Search dyami insights

On December 3, 2023, Venezuela’s government plans to hold a national referendum to establish a new Venezuelan state to incorporate the entire Essequibo region of Guyana into its territory. The announcement sparked a legal reaction from Guyana, which called for the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to intervene. Besides the ongoing legal proceedings in the Hague, the referendum is likely to go ahead. Given Venezuela’s ongoing domestic political difficulties and commitment to elections in 2024, the referendum could create new instabilities in the region and extend Maduro’s hold on power. The Essequibo Dispute The legal dispute between Guyana and Venezuela goes back to 1899. The Essequibo territory, which roughly contains two-thirds of current Guyana, was awarded to British Guyana by the Arbitral Award. Since then, Venezuela declared the award illegitimate because of the absence of Venezuelan negotiators. In 1966, just months before the independence of Guyana from the United Kingdom, Venezuela and the UK negotiated the Geneva Agreement, which established a regulatory framework that should be followed by both parties in order to find a solution for the Essequibo border dispute. There are growing disagreements between Venezuela and Guyana over the oil exploration operations by large oil companies in offshore areas in the disputed territory. In 2015, the situation deteriorated since ExxonMobil, one of the world's largest oil companies, announced the discovery of a new oil deposit in Essequibo, signing a beneficial agreement for the foreign company with the Guyanese government. The discovery of new oil deposits has revived Venezuelan claims over Essequibo resources and land, calling the concession to the U.S. oil giant ExxonMobil a “new form of imperialism.” In response, in 2018, Guyana asked the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague to review the border dispute and confirm the validity of the current borders drawn by the 1899 arbitration. However, Venezuela openly rejects the jurisdiction of ICJ over the dispute. In October 2023, Guyana announced the discovery of a significant oil and gas reserve in an ExxonMobil well situated in disputed waters. A few days later, Venezuela responded by scheduling the December 3 referendum on the Essequibo dispute. This triggered Guyana to, once again, seek the ICJ intervention to preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity and prevent the referendum from being held. Although Venezuela rejects the ICJ's jurisdiction, the court called on the Maduro government to counter arguments on the dispute to support its stance. Venezuela was represented by Vice President Delcy Rodriguez. Hearings of Guyana and Venezuela delegations were held at ICJ on November 14 and 15, respectively. Political reforms in Venezuela? The reopening of the dispute over Essequibo sovereignty comes with "questionable" timing from Venezuela. Indeed, while the dispute appears to be justified by new significant oil discoveries and disagreements over concessions, it is also a strategy employed by Maduro to divert domestic and international attention from recent developments in Venezuelan politics. On October 17, 2023, after resuming long-suspended negotiations, the Venezuelan government and the opposition reached an agreement that guaranteed opposition participation and the competitiveness of the next presidential election, scheduled for mid-2024. The negotiations, facilitated by Norway, were held in Barbados, in which Venezuela also agreed to release more than 250 political prisoners and lift the bans on opposition candidates for the 2024 elections. While the United States was neither a mediator nor a party included in the deal, its influence is undeniable. On October 18, 2023, only one day after the conclusion of the negotiations, the United States announced the temporary easing of some of the sanctions imposed on the Venezuelan oil, gas, and gold sectors in exchange for competitive elections in 2024. The easing of diplomatic and economic tensions with the U.S. represents a chance for Venezuela to relieve itself of the "maximum pressure" imposed by the U.S. in 2019. Lifting U.S. sanctions, however, is tied to fulfilling the electoral commitments Venezuela pledged in the Barbados agreement. However, the leading opposition candidate in the elections, María Corina Machado, is still excluded from the electoral race. Moreover, Maduro's government has not recognized the primary election as legitimate. The US has announced that it will withdraw the suspension of sanctions if Maduro’s regime does not have fair elections. While the prospect of competitive elections sounds promising, during Barbados' negotiation Venezuelan government and opposition signed a second accord, which binds both sides to support Venezuela's current stance in the territorial dispute with Guyana. This second deal could prove particularly relevant in the current circumstances, as it prevents any form of internal political opposition to Maduro's eventual plan to annex Essequibo. Referendum Propaganda While the referendum is going ahead, the campaign for the referendum is heavily influenced by the Venezuelan government’s control of social media outlets. President Maduro, under pressure to hold an election, is attempting to divert attention away from the upcoming elections by drumming up nationalist sentiment. On December 3, Venezuelans will be asked if they reject the 1899 arbitration and the ICJ's jurisdiction and if they oppose Guyana's unilateral appropriation of Essequibo's territorial waters. Venezuelans will vote on the creation of the new state of Guayana Esequiba in the disputed area, whose residents will be granted full Venezuelan citizenship status. However, it is unlikely to be a transparent vote. In preparation for the referendum, a massive propaganda campaign for the Essequibo dispute is spinning on Venezuelan social media. To the tune of propaganda slogans such as "el Esequibo es nuestro" or “El sol de Venezuela nace en el Esequibo,” the Venezuelan government is seeking popular support for the December referendum, urging the population to "decide sovereignly and democratically their future." The Venezuelan government has also accused the US of provocation. On November 8, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Yván Gil issued a statement accusing Guyana of conducting joint military operations with the United States in the Essequibo Strip to protect foreign, largely U.S.-based energy companies wrongfully exploiting resources in disputed territorial waters. However, Guyana's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hugh Todd, denied any allegations of military expansion in the Essequibo Strip, blaming his Venezuelan counterpart for spreading disinformation and false accusations to sway domestic and international public opinion in favor of Venezuelan claims. Outlook It is very likely that the December 3 referendum will take place. The validity of the outcome of the referendum is hard to prove due to the lack of transparency of the Maduro regime. The referendum on Guyana Essequibo comes at a very delicate time for Venezuelan domestic politics. Maduro would seem compelled to grant the opposition to the promised electoral improvements, especially to maintain the advantages of U.S. sanctions lifted. Yet, the deadline for implementing electoral and democratic concessions, set for late November, is approaching, and no electoral reforms or improvements have been put in place.

Who’s involved: Houthi rebels in Yemen, Israel, United States, shipping companies, international community. What happened? On 31/10/2023 the Shia rebel group called the Houthi declared war on Israel from Yemen in support of the Palestinian terrorist organization Hamas. On 08/11/2023 the Houthi fired their first missiles towards Israel but they were intercepted by the US Navy. From 09/11/2023 to 20/11/2023 the Houthi have launched several missiles and drones at Israel. All have been intercepted or have landed in the Sinai desert. The Houthi declared on 19/11/2023 that they would seize any Israeli vessel passing by Yemen on the Red Sea. On the same day the Houthi rebels used a helicopter to land on the shipping vessel the “Galaxy Leader” and took control of the ship taking 25 crew members hostage. The Houthi leadership claimed that the vessel is Israeli owned. The Israeli government quickly came with the reply that the ship is not under Israeli flag but is British owned and operated by Japan. Japanese authorities acknowledged that the ship is operated under the Japanese company NYK and that the crew is from several different nationalities of which none are Israeli. It is however believed that an Israeli billionaire might be part owner of the vessel, but this has not been confirmed. The Houthi rebel group receives logistical and weapon’s support from Iran. Israel has blamed Iran for staging the seizure of the vessel, but Iran has denied any involvement. The Red Sea shipping lane that continues on into the Gulf of Aden is an important shipping lane, with over 21.000 vessels per year going through it from China and the Gulf to Europe and vice versa. Consumer goods and oil are shipped through the Red Sea on large cargo vessels. Analysis: It is likely that the Houthi will try and seize multiple vessels that are supposedly under Israeli control. This will have a huge impact on the world economy as the shipping lane through the Red Sea is vital for the flow of goods. If shipping companies no longer dare to risk their vessels, crew and shipment to go through the Red Sea or the Gulf of Aden it will severely damage the world economy. When previously the cargo vessel “Ever Given” was stranded in the Suez Canal on 21/03/2021, for six days only, it already had an enormous amount of impact on the economy that extended into billions of dollars of additional costs and losses. Goods were perishing on board, shipments came in too late at their port of call, deliveries were delayed and some ships traveled all the way around the southernmost point of Africa taking two extra weeks to travel. From the early 2000’s to 2017 Somali pirates would frequently seize ships around the Horn of Africa between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. This severely impacted the world economy and forced shipping companies and national governments to take measures against piracy in the region. Ships would take alternate routes, hire mercenaries to protect their vessels, insurance companies upped their policy payments and several European and United States Navy vessels patrolled the area. A recurrence of such a situation is likely to have more of an impact now that the Houthi are involved. In contrast to the Somali pirates the Houthi rebels are well armed and equipped and receive logistical support from Iran. If there is any form of combat involved the stakes are much higher than with the Somali pirates who used simple fishing boats and had outdated weaponry. Conclusion This new phase in the war between the Yemeni Houthi rebels and Israel has taken the conflict into a whole new realm. By seizing cargo vessels, allegedly connected to Israel, there is a chance of direct disruption of the world economy since the shipping lanes in the Red Sea are vital for transporting consumer goods, food and oil across the world. It is unclear how far the Houthi will go to emphasize their point, but at the same time it is also unclear how far Israel and the United States will go to prevent any further seizures. Open combat with the Houthi in Yemen and on the Red Sea will undoubtedly lead to even more disruption in the shipping lanes, but the international community will be hard pressed to just stand by and watch as the Houthi continue their campaign.

Date: 20/11/2023 Where: Myanmar, Laukkaing, Shan State Who’s involved: Myanmar Junta, Three Brotherhood Alliance, People’s Republic of China What happened? On 27/09/2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance, an alliance between the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and the Ta’ang National Army, launched coordinated attacks on military outposts and installations in the northern Shan state in Myanmar. The name of the mission, “Operation 1027” is intended to expel the military from the area and regain control of the state for opposition forces. According to reports from a newspaper based in Thailand, the Irrawaddy, the Three Brotherhood Alliance has taken 90 military outposts, 4 towns, as well as two key trade routes to China. There is currently a standoff over the city of Laukkaing, a hive for unregulated gambling, human trafficking and illicit goods. The military junta has been unable to push back against the armed groups. The military has instead launched airstrikes and artillery bombardments of towns and villages thought to hold insurgent groups, with many hundreds of civilians fleeing. Former General Myint Swe spoke at an emergency meeting with the military junta suggesting that this is the most serious contest of the military’s power after the coup in February 2021. On 10/11/2023, the Chinese foreign ministry said that it will ensure stability on the border. China has traditionally acted as a power-broker in the Shan state, a region in eastern Myanmar on the border with China, with its ability to exert influence over different groups because of ethnic and trade ties. However, the city of Laukkaing has become a center for criminal gangs, scam centers, and money laundering. It has been reported that thousands of Chinese nationals and other foreigners from around the region have been forced to work there. China is seeking to clampdown on transnational criminal groups with the military unable to control cross-border criminal activity. The escalation of violence under Operation 1027 has led to civilian casualties and the displacement of 200,000 people nationwide. This has led to over 2 million civilians fleeing the fighting since February 2021, according to the United Nations. There are increasing calls for humanitarian aid to enter the country and both sides to respect international humanitarian law. Analysis: The Myanmar civil war since February 2021 has killed over 4,000 civilians and displaced 1.8 million refugees, and there are no signs of stopping. Research published by the Security Force Monitor has documented several human rights abuses committed by the Myanmar military junta. The new offensive represents the biggest battlefield challenge to the military junta’s rule since the coup in February 2021. Capturing Laukkaing will bring some gains for the opposition parties for the Three Brotherhoods Alliance to expel the military from the Shan state and bring it into their control. While this is not a lethal blow, this would cut off a significant source of income for the military junta and create challenges for leadership of the military. Sensing Myanmar's military weakness, other armed groups in the country have also stepped up attacks. This could overstretch the junta’s military capacity as a result. The armed groups have also seized a large amount of weaponry from retreating military units, including tanks, a howitzer and ammunition. The junta may have to accept ceding control of the country to the groups in order to launch counter attacks. In any case, the military’s failures are obvious for armed groups resisting the regime and may lead to groups launching attacks to seize on the weakness. China’s seeming unwillingness to intervene in the Shan state to support the military could indicate a decline in support for the regime. China’s economic interests in Myanmar include investments in rare earths, and the construction of multiple oil and gas pipelines flowing into the Bay of Bengal. China cultivated a close relationship with the military junta for protection of its economic assets. However, the growing transnational crime from Myanmar and the inability of the military junta to contain it could push China to see other players to maintain stability on its border. How lethal this attack proves to be for the Myanmar military, depends on the response of the Myanmar military, and whether it is able to fight a multifront counter insurgency. It is still well-armed, with Russian places and artillery and has fought counter-insurgencies in Myanmar since the 1960s. The military junta leadership is internally quite resilient to outside challenges however. Given its ordinance and expertise, it will likely step up bombing campaigns and mount heavy counter offensives against all rebel groups in the north and in the east. The fighting is therefore likely to intensify in the coming months as both sides try to seize the initiative. Conclusion The escalation of the conflict in Myanmar is leading to more violence in the country, with more refugees fleeing the country. The appearance of success of the armed groups offensive has given the Three Brotherhood Alliance more ammunition and achievements against the regime, which could lead to other groups seizing on the junta’s vulnerabilities. China’s influence in the country remains important, but its capacity to limit further escalation remains limited given the military junta’s capacity for military self-reliance. The escalating violence is likely to lead to more civilian deaths and refugees fleeing violence, in a conflict that has killed over 4,000 civilians and displaced 1.8 million.

Date: 17/11/2023 Where: New York (USA), China Who’s involved: Industrial and Commerce Bank of China (ICBC) Financial Services Division, Lockbit Ransomware gang What happened? On 8/11/2023, ICBC's Financial Services (FS) division in New York City was hit by a ransomware attack, leading to disruptions in specific systems within the division. ICBC FS immediately isolated the impacted systems to contain the incident. The attack was so extensive that it disrupted not only financial services systems, but also the corporate email, forcing employees to switch to Google Mail. On 9/11/2023, the ransomware attack caused disruptions in US Treasury markets. Some traders were unable to place or clear trades through ICBC and received emergency notices about connectivity issues. The blackout caused by the ransomware attack led to a temporary $9 billion debt to BNY Mellon, significantly larger than ICBC Financial Services' net capital. ICBC's parent company in China provided a cash injection to help repay BNY Mellon and manually processed trades with the custody bank's assistance. On 10/11/2023, ICBC confirmed details of the attack and made them public. The company stated it was investigating and progressing with recovery. The bank successfully cleared Treasury trades executed on November 8 and repo financing trades done on November 9. However, some market participants reported unsettled trades, affecting market liquidity. On 13/11/2023, A LockBit ransomware gang representative claimed that ICBC paid a ransom. This claim is not independently verified, and ICBC has, as of 17/11/2023, not immediately responded to requests for comment. On 14/11/2023, ICBC's management team flew to the US to address the fallout. Analysis: LockBit is a sophisticated threat actor, operating primarily as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model, enabling affiliates to carry out attacks using its malware in exchange for a share of the profits. Since its emergence in 2019, LockBit has rapidly evolved into one of the world's most prominent ransomware threats, known for its aggressive tactics. The group's activities often target critical infrastructure and major corporate entities, resulting in significant operational and financial impacts. It's widely speculated in the cybersecurity community that the group operates with a degree of impunity within Russia, as long as their attacks are primarily focused outside of Russian territory. This perceived tolerance by the Russian authorities is a common trait among several ransomware groups. LockBit has targeted businesses in several sectors throughout the European Union, including real estate, manufacturing, and logistics. In 2021, LockBit targeted Irish corporation Accenture, one of Europe’s largest IT consultancy firms. The ransom demanded by LockBit was 50 million dollars. Upon failing to pay the ransom, massive amounts of the exfiltrated data was leaked, which included proprietary information from an unspecified number of firms. This particular incident is unique in that a major Chinese institution was attacked by an entity that has some degree of cooperation with the Russian government. US and Chinese authorities are both likely to respond with some degree of force. The costs of cyberattacks globally continue to rise. Paired with the recent DP World Australia attack, this is likely the second event in only two weeks to have over one billion dollars in potential impact. The attackers exploited a vulnerability known as Citrix Bleed, which allows attackers to hijack authenticated connections and bypass authentication measures. These hijacked sessions can persist even after patching, enabling further network penetration and escalation of privileges. The attackers could potentially have access to ICBC’s systems in the future. Conclusion: While the specific financial implications for ICBC's parent company in China are not expected to be crippling due to the swift response, the attack underscores the growing cybersecurity threats to global payment networks and financial institutions. As global payment systems increase interconnectivity, even between entities in Chinese, North American, and EU markets, the potency of cyberthreats such as ransomware will increase. The incident raises concerns about the resilience of the Treasury market and is likely to attract regulatory scrutiny. The event also has the potential to open doors for international cooperation in the field of cybersecurity enforcement. While the US and China have a history of being competitors in the cyber domain, the need for cooperation in this incident may establish some of the legal precedence for a combined response.

Dyami Insights Analysis The Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinping seeks regime security above all else, with China’s security services accusing its own citizens and foreign businesses of espionage. On November 12, BusinessEurope, a representative of commercial lobby groups from around Europe, warned that Beijing’s anti-espionage laws threaten to push decoupling with China. The CCP counter-espionage law effective from July 1, broadened the definition of espionage, which could mean any organization perceived as unfriendly by the PRC. The definition of what constitutes a ‘threat’ is intentionally vague as well, and gives Chinese authorities a wide breadth to detain any foreign interests on suspicion of espionage. This drive for securitization poses risks to European businesses and governments need to recognize the significance of this shift in managing security threats. Regime Security above Development The Chinese leadership under Xi Jinping is moving away from economic development to a focus on national security. To this end, Chinese security officials investigated US management consultancy firms, Bain and Company and Mintz Group on charges of being “accomplices in overseas bribery, espionage, and extraction of national secrets and intelligence”. Chinese security officials confiscated mobile phones, laptops, and detained employees. These consultancy firms work in the field of business intelligence, providing information on Chinese companies for foreign business organizations, which grew along with China’s emerging, but notoriously opaque, economy. The primary reason is that Chinese authorities are wary of information gathering for perceived intelligence purposes. Chinese authorities investigated US-owned Capvision for allegedly paying Chinese military and high technology experts to obtain state secrets and intelligence. Capvision works with Chinese financial institutions for foreign companies to provide insights into commercial sectors. The state secrets were allegedly stolen by the company, by violating the national security law for the pursuit of economic interests. China’s priority of state security makes this harder and riskier for European companies attempting to make financial decisions in the country. China’s perceived threats to national security also extend to the financial sector. On November 3, China’s Ministry of State Security, the intelligence and secret police agency of the CCP, pledged to actively protect the country’s financial stability as a matter of national security. In a WeChat post, the Ministry of State Security suggested that some countries had been actively spreading bearish sentiment about China’s financial assets and undermining investor confidence in the country. This came as investments began leaving China due to stalling economic growth, low interest rates, and rising geopolitical tensions with the US. In light of China’s current government neglecting to improve job prospects for new graduates, or addressing the yawning inequality between coastal and inland regions, Xi’s political coalition has doubled down on regime security above all else. Trade Deficits in EU-China relations As Chinese authorities’ anti-espionage investigations into US companies come as US-China relations worsen, there are also concerns that European businesses could be targeted. EU policy on China is shaped by national priorities and does not speak with a single voice, yet there is a transition taking place. China’s close relations with Russia over its war in Ukraine, tensions over Taiwan, and Xinjiang human rights abuses are pushing EU member states and EU institutions to take a harder stance on China’s economic dependencies. Another weakening point in the relationship is the ballooning trade deficit with China (see fig. 1 and 2). The EU trade deficit with China has widened from €200 billion in 2020 to €400 billion in 2022. This has led to the EU Commissioner for Trade, Valdis Dombrovskis, arguing that the trade deficit with China was too large and needed to be brought down. This has triggered complaints of unfair trade practices, and a lack of access to China’s market for European companies. EU policy has reacted by creating a number of protectionist measures on China’s imports into the EU. The EU Commission’s launch of an investigation into state-subsidies into Chinese-made electric vehicles in Europe in September 2023, marked an aggressive turn in trade relations between the EU and China. There are also more EU commission plans down the road to investigate more anti-subsidy probes on wind turbine technologies made in China. Dider Reynders, the acting EU competition commissioner, said that cheap Chinese imports could threaten European businesses, and suggested a similar probe into state-aid funding for wind turbines. Beijing quickly shot back that these were “protectionist” measures from Brussels, accusing the EU of weakening domestic productivity rather than China’s state-subsidies. President Xi Jinping has appealed to Germany’s president Olaf Scholtz directly to put brakes on the looming trade war with Beijing. However, the trade deficit and EU calls for protectionism is likely to become louder in the future. More confrontational protectionist voices in member states could find a good audience in the growing urgency over China’s dominance of supply chains, critical minerals, and a potential clash over Taiwan. In this case, European businesses could be seen as security risks to the Chinese state. Dangers of Decoupling The intelligence alliance, Five Eyes, warned that a total decoupling of western economic links to China is unrealistic. However, China's Communist Party's turn to regime security above economic ties under Xi Jinping poses acute security threats for European organizations in China. EU-China relations are still at a crossroads, but growing hawkishness of EU-China trade relations indicates that Chinese authorities may pose a threat to European interests in China in the future.

Do you want to join our team and start your career in the security and intelligence world? Dyami is searching for one or two intelligence/research analysts for the first 2024 internship period (February to June/July)! Who are we? In a world with ever-growing and ever-evolving risks, organizations need bespoke and agile solutions to fulfill their duty of care and protect their operations, both at home and abroad. Dyami, a full-service strategic security provider, lives by its mission statement of enabling you to thrive; safely and successfully. To do this, our team provides strategic outlooks and analyses, security risk and threat reports, travel security advice, aviation services, and diverse types of training. At dyami, you will be working alongside a team of analysts and security experts with backgrounds in the private, public, and non-profit sectors. Job Description: The intern will work within the intelligence unit at dyami and report to the Lead Analyst. Your responsibilities and taskings will include: Following and analyzing current and emerging local, regional, and international security trends. Contributing to research, identifying security-related issues in volatile environments and conflict regions. Helping with research and risk assessments for stakeholders. Contribute to Dyami’s intelligence cycle. Assists in the day-to-day operations of a start-up company. Who are we looking for? Someone with a great ability to critically analyze qualitative information and to be a team player. Good organizational and communication skills, including writing clearly and concisely. Someone who is preferably enrolled in or have recently graduated from a master in security studies, conflict studies, international relations, intelligence/crisis management, journalism, or any related field. Excellent command of English, both spoken and written. Fluency in any additional languages is a strong plus. A flexible attitude is essential, as Dyami B.V. is a young and rapidly growing company. You also must possess an international mindset; intercultural sensitivity is important. Please note: you have to be located in the Netherlands and able to reach our office in Utrecht. What we offer: Practical learning opportunities to apply your analytical capabilities to real-world situations. An opportunity to develop professional analytical writing skills. Substantial feedback on your work by a variety of experts. Exposure to intelligence and security and risk management research methodologies. Exposure as an analyst on our website, social media, and through the extensive network of our team. The opportunity to work in a young and growing company. Internship allowance: This internship offers €350.00 gross a month for a 40-hour work week. Interested? If you are interested in applying for this position at dyami, please send the following documents: A CV; A brief cover letter that mentions your main topic(s) of interest (max one page and can be attached as email text); One writing sample of around 2 pages, preferably about a specific country, conflict, or current geopolitical situation. This can be an extract of previous (academic) work. Please send your application to: alessia@dyami.services, with the topic “Application Intelligence/Research Analyst internship. (YOUR NAME)” before December 10, 2024. This internship follows conventional 09:00-17:00 work hours, Monday through Friday. The start date is in February 2024 and it is expected to end in July 2024.

Date: 13/11/2023 Where: Australia (Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, and Fremantle) Who’s involved: Dubai Ports International (DP World) Australia, Australian Government, Undisclosed Threat Actor What happened? There was a significant cyber security incident first detected late on Friday, 10/11/2023 involving major Australian ports operated by DP World Australia, the country’s largest container terminal operator. They are responsible for handling 40% of maritime freight at their respective ports. This incident has led to the shutdown of ports in Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane, and Fremantle. Activities from DP World Australia were halted from 10/11/2023 until 13/11/2023. DP World Australia considered the incident so significant that it took its systems offline for quarantine. The Australian government has acknowledged the severity of the situation, describing it as a “significant cyber security incident” that could last several days. The response is being coordinated at a governmental level, with efforts underway to assess the full extent of the impact on port infrastructure. On the morning of 13/11/2023, DP World Australia said that they would resume operations in a “gradual manner” as the investigation continues. No additional details about a specific threat actor or what systems were impacted have been provided at this time. Statements are still being published about hundreds of containers holding up traffic. Analysis The fact that DP World Australia had to disconnect its systems from the internet suggests a breach with potential for extensive network infiltration, possibly a ransomware attack or an advanced persistent threat (APT), a highly skilled threat actor that may have been planning the attack for some time. The lack of ransom demands, however, might indicate a different motive such as espionage, disruption, or a state-sponsored attack aiming to destabilize critical infrastructure. Considering the scale and impact, this could be the work of a sophisticated cybercriminal group or a state-sponsored entity. The choice of target – a major port operator – hints at possible geopolitical motivations, suggesting the involvement of a nation-state actor or an APT group with backing from a nation-state. China is regarded as Australia’s primary regional competitor in exports. Given its recent history of engaging in cyberespionage with many of its neighbors–including The Philippines, Malaysia, Japan, and Singapore–a China-based APT would be a highly plausible culprit. That said, China is not the only nation housing threat actors with these capabilities, and isn’t the only regional power that would stand to gain from crippling these shipments. As well, the two nations recently have engaged in talks to improve relations, and a state-sponsored incident like this would be ill-timed. DP World is no stranger to controversy. In the context of the war between Russia and Ukraine, DP World is considered a “sponsor of war” by the Ukrainian government, as they are one of the most notable logistics companies that did not cease business with Russia in light of the invasion. Alignment with Russia, or even the perception of it, has been the impetus for many organizations to sustain cyberattacks, though admittedly none known of this severity. Conclusion While the situation at the DP World Australia’s ports is still ongoing, it represents the latest example of the vulnerability of global supply chains to various types of disruptions that can be perpetrated through cybersecurity-related incidents. The lack of clarity regarding the identity and motives of the threat actors means that recommendations for response and mitigation are limited for the time being. While the possibility of a China-based APT as the perpetrator aligns with the broader context of regional competition and recent cyber espionage activities, the absence of concrete evidence calls for caution against premature attributions. This incident also sheds light on the geopolitical dimensions of cyber warfare, where entities like DP World, which have significant international presence and political connections, can become focal points of cyber conflicts due to their strategic importance and affiliations.

Date: 10/11/2023 Who’s involved: Hezbollah, Mossad, Jewish community in South America, drug cartels. What happened? On 08/11/2023 the Brazilian police, in combination with the Israeli secret service Mossad, arrested two individuals with links to the Iranian-backed terrorist organization Hezbollah on suspicion of wanting to conduct a string of terrorist attacks in South America. On 09/11/2023 the Brazilian Minister of Justice denied any Israeli involvement in the case and said it had been an ongoing operation that had started before 07/10/2023. Since the Palestinian terrorist organization Hamas conducted an attack on Israeli territory on 07/10/2023, killing 1400 Israeli civilians, Israel has been waging a war against Hamas in the Gaza strip. Multiple South American countries have openly condemned Israel for the killing of civilians in Gaza and have recalled their ambassadors. Bolivia, Chile and Colombia have been very vocal in their disapproval of Israel’s retaliatory actions against Hamas. Argentina and Brazil have openly protested against Israel’s actions but have not been as outspoken as the former mentioned countries. Hezbollah is known to have deep ties in South America by aligning itself with the Brazilian drug cartel The First Capital Command. Together they smuggle drugs, laundry money and ship weapons across the globe. Hezbollah is known to have more ties with drug cartels across Europe and Africa in order to finance their operations. Iran, which gives military, financial and logistic support to Hezbollah, has in the past sent IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps) advisors to South America in order to help set up a terrorist network. In the 1990’s Hezbollah conducted several terrorist attacks in Argentina targeting Jewish and Israel-aligned institutions. On 17/03/1992 a suicide bomber detonated himself close to the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires killing 29 people and wounding 242. On 18/07/1994 a suicide bomber detonated himself inside the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires killing 80 people and injuring over 300. On 19/07/1994 a man on a Panamanian flight detonated himself and killed all 21 passengers of which 12 were Jews. Investigators found that Hezbollah mainly operates in the Triple Frontier area, which is the three way border between Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay and has a large Muslim population and is also a popular area for drug cartels to operate in. There are large Jewish communities in South America with Argentina and Brazil having the two biggest communities. The Jewish community has issued warnings to its members that since the Hamas attack on 07/10/2023 there has been an increase of nearly 700% in antisemitic behavior across South America. Analysis: Even though it is not widely known, South America is home to large groups of Jewish people. After the pogroms in Eastern Europe at the end of the 19th century large groups of Jews found a new home in South America. After the Second World War there was a new influx of Jewish people who decided that Europe was no longer safe for them. It is estimated that there are over 300.000 Jews residing in South America, with the majority in Argentina and Brazil. This has led to terrorist organizations that claim to fight for the Palestinian cause, focussing some of their operations into South America. The other reason terrorist organizations have an interest in South America is the fact that they can make a lot of money smuggling drugs and weapons for and with the drug cartels. Even though Iran funds and arms Hezbollah in large amounts, the organization feels the need to have another stream of income and the drug trade is the easiest way for a terrorist organization to get large sums of money. This also means that they can use the trade routes and infrastructure of the cartels and they can share knowledge on how to avoid law enforcement detection. With the drug cartels being a multi-billion dollar industry that works transnational and transcontinental this means there is a lot of knowledge and power at disposal for groups like Hezbollah. With the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas it is likely that pro-Palestinian terrorist organizations like Hezbollah will target Jewish communities across the globe. If local South American leaders openly show support for the Palestinian side and condemn Israel it is likely that this will lead to South America becoming a breeding ground for antisemitic sentiments, where in the past this was not the case, even under far-right dictatorships across the continent in the second half of the twentieth century. With security agencies across Europe and North America heightening their vigilance on terrorist activities aimed at Israel or the Jewish community it is likely that groups like Hezbollah will try and find other places to conduct terrorist attacks. South America seems to be high on the ladder of importance for Hezbollah because it already has support and an infrastructure in place there. Conclusion: It is imperative for the Jewish community in South America to keep a close eye on security issues regarding the Israel-Hamas war. Terrorist organizations like Hezbollah can easily find their way to weapons, explosives and manpower in the so-called Triple Frontier in cooperation with the First Capital Command drug cartel. It is not unlikely that a terrorist attack against the Jewish community or Israeli interests will take place in Argentina or Brazil. The attacks in the 1990’s show that Hezbollah has the capabilities and willingness to conduct large scale attacks in South America. The recent arrests in Brazil only show that the Hezbollah network is still in place. The Israeli secret services are capable, but with the vast network and connections Hezbollah has it is unlikely that Israel will be able to entirely neutralize the terrorist threat to the Jewish community in South America.

Date: 09/11/2023 Where: Yemen Who’s involved: Houthi rebels (Ansar Allah) backed by the Iranian government, United States government What happened? The U.S. Defense Department released a statement to the press that a MQ-9 Reaper drone was shot down by the Iranian-backed Houthi Rebels while operating over international waters and within international airspace. Yemen is situated between the Gulf of Aden to the south and the Red Sea to the west. Since the outbreak of the Israeli - Hamas war on 07/10/2023 the U.S has expanded their presence in the region to deter a larger-scale conflict. Iran and its allies have issued warnings of potential retaliation if Israel does not cease its attack on Gaza. The U.S. has relocated military resources such as aircraft carriers, Marines, and support vessels to the Middle East. Some of these ships are present in the Red Sea. The MQ-9 Reaper shootdown occurred 3 weeks after the USS Carney intercepted multiple missiles and drone attacks launched by the Houthi rebels as they moved northward over the Red Sea. Together with the IDF, the ship reportedly intercepted 4 cruise missiles and 15 drones targeted at Israel. On 31/10/2023, Israel intercepted a surface-to-surface long-range ballistic missile and two cruise missiles that were fired by the Houthi rebels in Yemen. It was Israel's first-ever (public) operational use of the Arrow (missile family) system for intercepting ballistic missiles. The MQ-9 shootdown took place hours after the U.S. President Biden gave the order to launch F-15E Strike Eagles to conduct an airstrike against a weapon storage facility in Syria that belongs to a different group of Iranian backed rebels. MQ-9 Reaper effect on Civil Aviation in the area It is unclear whether the MQ-9 Reaper was on a surveillance mission or armed for attack/reconnaissance, as the drone can carry a variety of armaments, including missiles and laser-guided bombs. After the recent drone and missile attacks by the Houthi Rebels out of Yemen aimed at Israel, it is highly likely that U.S. forces keep a close look at the developments in Yemen regarding attacks aimed at Israel and U.S. assets in the region. The MQ-9 was most likely shot down by the Yemeni “Fater-1” SAM, which is based on the Soviet SA-6 SAM. The Yemeni “Fater-1” SAM, poses a threat to Civil Aviation and the potential for mis-identification by Houti Rebel forces. However there are no major airways in the vicinity of Yemen airspace that are used nowadays by Civil Aviation. Houthi Rebels ‘Ansar Allah’ The Ansar Allah is an Islamist political and armed organization that emerged from the Yemeni governorate of Saada in the 1990s. The Ansar Allah is a predominantly Zaidi Shia force, whose leadership is drawn largely from the Houthi tribe. They are financially backed and militarily supplied by Iran and North-Korea. The Ansar Allah flag and slogan reads "God is the Greatest, Death to America, Death to Israel, Cursed be the Jews, Victory to Islam". Since 2015, the Houthi have been engaged in a conflict against the Saudi Arabian–led intervention in Yemen, which aims to establish full territorial control by the internationally recognized government within Yemen. Additionally, the Islamic State militant group has targeted various major parties involved in the conflict, including the Houthi, forces loyal to former president Saleh, the Yemeni government, and the Saudi Arabian–led coalition forces. The Houthis seek to govern all of Yemen and align themselves with anti-imperialist movements against the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. They have carried out multiple missile and drone attacks against Saudi cities. The conflict is widely viewed as a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Since the onset of the Israel-Hamas war, the Houthis have also initiated drone and missile strikes against Israeli cities.

Written by Mark Bruno In New York, four individuals have been apprehended for their involvement in two conspiracies aimed at illegally exporting controlled, dual-use technologies to Russia. The technology in question, valued at over $7 million, includes semiconductors and integrated circuits. These are crucial for the Russian military's technological capabilities, which have been stifled by sanctions. While the case is ongoing, there are indications that this incident is part of a larger conspiracy by Russia to subvert its technological limitations for its war in Ukraine. This is not the first vector–and certainly won’t be the last–for Russia’s attempts to steal western technology. Exports From New York One of the arrested individuals, Salimdzhon Nasriddinov, is a Russian-Tajik national, while Nikolay Goltsev and Kristina Puzyreva hold dual Russian-Canadian citizenship. They were part of a significant sanctions evasion and export control scheme. In a separate indictment, a Brooklyn resident, Nikolay Grigorev (also of Russian and Tajik citizenship), was arrested, and two Russian nationals, Artem Oloviannikov and Nikita Arkhipov, were charged but remain at large. The indictment reveals an illegal scheme to procure dual-use electronic components for Russian entities involved in drone development and manufacturing for the war in Ukraine. Grigorev and his partners used Quality Life Cue LLC (QLC), a Brooklyn-registered company, as a front to facilitate their illegal operations. This scheme was intended to support companies affiliated with the Russian military, including SMT-iLogic, a sanctioned entity identified as part of the production chain for Russian military drones. Court documents show that QLC accounts received about $273,000 between October 2021 and February 2022, which were used to purchase electronics for export to Russia. A search in June 2023 at Grigorev's residence in Brooklyn led to the seizure of over 11,500 electronic components awaiting illegal export to Russia. There are a number of methods used to circumvent sanctions. One common method is the use of third-party countries to re-export banned goods. EU-sanctioned goods are exported to certain third countries and from there further exported to Russia. This is often done to evade direct export bans from the EU to Russia, as evidenced by foreign trade data. Any entities trying to export to Russia would have to go through countries that haven’t sanctioned them. The two countries regarded as most important for this are Turkey and China. From October 2022 until the following January, imports of chips and processors from China to Russia were at least 50 percent higher than those of the previous year. However, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan fall into this, as well. In 2022, Armenia imported 515 percent more chips and processors from the US and the European Union, with 97 percent of those being re-exported to Russia. In the New York case, Goltsev and Nasriddinov were said to be able to order the items under assumed identities and false pretenses from US manufacturers. They allegedly were then able to ship them to Russia through intermediary companies located in Turkey, Hong Kong, China, India, and the United Arab Emirates. According to the investigation, it was found that US shipments to some of these foreign entities entirely came from Goltsev and Nasriddinov’s front companies. Some sanctions regulations may have loopholes or exemptions that can be exploited. For instance, the Sanctions Regulation adopted by the EU allows for some possibility of continuing exporting under pre-existing, or “grandfathered” contracts, subject to a case-by-case assessment. As well, there are some exceptions for non-military use products. Among the inclusions are products intended for cooperation in space programs, civilian telecommunication, and nuclear and maritime safety among the uses listed. This could potentially be used as a way to continue exporting dual-use goods under certain conditions, though some nations can be more discerning with their export controls. Western Technology In The Eastern Arsenal Russia has a long history of acquiring smuggled military-grade parts from the United States, including costly specialized chips for satellites that can withstand radiation in space. That said, even more mundane products can be used in some of these weapons systems. This latter category is much easier to get past export restrictions. AMD, Intel, and Texas instruments were all able to trace thousands of shipments of such products from the time the war started. Essential elements such as semiconductors, processing units, switching devices, storage units, power control modules, charge storage devices, and signal converters, among others, are included. The products from these 155 firms, found within Russian armaments, constituted critical component transactions amounting to $2.9 billion with Russia in the year 2022. Many of the weapons systems used against Ukraine have a need for these more consumer-grade components. To anyone following the conflict, this would include familiar-sounding systems such as Iskander-K missiles, Orlan and Korsar drones, T-72 tanks, Typhoon-K vehicles, and Tornado-G rockets. As well, components can be cannibalized for use in helicopters, electronic warfare systems, and other small electronic devices. They’re not just making their way into Russian equipment, but even more historically sanctioned arsenals such as those of Iran. New research has revealed that the Iranian drones deployed by Russia in Ukraine are powered by stolen Western technology. According to Conflict Armament Research (CAR), the Shahed-136 drones sold to Russia by Iran are powered by an engine based on German technology, which was illicitly acquired by Iran almost 20 years ago. There's evidence suggesting that US and Israeli components, including American-made microelectronics, are ending up in Iranian-made drones, as well. An investigation by the UK-based organization Conflict Armament Research found that 82% of the components in some of the drones downed in Ukraine were manufactured by companies based in the US. Much of Russia's weapons are running on Western-designed devices, core operating systems, and networking software. Companies such as Microsoft, Google, Oracle, IBM, and others have been named in reports. In a similarly-related situation, Russia's access to Western cloud computing resources and cloud-based data, such as commercial satellite imagery and GIS systems, has been critical in the ongoing conflict. Access to IT service providers such as Microsoft, Google (Cloud and Android), SAP, Oracle, IBM, Cisco and dozens of others, have been instrumental for Russia. Before the war, Russia's plan was to engineer systems well-prepared for future conflicts, with a strong emphasis on the development of artificial intelligence technologies. However, the Ukraine war and subsequent sanctions have hindered this plan. Nonetheless, there are indications suggesting Russian entities have attempted to employ artificial intelligence to bolster their disinformation efforts. Simultaneously, the Russian military is heavily deploying loitering munitions to strike at Ukrainian urban centers and hinder the Ukrainian forces' retaliatory actions. Loitering munitions, while it hasn’t been firmly established, are generally considered a place for AI implementation to grow rapidly within weapons development. Russia has made visible technological progress in hypersonic technology, with the development of hypersonic glide vehicles and cruise missiles. The Avangard intercontinental ballistic missile system, the sea and ground-launched hypersonic cruise missile Tsirkon, and the air-launched ballistic missile Kinzhal are examples of such advancements. Famously before the invasion of Ukraine, Russia had showcased the Kh-47 Kinzhal, which has since been used to strike targets as far from Russian airspace as Lviv, near the Polish border, and is shown to be capable of avoiding early detection. While specifics of the design are naturally considered sensitive data, it’s relatively easy to speculate that such an advanced weapon would require more sophisticated components than what Russia is able to develop domestically. A Challenge To The International Order One of the promises of globalization is its ability to resolve conflict through rational economic interests. Within this framework, sanctions seem like one of the best controls for dealing with states that overextend themselves and commit violations of the international order. However, Russia has seemingly managed to subvert what appear to be massive sanctions, while waging the largest land war in recent history, all while having an economy smaller than most of its military peers. That is not to say it’s weathered the storms without massive costs, but events such as the recent arrests in New York show that there is a long way to go before its supply chains are severed. An additional element in this context is that countries friendly to Russia–including China, Iran, and North Korea–have all demonstrated a willingness to not only share technology and designs with Russia, but also a willingness to steal designs and software from western developers. The New York arrests reveal Russia's persistent attempts to circumvent sanctions and procure dual-use technologies, demonstrating the extent of its efforts to bolster its military capabilities amid ongoing conflicts. As it stands right now, it would seem that sanctions are merely adding an additional step to Russia’s acquisitions. The case underscores the need for ongoing dialogue and cooperation between governments to address the global security challenges posed by sanctions evasion and technology misuse. Edited by Jacob Dickinson About the Author Mark Bruno is a noncommissioned officer in the United States military, where he serves as a Combat Medic and a Public Affairs Representative. He holds a Master’s Certificate in Information Assurance from the University of Maryland, and a Bachelor of Science in Communication from the State University system of New York. All statements made in this article are his own, and do not reflect any policies or positions of the United States Department of Defense.

Date: 08/11/2023 Where: Panama Who’s involved: Panamanian President Laurentino Cortizo, Panama Supreme Court Canada-based First Quantum Minerals, and Panamanian civil society. What happened? Since 20/10/2023, Panama has been experiencing a growing wave of protests triggered by the signing of a contract granted by Panamanian President Laurentino Cortizo to the Canada-based First Quantum Minerals mining company to operate in Cobre Panama copper mine, the largest in Central America. The contract allows First Quantum Minerals’ local subsidiary company, Minera Panama, to operate for 20 years, with the option to extend for another two decades. Also, the 20-year contract guarantees an annual income of $375 million to the Panamanian government, which represents 4.8% of Panama’s gross domestic product. The first Cobre Panama mine exploitation contract dates back to 1997, later declared unconstitutional in 2017 by the Supreme Court. The mine, in 2013, was acquired by First Quantum Minerals, which has operated there ever since, despite the absence of a contract. The mine was temporarily closed in December 2022. At the announcement of the new contract, thousands of people took to the streets of Panama City to protest against the exploitation of the country’s natural resources and the possible environmental consequences. The mine has, indeed, long been a cause for concern over its environmental impact due to its high water usage. Following the protests, First Quantum Minerals issued a statement announcing its climate change mitigation strategy, using advanced technologies to achieve a 30% reduction of emissions by 2025 and 50% by 2030. The protests are also motivated by discontent against the government and social inequalities. Protesters are concerned about concessions that favor the exploitation of the country's resources by foreign companies rather than prioritizing local enterprises. Moreover, negotiations between the government and the Canadian mining giant have been perceived as non-transparent and with no public input. Key actors, such as indigenous communities, have been excluded from the talks. Also, allegations of corruption against the lawmakers have been made. Since the start of the protests, about 900 protesters, including 117 minors, have been arrested for vandalism and damage to private property and government buildings. In clashes between security forces and protesters, numerous people have been injured, including at least 39 police officers. In response, President Cortizo announced a referendum, to be held on 17 December 2023, on whether to revoke the contract with First Quantum Minerals. On Friday, 03/11/2023, Panama’s Parliament approved an indefinite ban on new contracts for metal exportation and extraction, stopping ongoing proceedings of 103 mining concessions that were under review to be halted and 15 other existing contracts to be renewed. However, the ban will not apply to the already signed agreement with First Quantum Minerals. The constitutionality of the deal with the Canadian company will be assessed by Panama’s Supreme Court. The announcement of the referendum and the uncertainty over the future of mining concessions resulted in wiping out First Quantum Minerals' shares and market value by 40%. Analysis: The Cobre Panama mine is the largest and only active copper mine in Central America. It comprises two open pit mines, two power stations, and a port. At its full capacity, the mine can produce more than 300,000 tons of copper annually. Gold, silver, and molybdenum are also found on-site. The mine production accounts for about 1.5% of the global copper supply. First Quantum Minerals’ procedures appear to comply with environmental protection regulations. The mining company is also responsible for creating about 40,000 jobs in Panama over the years and has invested approximately $10 billion in the country. The Panamanian government’s stance on the matter and the eventuality that the December 17 referendum will result in the annulment of the contract with the Canadian company is putting at risk Panama’s reputation as an investor-friendly haven. Besides a severe devaluation of First Quantum Minerals, the ongoing protests and authorities' hesitations could discourage current and future investors, severely affecting the Panamanian economy. The referendum could lead to more restrictive laws on mining concessions and foreign companies’ access, as occurs in other countries in the region, such as Costa Rica and El Salvador. Environmental concerns underlie attempts to close the Canadian-owned copper mine. Civil society organizations oppose this project, which is considered non-sustainable for a country with such environmental vulnerability and vast biodiversity and water resources as Panama. Protesters also claim that open-pit mining activities negatively affect other pivotal sectors of the Panamanian economy, namely tourism, agriculture, rice production, and livestock farming. The protests suggest a widespread dissatisfaction with the government’s performance and are driven partly by social inequality, deteriorating living conditions, and a high unemployment rate. The social unrest comes at a delicate time for the Panamanian government. The next presidential election is scheduled for May 2024, and former President Martinelli (2009-2014) appears ahead in the polls, albeit being sentenced to 10 years for money laundering. Due to constitutional limitations, President Cortizo is not eligible for a second consecutive term. Civil society representatives announced that the protests would not stop until the termination of the mining contract with the Canadian company or the nationalization of the Cobre Panama mine. For now, the government has not commented on the possibility of nationalizing the mining complex. Even though President Cortizo has called for a referendum, it is still uncertain whether the vote can be considered legal. Indeed, the Electoral Tribunal of Panama has stated that the issue would require the approval of a law by Congress rather than a national vote. The legality and feasibility of the referendum are still under review. The government of Panama allowed the mine to operate while negotiations were ongoing. If the Supreme Court finds the contract unconstitutional and passes a new mining concession law, the contract with First Quantum Minerals could be terminated or renegotiated. Without the Supreme Court’s ruling, any unilateral termination by the government could be a violation of the contract and necessitate international arbitration. Conclusion: Mass protests over the concession of the largest Central America copper mine to Canada-based company First Quantum Minerals pose multiple challenges to the Panamanian government. The protests are unlikely to subside without achieving the termination of the contract with the Vancouver-based mining company and an escalation of the demonstrations could cause further violence in the country. Continued turmoil could also adversely affect the tourism sector. At the same time, however, not only could the cancellation of the contract with First Quantum Minerals have legal repercussions for the Central American country, but it could also damage Panama’s foreign business-friendly reputation. Should the December 2023 referendum cancel the contract with First Quantum Minerals and approve the revision of mining concessions laws in favor of more restrictive measures, it could be a major disincentive to foreign investment, severely damaging Panama’s economy and trade relations.

Date: 01/11/2023 Where: South China Sea, Spratly Islands Who’s involved: People’s Republic of China (PRC), Philippines, United States (US) What happened? Since early August, the Philippines has been supplying equipment to troops stationed on the Second Thomas Shoal, a Philippine military outpost in the disputed South China Sea. Following the 2016 UN Convention Law of the Sea ruling filed by the Philippines, the court found that China’s occupation of several islands in the South China Sea were illegal. Despite the ruling, China’s Coast Guards have remained on the island. On 05/08/2023, another China Coast Guard vessel shot a water cannon at a Philippine supply boat. This follows attacks against Philippine vessels earlier in the year, when China Coast Guard shined military-grade lasers at Philippine sailors. On 26/09/2023, the Philippines Coast Guard cut an underwater rope put into place by Chinese forces to prevent Philippines fishing boats from legally fishing in the region. The Philippines Coast Guard said that the “barrier posed a hazard to navigation, a clear violation of international law”. Manila has condemned the PRC’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea following the PRC’s attempts to block the Philippines from resupplying a military outpost in the Second Thomas Shoal, an island inside the Philippines exclusive economic zone. China has condemned the ‘provocations’ as unnecessary. On 15/10/2023, the Philippines’ House of Representatives and its Senate were allegedly under cyber attack. The online portals of both government bodies were out of service throughout the week. While not all of the details have been made available, there have been overtures of a harsher cybersecurity stance made by the Philippine government. Government sources claim that there was a “spike of attacks” on administrative bodies. On 26/10/2023, US President Biden warned China that the US will defend the Philippines if there is any “attack” in the South China Sea, invoking the Philippines Mutual Defense Pact signed in 1951. Analysis: The Philippines' resupplying missions and confrontation with China’s Coast Guard demonstrates a more forceful assertion of its rights in the South China Sea. While the Philippines won the UNCLOS case in 2016 which rejected China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea, in practice, China’s Coast Guard has stationed vessels in Philippines shoals, developing new oil rigs and actively preventing fishing boats from using the reefs. Under former president Duterte, the Philippines was more friendly toward China and Russia and weakened ties with the United States. For current President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, the government is feeling more confident in its support from the US to confront the PRC’s aggression in the South China Sea. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has signed further defense treaties with Japan and the U.S with fears mounting over a potential invasion of Taiwan. The Philippines is 93 miles away from the island and would become involved in some way. After 30 years since US troops left the island, in February 2023, the Philippines announced that the US has access to four new military bases. The dispute is likely to escalate in the near future, given the determination of the Philippines government to reassert its sovereignty over its waters. The Philippines-China relationship is likely to deteriorate. The PRC’s response is to use force to prevent the Philippines from asserting its right to fish in waters, resulting in the deaths of 3 Philippine fishermen. As well as constant collisions, it remains to be seen how China will further respond. The Philippines is highly dependent on trade with China, and could suffer from import bans through China’s economic coercion. China’s economic and cyber pressure on the Philippines could increase as a result. The Philippines Transport Secretary announced that China had “lost interest” in developing two railway lines between Philippine island of Luzon. Senators have indicated that they are looking to Japan and South Korean sources of investment as an alternative. The Philippines is highly dependent on trade with China, however, and is highly vulnerable to China’s economic coercion. In response to the recent cyber attacks, the Philippine Army’s Chief of Staff, General Romeo Brawner Jr., has promised to establish a joint Cyber Command. The General claimed that attacks on the cyber front are occurring “almost every day”. In the same statement, he said that the military would immediately put a halt to construction of telecom towers on military bases. It was pointed out that state-owned mobile carrier, China Telecom, is largely responsible for this infrastructure. Conclusion Tensions between the Philippines and China are likely to continue as the Philippines reasserts its rights to the Spratly Islands and the PRC responds forcefully against Philippine vessels. The concerns over an invasion of Taiwan has made the Philippines reconsider the threats from an assertive China. It will only push the Philippines closer toward the US and regional allies. At the same time, the Philippines is vulnerable to China’s economic and cyber coercion as it is highly dependent on trade with China, even though it is boosting security ties with the US. Given the US mutual defense treaty with the Philippines, there is a chance that the heightened tensions could be a key source of friction in the Indo-Pacific.