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Date: 19/04/2023 Location: Sudan, Khartoum, Darfur Parties involved: Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Rapid Support Forces (RSF) The Events: On 15/04/2023 deadly fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) broke out in Sudan. The fighting started in the city of Merowe and extended to the densely populated area of the capital Khartoum, where both groups are suspected to have thousands of troops distributed. Clashes between the SAF and RSF have extended to North, South and Eastern Darfur, in the southwest of the country. According to U.N. figures, more than 270 people, including three UN workers, lost their lives since last Saturday and over 2600 people are wounded. On 16/04/2023 the leaders of the SAF and RSF agreed upon a three-hour humanitarian ceasefire to create a safe passage for urgent aid. However, the announced cease-fire did not last and fighting in Khartoum continued. The ongoing fighting has made it almost impossible for Khartoum’s residents to leave their homes in order to find food, shelter or medical care. On 19/04/2023 the Sudanese health ministry warned of a total collapse of the healthcare provision in the country, as 16 hospitals went completely out of service. On 17/04/2023 the ambassador of the EU was assaulted in his residence in Khartoum. On the same day a U.S. embassy convoy came under fire in Khartoum. No one was injured during the attack. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that the attack was suspected to be carried out by the RSF. The head of the EU humanitarian mission (ECHO) in Sudan got seriously injured after being shot in Khartoum. On 17/04/2023 satellite images of Khartoum showed damage at several locations across the city, including Khartoum International Airport. Around 20 civilian and military aircraft have been damaged. Airlines decided to suspend their flights to Khartoum amidst fighting between the SAF and RSF over control of the airport. On 18/04/2023 the SAF and RSF agreed to a 24-hour ceasefire to create a safe passage for civilians and evacuation of wounded people. The ceasefire started at 6pm (16:00 GMT), but the battle for key locations in Khartoum continued just within hours after the ceasefire came into effect. On 19/04/2023 Japan announced that it was preparing to evacuate its nationals from Sudan with Self-Defense Forces personnel. Japan would be the first country to start evacuations out of Sudan. It’s still unclear what the plans for evacuation of other countries are. A spokesperson of the German Foreign Ministry stated that the country was assessing all options to assist its citizens in Sudan. Most embassies in the country have advised their nationals to stay indoors and to keep away from windows and doors. Analysis and Implications: The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have been ruling Sudan together since they orchestrated a coup in 2021. The government established in 2019 was made up of military generals and a civilian government following the protests which ousted the long-time Sudanese President Omar Al-bashir in 2019. However, the shared civilian and military administration broke apart over the plan to move towards a civilian government and remove the military from power in 2021. On 25/10/2021 Abel Fattah al-Burhan, now leader of the SAF, and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, now leader of the RSF, worked together to dissolve the joint military and civilian government, but their cooperation turned out to be fragile. In December 2022, the SAF and RSF agreed upon a framework that would allow for a civilian government. As part of this deal the RSF would be integrated into the SAF, but there have been disagreements over the timeline of the integration process as well as over future army leadership. The disagreements between the two parties eventually escalated into heavy fighting on Saturday 15/04/2023. Both militaries have ties to rival outside forces. Egypt is a strong supporter of the SAF and has multiple forces in Sudan for “training purposes”. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi stated that the country was willing to mediate between the SAF and SRF. Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry stated that he had been contacted by EU foreign policy chief Josep Borell, who stated that the EU was supporting Egypts efforts to stop the violence in Sudan. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, head of the RSF, is suspected to have formed a relationship with the Wagner group, a Russian mercenary group that operates within multiple African countries and is connected to the Kremlin. It has been reported that Wagner Group is not actively involved in the current conflict in Sudan, despite its extensive mineral interests in the region. The RSF has also cultivated ties with the United Arab Emirates. Two Egyptian security sources stated that Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have been working together on a ceasefire proposal for Sudan. In previous years, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States formed a group known as the ‘Quad’ that together with the African Union and the United Nations tried to mediate in Sudan. According to Irma van Dueren, the Dutch Ambassador in Sudan, the SAF as well as the RSF are not very popular among Sudanese citizens. The main reason for this is the involvement of both forces in the 2021 coup that dissolved the joint military and civilian government, but the popularity of the RSF is also lacking because of crimes committed by RSF forces in the past. The current situation in Sudan remains very volatile as fighting between the SAF and RSF continues. According to Volker Perthes, head of the U.N. Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), the SAF and the RSF have not been given the impression that they are open for peace mediation at the moment. It is thus likely that the situation for Sudanese civilians remains highly dangerous and that humanitarian operations as well as evacuation operations remain hindered during the next couple of days. Concluding notes: As the situation in Sudan and its capital is expected to remain violent over the coming days, it is likely that international actors will continue to push for a new ceasefire agreement between the SAF and RSF. However, it’s questionable whether a new ceasefire will really open up the possibility for humanitarian operations and evacuation operations, given the history of the previous agreed upon ceasefires that were not upheld. The situation in Sudan thus remains unpredictable and leaves Sudanese citizens, humanitarian workers and international embassy personnel vulnerable. For more in-depth Sitreps, analyses, or bespoke advice on the aviation security and safety concerns regarding this region, or other areas across the globe, please contact Dyami at +31 30 207 2120 or through our webpage.

Date: 14/04/2023 Location: Taiwan Straits Parties involved: Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-Wen, People’s Republic of China, Republic of China (Taiwan), United States. The Events: On 06/04/2023 Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen visited the United States to meet with the speaker of the United States House of Representatives Kevin McCarthy. China responded to the meeting with three days of military drills, lasting from 08/04/2023 until 11/04/2023. The country used multiple warships, including one aircraft carrier, and over 200 warplane flights, as reported by Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense. During the drills China simulated sealing off Taiwan. On 12/04/2023 Taiwan’s Ministry of Transportation and Communication stated that China planned to impose a no-fly zone close to Taiwan between April 16 and April 18, from 9:00 to 14:00 each day. According to China, the no-fly zone is needed for aerospace activities. Taiwan feared that the no-fly zone would lead to major travel disruptions across the region and was also concerned about the location of the no-fly zone, which would fall within the air defense identification zone of Taiwan. Eventually, the no-fly zone was reduced to a closure on April 16, from 9:30 to 9:57. In response to China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea and its intensifying military drills around Taiwan, on 11/04/2023 the U.S. and the Philippines began three weeks of the largest joint military drills ever. China’s foreign ministry responded to the drills by stating that both countries “must not interfere in South China Sea disputes.” Analysis and Implications: China claims that Taiwan is a part of China and maintains that it must accept reunification, even with force if no peaceful resolution can be reached. Beijing regularly accuses politicians inside of Taiwan as ‘separatists forces’ for pursuing independence of Taiwan and moving away from China. Beijing frequently violates Taiwanese airspace and the Communist Party of China under the leadership of Xi Jinping has repeatedly used inflammatory language against Taiwan. The military exercises are smaller in scale than the previous exercises following Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022. They took place over eight days and included missile firings over Taiwan, some of which landed near Japan’s exclusive economic zone, and blockade tactics which temporarily disrupted air and maritime traffic. The movement and planning of the drills suggest that they are intended to stage a more targeted strategy to take Taiwan. China’s extensive drills might also be a way to influence Taiwan’s upcoming presidential election in January 2024. With President Tsai Ing-Wen stepping down, China could be using military exercises to demonstrate that closely aligning to the US with the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) increases the likelihood of war. This might lead Taiwanese voters to elect the more China-friendly party, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) to the presidency. China is extending control over the island. Beyond intimidation tactics, China is also attempting to control the island by other means. Disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks against Taiwan’s infrastructure and pressuring governments to switch their recognition of Beijing instead of Taipei are examples of tactics that are commonly used. Beijing tries to influence Taiwanese citizens by spreading pro-unification propaganda and, recently, by targeting specialist engineers to work in China’s developing semiconductor industry. Military tensions in East Asia will remain strained. In response to China’s aggression, Japan is set to increase its military budget buying new fighter jets and powerful long-range missiles. For the first time in three decades, South Korea is considering placing nuclear weapons on South Korean soil if North Korea continues to test strategic missiles. With Taiwan being seen as the strategic key to a broader push into the South China Sea and US influence in the region, China’s aggression is likely to keep tensions high in the future. Tsai Ing-wen has presented Taiwan in terms of authoritarianism versus democracy to draw support from US policymakers. US official policy is to remain ambiguous on this question, but Joe Biden’s support for defending Taiwan against an invasion remains strong. While pushing for US support raises the prospect of deterrence against China, it also risks severing the US-China relationship even further. Concluding notes: China’s extensive military drills are comparably smaller than previous drills, but pose a distinct threat to Taiwan’s security as a functioning democracy. Tensions have characterized the relations between China and Taiwan since 1949 and, at the moment, regular incursions and pressure against the island will remain until the next Taiwanese presidential election in 2024. Yet the centralization of power by Xi Jinping in the Communist Party potentially creates a more volatile situation. Xi Jinping's nationalism that aims for a unified Chinese nation leaves less room for negotiation between the two sides. This, together with military exercises against Taiwan and/or inflammatory rhetoric creates the conditions for an international crisis, also given the high tensions in the region. For more in-depth Sitreps, analyses, or bespoke advice on the aviation security and safety concerns regarding this region, or other areas across the globe, please contact Dyami at +31 30 207 2120 or through our webpage.

Written by Julius Birch In the final months of 2022, concerning articles of instability in northern Kosovo and heightened tensions between Serbia and Kosovo made the news. Reports of barricades and troop movements were matched by fiery and bellicose statements by the nations’ presidents. Before long, however, the war in Ukraine took the front seat again, and the matter drifted out of the public eye. In light of the history of the Balkans, a deterioration in Serbia-Kosovo relations may have consequences for the stability and security of one the most volatile areas in Europe. However, when placed in the broader context of tensions between the two countries, it appears that whilst incidents such as the events of late 2022 may reoccur in the near future, a flare-up of the frozen Balkan conflict is unlikely. Due to interests in future EU membership, Serbia and Kosovo are probably going to be drawn together under the umbrella of European cooperation. Car Plates, Walkouts, and Gunfire The flashpoint for this diplomatic spat was almost comically minor. In November of 2022, a recently-enacted law requiring Serbs living in Kosovo to use licence plates issued by the Kosovo government raised tensions in the Balkans once more. Reports of Serbian troops being deployed to the border raised fears that the bloody conflict may be reignited in some form. Within the first week, an estimated 10,000 Serbian state employees in Kosovo resigned en masse in protest, refusing to enforce the law, as the Kosovar president accused Serbia of trying to destabilize his country. A series of high-level talks, mediated by the EU, eventually led to an agreement between the two countries that was hoped would cool down flaring tempers and prevent an outburst of violence. In early December, however, things took a turn for the worse. An attack by unidentified gunmen wounded a police officer in the north of Kosovo, and the Serbian government officially requested NATO to let 1,000 Serbian troops into the country in defence of the Serbian community. Following the arrest of a former Kosovo Serb policeman who had resigned in November, violence erupted, with Kosovo Serbs building barricades and engaging in shootouts with police. Elections were delayed, and as the year drew to a close conflict it seemed to some that the Balkans were on the brink of conflict once more. Serbian troops were put on high alert, and Kosovo closed the largest border crossing between the two countries. Behind the scenes, however, European diplomats scrambling to prevent the conflict from escalating met with success. Almost in tandem, Kosovo and Serbia each took action to back down as barricades were dismantled, Kosovo reopened the border crossing, and Serbian troops’ state of high alert was ended. The conflict simmered on throughout January, with the Serbian president warning that failure to resolve the conflict would lead to international isolation, and scupper Serbia’s chances of entering the EU. Throughout early February Kosovo’s and Serbia’s acquiescence with EU demands made headlines, as did the arrest of a group of Serbian ultranationalists allegedly preparing to overthrow President Vucic for betraying his country. On the 17th of February came the anniversary of Kosovo’s independence from Serbia, and while tensions have not gone away, the news chose to concentrate on the ongoing diplomatic efforts rather than discuss any renewed violence. True Risk? Ever since the end of the Yugoslav wars, NATO and the West have kept a wary eye on the Balkan region. Perceived Serbian dominance and over-representation in the government of other Balkan nations was an important reason for the initial breakup of former Yugoslavia. The majority ethnically Albanian region of Kosovo declared independence in 2008 for similar reasons, and until now Serbia has refused to recognise its statehood despite its de facto autonomy. Peace has been enforced by the presence of NATO’s KFOR mission of around 4.000 troops, effectively rendering the region as the site of a frozen conflict because Serbia has neither been able to reassert control nor is it willing to acknowledge Kosovo as an independent nation. Thus, it is not surprising that reports of raised tensions and sporadic violence in post-Yugoslav states raise concerns among the Western public. Many people remember it as a chaotic and bloody residuum to the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the last significant case of internecine violence in mainland Europe. With the war in Ukraine still ongoing, a second conflict in Europe would be an unwelcome military and political distraction. For the Netherlands in particular, the prospect of another Balkan conflict is especially alarming due to its role in the failure to prevent infamous massacres of the late ‘90s, which damaged its international reputation. After all, post-war tribunals of war criminals of the Yugoslav Wars are still being held in The Hague. Prospects for the future If the events of late 2022 are placed in the wider context of Kosovo-Serbia relations, then news of this specific row become considerably less alarming. A similar spike in tensions occurred during the previous year, when Kosovan police began to remove Serbian licence plates from vehicles crossing the border, sparking protests by ethnic Serbians living in the breakaway republic. In fact, political leaders on both sides of the border have an interest in making clashes and tensions seem much more volatile and high-risk than they really are. Hence, they use the conflict as an excuse to scapegoat the other side, fling vitriol, and present their governments as strong and decisive for confronting its adversaries. The Serbian request for NATO to allow their troops into the country is an example of this strategy; a rejection was entirely expected – and duly granted – but it helped to present the sitting Serbian government as “the little man”, struggling to protect Serbs everywhere despite international tyranny. Indeed, reports of barricades, gunfire, and closed borders raised eyebrows in Europe, as they would have if the action had taken place in any other European region with high separatist tensions or risk of conflict. But this conflict is not new, nor is it likely to escalate since Serbians in Kosovo have overwhelmingly rejected its independence for the past fifteen years yet no significant armed clashes have occurred. It would seem that sabre-rattling is a strategy employed by both sides to maintain domestic support for the government as well as keeping the international community’s attention drawn to their case. Putting on a tough act towards a national adversary is popular with voters, and forces international mediators to take the interests of a country’s demands seriously. But armed conflict is in no one’s interest for Pristina and Belgrade both have more to gain from peace. As Kosovo and Serbia both wish to move closer to the EU, pursuing an open armed conflict would practically shatter their ambitions of European Union membership. A recently-signed deal made strides in formalizing the relationship between the two former belligerents, having the full support of EU member states. The EU could therefore facilitate the amelioration of relations between Serbia and Kosovo by emphasising that their future in the EU is dependent on their commitment to the reconciliation process. By asserting its role as a geopolitical actor in the Balkans, the EU could offer a roadmap to regional stability through incentivising a future of prosperity based on European values of compromise and cooperation. Furthermore, the presence of KFOR in Kosovo makes an all-out war practically impossible. With a combined strength of 4000 military and civilian personnel, the NATO-led peacekeeping contingent should be enough to act as a deterrent against renewed hostilities. KFOR has acted as a military stabilisation force for over 2 decades, resulting in most of the regional security architecture between Kosovo and Serbia being based on its presence. In 2009, KFOR was downsized as the security situation had substantially improved, thus confirming the success of its complex and extensive mission as an authoritative security provider. Therefore, KFOR’s activities in the region should have altered the local security environment making direct armed confrontation unpropitious. In conclusion: a reignition of the conflict proper is highly unlikely. Whilst similar disputes may occur in the future, any belligerent actions are probably just sabre-rattling for political gain. As Serbia and Kosovo both have ambitions of ascension to European Union membership, both countries have vested interests against letting emotions run too high and spilling over into a full-scale conflict. Real security threats may, however, come from negative developments concerning the main stabilising forces in the region, namely KFOR and the EU. There may be serious repercussions for the Balkans if democratic backsliding in Serbia renders joining the EU an undesirable prospect or if NATO’s ability to restrain the warring parties is weakened because of an escalation in the war in Ukraine. About the author: Julius Birch Julius studied History at Utrecht University. He wrote his undergraduate thesis on shifting US attitudes towards Indonesia during the 1964-1965 genocide, and is currently taking a gap year in preparation for his Master's. His academic interests include such topics as the developing character of Information Age warfare and geopolitics in a historical perspective.

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Russia-Ukraine update: continuing fighting in Bakhmut, warrant against Putin issue. Democratic Republic of the Congo: major displacement, violation of the ceasefire, and war crimes. Israel: Anti-government protests continue. Sahel: worsening security situation and Russian-US geopolitical tensions. Yemen: flare-up in civil war, but new ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia may change outcomes. Colombia: armed group violence and ceasefire suspended with the Gulf Clan. India: tensions between Sikh separatist and pro-Hindu state. Kenya: post-election protests. Myanmar: illegitimate elections, human rights abuses, and civil war developments. Azerbaijan-Iran: continuation of tensions. Ethiopia: U.N.-mandated inquiry into atrocities will take place and there are developments in the peace agreement implementation, but assaults on civilians have continued. Haiti: severe humanitarian crisis continues, and no international military intervention is planned. Conflicts March 2023 1. Russia - Ukraine In March, heavy fighting continued in and around the city of Bakhmut. As written in our January-February Conflict Monitoring report, the Russian forces managed to gain control over the area North and South of Bakhmut. Ukrainian forces were expected to choose for a tactical withdrawal from the city, but this has not happened so far and Ukraine has continued to defend the city against the Russian offensive. On March 26, Yevgeni Prigozhin, chief of the Wagner Group, stated that his forces and their equipment were heavily damaged during the fight for Bakhmut. The number of casualties on both sides is reported to be high, but it is likely that the number of deaths on the Russian side exceeds the Ukrainian side. Ukrainian officials stated that for every Ukrainian soldier being killed, seven soldiers were killed on the Russian side. However, the exact number of casualties on both sides has not been independently verified. On April 3, the Wagner group claimed victory over the city as they raised a Russian flag over Bakhmut’s city hall. In a video, Prigozhin stated that Bakhmut was now Russian “in a legal sense”. However, this claim was immediately contested by a spokesperson of the Ukrainian Eastern military command. On April 5, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the Ukrainian forces would withdraw from Bakhmut to avoid encirclement, if necessary. Ukrainian troops have not withdrawn from Bakhmut yet. The heavy fighting between Wagner and the Ukrainian forces after April 3 suggests the battle for Bakhmut is likely to continue. Fighting also continued elsewhere along the frontline, for example in the city of Avdiivka and the surrounding area, where Russian forces tried to breach the Ukrainian defensive line. The city has been contested since 2014 and has become an important military objective for both sides. On March 15, the Ukrainian forces were pushed out of the town of Krasnohorivka, after which the Russian forces gained control over the northern area around Avdiivka as they tried to encircle the city. It is reported that fighting in and around Avdiivka is now, together with the fighting in Bakhmut, some of the most intense fighting along the front. However, the UK Ministry of Defence stated that Russian forces did not fully encircle the city and lost much of their equipment in the assault. The Avdiivka railroad is seen as an important asset for the Russian forces, since it could function as a supply hub for Russian forces on the frontlines. The city’s infrastructure could also play an important role in the supply of the Russian forces and separatists in the Donetsk region. However, the Ukrainian forces have prevented a major Russian breakthrough in the city of Avdiivka. On April 1, the Institute for the Study of War stated that the Kremlin had not achieved its objectives of seizing Donetsk and Luhansk oblast administrative borders in the winter offensive. Russian forces anticipate a Ukrainian counteroffensive between Orthodox Easter on April 16, and Soviet Victory Day on May 9. The Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov also stated that a spring counteroffensive is planned in several areas and could begin as soon as April. The first week of April, it was reported that Germany, Poland, Canada and Norway sent their pledged Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine and it’s expected that more weaponry supplied by Western countries will arrive in Ukraine any time soon. This equipment is expected to strengthen Ukraine’s position in the war and is seen as crucial for a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive, which may end the struggle over Bakhmut. On March 17, the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin. The ICC stated that Putin is allegedly responsible for “the war crime of unlawful deportation of population (children) and that of unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.” The arrest warrant could limit Putin’s ability to travel freely abroad, since the 123 member states of the ICC are obliged to detain and transfer Putin if he enters their territory. It is still unclear whether all 123 countries will oblige. 2. Democratic Republic of the Congo The conflict in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is worsening and, within one month, more than 300,000 people were displaced. Despite an announced ceasefire between M23 and the Congolese government forces, violence has continued in the eastern region of the country. On March 7, clashes between M23 and government forces erupted near Goma, the capital of North Kivu province, even though the agreed upon ceasefire would start on that same day. The fighting continued the days afterwards and M23 managed to close in on Goma and seize several villages. It’s believed that M23 is supported by Rwanda and according to Human Rights Watch, M23 has left behind a growing trail of war crimes against civilians in North Kivu. The group is now making gains in the area North of Goma as well as in the West. Roads leading to the city have become more difficult to access and gates to the city are partially being closed off. This does not only make it more difficult for people living in Goma to get access to basic goods, but it also hinders the possibilities of humanitarian organizations to provide aid to the region. Additionally, in March, the Allied Democratic Forces, a group that is linked to ISIS and that’s been blamed for killing thousands of people over the last 10 years, have continued attacks on villages in North Kivu. On March 9, 36 people were killed by the Allied Democratic Forces in the Village of Mukondi and the nearby village of Mausa. On March 12, reports emerged that rebels from the Allied Democratic Forces killed 19 people in the town of Kirindera in North Kivu. It’s suspected that attacks like these have happened in several North Kivu villages over the last month. 3. Israel On January 7, 2023, anti-judicial reform protests started in Israel in which people expressed their concerns about the plans of Netanyahu’s government. The government introduced a judicial reform bill that would weaken the influence of the Supreme Court on the government’s decision-making. This bill led to mass protests and strikes across the country shutting down highways and, for a short time, Ben-Gurion Airport. January, February, and March have been characterized by frequent protests, with often 100,000 people on the streets. As of March 27, protests have escalated, following the sacking of a Defence Minister who opposed the reforms, and supporters of the bill have joined in counter-protests which in some instances led to violent clashes. Hundreds of reservists from the Army, Navy, and Airforce have also refused service and have gone on strike to protest the reform bill. The Israeli Defense Forces are heavily reliant on the reservists; without them, there are gaps in the national security defense apparatus. After being careful to criticize the judicial overhaul, U.S. President Joe Biden finally urged Netanyahu to walk away from the judicial reforms on March 28, 2023. The request by Biden was met with a strong reaction from Netanyahu. As of now, the Israeli government postponed the judicial reform. The continuation of the protests and the refusal of the government to withdraw it completely are likely to increase the political instability of the country. If prime-minister Netanyahu decides to withdraw the bill there is a likelihood that his government will fall. If he does not withdraw the bill the country will likely come to a standstill due to protests and strikes across the board. Together with the recent police repression of Palestinian worshippers at Al-Aqsa mosque and its spillover effects, the situation in Israel is likely to worsen in April. 4. Sahel In March, terrorism-related violence continued in West Africa. From March 30, Burkina Faso announced a state of emergency in 22 provinces due to insecurity from terrorism, slated to last until May 19. According to the Institute for Economics & Peace’s Global Terrorism Index published in March 2023, the Sahel accounted for 43% of the world’s total in 2022. The coup d’etats that took place in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea, and the exclusion of these countries from the African Union and ECOWAS, the situation is likely to worsen in the upcoming months. The United States and Russia are also competing for influence in the Sahel and West Africa. France’s military withdrawal from the Sahel and West Africa has left room for the Russia-affiliated Wagner group to enter the continent. The US has also been increasingly active in the region. Recently, the US warned Chad’s president of a plot against him and three other senior officers by Russian mercenaries. US intelligence also indicated that Moscow was backing Chadian rebels hiding in the neighboring Central African Republic. On March 16, the US carried out the first maritime exercise together with forces from Ghana, Ivory Coast, and Nigeria, as part of the Flintlock 2023 drills, which ran from 10-15 of March. Earlier in March, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and US Vice President Kamala Harris both pledged further investments and humanitarian aid for the Sahel region. 5. Yemen Yemen has experienced a new wave of fighting after ten months of relative calm. Iran-backed Houthi movement forces launched an attack on Marib’s Harib district, the energy-rich province in the center of the civil war-torn country. The number of casualties remains unknown. The attack ends a period of relative calm after the United Nations-brokered truce of April 2022. However, a breakthrough in regional geopolitical affairs might influence the war in Yemen: Iran and Saudi Arabia, who fight each other through proxies in the war in Yemen, reached an agreement to restore diplomatic relations. The deal was brokered by China, who has a significant interest in the improvement of the relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia to be able to strengthen its own ties with the two countries. On April 6, the leaders of both countries met in Beijing. The countries will reopen their embassies for the first time since 2016. The restoration of ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia comes as the Saudi crown prince is aiming for a broader realignment in the Gulf region, restoring its relation with Syria as well. This could have significant effects on the conflicts in the region, as diplomatic hostility blocked regional stability. Alerts and developing situations, March 2023 1. Colombia On 29 March, nine Colombian soldiers were killed by the ELN (National Liberation Army) rebels in Colombia’s Norte de Santander province. The area is a stronghold of ELN rebels, and an important coca-growing and producing region. The attack comes as Colombia’s current president, Gustavo Petro, started peace talks with the insurgency group in November 2022. Although no ceasefire had been agreed upon as of March 2023, the ELN had made important moves towards a truce during a second cycle of negotiations on March 10. The attacks jeopardize the recent peace talks. On March 19, Petro suspended the ceasefire with the main drug trafficking cartel, the Gulf Clan. This suspension is a political blow to the president, who had been pursuing a significantly different approach than his predecessor, Iván Duque. The December 2022 ceasefire was part of the president’s effort to end the country’s armed conflict through peaceful dialogue. His diplomatic approach differs significantly from former president Iván Duque’s military approach. The suspension of the truce with the Gulf Clan, together with the recent attacks by ELN rebels, are severe blows to Petro’s diplomatic approach, and therefore the security situation in Colombia could deteriorate in the following months. 6. India The Indian police’s manhunt for Sikh political activist Amritpal Singh Sandhu which started on March 21 has led to numerous protests in the northwestern region of Punjab and among the Sikh diaspora in the United Kingdom and Canada. Singh is a self-declared Sikh preacher who revived talks of an autonomous Sikh state called Khalistan. The search has become a political crisis for the state on the border of Pakistan and Kashmir. Indian authorities deployed thousands of personnel to the Punjab region to search for Singh, and shut down internet access in the region to curb the spread of fake news, affecting over 28 million people. Singh has not yet been captured, but over 100 of his supporters have been arrested by police, many of whom were carrying swords and guns during extensive protests across the state. In London, Sikh separatist supporters took down the Indian flag of the Indian embassy on March 19. Also, Canada has experienced protests, as hundreds gathered in front of the Indian consulate in Vancouver on March 21. India’s current Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, and his ruling Bharatiya Janata Party are adhering to a Hindu nationalist ideology, which could fuel the tension between the state and the Sikh separatists; a broader exclusion of Sikh’s could reignite an insurgency that India experienced during the 1980s and early 1990s, killing over 20,000 people. 7. Kenya During March, post-election violence in Kenya spilled over to the streets. William Ruto won the elections in August 2022, after which he was declared president of Kenya. The opposition, led by former Prime Minister Raila Odinga, never accepted the election results and blamed President Ruto of committing electoral fraud. On March 20, 2023, Raila Odinga called for nationwide protests until the government would lower the costs of living in Kenya and would give access to the 2022 election results from the electoral commission’s computers. After the call by Odinga, three different marches happened over two weeks in which thousands participated. All three marches turned violent as protesters clashed with the police, after which more than 200 protesters were arrested. In total three people died, over 400 were injured, and property was vandalized. On April 2, President Ruto asked the opposition to call off the protest that was planned for the next day under the promise that he was willing to create a bipartisan parliamentary committee to look at the concerns over the electoral process. The opposition led by Odinga listened to the request by Ruto and suspended the anti-government protest. However, similar protests might erupt in the near future, as Odinga stated that his party “reserves the right to call for demonstrations should this process not bear fruit.” 8. Myanmar Myanmar’s military junta is pressing forward with their plans to hold an election later this year. However, on March 28, the junta dissolved the National League for Democracy (NLD) in an attempt to curtail electoral competition. The NLD won the last two elections (2015 and 2020) with landslide victories. The junta’s call for elections, which has been deemed illegitimate by Western countries, comes at a time the regime intensifies airstrikes against villages while committing extensive human rights abuses against civilians in Chin state, close to the border with India. Violent clashes between the military junta and resistance groups have been continuous since the junta seized power in February 2021. However, the military junta has struggled to suppress growing resistance to the coup. Armed resistance to the regime's rule has spread to the relatively peaceful central regions which are usually confined to ethnic minority-inhabited regions. In a recent military parade, Myanmar’s top military leader labeled resistance to the military junta as an act of terrorism and vowed to crush the resistance led by the loosely affiliated National Unity group and the People’s Defence Forces. The military has recently lost outposts on the border with Thailand to other resistance groups. Follow-ups on previous conflict monitoring reports 1. Azerbaijan-Iran As stated in our last Conflict Monitoring report, tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan have been increasing in the past half year. Tensions peaked in late January, with the armed attack on the Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran on January 27. The attack led to the closure of the embassy. Azerbaijan officials accused Iran of attacking the embassy as part of an anti-Azerbaijani campaign, but Iranian officials denied this accusation and argued that the gunman acted on personal motives instead. In March 2023, a series of events further deteriorated the relationship between the two countries. On March 11, Azerbaijani officials argued that Iran had provoked them by flying a military aircraft along the Azerbaijan-Iran state border, near the disputed regions of the Nagorno-Karabakh War of 2020. On March 29, Azerbaijan opened an embassy in Tel Aviv in an effort to strengthen its collaboration with Israel. However, as Israel is Iran’s rival, this is likely to increase tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan. On the evening of the opening of the embassy, one member of the Azerbaijani parliament, who is an outspoken critic of Iran, was shot in a failed assassination attempt. Azerbaijani officials were quick to blame Iran, however there is no proof of Iran’s involvement. Despite the increasing tensions, it is unlikely that the situation will develop into a military conflict, and will probably be solved diplomatically instead. If a conflict were to begin, however, it would quickly include Turkey, as the country has a mutual defense pact with Azerbaijan. 2. Ethiopia As written in our January-February Conflict Monitoring report, the Ethiopian Government has been trying to stop a U.N.-mandated inquiry into atrocities that happened during the war. However, on March 23, multiple diplomats and human rights groups stated that Ethiopia will refrain from the bid to end the U.N.-mandated inquiry on Tigray abuses. This means that the International Commission on Ethiopia will be able to finish their inquiry and to publish its findings. The Commission already stated that they found evidence of war crimes by all parties involved in the conflict. On March 23, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken came with a similar statement, saying that he was determined that “members of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces, Eritrean Defense Forces, Tigray People’s Liberation Front forces and Amhara forces committed war crimes during the conflict in northern Ethiopia.” Furthermore, Blinken called for the acknowledgment of committed atrocities, accountability, and reconciliation by all parties. The International Commission on Ethiopia is also investigating the violations that were committed since the November peace deal, as women, health workers, and aid organizations have reported that assaults on civilians in Tigray have continued despite the peace deal. On March 22, Ethiopia’s parliament removed the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) from the list of ‘terrorist organizations.’ The delisting was a prerequisite by the TPLF to participate in the establishment of an interim regional government as part of the November peace deal. On March 23, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed appointed Tigray People’s Liberation Front delegate Getachew Reda as head of the new interim government of Tigray. Besides, Ethiopia’s prosecutors announced that they will drop charges against military and civilian members of the TPLF as part of the November peace deal. The charges will instead be considered in the framework of transitional justice. Ethiopia is thus putting effort to fulfill its obligations under the November peace deal. 3. Haiti Political instability, hunger, and gang violence are still persistent in Haiti as the country experiences a severe humanitarian crisis. According to the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), around 80 percent of the capital Port-au-Prince is now under control or influence of armed groups. Armed groups have been present in Haiti since approximately 1956, but their influence has grown since the assassination of President Moïse and the earthquake on 14 August 2021. The recent outbursts of violence are not only limited to Haiti’s capital, but are also reported also in other areas of the country, for example in the Artibonite department. According to the OCHA, at least 1.5 million people are directly affected by the violence and over 136,500 people are internally displaced as a result of the ongoing violence. More than 5.2 million people in Haiti are in need of humanitarian assistance. However, the ongoing violence has made it more difficult for humanitarian organizations to provide assistance to Haiti’s population. In the beginning of March, the international medical charity Doctors Without Borders was forced to temporarily close its hospital in Port-au-Prince, as violent battles between armed rival groups happened just meters from the hospital compound. The organization stated that it could no longer guarantee the safety of its patients and staff. As stated in our January-February Conflict Monitoring report, Haiti’s Prime Minister Ariel Henry as well as United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres have requested the international community for military assistance to address the humanitarian crisis. This request led to dissatisfaction among many citizens in Haiti, as they have not forgotten the country’s history with foreign intervention. As of now, no military intervention by the international community has been planned. About the authors Alessia Cappelletti Alessia is Intelligence Analyst and Project Coordinator at Dyami. She has field experience in South America, Colombia especially, and has experience in researching organized crime and conflicts. Her academic background includes conflict analysis, international humanitarian law, and criminology. Anneloe Brakel Anneloe is currently enrolled in the masters Conflict Studies & Human Rights at Utrecht University and completed her Bachelor's in History and International Relations from Historical Perspective, equipping her with skills to contextualize (historical) events and to acknowledge both the uniqueness and similarities between certain events. She is an experienced researcher in the field of disinformation and is very keen to learn more about (cyber) espionage. Iris de Boer Iris has a background in Human Geography and has developed a broad interest in geopolitics and armed conflict during her academic career. She is currently enrolled in the Master’s degree Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University, during which she developed conflict mapping and conflict analyzing skills. Her previous research focused on the polarized display of the United States presidential elections in 2020 within Dutch media. Jacob Dickinson Jacob studied Global Political Economy at Leiden University. He is passionate about international development and is looking to expand his expertise in geopolitics and crisis management. Curious about other cultures, he has traveled in Europe and Asia for both academic study and professional purposes. His expertise includes the geopolitics of oil and industrial upgrading in the electronics global value chain. He is particularly interested in the evolving political and economic relationships between China and ASEAN, and the consequences for regional development and security.

Date: 03/04/2023 Location: Northern Ireland, United Kingdom Parties involved: The New Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), the Northern Ireland Assembly (Stormont), the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), the British Government, the European Union (EU). The Events: The MI5 has increased Northern Ireland’s terrorism threat level on 28/03/2023 from substantial to severe, meaning that a terrorist attack is highly likely. The move by the British Security Service follows the shooting of a senior police officer, John Caldwell, whilst off-duty on 22/02/2023 by masked gunmen of the New IRA in Omagh, County Tyrone. Thirteen arrests have been made in connection with the attempted murder. Despite the increase of the terrorism threat level, US President Joe Biden is still set on visiting Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland in early April to mark the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. Political violence has been increasingly on the rise in Northern Ireland during recent months as the PSNI has come under attack from dissident Republicans. The Arm na Poblachta (Army of the Republic) said police officers' families would also be considered targets. Further attacks include those on 17/11/2022 when a police patrol vehicle suffered a bomb attack in Strabane, County Tyrone. And on 20/11/2022 a delivery driver was held at gunpoint by a number of men carrying AK-47s who forced him to abandon his car outside the Waterside police station in Derry/Londonderry. A suspicious device was later found in the car. Intensive investigations and searches have been conducted by the Police Service into New IRA violent activity. On 28/03/2023 ammunition was seized by the Police Terrorism Investigation Unit (TIU) in Derry/Londonderry with firearms having been found 2 days earlier. Further guns and ammunition were seized in Omagh on 23/03/2023 during police searches. Loyalist paramilitaries have also been active in the East of Northern Ireland. Since 22/03/2023, there have been over 12 petrol bomb attacks on properties in Bangor and Newtownards, County Down by rival factions within the UDA. On 27/03/2022, the Paramilitary Crime Task Force uncovered a drug supply of over £100,000 linked to the East Belfast UVF during a car search in the country’s capital. Post-Brexit Context Renewed tensions in Northern Ireland can be linked to Brexit. The Northern Ireland Protocol with the EU came into force on 01/01/2021, where checks on goods and people traveling from Great Britain take place at Northern Ireland’s ports instead of at the Irish border. The DUP has argued that this places a de facto border in the Irish Sea, separating Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK. British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak’s new Brexit Northern Ireland deal was passed in the UK Parliament on 23/03/2023 by 515 to 29 votes overall. This deal consists of 2 parts: the Westminster Framework and the Stormont Brake. The Westminster Framework intends to split goods traveling from the UK into two different lanes where only goods destined for Ireland and the rest of the EU would have to be checked. Moreover, the Stormont Brake would give the Northern Ireland Assembly powers to object to new EU rules. However, the European Court of Justice would still have a final say on whether Northern Ireland must follow certain EU single market rules. The DUP has voted against the deal with Unionists arguing that Northern Ireland would remain imprisoned by the EU legal order, placing a barrier between them and the rest of the UK as Northern Ireland would not be able to properly diverge and take advantage of Brexit. The Northern Ireland Assembly has been suspended since February 2022, meaning that Northern Ireland is continuing to lack a functioning government. The power-sharing agreement which allows a government to be established has not been reached as the DUP, Northern Ireland’s largest Unionist party, has been boycotting Stormont over disagreements regarding the Northern Ireland Protocol. Analysis and Implications: Despite an increase in political violence in Northern Ireland, there have been no clashes between Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries. Hence, the possibility of an immediate escalation of intercommunal violence reminiscent of the Troubles in the 20th century is extremely low. Violence perpetrated by Loyalist paramilitaries, such as the UVF and UDA, is mostly linked to drug related feuds, organized crime and racketeering and is not linked to the sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland. Since the motivations for recent Loyalist attacks have been economic, feuds have been internal to the various groups and factions, suggesting that there are no political objectives involved other than coercive control over local communities for personal enrichment and prestige. Although members of the public could become collateral damage of Loyalist violence, this issue resembles gang crime rather than terrorism. Thus far, most recent attacks perpetrated by the New IRA have been targeted against members of the PSNI rather than the general public. Consequently, terrorist attacks are likely to be small-scale and aimed at law enforcement personnel but there is still a risk that the general public may become collateral damage. Taking into account the history of the IRA, their campaign of “armed struggle” is going to be aimed at state institutions for they see the presence of the British state in Northern Ireland as illegitimate. The persistent political tensions caused by Brexit have flared up Republican antagonism towards the British state in this protracted conflict, making the PSNI a desirable target for the New IRA. The terrorism threat extends beyond Northern Ireland to the rest of the UK, so increased vigilance should be advised throughout the country. The New IRA has shown its willingness to execute terrorist attacks outside of Northern Ireland in 2019 when the group claimed responsibility for sending out 5 Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) disguised as parcels destined for the London area and Glasgow. The targets included London’s Waterloo Station, London City Airport, Heathrow Airport, and the University of Glasgow. As with other terrorist groups, transport hubs and other gathering places have been vulnerable to attacks due to being frequented by a large number of people every day. Although the MI5 has declared a rise in the terrorism threat level, this is no cause for alarm. Northern Ireland’s terrorism threat level has only been reduced in March 2022 for the first time in the past 12 years. This was due to successful security operations run by the MI5 in collaboration with the PSNI which put the New IRA on the back foot. Indeed, the MI5 and the PSNI have had ample experience dealing with Northern Ireland related terrorism since the start of the Troubles during the 1960s. Therefore, there are robust security protocols in place to thwart terrorist attacks before they occur and to mitigate the impacts of terrorism on people and property. The PSNI is already conducting additional security checks and extensive investigative searches in order to deter terrorist activity. The support for Northern Ireland’s paramilitary organizations is small, having no backing among any major political parties. The democratic institutions established by the Good Friday Agreement have successfully functioned as conflict resolution mechanisms, yet Brexit risks unraveling the progress made thus far. The current deadlock at Stormont poses the greatest threat to peace and stability in Northern Ireland so a solution must be devised soon in order to reinstall Northern Ireland’s devolved government even if the DUP continues to refuse to cooperate. In the context of today’s cost of living crisis in the UK, there is a risk that sectarian politics may spill onto the streets if people have to look elsewhere to have their financial and security needs met, thus increasing the attractiveness of paramilitary organizations. With the PSNI under threat, if budgets cannot be agreed upon via the democratic political process then the police will find it incredibly difficult to ensure law and order with minimal resources. Concluding Remarks: Whilst there is no immediate risk of an escalation of violence in Northern Ireland, the rise in the terrorism threat level indicates an urgent need for increased vigilance throughout the UK. Presently, there is still a committed minority of extremists in Northern Ireland who are prepared to use violence in order to pursue their political agendas, which notably applies to the Republican side of the sectarian divide. Above all, Northern Ireland has been without a functioning government for over a year as the DUP refuses to agree to power-sharing due to the Northern Ireland Protocol deal caused by Brexit. In this current time of crisis, the absence of a democratic political system to negotiate competing interests may risk increasing support for paramilitaries in the future. For more in-depth Sitreps, analyses, or bespoke advice on the aviation security and safety concerns regarding this region, or other areas across the globe, please contact Dyami at+31 30 207 2120 or through our webpage.

Executive Summary The incidents from the last few months show the importance of keeping up-to-date with the recurring and emerging security threats to the business aviation sector in Europe and the wider world. The need for timely analysis and accurate information regarding new threats is a necessity to plan ahead and take precautionary measures. There are several new threats which pose potential risks for business aviation around the world. In Europe, climate protests have targeted runways and breached security checkpoints in the Netherlands. The risk of climate protests pose particular problems for the business aviation sector as they are explicitly the target. Commercial and private drone use near airports, have posed difficulties for business aviation which are unable to land or have faced delays. Global 1.1. Climate activism on airport grounds There have been multiple protests at the beginning of February 2023, targeting business/private aviation. All the actions are part of the campaign “make them pay”. On the 14th and 15th of February climate change activists from Extinction Rebellion (XR) and Scientist Rebellion have blockaded the business aviation entrances of multiple airports. 1.2. Drug trafficking Business model jets have been and continued to be used for drug/contraband smuggling across the globe. These flights are usually to and from Latin America. The aim of using business jets instead of commercial aviation is to lower the chance of getting caught, and up the volume taken per flight. 1.3. Human trafficking In order to improve the ease of human trafficking, and to stay away from prying eyes of airport security as well as cabin crew, traffickers prefer to use business jets if they can. This problem is a worldwide ordeal which is hard to combat. Europe 2.1. Private flight reduction Schiphol Airport In autumn 2023, the Dutch government will implement a new restriction on noise at Schiphol Airport. The Dutch government has proposed a new law to reduce half of all private jets allowed into Schiphol Airport. The new law was proposed to meet environmental standards and reduce noise around Schiphol Airport. 2.2. Extinction Rebellion protest at Eindhoven Airport On Saturday the 25th of March, climate change activists from Extinction Rebellion organized a protest at Eindhoven Airport (EHEH). During the protest, the climate activists cut through the fences of the airport to enter the private jet platform. 2.3. Drug money smuggling at London Heathrow Airport The UK’s National Crime Agency (NCA) has seized gold bars worth over 4.8 million dollars at London Heathrow Airport (LHR). The gold bars are suspected of belonging to South American drug cartels which have been smuggled for money laundering purposes. 2.4. Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport blocked On Thursday the 23th of March, the terminal at Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport (CDG) was blocked. Anti-government demonstrators launched a Black Thursday of chaos in Paris. The demonstrators blocked Terminal 1 and road access to other areas. 2.5. Private jet ban Germany Left party leader Schirdewan is demanding a ban on private jets in Germany. The discussion is about the question of whether the state has to intervene in lifestyles with bans in order to promote climate protection. 2.6. Airspace infringement by use of commercial drones For multiple weeks in the past two months, commercial drones have been disturbing operations at Dublin Airport. These infringements resulted in delayed departures, holding patterns and even diversions. Middle East 3.1. Overflight Risks Recent developments in the region have caused a need for extra security measures differing per country. These are important to adhere to, as ignoring the risks while overflying can lead to catastrophic results. 3.2. Protest in Israel As of the 27th of March, protests in Israel against the proposed reforms of the judicial system by Prime Minister Netanyahu have escalated. Asia 4.1. Human trafficking private jet flight at NAIA Unauthorized individuals slipped onto a private jet at Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). The flight was Dubai bound. The authorities were unable to stop the flight, even after an anonymous tip on the supposedly human trafficking activity. 4.2. New Zealand pilot hostage Papua In the Indonesian region of West Papua, independence fighters have taken a New Zealand pilot hostage. The pilot is taken hostage due to political motives. The indepence fighters will only free the pilot if the country of Indonesia acknowledges the freedom of West Papua. 4.3. Shot at an airplane in Indonesia Trigana Air Boeing 737-500, flight IL221, was hit by gunfire on departure from Yahukimo Nop Dekai Goliat Airport (DEX) in Indonesia. The four gunshots were heard when the aircraft made the final approach to Yahukimo Airport. The aircraft could land without issue, with no injuries or damage reported. 4.4. Electronic interference Chinese navy China’s navy is suspected of being behind disrupting communications for both military- and civilian flights over the South Pacific and Indian Ocean. The electronic interference included blocking aircraft from using the Global Navigation Satellite System. 4.5. Regional instability Political instability in some countries have led to recurring protests, particularly in Myanmar and Nagorno-Karabakh. Instabilities in some countries prove themselves risky to aviation, including business aviation. This ranges from minimum flight levels to security issues on the ground. Africa 5.1. Overflight risks Recent developments in the region have caused a need for extra security measures differing per country. These are important to adhere to, as ignoring the risks while overflying can lead to catastrophic results. North America 6.1. Security contractor back out in the United States It is unclear at Jackson Hole Airport in Wyoming who will be the new airport security screening contractor, starting on the 1st of May. The new contractor Aviation Management Management LCC told employees that it was backing out. There is no evident reason why the new contractor is backing out. 6.2. Private helicopter theft and crash in the United States On the 15th of March a thief crashed a helicopter at Sacramento Executive Airport (KSAC), the thief is missing. The helicopter crash caused damage to multiple aircraft at KSAC. De debris appeared to span hundreds of yards over the airport apron. South America 7.1. Airport heist Chile On Wednesday the 8th of March, ten heavily armed robbers in three vehicles entered the premises of Santiago’s Arturo Merino Benitez International Airport (SCEL/SCL), after tying up a security guard. The target was 32.5 million dollars from a LATAM Airline Boeing 787-9, operating flight LA501 from Miami. Forecast The threats to the business aviation sector between February 2023 and March 2023 are likely to pose continuing threats in the coming months. Climate protestors are likely to continue targeting business aviation worldwide and pose risks to airport security. Steps are being taken by the authorities to reduce the incidents of commercial drones disrupting airspaces. In Asia and South America, continuing instability and the use of aviation for human smuggling and drug trafficking is widespread throughout the region. The security risks identified are likely to pose threats for the foreseeable future. Recognizing the potential risks and creating scenarios are vital for security for the business aviation sector. Global 1.1. Climate activism on airport grounds The protests during February 2023 were a part of the coordinated action launched last week. Climate activists from eleven countries targeted multiple sites in Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. There have been protests at: Aeroporto de Cascais (Portugal), Milan Malpensa Airport (Italy), Essendon Fields Airport (Australia), Schiphol Airport (The Netherlands), Aeropuerto de Sevilla (Spain), Stockholm Bromma Airport (Sweden), London Luton Airport (UK), private airport in Raleigh North Carolina (US), Oakland International Airport (US), Boeing Field (US), private jet terminal Seattle (US), Palma de Mallorca Airport (Spain), Ibiza Airport (Spain), Vaernes Airport (Norway) and Christchurch Airport (New Zealand). Also, XR Belgium infiltrated the European Business Aviation Association conference in Brussels and stood on the stage with signs. The British Business and General Aviation Association (BBGA) Annual Conference 2023 in central London has been disrupted by two climate change activists. 1.2. Drug trafficking Drug trafficking is still a present risk for business aviation. For organized crime groups and cartels, business aviation is sometimes the preferred method of transportation when compared to commercial aviation. Due to the association of drug trafficking with profitability for crime organizations, firearm smuggling and use in terrorist organizations, the drug trafficking world is considered as dangerous as terrorism. 1.3. Human trafficking With human trafficking still being a major issue to this day, the involvement of business aircraft is to be expected. In commercial aviation steps have been made and are still being made in recent years to improve the awareness and by that prevention of human trafficking. While steps being made is an objectively good thing, it does have the potential to push human traffickers into finding other solutions. One of these solutions for human traffickers is business/private aviation. If one can overcome the increased costs of such an operation compared to trafficking via commercial aviation, it allows for flights to smaller airports with less experienced and not as many employees as on a major commercial airport. Additionally, in countries which are not as stable as one would hope, it is easier to bribe or even blackmail customs agents/border guards to turn a blind eye to what you are doing. Europe 2.1. Private flight reduction Schiphol Airport During 2022 there were 22.372 private aviation flights to Schiphol Airport. Under the new government policy there should be no more than 11.500 private aviation flights arriving at the airport. There is also reported that the governing body of Schiphol Airport wants to give 2.5 percent of its annual flight movements. To adhere to the new restrictions, the government proposed the reduction of private flights. The flag carrier of the Netherlands, KLM, supports the initiative from the government. A trade association representing private aviation in the Netherlands, EBAA, is against the initiative of the government. The EBAA believes that the corporate aviation industry is an important engine for the economic growth in the Netherlands. 2.2. Extinction Rebellion protest at Eindhoven Airport On Saturday the 25th of March, climate change activists from Extinction Rebellion organized a protest at Eindhoven Airport (EHEH). Climate activists demanded that EHEH must stop the polluting aviation operations, and to comply with the climate regulations and decrease the number of flights. The organization, Extinction Rebellion, expected around 500 climate activists for the action. A group of climate activists cut through a fence and gathered on the platform where the private jets are parked. Some climate activists left when ordered by the police; those who refused, around 100, were arrested. Because of the protest, a total of ten flights, to and from EHEH, were canceled or relocated. 2.3. Drug money smuggling at London Heathrow Airport The UK’s National Crime Agency (NCA) has seized gold bars worth over 4.8 million dollars at London Heathrow Airport (LHR). The gold bars are suspected of belonging to South American drug cartels. The gold bars have been smuggled for money laundering purposes. The seizure of NCA was part of an international investigation. The investigation discovered that the gold initially moved by private jet from Venezuela to the Cayman Islands. 2.4. Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport blocked Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport (CDG), was blocked on Thursday the 23th of March. Anti-government demonstrators launched a Black Thursday of chaos in Paris. The demonstrators blocked Terminal 1 and road access to other areas. Passengers were forced to walk on the roads to access the airport. Such actions, as on CDG, were replicated across France, as oil depots, town halls, ports, and other transport links were blockaded. The protest movement is against raising the pension age from 62 to 64. The protest started on the 19th of January and the protest is still going on. The protest began as a peaceful trade union-organized strike and has shifted to more impromptu protest gatherings over the 10 past days. The government has vowed to hold firm. It is uncertain how many more days of strike action would be called. 2.5. Private jet ban Germany Leftist party leader Schirdewan is demanding a ban on private jets in Germany. The discussion is about the question of whether the state has to intervene in lifestyles with bans in order to promote climate protection. According to Schirdewan the action against private jets is not being taken hard enough at EU level in particular. 2.6. Airspace infringement by use of commercial drones On the 21st of February operations at Dublin Airport were suspended for 30 minutes following the sighting of a drone within the airport’s airspace boundary. The drone is not the first occurrence of the month. The latest event follows three days of disruption at Dublin Airport caused by drone sightings earlier this month. During the three days of disruptions, between the 4th and 7th of February, there were widespread disruption, delays, cancellations and diversions at the airport. Middle East 3.1 Overflight Risks Developments in the region have caused a need for extra security measures. These include an advised minimum flight level of 320 over Iraq, with a focus on Baghdad. Additionally, GPS interference is to be expected when overflying the country as well as Lebanon, Turkey and Israël. Iranian airspace remains unsafe for western aviation to use, with the same applying to Afghanistan (except for P500/G500), Yemen and Syria. Overflying Saudi Arabia is safe, as long as flying above FL260. 3.2. Protest in Israel During the Israel protests on the 27th of March, striking workers joined the protests and declared a nationwide strike against the proposed reforms. The protests and strikes in the country had led to the closing of highways and, for a short time, Ben Gurion Airport (TLV). Protests in Israel will likely continue in the future. Asia 4.1 Human trafficking on private jet at NAIA in Philippines Unauthorized individuals slipped onto a private jet at Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). The flight was Dubai bound. The authorities were unable to stop the flight, even after an anonymous tip on the supposedly human trafficking activity. Besides the one declared passenger, three additional people got on board before the flight’s departure. 4.2 Pilot held hostage in West Papua (Indonesia) The pilot taken hostage around two months ago in West Papua is still being held by his captors. The fate of his passengers is known by now, as they were released by the separatists for being locals to the region. There was no news heard from him until the 10th of March, when a video was released where he appeared alive. The demands made by the separatists for his release is that Indonesia recognises West Papua as separate from Indonesia. For now, no end is in sight to his captivity. 4.3 Aircraft hit by gunfire on departure in Indonesia A 737 from Trigana Air was hit while departing from Dekai Nop Goliat Airport. The bullet penetrated the cabin but was stopped in a passenger seat. Even though this was a commercial flight, the apparent indiscriminate nature of the gunfire means any aircraft could be targeted by whomever targeted the 737. 4.4 Electronic interference by Chinese Navy Over the South Pacific and near the Indian ocean, aircraft experienced interference in the use of the GNSS, as well as RADALT systems. The suspected reason is unidentified warships, likely belonging to the Chinese Navy. Additionally, some aircraft were called over the radio by “Military warships” sometimes given vectors deviating them around the airspace above the calling warship. A notice regarding the situation was released by IFALPA, instructing pilots to ignore the calls from the ship, and instead immediately contact the ATC of the local FIR. 4.5 Regional instability Myanmar is a country that has been troubled for a long time, a recent development however is that it is advisable to overfly Myanmar at a minimum flight level of 320. This is because of anti air weapons present in the country, in combination with the combative nature of the country at this point in time. The Nagorno-Karabakh region still holds a security threat, as it has shown many examples of combat flaring up without warning. There are many anti air systems located in this region, capable of engaging aircraft at great heights. Thus, overflying this region should be avoided. Africa 5.1 Overflight risks Overflying Africa comes with its own risks differing per country, with Libya being the only one with a do no fly advisory. There are several countries which can be overflown while sticking to a security advisory. Egypt, with an advice to fly above flight level 300 over the Sinai region due to anti air systems being in the hands of terrorist organizations in the region. Ethiopia, the Tigray region remains unstable even though an official peace deal was signed in November. In this region too are anti air systems. The advice is to avoid overflying the region. Somalia, the advice here too is to not overfly the country below a flight level of 300, this is because of the instability in the country in combination with the presence of anti air systems. Kenya, the border region has an overspill effect of the civil war in Somalia, thus posing the same threat as in Somalia itself, to not fly below flight level 300. Mali, here too is an advice to not fly below flight level 300 over the country, because of the presence of anti air systems in the hands of militants. Western Sahara, Due to the conflict in the region between Morocco and the independence movement in the region, there is a risk of anti air weaponry in the region, the advice is to stick to a flight level of 200 or more. North America 6.1 Security contractor back out in the United States At Jackson Hole airport (Wyoming), the expected security contractor backed out of the contract, leaving the airport with a lack of security employees from May 1st. The airport will support travel, and will proceed uninterrupted with security screenings provided by the TSA instead of a private contractor. 6.2. Private Helicopter theft and crash in the United States On the 15th of March a thief crashed a helicopter at Sacramento Executive Airport (KSAC), the thief is missing. The helicopter crash caused damage to multiple aircraft at KSAC. The debris appeared to span hundreds of yards over the airport apron. According to the Sacramento police, the unknown suspect broke into the airport and attempted to start four helicopters during the incident. It is unknown if the person of interest is connected to the airport or the crashed helicopter (Capital Helicopters). South America 7.1 Airport heist Chile On Wednesday the 8th of March around 6.30 local time, ten heavily armed robbers in three vehicles entered the premises of Santiago’s Arturo Merino Benitez International Airport (SCEL/SCL), after tying up a security guard. At 7.00 local time a LATAM Airline Boeing 787-9, operating flight LA501 from Miami arrived at the airport, which was the target for the robbers. At the gate a Brink’s Security Truck was ready to haul 32.5 million dollars in cash from the aircraft. During the crucial process of unloading and transferring, the perpetrators opened the fire on the airport workers unloading the cargo from the aircraft. During the shoot-oot, one DGAC officer and one of the thieves was killed. Eventually, the heist failed and two vehicles that were used to access the airport were found in the vicinity of the airport grounds. About Dyami Aviation Services Our experts have extensive aviation security and intelligence experience at the highest international level; for airlines and corporate jet operators alike. Our services are broad: from AOC application support, security policy design, threat assessments, to crew training. Our security risk & threat assessments focus on overflight risk during flight operations. They contain actionable intelligence to ensure a safe and secure operation. Is it safe for your crew to operate the planned route? What is the actual situation regarding (geo)political factors, crime, corruption, espionage, terrorism or health risks? Our extensive reports are easily understandable to allow you to anticipate properly and make better critical decisions. >> www.dyami.services/aviation About European Business Aviation Association The European Business Aviation Association (EBAA) is the leading organization for operators of business aircraft in Europe. EBAA represents more than 700 companies from across the entire value chain of the European Business aviation industry.EBAA works to improve safety standards and share knowledge, to further positive regulation, and to ease all aspects of carefully tailored, flexible, point to point air transportation for individuals, governments, businesses and local communities in the most time-efficient way possible. Founded in 1977 and based in Brussels (Belgium), EBAA represents more than 700 companies, corporate operators, commercial operators, manufacturers, airports, fixed-base operators, and more, with a total fleet of more than 1,000 aircraft. The association provides more than 50 products and services to the Business aviation community, including the European Business Aviation Convention & Exhibition (EBACE), Europe’s largest Business aviation trade show. >> https://www.ebaa.org/

Written by Diana-Alexandra Coman In order to attract foreign investment after the 2013 Banking Crisis, the Cypriot government appealed to the “Citizenship by Investment” scheme. Through investing a minimum of €2 million in Cypriot real estate, wealthy individuals were granted a Cypriot —and thus an EU— passport. Between 2013 and 2020, the Cypriot government attracted 8 Billion Euros in foreign funds through this citizenship pathway, which undoubtedly proved economically beneficial for the island. However, it also attracted a disproportionate amount of high-income Russians (roughly one 6th of the 6.700 recipients), who now constitute a substantial and powerful share of the island’s wealthy population. Historically, the USSR was known for its attempts to influence foreign governments by exploiting business, political, and cultural positions. The formation of the Russo-Cypriot EOP Party (Εγώ ο Πολίτης – I the Citizen) in 2017 has showcased that this trend is replicating itself. Owing much of its funding and guidance from Russian businessmen who have close ties to Putin and his advisers, it seems that the EOP, the Russian Population, and general ignorance of the developing situation on the island, could serve as tools for the Russian Government to spy and influence the inner workings of the European Union and the wider Western community. Selling Passports to Save the Economy Prior to the Banking Crisis in 2013, Cypriot Banks held assets valued eight times the country’s GPD, which mainly came from Russian oligarchs. However, poor financial governance and reckless investments in Greek bonds led to the collapse of the Cypriot economy and the dissolution of the Laika Bank (the Cooperative Bank of Cyprus). To address this financial crisis, the newly elected President, Nikos Anastasiadis, formulated a plan to attract foreign direct investment and keep money in Cypriot banks. Thus, the “Citizenship by Investment'' scheme was introduced. While controversial, EU countries such as Malta, Spain, and Bulgaria also partook in what has come to be known as the “Golden Passports” system. For its recipients, the ability to travel across the EU, run businesses with less hassle, and be restricted by the laws of their other nationality seemed to offset the monetary investment. But for Russian citizens, the EU passport also meant that they could avoid EU sanctions that were applied to their country following the 2014 Annexation of Crimea. This loophole led the European Commission to raise concerns over money laundering, which eventually caused the Cypriot government to end the scheme in 2020. This move did not affect the 50,000 Russians who already have the right to reside within Cyprus. How deep are the Russian roots The EOP claims that its focus is on bettering the life of Cypriot citizens. Its policy plans include stimulating economic prosperity through the increasing liberalization of the economy and the exploitation of new technologies. But its links to Russia are clear. Its founding leader, Alexey Voloboev, was replaced by a Greek Cypriot called Yorgos Kunturis in 2019. Mr. Kunturis happens to be an alumnus of the Conservatory in St. Petersburg and a member of the Expert Council of the Russian Cultural Centre in Cyprus. The party’s spokesman, also a Greek Cypriot, Dimitris Michalakakos, studied in St. Petersburg and had been a member of the Communist Party. Furthermore, the Russian Embassy and the Russian Cultural Centre in Nicosia often host the EOP and associated Russo-Centric meetings, of which many participants come from the wealthy Russian population of Cyprus. The success of this cooperation led to 100 billion euros alone entering Cyprus as foreign direct investment in 2020. However, due to the European Union’s sanctions on the Russian Government and its citizens, the Russian businessmen’s capabilities to directly affect Cyprus’ finances have been severely limited. Russian tourism has also plummeted due to the lack of direct flights between Russia and Europe, further limiting their physical footprint on the island. Overall, these factors have led to the EOP’s official Twitter becoming inactive and the political parties’ activity being muted. This would indicate a reduction in the risks posed by this subsection of Cyprus’s society to the country itself and the wider European Union. However, this conclusion is counterintuitive, as the current situation now allows for Russian Cypriots to do the most damage. An open flank for Europe? At the core of statecraft lies information. For Russia, in its current wartime climate, there is a large and imminent necessity to understand how the EU and the wider Western community are articulating themselves against Putin and his regime. To gather information, espionage techniques serve for acquiring actionable intelligence so that politicians can make decisions. Through Cyprus, the Russian Government now has a golden opportunity to recruit and place its actors within three key strategic areas, being the European academia/industry, the Cypriot Military, or bodies within the European Union itself. Since many Russians have settled in Cyprus, their children have also been eligible for Cypriot citizenship. As many come from wealthy families, they have been enrolled in the numerous British/international schools on the island that offer British-accredited certifications, which may grant easier access to top Universities in Europe. But due to their EU nationality, they also have the capacity to slip vetting nets when applying for government, educational and private institutions following their studies. These individuals become, then, of high interest to Russian International intelligence organizations. National service laws on the island mean that ethnically Russian Cypriot passport holders are required to serve in the military for 14 months, following their 18th birthday. But this also poses a security challenge. Due to the presence of the British airbase RAF Akrotiri, many interactions and joint training take place between members of the British Armed Forces and those of the Cypriot national service forces. In addition, operation TOSCA, which is the UN-mandated operation to keep the peace between the Greek and Turkish sides of Cyprus, sees a large rotation of multinational forces enter and exit the country annually. From the training and interactions experienced by Russian Cypriots, the Russian intelligence services have a large capacity to glean, copy, and even steal tactics and even equipment from multinational “Western” forces; which could be used against the EU, the UK, and even NATO in the future. Lastly, while many of the 50,000 Russians living on the island choose what parties they vote for, have no affiliation with the Russian government, and may indeed want to live a life apart from their birth land, the possibility of Russian actors infiltrating other Cypriot political parties is high. This could, under a long-term and protracted campaign, allow Russian actors to manipulate the domestic political discourse on the island. While little evidence of such actions has taken place, the risk nonetheless exists. Key takeaways It seems that while the decision to allow wealthy business people to acquire Cypriot passports did much good for the Cypriot Economy in a time of crisis, the security pitfalls of such a move seem to have been an afterthought. While other European countries partook in the said scheme, the creation of the EOP, the Anglo-centric education systems, and the dense military presence on the island all have directly led to noteworthy opportunities for Russian Intelligence Services to capitalize on this situation. But although it would be far-fetched to demonize Russian Cypriots, it would be beneficial for institutions considering hiring Cypriot nationals to dig a bit deeper into the heritage and/or network of current and prospective employees. About the author: Diana-Alexandra Coman Diana is a passionate irregular warfare researcher. After completing her Bachelor’s in Political Science, she enrolled in a Master’s of Military Strategic Studies at the Netherlands Royal Military Academy to refine her understanding of Civil-Military Interaction. Her focus is predominantly on the Middle-East, however her eagerness to learn extends to all areas of the globe in which irregular methods are used to wage war.

Historically considered the “the backyard” of Australia, New Zealand and the United States, the Pacific regions of Melanesia, Polynesia, and Micronesia have recently sparked new international interest. These regions contain multiple small island nations, states, and territories that bear the markings of troubled colonial pasts, civil unrests, and economic potentials. The islands’ territories, in fact, are rich in natural resources, but they remain underdeveloped. They rely on maritime trade to acquire advanced goods, especially from the aforementioned Western nations. Over the past two decades, other Asian countries such as the Philippines have increasingly invested within the region. However, a third player, China, has been setting off alarm bells. Following the leaking of an agreement between the Solomon Islands and China, it has become clear that the latter has intentions of providing military and policing support to the growingly unpopular pacific government. This has stoked concerns in both Canberra and Wellington that China is attempting to increase its military presence in the region. Which begs the question, why? Whereas the Pacific Islands remain outside the geographic focus of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, previous engagement with countries such as Equatorial Guinea indicates that China may be planning to expand its sphere of influence in the region. One Belt, One Road Following the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party [CCP] spent almost half a century reengineering China from a feudalistic society to one of the most technologically developed countries in the world; at an enormous cost to human life. Within the same period China also successfully exported its communist vision to countries departing from their colonial progenitors; often through the supplementation of economic and military support. The success of these internal and external policies allowed for the creation of pro-Chinese states in Africa and Asia, such as communist Vietnam, Tanzania, and Angola. However, it was established in the early 2000s that China’s rapid growth put its population in a precarious situation. Having almost tripled its population in a single generation, it was forecasted that China’s domestic resources would not be able to satiate its population's demands in the near future. In addition, while many pro-western and neutral countries across all continents of the globe became good trading partners with China in the years after the end of the Cold War, they also came to distrust its government due to their prior escapades across the developing world. This status quo led the CCP to hold a forum in 2006 to explore the viability of a single strategy that would promote both Chinese economic and political interests abroad. Fast forward to 2013 and this strategy became what is known as the concurrently running “One Belt, One Road initiative”, otherwise known as the BRI. The strategy involves an estimated four to eight trillion dollars worth of investments by Chinese over the next four decades into countries that are roughly demarcated by the Silk Road, which operated from the 1st century BCE to the 15th century AD [the Road]. Additionally, a new maritime route was also designated in 2013 which was deemed favorable for Chinese cargo shipping [the Belt]. On paper, host nations receive large sums of money to build ports, roads, electricity power grids, and all the factories involved in the creation of said systems. But unlike many aid packages from the West, these loans on paper are meant to come with zero strings attached. This has led the BRI to receive the accolade of “Benign, Win-Win Cooperation”, but this is seldom the case. Security Concerns with the BRI Under Chinese law, all private Chinese commercial entities are obliged to cooperate with the CCP, its military, and its security services. This means that all the digital and physical infrastructure created with Chinese money/companies is accessible by the Chinese state and is built to military standards; both domestically and abroad. But while this “totalitarian” policy has led to disastrous human rights issues within China, a benefit felt abroad from said strategy comes in the form of combating the unwillingness of foreign governments to host Chinese military infrastructure. Through providing large loans to governments that are perceived as unlikely to repay them, the Chinese state is effectively able to bend their will into accepting alterations in the security dynamics of their borders. A recent example of this security overlay to Chinese debt can be seen in Sri Lanka. In 2016, the financially unviable Hambantota International Port was leased to the Chinese-owned company CMP for a 99-year period in exchange for 1.15 billion dollars of loans to the Sri Lankan government. But within 24 months, said government defaulted on its debts to China. This was awfully convenient for the CCP, as due to its “civil-military fusion” the port can service not just tankers and cargo vessels, but Chinese Navy ships as well. While this has yet to occur, the Chinese government has on paper acquired a replenishment station for its Navy’s patrolling operations in the Bengali bay and the Arabian Sea portion of the Belt route. When factoring in the weakened bargaining position of the Sri Lankan government, if the CCP decides to make a move on said port, there will be little in the way to stop them from carrying out said wishes. Based on the logic that the Pacific Islands geographically fall outside of the scope of the Belts and Roads initiative would indicate that they are safe from such geopolitical maneuvers. However, the case of Equatorial Guinea highlights the causes for alarm. Covering the Flanks Far outside of the reach of either the Belt or the Road, Equatorial Guinea hosts the built port of Bata. Falling in line with the BRI initiative, investment within the country goes much further than the port itself, winding its way through the construction of road networks, telecommunications, and electrical grids. But unlike Hambantota International Port, the Chinese government has voiced its intentions of hosting a Chinese naval base within the confines of the port. The rationale for this move according to the CCP is that Equatorial Guinea forms part of its “Pan-African” policy. Unveiled in 2021, the Chinese government claims once more “a Partnership of Equals” and “Mutual Support” with participating states within the African continent. Much like commentators on the Belt and Roads initiative, foreign affairs analysts have highlighted the militaristic inclinations of the policy. In essence, Bata will allow for the Chinese Government to widen the scope of security apparatus around the flanks of its Belts and Roads initiative in the coming years. In relation to the Pacific Islands, the deal between the Solomon Islands and China seems to be following a halfway point between Bata and Hambotana. The forecast for the Pacific Islands and China While the Solomon Islands prime minister has publicly stated that his government has no intentions of allowing China to build a military base in the region, the leaked agreement does state that Chinese Warships will be able to dock within the Solomon Islands waters. Although this is not expected to occur in the short term, this move seems to be the beginning of what one could refer to as the beginning of a “pan-pacific” approach to BRI. What is expected in the coming years is that neighboring countries to the Solomon Islands will be targeted for Sri Lankan-style loans. Evidence has already arisen for such plans when the island of Samoa backed out of a 100 million dollar deal to turn its wharf of Vaiusu Bay into a deep water port. But with corruption rampant within the region, it is highly likely that further attempts in the coming years will be made to create a “friendly port” for the Chinese Navy ships.

Written by Facundo E. Saponara On the 26th of August 2021, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP, the Islamic State’s Afghan-Pakistani affiliate) detonated a suicide vest at Abbey Gate, on the perimeter of the Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKAI) in Kabul. Claiming the lives of 180 people and wounding hundreds more, the day of this piece’s publication marks one-year since the attack and the rise to power of the Taliban. To highlight this occurrence, this piece will review the current security scene within Afghanistan one-year on, and what implications this may have for the region. The current terrorist threat On the 18th of August 2022, unknown terrorist actors detonated explosives at the Abu Bakr al-Sadiq mosque, Kabul, killing 21 and wounding tens more. Hours later, a different attack took place in Kandahar, where over 2,500 Taliban officials were congregating. These attacks, which form part of a long string of over 220 attacks by ISKP since the Taliban took power in August of 2021, highlight the severity of the current terrorist threat within Afghanistan. But while public hangings, executions, and humiliations, have been used by the Taliban to deter the ISKP movement, it seems that number and size of terror attacks are increasing. In part, this is a the result of the weakened financial state of the Taliban Government; which due to international sanctions, has struggled to maintain its military operations against ISKP. However, a greater contributor has been the inter-tribal dynamics that have long existed prior the arrival of Western forces to the region. This dynamic has been navigated effectively by ISKP to gain a stronger foothold in the country and position itself as a viable opposition and a genuine threat to Taliban rule. But while there would be an international vested interest in aiding the Taliban to combat ISKP, the recent liquidation of the prominent Al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri in Kabul by the US Air Force highlights a concrete connection between the two groups. This is in direct contradiction to the Doha Agreement, in which the Taliban committed to not cooperating with known terrorist groups. As long as such actions by the Taliban continue, it is unlikely that any financial or military assistance will be provided by the international community to aid in the current deteriorating security situation. Political and social security On the political and social front, the first year of Taliban rule has been characterized by a series of challenges. Firstly, the failure to consolidate – or begin the process of consolidation of – an inclusive national government. Although the Taliban label their government as such, the inclusiveness is not derived from a diverse pool of political affiliations, but rather from the distribution of political positions to Talib from different ethnical backgrounds (Uzbeks, Hazarans, etc.). This has given the Taliban ground to place their officials in the most strategic positions, while refusing any sort of representation to those in the political opposition. Secondly, the oppression of women’s rights has fueled political and social instability in the country, particularly regarding basic female rights to freedom of mobility, access to education, and the labor market; despite the Taliban’s initial reassurance. Local authorities have provided several reasons that justify the closure of girl schools in the country (mainly being cultural and religious sensitivities), but these haven’t been able to pacify the Afghan society. Thirdly, the lack of internal consensus within the Taliban has been palpable since their takeover, and could prove to be especially destabilizing for the country if not managed appropriately. Religious rigor, the creation (or reinstitution) of the Islamic Emirate, the adoption of the Taliban white flag as the national flag, the imposition of a Taliban-controlled government, and the openness and insertion of the international community are major hurdles that the Taliban will have to address in the near future. Overall, these political factors find themselves positioned on the backdrop of a full blown economic and humanitarian crisis. Since the fall of Kabul, the international community has questioned whether the Taliban would be capable of avoiding a famine. First estimates predicted that, within six months of the fall, an unprecedented food catastrophe in the country would take place. Thankfully, through humanitarian aid provided by a plethora of non-governmental organizations, such a catastrophe was avoided. Nevertheless, the need for humanitarian assistance continues to be of paramount importance since the crumbling state of the economy reduced the annual food production and the shortages caused by the war in Ukraine continue to put pressure on the food supply chain. Looking ahead Overall, Afghanistan is in a delicate state of affairs which is likely to degrade without further international assistance. ISKP’s ability to lure in disgruntled Taliban and al Qaeda members is a critical factor, as al Qaeda will soon need to name its new leader and the Taliban continue to show disunity. The unopposed growth of ISKP in Afghanistan will unequivocally have broader regional consequences as the group is currently present in Pakistan and – albeit in small numbers – in India. Such growth may also allow for the establishment of a new safe haven from which terrorist groups will be able to operate regionally; allowing them to exploit historical tensions between neighbouring countries (such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, or more worryingly India and Pakistan). Additionally, al Qaeda’s need to name a new leader may alter their relations with the Taliban. If the newly appointed leader is not of Afghan origin or does not seek refuge in Afghanistan, this might be the first step in distancing the organization from the de facto rulers of Afghanistan. This would be a necessity for the Taliban factions that aspire to gain international recognition. That being said, the international community should remain watchful over the Taliban-al Qaeda relationship, as the historical links between the groups were instated decades ago and are not likely to fade in the near future. Tackling Afghanistan’s decaying economy (shrinking between 20 and 30% since August 2021) should be considered a matter of national security for Western mandataries’ policies. The price of basic commodities has more than doubled in the last two months, and the shortage of inputs of the agricultural industry, such as fertilizer and fuel, has also doubled in the same margin of time. If not properly addressed, the economic and humanitarian crises will continue to affect an ever-growing number of individuals. Seeking to reduce the extent to which the Afghan civilian population is exposed to a humanitarian crisis, political violence at the hands of the Taliban, or of more radicalized parties, should be the main focal points of the international community’s approach. As an inability to do so will lead to a greater global terror threat. To avert this, the international community will need to pursue an active policy of engagement with the Taliban authorities; which would likely involve partially enabling the access of the Afghan Central Bank to its frozen foreign assets, while assisting the Taliban in creating and implementing effective procedures for counter-terrorism policies. About the author: Facundo E. Saponara Facundo, originally from Argentina, is currently enrolled in the master’s degree in Strategy and Geopolitics at the Escuela Superior de Ejército. Counting with a background in international relations, he has specialized in the analysis of interstate and intrastate conflicts and terrorism. This article was edited by Alessia Cappelletti. Annick Dingemans contributed with valuable insights from her first hand experience.

Written by Daan Vegter, Alessia Cappelletti, Adriaan Kolkman – December 2022 October and November’s conflicts and alerts/developing situations highlighted: Conflicts Russia-Ukraine: Ukrainian forces push back on Russian troops Yemen: Failed extension of the ceasefire Ethiopia: Peace agreement in Tigray, but fighting started in Oromia Turkey-Syria: Istanbul bomb attack and Turkish offensive into Kurdistan Iran: Anti-government protests following the death of Mahsa Amini Brief alerts China: Anti-government protests following harsh Covid lockdowns Iran-Azerbaijan: Heightened tensions between the countries as Iran closes ties with Armenia Pakistan: protests following Khan’s assassination attempt Colombia: Colombian government and ELN resume peace talks in Caracas World Conflicts – October-November 2022 The Russia-Ukraine War In early October, the Ukrainian army completed their counter-offensive towards Lyman, capturing the town with little resistance. The capture of Lyman posed a major loss to Russian forces as the city acted as their logistics and transportation hub. A week later, a substantial explosion partially destroyed the Kerch bridge, the sole land connection between mainland Russia to Crimea. Not only was the explosion on the bridge a logistical setback for Russia, but it also was a symbolic loss because the bridge represents the ‘reunification’ between the two lands. Russia responded to this attack by barraging Ukraine with missiles on October 10, striking cities and important (energy) infrastructure. Throughout the rest of October, Russia kept targeting more Ukrainian infrastructure with missiles. In November, the Ukrainian armed forces continued to push their counter-offensive in the south of Ukraine. This led to the retreat of the Russian army from Kherson and the Ukrainian army recaptured the city. Although the recapturing of Kherson itself went with little resistance, the fighting prior to this was heavy. On November 15, Russia launched its largest missile attack yet on the whole of Ukraine. Major cities and energy facilities were hit. During the midst of the attack, missiles also landed across the border in Poland, killing two Polish citizens near the border with Ukraine. Since Poland is a NATO country, a response by organization was feared. However, preliminary research showed that the missiles were likely to have been surface-to-air missiles used by the Ukrainian armed forces. These missiles were fired due to the large-scale Russian attack, and are likely to have missed their target, landing in Polish territory. The repeated attacks by Russia on the Ukrainian energy infrastructure show that Russia is willing to ‘weaponize the winter.’ Without sufficient energy supplies, not only the Ukrainian armed forces but also Ukrainian civilians will either freeze or starve to death as temperatures in the country keep dropping. Russia hopes that this will slow down the Ukrainian armed forces or create a strong sentiment against the war among the citizens of Ukraine, turning the war into a war of attrition. Images by Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project retrieved from Critical Threats. Yemen In April 2022, Yemen’s Government, backed by a Saudi-led coalition, and Houthi rebels called for a two-month truce, which was then extended two times until October 2nd, 2022. However, the negotiations for a further extension failed and the truce ended. Since then, Houthi rebels have targeted oil terminals and ports controlled by the Yemini Government. Clashes between Saudi-backed militias and Houthi rebels have also reportedly killed eight people. Although a full-fledged conflict has not developed at the time of writing (06/12/2022), the failed truce extension and the new attacks by Houthi rebels have raised fears that frontline fighting will resume in the country. The UN special envoy for Yemen is pushing for new talks and a new ceasefire, it is unlikely that a new truce will happen in the near future. Ethiopia On November 2, 2022, the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in the north of Ethiopia, signed a peace agreement after two years of war. The deal was brokered by the African Union and mediated by former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo. In the agreement, both parties agreed to the permanent cessation of hostilities, protection of civilians, and provision of humanitarian access and the demobilization of the TPLF as the most important points. The agreement comes at a time when millions of people have been displaced and are in need of humanitarian assistance. However, although the fighting between the Ethiopian government and Tigray has settled, fighting in the Oromia region, south of Addis Ababa, has increased. In the first week of November, several dozen have reportedly been killed by government drone strikes, the victims being mostly civilians. Oromia is the largest Ethiopian state and has steadily been growing their army, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), which is the military wing of the opposition party. With fighting ending in Tigray, the government can now shift its focus on Oromia, which will likely lead to further hostilities in the region. Turkey-Kurdish Forces On November 13, 2022, a bomb explosion in Istanbul killed six people and injured more than eighty. Although Kurdish groups denied responsibility, the Turkish government has blamed the Kurdish separatist organizations, PKK and YPG. In retaliation, the Turkish government carried out air attacks in Syria and Iraq on Kurdish positions. The Turks claim they killed 184 Kurdish militants, although the Kurds say only civilians were killed in the attacks. Since then, Turkish President Erdogan has announced that Turkish forces are planning a ground offensive against the Kurds in Syria. The international community is calling for Turkish restraint. Russia, long-standing ally of Bashar al-Assad, urges Turkey to de-escalate because it does not want the situation in Syria to deteriorate. Given Moscow’s support to the Syrian regime and the war in Ukraine, if the conflict in Syria escalates due to the Turkish offensive, Russia will most likely not be able to contain the conflict. The United States is also calling for Turkey to stop their offensive. The US has worked for years with Kurdish militias to quench Islamic State fighters; attacking Kurdish forces could therefore jeopardize years of progress in counter-terrorism operations. The Turkish airstrikes are also threatening US troops working in the region, with recent airstrikes landing as close as 300 meters from US military personnel. Iran On the 16th of September, 2022, Mahsa Amini died in custody at the hands of the Iranian Morality Police. Following her funeral on the 17th, protests erupted in her home city of Saqez, the Kurdish city of Sananda, and in Tehran. While the protests were initially peaceful, the strong handed approach of the Iranian Police and Revolutionary Guard Corps in subduing social unrest caused the death of a few dozen civilians in the first weeks. These events led to an aggressive expansion of protests over the month of October, predominantly in the western Kurdish region of Iran. Like the protests in September, they resulted in civilian deaths. Although these protests started out as anger due to the death of Amini, they have since developed into general anti-government protests, with the Iranian people demanding more freedoms and a regime change. While deadly protests are not a novelty to Iran, the manner in which these recent protests are being put down is creating a socio-political climate that is likely to tip into armed revolt against the regime in Tehran. However, the opposition/protesters are not currently unified or organized in a conventional manner and, short of a handful of incidents, the vast majority of Iranian Government security forces/militias remain loyal to the regime in Tehran. While the long-term prospects for the Iranian Government are currently unknown, it is likely that there are many more violent days to come. Brief Alerts – October-November 2022 China Since January of 2020, Chinese citizens have been living under some of the harshest Covid-19 lockdown measures under what is known as the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ‘Zero Covid Policy.’ While small scale protests have occurred since the policy’s implementation, in the last weeks of November, a large outburst of anti-Zero Covid protests have occurred in major Chinese cities. Additionally, in late November, factory employees' protests against low pay and harsh conditions quickly escalated into an outcry against the state. All the demonstrations have been met with violence by Chinese security forces, and vigils were organized in multiple cities – which have also been suppressed. The harsh treatment of mourners, plus Covid-19 protestors, have jointly started chanting for the resignation of the CCP’s president, Xi Jinping. However, it is unlikely that the unrest will prompt change in the Chinese government. Instead, it is plausible that a harsh and swift response will be applied by the various governments of cities across China, and perhaps some political figures are moved in order to quell criticism. Azerbaijan-Iran In the Southern Caucasus, Iran has been increasingly siding with Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, heightening tensions with Azerbaijan. In mid-October, Iran’s military conducted a large-scale drill close to its border with Azerbaijan, even practicing crossings of the river dividing a large portion of their border. In early November, Azerbaijan started military drills in the south of the country and detained 19 people suspected of espionage on behalf of Iran. The drills and arrests come as Iran has been critical of Azerbaijan’s intentions for establishing a new transport corridor that would connect Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan exclave. This corridor would pass along Armenia’s border with Iran and block Tehran’s connection with Yerevan. While escalation to war is unlikely, the two countries have increasingly been using hostile rhetoric and carrying out military drills in the border region. If Iran continues to support Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, a military response/action cannot be ruled out. Pakistan On November 3, Imran Khan, Pakistan’s former prime minister was shot and wounded in a failed assassination attempt that killed a supporter and injured a dozen others. Khan staged protests and marches against the government of Shehbaz Sharif, who took office in April of this year after a no-confidence motion against Khan. At the end of October, Khan announced a march on Islamabad to ask for snap elections in which analysts believed Kahn would be the favorite to win. Sharif and the current government want elections to be held in accordance with the constitution, after August 2023. Whereas the former PM has been calling for protests since April, the rhetoric used in October has been more provocative and tensions rose even further in the aftermath of the shooting. Due to the havoc these protests created, Khan called them off on November 26 and announced that his party, ‘Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)’, would resign from all provincial assemblies to push for early elections. However, it is unclear whether protests and riots will resume. If so, Pakistan may witness more violence which will further hinder the fragile state of its economy. Colombia-ELN On 21 November, new peace talks started in Caracas between the Colombian Government and the left-wing National Liberation Army (ELN). After the former peace talks were suspended in 2019, newly elected left-wing President Gustavo Petro pushed for new talks. The peace talks are part of the ‘total peace’ policy run by President Petro that promotes negotiating with rebels and criminal groups to end nearly sixty years of war in the country. Both the ELN and Colombian Government say they are willing to build a democratic peace as they stated in a joint declaration. Negotiations do not mean that military actions against the rebels will cease. About the authors Daan Vegter Daan interns as an intelligence analyst at Dyami. He is currently pursuing a Masters in Peace and Conflict Studies at Uppsala University. Experienced in analyzing large datasets and doing research on international terrorism, civil wars and emerging security threats. Although originally Dutch, Daan has also lived in the United States and Sweden. Alessia Cappelletti Alessia is Intelligence Analyst and Project Coordinator at Dyami. She has field experience in South America, Colombia especially, and has experience in researching organized crime and conflicts. Her academic background includes conflict analysis, international humanitarian law, and criminology. Adriaan Kolkman Adriaan is a contributing analyst at Dyami. He is currently pursuing a Masters in Global Studies at Gothenburg University in Sweden. Previously, Adriaan completed a Bachelor in Safety & Security Management in the Netherlands. He has experience working in the private security industry in South-America, and while having Dutch and Swedish nationality, he also lived in Suriname and several countries in the Middle-East.

Written by Daan Vegter In April of 2022, a person named Viktor Muller Ferreira was apprehended at Schiphol Airport by Dutch authorities and declared Unacceptable for admission into the country. The reason? The AIVD, in collaboration with other parties, identified the individual as a Russian GRU Intelligence Officer named Sergey Vladimirovich Cherkasov. The man possessed a Brazilian Passport which claimed that he had been born in 1989, he was the son of an Irish father, and that his mother originated from Rio de Janeiro. However, the scope of this person’s constructed identity spans further than just a false travel document. Cherkson worked as a travel agent in Brazil before commencing his bachelor’s study in 2014 at Trinity College, Dublin. He later moved to Washington DC in 2018 to pursue a Master’s at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Cherkasov’s decision to apply for the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2020 led to his apprehension by the Dutch intelligence services. Following a successful application as an intern at the ICC, his arrival to the Netherlands was postponed due to Covid. During this time, the AIVD was able to detect and investigate Ferreira, discovering beyond reasonable doubt that he was a GRU intelligence officer. Upon arrival in the Netherlands, Cherkasov was informed about the predicament he was in, was ordered to leave the country, and was placed on the first flight back to Brazil. Why does espionage happen? Due to Russia’s involvement in the 2008 Georgian War, its protracted mission in Syria, and most recently, its invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Government is eager to know the inner workings of the ICC. But to fund such a long and extensive operation, an additional concrete threat to Russian citizens, military personnel, and politicians must have existed and worried the Russian intelligence apparatus. Especially in cases concerning matters of (real or perceived) national security, the world of espionage does not stop at placing individuals in strategic positions for gathering sensitive information. Stealing, sabotaging, or even destroying information and/or equipment falls within the responsibility of international intelligence. Famous examples are China stealing the blueprints of Lockheed Marin’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and Israel digitally sabotaging an Iranian Uranium enrichment site. Both the stealing of the F-35 blueprints and sabotaging of the Uranium enrichment site are examples of cyber espionage. Cyber espionage is the practice of stealing or sabotaging sensitive or classified data and intellectual property, to gain an advantage over a rival entity, through digital means such as cyber-attacks and data breaches. When people are used to do this, it is called human intelligence (HUMINT). Here, intelligence is gathered through means of interpersonal contact. Either a spy goes undercover and steals sensitive information, or people who are close to the information gather it for a thrid party. These activities serve the primary function of international intelligence, or to search for angles/leads that will eventually help protect or advance the interest of their governments. For this reason, any individual, company, government, and non-governmental organization that deals with sensitive information could be a target of international intelligence gathering campaigns. While highly dependent on the profile of the company, typical targets for said campaigns are technology, agriculture, security, medical, and aviation sectors. What can be done to prevent (industrial) espionage? Awareness is key. Companies and organizations need to be aware that they might be a target of espionage. As said above, not only governments deal with espionage threats. Certain companies and organizations might also have valuable information useful to outside actors. To assess whether or not an organization is at risk, questions need to be asked internally such as: what type of business is this; where does the organization operate; who is hired and what actors the organization deals with on a day-to-day basis. For example, an innovative high-tech company or international NGO with government contacts is more likely to be a target than a small bed and breakfast in the countryside. Insider threats are real and need to be identified. One threat that organizations need to recognize is that people in crisis tend to be more susceptible to committing espionage. It is essential for companies to be aware of personal crises at an early stage to minimise the risk of employees being lured into espionage. Potential indicators of people committing espionage include, but are not limited to, drastic changes in behaviour, efforts to avoid security measures, financial hardship, unreported and excessive foreign travel, after-hours access to company buildings and classified documents. All employees need to be aware of these indicators and feel comfortable sharing their concerns about colleagues. Be on the offensive, do not sit and wait for something to happen. In the cases of information leaks or personnel being identified as working for foreign actors, the damage is often already done. However, when State counter-espionage campaigns miss outside actors entirely, the situation can be far more worrying. For this reason, it is essential that companies gain the relevant skills to protect their data, intellectual property, and their staff, which fall under their duty of care. Dyami offers solutions. We provide counter-espionage trainings, risk assessments, and help revising, designing, and implementing tailor-made security measures and policies. We work closely with former employees of, among others, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (BZ), the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to make organizations resilient against espionage and aware of the threats they may face. About the author: Daan Vegter Daan interns as an intelligence analyst at Dyami. He is currently pursuing a Masters in Peace and Conflict Studies at Uppsala University. Experienced in analyzing large datasets and doing research on international terrorism, civil wars and emerging security threats. Although originally Dutch, Daan has also lived in the United States and Sweden.