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Date:   21/08/2024 Who’s involved? Ukrainian government, Russian government, the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Russian Armed Forces  What happened? Ukraine invaded Russian territory in the Kursk region on 06/08/2024 . This time multiple Ukrainian brigades were dedicated to the attack, as opposed to smaller contingents of Russian nationals seen in 2023 and early 2024 with groups such as the Freedom of Russia Legion and the Siberian brigade. Mass amounts of Russian POWs were taken, largely consisting of conscripted forces. This caused backlash in Russia, resulting in the first Russian initiated prisoner exchange talks. In the following days, airstrikes hit Russian air bases, which were suspected of housing the aircraft responsible for the mass glide-bomb attacks on Ukrainian lines. Most recently, Ukraine blew up three bridges, effectively cutting off 600km2 of land, and an estimated 3000 Russian troops from the rest of Russia. Russian forces have been unable to come up with a quick response to the Ukrainian incursion, losing large amounts of reinforcing troops to ambushes. However, Russian defenses seem to slowly be established by now.    What is Ukraine’s motivation? Diversion of Russian troops:  This goal is both short- and long-term. In the short-term, as a direct effect of this incursion, Russia will have to redirect troops from the active front lines in Ukraine to the Kursk region. This results in slightly less pressure on Ukrainian troops on those lines. In the longer-term, this incursion is likely to make Russia dedicate more troops to the defense of its own borders, locking these troops out of combat in Ukraine. If Russia opts to not do so, it runs the risk of falling to another incursion in the future. This balances the ‘field’ more, as Ukraine has had to protect all of its border shared with Russia, and even Belarus, since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022.  Denying Russia rest:  Russia has been on the offensive since March 2024. Offensive operations always cost more manpower, equipment, and ammunition than defensive operations. At the point of culmination, when an offensive has lost all of its momentum, an army typically takes a defensive posture to ‘recharge’. This moment will arrive soon for the Russian army, but they will likely not be able to rest, as it is unlikely that Putin will allow Ukraine to hold Russian territory for long. This means the Russian army will have to stay on the attack in the Kursk region, after being on the attack for months already. This will likely hurt their future war effort.  Bringing the war to Russia:  For the first time since the start of the full scale war, large swaths of Russian land, over 1000km2 has been occupied by Ukrainian forces. This forced Russian citizens to flee, and showed Russians living near Ukraine that they are not safe from this war. This (for now) massively successful Ukrainian incursion also showed the Russian citizens that Putin is not as in control of the situation as he outwardly portrays to be, hurting the stability of his position.  Diplomatic leverage:  If peace talks will happen, and Ukraine is still holding Russian territory, this ensures Kyiv leverage at the negotiating table. However, (for now) Ukraine’s official stance is that they do not plan to hold the Russian territory in the long-term.  Seize successes on the battlefield:  It has been a while since Ukraine had any major gains on the battlefield, dating as far back as late 2022. This new success does not only hurt Russian morale, but it is also likely to significantly boost Ukrainian morale. It is critical that Ukraine continues this operation successfully, and if/when pulling out of Russia, does not incur major losses of personnel or machines.  POW exchange fund:  Ukraine managed to capture record amounts of POWs in the two weeks (at the time of writing) of this operation. Reportedly, over 2000 Russian soldiers were captured. As declared by Zelensky, these POWs will be used to exchange captured Ukrainian soldiers. The Azov fighters captured at Mariupol are specifically mentioned. Due to both the scale and conscript nature of most of the POWs taken in Kursk, Russia is more inclined to exchange POWs to quell unrest in Russia itself.  Show to ‘the West’ Ukraine’s capabilities to win:  As mentioned before, the last Ukrainian victory on the frontlines was more than a year ago in 2022. One of the main reasons used by those who oppose supporting Ukraine in ‘the West’ is the claim that Ukraine does not have the capability to win the war. This incursion into Kursk shows Ukraine’s capabilities and potential. This may motivate Western leaders to donate more equipment to Ukraine.  Conclusion Ukraine’s operation into Kursk can be seen as a great success for Kyiv (at the time of writing). Multiple goals have been achieved, and there are no signs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces decreasing their efforts anytime soon. As they still hold the upper hand, and dictate the fighting, there is potential for further success. It will however be critical for Ukraine to not let this operation end with major losses while holding onto territory against mass attacks from Russia, if those will happen. This would take away from the success of this operation and severely damage Ukrainian morale.

Date:  20/08/2024  Where : Haiti Who’s involved : Kenya-led MSS,  Haiti security forces, gangs  What happened? Haiti has been experiencing a deteriorating security and humanitarian crisis since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in 2021.  In  September 2022, a powerful coalition of gangs, known as the G9 Family led by Jimmy “Barbecue” Cherizier, took control of several parts of the capital Port-au-Prince. The security situation further deteriorated in late February and March 2024 , when gangs launched a series of coordinated attacks in response to former de facto PM Ariel Henry’s agreement for the deployment of Kenyan police officers in the country. The escalation of violence and the unrest led to a political crisis, the resignation of the contested PM Henry, and the installation of a transitional council. Haiti's new government was announced in June 2024 , led by Prime Minister Garry Conille.  Amid   growing insecurity and gang-related violence in Haiti, the   UN Security Council approved to send a Kenyan-led multinational force , the Multinational Security Support (MSS), to assist the Haitian government in countering armed gang violence in October 2023. The MSS’ aim is primarily to train the Haiti National Police (PNH) to defeat the armed gangs and lead to a situation where it will be possible to hold democratic elections.   The initial forces of the MSS arrived in the country on 25/06/2024 , after several postponements. Currently, 400 of the 2500 planned forces have been deployed in Haiti. Along with Kenya, other countries, including the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Chad, Barbados, Jamaica and Benin, are planning to join the support mission.  Since their arrival,  Kenyan forces are not achieving significant results and advances against the gangs , which control 90% of the capital. The main accomplishment of the MSS has been taking back control of the largest public hospital in Haiti. Analysis : Haiti is grappling with a prolonged economic, political and security crisis . The crisis was exacerbated by the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in 2021. The recent escalation of gang-related violence and political instability has worsened the already precarious situation. In Haiti there are more than half a million internally displaced people, about 5.5 million people in immediate need of humanitarian assistance, and about 45% of the population facing food insecurity. Kidnappings and murders have soared in recent months, with over 3,200 reported killings in 2024.  The MSS is widely regarded as a key response to Haiti's security issue, welcomed as a “unique opportunity” to restore order by Haiti’s interim PM Conille, and praised by US President Biden as “the best chance” to restore democratic governance in the country. However, the MSS has been presented with structural and mandate issues that make it unlikely to achieve its goals, and is spawning significant controversies.  First, the MSS’s mandate and long-term strategies are not clear and transparent.  Although authorized by the UN Security Council, the MSS mission operates outside the  supervision of the UN and involves limited involvement of Haitian authorities and civil society.  Haitian authorities, including the Presidential Security Council and law enforcements, appear to have limited influence and knowledge of the MSS mission's operational strategies.  The lack of cooperation between the government and the MSS   undermines the credibility and legitimacy of the mission.  The main objective of the MSS is to support and train Haiti’s national police (PNH) into tackling gang violence and assist the government in restoring law and order, addressing the humanitarian crisis and advancing the political process. However , little progress has been made for Haitian police capacity building . The risk is that the MSS mandate ends leaving the PNH untrained and in an unchanged unstable environment. Slow progress shows that the mission may lack adequate resources and equipment .  The MSS force lacks critical assets such as helicopters, combat vehicles, and necessary infrastructure, to combat the estimated 5,000 to 10,000 gang members entrenched in and around Port-au-Prince. The situation has increased pressure on the operation’s main sponsor, the US, to boost financial support and deploy additional resources . Beyond financial aid, the MSS also requires more personnel. Although additional forces were expected from countries like the Bahamas, Bangladesh, and Jamaica, their deployment remains uncertain.  Moreover, human rights organizations and Haitian civil society expressed concerns over the lack of clear accountability mechanisms to address potential human rights violations.   Haiti has a troubled history with international interventions and impunity. The last international intervention, the U.N.’s 2004-2017 MINUSTAH mission, resulted in a massive sexual abuse scandal and a cholera epidemic. MINUSTAH have caused widespread distrust of foreign forces in Haiti, and part of the civil society remains opposed toward international interventions . Moreover, Amnesty International has pointed to the Kenyan police’s troubling human rights record, including recent allegations of brutality towards protesters in Nairobi, last June 2024 .  Finally, the MSS lacks a long-term strategy to address and solve the root causes of the cycle of violence in Haiti . Besides the short-term goal of assisting and training the Haiti National Police (PNH) in fighting gangs, the MSS has a marked military-centric approach  which will prove ineffective in the long run in identifying and resolving the socio-economic and political drivers underlying the gang violence and dynamics in the country. Gangs in Haiti are deeply intertwined with society, the political sphere, and the private sector and cannot be eradicated by military force alone . Moreover, Haitian gangs are linked with regional criminal organizations and successfully finance their activities by participating in transnational illicit networks, mostly arms and drugs trafficking.  Kenya has recently experienced a big wave of anti-government protests  that lasted for over a month. Although not reported by the media, it is also possible that further  turmoil in Kenya might have an impact on the Kenyan forces deployed in Haiti,  perhaps requiring them to go back to provide support in their country.  Conclusion : Nearly two months after the arrival of the international MSS forces little has changed in the volatile security environment in Haiti.  Despite the deployment of international forces, the humanitarian crisis and escalating gang-related violence is intensifying.  The mission, greeted with great enthusiasm by the international community and the Haitian ad interim government, does not seem to be able to meet expectations due to discrepancies between the ambitious objectives and actual resources and the lack of a clear mandate.  The inconsistencies of the MSS and the lack of tangible improvements for the local population threaten to exacerbate frustrations and distrust toward local authorities and foreign forces , jeopardizing the credibility and legitimacy of the Kenyan-led mission. Moreover, ensuring the success of the MSS requires a long-term strategy to address gang violence  and governance with a more holistic approach. Capacity building of the Haitian police force and greater involvement and ownership of the country's stabilization process by the government and local stakeholders are imperative steps to accomplish the objectives of the MSS.

Total MPOX cases from 01/01/2022, as of 31/03/2024. Source: WHO  (2024) Date:   15/08/2024 Who’s involved? The African center for disease control and prevention, World Health Organisation, the Democratic Republic of Congo, pharmaceutical companies and Western governments. What happened? On  13/08/2024,  the African Center for Disease Control and Prevention  declared a public health emergency on the African continent pertaining to a new strain of MPOX that has been found to spread fast in certain parts of West Africa and is targeting women and children. On  14/08/2024,  the World Health Organization called the MPOX outbreak a global health emergency  making it easier for countries and emergency services to obtain adequate amounts of vaccines and reduce paperwork to effectively control the outbreak. In 2022, the WHO also called another outbreak of MPOX a global health emergency but this referred to another strain of the virus which was transmitted through sexual contact. The newer strain seems to spread easier and affects also women and children whereas the former strain was more prevalent among men as it was spread mostly in the gay community through sexual encounters.  This 2022 strain of MPOX spread across the world and there were numerous cases in the United States, Germany, France, Denmark and other countries. MPOX is a version of smallpox and can cause fever, very painful lesions, chills and body aches. Lesions are usually seen across the face, hands and chest but the new strain shows less obvious lesions and mostly in the genital area.  People, mainly children, can die from MPOX. The new outbreak seems to center on the DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo) and has been responsible for dozens of deaths of children in crowded and unsanitary refugee camps. The East of the DRC has been an unstable region for decades and the government has little to no control over the region which is rich in minerals and is fought over by dozens of terrorist and guerilla groups.  The mineral mining in the area is supported by foreign governments and organizations that profit from extracting the minerals and are willing to pay armed groups to protect their interests from being seized by the government.  Vaccines are readily available for Western countries and outbreaks are easily managed which reduces the mortality rate severely.  In West-Africa however vaccines are not readily available and pharmaceutical companies and Western governments seem reluctant to provide vaccines. The WHO declaration of a global health emergency has been issued to tackle this problem by circumventing bureaucracy and red tape, but it is not a guarantee that enough vaccines will be available. It is hard for NGOs to get correct numbers and information on the MPOX outbreak  in DRC as the outbreaks occur in contested and dangerous areas where there is no government oversight and armed groups control the flow of people and products.   Analysis: With the new strain of MPOX spreading fast throughout the DRC and other countries it is likely that hundreds of people will be infected in the coming weeks and months.  The number of deaths will rise exponentially and without a well regulated vaccination programme there is the chance the virus will spread to other countries in the region. Countries bordering the DRC like Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and South-Sudan house large numbers of refugees and displaced people in camps that are not very sanitary. MPOX can easily spread through these camps and it could force people to leave these camps out of fear for their children’s lives. Such an event will spread the virus to places it has not been before, like the refugee camps in Sudan, and it can quickly turn into a very large health emergency.  The past has shown that the outbreak of a disease in poor regions of the world can wreak havoc amongst the population, especially when they live in refugee or displacement camps that are not very hygienic. Armed groups and terrorist organizations can take advantage of this situation by getting their hands on vaccines and being the ones that distribute them in regions under their control.  This will likely make people feel more favorable towards these groups as their resentment towards their own government or the West grows. A large outbreak across the African continent can destabilize entire regions that are already on the brink of falling over. This effect can become exponentially worse if the virus spreads to the West and other rich countries and vaccines for Africa will be even less in supply. Resentment over the unbalanced distribution of the COVID vaccines can be fertile ground for extremism.  If groups like ISIS or Al Qaeda, or countries like Russia, jump in the gap and help distribute vaccines it is likely that alliances in these regions will shift. The handing out of vaccines is imperative and will likely help stop the virus from spreading. The willingness of Western countries and pharmaceutical companies to distribute the vaccines free of charge to poorer countries and regions will be the main driving force behind stopping the spread or by letting it run its course. During the COVID pandemic in the early 2020’s the lack of availability of vaccines for poor countries across the globe was the main factor in the rise of the number of deaths in these countries. This also made the pandemic last longer than necessary.  It has long been a contentious point on the global scale that Western countries and pharmaceutical companies tend to keep vaccines for themselves.  There is an overproduction and storage of vaccines in the West that at certain times needs to be disposed of because the vaccines have passed their expiration date. During the COVID pandemic in 2022 several pharmaceutical companies pledged to open factories and laboratories in Africa to serve the vaccine market there. But recently most companies have retracted their investments stating that it is not economically viable.  Western companies cannot compete with countries like India that produce generic vaccines.  Another problem the pharmaceutical companies have come across was that qualified people who could work in their laboratories usually leave Africa to find work in Europe or the United States. High salaries and a higher standard of living makes moving more attractive. Conclusion With the WHO and the African CDC declaring a global health emergency on the outbreak of MPOX in West-Africa there is still a chance that the spread of the disease can be halted if enough vaccines are distributed in these regions. However, it seems that the West and pharmaceutical companies are again reluctant, as they were during the COVID pandemic, to produce more vaccines and supply them to NGOs and emergency health organizations . This reluctancy can lead to a wider spread of the virus and will be responsible for the deaths of dozens of people, mostly children. MPOX is a treatable virus but the new strain is harder to recognize if not looked at by medical professionals. It is therefore likely that the virus will infect more people as they do not know that they are infected by MPOX.  This does not help with curbing the spread of the virus. The African CDC and the WHO are likely to lobby for more grants and vaccines to be made available to tackle the outbreak before it becomes a true global problem as COVID turned out to be.

The security situation in Bangladesh is worsening. Mohammed Yunus now leads the interim government but the protests are unlikely to stop. There are several reported attacks against Hindu minorities in the country, with rioters also targeting the apartments of members of the Awami League. Rival political factions, as well as students calling for the immediate release of prisoners held by the authorities, will hold demonstrations in the coming weeks. Police presence has resumed somewhat but remain scarce, with the military refusing to act to prevent further rioting. While international flights are open and train links have resumed their services, it is possible that they will become targeted as gathering centers for protests. Protesters have also targeted banks, public buildings and hotels around the country, with several clashes resulting in the shooting of civilians. Several countries have advised against all but necessary travel to Bangladesh. International travelers must consider rethink any travel plans to Bangladesh for the time being, unless the situation improves. Dyami will continue to monitor the unrest and are ready to assist.

Written by Arianna Lucà, Jacob Dickinson, Iris de Boer, Kevin Heller, Sara Frisan  Russia-Ukraine: Russia launched its largest sustained drone attacks against Ukraine, while Ukraine continues to strike targets inside Russia.  Israel:   The conflict between Israel and Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran and the Houthi is going into a new phase. Myanmar:   Large scale offensive from pro-democracy and ethnic armed forces make significant gains with the arrival of the first conscripts into the Myanmar military junta.  Sudan:   Territorial gains by the RSF in Sudan’s southeast. HRW reported high levels of sexual violence against women and girls committed by the RSF as well as the SAF. Mali: Following major losses of Malian soldiers and Wagner Group fighters in large-scale clashes, the government cuts ties with Ukraine for allegedly supporting the rebels.  Somalia: Increasing threat from Islamic State and Al-Shabaab, posing new challenges for Somali Security forces as UA peacekeeping mission will withdraw in December 2024. Nigeria:  Nationwide protests over the soaring cost of living and economic hardship turned violent in Nigeria. Mexico: The arrests of Mexican Sinaloa cartel’s drug lords could trigger further violence and instability in the country.  Bangladesh: Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina resigns and new elections have been called with General Waker, an Army Chief leading an interim government. DRC: Amid escalating fighting between Congolese army and M23 rebels, DRC and Rwanda agreed for a ceasefire.  Kenya:  As violent anti-government protests against President Ruto persist, concerns grow over police violence and the economic repercussions of instability in Kenya.  Venezuela:  Deadly protests erupted in the aftermath of July 28 Venezuelan presidential elections, as Maduro was declared winner in a contested and likely fraudulent vote.  China-Taiwan: The PRC pressures other states to not attend Taiwan’s diplomatic initiatives and Taiwan holds annual military exercises. Conflicts, July 2024 Russia-Ukraine In early July, Russia managed to gain territory in the area of Chasiv Yar  in Donetsk Oblast, while Ukraine managed to make small gains on other parts of the on the eastern front . Fighting also continued in the Kharkiv region, where it was reported that Russia used wounded soldiers on the frontline. Ukraine succeeded in regaining some ground lost in the north  with the support from the Ukrainian Air Force. In addition, fighting took place in the Zaporizhia region and on the southern bank of the Dnipro river in Kherson Oblast. In July, Russia launched its largest sustained drone attacks towards Ukraine  since the full-scale invasion, targeting civilian and critical infrastructure. Russia launched 90 drones at civilian targets across Ukraine earlier this month, particularly in Kyiv, with one attack targeting the main children’s hospital, killing over 30 people. Ukraine managed to strike targets inside Russia  on an almost daily basis, including military facilities. In late July, Ukraine succeeded in striking the ferry port that connects Crimea to the Russian mainland and in early August a Russian submarine sank due to a Ukrainian strike.  NATO allies had pledged more aid for Ukraine as a new deal suggested that Ukraine is on a path to membership. At the end of July, Kyiv received several F-16 fighter jets from the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway  which are hoped to allow the Ukrainian air force to strike further into Russian territory and defend against Russian glide bombs. On August 1, a major prisoner swap  between Russia and the West took place, involving people from seven different countries. The swap has been the result of months of negotiations and has been mediated by Türkiye. Israel The conflict between Israel and Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran and the Houthi has gone into a new phase in July 2024. After Israel presumably killed Hamas political leader Haniyeh in Tehran  on July 31, on the day of the inauguration of the new Iranian president, tensions have flared in the Middle East.  Iran has vowed to retaliate against Israel  for the death of Haniyeh and has formally declared that it will attack Israel. Meanwhile, Israel also managed to kill the most high ranking Hezbollah military commander  in Beirut on the same day Haniyeh was killed in Iran. This right hand man of Hezbollah leader Nasrallah, called Shukr, was known to have been involved in dozens of terrorist attacks including the attack on the American embassy in Beirut in   1983 which killed hundreds of US Marines. Israel held him responsible for the deadly attack on a Druze village on   July 27 killing 12 children who were playing football.  Iran is preparing to attack Israel with the help of its proxies in the region . Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria, Hezbollah in Iraq, Hamas in Gaza and the Houthi in Yemen are all well funded and supplied by Iran and it is reasonable to assume that they will all be involved in a multifront attack on Israel. Meanwhile, the IDF actions in Gaza in July were focussed on neutralizing Hamas command structure across Khan Yunis  mostly. Several large raids on Hamas compounds were conducted and several high ranking Hamas terrorists were killed. The IDF also uncovered several large tunnels leading into Egypt. These tunnels were large enough for trucks to drive through and were probably used to transport weapons and hostages in and out of Gaza. The fate of the Israeli hostages is uncertain  and negotiations on their release have stalled with the death of Haniyeh. Several bodies of killed hostages have been found and returned to Israel in July 2024. Myanmar  The Brotherhood Alliance , a mix of three ethnic armed groups and pro-democracy forces, made  substantial gains against the military junta  in July. On July 8, the Arakan Army (AA) seized the Thandwe Airport after heavy fighting in Rakhine State in a major blow to the military. The UN has reported that the Arakan Army and the military have conducted human rights violations  against the minority Muslim Rohingya community.  The end of a Chinese negotiated ceasefire  in June has led to more offensives against the military junta in the north eastern Shan State. On 26 July, the ethnic Chinese armed group the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) reported that it had captured a key regional commercial and military command headquarters in the city of Lashio after a month of siege. The fall of Lashio  is significant as it reduces the junta’s ability to stage a renewed assault on the territory it has lost in Shan State or re-establish control over the lucrative Myanmar-China border area. This followed another announcement by the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) that they had gained control over a ruby-mining center to the west of Lashio. The alliance between these groups and the People’s Defense Forces (PDF) have so far remained intact and are able to push the military out.  However, there are indications that the junta is halting several offensives in Sagiain and Kayin, and recaptured a key city in the Kayah State . It has stalled the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). The military’s unpopular conscription order will produce another 15,000 soldiers by the end of 2024. The military has restarted its defense industries by maintaining its air force and conducting airstrikes more than ever. If the opposition forces fail to stay together to defeat the military in common cause, or the military junta maintain its ability to wage war, then the civil war will become worse in the near future.  Sudan  While the government supported Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are at war with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Sudan's government accepted an invitation for a new round of peace talks  in Geneva sponsored by the U.S. in late July. However, General Burhan who is leading the SAF later stated that the SAF would not join talks as Burhan survived a drone strike  while visiting an army base in eastern Sudan. The RSF has denied any responsibility for the attack. In July, the RSF continued its territorial gains in Sennar state  and took control of a majority of cities in Sennar as well as some SAF bases. In early July, the RSF also succeeded in capturing the city of al-Meiram  in West Kordofan. It is reported that the RSF is establishing civil administrations in the captured territories to weaken the control of local governments. According to the UN, the fighting in Sennar displaced over 151 thousand people from their homes.  The humanitarian situation in Sudan has worsened as food insecurity  is increasing as Sudan is currently experiencing lean season, which normally takes place from June to September. On August 5, the Sudanese government denied famine in the Zamzam refugee camp  in north Darfur despite findings by a global food monitor. In late July, heavy rains and floods took place in the Kassala province  in Southern Sudan, damaging multiple refugee camps. On July 28, Human Rights Watch released a worrying report documenting an intense degree of sexual violence by both the RSF and SAF targeting women and girls in Sudan . In addition, it was reported that the fighting parties have targeted health facilities and staff. Earlier in June, Doctors Without Borders released a similar report. It is estimated by the United Nations that over 10.7 million people have been internally displaced in Sudan since the start of the war in April 2023.  Alerts, July 2024 Mali In early July 2024, the military rulers of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso signed a treaty establishing a confederation called the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)  and formalized their exit from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Malian President Goïta was named as the first leader of the AES. The separatist confederation has an anti-ECOWAS and anti-Western stance. It confirms the military juntas' alignment with non-Western powers like Russia, Iran, and China. In July 2024, Mali signed new cooperation agreements with Russia and discussed plans for a nuclear power plant. Moreover, domestically, tensions are escalating between the military junta and the opposition. Despite the government lifting the three-month ban on political party activities and the call for national dialogue, on July 15, several opposition parties announced a boycott of consultations with the government, denouncing political repression and arbitrary detention of opposition figures . The presence in Mali of about 1,000 troops of the Russian private military group Wagner , who are responsible for atrocities against civilians, has been confirmed since 2021. In July 2024, clashes between the Malian army, supported by Wagner's Russian fighters, and Tuareg rebels intensified  in the north of the country on the border with Algeria. Large-scale fighting was reported from July 25 to July 28. The rebels gained significant wins and confirmed the killing of 84 Wagner mercenaries and 47 Malian soldiers . Following the fighting, arguably Wagner's deadliest defeat, the spokesperson of Ukraine's military intelligence agency (GUR) claimed that the Tuareg rebels had received the necessary information for a successful military operation against the Russian armed group. Although Ukraine denied its support for the rebels, on August 4, the Malian government cut all diplomatic ties with Kyiv for alleged involvement in the rebel attack . Moreover, an Al-Qaeda affiliate claimed the killing of 10 soldiers and 50 Wagner’s mercenaries in northern Mali.  Somalia The  threat of Islamic State  in Somalia is growing as IS increased its activities in Puntland , a semi-autonomous region of Somalia. In May 2024, the US and the Somali National Army (SNA) conducted an airstrike and attempted to target the leader of IS in Somalia, Abdulqadir Mumin. However, the airstrike did not succeed in eliminating Mumin. It is also believed that IS in Somalia has experienced an influx of fighters from other countries in the region , including some top IS members. This would strengthen the power of IS within the region and its ability to support global IS activities. Somalia’s security forces are also dealing with the  threat from the Al-Qaeda affiliated insurgency Al-Shabaab , and intensified its operations in the southern part of the country. Al-Shabaab, who has been contesting the government for over 17 years, is known for its deadly terrorist attacks all around Somalia, including the capital Mogadishu. On August 3, Mogadishu has experienced an attack by an Al-Shabaab suicide bomber and gunmen killing 37 people . Somalia’s security forces are currently supported by the African Union peacekeeping force, but its peacekeepers are expected to withdraw  in December 2024. This has increased worries about Al-Shabaab further expanding control in the country. In addition, it was reported by ACLED on 31 July that inter-clan fighting has also risen since February 2024. Authorities blamed Al-Shabaab for influencing this inter-clan fighting. Nigeria Hundreds of people took to the streets in Abuja, Lagos, and other major Nigerian cities to protest economic hardship, unsustainable living costs, and bad governance . Nigeria is experiencing its worst economic crisis in decades , with inflation above 34 percent, rising prices of primary goods, and a dramatic increase in the population below the poverty line. Attempts to revive the economy under President Tinubo, who has been in office since May 2023, including the partial suspension of fuel and electricity subsidies and devaluation of the national currency, have led to rising fuel and other goods prices. Nigerian security forces have violently suppressed previous protests . Amnesty International reported the killing of 13 protesters, although authorities put the death toll at 7, and the arrest of at least 50 journalists. Activists and protesters denounce the use of excessive force by police . About 700 protesters have been arrested. On August 4, President Tinubo called for an end to the protests, promising to create opportunities for dialogue. Nevertheless, it is likely that the protests, expected to last until August 10, 2024, will continue in the coming days. Further clashes between protesters and police and an escalation of violence cannot be ruled out.  Bangladesh The  student-led protests in Bangladesh against an unpopular quota system turned violent  in late July. The Awami League, under the direction of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and the security forces, clamped down fiercely on the protesters, imposing a curfew, shutting off access to the internet and employing arbitrary detentions. The total number of over 200 people dead  is higher than the single digits estimated by the authorities. The Awami League blamed the protests on ‘outside forces’ and the opposition Bangladesh National Party (BNP).  The protests continued for another week of intense clashes. At the beginning of August, Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina unexpectedly resigned as protests broke into her former residence and fled the country . As the daughter of the leader of Bangladesh’s independence movement in 1971, she was frequently arrested and came to power as a pro-democracy candidate against the military government. However, according to critics, her government oversaw the repression of opposition parties, clamping down on internet freedom, and widespread corruption . Her departure, potentially to New Delhi, is a demonstration of her close ties with the Indian government , who see her administration as a beacon of stability in the unstable northeastern Manipur region in the northeast of the country. The new interim government , led by Army Chief General Waker-us-Zaman,  announced that new elections will take place with the engagement of the opposition parties  and that an inquiry will be held into the deaths of protesters from the authorities. The president of Bangladesh, Mohammed Shahabuddin, ordered the release of student protesters . There is likely to be more instability as some rioting elements continue. The compromises reached by the opposition parties, the Army Chief and the timing of the next elections will be crucial in seeing how the situation will develop.  Mexico . On July 25, Mexican drug lord Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada and Joaquín Guzmán López, son of “El Chapo,” were arrested in Texas , after disembarking from a plane. El Mayo is one of the most important traffickers in Mexican history, co-founder of the Sinaloa Cartel with the former kingpin “El Chapo”, while Guzmán López inherited his father's cartel faction. Their arrests, a major coup for US authorities, were conducted without Mexico's knowledge and could trigger divisions within the Sinaloa cartel . This instability might benefit the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), long-time rival of the Sinaloa cartel. The Mexican military deployed forces in the Sinaloa state to avoid escalation of violence. While the arrests are a win for US law enforcement, they could lead to increased violence in Mexico, due to the  resulting power vacuum .  Updates, July 2024 Democratic Republic of Congo Despite the humanitarian truce announced by the US on July 4, and extended until August 3, clashes between the Congolese army and M23 rebels have not stopped in the eastern part of the country , especially in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces. M23 attacks and fighting have been reported in Lubero and Masisi territories, North Kivu, aggravating the dire displacement crisis.  Nearly 2500 Congolese, including 98 police officers, crossed the border with Uganda  in the past few days, fleeing from the escalation of violence. In recent weeks, IS-affiliated ADF attacks have also increased in North Kivu province. On July 13, at least 70 people were killed in an escalation of intercommunal violence  in Kinsele, about 100 kilometers east from Kinshasa, fuelling concerns over rising ethnic violence in the country.  On July 30, the foreign minister of DRC and Rwanda signed a ceasefire deal  during a meeting held in Angola. The ceasefire started on August 4. While the UN and the international community welcomed the agreement and the possibility of halting the hostilities, it is still unclear which parties agreed to the ceasefire as the Rwanda-backed M23 militias were not signatories to the accord . Escalating tensions between DRC and Rwanda had slowed the withdrawal of MONUSCO peacekeepers, requested in 2023 by the Congolese government. On July 14, the DRC foreign minister said that the departure of UN forces is not viable as long as there are Rwandan troops in the country . Kinshasa has long accused Rwanda of supporting the M23, accusations denied by Rwanda. Moreover, in early July, the UN provided evidence of Ugandan army support to the M23 in eastern DRC. Uganda denied any involvement with the militia.  Kenya In July 2024,  Kenya experienced an unprecedented wave of nationwide protests . Triggered by a controversial proposed financial bill and tax hikes, protesters argue the measures disproportionately affect the poorest. They are demanding better living conditions and President Ruto's resignation,  blaming him for the deaths and violence against protesters in recent weeks. The demonstrations, which began in mid-June as peaceful, took a violent turn due to the repressive response by police forces. According to human rights organizations, Kenyan security forces used excessive force toward the protestors, resulting in the deadliest anti-tax protests  in the history of the country. At least 50 people were in the clashes, while over 650 people have been arbitrarily detained. To halt the protests, President Ruto withdrew $2.7 billion in tax increases and fired almost his entire cabinet, appointing members of the main opposition party to the cabinet Despite the concessions to the protesters, anti-government protests seeking the president's resignation will likely continue throughout August 2024. Anti-government rallies have already been announced for the coming weeks  outside government buildings in major Kenyan cities. The violent developments in Kenya are having dramatic economic and political consequences. The UN, the US, and the EU have called for dialogue and restraint on all sides. International observers are closely monitoring reported suspected abuses and violations by Kenyan security forces, which already have a reputation for brutality and corruption.   Venezuela On July 28, Venezuela held presidential elections marked by intimidation and obstacles for the opposition . Despite independent polls predicting a major victory for opposition candidate González Urrutia,  the government-controlled National Electoral Authority (CNE) declared Maduro the winner . While Russia, China, and allied countries like Cuba and Bolivia congratulated Maduro, most of the international community called for full release of the voting results , which the CNE has so far failed to do. On August 1, the US recognized Venezuela’s opposition candidate as the election’s winner.  Protests erupted immediately after the results were announced , with demonstrators tearing down statues of Hugo Chávez and demanding political and civil freedoms. Security forces responded using tear gas and rubber bullets. On August 3, massive demonstrations organized by the opposition took place nationwide. Clashes with security forces resulted in thousands of arrests and at least 20 deaths . The UN expressed concerns over the allegations of human rights’ violations.  The Organization of American States (OAS) asked the ICC and ICJ to investigate Maduro's protests’ crackdown. Maduro launched an investigation against opposition leaders, accusing them of inciting the insurrection. González and Machado called on security forces to “stand by the people” and stop their support for Maduro’s regime.  Venezuela is currently experiencing a deepening political crisis , with growing regional and international concern over escalating protests, security, human rights and democracy in the country. More protests and repression are expected. Venezuela's neighbors fear a new mass exodus due to rising violence . Peru, Panama, Brazil and Chile increased border security.  China-Taiwan China and Taiwan relations in July began with Taiwan announcing that China’s Coast Guard had seized a Taiwanese fishing boat in the Taiwan Strait  on 3 July claiming that they were illegally fishing in China’s waters. In a turn toward minor positive relations on maritime issues, on 30 July, China and Taiwan reached a deal over fisherman’s deaths  in February 2024.  There were also reports from six countries saying that Chinese diplomats had been pressuring governments  to not attend a special conference on the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC). The meetings were held in Taipei and focussed on how  democracies should deal with the threat from Beijing. Members of the IPAC have been subject to cyberattacks and sanctions. The Taiwanese military conducted annual military exercises , called Han Kuang based on Taiwan, and the islands of Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu simulating an attack from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army from the PRC.  Taiwan’s ties with Japan, the Philippines and Australia have become closer in July . Japan released a new defense paper and warned of China’s rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait, with possible military action involving mainland Japan. More collaboration has been announced with the US, with the US  stationing a three-star general in Japan for the first time since the 1990s. The US also announced further military funding for the Philippines , including an additional  $500 million for improving maritime defense and intelligence sharing capabilities due to shared concerns over China’s actions in the South China Sea.  The US presidential election also implicated Taiwan in July. Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump said that Taiwan should pay for the protection of the island from China . After leaving office in 2020, he was the preferred candidate instead of Biden because he strengthened ties with the island for the first time since the US severed the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan in 1979. Biden’s presidency has seen closer ties with the island, stating on several occasions that he would defend Taiwan if attacked . Trump’s comments on the US-Taiwan relationship led to the Taiwan’s premier saying that Taiwan was grateful for US support and was working to build its own self-defense capabilities.  About the authors  Arianna Lucà Arianna is a new intern at Dyami, covering the role of Research Intelligence Analyst to enrich her background knowledge in International Relations with topics involving security and conflict. She holds an MA in International Relations from Leiden University and an LLM in European Criminal Justice from Utrecht University. During her academic career, she has volunteered for different NGOs, mainly Amnesty International, and Emergency and ActionAid, embracing humanitarian and conflict security causes, and addressing issues like famine and lack of security in different regions of the world. With Dyami, she is contributing to joint publications, writing articles, and keeping up to date with key regional developments. Jacob Dickinson  Jacob studied Global Political Economy at Leiden University. He is passionate about international development and is looking to expand his expertise in geopolitics and crisis management. Curious about other cultures, he has traveled in Europe and Asia for both academic study and professional purposes. His expertise includes the geopolitics of oil and industrial upgrading in the electronics global value chain. He is particularly interested in the evolving political and economic relationships between China and ASEAN, and the consequences for regional development and security.  Iris de Boer Iris works as a Global Intelligence Analyst at Dyami, leveraging her background in Human Geography. Additionally, Iris holds an MA degree in Conflict Studies and Human Rights from Utrecht University, specializing in conflict analysis, peace processes, and geopolitics. Her MA thesis delved into the securitization of the war in Ukraine by the Heads of State, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and Ministers of Defense of the Netherlands and Poland. Within Dyami, Iris is actively involved in security risk management, travel security, and geopolitical analysis. Her enthusiasm for addressing topics in international security extends across a diverse spectrum of countries and regions Kevin Heller Kevin has over a decade of experience in the world of counter-terrorism as a consultant, trainer, and analyst. His background is in military Close Quarter Battle/Combat and Krav Maga for Military and Law Enforcement agencies. As a Global Intelligence Analyst, he writes Intel Briefs on conflict zones and terrorism.He has extensive knowledge of conflicts, politics, and other events happening in the Middle East. Kevin also has a background in Journalism and International Affairs/Conflict Studies. Sara Frisan  Sara works at Dyami as a Geopolitical Intelligence Analyst, leveraging her background in Peace and Conflict Studies. Sara joined Dyami after completing her MA in Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University and held an MA degree in International Sciences and Peace Studies. During her academic career, she conducted research in South America, primarily Colombia, on the dynamics of collaboration and resistance between civilians and non-state armed groups in violent settings. In her previous internship at the investigative think-tank InSight Crime, Sara developed some expertise on transnational organized crime and political-criminal alliances.

Date:   08/08/2024 Where:   Country: United Kingdom  Who’s involved: English Defense League, football hooligans, Tommy Robinson, Civil Newsgroups, disinformation campaigners and others. What happened? On 29/07/2024 , a tragic stabbing attack  at a Taylor Swift-themed holiday club in Southport resulted in the deaths of three young girls. Eight other children and two adults were injured, with some still in critical condition. The perpetrator, identified as 17-year-old Axel Rudakubana, is now in custody until October 2024. Rudakubana, born and raised in the UK, and of Christian Rwandan heritage, had his identity initially withheld due to his age.  In the aftermath of the knife attack, social media accounts speculated that the attacker was a Muslim asylum seeker that recently arrived in the UK . This story is false, but was quickly picked up by rightwing groups, generating a stream of anti-immigrant and Islamophobic posts on social media, calling for the organization of anti-migrant riots . Plans of engaging in violent gatherings, including the locations and times for the riots, were spread on social media and messaging apps in advance to the riots.  One such riot took place on 30/07/2024 ,   when a large crowd clashed with the police  in Sunderland, resulting in more than 50 officers injured. Rioters threw bricks, fireworks, and rocks at a mosque, set a police car and a building on fire, and chanted "we want our country back." The unrest spread to several towns and cities  across England, like Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds, Nottingham, Bristol, and London. Rioters attacked migration centers  and hotels housing asylum seekers too.  To date, far-right riots have impacted around 20 towns and cities across the UK. On 02/08/2024 ,   Prime Minister Keir Starmer met with local leaders in Southport to discuss support for the local community, a day after he announced a new “ national capability ” to tackle disorder . The new measures will allow the sharing of intelligence, improved facial recognition technology and criminal behavior orders to restrict travel to troublemakers.  After chairing a second meeting of the emergency response committee on 05/08/2024 , Starmer reassured the public saying that perpetrators will be dealt with the “ full force of the law ”. Over 400 people have been arrested  since the riots started and around 100 people have already been charged  over the violent unrest.  On 07/08/2024,  after police warned of unrest from planned far-right rallies at 100 locations, thousands of counter-protesters   peacefully took to the streets  in over a dozen cities, in solidarity with immigrants and ethnic minorities. Forming human shields around asylum centers, they held  “refugees welcome”  signs and chanted “ there are many more of us than you ”. However, in most areas they found no far-right supporters to oppose. This was not the first such demonstration. Violent clashes between far-right rioters and  Muslim counter-protesters had already taken place a few days earlier in Bolton. Analysis: After a week of widespread unrest, the UK is facing the worst anti-immigrant violence since 2011 , when a deadly police shooting of a black British man in North London led to lengthy riots in the capital. Back then, it was again Keir Starmer, then Director of Public Prosecutions, who led the prosecutions of offenders. He is now facing a similar crisis just one month after his election, and he is responding in the same way, possibly allowing courts to be open for 24 hours. Disinformation campaigns focussing on immigration also played a key role during the time of the Brexit vote in 2016. Misinformation on the UK’s future as an economic success, dictatorial EU laws, immigration and crime were coupled with a surge of national pride. This has put a focus on the importance of English pride and resulted in the perception that immigrants would endanger English culture and traditions.   Prominent politicians within right wing groups in the UK have reacted to the riots in different ways. Many elected officials have completely condemned the anti-immigrant riots. However, while condemning the riots, some right wing politicians stated that the riots were evidence of the way in which migration was affecting UK society. It's mainly the head figures within far right groups and extreme right groups organized through online platforms that have been supportive of the riots and don’t refrain from the use of violence.  However, the majority of the society in the UK is not supporting the violent riots, with many people stressing that the rioters are not representative of the UK as a whole. The UK is currently experiencing the biggest increase in poverty since 30 years . People are facing rises in the costs of living, with healthy affordable food becoming less accessible. People feel stuck in a difficult situation and those negative feelings are acknowledged within the anti-immigrant rhetoric by projecting them onto the ‘other’ . Especially the leader of the far-right English Defence League , Stephen Yaxley-Lennon operating under the alias Tommy Robinson , has played a key role in spreading Islamophobic and anti-immigrant disinformation, calling for the deportation of immigrants and provoking violent riots. It is believed that Robinson has close links to the Kremlin.   The situation might develop in different ways. One scenario is of a heavy judicial response, and that the loose organizational structure of the riots may dissipate.  Hundreds of people have been arrested so far. Starmer has vowed to “ take all necessary measures ” to end the chaos. The UK's former head of counter-terrorism suggested treating the attacks as acts of terrorism. At present, police presence has been reinforced, thousands of specialist officers have already been deployed as a “standing army” to deal with more potential riots, and trouble hotspots.  However, challenges are likely to persist. UK prisons are facing an overcrowding problem. The UK Ministry of Justice reported on 02/08/2024  that only slightly more than a thousand spaces were available across prisons in England and Wales, following the Secretary of State for Justice announcement  that the UK prisons were on the point of collapse, and operating at 99% capacity, last July 2024. Underfunding of the UK's public services is an additional challenge for Starmer. Another possible scenario is that unrest will continue, evolve into mass rallies and riots against prosecuting demonstrators , as people who take part in acts of hatred form strong group identities. Large scale counter protests are taking place and rioters have already clashed with the counter protesters in various locations across the UK. As the counter protests are growing in size, there is a possibility that clashes between rioters and counter protesters will escalate in the near future.

Date:   06/08/2024 Location:   Bangladesh  Parties involved:   Students in Bangladesh, the Government of Bangladesh, Bangladesh National Party (BNP), Bangladesh Armed Forces What happened? On 05/08/2024 , Sheikh Hasina, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, announced her resignation and is residing in the Hindon Air Force station near Delhi.  This came after a month of protests in which security forces and members of the Awami League violently repressed demonstrators. The tipping point was her decision to crackdown on thousands of people protesting outside of her residence on 05/06/2024 . This prompted her powerful backers, the military and the garment industry tycoons to turn against her. Following talks with her family and her advisors, she handed in her resignation.    There are reports of extensive clashes between protesters and the authorities in Dhaka, particularly Bakshi Bazar, Banasree and Basundhara.  Attacks have also targeted cultural venues, television offices and parliament, as well as the former Awami League party offices in Dhaka. Without balancing the need for order and preventing further reprisals from the authorities, further violence could also occur in the coming days.  The July protesters began with demands to reform a quota for civil services jobs for the ruling party, the Awami League. After weeks of peaceful protest however, they became violent as authorities cracked down on protesters. The clashes with the authorities and demonstrators have led to over the deaths of 300 people, the worst bloodshed in Bangladesh’s recent history.  The demands turned to regime change as more than 20,000 protesters were injured. The protesters are demanding accountability for the violent suppression of the protests.  The EU and India have said that they are very concerned about the reports of attacks on minorities, places of worship and members of religious and ethnic minorities.  The situation remains volatile as the protests have picked up. The army and police are unwilling to act to repair basic order around the country.  The organization of the army is also in flux; the military has been reshuffled and five generals were put into retirement.  Analysis: The mass protests have produced a profound and historic political change in Bangladesh. While the country has often been touted as a success story of economic growth and export manufacturing, inequality is rampant and corruption between garment tycoons and political elites has been rampant. The Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina had maintained power through cracking down violently on protesters, extrajudicial killings and rigged elections.  Previous attempts at protests, such as after the opposition-boycotted elections in January 2024, resulted in widespread repression on opponents and human rights violations.   The question remains about who will lead the country after she has left.  The current president of Bangladesh, Mohammed Shahbuddin ordered the release of opposition leader Khaleda Zia, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and said that all political parties had agreed to dissolve parliament and form a transitional government. It is notable that the BNP and the Jamaat-e-Islami party were in talks, without the former ruling Awami League politicians. The students who played an instrumental role announced that they will not accept a candidate supported by the military, and have instead announced their own list of eligible candidates. One suggestion is the Nobel laureate Mohammah Yunus, the head of a development bank, as the chief advisor to the interim government.  The students also remain wary of relying too much on the military for the restoration of order, citing the military’s role in suppressing democratic processes in the past. On the other hand, there are some reports that there are divisions in the military elite over how to handle the ensuing protests, with some calling for a further crackdown, while others are calling for the demands of the protests to be recognised.   Sheikh Hasina’s future is an important factor for the future of Bangladesh's relationship with India. She initially fled to New Delhi and there are reports that she is trying to seek asylum in the UK, though the UK government has not so far accepted her argument. If she stays in India, it will be difficult for India to build ties with the new Bangladeshi government that may come to power after ousting her . PM Hasina has forged closer relations with India, due to its support for Bangladesh’s independence in 1971. She also received support from India due to her hard position toward anti-Indian armed groups operating the country.

Date:  02/08/2024 Where :  Malaysia Who’s involved : Malaysian  Prime Minister's Department of Law and Institutional Reform Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) Social media and Internet messaging platforms What happened? On July 27th , the Malaysian government announced several plans for new regulatory frameworks in new legislation proposals. The proposals are controversial, particularly a plan to implement an  internet "killswitch" . The proposals will be brought to a vote in October 2024 . A government memo entitled, “New Regulatory Framework For A Safer Internet For Children And Families”, was distributed by the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission on Saturday.  The memo states that, effective August 1st , all social media services with at least eight million registered users in Malaysia to apply for a license under its current censorship regulations, required by January 1st . Previously, these services were exempted from licensing requirements. A conference to discuss online harms relevant to the legislation is scheduled for September 2024. Analysis Malaysia would join Egypt, India, Iran, Turkey, Russia, Ethiopia, and others in the short list of nations with verified “internet killswitch” mechanisms. The presented reasoning behind the new law, particularly the need for the “killswitch” , is a response to the increasing prevalence of cybercrime in Malaysia . A government Minister stated on Sunday that the “digital killswitch” is necessary to improve security. The government is also reviewing proposals to amend the Penal Code to classify and define cyberbullying offenses. Additional reforms are being proposed to Malaysia’s Anti-Money Laundering , Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act , and the Criminal Procedure Code. While there could be room for government overreach and abuse in these expanding definitions, it also will allegedly empower victims to pursue greater punishment against cybercriminals  that act against them, restoring lost property. Current laws and the powers invested in the MCMC are considered outdated, having been in place since 1998 . These dated institutional powers allegedly struggle to address the current digital landscape.  By implementing these measures, Malaysia aims to align itself with global standards on digital safety, yet this move has sparked concerns over  potential censorship and the impact on freedom of speech . The killswitch could be activated under certain conditions such as the spread of false information, cyberattacks, or threats to national security . The specifics of these conditions have not been fully detailed. The actual mechanism would involve cooperation with internet service providers (ISPs) and social media platforms. The government would have the authority to direct these entities to restrict or shut down specific internet services or platforms during critical situations. In comparison to countries like China and Iran, which are known for more stringent control over civil liberties, Malaysia's issues regarding human rights are somewhat less severe but still significant, particularly in the areas of freedom of expression, judicial fairness, and minority rights . According to digital rights advocates, 2024 is following in a trend of increasing politically-motivated internet outages , with India  being the leader in 2023 and Q1 2024. Conclusion Recently, Malaysia's political direction has shown signs of becoming more repressive, despite initial moves toward liberalization following the Pakatan Harapan coalition's victory in the 2018 elections. The current government, under Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, initially rolled back some repressive measures, such as the Anti-Fake News Act. However, it has maintained other restrictive laws like the Sedition Act and the Communications and Multimedia Act, which have been used to curb media freedoms and restrict public discourse. The proposed regulatory measures, including the implementation of an internet "killswitch" could significantly impact online freedom and the operation of digital platforms in Malaysia, potentially leading to stricter content controls and enforcement actions. While these steps claim to enhance cybersecurity and protect citizens from cybercrime, they also raise concerns about potential overreach and the impact on freedom of expression.  The legislation's vague criteria for activating the killswitch and the broad authority granted to the government could lead to unintended consequences, such as censorship and restrictions on digital platforms. As Malaysia aligns itself with global practices seen in countries like China and India, it is crucial to monitor the development and implementation of these laws to ensure that they balance security needs with the protection of civil liberties. This situation warrants close observation, particularly in light of increasing global trends toward politically motivated internet restrictions.

Written by Chris Dalby, Director of World of Crime The Kingdom of the Netherlands seems perpetually locked in a rivalry with its neighbor. This neighbor is accused of being more corrupt, more violent, and full of drug trafficking. Oh, no, this is not about Belgium. That would be too easy. This is about Venezuela. The coastline of South America’s most corrupt country lies just 65 kilometers from the island of Curaçao, a constituent country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Drugs , migrants , gold , weapons, and contraband  have flowed across this narrow strait, relying on the well-established criminal collusion within the government of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and security weaknesses in the Dutch Caribbean.   But the threats posed by Venezuela to the Netherlands have evolved. Venezuela’s largest gang, Tren de Aragua, saw its base of operations, the Tocorón prison, raided and its leadership scattered in 2023. But that has only multiplied the drug trafficking threat. The islands also provide traffickers with a plethora of options. A rise in violence in small islands across the Caribbean can be correlated with an increase of cocaine trafficking through the likes of Turks and Caicos, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and St. Lucia. These countries are destinations along “island hopping” routes, where drugs are moved by go-fast boats through different islands where they are temporarily stored before moving on. Many of these routes begin their journey through Aruba and Curaçao. Expansion of Venezuelan Gangs to Curaçao Venezuela’s transnational criminal presence does not begin and end with Tren de Aragua . But it may seem that way. Since starting inside one of Venezuela’s main prisons, in the state of Aragua, the gang has expanded its criminal tentacles by following the flow of migrants leaving the beleaguered country. Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru have all felt the presence of the gang, bringing with it homicides, human trafficking, and sex trafficking. Curaçao has not escaped this. Tren de Aragua has been connected to regular shipments of illegal migrants to Aruba and Curaçao. Millions of migrants have fled Venezuela over the last decade, but the small number fleeing to the Dutch islands has proven so profitable that Tren de Aragua is willing to fight to keep it. One route, from the town of La Vela de Coro in Venezuela to Curaçao, was dominated by a different gang until Tren de Aragua muscled in and took over, according to an investigation  by Invisibles. These migrants are charged exorbitant fees, with the chance of reaching a destination so closely connected to a European nation being all the more attractive. Policing this requires close cooperation between Dutch authorities as well as strong information-gathering in Venezuela, which is a tough task. Tren de Aragua may be the biggest name ferrying these migrants across, but they are not the only gang to do so. Plenty of small outfits operate across Venezuela’s Caribbean coast, often with the backing of local political elites, making it difficult to investigate and crack down on them.  Furthermore, in September 2023, thousands of Venezuelan police and soldiers raided Tren de Aragua’s base at Tocorón prison. This caused the group’s leadership to scatter, and there is little evidence they have regrouped in just one location.  Prisoners gathered during the raid at Tocorón prison. Source: Venezuelan Government Instead of a top-down hierarchy, reports of smaller cells have emerged, indicating a more scattered operation. However, it remains a real threat. In July 2024, the United States labelled Tren de Aragua as a transnational criminal organization, and it is one of the principal criminal threats in Chile. The Dutch Caribbean would be an obvious area for Tren de Aragua cells to maintain their presence. Beyond the easy money to be made from ferrying migrants, the existing Venezuelan diaspora, which makes up over 10% of the population of Curaçao, provides fertile ground to find new victims.  Vulnerabilities in Curaçao's Institutions and Defense Curaçao's institutions and defense mechanisms are vulnerable to corruption and require ongoing vigilance. The Royal Netherlands Navy frequently deploys vessels to the Caribbean to monitor and counteract drug trafficking and other illicit activities. These have proven crucial to seizing drugs and following go-fast boats. Seizures of cocaine by Dutch ships  such as the Zr.Ms . Groningen  are regularly among the most significant in the Caribbean and are an obvious way to show the Netherlands’ collaboration with American, British, French and Latin American partners. However, beyond the statistics, the impact of these patrols are limited.  Source: Koninklijke Marine For example, periods of increased criminal activity have been observed during the absence of these patrols. When a ship is rotating out of the Dutch Caribbean area, and replacements can need several months to be in place, a noticeable increase in drug-related crimes and smuggling activities, showing how this prevention does not actually harm long-term criminal abilities. And a March 2024 report stated  that “ the port of Curaçao is increasingly being chosen by international drug cartels as a starting point for shipping large quantities of cocaine to the Netherlands and other European destinations.” A major reason for this was that the Dutch Coast Guard had not had a patrol vessel assigned to the island for almost a year, allowing go-fast boats to operate with more impunity. Corruption has also long been a challenge, with prosecutors seeking prison sentences of up to 15 years now for corrupt port personnel. There have been several reports of law enforcement officials colluding with drug traffickers. Beyond drugs, the handling of Venezuelan crude oil stored  on Curaçao has also presented opportunities for graft. Worse, the treatment of migrants has come in for sharp criticism. An April 2024 investigation  by Dutch media, Pointer, found that Venezuelan migrants were abused, families were separated, and were not provided with legal protection. Instead of helping these migrants and sheltering them from criminal influence, this lack of support only enhances the chance they will fall into the clutches of Tren de Aragua or other Venezuelan gangs. Phenomenon of Island Hopping Island hopping has become a critical tactic for criminal organizations operating in the Caribbean, significantly impacting Dutch territories like Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao. This method involves using the geographic proximity of islands to Venezuela to facilitate the movement of drugs, arms, and human trafficking victims, making law enforcement efforts exceedingly challenging. Criminals exploit the close distances between these islands, allowing them to quickly transfer illegal goods and evade detection. One longstanding tactic is for traffickers to use high-speed boats to move cocaine from Venezuela to the Dutch Caribbean islands, where the drugs are then further distributed to Europe and North America. These small, fast vessels can easily navigate the archipelago, making it difficult for authorities to intercept them. And when they do, the crews don’t hesitate to use violence. On June 4, 2024, two Dutch craft responded  to a go-fast boat near Curaçao, suspected of carrying cocaine. Three men on board opened fire on the Dutch soldiers who defended themselves and sunk the ship and alleged traffickers. The quantities on board can be eye-watering, with around one ton of cocaine found on one vesse l in November 2023 and 1,600 kilograms dumped off  another last July.  This is nothing new, the cat-and-mouse game between traffickers and Dutch law enforcement has lasted for years. But the additional complexity of island hopping complicates the state response. While the Zr.Ms . Groningen  and other naval assets are a major strength for the Netherlands, integrated surveillance, data-sharing and other forms of cooperation with smaller Caribbean nations are weak. Crises to do with homicide, arms trafficking, and cybercrime in the region have triggered efforts to curb this lack of cooperation. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) began a cybercrime initiative  in 2022 and a “war on guns”  in 2023. Much of CARICOM’s work in the criminal and security sphere is focused on the threat from Venezuela.  However, the Netherlands-CARICOM collaboration is not yet fully exploited, since Curaçao only became  an associate member in June 2024. It is the only Dutch Caribbean island to have this status.  There is much for the Netherlands to offer, including the use of radar systems and aerial drones to warn other nations of suspicious ships and planes. Additionally, fostering stronger legal frameworks and joint task forces among Caribbean nations can ensure swift action to disrupt these sophisticated networks and secure the region more effectively​.

Written by Sara Frisan, Arianna Lucà, and Alessia Cappelletti   Following the 2024 Venezuelan Presidential election, protests have escalated in major cities nationwide. While the situation is still evolving, international reactions have been mixed.  A clear divide is visible. China, Iran, and Russia have rushed to congratulate President Maduro on his victory, while the U.S. and the E.U. have said  they would not recognize the election results until all votes were counted and records provided. U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken said the ‘result announced [did] not reflect the will of the voters’. The E.U.’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell stressed the importance to ‘ensure full transparency’ and respect the will of Venezuelans. Other countries  in Latin America have also expressed doubts about the outcome, and called  for an emergency meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS) permanent council on 31 July. Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Peru, and Panama have rejected the result or called for more transparency. In response, the Foreign Minister Yvan Gil has expelled  all diplomatic staff from these states to leave Venezuela with immediate effect.  Instead, other regional partners of Venezuela such as Cuba, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Bolivia have all congratulated President Maduro.  The international response so far is in line with Venezuela’s foreign ties under Maduro, which for the past decade have thrown him and his regime a lifeline. Over the years, Maduro's administration has strengthened ties with Russia and China, while distancing itself from the U.S.. This alignment has been exacerbated by sanctions that exclude Venezuela from the U.S. market. Venezuela has also become increasingly isolated, withdrawing from regional bodies like the Organization of American States and Mercosur, Latin America's largest economic union.  Caracas and Washington  The U.S. has imposed sanctions on Venezuela since 2005, targeting individuals and entities associated with the government. The sanctions intensified after Maduro's controversial re-election in 2018, which was marred by allegations of voter suppression and human rights abuses. The Trump administration, along with a coalition of Latin American countries, implemented "maximum pressure" sanctions aimed at ousting Maduro. These measures severely restricted Venezuela's access to U.S. financial markets and froze the assets of the state oil company, PDVSA. In 2023, a potential thaw between the US and Venezuela emerged with the Barbados Agreement, which sought to promote dialogue between the Maduro government and the opposition in return for allowing U.S. companies like Chevron to resume oil operations in Venezuela. However, following violations of the agreement, sanctions were reimposed in April 2024. As of July 2024, there were indications that Maduro sought to resume negotiations with the U.S. Following the National Electoral Council’s announcement of the election result, the US said  the results had been manipulated and did not reflect the will of the Venezuelan people. On July 30,  after a call between US President Joe Biden and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio da Silva, they issued a joint statement  on “the need for immediate release of full, transparent and detailed voting data”.  Caracas and Moscow   Russian President Vladimir Putin is among the few world leaders who congratulated Venezuelan President Maduro on his proclaimed victory in the Presidential election. Russia has been a pivotal ally for Venezuela since the early 2000s under Hugo Chávez, and the two countries enjoy a strategic partnership and robust political, military ties  and economic relations. They are also profoundly opposed to US foreign policy.  Venezuela has generally always supported Russia's actions, including Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and opposed NATO's defensive measures. In exchange, Russian oil companies are engaged in major exploration projects for oil and mineral resources in Venezuela, and they have recently agreed to increase the pace and volume of their cooperation in the field of nuclear energy and oil production. Russia has also provided Venezuela with military hardware, including advanced weapons systems, and has supported Venezuela's military elite.  Russia has consistently provided diplomatic support to Venezuela, voicing concerns about external interference of the West and blocking sanctions and embargoes on the Latin American country. By maintaining relations with Venezuela, Russia is also able to prevent US interests in Latin America generally, as well as claiming to have a more substantial role in international security. For example, in February 2024, Russia’s foreign minister Sergey Lavrov claimed to have arranged a meeting between Venezuela and Guyana to settle the territorial dispute over the Essequibo territory to form the basis for a constructive dialogue. Caracas and Beijing   The ties between China and Venezuela are long-standing and significant. On  July 29 , Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian congratulated  Maduro, saying China will strengthen relations with Venezuela.  China has opposed the re-imposition of US sanctions on Venezuela, and remains one of the most important buyers of Venezuelan crude oil. Despite criticism, with the reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Venezuela, China’s interest in Venezuelan oil is likely to increase. The sanctions make Venezuelan oil less expensive and reduce competition, presenting a more attractive opportunity for China. As the world’s largest importer of oil, China could benefit significantly from the lower prices and increased availability of Venezuelan crude oil. China has provided Venezuela massive investments and loans through state-owned banks in exchange for oil, making it Caracas’ largest creditor and bilateral lender. In September 2023, President Maduro visited China and the two countries upgraded their relationship by signing an “all-weather strategic partnership”  covering various sectors such as economy, trade, development, agriculture, and tourism. President Maduro expressed strong support for Chinese initiatives and international frameworks like the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, and the Global Security Initiative. Venezuela is also the top purchaser of Chinese military hardware in Latin America, a relationship that deepened after the U.S. prohibited arms sales to Venezuela in 2006. Between 2006 and 2022, China exported  around $629 million worth of weapons to Venezuela. Caracas and Tehran Iran and Venezuela, both under heavy U.S. sanctions, have forged a closer partnership, particularly in the oil sector. Iran has recently supplied Venezuela with gasoline and technical assistance to develop its oil industry, helping Venezuela circumvent some of the impacts of U.S. sanctions. However, economic challenges persist and Venezuela has had difficulties in meeting payment obligations to Iran. Why the Netherlands should observe this election The international community closely watched Venezuelan presidential elections, as the outcome could impact regional stability and global geopolitical dynamics. But with Maduro at the helm, at least for the foreseeable future, Venezuela’s stance in the world is unlikely to change.  The Dutch government warned  about the interference of the geopolitical interests of third parties (U.S., China, Russia) on its border with the country. The Kingdom of the Netherlands shares its longest border with Venezuela, through the Dutch Caribbean islands—Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao. The recurring socio-economic, political and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela has led to a mass exodus of Venezuelans to other countries in the region and the US. This has acutely affected the Dutch ABC island too. Aruba, in particular, has become a significant destination for Venezuelan refugees, with Venezuelans making up about 15% of its population. With the maintenance of US sanctions on the country, the economic situation could become worse in the future. In 2023, Venezuela and the Netherlands began to restore diplomatic ties, aiming to gradually reopen the borders that Maduro closed in February 2019. This closure was initially implemented to block humanitarian aid, which Maduro claimed was part of a plot to overthrow his government. Without a change of government, the tense relationship is likely to continue while Maduro is in power. While the likelihood of a conflict between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and Venezuela is low, Maduro has shown he is willing to use conflict as a means to try and shore up support from the military. Maduro’s threats  to annex Essequibo’s territory from Guyana in October 2023 demonstrates he is willing to restart territorial disputes with Venezuela’s neighbors. The Venezuelan elections are therefore important for the security of the Dutch Caribbean islands.  Edited by Chris Dalby, Director of World of Crime

Written by Sara Frisan, Arianna Luc à and Alessia Cappelletti The Security Strategy for the Kingdom of the Netherlands published in April 2023 highlights that the complex and evolving situation in Venezuela holds significant implications for the Netherlands. Venezuela's political instability, economic crises, extensive criminal networks, and growing alliances with non-Western powers like Russia, China, and Iran pose potential security and economic challenges that could ripple across the Caribbean and beyond. The Dutch Caribbean, particularly the ABC islands (Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao), which share maritime borders with Venezuela, are directly impacted by flows of illicit drugs and weapons, displacement, and regional security concerns.  In this three-part series, Dyami collaborates with World of Crime  to delve into the political, international, and criminal challenges facing Venezuela, and why these developments matter for the Netherlands. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for Dutch policymakers, businesses, and citizens in navigating the complexities of an interconnected world. In the first article of the series, we look at the Venezuelan elections held on Sunday July 28 and possible spill-overs.  Venezuelan election sparks hope for change  Venezuela  held its Presidential elections on July 28 and the situation is still evolving at the time of publication. For the first time in over a decade of growing autocracy, mismanagement, and economic crisis, hopes for political change are high – Venezuela could emerge from political and economic isolation and an eventual democratic transition. But challenging times lie ahead, whoever is confirmed the winner. President Nicolás Maduro, who first came to power in 2013, has consolidated his power by securing control over the military and institutions like the National Electoral Council, the Supreme Court, and the judiciary through political repression, censorship, and rampant corruption. Under Maduro's rule, Venezuela, home to the largest world's oil reserves, suffered economic collapse, hyperinflation, and chronic shortages of essential goods.  Compounded by plummeting global oil prices and U.S. sanctions against the Venezuelan government and oil apparatus, the country tumbled rapidly into a tight economic recession that forced nearly 8 million people to leave the country. According to a UN Human Rights Council report , today over 80% of Venezuelans live in poverty and 53% are unable to afford food.  Recent polls had predicted a victory for the opposition, showing that most Venezuelans  were eager for change and willing to exercise their right to vote. The favorite was opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia, the replacement for opposition leader Maria Corina Machado, who has been barred from running by the government. Despite efforts to disadvantage the opposition, most polls  predicted Maduro and his United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) wo uld lose by 20 to 40 points. However, in the early hours of Monday 29th July the National Electoral Council (CNE), controlled by Maduro allies, said Maduro had won with 51.2% of votes, against 44.2% for González Urrutia.   The result –and whether it is accepted– will be consequential for Venezuela, for its diaspora abroad, and the country’s foreign relations.  Contested results  On July 29th The National Electoral Council declared President Nicolas Maduro the winner of the presidential election, with Maduro claiming 51% of the vote against the opposition’s 44%. The result has been disputed by the opposition and many countries who observed the elections in the Americas and Europe. Leading opposition figure Maria Corina Machado claims González won 70% of the vote.  Opposition leaders claimed the election was rigged, saying that their witnesses were denied access to the CNE headquarters as the votes were counted, and that some votes were prevented from being processed. Instead, Maduro claimed  elections were fair and that outsiders tried to interfere.  Large protests will lead to a crackdown by security forces supporting Maduro, who warned the opposition of a ‘ fratricidal civil war ’ if he lost the election. Maduro has expressed no intention to step aside, while more countries are joining the widespread international community's lack of trust in the results. The OAS will hold a meeting on Wednesday, 31st of July, to discuss the results.  Despite the opposition leader calling for calm, protests took place in Caracas, and several other main cities, as well as other countries, including Argentina, against the election results on Monday evening.  Thousands of people took the streets of Caracas, chanting  “Freedom, freedom” and “This government is going to fall”. Protesters around the country took down at least two statutes of Hugo Chavez, Maduro’s predecessor. Security forces fired tear gas and rubber bullets at protesters, some responded by throwing molotov cocktails and rocks.  Maduro’s government is not new to protests and demonstrations. In 2014, 2017 and 2019 protests against the government have become increasingly violent. Maduro’s  government has been notoriously repressing dissent in the past, through violent crackdowns on street protests, jailing opponents, and prosecuting civilians in military courts, for the act of protesting, causing the human rights crisis that contributed to the Venezuelan exodus.  An important role is also played by the military and law enforcement authorities, as they enjoy a privileged position in Venezuela, which historically has a constructed militarized state apparatus. By giving the military money, prestige and power, Maduro has bought their political backing and their support, which Juan Guaidó, Maduro’s opponent in 2018, lacked . Currently, there are no signs that the military is breaking from the government.  Fraud and Electoral Manipulation  Venezuela has not held free and fair elections since 2013, and the opposition has been largely absent from elections since 2015 due to the government’s tested and proven repression and manipulation tactics.  In 2015, Leopoldo López, a prominent opposition leader, was sentenced to 14 years in prison, on charges of inciting violence during anti-government protests which the European Union defined as politically motivated. This followed a six-year ban from holding public office which began in 2008. In 2017, Henrique Capriles, another opposition figure, was barred from running for public office for 15 years, for alleged administrative irregularities. In 2023, the Maduro administration charged his most famous opponent, Juan Guaidó, with money laundering, treason, and usurping public functions, after years of intimidating him and his staff.  There are many more such examples. Most recently, the opposition's initial candidate, Maria Corina Machado, was banned from running in January 2024 over alleged fraud and tax violations, which caused the U.S. to reinstate sectoral sanctions lifted in October 2023. Machado has already faced criminal charges for her participation in anti-government protests 2014, when she also was stripped of her parliamentary seat. Maduro, however, still has a challenger. González, a less well-known career diplomat of Machado’s party, was leading in the polls  in the run up to the election. He has promised to revive the economy, restore independent institutions and free expression, and release political prisoners.  A free and fair election was far from guaranteed. Maduro has been manipulating both the campaign and the electoral process. Despite pledging to hold competitive elections, the regime holds power over key political institutions, including the National Assembly and the National Electoral Council (CNE). In mid-June 2024, six CNE members were forced to resign without explanation and the National Assembly immediately appointed a new CNE commission whose members have close ties to the ruling party.  Maduro has attempted to undermine the chances and credibility of the opposition through intimidation, deliberate arrests of opposition coalition members, journalists, and anti-government activists, and arbitrary disqualification of several opposition figures and electoral candidates, including Machado, from taking office. It is estimated that approximately fifty of the latest arrests among opposition ranks are linked to Machado and González.  In late June, the government banned  ten sitting mayors from holding offices, after González and Machado held rallies in their cities. On July 18, 2024, the head of security for Machado was arrested by authorities on charges of gender violence. Both Machado and González condemned this as a deliberate provocation to weaken their security just before the election.  The government is also taking advantage of the state-owned media and social media to prevent coverage of opposition candidates and pushing the narratives of the ruling party.  Despite the Venezuelan Constitution guaranteeing the right to vote for citizens abroad, the government is imposing bureaucratic obstacles to prevent the Venezuelan diaspora from voting. Currently, only a few  of the nearly 8 million Venezuelans living abroad have managed to register. The borders with Colombia were also closed  on the 27th and 28th of July for ‘security reasons, preventing citizens living on the border from traveling back to vote.  The E.U. was not allowed to observe the elections, but the U.N. and the Carter Center provided limited election monitoring and kept their findings confidential. The Carter Center has mentioned  they “will not conduct a comprehensive assessment of the voting counting, and tabulation process,” due to its limited presence.  Venezuela after the elections These elections are crucial for stability in Latin America. Maduro’s alleged victory has lead to increased tensions throughout the region. Any rapprochement with the U.S. and lifting of sanctions will now be far harder and he  will probably forge stronger economic ties with China, Russia and Cuba.  The alleged electoral defeat of the opposition and Maduro’s firm rejection of protesters' demands has closed the door to more cooperative relations with the international community. González was expected to pivot toward democratic governments in the region and with Washington, and work to rebuild international ties. He had announced plans to rebuild international ties with multilateral organizations, such as the IMF, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. With Maduro’s clinging to power, these options have been taken away. The contested election is far from over, and more civil unrest and protests are expected to happen. Even minor institutional victories at lower levels of government, these elections show the hold of the PSUV over Venezuela’s political institutions. Dismantling those institutions built over years of PSUV rule will not be easy to clean up. Maduro’s party still controls the military establishment and is likely to crack down on opposition protests. Any transition to a new government would take place six months from now, giving plenty of time for Maduro to derail the democratic process.  Edited by Chris Dalby

Date:   24/07/2024 Location:   Bangladesh  Parties involved:   Students in Bangladesh, the Government of Bangladesh, Bangladesh National Party (BNP) What happened? Bangladesh has been faced with large student protests   since early July . The protests demand a change to a quota system  which requires 30% of well-paid civil service jobs to go to veterans from the Bangladesh war of independence in 1971. Protesters argue that the quota system is biased in favor of the ruling Awami League party members. The protests in early July started peacefully, but became violent on 15/07/2024 . The authorities launched a harsh crackdown on demonstrators  with security forces targeting unarmed students, imposing a curfew in major cities and shutting down internet services around the country. PM Sheikh Hasina has claimed that the measures were necessary as political opponents were behind the protests and accused them of being ‘internal enemies’.  As of 23/07/2024 , various news outlets reported that the death toll had reached 160 and that over 2,500 people have been arrested. The United Nations and Human Rights Watch have condemned the crackdown on the protests by the authorities of Bangladesh. The protests took place in Chittagong , Natore , Rajshahi and the capital city of Dhaka . The protests mainly focused on university campuses, but in Dhaka also spread to other districts with protesters calling for a complete ‘shutdown’ of the capital. On 21/07/2024  Bangladesh Supreme Court decided to scale the job quota back to 5% for family members of 1971 independence war veterans and 2% for members of ethnic minorities, transgenders, and disabled people.  While the Supreme Court scrapped most of the job quota, the protesters gave the government a 48-hour deadline to meet new demands  on 22/07/2024 . The demands call for justice for the killed protesters and their families and call for Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to take responsibility. In addition, the protesters want the home minister and the road, transport and bridges minister to resign from cabinet and the Awami League party. Another demand is the resignation of the Vice Chancellors of multiple universities and the arrest of police officers that are responsible for the killings.  Analysis: Bangladesh became independent in 1971 following a brutal war of independence from West Pakistan. Originally a part of East and West Pakistan, the then ruling military junta began Operation Searchlight to target Bengali nationalists through a mass insurgency campaign culminating in the Bengali genocide. The secular Awami League, supported by India, drove the military junta’s troops out of the country and declared its independence as Bangladesh. The Awami League has been in power since 1971 . The current PM Sheikh Hasina is the daughter of the leader of the independence movement.  The violent response and crackdown on the protesters poses a serious challenge to the ruling Awami League . After winning the election on a low turnout with low voter participation and banning the main opposition party in January 2024, the grievances over inequality and corruption  are continuing to be key concerns. The resurgence of a coordinated student movement and support for the opposition Bangladesh National Party (BNP) could lead to a more violence response from the authorities, as they have cracked down harshly on opposition movements using live ammunition in extensive anti-government protests in 2018 and 2023.   The court ruling in favor of overturning the quota system on 23/07/2024  may calm the situation in the short-term. However there are still unmet demands by student protesters  who have posted further demands arguing for a public apology to the families of students who were killed from the PM Sheikh Hasina and the resignation of several government ministers. It is still unclear how many protesters have been killed or tortured, with conservative estimates stating at least 150 people have died. India has thus far remained neutral on the crackdown and curfew , calling it a matter of internal affairs. New Delhi has formed a close relationship with the ruling Awami League and may prioritize regime stability above accommodation. India is looking to maintain border stability with Bangladesh and prevent large inflows of refugees which could destabilize the delicate security situation in Manipur and Assam.  The UAE, India and Malaysia have evacuated citizens from major airports in Dhaka and Chittagong . Major airports are unlikely to be targeted but some protestors have called for airports which transport members of the ruling Awami League party to be blocked.