Date:   09/09/2025 (17:00 UTC+2) Where?  Doha, Qatar What happened?  On 09/09/2025 around 15:00, it was reported that several blasts were heard in the Katara district of the Qatari capital Doha. In several photos and videos circulating online,  the smoke and damage to buildings is visible.  Around 15:10, it was reported that an Israeli official told Axios correspondent Barak Ravid that the explosion in Doha was an assasination attempt targeting senior Hamas officials.  At 15:11, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and Israeli Security Agency (ISA) announced that a ‘ precise strike targeting the senior leadership of the Hamas terrorist organization ’ had been conducted. This attack came as the negotiators were meeting to consider the latest ceasefire proposal put forth by the US.  That Israel is targeting Hamas abroad does not come as a surprise. Last week, on 31/08/2025, IDF chief Eyal Zamir warned that  Israel “would reach them  [Hamas leaders abroad] too”. At 15:30, Majed Al Ansari, spokesman for Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said in a statement that the country "condemns [the attack] in the strongest terms”.  At 15:52, it was reported that the US declined to comment on the attack. At 15:57, a Hamas source reported to Al Jazeera  that no Hamas official was killed in the attack. Several other sources however claim the opposite, and state that Khalil al-Hayya and Zaher Jabarin were killed. Neither statement has been confirmed at the time of publication. At 16:12, in a social media post , Netanyahu’s office said that Israel acted alone in the attack and takes full responsibility.  One of the strikes was geolocated and confirmed through our analysis to have targeted a building in the vicinity of 25°21'25.1" N, 51°30'34.6" E  in the West Bay Lagoon area of Doha. Analysis The Israeli strike on Hamas leadership in Doha represents a major escalation in the broader conflict between Israel and its adversaries. By conducting such an operation on Qatari soil, Israel has openly violated international law and Qatar’s sovereignty. The action is unlikely to be received positively by the international community, specifically with the recent tensions surrounding certain European countries taking a harder stance against Israel on the eve of the UN General Assembly. The key question is what comes next. Qatar is expected to limit its response to strong diplomatic condemnation. The country has always sought to balance its regional relationships and avoid direct confrontation, as exemplified by its reaction to the recent Iranian missile strikes on the US’ Al Udeid Air Base, which prompted solely formal condemnations and a deterioration in Qatar-Iran relations. Hamas may be inclined to retaliate, but its operational capacity to do so remains limited at most. A further consequence of the attack is that Hamas leadership abroad will likely be forced underground even further, at least partially. What remains to be seen is how this will play out in other nations where Hamas has a presence, such as Turkey. It is improbable that Israel would extend similar operations in the country: Ankara is a powerful regional actor and Israel has little to gain and much to lose in a direct clash with the country.  This attack likely serves as a demonstration of power by Israel, signaling to Hamas and other adversaries that they are vulnerable anywhere. In that sense, this strike serves not only as a tactical operation but also as a strategic signal of deterrence, underlining the willingness of Israel to pursue its enemies across the border, even at the expense of diplomatic fallout.  If the situation escalates further in the Middle East, this could cause serious disruption for aviation. At the time of publication, Doha International Airport (DIA/OTBD) remains open and there have been no reported disruptions to air traffic.  Dyami is actively monitoring the situation.

Date:  01/09/2025  Where:  The Gambia and coastal waters Who’s involved: Gambian Government, local fishermen and fishing communities, Chinese, Egyptian, Greece, Italy, Portugal Spain and other EU or foreign-owned fishing companies. What is happening? The Gambia’s fishing sector and artisanal fishermen are under severe strain from foreign trawlers engaged in illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) practices , driving overfishing, pollution, violent confrontations, and the loss of livelihoods for many locals. According to 2018 official reports, there were 52 registered fishing vessels operating in Gambian seas, 90% are foreign owned. Subsequent data remains limited but is presumed to have increased , particularly with the 2019 European Union-Gambia sustainable fisheries partnership agreement.  Foreign-owned fishing trawlers sometimes operate close to the country’s coastal waters without permission , overfishing and leaving very little catch for local fishermen who rely on fishing for their livelihood. The majority of the country’s 2.5 million people live along a 20 km stretch of coastline and consume more than three times as many fish, 29 kg per year, compared with 9 kg for those living inland, who may eventually face a food crisis .  Industrial fishmeal factories process hundreds of tonnes of fish daily for export, competing directly with artisanal fishermen and accelerating depletion of fish stocks , while contributing to coastal pollution, taking a toll on the health of locals.  Local fishermen have reported their nets damaged and destroyed  by foreign-owned trawlers giving way to grievances that have resulted in attacks on larger vessels, and vice-versa. Foreign trawlers reportedly operate as close as 5 nautical miles  from the coast, in breach of the 9-mile artisanal zone  reserved for locals. As fishing collapses, some fishermen abandon the trade, turning to human smuggling or selling boats to traffickers. Migrants pay between €600–€1,000 per person, with boats carrying over 200 passengers and generating up to €200,000 per voyage. Analysis After the ousting of former authoritarian leader Yahya Jamme in 2017, the succeeding government opened their coasts to foreign fishing vessels in 2018. While initially welcomed as a means of foreign investment, risks to maritime vessels in Gambian waters are escalating as overfishing, encroachment and weak enforcement fuel hostility towards foreign trawlers. Attacks such as the arson on the Egyptian-owned trawler Abu Islam , which left at least one Gambian sailor aboard severely burned, highlight how confrontations have already crossed into violence. With at least 11 local fishermen killed in the past 15 years and foreign vessels repeatedly violating the 9-nautical-mile boundary into areas exclusively for local fishermen, both local and foreign operators face growing exposure to sabotage, arson or hijackings. Enforcement actions such as the detention of around eight vessels in 2023, remain rare and ineffective, as most offenders have been known to quickly return to sea, resuming their previous activities. If grievances continue unchecked and weapons enter circulation, Gambia risks sliding into Somalia-style dynamics, where unchecked foreign fishing directly contributed to piracy and systemic maritime insecurity. At the societal level, the serious challenges to the artisanal fishing economy is transforming the country’s economic and social structure, with dangerous consequences. Fishing equipment from artisanal fishermen is destroyed, often unable to be replaced, while fishmeal factories divert hundreds of tonnes of fish daily to foreign companies for export, pushing prices beyond local reach. Disenfranchised fishermen unable to sustain their families, are increasingly selling boats to traffickers or trafficking people themselves for between €600 to €1000, enabling smuggling voyages that can earn up to €200,000 per trip. This fusion of economic despair, corruption in licensing (reportedly as low as $275 per tonne) and perceptions of state complicity creates fertile ground for unrest, organised crime and militia formation. An extreme case was seen in Somalia starting the 2000s, with serious grievances from local fishing communities against foreign-operated trawlers and overfishing, resulting in widespread piracy and violence against not only foreign, but local fishing vessels. While The Gambia has more stable political institutions, grievances less widespread and far less weapons in the hands of locals, an overall transformation of the lives of fishing communities compromising their livelihoods has the potential to result in serious social unrest.  Looking ahead Looking ahead, the persistence of weak enforcement, and IUU fishing activities by foreign trawlers could entrench a cycle of violence at sea and deepen instability ashore. If left unresolved, tensions may escalate into organised piracy, militia activity and greater reliance on illicit smuggling networks. The social costs are equally severe, with declining food security, the erosion of traditional livelihoods and migration pressures that risk hollowing out coastal communities. Without targeted action, the Gambia’s fisheries sector may not only eventually collapse ecologically, but also generate a wider security crisis in the region, although the risk at the time of writing appears low, in part due to the political stability of state institutions in the country.  Mitigating these risks will require a multi-layered approach. Strengthening maritime enforcement through better-resourced patrols, regional cooperation and transparent licensing will be essential to curb IUU fishing and rebuild trust in fishing communities. Parallel to that, investment in alternative livelihoods, fair compensation schemes and sustainable management of fisheries can contribute to reducing social grievances and restore economic stability. Also, international actors, including governments and NGOs, have a role in supporting surveillance, enforcing sanctions on repeat offenders and ensuring global seafood supply chains do not fuel local instability. By combining maritime security with social investment programmes, The Gambia may be able to prevent a dangerous drift towards serious structural and social unrest. In January 2025, for example, the government distributed over 20 artisanal fishing boats to local fishermen, an initiative aimed at supporting livelihoods and easing grievances. Without such measures, the country risks following a trajectory similar to Somalia, where overfishing and grievances against foreign fishing vessels in the early 2000s severely undermined local livelihoods, creating instability that persists to this day. Dyami Services Security is not a luxury but a necessity. With Dyami Security Intelligence as a Service, you gain a proactive, flexible, and affordable solution to manage risks, monitor geopolitical threats, and respond immediately to crises. Why subscribe to security? ✅ Resilient business operations in today’s world ✅ We act as your security department and Geopolitical Risk Officer ✅ Direct access to security expertise without high costs ✅ Prevent crises with up-to-date threat intelligence ✅ Scalable subscription plans ✅ Access to our unique global network Want to know how this protects your organization? Request a free consultation! Subscription options Dyami Security as a Service: a flexible security subscription that keeps your organization protected at all times—without the need for costly internal capacity.

On August 11, 2025 , the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld a landmark trial ruling that has profound consequences for global aviation. In N.S. v. Ukraine International Airlines  (2025 ONCA 587), the court unanimously confirmed that Ukraine International Airlines (UIA) was negligent  in allowing Flight PS752 to depart Tehran on January 8, 2020 , when two Iranian missiles brought the aircraft down, killing all 176 passengers and crew . The Court emphasized a fundamental point: airlines carry a duty to conduct thorough conflict-zone risk assessments  before departure or overflight. UIA failed this duty, and as a result, the carrier was found fully liable under the Montreal Convention. The core finding: negligence in risk assessment Justice Akbarali’s trial decision, and now the Court of Appeal’s confirmation, makes clear that: Airlines cannot rely solely on airspace being “open” ; regulatory permissions do not replace operator due diligence. A thorough, timely risk assessment  was expected before allowing PS752 to depart. Even a short delay to gather intelligence on the volatile situation in Tehran could have prevented tragedy. This ruling sets a new precedent: if airlines fail to perform conflict-zone or overflight risk assessments, liability may be unlimited . This goes beyond flight PS752 Aviation operates in a world where geopolitical tensions, conflicts, and state-based threats evolve rapidly. In recent years we have seen: Surface-to-air missile incidents  not only in Iran but also in Ukraine (MH17) and other regions. Regional conflicts  where sudden escalations threaten civil aviation—examples include the Red Sea, Iraq, Sudan, and Syria. Airspace restrictions  that are inconsistently applied, leaving operators with gaps in official guidance. This means that every operator, commercial airlines, business aviation, and cargo carriers, must actively assess risks  when planning routes or departures. The broader lesson: safety and duty of care For operators, the PS752 case reinforces several key principles: Regulators alone cannot guarantee safety.   Operators must take responsibility for assessing real-time intelligence. Duty of care extends beyond compliance.   Families, clients, and insurers expect proactive safety measures, not reactive excuses. Risk assessments protect business continuity.   A single catastrophic incident can destroy not only lives but also reputations, partnerships, and financial stability. What proper risk assessment looks like A robust risk assessment process should include: Monitoring geopolitical intelligence  and real-time developments. Consulting with aviation security experts  who understand state threats and conflict dynamics. Evaluating airspace overflight risks  based on weapon ranges, military activity, and recent incidents. Documenting the decision-making process, demonstrating why a flight was routed, delayed, or cancelled. In short: airlines must be able to show their work . Conclusion: a turning point for aviation security The Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision sends a clear message: aviation safety cannot rely on luck, nor on minimal compliance.  Operators have a legal, moral, and operational obligation to perform conflict-zone and destination risk assessments. At Dyami Security Intelligence, we see this daily: proactive intelligence and structured assessments not only protect passengers and crew, they protect the very viability of aviation businesses. The PS752 tragedy reminds us all that failure to act can have irreversible consequences. About the author Eric Schouten  is the Founder & CEO of Dyami Security Intelligence , a Netherlands-based firm specializing in travel risk management, aviation security, and geopolitical intelligence. With a background in the Dutch intelligence services and extensive aviation security experience, Eric has been directly involved in high-impact crises such as the MH17 disaster , and played a role in founding the Dutch expert group on information sharing for airlines , which enhanced cooperation between carriers and government agencies. He is also actively involved with IBAC (International Business Aviation Council)  and other aviation organisations like the European Business Aviation Association , where he regularly teaches and advises on conflict-zone risk management and overflight security. As a recognized subject matter expert and international speaker  on overflight risks, Eric supports airlines, business jet operators, and global corporations in navigating today’s volatile security environment. His mission is to make world-class intelligence and risk management accessible, proactive, and people-centric.

Date:   13/08/2025 (15:00 GMT+2) Where?  Israel; Iran; broader Middle East could also be affected. What happened?  On 12/08/2025 , Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu uploaded a video  on his X- account (formerly Twitter ), in which he directly addressed the Iranian population.  The video, which is full of veiled messages (verbal and non-verbal), is a clear attempt at shaping the Iranian public opinion and turning it against Iran’s current government. The country is currently facing a ‘ triple crisis ’ - power and water outages combined with record-breaking heat. Netanyahu clearly frames the first two crises as the direct result of bad governance, while the “descendants of Cyrus the Great deserve so much more”. However, the video is more than an attempt to shape public opinion - it is a call to action. The Israeli PM is actively calling for people to stand up and ends with a note which sounds like an indirect warning, stating that “soon your country will be free. Do not let these Mullahs ruin your lives any longer. I stand with you. Israel stands with you!”.  Netanyahu has sent videos directly addressed to the Iranian public several times before. In May 2018, Netanyahu’s office began airing short YouTube videos  in which he emphasized Israel’s admiration for Iranian culture and its people. The central message was consistent: Israel views the regime, not its people, as a threat. In a similar video from September 2024, Netanyahu appeared to lay the causes of internal issues in Iran on the country’s leadership.  Recently, as tensions between Israel and Iran escalated into the 12-day war in June 2025,  Netanyahu asked Iranians to “ stand up against an evil and oppressive regime ” amidst a military standoff between the two nations.   This latest video presents what appears to be a next step toward another Israeli offensive against Iran. Reports  and our own human sources suggest that Iran is already preparing for a potential strike. As a response, it was allegedly reported - though unconfirmed - that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had started large-scale military readiness exercises  directly after the video was published involving the launching of ballistic missiles and fighter jets. Analysis Following previous video messages, military action did not follow suit. However, Netanyahu’s latest video may signal the beginning of a new round of tensions between Israel and Iran, with reports already indicating that both nations are preparing for potential escalation. This information is likely to be plausible for several reasons. An initial analysis of the 12-day confrontation in June 2025 between the two countries makes clear that Israel’s strategic objectives were not fully achieved, despite Iran’s nuclear facilities sustaining damage and the assasination of around 30 senior commanders and 19 nuclear scientists. However, most officials were quickly replaced, and instead of a popular uprising, a rally-around-the-flag-effect took place. These developments may well have fortified the Iranian government’s narrative that the country needs nuclear capabilities to effectively deter enemies.  More broadly, aside from the ‘nuclear factor’, Israel simply was not able to topple the current Iranian government amid the last conflict. Through its ‘forward defense doctrine’, Tehran, via its proxies such as the Houthis and Hezbollah,  forms what the Israeli government perceives as possibly the biggest national security threat to Israel. Having been unable to neutralize this threat previously, Israel may now be seeking another opportunity to achieve that goal. Another reason for Israel to start another offensive, is that Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu might be willing to start another offensive against Iran to shift the political narrative surrounding his leadership. The Israeli leader is currently facing three major corruption trials  and an ICC arrest warrant on the charge of war crimes. A new conflict with Iran could offer him a way to reassess his image as leader, divert national attention from these woes to a unifying external threat. But more importantly, it could allow the Israeli Knesset to extend the state of emergency which, in a similar manner to the June confrontation, may serve to further delay Netanyahu’s trial. Given the dominance of Netanyahu over Israeli politics and military operations, once again proven by his deeply controversial decision to occupy Gaza city , it is reasonable to conclude that his personal preferences carry significant weight in shaping Israel’s military decisions. Looking forward For mentioned reasons it is plausible that Israel is planning another operation against Iran. The question therefore is not necessarily when, but rather how such an action will occur. It could manifest as a military campaign - just like in June - but it could also unfold as an operation aimed at destabilizing Iran from within. Scenario  A: a military offensive Assuming Israel is planning to start another military offensive, it is likely that, in order to achieve its strategic objectives, Israel may seek to strike Iran again sooner rather than later. Iran is currently already in the process of rebuilding its military resources after the 12-day war in June. The longer Israel waits with another offensive, the more facilities the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was able to destroy during the last campaign might be operational again. This would align with Israel’s “mowing the grass” strategy, which encompasses conducting preventive and repeated (smaller) strikes to stop adversaries from developing capabilities that could challenge Israel’s military dominance.  It’s likely that the IDF will once again leverage its technological edge to reestablish aerial dominance, target key IRGC figures, and strike critical military infrastructure. Considering the strong intelligence capabilities Israel demonstrated during the previous offensive, it’s reasonable to assume those advantages remain in place - and that they will be used to maximum effect. While it is uncertain how much Iran has been able to replenish its stockpile,, it is likely it will respond with military measures and actions as well, similar to its actions in June, in order to project  strength and avoid perceptions of vulnerability.  However, regime change may require boots on the ground, outside of Israel’s capabilities due to numerous technical reasons. Iran, unlike Gaza, is not in Israel’s background, and the strategic implications of any plan to attack Iran via land would be a momentous task that the IDF is arguably incapable of undertaking. Instead of turning the tide of public opinion, the June confrontation appeared to create certain support for the Iranian government. What can be said, though, is that yet another Israeli-Iran war can destabilize the wider Middle East again, and that it will carry serious consequences for both local and overflight security.  As observed in June, closing the corridor between Iraq and the other Gulf countries creates significantly more complex operational routing, with detours potentially adding two or more hours to flight time. In any case, we are monitoring indicators of changes in overflight security assessments and will report on these developments accordingly.  Scenario  B: destabilizing Iran from within Given the aforementioned difficulties in achieving regime change through military means, Israel could instead choose to intensify operations aimed at destabilizing Iran from within and turn the tide of public opinion in Iran. Iran is already grappling with major internal crises: recurring power outages, water shortages during a period of drought, and the lingering shock of the largest protests in decades, which erupted in 2022 after the death of Mahsa Amini. Amini died under mysterious circumstances while in police custody, following her arrest for allegedly wearing her hijab improperly. Those demonstrations were widely described as “ unlike any the country had seen before ” - Israel might be aiming to ‘light the spark’ on this widespread resentment.   Such operations would aim to weaken the Iranian leadership’s grip on power and divert resources toward maintaining internal stability and security. This will indirectly slow down strategic programs like missile development and nuclear enrichment. In addition, this approach aligns with Netanyahu’s message in the video published on 12/08/2025 on X, where he encourages the Iranian people to protest and reclaim their power from the regime.  Conclusion Considering both Netanyahu’s latest video message and the broader geopolitical context, it seems plausible that Israel and Iran are preparing for another round of hostilities. This intelligence brief indicates that Israel - and prime minister Netanyahu himself - have ample motivation to engage in renewed conflict.  Building on that assumption, two scenarios were outlined for how a new Israeli offensive on Iran might unfold. The IDF could launch another military campaign, likely following a trajectory similar to the outbreak of hostilities last June. Israel would aim to leverage its technological superiority, while Iran would respond with military actions.  However, history has shown that achieving regime change through military means is virtually impossible without ground forces - a step Israel is unlikely to take, not least because of the significant logistical challenges involved. Another scenario outlined in here, which would also make sense in light of Netanyahu’s video message in which he called on the Iranians to stand up to their leadership. This could potentially be more fruitful, given the outburst of widespread resentment in 2022, the current ‘triple crises’ and general frustration about Iran’s isolation in the world. Looking ahead, the region is likely to remain highly unstable. Any renewed Israeli-Iranian confrontation could escalate unpredictably, fueling cycles of retaliation and heightening tensions across the Middle East. Without a clear path to resolution, political, economic, and security uncertainties are expected to persist, keeping the region on edge for the foreseeable future.

Date:   12/08/2025 (14:00 GMT+2) Where?  Mali What happened?  On 11/08/2025 , it was reported that Malian authorities had arrested two dozen soldiers accused of plotting to overthrow the ruling junta. The arrests include several high-ranking officials, such as General Abass Dembélé, former governor of the Mopti region of the country and a respected military officer and General Nema Sagara, one of the few high-ranking female officers in the armed forces. The suspected coup attempt comes amid an increasingly oppressive political climate. On 10/07/2025 , a bill was signed into law granting General Assimi Goïta, who leads Mali’s junta, a new five-year presidential mandate, renewable “ as many times as necessary until the country is pacified ”, which essentially created the legal basis for Goïta to rule for life.  This followed an unprecedented political crackdown in the country. On 13/05/2025 , Mali’s military leadership formally dissolved all the political parties. Just one week earlier, on 07/05/2025 , the junta suspended all political activities across the country as a response to a protest planned  on 09/05/2025  calling for the return to constitutional rule and demanding presidential elections. Amidst the political turmoil, Mali continued to face grave security challenges, mostly coming from an insurgency which has gripped the country since 2012 by Islamist groups such as Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and also by Touareg rebels, who united under a group named the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA).   On 01/06/2025 , JNIM carried out an attack on a Malian army base, with reports estimating the number of casualties between 30 and 100. On 02/06/2025 , the same group attacked the Malian city of Timbuktu, with reports stating “ dozens of soldiers killed ”. On 05/06/2025 , JNIM again attacked two army outposts in Mahou and Tessit, leading to more soldiers killed. On 13/06/2025, FLA fighters clashed with the Malian army and Russian forces supporting them between Aguelhok and Kidal, leading to dozens killed. On 01/07/2025,  the city of Kidal was attacked and ransacked by JNIM. Conclusion After Assimi Goïta took over power in May 2021, his own regime now finds itself in an increasingly difficult position as it is struggling to contain the rampant security threats in his country’s territory, all while relying on repression to maintain control, much like his predecessors. Many actors who once supported his rise to power now find themselves considering alternative options - this thwarted coup was merely a symptom of those underlying shortcomings . Taken together, these things paint a bleak picture for a country whose regime needs military cohesion to maintain control.  Moreover, there appear to be two main scenarios for the current situation. The first one is that Mali will face enduring destabilization as military cohesion and the legitimacy of the junta continue to erode, creating fertile ground for possibly another coup. The other scenario involves ruling leader Goïta tightening his grip on power even further and centralizing it through repression, purges and loyalty-based promotions to secure his position after this latest foiled coup attempt. This might buy him time, but risks exacerbating the problems that initially led to this failed coup. This will only accelerate the instability in Mali - the instability that his rule meant to stop.  This is a shortened version of a more elaborate report. To access the full version, contact info@dyami.services

Date: 08/08/2025  (17:00 UTC+2) Where?  Lebanon What happened?  On 19/06/2025 , after months of pressure for the disarmament of Hezbollah following the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire deal, signed on 18/11/2024 , US special envoy Thomas Barrack delivered a plan to the Lebanese government officials. The plan entailed the full disarmament of Hezbollah within four months in exchange for a halt to Israeli air strikes and withdrawal of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) from southern Lebanon. The IDF has maintained a presence in five posts in southern Lebanon since first establishing a presence during the Israel-Hezbollah conflict of 2024, namely in Jabal al-Labouneh, Jabal Blat, Talat al Awida, Tallet al-Hamamamis, and Tallet Aaziyyeh. On 07/07/2025, the Lebanese government delivered a response to US envoy Barrack, which was so well received it even prompted Barrack to state he was “unbelievably satisfied” with Lebanon’s reply. This was, however, not a final agreement, and negotiations were to continue in order to finalize the deal.  Fast forward a few weeks, on 21/07/2025, during a press conference after a meeting with Lebanon’s PM, Nawaf Salam, when asked about the extent to which the US could act as a security guarantor for Lebanon and push Israel to respect its end of the deal, Barrack casted doubt over the US’ mediating power, stating that the US “has no business in trying to compel Israel to do anything”. On 29/07/2025, the US publicly pressured Lebanon to formalize its commitment to Hezbollah’s disarmament, pushing for the Lebanese cabinet to approve the disarmament of Hezbollah.   On 30/07/2025, Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem scorned calls to disarmament, stating that the group will “not submit to Israel” and that weapons are “an internal Lebanese affair”. On 31/07/2025, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun urged Hezbollah to disarm, arguing that avoiding doing so would only result in the continuation of Israeli air strikes in Lebanon. On 05/08/2025, the Lebanese Cabinet tasked the army to draw up a plan to establish a state monopoly on arms by the end of the year. As a response, Hezbollah supporters began protesting, especially in Beirut, where they had first gathered on Monday, 04/08/2025 . The plan is to be presented to the Lebanese government by 31/08/2025. During the cabinet meeting that led to this decision, Hezbollah’s Qassem repeated his refusal to disarm while threatening Israel that Hezbollah would retaliate if Israel were to re-intensify its air campaign on Lebanon. On 06/08/2025, Hezbollah leader Qassem repeated his disdain for the cabinet decision the previous day, stating that the Lebanese government was committing a “grave sin” by directing the Army to establish a monopoly on arms.  On 07/08/2025, the Lebanese Cabinet approved the US-proposed plan to disarm Hezbollah. Conclusion The recent Lebanese Cabinet decision to formalize the disarmament of Hezbollah represents a major change in the government’s stance towards the Iran-backed group that has essentially ruled the country for the past two decades. The decision comes after Hezbollah suffered heavy losses during the recent Israel-Hezbollah war, which resulted in the death of most of its leadership and a significant part of its fighters. Weakened both militarily and politically, Hezbollah could not avoid the appointment of Lebanon’s new President, Joseph Aoun, who was elected by a vast majority in parliament after more than two years since the last election.  Aoun, a former Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), has vowed to rebuild the country and has identified the State’s monopoly on arms as a crucial factor in the rebuilding process. On 07/08/2025, the Lebanese Cabinet approved plans for the LAF to conduct Hezbollah’s disarmament and deliver a result by year’s end. The plan, heavily pushed by the US, is likely not in line with what Aoun’s government, wary of fostering more dissent (Hezbollah still enjoys some popular support) by rushing the group’s dismantlement, would have preferred. Nevertheless, the plan is now in motion, and the LAF, following years of neglect and under-funding, faces a monumental task that warrants continued monitoring. This is a shortened version of a more elaborate report. To access the full version, contact info@dyami.services

Date:  08/08/2025  (15:00 UTC+2) Where?  Bosnia and Herzegovina; Republika Srpska Historic context: On 14/12/1995 , the Dayton Accords (officially the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina) was signed between the newly established states of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which at this point in history consisted of modern-day Serbia and Montenegro after the other former Yugoslav republics had declared independence. The Dayton Accords ended the Bosnian War that had raged between 1992 and 1995, and saw the country being divided into two parts: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on one side (gray on the map below), and the Republika Srpska (RS) on the other (red), encompassing areas populated primarily by ethnic Serbs.  Despite the fact that a formal peace was signed between the former Yugoslav republics, tensions persisted, primarily in BiH, between the Bosniaks (Bosnian muslims), ethnic Croats (mostly in the south) and ethnic Serbs. Grievances from the 1992-1995 war continued to fuel political disputes, ethnic segregation and occasional outbursts of unrest. What happened?  On 06/08/2025, Milorad Dodik, leader of RS, was dismissed from office by the  Bosnian election commission. He promptly declared that he would disregard the commission’s ruling and expressed his intention  to hold a referendum on his mandate. However, this latest wave of unrest in the young republic is part of a long-standing pattern of rising tensions  between the country’s ethnic groups, particularly between Serbs and Bosniaks, who largely reside in separate administrative units. The election commission’s decision follows a court order made on 26/02/2025,  which convicted Dodik to a one-year prison sentence and a six-year ban on holding public office.  This verdict was the result of a long-standing conflict between Dodik and the international High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Christian Schmidt. The High Representative’s function is to oversee the civilian implementation of the Dayton Agreement. He or she has the authority to impose laws and sack officials. Dodik was convicted for defying the High Representative by enacting laws in RS that blocked the implementation of the High Representative’s decisions and Bosnia’s constitutional court rulings—an act deemed an assault on the country’s constitutional order. Dodik responded that the verdict was ‘politically motivated’, driven by ‘racial and national hatred [against Serbs]’ and implying an agenda driven by Western actors against him, but also against the Serbs in general. He vowed not to recognize the authority of the judiciary in Sarajevo.  Shortly after, on 26/02/2025 , Dodik announced  that RS would adopt a series of laws aimed at effectively severing the administrative region from Bosnia’s state institutions. Among them was a law prohibiting the Bosnian Prosecutor’s Office from operating within the RS. Decisions made by Bosnian courts would no longer be recognized in the Serb-majority entity, and Bosnian intelligence and security services would also be barred from operating on RS territory.  Amidst the escalating tensions between RS and BiH, RS adopted a new draft constitution on 15/03/2025 , granting the territory expanded decision-making powers. A key provision of the draft is the elimination of the Council of Peoples, a body meant to protect the rights of BiH’s ethnic groups.  On 27/03/2025,  Bosnia issued an international arrest warrant for Dodik. On 23/04/2025 , Bosnian state police (SIPA) attempted to arrest Dodik in East-Sarajevo, which is part of RS. Local police instead prevented  the arrest. Despite the arrest warrant, Dodik made public appearances in Banja Luka, the RS capital, travelled to Serbia and maintained certain allies, such as Serbia’s Aleksandar Vučić, Russia’s Putin and Hungary’s Orban. The latter also stood up  for Dodik after his conviction, calling it a ‘political witch hunt’.  Tensions somewhat eased on 04/07/2025, when, after several failed arrest attempts, Dodik was pressured into appearing for questioning before prosecutors, which led the state court to lift the arrest warrant. Instead, restrictions were imposed, such as mandatory police check-ins. On 01/08/2025, it was reported that the earlier court verdict on 26/02/2025  would be upheld and that Dodik would be stripped of the RS presidency and receive a jail sentence. Analysis The political crisis surrounding Dodik highlights the persistent tensions between the RS and the central government in Sarajevo , with each side backed by its own allies. BiH — a state essentially shaped by the Dayton Accords and still overseen by the High Representative — faces ongoing disputes as RS and Dodik increasingly clash with both the High Representative and Sarajevo over actions taken within RS. Instead, they are turning toward alternative partners (usually those ideologically opposed to the West) such as Hungary, Russia, and Serbia, refusing to recognise the legitimacy of Bosnia’s constitution and portraying efforts at BiH state-building as part of a Western witch hunt driven by hatred against the Serbs. As a response to the clash between RS and Sarajevo, RS has introduced a series of laws creating parallel RS institutions and restricting state-level bodies from operating within its territory, essentially isolating the RS from BiH’s state institutions. These measures, combined with the adoption of a new draft constitution, illustrate an attempt to de facto  break from BiH, either laying the groundwork for a future secession or functioning as a parallel state in all but name. Conclusion The latest round of tensions largely reflects the pattern of unrest which has gripped Bosnia and Herzegovina since its independence , the direct result of the devastating civil war that took place between 1992 and 1995. The ethnic division of the country, as ‘designed’ in the Dayton Accords, may have temporarily eased hostilities, but it was never a sustainable foundation for long-term stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as mutual distrust and ethnonationalism remain widespread. Instead of solving underlying tensions, the Dayton Accords entrenched ethnic divisions within the country’s political architecture The result was a country where - despite being united - ethnic distrust always remained an obstacle to statebuilding.  Instead of compromising, voters in both entities have elected nationalist leaders who prioritize ethnonationalist agendas, perpetuating divisions rather than fostering unity. Milorad Dodik fits this trend, as he consistently uses divisive and nationalist rhetoric. This pattern is mirrored among Bosniak leaders as well, such as Haris Silajdžić, who similarly advocated for positions rooted in ethnic nationalism.  The latest outburst of tensions is a symptom of a much broader problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina, one without a quick or simple solution.  How Milorad Dodik will respond to his sentence remains uncertain, but regardless of his reaction, there is a real risk that it could further deepen internal divisions and spark renewed instability, not only within Bosnia and Herzegovina but across the wider Balkan region as well.

The recent cybersecurity incidents involving Qantas , Hawaiian Airlines , and WestJet  highlight that the threat to the aviation industry remains both severe and immediate. These breaches, often rooted in third-party vulnerabilities and sophisticated social engineering tactics, expose millions of passenger records and disrupt critical services. Additionally, major IT outages such as the one affecting Alaska Airlines  on 21 July 2025 and the widespread disruption at Delta Airlines  last year underscore the aviation sector's deep reliance on interconnected digital systems. Even non-malicious events can cascade into operational paralysis, affecting flights, passengers, and reputations.  The report will outline our understanding of a cybersecurity incident, identify the three most prominent threat actors commonly observed in this domain, and highlight the most essential cybersecurity basic hygiene practices necessary to reduce risk and enhance protection. While insider threats remain a critical concern, they will be considered out of scope for the purposes of this analysis. What is a cybersecurity incident? A cybersecurity incident is an event, often driven by malicious intent, that compromises the confidentiality (C), integrity (I), or availability (A) of information or systems. Examples of cybersecurity incidents in the aviation sector are: A hacker breaches an airline’s passenger database and steals personal information. A ransomware attack encrypts airport operational systems and demands payment. An employee accidentally clicks a phishing link, allowing access to the sensitive data of a company. DDoS attacks flood an airport’s website during geopolitical tensions, making it inaccessible to customers. Each incident carries a distinct type of impact, affecting different aspects of the CIA triad. What these examples demonstrate is that, despite existing security controls and mitigation strategies, threat actors continue to find ways to bypass defenses and cause real disruption. This highlights that organizations should not only focus on preventing cyber incidents (resilience), but must also invest in response readiness when an incident actually occurs. Threat Actor: Cybercriminals Cybercriminals are financially motivated. They target organizations that handle large volumes of data or revenue, like airlines and airports, aiming for quick monetary gain through ransomware, data theft, or fraud. Political or ideological factors are typically irrelevant to their goals.  The aviation industry has become an increasingly attractive target for cybercriminals, largely due to its growing profitability and global reach. As revenues continue to soar, so too does the incentive for malicious actors seeking financial gain. Scattered Spider , also known as UNC3944, Starfraud, Scatter Swine, or Muddled Libra, is a financially motivated cybercriminal group operating mainly from the US and UK.  They have targeted major airlines and airport service providers,  causing significant operational outages, delays, and compromising passenger data. Their modus operandi often involves impersonating employees or contractors to deceive IT help desks, bypass multi-factor authentication controls, and gain initial access to airline networks and third-party vendors. The group’s ability to tailor phishing campaigns with AI-generated deepfake voices or realistic spear-phishing messages has raised the bar on social engineering threats. Ransomware remains one of the most aggressive and damaging forms of cybercrime affecting the aviation sector. These attacks typically involve encrypting critical systems or stealing sensitive data, followed by demands for ransom payments to restore access or prevent public exposure. While the notorious 2023 LockBit ransomware attack  on Boeing's parts and distribution business is a well-known example, the threat has only grown. More recent incidents, such as the ransomware attack on AerCap  and the Rhysida ransomware attack  that crippled operations at Seattle–Tacoma Airport in 2024, demonstrate how both direct aviation operators and supporting infrastructure remain high-value targets. Threat actor: (H)activists Hacktivists, or cyber activists, are driven by ideology. Their attacks are meant to send a political or social message, often in response to specific events or policies. Aviation, as a high-visibility sector, can be a symbolic target to draw global attention to their cause. One of the most notorious hacktivist groups currently active is NoName057(16) , a pro-Russian collective known for launching politically motivated cyberattacks. Among their many operations, they target aviation infrastructure as a form of protest against foreign policies and to demonstrate digital allegiance to national agendas. In 2025, the group claimed responsibility for a DDoS (Distributed Denial-of-Service) attack on Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport . The attack temporarily disrupted online services and public access to key airport systems, aiming to send a geopolitical message amid heightened global tensions. This incident was just one in a series of attacks. However, such attacks are often limited in technical complexity and the impact is much lower than attacks intended by cyber criminals. Nevertheless, it can still result in somewhat of operational disruption, and strained public confidence, especially when timed with geopolitical flashpoints. Threat actor: Nation states Nation-state actors operate with strategic, long-term objectives aligned with national interests. They target aviation through advanced persistent threats (APTs). These attacks are often highly sophisticated and difficult to detect. State-linked cyber actors from Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea each pose distinct threats to the aviation sector, shaped by their strategic priorities.  Russian-affiliated groups are primarily engaged in cyber espionage , aiming to collect intelligence and to potentially disrupt infrastructure in adversarial countries. Chinese APTs   have a long history of industrial espionage, with a focus on stealing intellectual property related to aircraft design, engineering and maintenance processes, avionics software, and advanced materials information  that can accelerate both commercial and military (aerospace) programs. Iranian state-sponsored actors present a unique threat to Western aviation, driven more by political and surveillance objectives than by financial or industrial gain. One of their key interests lies in accessing passenger data from airlines and travel systems to monitor political dissidents  and individuals of strategic interest. North Korean APTs operate largely to sustain the regime’s strategic ambitions , combining cyber espionage with financially motivated attacks and disruptive operations aimed at adversaries. What to do? At a minimum, every organization in the aviation sector must take foundational steps to prepare for and mitigate cyber threats. First, identify the most critical systems, data, and processes that, if compromised, would have the greatest operational, financial, or reputational impact. Effective risk management must be in place to assess vulnerabilities, prioritize assets, and align protective measures accordingly. Organizations should also have crisis response plans and escalation procedures in place, regularly tested through exercises, and clearly communicated to all relevant teams to ensure swift and coordinated action when an incident occurs. In the case of ransomware, it is essential to define policies in advance, including positions on ransom payments.  For organizations without internal cybersecurity expertise, it is vital to outsource to trusted partners. Ask the right questions, demand transparency, and ensure service providers understand the specific risks and requirements of the aviation industry. Proactive preparation today can significantly reduce the impact of tomorrow’s incident.

Date: 05/08/2025  Countries of flotilla departures (yellow) and destination Israel/Gaza strip (orange)   Where: East Mediterranean Sea, coastal   waters off Gaza strip.  Who’s involved: Israeli government,   Israeli military, pro-Palestine sympathy   groups from Algeria, Australia, Austria,   Bahrein, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil,   Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France,   Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland,   Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia,   Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New   Zealand, Norway, Oman, Philippines,   Poland, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sri   Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand,   Tunisia, Turkey, the UK and US. What is happening?  ● Largest civilian flotilla destined to Gaza to date named the Global Sumud Flotilla,  including over 6,000 participants, dozens of vessels from over 44 countries to depart  from three different locations towards Gaza.   ● Departure points and dates are staggered : initial group departing on 23/08/2025 from  Malaysia, 31/08/2025 from Spain and 04/09/2025 from Tunisia. Routes are expected to  converge in international waters in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea.  ● The flotilla’s objective is to establish a maritime humanitarian corridor to Gaza ,  bypassing Israeli restrictions, challenging the current blockade of the territory by Israeli  authorities.   ● Participants include a wide range of individuals (lawyers, doctors, journalists) and  human rights defenders, as well as national delegations from over 30 countries , and  nationals from even more countries.   ● This flotilla is an effort from four different pro-Palestine initiatives: the Maghreb Sumud  Flotilla, the Freedom Flotilla Coalition, the Global Movement to Gaza, and Sumud  Nusantara. It also has the direct backing of the Malaysian Prime Minister who will see  the flotilla depart from Malaysia himself.   ● Training sessions for flotilla participants are being held at different departure points  to prepare crews and passengers for potential confrontation or media engagement,  also solidarity encampments at departure points will be organised for public  awareness efforts. Participants will undergo vetting, nonviolence training and safety  preparation according to the initiative.  Analysis  The Global Sumud Flotilla represents both a humanitarian initiative and a geopolitical point of  tension. Its scale, diversity of participation and high profile backing (Malaysian Prime Minister)  increase its symbolic and strategic importance. The flotilla constitutes a high-visibility act and  challenge to widely perceived international complacency for the ongoing blockade of Gaza  amid the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict.   Historically, the Freedom Flotilla Coalition has been actively challenging the Israeli blockade  since 2010, building on efforts that began in 2008. Past flotillas, most notably the 2010 Gaza  Freedom Flotilla (Mavi Marmara incident), have resulted in deadly confrontations when Israeli  commandos raided the ships in international waters.   From Israel’s standpoint, the flotilla will be viewed as a direct threat to national security and  territorial control. Interceptions are almost guaranteed, as seen with the The Conscience ,  attacked by Israeli drones in Malta in May of this year as it prepared to depart, followed by the  interception and detention of crews on the Madleen on 09 June and the Handala on 26 July, all  three vessels part of the international campaign Freedom Flotilla. Israel will likely intercept  vessels well before they reach territorial waters, a tactic that invites legal and diplomatic  pushback, especially if it occurs in international waters, an act organisers say would amount  to piracy under international law.   The situation may put pressure on air travel and maritime routes into and out of Israel,  particularly if a militarisation of the country’s coastal waters increases. Israeli airport  authorities, particularly at Ben Gurion International Airport, are likely to apply stricter screening  procedures, flag passengers from flotilla-supporting countries and possibly expedite  deportations or prohibit the entry of individuals of concern into the country. Civil society actors  onboard the flotilla (journalists, doctors, human rights defenders), add further complexity,  increasing reputational risks for Israel if confrontations occur or detentions are made.   Complicating matters further, the exact number of vessels expected to participate remains  unspecified, though organisers and an independent assessment suggests it may involve  hundreds of small and mid-size boats. According to the Sumud Flotilla Initiative , each vessel  will carry its own delegation equipped with legal, nautical and logistical support. The use of  smaller boats, reportedly harder to obstruct and less bureaucratic in documentation,  combined with a decentralised departure model and undisclosed launch locations, poses  operational challenges for Israeli forces attempting to intercept vessels before they reach Israeli waters. This fragmented and mobile structure could test Israel’s naval and intelligence  capacity, increasing the risk for miscalculation or inconsistent responses at sea.  Official map of the origin of participating delegations (orange), departure countries  (yellow) and flotilla convergence location (pink). Source: Global Sumud Flotilla (accessed 06 August 2025) Looking ahead  In the weeks leading up to the and following the flotilla’s convergence, increased scrutiny at  Israeli borders, particularly air and maritime can be expected. Airport authorities are likely to  continue flagging passengers from identified flotilla departure points (Malaysia, Spain, Tunisia)  and may restrict or deny entry to those suspected of affiliation. Maritime advisories and naval  presence in the Eastern Mediterranean adjacent to Israeli territorial waters will most likely  intensify, prompting the need for extra caution from commercial vessels navigating in the area. Internationally, the response will hinge on the outcome of the flotilla’s interception. A peaceful  resolution with minimal confrontation may pass with limited fallout, but any escalation  involving violence or legal violations could trigger reactions from governments and  international bodies. Protests and solidarity actions in various capitals are also likely to take  place, with increased mobilisation by pro-Palestine networks and groups.  The Global Sumud Flotilla is likely to face detention by Israeli authorities, as was the case with  vessels and crew of the Freedom Flotilla between May and July of this year, with Israeli forces  employing chemical sprays and detaining nationals from France, Spain, Turkey, Netherlands,  Germany, Brazil, and Sweden. With this flotilla expected to be much larger, potentially involving  hundreds of small vessels, it will present logistical challenges for the Israeli navy. A high number  of vessels will stretch Israeli interception capabilities, leading to the possible use of drones to  disable ships from a distance. Such actions carry risks, including injury, death or leaving crews  stranded at sea on disabled vessels. NGOs and human rights groups are expected to closely  monitor the situation and amplify any harm or mistreatment, increasing the likelihood of  international scrutiny depending on the outcome at sea or during detentions.  Finally, a large number of detained individuals by Israeli authorities could create challenges in  ensuring their welfare and whereabouts, as well as organising their eventual repatriation if  deported. Diplomatic missions in Israel, whose citizens may be detained, will face logistical and  legal challenges in providing assistance. Citizens of countries lacking diplomatic  representation or ties with Israel will face greater difficulties, with communication with family  back home and access to consular support severely limited, raising the risk of delays in  identification and increasing the number of potential missing persons due to the lack of  diplomatic channels able to assist them.

Date: 04/08/2025 15:00 UTC+2 Location:   Goma, North Kivu Province, DRC; Nyabibwe, South Kivu Province, DRC; Kalehe, South Kivu Province, DRC; Bukavu, South Kivu Province, DRC. Kinshasa, Kinshasa Province, DRC. Bunia, Ituri, DRC. Historic context: On 28/01/2025, the M23 rebel group seized Goma — one of eastern Congo’s largest cities — and large parts of North and South Kivu in a rapid offensive that left thousands dead and displaced many more. This renewed violence is part of a 30-year conflict rooted in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, which saw millions of Hutus flee to Congo, forming militias like the FDLR. The Congolese government has consistently accused Rwanda of supporting the M23 rebel group.  Kigali denies these claims, despite UN experts saying  that Rwanda exercises direct control over the rebels. In response to the offensive, Congo severed diplomatic ties with Rwanda. Although Rwanda has 7,000–12,000 troops stationed in the DRC, it claims they are there solely to defend against Hutu militias linked to the genocide. On 26/05/2025 , it was reported that Joseph Kabila, Congolese president from 2001 until 2019, returned to the country after years of self-imposed exile, a move that has intensified political tensions, given his fractured relationship with President Tshisekedi and his recent presence in rebel-held Goma after arriving via Rwanda. On 27/06/2025 , the DRC and Rwanda signed a US-mediated peace deal aimed at ending hostilities and laying the groundwork for long-term stability. The agreement included a ceasefire, withdrawal of foreign troops, a neutral monitoring force, and frameworks for regional economic integration and the disarmament of armed groups like the FDLR. It also committed both countries to cooperate on demobilization, reintegration, and border security. A couple of weeks later, on 19/07/2025 , the DRC signed a separate Qatar-brokered peace deal in Doha with the M23 rebel group and its political wing, the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC). The agreement called for M23’s phased withdrawal, reintegration of fighters into the national army, the safe return of displaced civilians, and local governance reforms in eastern Congo. Qatar pledged $300 million in reconstruction aid and will help oversee implementation alongside the UN and the African Union. What happened:  Despite two peace deals, fighting in the eastern DRC between M23 and Wazalendo (Swahili for ‘patriot’) militias aligned to the regime in Kinshasa has not stopped at the time of writing. There is a significant distrust on both sides. M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka also accused  the DRC of deploying extra troops and heavy weapons to the region, in violation of the ceasefire.  On 01/07/2025,  the armed forces of the DRC (FARDC) shot down an airplane in the Kivu province. They later claimed it entered Congolese airspace illegally and refused to identify itself. M23 claimed the plane was carrying food and medical supplies for locals.   On 05/07/2025, Rwandan President Paul Kagame publicly expressed doubt  over the DRC-Rwanda peace deal, stating that he does not believe that the DRC will be able to effectively deal with the FDLR, Rwanda’s biggest security concern within the DRC.  On 07/07/2025,   it was reported that  the U.S. company HYDRO-LINK will construct a $1.5 billion power line connecting hydro-rich Angola to southeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The project aims to deliver a stable electricity supply to the region, potentially supporting U.S. access to the critical minerals found there. On 09/07/2025 , large M23 troop movements southwards were reported by observers.  On 19/07/2025,  the DRC and M23 signed a declaration to end hostilities, outlining an immediate ceasefire and a commitment to begin talks.  On 01/08/2025 , the DRC and Rwanda held their first meeting of a joint oversight committee, an actual first step in implementing the decisions made during the peace deal weeks earlier.  On 02/08/2025 , Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo agreed on a draft economic framework under a US-brokered peace deal. The agreement includes cooperation on energy, infrastructure, and mineral supply chains. They also committed to linking new infrastructure to the U.S.-built Lobito Corridor—a major transport route connecting the interior of Africa to the Atlantic Ocean via Angola, designed to boost regional trade and export critical minerals. Analysis Pitfalls   The two parallel peace deals in the DRC - one between Rwanda and the DRC, and one directly between M23/AFC and the DRC - are a step in the right direction. They also overcame an important hurdle, which was outlined in our previous intel brief,  where it was concluded that a deal at the state level only might not suffice in bringing peace to Kivu. The declaration signed on 19/07/2025 directly addressed that concern by engaging both the state and rebel actors. However, challenges remain. Despite these agreements, it is still uncertain whether they will effectively end the decades-long cycle of conflict in the region. The deal between M23 and the DRC, which includes commitments to a ceasefire, a suspension of hostilities and further peacebuilding, is a step in the right direction, especially given Kinshasa’s initial refusal to have direct talks with M23. Experts have, however, called the agreements ‘vague ,’ which, combined with the fact that the parties seriously distrust each other, results in a difficult implementation. The deal between the DRC and Rwanda also faces major obstacles. Previous attempts to secure the Rwandan withdrawal from DRC territory failed. This means that a Rwandan withdrawal from Congolese territory - a non-negotiable demand for lasting peace from Kinshasa’s side - will likely be dependent on Rwanda’s most important demand: the ‘neutralization’ of the FDLR. However, the agreement lacks clear criteria as to what ‘neutralization’ means in this regard, and even if this was the case, eliminating the group will likely be challenging as it is deeply entrenched in Congolese society. Internal Congolese politics complicate the situation even further, mostly due to the problematic relationship between current president Felix Tshisekedi and former president Joseph Kabila. Kabila returned to the DRC this year after a period of self-imposed exile. Following his controversial reluctant departure from power in 2019. While the two initially had a power-sharing agreement, their alliance ultimately broke down, and their relationship severely deteriorated. Tshisekedi has since moved to sideline Kabila, who is likely trying to reclaim political influence by aligning himself with powerful actors such as M23 and Rwanda. This remains a hypothesis, but Kabila’s appearance in rebel-held Goma  and his arrival in the DRC via Rwanda gives reason to suspect it. This further complicates peace efforts as it ‘fractures’ the Congolese response to the crisis.   Prospects  Despite the ongoing difficulties in achieving lasting peace in Kivu, the economic aspect of the DRC-Rwanda peace deal holds some promise.. Part of the Washington Accord signed last June is the US-brokered regional economic framework, which aims to integrate the region’s economic infrastructure and includes elements of cooperation on energy, infrastructure, mineral supply chains, national parks and public health.  This is a clear attempt to ‘bank’ on economic ties to promote stability in the region. It essentially gives Rwanda precisely what they want: Kigali secured formal recognition and a key role in regional economic integration with the DRC, which is rich in resources such as tantalum, gold, copper, cobalt and lithium.  This way, the country could participate in joint industrial ventures, which means it can benefit the DRC’s mineral resources. For Kinshasa, the deal promises regulated, conflict-free trade and much-needed infrastructure, such as the Ruzizi III hydropower project  in Rwanda, which can also deliver power to the DRC. The US, which brokered the peace agreement between Kigali and Kinshasa, benefits too for two reasons. First, it provides the US with access to critical minerals it desperately needs. The country is notoriously dependent on China for certain minerals, which in recent years is increasingly choking off supply to Western companies . The regional economic framework encompasses joint mining operations, customs coordination, and industrial investment, particularly through the US-backed Lobito Corridor , which provides Washington with a more sustainable source of these minerals. Secondly, by securing alternative sources of critical minerals, the U.S. also challenges China's growing dominance in Africa, particularly in the DRC, where Beijing has established a firm foothold. This initiative could serve as a strategic counterbalance to Chinese influence in the region. Conclusion The peace deals made between the DRC and M23 on one side and Rwanda on the other still have significant difficulties, which is why it remains hard to gauge the extent to which they will achieve a durable peace. Deep-rooted mistrust, vague conditions and the rift between Kabila and Tshisekedi are the most complicating factors.  That being said, the economic framework does give reasons to be optimistic by aligning the two former rivals around a goal of shared development. The fact that they agreed on the outline for the economic framework on 02/08/2025,  as promised during the peace deal, is an indicator that both parties are willing to make it work. Furthermore, with backing from the United States, which has strong strategic and economic incentives to see the framework succeed, both nations have added motivation to adhere to its terms.

Date:   31/07/2025 (12:00 GMT+2) Where?  Angola; Luanda; Icolo e Bengo; Huambo What happened?  On 04/07/2025, Angolan authorities announced a 33% increase in the price of diesel, the most commonly used fuel for vehicles in Angola - the third price increase of 2025. The price will rise from 300 to around 400 kwanzas per liter. The new price amounts to €0,38 per liter. For context, the average salary in Angola equals €66,50 monthly. (€1=1050 kwanza per 31/07/2025).  This decision prompted minibus taxis, a common method of transportation for Angolans, to increase their prices by as much as 50%. This price hike also increased the price of staple ingredients, which need to be transported by road. The protests initially began as a three-day strike by taxi drivers on 28/07/2025  against rising petrol prices. However, by 29/07/2025 , the protests had grown  into one of the most widespread waves of protest the country has seen in recent history.  The protests mostly took place in the capital, Luanda. Shops were looted , and people set up roadblocks in the city. The provinces of Icolo e Bengo and Huambo reported similar disturbances. Reportedly, people chanted “down with the dictatorship” , as they complained about hunger, oppression and poverty.  President João Lourenço dismissed the protesters’ concerns, saying that protesters are using petrol prices as a pretext to undermine the government.  Reportedly, the police responded with force. In videos  circulating on the internet, police can be seen en masse, in riot gear, firing rubber bullets but struggling to contain the uprising. On 29/07/2025 , at least four deaths were reported. On 30/07/2025, protests continued. The Angolan government later reported that the total number of victims killed had risen to at least 22 . More than 1200 have reportedly been arrested.  As of 31/07/2025,  most major shops, banks and other businesses remain closed. Analysis What began as a three-day strike by taxi drivers quickly escalated into one of the largest popular uprisings Angola experienced in recent years. The 33% increase in the price of diesel, the most widely used fuel in Angola, not only affected transportation costs but also drove up the prices of basic goods delivered by road. With an average monthly wage of around 70,000 kwanzas (€66.50 per 31/07/2025), many Angolans are unable to deal with such price hikes, especially for essential items like food and transport. However, the protests reflect more than just frustration over this specific price hike. They quickly broadened to encompass a range of grievances and evolved into a wider critique of the Angolan government. Many took to the streets not only over economic hardship, but also out of growing discontent with the ruling MPLA party, which has held power for nearly five decades. The very nature of the fuel price hike is emblematic of this: Angola is one of Africa’s largest oil producers, yet lacks refineries to match domestic demand and therefore remains dependent on imported diesel.  The situation in Angola reflects a broader trend across several mid-tier African economies, where the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, global inflation, and domestic crackdowns on dissent have created a more difficult political climate and made everyday life increasingly challenging for ordinary citizens. This led to unrest, not just in Angola. Earlier this year, in June and July, Kenya saw massive protests  following the death of a popular blogger in police custody. However, these protests reflected a widespread frustration related to police brutality, economic inequality, corruption, and a perceived erosion of democratic freedoms. Ghana and Nigeria have likewise faced protests, each shaped by their own mix of political discontent coupled with economic troubles. Conclusion The current wave of protests in Angola started relatively small but grew into one of the biggest waves of civil unrest the country has faced in recent years. While a fuel price hike was the direct cause of the protests, this period of unrest is symbolic of more than just that: it reflects widespread grievances about proper governance in the country and frustration with stagnating living conditions.  For now, the situation in the country remains unpredictable. President Lourenço’s response that protesters are using petrol prices as a pretext to undermine the government signals that he might not be willing to make any concessions. If the government refuses to address the concerns behind the protests, the unrest is likely to continue, further challenging Angola’s stability.

Date:  31/07/2025 12:00 GMT+2 Where :  Oslo, Norway Who’s involved : Mohamed Orahhou Russian and Iranian Intelligence Services Norwegian Authorities US Embassy in Oslo What happened: On 23/07/2025,  Mohamed Orahhou, a Norwegian national in his twenties and former security guard at the US embassy in Oslo, was charged with espionage by Norwegian authorities. Allegedly, he was spying for Iran and the Russian foreign intelligence service, the SVR. The charges come after an eight-month investigation into claims that Orahhou shared private information about American diplomats and Norwegian intelligence officers. He is suspected of providing Russian and Iranian foreign intelligence officials with names, contact information, and evacuation plans for the embassy between March and November 2024 . Allegedly, the information was shared at classified meetings in Norway, Turkey, and Serbia. Norwegian authorities claim that in exchange for his collaboration, Orahhou received €10,000 from Russia and 0.17 Bitcoin (at the time worth around €10,000) from Iran. The indictment also alleges that Orahhou took deliberate measures to avoid detection, including transferring part of the money he received to bank accounts belonging to family members to prevent his employers from noticing a sudden spike in his own account, and later asking them to return the funds to him. Orahhou faces up to 21 years in prison. Analysis : The espionage case is one of the most serious diplomatic and national security breaches in Norway in recent years. The defendant’s access to embassy infrastructure and sensitive information once again underlines the vulnerability to foreign intelligence operations. Orahhou's cooperation with both Russian and Iranian intelligence suggests a coordinated joint operation, signalling emerging strategic cooperation between Moscow and Tehran in targeting Western diplomatic assets. The use of cash and cryptocurrency payments shows efforts to obscure financial trails, which have not been too prevalent in previous espionage cases. Internal security audits at NATO-aligned diplomatic locations throughout Europe may be triggered by the case, especially with reference to low-clearance employees and third-party contractors.  Despite the defense's claim that the leaked material was not classified, the presence of personal information and evacuation preparations raises concerns regarding the embassy staff's physical security. Advice and Mitigation: This case highlights the renewed threat of espionage and sabotage in today’s world. To reduce the risk of becoming the next target, there are some straightforward steps your organization should take: Limit access to sensitive information:  Ensure that only personnel with a legitimate need-to-know have access to classified or operationally critical data. Regularly review and update access permissions. Strengthen personnel screening and oversight:  Conduct thorough background checks, periodic re-evaluations, and monitor for behavioral red flags—especially among employees in sensitive roles or those with access to sensitive information. Practice discretion:  Avoid discussing sensitive work-related matters in public or semi-public settings, including cafes, transit, or online forums. Protect personal data:  Be cautious with sharing professional affiliations, job details, or travel patterns on social media or networking platforms. Secure communications:  Use encrypted messaging apps for sensitive communication, especially if operating in security, defense, or diplomatic sectors. Exercise caution during travel:  Be aware of risks when traveling through countries known to host intelligence operatives or serve as neutral grounds for clandestine activity. Report suspicious contact:  Immediately report any unsolicited approaches, requests for information, or unusual interest in your professional role to your organization’s security lead or local authorities.