength . With the war in Ukraine and Israel taking up all the attention in the media and politics, it is not strange to see intelligence agencies and other government departments focus less on the Jihadist threat. Resources are simply not available or allocated to deal with the resurgence of groups like Al Qaeda while at the same time Western governments seem to have lost interest in creating a stable region in the Sahel after being evicted from a wide range of countries by young idealistic nationalist military regimes there. It seems likely that Jihadist groups will grow in strength in the coming years as economic disparity and climate change will have more of an effect on the sub-Saharan region and parts of the Middle East and Central Asia. With the West retreating behind a curtain of international isolationism, as they deal with the war in Ukraine and the effects of electoral victories of anti-immigration parties,  it is only a matter of time before Jihadist groups feel empowered and influential enough to again challenge the Western powers by conducting large terrorist attacks on Western soil, while in the meantime consolidating their position in the Sahel and Central Asia. Download the PDF:

Date :   28/10/2024 Where :  Ukraine, Russia Who’s involved : Parties: Russia, North Korea, Ukraine What happened?   On 28/10/2024 , NATO confirmed that North Korea has sent troops to Russia to join the war against Ukraine and that they have been deployed in the Kursk region. The exact number of North Korean troops in Russia is still not yet determined. U.S. and South Korean intelligence have now claimed there are 3,000 North Korean troops training in Russia. Ukrainian intelligence claims the figure is closer to 12,000 troops. On 28/10/2024 , South Korea began diplomatic talks with the U.S. and NATO to discuss the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia. On 25/10/2024 , the Dutch Intelligence services joined Ukraine, the U.S. and South Korea in confirming that up to 1,500 North Korean troops have been sent to fight in Russia’s war against Ukraine on the battlefield, though their specific role is uncertain. The North Korean special forces units are expected to be deployed against the Ukrainian military within Russia’s Kursk region. On 25/10/2024 , South Korea and Poland are close to signing a deal that would send K2 tanks to Poland which would aid in their support in backing Ukraine in the war. On 24/10/2024 , South Korea warned that it might send weapons to Ukraine after North Korea deployed troops to Russia. The presidential office said it may upgrade its aid to Ukraine from purely defensive weapons to offensive weapons, depending on North Korea’s involvement in the war. On 18/10/2024 , South Korean National Intelligence services released satellite images which they claim show North Korean personnel in a training ground at Russia’s Ussuriysk military facility. More satellite images were released showing a Russia naval vessel which is suspected of transporting North Korean troops to a Russian port. Analysis : North Korea has shifted in importance to Russia from being just an arms supplier to now being an active participant in their fight against Ukraine. North Korea’s support for Russia in the Ukraine conflict has also proved m utually advantageous; it has earned North Korea approximately $540 million from arms sales to Russia. Russia and North Korea signed a landmark defense pact in June 2024 which would mean both countries would provide immediate military assistance to each other in the case of an attack. With North Korean troops possibly used for combat purposes, it offers a unique opportunity to test its military capabilities in real combat conditions. North Korea currently has 1.3 million active soldiers and 7.5 million soldiers on reserve with 8 to 10 years mandatory years of military service making them experienced but lacking exposure to real-life combat conditions. Russia’s training and deployment of North Korean troops in its conflict with Ukraine suggests that the war is not unfolding as Russia had planned.  Their reliance on foreign forces highlights a growing strain on Russia’s military, in which an estimated 600,000 troops have been killed or wounded since the full-scale war started in 2022. Moreover, the Kremlin’s increasing dependence on weapons deliveries from countries like Iran and North Korea point to a depletion in Russia’s own weapon stockpile. Despite Russia’s initial expectation of an expeditious campaign, recent development demonstrates they have faced challenges in maintaining a strong front in the war.  The participation of North Korea taking a more direct role in the Russia-Ukraine war could destabilize Ukraine's defenses. The additional North Korean troops will add more pressure to the Ukrainians’ defensive lines and maintain their positions in the Kursk region. However, it is not clear yet if they will make a difference to Russia’s war effort.  South Korea has stated that they are considering sending offensive weapons to Ukraine to aid in the war following intelligence on the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia.  South Korea is profoundly concerned that the deal includes assistance to raise Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear programme, or that Russian soldiers could be deployed to North Korea in the future. Russia’s reliance on North Korea enables North Korea to obtain more missile and nuclear capability technology.  Conclusion: Intelligence reports from western governments suggest that North Korean troops are being trained in Russian military facilities; the exact number of troops are still to be determined. Although it is not yet clear on the role of North Korean troops for the conflict, the strategic partnership and recent deployments have raised significant alarms for the international community. Whilst alliance mutually benefits Russia and North Korea, Europe and the Indo-Pacific should be fully prepared for an escalation in the conflict that could reach beyond the borders of Ukraine and exacerbate the already dire humanitarian crisis and mass displacement of people.

Date: 24/10/2024 Who’s involved :  Israel, Hezbollah, Hamas, Iran, United States. What happened? The Israeli Defense Force’s ground invasion of Lebanon and the Israeli Air Forces’ bombing campaign in the south of Lebanon aimed at crippling Hezbollah’s forces is ongoing. On 16/10/2024  an Israeli airstrike destroyed the municipal headquarters in a major town in south Lebanon, killing 16 people including the mayor. On the same day, the UN mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) said its peacekeepers observed an Israeli tank firing at their watchtower near southern Lebanon's Kfar Kila. On 21/10/2024  UNIFIL was accused of accepting money from Hezbollah in exchange for access for this latter to UNIFIL bases for conducting operations. UNIFIL denied the accusations, but the investigation is still ongoing. On  20/10/2024  the Israeli Air Force conducted a series of targeted, intelligence-based strikes against dozens of facilities and sites used by Hezbollah to finance its terrorist activities against Israel.   On 21/10/2024  seven Israelis were arrested by the Israeli security services on suspicion of espionage for Iran. Prosecutors alleged they had completed around 600 missions on behalf of Iran, including gathering intelligence on sensitive military and infrastructure sites, and identifying potential human targets for Iran.  On 21/10/2024  an Israeli official stated that two of Israel’s conditions for a ceasefire with Lebanon include allowing the IDF to engage in active enforcement to prevent Hezbollah from rearming and rebuilding its military infrastructure in the areas of southern Lebanon, and freedom for operations of the IDF in Lebanese airspace. The US Department of Defense deployed a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery (THAAD) and an associated crew of US military personnel to Israel. On 21/10/2024  a classified document regarding Israel’s plans to attack Iran was leaked without authorization on Telegram. The document assessed Israeli’s readiness to conduct the attack and its possible weaknesses. It also describes the possible use of long-range missiles to conduct a long distance aerial attack. On 18/10/2024  the Islamic resistance in Iraq, a coalition of armed groups based in Iraq, targeted two key military sites in the city of Eilat and in southern Israel. Over the past two weeks, Iran-linked militias in Iraq have launched about 40 aerial attacks involving missiles, drones or rockets on Israel.  On  17/10/2024  the Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was killed by IDF forces in an operation in Rafah, Gaza. Yahya was one of the masterminds behind the 7th October attack. His death is significant for the existence of the Hamas group, and many western countries hope that this event could lead to the signing of a ceasefire and the release of the hostages held captive by Hamas. The US has urged Israel to end the war in the Middle East and bring peace to Gaza, stating that the death of Sinwar has fulfilled Israel’s objectives in Gaza.  Analysis : After the Iranian ballistic missile attack on 01/10/2024 , Israel has vowed a response in retaliation for the attack. There is speculation that  Israel could lead to aerial bombing and targeting of Iranian oil fields or nuclear sites.  The US has deployed an anti-missile system to Israel and Iran’s air defenses are on high alert in anticipation of expecting Israeli retaliatory airstrikes. The conflict between Hezbollah and Israel is intensifying. Israel is attempting to destabilize and destroy Hezbollah by revealing how Iran funds Hezbollah's terrorism using civilian institutions, associations, and charities as cover for their operations, and how any other illicit financing and supporting activities have been used by the Iran-backed group. Israel seems to be considering accepting a ceasefire with Hezbollah, but on the condition that Hezbollah does not maintain its position close to Israel's northern border. Hezbollah had initially said it would only consider a ceasefire with Israel if a ceasefire was reached in Gaza. The death of Yahya Sinwar as the head of Hamas may be a turning point after a year of hostilities in the Israel-Hamas conflict. His death dealt a blow to the organization, and could potentially accelerate a hostage deal, or lead to the group’s disintegration. The leader that will replace Sinwar could play a role in a possible ceasefire. Other candidates include Yahya Sinwar brother Mohammad Sinwar or Khaled Mashaa. It is likely that the latter will take the role of leader from outside Gaza, whereas Mohammad Sinwar is expected to assume a bigger role within Gaza.  Conclusion: The situation in the Middle East is highly tense and unpredictable. The Israeli targeting of Hezbollah and Hamas on all the open fronts are weakening both organizations. This limits Iran’s assets, leaving the country to rely on its other minor proxies. The US intervention to mediate for a ceasefire in both Lebanon and Gaza offers a possibility for a ceasefire, though previous attempts have not led to concrete results. The US anti-missile system deployed in Israel might hinder the effectiveness of a US mediation. Iran’s air defenses are on high alert in anticipation of expecting Israeli retaliatory airstrikes, though the scale and targets of the IAF is yet to be seen.

Written by Jacob Dickinson, Iris de Boer, Alessia Cappelletti Sudan : power struggle between military factions broke into open conflict. Russia-Ukraine : heavy fighting on the Ukrainian frontline, particularly in Donetsk. Myanmar : military junta targeted civilian camps and committed human rights abuses. Ethiopia : Amhara region on the border with Tigray has seen extensive protests. Armenia-Azerbaijan : increased tensions after the establishment of Azerbaijani checkpoint. Democratic Republic of Congo : continuation of the conflict on the border with Uganda. Israel : judicial reforms in Israel postponed and worsening security situation in Israel-Palestine. Burkina Faso : over 150 civilians killed in attack in Northern Yatenga province. Mali : unrest continues as multiple attacks take place within the country. Yemen : progress in peace talks by opposing sides. Colombia : reshuffle of cabinet to reinvigorate reform plan and planned negotiations between the government and guerilla’s Chile : Chile nationalized its lithium industry amidst growing competition for critical minerals used in green technologies. Conflicts April 2023 1. Sudan On April 15, 2023, a crisis emerged in Sudan as violent clashes erupted between competing military factions . The conflict is primarily between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their respective leading generals Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemeti. The immediate cause of the conflict is the disagreement over the absorption of RSF forces in the SAF and the supposed disagreement on a timetable for a transition to democratic government after the coup in 2021. The fighting and airstrikes have intensified in the capital’s international airport and in the gold-rich region Darfur in the southwest of the country. The outbreak of conflict has so far killed 512 people and wounded nearly 4,200, though the death toll is thought to be far higher. Humanitarian aid has struggled to keep up as airstrikes and artillery have destroyed hospitals and cut off critical infrastructure. The United Nations has predicted up to 100,000 people have fled Sudan to neighboring countries, Ethiopia, Chad and towards the Port of Sudan. Outside actors also have significant interests in the outcome of the conflict. Egypt is a supporter of the SAF as they have supported Egypt’s opposition to Ethiopia’s plans for the GERD dam construction. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have cultivated close relationships with the both militaries due to the extensive trade in illegally mined gold in the country. The Russian Wagner Group has cooperated with the RSF to secure gold mines and transport gold back to Russia. For now, most actors seem to be supporting a ceasefire and refusing to openly back one side or the other . The scale of the violence and need for humanitarian aid have fueled concerns of broader instability in the region . Sudan’s geographical position, the ongoing conflict, and the refugee movements fleeing violence, are also likely to put pressure on humanitarian aid delivery. The close ties between Chad and the RSF suggest that there is a chance of the former becoming involved to some degree. Sudan’s conflict risks spilling over to other countries due to the arms trade and rebel groups moving between borders. With ceasefires failing to hold, the conflict is likely to continue in May. 2. Russia-Ukraine Heavy fighting on the Ukrainian frontline , and particularly in Donetsk, is taking place in flashpoints around Bakhmut , and also Kreminna and Marinka. Bakhmut has seen the fiercest fighting along the frontline. Ukrainian forces have managed to maintain logistical lines for the city and retain limited control. The Russian forces and Russian mercenary Wagner Group have fought together against the Ukrainian military and faced significant losses, though the strategic value of the city is questionable. Without gains on either side, analysts have predicted that the war could become a hot frozen conflict. While Russia and the Wagner group remain focused on Bakhmut, Ukraine’s much-discussed counter-offensive against Russia’s hold has not started yet , though it was expected for the last weeks April. Analysts have argued that Ukraine's objective could be to push toward the Sea of Azov and sever the land bridge between Crimea and Russia. The information channels remain extremely limited on the objectives and scope of the counteroffensive. Russian forces are preparing defensive positions against the advance, laying mines and digging defensive positions. On April 11, a US intelligence leak emerged with classified documents , suggesting that Kyiv is not likely to meet its objectives in the spring counteroffensive and its air defenses are weak. The intelligence leak was not intentional and the leak suspect was quickly arrested. However, while the intelligence leak represents what the US intelligence community thinks about the issue, the assessments are not foolproof. The US intelligence extensive reporting on detailed Russian military operations nevertheless demonstrates the weakness of Russia’s counter-intelligence operations and it is also witness to the fact that the US spies on its allies. This is not likely to alter diplomatic relations between the US and Ukraine given Washington’s military support for Kyiv. Behind the frontlines, Russian airstrikes have continued to hit Ukrainian cities and the Ukrainian military. Russian missiles have also targeted critical civilian infrastructure . On April 30, Russia launched missile attacks against Pavlohrad, a logistically important transportation link, wounding 34 people. Another Russian attack killed 23 Ukrainian civilians in the city of Uman. With the arrival of Western arms to Ukraine, the first Ukrainian tanks crews trained in the Leopard 2 and Challenger 2 are expected to be used in the counteroffensive. However, the Ukrainian foreign minister has noted that the coming counteroffensive is likely to be one of many. For now, the timing and scope of the planned counteroffensive could be as late as summer without an improvement in terrain conditions in Ukraine . 3. Myanmar The conflict between the Myanmar military and different opposing factions continued in April, with the military targeting civilian camps and committing multiple human rights abuses. On April 11, the Myanmar military carried out airstrikes on a local village inhabited by opponents of the military in Kanbalu township, killing 168 people. According to analysts, this signals the desperation of the military junta in fighting against the armed resistance. Since the military coup on 1 February 2021, the military has been unable to defeat resistance groups and fighting has moved to previously peaceful big urban centers in the country. Outside diplomatic efforts to act as peace providers or prevent further escalation remains difficult . Indonesia, the new chair for the regional bloc for Southeast Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), condemned the attack in a short announcement and is attempting to construct a more robust regional response to the Myanmar military’s atrocities against civilians. Given the organization’s principle of supposed non-interference in member’s internal affairs, Myanmar remains a member of ASEAN and governments have struggled to come to a consensus on solutions to the crisis . Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand are unlikely to agree on a common response given their accommodating position on Myanmar’s military. The military's considerable capacity for self-reliance, as well as its cultivation of relationships with Russia and China, suggest that outside actors retain little capacity to exert pressure over the Myanmar military. 4. Ethiopia The Amhara region in Ethiopia, on the border of Tigray, has seen political instability during April. On April 6, the Ethiopian government said that it plans to integrate all 11 regional military units into a single centralized army. This provoked a series of protests in the Amhara region against the centralization of military power, in a country with highly decentralized military forces. Protests and gun battles were consistent throughout the month. In a further escalation of tensions, on 27 April, Amhara nationalists assassinated a member of the ruling Prosperity Party, Girma Yeshitila, criticizing his close relationship to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. This is likely to cause further instability. At the same time, Ethiopia’s government has made progress in other peace talks . On April 23, the Ethiopian government accepted the terms of the peace negotiations with the rebel group Oromo Liberation Army ( OLA ). Both parties blame each other for attacks in the Oromiya region, in which air strikes were used against civilians. This rebel group is formally separate from the brutal conflict in Tigray, but the OLA did forge an alliance with the Tigray People’s Liberation (TPLF) in 2021. 5. Armenia-Azerbaijan Tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan have increased after Azerbaijan established a checkpoint on the only land route to the Nagorno-Karabakh region on April 23. After the establishment of the checkpoint, border shootings by soldiers from Armenia as well as soldiers from Azerbaijan were reported. Azerbaijan stated that it had taken “appropriate measures to establish control at the starting point of the road.” Armenia claims the checkpoint is a violation of the Russian brokered ceasefire agreement in 2020 in which Azerbaijan agreed to “guarantee safe movement of citizens, vehicles and cargo in both directions along the Lachin corridor.” As part of this ceasefire agreement, the Lachin corridor has come under the jurisdiction of Russian peacekeeping forces that are present in the region. Nagorno-Karabakh is a region that was claimed by Azerbaijan and Armenia after the Russian Empire fell in 1917 and has been contested ever since. The two sides have gone to war in 1990 and 2020, and clashes continue on a regular basis. The Nagorno-Karabakh region is located within Azerbaijan, but is mostly populated by Armenian citizens. The region has its own government that works closely together with the Government of Armenia but is not officially recognized by UN member states. During the first week of May, the Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia visited the US and met with the US Secretary of State to halt long-standing tensions over the region . On May 2, Russia stated that there is “no alternative” to the Russian-brokered peace agreement signed in 2020. Alerts and developing situations, April 2023 1. Colombia On April 26, President Petro replaced seven ministers in his cabinet , in response to the coalition partner’s refusal to approve a healthcare reform that is pending in Congress. Petro hopes that the reshuffle will reinvigorate his reform plan. Healthcare reform has been a contested key issue by the opposition. In the same month, a group of FARC dissidents who rejected the 2016 agreement announced that their delegates are ready to start negotiations with the government in May 2023. Similarly, peace talks with another guerrilla, the ELN, entered their third round in the first week of May, with both parties advocating for a temporary ceasefire. Despite this, trust between the parties is still very low, as in March a previous ceasefire was broken and 9 Colombian soldiers died. 6. Chile Chilean President Gabriel Boric announced on April 20 his plan to nationalize the country’s lithium industry to increase state revenues. Lithium is essential to produce electric vehicle batteries and Chile is the world’s second largest producer of the metal (behind Australia) but hosts the largest reserve. The plan announced would transfer the operations to a separate state-owned company and away from giants such as SQM and Albemarle – but not immediately as the companies’ current contracts run until 2030 and 2043, respectively. Since the announcements, the two companies lost a collective $8.5 billion. In Boric’s plan, future contracts would be issued as a public-private partnership with at least 51% state stakes. Criticisms from mining executives and industry analysts highlight that Boric’s strategy might have the opposite effect and shift investment towards Australia, Argentina, and several African countries – though Chinese firms may try to fill the gap. In the transition to climate-friendly technologies, mining and procurement of specific natural resources are climbing on the agendas of public as well as private entities and may become the next stage for geopolitical competition . Follow-ups on previous conflict monitoring reports 1. Democratic Republic of Congo The conflict in DRC has continued on the border with Uganda in the province of Ituri. On 15 April, dozens of civilians were killed by an armed militia called the Cooperative for Development of the Congo (CODECO). The competition is based on ethnic tensions and control over the Ituri region’s oil and gas deposits. Throughout April, massacres have occurred in the area as different groups, some with links to Islamic State, have vied for control. The ongoing humanitarian crisis is likely to continue as violence escalates throughout the country. 2. Israel Israel's PM Netanyahu's plans for a controversial judicial reform have been halted to avoid an immediate escalation of protests. On April 16, Netanyahu said he would not immediately resume the reforms after months of protests. Critics of the proposal argue that limiting the court review will lead to authoritarianism in the country. At the same time, tens of thousands of protests supportive of the measure have also marched through Jerusalem. The proposed reforms seem to be temporarily postponed, given the scale of the division over the issue . The security situation has also worsened in Israel-Palestine throughout April . There have been rockets fired from Gaza, the West Bank, the south of Lebanon, and the west of Syria. On April 8, the Israeli Defense Forces retaliated with airstrikes in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria. Israeli settlers have attacked Palestinian villages and left several Palestinian citizens wounded. On April 8, a Palestinian gunman opened fire on a crowded bar in Tel Aviv, killing three people. Palestinian terrorist organizations have also been more active. The intensity of violence between Israel and Palestine has become severe , and the plans to implement judicial reforms are likely to create more political instability in the short term. 3. Sahel Burkina Faso : Killings of civilians in Burkina Faso by Islamist armed groups and Burkina Faso Armed Forces has increased since 2022. On April 20, 156 civilians were killed during an attack on the village of Karma in Northern Yatenga province. The government of Burkina Faso has condemned the killings and stated that it will start an investigation. Islamist armed groups linked to al Qaeda and the Islamic State are known to control territory in the area where Karma is located. According to villagers, the killings in Karma have been a retaliation against people in the village who are suspected of cooperating with Islamist armed groups. It is estimated that over 5.5 million people in Burkina Faso are in need of assistance and nearly 2 million people have been displaced . Mali : The March’s Conflict Monitoring Report focused on the growing influence of the Russia-affiliated Wagner group in the Sahel. On April 20, there was an attack near a military camp that hosts Malian forces, UN peacekeepers, and Wagner fighters. According to Lassane Ouedraogo Wedraogo , a researcher from the Centre for Democracy and Development who focuses on the Sahel, the attack likely targeted the Wagner fighters in the camp. The attack killed at least 10 people and wounded dozens. On the same day, the Malian army stated that it “destroyed a terrorist sanctuary in Mourdiah and neutralized some 60 terrorists in Boni.” The actions by the Malian army followed an attack on April 18, during which the chief of staff for Mali’s interim president and three others were killed in an ambush in the rural area of Nara, a region in which rebels linked to al-Qaeda and Islamic State control territory. 4. Yemen Following an outbreak of fighting in March, Yemen has seen progress in peace talks by opposing sides backed by Saudi Arabia and Iran . Following the thaw in relations between regional rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran, on April 10, Saudi and Iran-backed Houthi leaders met and discussed a peace plan which is scheduled to take place over a period of 8 months. The ceasefire may be the first step to ending Yemen’s deadly civil war, which has lasted for 8 years and killed over 377,000 people. Hopes for holding the ceasefire are likely to continue following the Yemen government’s and Houthi rebels' exchange of over 900 prisoners of war on 15 April. The exchange of prisoners is intended to build on the ceasefire in the diplomatic push to end the war. However, the UN has suggested that prospects for peace remain fragile . The Iran and Saudi Arabia thaw is new for historical arch-rivals, while Yemen’s internal situation remains deeply divided. While April saw progress in peace negotiations, the restart of conflict remains a concern. About the authors Alessia Cappelletti Alessia is Intelligence Analyst and Project Coordinator at Dyami. She has field experience in South America, Colombia especially, and has experience in researching organized crime and conflicts. Her academic background includes conflict analysis, international humanitarian law, and criminology. Iris de Boer Iris has a background in Human Geography and has developed a broad interest in geopolitics and armed conflict during her academic career. She is currently enrolled in the Master’s degree Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University, during which she developed conflict mapping and conflict analyzing skills. Her previous research focused on the polarized display of the United States presidential elections in 2020 within Dutch media. Jacob Dickinson Jacob studied Global Political Economy at Leiden University. He is passionate about international development and is looking to expand his expertise in geopolitics and crisis management. Curious about other cultures, he has traveled in Europe and Asia for both academic study and professional purposes. His expertise includes the geopolitics of oil and industrial upgrading in the electronics global value chain. He is particularly interested in the evolving political and economic relationships between China and ASEAN, and the consequences for regional development and security.

Date: 09/10/2024 Who’s involved?   Maia Sandu and the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) Alexandr Stoianoglo supported by the Party of Socialists (PSRM) Nine other election candidates The Russian Federation The European Union What happened? Presidential elections in Moldova will take place on   20/10/2024 . On the same day, Moldova will hold an EU membership referendum  in which voters will answer the question “are you for the accession of the Republic of Moldova to the European Union?”. Eleven candidates are participating in the Presidential elections, which will be held according to a two-round system. Election polls suggest that current President Maia Sandu will compete with former Prosecutor General Alexandr Stoianoglo during the second round of the elections.  Maia Sandu is a pro-European election candidate  and leads the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS). Critics have mentioned that her party is exploiting the EU referendum to guarantee a second presidential term. Alexandr Stoianoglo has been put forward by the Party of Socialists (PSRM)  as a candidate that seeks to represent a unified opposition. The PSRM is a pro-Russian party and it is believed to have close ties with the Kremlin . The outcome of the EU referendum will determine whether Moldova will amend its constitution by adding two new paragraphs that reaffirm the European identity of Moldova as well as its European course, and that declare Moldova’s integration into the EU as a strategic objective.  Moldovan officials have warned of Russia’s interference in the Presidential elections and the EU referendum . They reported that pro-Russian groups that are directly paid by the Kremlin are behind a wave of vandalizations of state buildings in Chișinău , try to convince voters to choose for pro-Russian election candidates and a ‘no’ vote during the referendum by paying them money, and are planning to seize government buildings.  Context: Moldova’s current government, led by Maia Sandu, has worked to enable the country’s accession into the European Union and officially applied in 2022. Moldova is now holding an EU candidate status  and has moved to the second stage of accession negotiations in 2024.  While Russia worked together with the US and EU in order to bring down the regime of Vladimir Plahotniuc in Moldova in 2019, the Kremlin is currently conducting a destabilization campaign in order to increase its influence and hinder Moldova’s EU accession process . Russia mainly focuses on the Moldovan break-away regions Transnistria and Gagauzia, where it spreads disinformation, financially supports residents, and helped to install pro-Russian governors. In addition, there are Russian troops stationed in Transnistria. These troops have already been here since 1992 and stayed as part of a peacekeeping mission in 1995. However, the current government of Moldova sees the continuation of Russian military presence in Transnistria as illegitimate. It is believed that the final goal of the Kremlin is to bring down the current pro-European government of Moldova and to replace it with a pro-Russian puppet government . The upcoming Presidential elections and EU referendum are thus the perfect occasion for Russia to pursue this goal. An increase in destabilizing actions performed by pro-Russian groups, believed to be paid by the Kremlin, is expected in the run-up to the elections.  Recent polls still suggest that Maia Sandu is going to win the elections and that the majority of the voters will be in favor of the EU referendum. However, polls are not completely trustworthy and it is still unclear what the effect of the Russian destabilization campaign will be on the election results .  Scenarios: If Sandu wins the elections and the referendum will pass , Moldova’s pro-European course is reaffirmed by the public and the amendment of the constitution will be a solid signal towards the EU that the country won’t wander from the path to EU accession. The amendment of the constitution will give Sandu’s government legitimacy to change certain laws and regulations to align with the EU accession requirements .  There is also an option that  Sandu wins the elections, but that people will vote against the EU referendum. This will make it more difficult for Sandu’s government to change laws and regulations in order to meet the EU accession criteria, as the constitution won’t necessarily support such changes. The latter is a solid argument for the opposition to fight the pro-European course of  Sandu’s government. If Stoianoglo wins the elections and the referendum won’t pass,   it is likely that Moldova will increase its ties with Russia and that the government abstains from continuing the path to EU accession. This will be fought by the opposition, but as Moldova’s aim for EU accession is not implemented in its constitution, the opposition won’t have many tools in place to secure the continuation of the EU accession process. In this case, it is expected that the accession process will stagnate. Protests by pro-European citizens might take place. When Stoianoglo wins the elections and people will vote in favor of the EU referendum , it is likely that Stoianoglo will still not change the constitution as Russia will pressure Stoianoglo’s government and the referendum is not binding . In this case, it is likely that ties with the EU will erode and that Russia increases its influence over Moldova to make it align with the objectives of the Kremlin. Conclusion: The Moldovan presidential election as well as the EU referendum will highly influence   Moldova’s alignment with the European Union as well as its alignment with the Russian Federation . Multiple scenarios are possible and 20/10/2024 will be an important day for many Moldovan citizens. However, it is sure that the election results and the results of the EU referendum will be closely followed in Brussels as well as in the Kremlin.  An increase in destabilizing actions by Russia as well as a close monitoring of the election process by the EU is expected.  There is a possibility of protests against the results of the presidential election and the EU referendum in the aftermath of 20/10/2024.

Date:  10/10/2024 Where :  USA China Who’s involved : US Federal authorities US Telecoms AT&T Lumen Verizon Chinese Threat Actor Salt Typhoon What happened? Chinese threat actors infiltrated the wiretap systems of several major US telecom and internet providers . The wiretap systems targeted were mandated  by the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), a US federal law that requires telecoms to provide technical support to law enforcement for lawful surveillance–enacted in 1994. These compromised systems may have granted hackers access to vast amounts of internet traffic and customer data, potentially allowing them to gather intelligence on Americans. The breach is considered “potentially catastrophic”  by national security sources, given the sensitive nature of wiretaps. Analysis The breach of wiretap systems is a clear exploitation of the legal backdoors that were designed for lawful interception by law enforcement. This indicates that these systems can be high-value targets for state-sponsored actors. The hackers reportedly accessed systems that law enforcement uses to intercept traffic for criminal investigations . This implies that the attackers gained entry through vulnerabilities or misconfigurations in these systems. The breach likely involved reconnaissance techniques to identify and exploit specific targets within the telecoms' infrastructure that support the lawful interception of communications. This indicates that the threat actors have also developed an intimate knowledge of these systems , regardless of any operational success. The attack could have multiple objectives, including intelligence gathering and reconnaissance in preparation for more destructive cyberattacks in the event of a conflict between China and the US, potentially over Taiwan. The breach has been contextualized within a further debate over the use of backdoors and the inherent security risks. Backdoors, even those created for lawful purposes, are fundamentally insecure and prone to abuse by malicious actors. This incident is expected to renew discussions around encryption policies and push for stronger encryption measures by companies to protect user data. It’s worth noting that European infrastructure is typically better in this regard when compared to that in the US, but a lot of European infrastructure is still reliant on US-based tech giants such as Microsoft . The EU Council is scheduled to debate related issues to encryption backdoors at its session on 10/10 . Conclusion The breach by a Chinese state-sponsored threat actor is a significant national security concern that may have long-term implications for both US and European intelligence and law enforcement operations. It comes at a time where Chinese cyber operations are continuing to escalate. It also shows the dangers of mandated backdoors in communication systems which can be exploited by adversaries. Moving forward, there will likely be increased pressure on the US government and telecom providers to strengthen encryption and reconsider the use of backdoors in lawful surveillance systems. Hopefully, the outcome of this event will shape future US policies in favor of encryption, make careful choices regarding surveillance, and cybersecurity strategies, with implications for US allies.

Date:   08/10/2024 Who’s involved : European Commission, European Member States, China, automotive industry. What happened? On 04/10/2024 , EU member states voted to implement tariffs up to 50% on imports of electrical vehicles made in China . After a year of the opening of the EU’s Commission investigations into China’s automotive industries after the surge in low prices in the electric vehicle market, EU member states voted to raise import tariffs by up to 54% on China’s imported electric vehicles. The vote divided EU member states; France, Poland and Italy voted for the raise in import tariffs to protect domestic industries, while Germany and Hungary voted against. China’s Commerce Ministry said it opposed the planned tariffs  and called them ‘unfair, non-compliant and unreasonable’. In a retaliatory measure to import tariffs, China on the same day launched investigations into the import of European pork and dairy , which are aimed at EU member states who support battery electric vehicles (BEV)   tariffs against China. On  26/08/2024 , Canada followed the lead of the United States and the European Union  said that it would impose 100% tariff on imports of Chinese electric vehicles and 25% tariff on imported steel and aluminum from China.  On  04/10/2023 , the European Commission launched an anti-subsidy investigation into the imports of BEV from China . Ursula Von Der Leyen said that the electric vehicle holds potential for the future of Europe’s competitiveness. Evidence of market distortions and unfair competition in China’s BEV sector will be investigated. The EU Commission investigated whether China’s benefits from ‘illegal’ subsidization and whether this threatens or harms EU BEV producers.  Analysis : The EU member states' split vote on BEV tariffs comes as China churns out steel, cars and solar panels more than its economy can consume domestically, forcing cheaper exports to the rest of the world. This is a part of Xi Jinping’s economic strategy to focus on “high quality productive forces” and to make China a world leader in high-tech industries by plowing billions into strategically important sectors .  The EU’s investigation into China’s electric car subsidies is due to accusations of “unfair trade practices” . The EU is concerned that the far cheaper prices offered by Chinese companies such as BYD and SAIC will be unable to compete with its own profoundly China-dependent automotive industry. The move intends to protect the European car industry from being undermined by what EU politicians say are unfair Chinese-state subsidies. Despite the political pressure to act, the European car industry has strongly objected to imposing tariffs for fear of China’s retaliation. China is the world’s largest market for Europe’s car manufacturers and many have built supply chain relationships over years.  The surge in China's electric vehicle exports is not restricted to Europe. China’s electric cars are cheap and are common throughout the world. Subsidies have played a role in the development of new Chinese car brands such as BYD and SAIC. Yet the combination of China’s slowing demand for more expensive cars and an aggressive price war between 40 companies throughout 2024 in China’s domestic market has led Chinese electric car brands to aggressively expand abroad. China’s transition from an exporter of low-value exports to higher-value exports, like industries important for the green transition such as solar panels and wind turbines is only just beginning .  China is likely to target European products which are sold well in China or that China controls such as dairy, pork, brandy, luxury goods, and critical minerals. China's previously curbed exports of germanium and gallium in response to the US export restrictions on semiconductors. China’s dominance in the production of several critical minerals has led to China using export controls to retaliate over US and EU technology export controls against China.  Conclusion: EU-China trade tensions are growing partly due to Beijing’s close relationship with Moscow after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the EU’s push to ‘de-risk’ from the world’s second largest economy, including materials and products in the green transition. The idea of a looming trade war between EU and China is now commonplace. Both blocs could easily slide into raising tariffs across a whole range of goods and services.  While the EU remains divided over how to improve competitiveness against both the US and China, Chinese companies will continue to bypass import tariffs by building auto plants in Hungary, Turkey and Morocco. As the EU has discovered in its barrage of sanctions against Russia, trade restrictions can easily be diverted to third countries yet still be imported across the continent.

This publication is part of a larger report on the Horn of Africa region . The report expands on the contentions surrounding Ethiopia’s desired access to ports and the construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam, followed by insights into the most recent developments and emerging security issues related to the aforementioned. To access the full report please email alessia@dyami.services   Date: 07/10/2024 Location:   Horn of Africa Who is involved:   Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia,  Somalia, Turkey What happened? Ethiopia’s pursuit to Red Sea Access  On 02/01/2024  Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a "New Year's Day Deal": Ethiopia gained access to a port through leasing 20km of Somaliland’s coastline. Additionally, Ethiopia secured a 50-year lease on a naval base. In exchange, Ethiopia promised to, at some point, officially recognize Somaliland as a sovereign state.  Prior to the agreement: Ethiopia has actively sought access to a port, which it lost in 1993 when Eritrea gained independence. Ethiopia relied on Djibouti for 90% of its trade through ports. This cost Ethiopia approximately $1.5 billion annually. The agreement would significantly impact Djibouti's port-dependent economy. Following the agreement: Somalia protests Ethiopia's recognition of Somaliland. Somalia demands withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Somalia by the end of 2024. Removal of Ethiopian forces weakens Ethiopia's defense against regional threats. Escalating Tensions and Regional Rivalries In August 2024, Somali and Ethiopian foreign ministers met twice in Ankara, Turkey to discuss disagreements over the port deal Ethiopia signed with Somaliland in January. Turkey maintains economic ties with both Ethiopia and Somalia, providing a foundation for its mediation efforts. On 08/02/2024  Turkey signed a “Defence and Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement” with Somalia, a 10-year defense deal that will see Ankara helping Mogadishu with security cooperation and building the capacity of its naval forces, further solidifying Turkey’s influence in the area. On 13/08/2024  Turkey proposed an arrangement allowing Ethiopia sea access via Somalia which is contingent on Ethiopia recognizing Somalia's territorial sovereignty. On 14/08/2024  Egypt signed a defense pact with Somalia. The agreement replaces departing Ethiopian troops with 10,000 Egyptian troops. Half of the troops join “Africa Transition Mission In Somalia”, while the other half is stationed in Mogadishu. Egyptian troops will also train the Somali army to combat terrorist groups. On 27/08/2024  Egypt strengthened its military alliance with Somalia by sending two C-130 military aircraft filled with weapons. This event marks the first military aid from Egypt to Somalia in decades. On 19/09/2024  Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated that Turkey aims to meet with Somalia and Ethiopia separately to resolve the dispute. On 23/09/2024  Egypt reinforced their security pact with Somalia by sending an Egyptian warship to the Mogadishu port, carrying anti-aircraft guns and artillery. Egypt pledges continued support for Somalia's security, stability, and development. At the same time, Egypt issued a statement urging citizens in Somaliland to leave immediately via Hargeisa Airport. Advisory warns against travel to the region due to escalating security concerns. Analysis The situation in the Horn of Africa is precarious, with Ethiopia and Egypt supplying arms to different groups in Somalia, there is a significant risk of a proxy war. To prevent military escalation, a binding agreement is crucial. If agreements on the port deal fails, Ethiopia might ratify the recognition of Somaliland as a sovereign state in exchange for the use of the port and naval base. This could lead to increased tensions and political conflict in the region.  Tensions between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia over the region’s precarious water supply might also escalate. Regional destabilization could occur involving neighboring countries and regional actors, likely backing Egypt due to shared water security concerns, into a conflict. Civilian casualties, mass migration, and strained regional resources would draw in neighboring countries and international intervention for aid and support. This would lead to a severe humanitarian crisis that would be detrimental to the region and beyond. Conclusion The escalating issues—rooted in water insecurity, port access, and shifting military alliances—have naturally raised fears of an inter-state conflict. It is crucial for negotiations to continue and an agreement be drafted so as to not allow the region to turn to military escalation. To access the full report on the tensions in the Horn of Africa and the broader region please contact Alessia@dyami.services

Date: 20/09/2024 Who’s involved : Tunisian government, civil society  Context: After the Jasmine revolution and the Arab Spring in 2011, Tunisia seemed to move toward a democratic future, and Ennahda, a self-defined Islamic democratic political party, emerged as the strongest party. In 2014, Beji Caid Essebsi  was elected as president, becoming the first directly elected head of State after the Arab Spring  uprising. The president helped draft a democratic constitution , which guaranteed fundamental rights such as freedom of speech, and co-brokered a  power-sharing deal between his Nidaa Tounes movement and Islamist party Ennahda , which helped to steady the country under a unified government. However, after Kais Saïed was elected in 2019 , the country has descended into a form of autocracy. During Covid-19 crisis, through a unilateral executive decree, Saïed took control of the country , dismissing the elected parliament and since then tried to hold on to power by arresting opposition leaders, journalists and other perceived dissent.  On 20/07/ 2024  the Tunisian President expressed his willingness to seek a new five-year term, and Tunisians will be able to cast their vote in the presidential elections on 06/10/2024 . What has happened recently? In May 2024,   Tunisian authorities intensified their repression on media and freedom of expression across the country. On 22/05/2024 , the Tunis First Instance Court sentenced two journalists to a year of prison. The two journalists, Borhane Bsaies, a talk show host on private TV and radio channels and Mourad Zeghidi, a political commentator, were charged for nine video clips of statements made between February and April 2024. Zeghidi was additionally sentenced for his Facebook post supporting an investigative journalist who was already serving a six-month sentence for publicly questioning a government ministry’s public spending. On 26/05/2024,  president Saïed replaced the interior and social affairs ministers following a series of arrests targeting human rights activists, lawyers, and journalists. In August, the electoral commission eliminated three prominent candidates from the race, citing alleged irregularities in their candidacy filings, and on 05/08/2024 , president Saïed denied that his government was using judicial intimidation against the opposition and the media. On  02/09/2024 , the police arrested politician Ayachi Zammel, one of the two challengers to Saïed in the polls. He is the head of the opposition Azmoun Party, and was arrested with charges of falsifying voter signatures on the candidacy paperwork. He later called the charges manufactured by Saïed. On  13/09/2024, thousands of Tunisians marched in the streets to protest against the President Kais Saïed, whom they accuse of trying to rig the upcoming elections by detaining and intimidating his rivals. On  14/09/2024,  at least eighty members of Tunisia’s largest opposition party Ennahda were arrested, as thousands took to the streets to protest against the current President.  On  18/09/2024,  presidential candidate Ayachi Zammel was sentenced to 20 months in prison. On 22/09/2024 , a draft law by Tunisian lawmakers sparked a new wave of protests. The proposed law limits the powers of the administrative court and would threaten the role of the judiciary to preserve elections’ integrity, according to Tunisian Network for Rights and Freedoms. Analysis : The current president's repression of the media and the opposition, the dismantling of the democratically elected municipal councils, and the recent arrest of the opposition leader Zammel, indicate that there will likely be unfair elections. In the previous months, the authorities have been arresting or prosecuting several candidates that would have run for office, and the Independent Higher Election Authority has banned fourteen of them from running on procedural grounds. Ultimately, the only candidate running for elections and confronting the current President is Zouhair Magzhaoui, who is part of People’s Movement, one of the parties supporting the exceptional measures imposed by Saïed since 2021. Since the only other candidate running is part of a political party that supports Saïed centralization of power, it is probable that Saïed will either win or make sure the government will still have the same policies and type of regime. Therefore, the political environment in which the election will take place will probably be characterized by repression and opacity. However, given the recent turmoil in the country, the elections are likely to lead to a new series of protests, stronger than the current ones. The anti-government protests and political tension might lead the situation to escalate into a revolution and regime change.  Conclusion Tunisia is turning towards an authoritarian regime. The coming presidential election has unleashed turmoil in the country, and the population has begun to protest against the current government, which has been arresting and preventing candidates from the opposition from running for elections. The situation is tense, and the coming elections on October 6th will be a test for Tunisian democracy and civil society, and may have an impact on the neighboring countries as well.

Date : 24/09/2024 Where : Sahel Region, West Africa Who’s involved : Sahel Region, AES (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso)  ECOWAS (Benin, Nigeria, Togo) Russia, U.S., France, Italy, Germany Al-Qaeda-linked JNIM, Islamic State What happened? On 15/09/2024 , the US completed its removal of their roughly 1000 troops located in the Sahel region  thus marking the end of nearly all Western influence in the area. Italy is an exception given that they still have around 300 troops that remain in the region. This removal also finalizes the end of the previous agreement between Niger's government and the US, preventing them from continuing their counter-terrorism efforts. On 16/09/2024 , the AES announced the introduction of new biometric passports , which will be implemented in the next few days. According to the Malian Junta Leader, this will facilitate seamless travel for all citizens within the AES in addition to standardizing travel documents across the alliance . There are also plans to implement a shared information channel to foster the exchange of information among the alliance. On 16/09/2024 , two police officers were ambushed in northern Benin near the border with Niger. This incident follows a similar attack in June 2024, in which  seven soldiers were killed  in Pendjari National Park, on the border with Burkina Faso. The rise in cross-border attacks  underscores the growing security concerns in northern Benin. On  17/09/2024, a major jihadist attack  occurred in the Malian capital Bamako . The Al-Qaeda-linked group JNIM has since claimed responsibility. The attack began at 5.30 a.m, targeting the  gendarmerie training center  in Falidie district and Modibo Keita International Airport.   The attack resulted in significant human and material loss,  fire was set to several military, government and UN aircraft. This is the first major attack on the capital since 2015, when Mali was ruled by a civilian government and assisted by French troops.  Islamist armed groups  in the Centre-Nord region of Burkina Faso  have significantly increased attacks on civilians . Between January and September 2024, jihadist attacks resulted in at least 2,000 civilian deaths . Large portions are now controlled by jihadist groups, leaving the government in control of roughly half of the country’s territory. Analysis  Since the withdrawal of western and UN troops,   there has been a noticeable increase in attacks  from groups in the AES area. According to ACLED, civilian targeting has increased in the first half of 2024, with 3064 reported fatalities compared to the previous six months which had 2520 civilian fatalities. JNIM is the most active rebel group in the Sahel with data showing that violent events conducted by them occurred three times more from 2022 to 2023. There is a strong indication that violence, in particular towards the civilian population, is only going to continue and potentially worsen without Western aid.  Most recently,  attacks have taken place in Bamako, Burkina Faso and on the border with Benin.  With Western troops departing the region, the AES countries' ability to tackle the threat of jihadist groups linked to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State have significantly reduced. With growing anti-western sentiment and the desire for non-western alliances, the AES has turned to an alliance with Russia . Mali hosts around 2000 Russian soldiers, while only an estimated 100 are present in Burkina Faso. Niger also received Russian units, but the number is unknown. However, the aid of Russia’s Africa Corps (former Wagner group) has until now been limited in scope, with questions arising regarding their ability to aid in the counterterrorism efforts while also protecting civilians. Therefore,  there is the concern for an escalation of significant threats across the AES and potentially beyond.  With the potential for escalation, the number of displaced persons might also rise, thus putting a strain on bordering countries. The ECOWAS has been established for 49 years between 15 West African nations . Its aim is to promote regional peace, stability and foster security and growth across the region through integration and cooperation amongst its members. Following the departure of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso , the already faulty integrity and credibility of the ECOWAS was diminished further. With the introduction of the biometric passports, the previous coordination and collaboration between the nations is further fragmented  in various ways. The prior protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment across the ECOWAS allowed citizens of its member states to travel using a standardized passport, which enhanced the ease of travel and trade across its borders. The introduction of the AES biometric passport will disrupt this movement  and is exacerbated by the standardization of AES travel documents. Beyond this, it could signal that the Sahel countries are simply prioritizing their own security threats rather than focusing on threats to the entire West African region. Overall, this will likely weaken the efforts of the ECOWAS to coordinate and integrate security measures, trade and movement across the region that have taken 49 years to attain. Conclusion The increase in attacks and the potential spread of conflict is crucial to observe because the violence can expand into bordering ECOWAS countries, such as Benin and Togo. The protection that the AES-countries had from Western troops against the Islamic State and JNIM groups is also no longer present and will have significant repercussions on the rest of the wider region and continent. Increased displacement, disruption of movement, and a strain on trade across borders would affect the countries within the AES and the nations within the ECOWAS.

Date:   23/09/2024 Where :  Turkey Who’s involved :  Turkey, BRICS Nations What happened? On 04/09/2024,  Yuri Ushakov, President Vladimir Putin’s foreign affairs aide told reporters that Turkey formally applied to join the BRICS economic forum  (Brazil, Russia, India and China). On 01/01/2024,  BRICS admitted Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, United Arab Emirates, signaling a desire for further growth and influence. On 20/08/2024, Azerbaijan formally applied to join BRICS, this will make it easier for Turkey to align with BRICS policies as Azerbaijan is Turkey’s main partner in the Caucasus region. The 2024 BRICS Summit will be held in Kazab, Russia, from 22/10/2024  to 24/10/2024 .  Analysis : BRICS is a block of emerging major economies founded on 16/06/2009 that seeks to reshape the global order and challenge western dominance . BRICS aims to promote multipolarity, reform international institutions, and enhance cooperation in area’s like trade, finance, and development. The move marks another step in Turkey and Azerbaijan’s deepening alignment on foreign policy . This is one of Turkey’s biggest steps since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, during which Turkish armed forces were involved in training and arming the Azerbaijani forces. Turkey’s bid indicates a potential shift in its foreign orientation. Turkey’s motivations include economic diversification, geopolitical leverage and regional leadership aspirations .  First, the Turkish economy is experiencing numerous obstacles, including a continuous currency crisis and excessive inflation. Ankara's post-2023 economic model is mainly reliant on getting investment from Western countries. However, these expectations have not been met, with new investments predominantly focused on short-term financial benefits rather than long-term growth. The BRICS grouping, particularly China and the New Development Bank, represents an alternate source of investment and funding.  By joining with the BRICS economies, Turkey seeks to gain access to new trade opportunities, alternative investment sources , and improved integration into global supply networks. Turkey's desire for BRICS membership suggests its desire to play a larger role in global governance and demonstrate its strategic autonomy. The move reflects growing discontent with the stalled EU accession process and perceived neglect of its security issues within NATO.  Turkey aspires to diversify its alliances  and lessen its reliance on traditional Western partners, particularly in light of continued differences over critical issues including defense procurement, regional security, and political alignment. By joining BRICS, Turkey hopes to get a voice in global economic policy changes and engage more directly with major global actors such as China, India, and Russia. Moreover, Turkey's BRICS bid could have consequences for the bloc's dynamics, as well as Ankara's regional and global status. It emphasizes Turkey's vision of a multipolar international order and willingness to serve as a bridge between the East and the West. Turkey's potential participation in BRICS would provide strategic depth, allowing the bloc to enhance its influence in the Balkans, Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus.   President Erdoğan's anticipated presence at the 2024 BRICS meeting in Russia will offer significant perspectives on the bloc's openness to accepting Turkey's bid for membership. It is expected that the meeting would cover BRICS expansion, paving the way for future talks on Turkey's accession.  Turkey's potential BRICS membership carries significant implications for a range of actors: Turkey: Economic diversification: Gaining access to BRICS' markets and development money might help Turkey's economy and reduce its reliance on Western investment. Geopolitical leverage: Turkey's membership in both NATO and BRICS would provide it power and maneuverability in global affairs. Regional leadership: Turkey may strengthen its position in the Middle East and Central Asia, potentially managing crises and boosting economic cooperation. BRICS Nations: Expanded influence:  Gaining a NATO member would enhance BRICS' global reach and legitimacy, challenging Western-centric institutions like the EU. Economic benefits:  Turkey's strategic location and economic potential could boost intra-BRICS trade and investment and help China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Internal dynamics:  Turkey's membership could shift the power balance within the bloc, requiring adjustments in existing member states' strategies. EU and US: Strained relations:  Turkey's closer alignment with BRICS could further strain its ties with the West, potentially impacting trade, security cooperation, and even its NATO membership. Geopolitical challenges:  The West might face increased difficulty navigating a multipolar world with a more assertive Turkey aligned with BRICS. Regional Actors: Middle East & Central Asia:  Turkey's growing influence within BRICS could impact its relations with regional rivals and allies, particularly those with conflicting ties to BRICS members. Conclusion:  The conclusion of this bid has big implications, affecting Turkey's relations with both Western and non-Western states. The changing geopolitical landscape emphasizes the importance of constant assessment and change as Ankara navigates its complex relationships with many global entities.  Acceptance: The BRICS may admit Turkey under specific circumstances. These could include policy changes concerning trade, investment, currency, or even foreign policy alignment. China, as a significant BRICS actor, may use its influence to guarantee that Turkey remains impartial on matters involving Taiwan, the South China Sea And the persecution of Uyghurs. Russia, which is increasingly isolated, may see Turkey's admission as a diplomatic win and an opportunity to enhance ties. India, concerned about Turkey's connections with Pakistan, may seek assurances of regional stability. Rejection of the Bid:  In an unlikely scenario, BRICS could reject Turkey's application, citing concerns about its geopolitical alignment with the West or internal disagreements among existing members. However, given the bloc's expansion plans and Turkey's strategic importance, this outcome appears less likely.