Zoek naar dyami-inzichten

How recent violence in Darfur threatens peace in South Sudan By Chiara Longmore Since gaining independence from Sudan a decade ago, South Sudan's early history has been marred by a destructive civil war. Slow steps towards peace have been made, with the latest ceasefire agreement being signed in October 2020. Nevertheless, with recent violent clashes in neighbouring Sudan's Darfur region threatening to rekindle old conflicts, the prospect of stable peace in South Sudan remains hanging in the balance. Violent Beginnings Since gaining independence from Sudan in 2011, South Sudan has experienced a bloody and violent birth as a new state. In December 2013, Vice President Machar's Sudan People's Liberation Party-In Opposition (SPLM-IO), largely reflecting the Nuer population, split from President Kiir's Sudan People's Liberation Party (SPLM), representing the Dinka people. However, South Sudan's violence is not merely 'Kiir-led-Dinkas vs. Machar-led-Nuers'. The complexity of the war in South Sudan is mostly related to the range of actors involved, from a variety of different ethnic/tribal groups. Despite the conflict's ethnic dimensions, the cause of violence cannot be reduced to ethnic divisions. Instead, the South Sudanese war's origin is rooted in its very creation, one which did not adequately consider the establishment of effective political institutions; and where President Kiir's new government mismanaged the country's economic potential in oil.1 This intensified political tensions in a state which was already heavily militarised from its recent fight for independence from Sudan. This has had catastrophic effects with an estimated 400,000 people being killed since the violence began, and 2.3 million refugees and asylum seekers created.2 The delicate balance of peace Since violence began, there have been various attempts at peace in South Sudan, with negotiated peace settlements in 2013 and 2015 failing, and accompanied by a series of ceasefires violations, notably in 2017 and 2018.3 The negotiated 'Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan' signed by Machar, Kiir and other parties in 2018 offered South Sudan a step in the right direction. The complex myriad of actors involved in South Sudan disrupted this when non-signatory groups, such as the National Salvation Front (NAS), joined a coalition of rebel groups called South Sudan Opposition Movement Alliance (SOMA).4 who clashed with the government's SPLM/IO army. This forced the creation of 'the Rome Declaration'; a ceasefire agreement signed by the SSOMA and the government in October 2020, which has seen a period of reduced violence in South Sudan. Nevertheless, as South Sudan has made some small movements towards greater stability and peace in the last six months, neighbouring Sudan has taken drastic steps back as violent clashes have rippled through the Darfur region. Since the joint UN-African Union Mission (UNAMID) withdrawal on 31 December 2020, the UN has reported a 'sharp uptick of intercommunal violence in Sudan's Darfur region'.5 In January of this year, days of violent clashes saw an estimated 250 people killed and 100,000 more displaced6. As of 11 February, East Darfur reported a State of Emergency due to violent clashes between groups.7 Local cycles of violence The recent violence in Sudan is predominantly being carried out by ethnic and tribal pastoralist groups.8This reflects a vital feature of the conflicts in Sudan and South Sudan through cattle raiding. This is a long-standing cultural tradition of pastoral communities in East Africa, where local groups steal cattle from each other to 'restock' after their own cattle had been lost to drought or disease as well as acquire status and wealth.9 Due to decades of conflict in the region, this tradition from pastoralist communities has recently taken on an intensely violent nature. Cattle raiding has not only being co-opted by 'commercialised criminal networks'10, but also by political elites in South Sudan who saw an opportunity through the local pastoralist tribes to garner support for their own agendas11. Such violence is not isolated and crosses Sudan, and South Sudan's borders through the Darfur region with the nomadic Misseriya in Sudan travel to Aweil East County in South Sudan, often clashing violently with the Dinka cattle herders12. Recently the killing of a Misseriyan tribesman caused the closure of the border between Sudan and South Sudan. Whilst cattle raiding is an intrinsic part of the violence in South Sudan and Darfur and is responsible for intense cycles of violence on the local level; it is an issue which has been left unaddressed by broader peace processes. In fact, the recent border closure was "the first time that the Sudanese government was directly involved in addressing the conflict" according to a representative of the Dinka Malul13. Recent steps have also been taken by the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to confront the problems of cattle raiding across the Sudan/South Sudan border, with an agreement been drawn up with the South Sudanese government and UNMISS' local partners to promote the freedom of movement without possession of weapons. Whilst the conflict in South Sudan and the Darfur region cannot be solely reduced to cattle raiding, acknowledging its role as a driving force for local-level violence is vital for sustainable peace and stability in the region. It is even more prevalent when we see consider how the recent events in the Darfur region raise concerns about a return of 'Sudan's old conflict'14, which will undoubtedly threaten South Sudan's tenuous peace. Therefore, continued collaborative efforts across the Sudan/South Sudanese border are imperative to reduce local-level conflicts which risk reigniting violence in the region. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group. It has also been published by Africa Nexus, an independent organisation seeking to provide focussed informational and strategic insights into extremism and conflict in Africa. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author Chiara Longmore is originally from Scotland; however, she has moved to the Netherlands to complete a master’s at Leiden University in International Relations and Diplomacy. With an interdisciplinary background, her bachelor’s was in Liberal Arts, she has analysed situations of violence and conflict with a multi-disciplinary framework, in particular with Political Science, Anthropology, and Sociology.

Developing disputes over the river’s basin amidst regional conflict By: Chiara Longmore The Nile, one of the longest rivers in the world, spanning across 11 African countries with around 280 million people living in its basin. Recently, a developing dispute has emerged between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia over the construction of the Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam (GERD), which will impact the flow of the river into Egypt and Sudan. Placed within the wider context of conflict and instability in the region, the use of the Nile as a potential bargaining chip is one which could escalate disputes with devastating consequences. Egypt’s River The Nile river has long been an important source of fertility for the land it traverses. In particular, Egypt has cultivated the river’s basin for more than 5,000 years, with the Nile Delta in the north measuring 161km. The Nile river flows from south to north and, as Egypt is a lower riparian state and has lower levels of rainfall than upper riparian states, the state is heavily reliant on the Nile as a water resource. Often referred to as ‘Egypt’s largest food basket’ the Nile Delta contributes to around half of Egyptian agricultural production, with the annual flooding of the riverbanks depositing nutrient rich silt. Whilst the Nile is a lifeblood for Egyptian agriculture, Egypt’s historic dominance over the Nile can be linked to colonialism. In 1929 the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was signed between Britain and Egypt, which granted Egypt the right to veto any projects which may impact its control and share of the river. Other African states in the Nile basin, such as Ethiopia, had no say in this treaty which ultimately granted Egypt a monopoly over the river. Egypt maintains that the 1929 agreement still stands, along with the 1959 treaty which gave Egypt access to 66% of the river’s annual water supply, Sudan access to 22%, and Ethiopia the rights to nothing. Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam Ethiopia’s historic exclusion from access to the Nile has left it unable to utilise its own natural resources. It is therefore unsurprising that Ethiopia has sought to rebalance this by building the Grand Renaissance Dam (GERD) on its border with Sudan. The hydroelectric dam project is one of the largest in Africa, its reservoir covering 74 billion cubic metres. Whilst hydroelectric power has advantages in its low emission energy production, it is also an economic opportunity for many developing nations. For Ethiopia, GERD’s production of electricity will be greater than the country’s domestic demand, producing a total 6,450MW, and this will allow Ethiopia to export around 2,000MW of excess electricity making it Africa’s major electricity provider. The export of energy is vital for developing countries to generate foreign income and stimulate their economic growth and GERD aims to generate around $1 billion per year in revenue for Ethiopia, making it Africa’s biggest exporter of electricity. GERD is situated on the Blue Nile, one of the river’s main tributaries. Starting in Lake Tana in Ethiopia, it crosses into Sudan and its capital Khartoum, and up into Egypt. The construction of the dam close to Sudan could benefit the country, specifically in its potential to prevent flooding. Nevertheless, Ethiopia’s dam could reduce levels of fertile silt in Sudanese lands which would impact its agricultural production and threaten the country’s food security. For Egypt, the construction of large hydroelectric dams by its southern neighbours is one of strategic concern. In particular, Egypt is alarmed at the timeframe by which GERD is filled by Ethiopia, as this could inflict significant damage to the region. Predictions indicate that if the dam is filled in 5 years this would cause Egypt to lose around half of its fertile land and cause a water deficit of 36%. Egyptian fears over its water resources are not unsubstantiated. In 2007 the country faced the “Revolution of the Thirsty” where water scarcity in the Nile Delta saw protests over limited access to clean water. Due to the tensions which have arisen over the development of GERD, a series of negotiations have been initiated between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan. In January of this year, talks chaired by the African Union quickly fell through over disagreements about the second filling of the dam planned for July of this year. Last week, Sudan’s Prime Minister Hamdok met with Egyptian President el-Sisi in Cairo to sign a military cooperation agreement and discuss the ongoing GERD dispute. Their calls for international involvement to mediate that talks have been rejected by Ethiopia, with Ethiopian Foreign Minister calling for “African problems to be solved through African solutions”. A Context of Conflict It is important to place the developing dispute over GERD and the Nile within the broader context of conflict and instability facing the Horn of Africa. Since obtaining power in 2018, Ethiopia’s President Abiy has overseen drastic political change in the country, establishing a more centralised system. Yet recently in the northern region of Tigray, violence has steadily escalated between the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian military, resulting in a devastating humanitarian crisis in the region. Mass movement of tens of thousands of refugees spilling across the Sudanese-Ethiopian border has increased tensions between the two states, with violent clashes between Ethiopian and Sudanese military occurring just last week. Sudan is also facing its own internal problems with East Darfur declaring a state of emergency on February 11 as violence in the region escalates. With recent reports emerging that Eritrean military have entered the Tigray region, the potential for a protracted and potentially inter-state conflict is one which seriously threatens the region. Within this context the dispute over GERD, and more broadly access to the Nile, risks becoming increasingly intertwined with the current political and military disputes of the region. As an upper riparian state, the GERD gives Ethiopia an advantageous position to potentially shut off water supplies to neighbouring states, particularly as Ethiopia’s President Abiy seeks to assert greater political and economic dominance in the region. This would have devastating consequences not just for Egypt and other lower riparian communities, but also to the wider international community as key trade routes such as the Suez Canal would be detrimentally impacted. The Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) estimates that by 2030, the current population within the Nile’s basin will increase by between 61-82%, placing further strain on the river basin. Therefore, with water becoming a more valuable resource due to increasing demands, the potential for the Nile to be used as political leverage is a frightening, but not unrealistic prospect in the midst of developing conflict and instability in the region. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group. It has also been published by the Planetary Security Initiative, launched by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2015. *Major Contribution from Akash Ramnath This article was written in collaboration with Akash Ramnath who is currently working at the Planetary Security Initiative at The Clingendael Institute in The Hague. Akash’s primary research interests focuses on climate security, specifically in relation to water security and the geopolitics of the energy transition. Akash is also currently completing an Advanced Master’s in International Relations and Diplomacy at Leiden University. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author: Chiara Longmore is originally from Scotland; however, she has moved to the Netherlands to complete a master’s at Leiden University in International Relations and Diplomacy. With an interdisciplinary background, her bachelor’s was in Liberal Arts, she has analysed situations of violence and conflict with a multi-disciplinary framework, in particular with Political Science, Anthropology, and Sociology.

Foreign Money but Internal Losses: When liberal peace schemes increase the country’s vulnerabilities By Alessia Cappelletti It is generally accepted that economic investment in the form of foreign aid or business ventures into post-conflict societies is a fruitful activity that can often enhance local peace and stability. The underlying reasoning of this ‘economic peace’ is to make stability more profitable than war - this is generally known as the ‘liberal peace’ framework. However, the reality is never as clear-cut as theories because local dynamics are not linear nor straightforward. Certain studies proved that there is no actual correlation between foreign direct investment (FDI) and post-conflict peace. Quickly re-opening the country to foreign investment may even destabilize the country further by introducing new influential stakeholders. In some instances, foreign economic interest is proven to be detrimental to the humanitarian development of the country. This is because they tend to create new elites or exacerbate preexisting cultural hierarchies. Often, in war-torn countries, discrimination against minorities is systematically enforced, and corruption is a common practice carried out at the - literal - expenses of minorities. If foreign donors or business people are not aware of this, they risk seriously aggravating the situation. Businesses in the Post-Conflict In Myanmar, it has been documented that the government-supported multinationals contributed to the instability of the country. At the end of the military regime in 2011, the country opened its doors to foreign businesses believing that the new frontier for a stable peace was the economic development of the territory. Whether this could be true in theory, the reality was different. Very few people benefitted from liberal peace models implemented in the country. Elites got richer, but tensions between Rakhine and Rohingya intensified since the 'development' promises that were made to the population ultimately did not materialise. The Rakhine population was promised a fortune from the business deals. Still, as exclusion became clearer, Rohingya Muslims were blamed - which is both a symptom and an aggravation of the active ethnic targeting being perpetrated to their expenses. As a result of these culturally unresponsive economic endeavours, the country is still far from the peace and stability it hoped to achieve at the beginning of the economic opening. Ethnic grievances have transformed into frequent clashes around the country between the military, Rakhine's armed group, and the rebel faction of the Shan state. In addition to this, there is, of course, the ethnic cleansing of millions of Rohingya Muslims taking place. Donors in the Post-Conflict Examples of such failed 'liberal peace' schemes are everywhere to be found, from Colombia to Congo, to Sierra Leone. Where foreign involvement is disconnected from local realities, it can result in unhelpful or useless projects and, in the worst-case scenarios, projects that are harmful to the local population. That is the case also for Nepal, in which foreign aid organisations often reinforced cast divisions, negotiating with the elites and excluding the rest of the population. Nepal suffered a ten-years long conflict, from 1996 to 2006, between the government of Nepal and Maoist insurgencies. The conflict came to an end in 2006, with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord and the abolition of the monarchy. In Nepal, foreign aid is now considerably significant (in 2018-19 it represented 22% of the yearly state budget) and after the accords, even the Maoist Party welcomed it. The issue is that the political elite's relatives manage the NGOs that receive foreign funding, which then is associated with one party or another,  thus creating a 'development cast.' Even by trying to operate as locally as possible, problems of power and authority did not change, and money flows are often ultimately controlled by some other elite – though not passing through the central government. This situation created a stall in which the subsistence of post-war Nepal is based on foreign money in-flow. Should this stop, the government would be severely underfunded. This also erodes the government's authority and legitimacy among the population, as only (some) foreign implemented projects are effective in reducing poverty. Moreover, the government is perceived to fail systematically at addressing the needs of the poor. Thereby, foreign investment has created a cycle that reinforces local structures of inequality, similar to the case of Myanmar. Conclusions Ultimately, 'going abroad' with a substantial investment capacity always needs an in-depth risk assessment, not only at the beginning stage of the project but also during its implementation. A constant re-evaluation and honest and transparent evaluation of the benefits of such projects will ultimately benefit the local population. If investment or aid is perceived as being detrimental for ethnic and class discrimination, or if it exponentially increases the dependence of the country, region, or village on foreign money, rather than empowering them, it should be stopped and re-assessed. This article is part two of a series highlighting the potential risks of doing business in post-conflict countries. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the author: Alessia Cappelletti is a Global Security Analyst and Program Manager of DEWIS. She has field experience in South America, Colombia especially, which makes her largely acquainted with the security challenges of the Latin American context. Her expertise includes conflict analysis and investigation, human rights protection, and criminality.

Europe's Failed Strategy in Libya By: Anton Witchell-Chibber European powers have struggled to devise a coherent strategy in Libya ever since long-standing dictator Colonel Muammar Qadhafi was ousted from power in a NATO-backed rebellion in 2011. The NATO mission, led by Britain and France – and initially opposed by Germany and Poland – led to a transferral of power to the National Transitional Council (NTC), and later to the General National Congress (GNC). Whilst these institutions were recognised in European capitals, as political and military power in Libya splintered, so did consensus in Europe on how to respond to the deteriorating security situation and political impasse. Rather, European actors supported opposing power centres and have been accused of prioritising parochial interests – such as countering Islamic extremist terrorism and controlling migration flows – over long-term goals to foster national reconciliation and lasting peace. A European Union? In November last year, an agreement was reached in Tunis between Libya's warring factions in the 75-member Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), led by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), to hold presidential and parliamentary elections on 24 December 2021. . In a rare display of unity on the Libya question, Britain, France, Germany and Italy released a joint statement on 23 November 2020 which 'welcome[d] the results of the […] Forum', called for 'Libyan parties to fully implement the ceasefire agreement', expressed 'full support to the UNSMIL led process' and called on 'all Libyan and International parties to refrain from any parallel… For the full article and source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author: Anton Witchell-Chibber is a contributing analyst at Dyami. He has a postgraduate degree in Conflict Studies & Human Rights from Utrecht University and has specialist knowledge on Chinese foreign policy and sectarian conflict in fragile states.

How the Amazon’s destruction is pushing away investors in Bolsonaro’s Brazil By: Isabel Oriol Llonin In the last article 'When political change becomes a risk: how the Mexican government undermined investor's confidence' a case was made that political change in some Latin American countries can bring about a drastic change in a country's economic policies. This can represent a risk for mid-term and long-term business interests. This Dyami Insights will discuss how political change in Brazil has impacted business interests with the new government of Jair Bolsonaro. As a controversial figure, Jair Bolsonaro has made world headlines for his far-right, discriminatory remarks. However, his problematic comments are not the only issue that has impacted Brazil's international image. The international community has not welcomed his environmental policies and the rise of deforestation and human-made fires in the Amazon rainforest. They have ultimately damaged investor's confidence in Brazil. A country in need of change The election of a far-right leader in Latin America's leading economy stirred controversy around the world. Many were afraid Brazil would take on a completely different direction bringing uncertainty to the country and the entire region, especially after 13 years of left-wing governments led by the Worker's Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores​). In the five previous years to Bolsonaro's election, Brazil faced the worst economic recession in the country's history with rising numbers of unemployment and crime. In 2014, operation 'Car Wash' (Lava​ Jato​) uncovered deeply rooted corruption at the highest levels of politics, extending to several government officials, companies, and countries across the region mostly in the form of handouts and briberies in the oil and energy sector. For many Brazilians, the Worker's Party and its leaders were responsible for such high levels of corruption, crime, and a struggling economy. Bolsonaro exploited people's discontent with a very discredited left and presented himself as the heavy-handed anti-establishment candidate the country needed to end corruption and crime. Once elected, Bolsonaro pledged to the outside world to 'eliminate uncertainty for foreign trade flows', by lowering taxes and loosening regulations in order to appeal to international investors.[1] However, major foreign businesses have started to see Brazil as unappealing for investments due to a different issue than economic policies: the Amazon rainforest. How the Amazon was put under the world’s spotlight The Amazon rainforest is the largest and most biodiverse rainforest globally; it comprises more than half of the world’s rainforest areas. The Amazon plays a crucial role in sustaining life on the planet, and it is estimated that it absorbs 5% of the CO2​ annual emissions, playing a vital role in preventing climate change. While the Worker's Party leadership in Brazil did not have a clean sheet in terms of environmental damage, regulations were put in place to contain the Amazon's deforestation. Since Bolsonaro, a climate-change denier took office, many of these regulations have been removed, and deforestation continues at alarming rates. Between August of 2019 and July 2020, a total of 11,080 sq km were deforested, a 9.5% increase from the year before setting the record for a 12-year high.[2] Additionally, in 2019 the Amazon made world headlines due to an increase in wildfires. By 2020 the situation had worsened with a rise of 28% in July 2020 over the previous year, almost 50% in September from a year earlier.[3] Many of the wildfires are human-made and illegal with the aim to repurpose the land for the production of beef and soybeans. Bolsonaro has been accused of turning a blind eye to these unlawful practices. A burned area in the Amazon Rainforest in Prainha, Para state, Brazil. (AP Photo/Leo Correa) Concerned about their reputation and the security of their long-term investments, international investors have urged the Brazilian government to curb deforestation. In June 2020, a group of financial institutions collectively managing more than $3.7 trillion in assets urged the Brazilian government to reconsider its environmental policy claiming it has generated "uncertainty about the conditions for investing in or providing financial services to Brazil".[4] Private investors are not the only ones pressing the Brazilian government for a change in the Amazon management. In 2019 president Emmanuel Macron of France called the Amazon wildfires a global crisis that should be addressed at the G7 summit. President Bolsonaro did not welcome this comment and accused Macron of colonialist tendencies. The tension between the two leaders had impactful consequences. Macron stated that France would be opposing the EU-Mercosur free trade agreement if Brazil failed to contain deforestation in the Amazon. The EU-Mercosur (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay) agreement is reaching the end of negotiations after nearly 20 years. It would create the largest free trade agreement area in the world. After the rejection of other European countries to Brazil's environmental policies, the deal now hangs by a thread. More recently US president-elect Joe Biden pledged to spearhead a $20 billion international effort to protect the Amazon while threatening with 'economic consequences' if Brazil failed to cooperate. So far Bolsonaro has been defiant of Biden's and other foreign leaders' remarks regarding the Amazon and framing it as an issue of Brazilian sovereignty. Concluding Remarks It is likely that in the upcoming months, with president-elect Biden taking office in January, the topic will regain attention. The US might join efforts with others in the international community to leverage against Brazil's environmental policies by imposing economic sanctions or encouraging companies to stop importing Brazilian products (just like Timberland, Vans, and The North Face have already done). This could potentially represent a significant blow to the Brazilian economy, which has been hit hardly by the COVID-19 economic crisis. It is a risk that Brazil might not want to take. This article is part two of a series highlighting the importance of political change in security risk analysis in the region of Latin America. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the author Isabel Oriol Llonin is a contributing analyst at Dyami. She holds a bachelor’s degree in International Relations and has a post-graduate degree in Public International Law from Utrecht University. She has expertise in the Latin American region and the public international law implications of conflict analysis.

How the Mexican Government has Underminded Investor's Confidence By: Isabel Oriol Llonin Traditionally security risks in Mexico are commonly associated with organised crime, drug trafficking and other sources of violence. However, there are other aspects of the Mexican context that should be considered when making a risk analysis, such as how political change and national policies can impact mid-term and long-term investments. Political changes are usually not seen as an imminent security risk in Mexico, or in most parts of Latin America, however, they can represent a risk to mid and long-term business interests. A new government can bring a drastic change in the country’s approach to economic policy and business affairs with international companies. Such is the case of Mexico with president Andrés Manuel López Obrador who took office in late 2018. A new era for Mexico with López Obrador López Obrador -or AMLO as he is known- is the first left-wing president that Mexico has had in recent decades. His victory broke a cycle of governance between the two major parties that have been in power in the last years, the PAN and the PRI, the first a conservative party, and the second a self-proclaimed centrist party, both with a history of strong neoliberal economic policies. With a society increasingly tired of the political elite and corruption scandals, AMLO ran a campaign based on the idea of being 'one of the people', with a strong preference for austerity policies and the promise to end corruption in the high political spheres. He also inherited a country with alarming rates of violence, crime, and rumours of organised crime infiltrated at all levels of government. Therefore, it is unsurprising that his government has been characterised by efforts to appear different from the traditional political elite. One of these efforts has been transforming the Mexican economy from the conventional neoliberal economic policies that the country has held for decades to a more state-controlled economy. Since his presidential campaign, both the national and international private sectors were unsettled about the potential consequences of such changes. Two years into his government, some of those concerns have proven to be true. Lessons learned from the Mexico City Texcoco Airport The Mexico City Texcoco Airport was a megaproject located in the highly populated capital of the country, a city with approximately 20 million inhabitants in its metropolitan area. It was intended to replace the current airport and meet the demand for a higher air traffic capacity in the city. The ambitious USD 13 billion projects, expected to have a capacity of 125 million passengers per year at its completion, was launched in 2016 by the previous administration led by Enrique Peña Nieto. As a presidential candidate, López Obrador took a strong stance against the project claiming it was too expensive. The Texcoco Airport project became a symbol of his discourse against 'unnecessary spending', playing into his narrative of a 'people's president' who refuses to favour the elites. The project also had some environmental concerns regarding the land in which it was being built, so AMLO then proposed the cheaper alternative of adapting the Santa Lucía military base, north of the city. However, critics pointed out several issues with this alternative: the project had severe viability concerns that would probably raise the cost of construction in the future -this was later proven to be true- and the environmental impact report had not been released to the public. In December 2018, within less than a month of taking office, President López Obrador announced the official cancellation of the Texcoco Airport after 30% of the project had already been built. Naturally, this raised serious concerns among the business sector, undermining investor’s confidence in public projects, and added to the overall air of uncertainty in the country. Uncertainty in the Energy Sector In 2013 former President Enrique Peña Nieto spearheaded a comprehensive energy constitutional reform that would, among other changes, allow the private and foreign investment across the energy sector. Along with the auctioning of untapped oil and gas blocks across the country, the reform ended a 75 year-long state monopoly over oil and energy supply chains. Fast forward to the current government; the energy sector has been a critical area in the efforts of López Obrador to counter decades of neoliberal economic policies. He has criticised the 2013 energy reform as fraudulent by pointing out the corruption and bribery scandals that have surrounded it since the beginning. Moreover, his government has been characterised by his attempts to strengthen the inefficient and indebted state-owned oil (PEMEX) and electricity (CFE) companies as key pieces to 'recover economic sovereignty'.[1] This has led to several controversial decisions. At the beginning of his presidency, López Obrador indefinitely postponed all auctions on oil and gas blocks to private companies, proving once again to foreign investors that previous administration's deals were at risk with the new government. In 2020, he announced a new sustainable energy policy that would impose considerable limitations and additional requirements to private renewable energy farms. The government argued it was intended to protect the reliability of the national supply of energy during the crisis. However, critics have speculated that it was an effort to protect the state-owned Federal Commission of Energy (CFE). The new sustainable energy policy resulted in the temporary closing of 44 farms of renewable energy while putting at risk investments for USD 6 billion and almost 30,000 jobs.[2] However, after a series of legal battles, the Supreme Court ruled that the president’s policies were unconstitutional, and most farms were allowed to carry out operations again. While the government did not win this battle, the actions it implemented certainly undermined investor’s confidence and could potentially harm the development of renewable energy soon. It is not completely clear what direction the government will take now, especially considering the economic and health crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic. The significant drop in oil prices is forcing national oil companies around the world to reconsider their long-term projects and investments, potentially allocating more resources to other sources of energy. While private investment into the energy sector, especially into renewable resources, could be the boost that the Mexican economy needs to revive after the crisis, it seems unlikely that López Obrador's government will take that path. With four more years left as president, chances are the business sector -especially the energy sector- will navigate a certain degree of uncertainty in Mexico. Therefore the political context should be considered in any security risk analysis. This article is part one of a series highlighting the importance of political change in security risk analysis in the region of Latin America. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the author: Isabel Oriol Llonin is a contributing analyst at Dyami. She holds a bachelor’s degree in International Relations and has a post-graduate degree in Public International Law from Utrecht University. She has expertise in the Latin American region and the public international law implications of conflict analysis.

An Introduction By: Bob Rehorst In February 2019, the Washington Post reported the existence of a 'secret' Chinese military base in the remote and inhospitable Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province of eastern Tajikistan. According to the report, local sources have witnessed Chinese soldiers purchasing goods and phone credit since 2017 at a nearby market. A Chinese soldier told the Post's investigator: "Remember, […] You never saw us here."1 Though, Chinese military presence abroad is not unique to Tajikistan. Since 2017, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has also constructed an operational military base in Djibouti, expanding its influence in the Horn of Africa – and has increased its presence in the South China Sea. China's external operations appear to be increasing, especially in the Central and Southern Asian region. This introductory article will explore and contextualise the apparent expansion of China's military presence abroad, indicating a move away from the PRC's core principle of 'non-interference'. It will question whether this phenomenon has developed in tandem with China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in order to protect Chinese commercial and economic interests abroad. One Belt One Road in Central Asia The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), previously known as ‘The Silk Road Economic Belt’ or the ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR), is a great illustration of the scope and size of Chinese ambitions abroad. The project, which aims to engender greater connectivity between China and the world, envisages a series of transportation networks which will traverse the Eurasian heartland towards Europe. Its total scope imagines global transportation connections via land, sea, air, and electronic means (a.k.a. the digital silk road). Here, we focus specifically on three economic corridors (EC’s) of the BRI, namely: (1) The New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor, (2) the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and the China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor. China’s ambition to operate overland through Central Asia – a region long overlooked as the vast and distant ‘heartland’ of the world – carries the possibility of major economic benefits for China. As a simple illustration, the average transport time from Shanghai to the Polish port of Gdansk by sea freighter is between thirty and thirty-three days. By rail transport, however, the already operational China-Poland connection takes between nine and fourteen days. Evidently, the Eurasian overland routes have the potential to decrease transportation time and costs for the PRC substantially. Consequently, China’s Western Xinjiang province, historically the country’s remote ‘back door’ bordering on the former Soviet ‘Stans’, is transforming into the CCP’s front gates. Generally, the BRI signifies the development of infrastructure and new foreign investment projects, which, not only further develops and globalises Chinese economy, but also warrants greater security initiatives beyond China’s borders to protect its trade and communication routes.[1] China’s flexible approach to non-interference: Interestingly, since the 1950s, Chinese governance has adhered to a strict ‘non-interference’ policy, as part of the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’.[2] In theory, this entails that China will refrain from intervening in the foreign affairs of other nations which stands in contrast to other regional and international power players such as the US, UN, EU, Russia, or even Turkey. In recent years, however, China’s strict adherence to its non-interference principle has unravelled, as its interests abroad have expanded.[3] While the 2015 National Security Law and Anti-Terrorism Law already permits China to partake in counter-terrorism operations abroad, this trend is no more apparent than in China’s 2019 White Paper: ‘China’s National Defence in the New Era’. The paper emphasises the need to strengthen the Chinese military and develop its overseas capacity in order to promote world peace and stability.[4] Chinese policy aims to realise a strategy where soft-power instruments, such as successful economic trade and investment (e.g. the BRI), eases recipients towards an increased Chinese presence, eventually opening up the possibility for other modes of influence. For example, the establishment of a Chinese military base in Djibouti, the first of its kind, marks a turning point in Chinese foreign policy and security.[5] Initially, the Djibouti base was stated to be a facility to support Chinese logistics and provide assistance in combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden. However, the CPP aims to have developed the PLA into a full-fledged military force by 2050 and we can expect that, not too far into the future, the Chinese military in Djibouti will fulfil other tasks such as extraditing nationals from hostile environments and take part in combat operations.[6] In short, Chinese security and military developments appear to coincide with its strategic interests in need of protection, the Djibouti Base being an example of defending Chinese interests in the turbulent Horn of Africa region. Now we can explore the case of the military presence in South-East Tajikistan. A military base in the mountains The base in Tajikistan, located approximately 30 kilometres away from the Chinese border and about thirteen kilometres from the Tajik-Afghan Border, is located deep within the Pamir mountain range. Chinese officials have explained how its security presence in Tajikistan extends into Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor, but is simply there for training and logistical purposes, not military occupation.[7] However, given the increased likeliness of US military withdrawal from Afghanistan, in relation to China’s operations against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, it is plausible that this base serves an alternative purpose. Uyghurs, TIP and China’s perceived threat In Xinjiang, the Strike Hard Campaign continues to control the repressed Uyghur population by means of mass surveillance. Human Rights Watch reports almost a million ‘vanished’ Uyghurs while others are being continuously monitored and harassed by Chinese authorities.[8] Aimen Dean, former Al-Qaeda operative and MI6 informant, has warned that that the repressive policies implemented against the Islamist community of the Uyghurs may effectively increase radicalisation within and against China – mainly by returning Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) militants, a prominent force in the Syrian civil war – rather than combat it.[9] Indeed, throughout China’s war on the ‘three evil forces’ (terrorism, separatism, and extremism), it has operated on the existence of a ‘direct threat’ towards China. Now that the US is moving forward with its withdrawal from Afghanistan, China increasingly fears that Afghanistan could become a potential ‘springboard of terrorism’ into the PRC. Dean has echoed this fear and has advocated dialogue between the Uyghurs and Beijing to prevent a mass insurgency targeting China and Chinese assets abroad. The Research Project A few things have become clear over the past years. Firstly, Chinese expansionism is manifesting itself heavily in Africa, the South China Sea and now also into Central- and South Asia. Secondly, subsequent to Chinese expansion through soft-power instruments, it seems that China is dead set on protecting its foreign investments. The Tajikistan Case presented here is indicative of a larger trend of China pivoting slowly into the Eurasian Heartland as part of its defensive strategies against terrorist threats coming from neighbouring countries. Now that China is expanding Westward, it is stepping out into possible inhospitable environments which may prove more sinophobic than anticipated. As a result, if China is to protect its strategic interests in Eurasia, it may be compelled to increase its military presence as well. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group, as part of the ‘Defending Chinese Strategic Interests in the Eurasian Heartland’ research project led by Anton Witchell-Chibber and Bob Rehorst. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author: Bob Rehorst is a Global Security Analyst at Dyami. He has extensive field experience in the Levant-Middle East region, North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. He holds a Graduate Degree in Conflict Studies and Human Rights, and an Undergraduate Degree in Cultural Anthropology, both from Utrecht University. Bob specializes in geopolitics, conflict development and global crises.

Why peace in the Caucasus might remain elusive By: Ruben Pfeijffer On 9 November 2020, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a Russian-brokered armistice that ended ongoing hostilities over the possession of Nagorno-Karabakh. However, growing discontent in Armenia over the terms of the armistice might jeopardize the fragile peace in the Caucasus region. Under pressure The political situation in Armenia recently has become increasingly unstable after the general staff of the Armenian army openly called for Prime Minister Pashinyan's resignation in a joint statement on 25 February, citing that "The ineffective management of the current authorities and the serious mistakes in foreign policy have put the country on the brink of collapse"1. The statement follows months of large-scale demonstrations that erupted in the wake of the Russian-Brokered armistice that ended the Nagorno-Karabakh war of 2020. Pashinyan's insecure position raises significant worries about the possible implications his resignation -or removal- might have for the current peace with Azerbaijan. Historical background Located within the territories granted to Azerbaijan after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Nagorno-Karabakh is a region mainly inhabited by ethnic Armenians, who, as the self-proclaimed republic of Artsakh, fought a war of secession against Azerbaijan in the early 1990s. With the help of the Armenian army, Artsakh managed to force Azerbaijan to sign a ceasefire in 1994, in which the Azeri’s de-facto ceded control over Nagorno-Karabakh and several surrounding territories to the Armenians. However, in the following decades, continuous breaches of the ceasefire would constantly add fuel to the animosity between Armenia and Azerbaijan, causing significant armed clashes. Geopolitical relevance Apart from being the source of a long-standing national dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh has also increasingly become the locus of Russian and Turkish power projections in the Caucasus region. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan serve as a proxy-state in this geopolitical struggle. Armenia is a member of a defensive military alliance with Russia (CSTO), while Azerbaijan is historically backed by its 'brother-nation' Turkey. This means that an escalation of violence between Armenia and Azerbaijan would typically also involve these two major regional powers. The war of 2020 On 27 September, both Armenia and Azerbaijan mobilized their armies after a series of serious clashes erupted in the border region. In the following month and a half, Azerbaijan, with Turkey's military aid, was able to make significant territorial gains on Armenia, who, despite their defensive alliance with Russia, were largely left to fend for themselves. There could be several explanations as to why Russia decided not to get militarily involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh war. They may have wanted to avoid a confrontation with Turkey, as such a confrontation has the potential of sparking a severe regional - or given Turkey's NATO membership - even global conflict. Another explanation is that Russia simply was not eager to come to the aid of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who toppled the previous pro-Russian Prime Minister during the Velvet Revolution of 2018. Regardless, even without intervening militarily. Russia managed to safeguard its influence in the Caucasus region by brokering the Nagorno-Karabakh armistice that was signed on 9 November. The Russian-brokered armistice After suffering a series of military defeats, including the loss of Shusha, one of the main cities in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan agreed to sit down at the negotiating table with his Azeri counterpart Ilham Aliyev at the behest of Russian President Vladimir Putin. According to the terms of the resulting armistice, Armenia would cede several occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan and withdraw all their troops from the border area. A Russian peacekeeping force of 19,600 soldiers would take their place and guard the buffer zone, with Turkey acting as observers2. Azerbaijan was allowed to keep ‘the spoils of war’ while Russia significantly enhanced their military presence in the Caucasus region at the cost of Turkey, who were limited to an ‘observers’ role. Even though the majority of Nagorno-Karabakh would remain in Armenian hands, Armenia had to make some painful concessions that undoubtedly left them with a sense of defeat. Joy and anger While the armistice was widely celebrated around Azerbaijan as a great victory over their long-standing enemies, reactions in Armenia. were -as expected- significantly less enthusiastic. Right after the terms of the armistice were made public by the Armenian media, hundreds of protesters, angered by the territorial concessions made to Azerbaijan, stormed the Armenian parliament. They demanded the resignation of Prime Minister Pashinyan, whom they held responsible for the failed war effort and 'weak' negotiations with Azerbaijan and Russia3. After months of political unrest, the Armenian army has now decided to become involved as well by demanding Pashinyan's resignation. Peace at stake The current political instability in Armenia has potentially severe implications for the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh armistice. The terms of the armistice, which many Armenians perceive as highly unfavourable towards Armenia, will likely remain a significant source of unrest in the country for the foreseeable future. Although the Armenian military has not yet made a move beyond their earlier political statement, it cannot be ruled out that an actual military coup is on the cards if Pashinyan refuses to step down. Regardless, even if Pashinyan steps down voluntarily, it is far from certain whether his democratic successor will respect the terms of the armistice with Azerbaijan. Armenia's developing situation also leaves Russia in an awkward situation, who now have to deal with a politically unstable ally who might seek to reignite the conflict with Azerbaijan as soon as its current leadership changes. Furthermore, Russia's limited support for the Armenians during the war might force Armenia to turn their gaze to others for help, which could, in turn, insert yet another geopolitical player into the already cramped Caucasus region. While Turkey might be content with Azerbaijan's military victory over Armenia, they are likely frustrated about being 'left out' of the peacekeeping force. Although the Nagorno-Karabakh armistice has secured peace, for now, it seems probable that the region will remain a hotbed for conflict until an accord that is satisfactory to all sides has been reached. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author: Ruben Pfeijffer is a graduated anthropologist who currently follows the MA program Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University. While working on his bachelor thesis in the Netherlands during the early stages of the COVID-19 outbreak, Ruben gained experience with conducting ethnographic research under the challenging circumstances of the pandemic, and has learned to be adaptable with his research methods.

Russian National Interest and its ‘peaceful’ strategic outposts By: Bob Rehorst Russia, the largest country in the world. It is the country that contains massive forests, lakes, rivers, tundra’s, steppes, mountains – everything about it is big. Stretching from the Bering Sea to the Baltic, Black and Caspian Sea, its size is representative of its ambitions. Ever since the fall of the Soviet Empire, the big bear of Russia has been there, hibernating, waiting for the moment to wake up again. That moment has long passed, and Russia seems to be increasingly active across the globe once more. Rather than full military offensives, the awoken bear is cunning, strategic and calculative. There are very little coincidences in Russian foreign policy. More pertinently, in the 1990s, NATO's expansionist behaviour began to raise former Soviet nations to an allied status aggressively. The Russian bear was still licking its wounds, and NATO was bringing chunks of its empire into the fold of the Allied forces. For a long time, Russian presence across the globe scaled down substantially, while its enemies raised military presence around its periphery. Now Russia is reclaiming its position on the world stage because they simply have to. A striking example of Russia’s craftiness is its slow but steady disruptive methods in Ukraine. Russia managed to annex Crimea by using Russian ethnic votes and utilising the Ukrainian unrest to send forces into the peninsula. Questions that arise then are, why Crimea, why Ukraine, and, where else is Russia active? This Dyami insights will provide a brief introduction into Russian foreign ambitions. The Crimean annexation serves Russia as a strategic outpost to project military power in other places like Georgia, Ukraine and Syria. What is often overlooked, however, is that control over Crimea means control over the Sea of Azov, which directly links to the Caspian Sea via the Volga-Don Canal. The ability to move warships from the Caspian shorelines (including Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and, Iran) to the Black Sea, allows Russia larger maritime options, as well as flexibility when crises erupt in the region. For example, before WWI started, 50 per cent of all Russian exports, and 90 per cent of its agriculture exports passed through the Bosphorus channel of Istanbul out of the Black sea. Today, every fifteen minutes an oil tanker passes through the same channel, carrying Russian and Kazakh oil. This exemplifies the fact that, throughout history, Russia’s Black Sea ports, being the country’s only warm water port, have always served Russian commercial interests. Currently, the Crimean peninsula also serves as a strategic outpost for Russian power projections in the region, as well as for energy projects, pipelines and trade corridors. It ensures its position in the region by sending in troops to ‘protect Russian people’ in the peninsula. Russian ambitions in the Black Sea are no secret, and Crimea served as a highly strategic starting point. However, it is not the only outpost that was seized via hybrid strategies by Russia. We see similar patterns emerging in Georgia’s breakaway region of Abkhazia. After the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia, the northern regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have played a role in Russia’s ‘creeping occupation[ Alexander Lanoskar, “Russian hybrid warfare and extended deterrence in eastern Europe,” The Royal Institute of International Affairs 92 (1), 2016, 175–195.]’ of Georgia. Georgia’s ‘western ambitions’ in regards to trade and alliances are a thorn in Russia’s side, and Moscow continues to undermine Georgian hegemony, as well as its developments to European logistical and economic status[ Cappelletti, A. & Rehorst, B. 20 November 2020. ‘Doing Business in the Post-Conflict part III – The Case of Georgia: Between Western ‘darling’ and Russian strategic outpost’. Dyami Strategic Security Solutions. https://www.dyami.services/post/doing-business-in-the-post-conflict-part-iii-the-case-of-georgia.]. For now, Abkhazia contains approximately 4,000 Russian troops (originally dubbed as 'peacekeeping forces'), and Russia remains ever-present in the South-Caucasus region. Thereby solidifying additional coastal outposts on the Eastern end of the Black Sea. A third strategic outpost is the Transnistria region of Moldova. Its etymology is essential here (Transnistria is Romanian colloquial for ‘Beyond the Dniester River') because it indicates a Romanian description of an otherwise Russian-speaking region. In the region itself, the breakaway state is referred to as 'Pridnestrovye’, which is a name also used in Russian. The area has been a long-standing outpost of Russia in post-Soviet times, and it was the stage for a two-year civil between pro-Russian separatists and the Moldovan defence forces between 1990 and 1992. The conflict was frozen through the brokering of a ceasefire, and Russia sent in 'peacekeepers', which remain in Transnistria to this day. Peacekeepers in Abkhazia, peacekeepers in Transnistria, ‘protective forces’ in Crimea, it appears that Russian ‘peacekeeping’ interest serve alternative purposes. At the time of writing, Russia has been deploying peacekeeping troops to the Nagorno-Karabakh region, as part of a Russian-brokered peace deal between Russian President Vladimir Putin, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenia's prime minister Nikol Pashinyan[ BBC World News, 10 November 2020. ‘Nagorno-Karabakh: Russia deploys peacekeeping troops to region’. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54885906]. Russia had previously brokered a ceasefire with Turkey and Syria, demonstrating its reinsertion as a powerful actor in the Middle-East and beyond. Nagorno-Karabakh was the only post-Soviet conflict without Russian presence, which was a source of incredible frustration for Moscow. All the while, Azerbaijan was supported by its patron, Turkey, by means of drones and Syrian mercenaries. This was a clear threat to Russia and its sphere of influence, and it seems that Russian troops are deployed to push back against Turkey's regional power moves. According to Thomas de Waal, a senior fellow with Carnegie Europe, "[…] Russia is reinserting itself into that region, where it's been in retreat"[Losh, J. 25 November 2020. ‘Russian Troops in Nagorno-Karabakh ‘Clearly a Win for Moscow’’. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/25/russian-troops-nagorno-karabakh-peackeepers-win-moscow-armenia-azerbaijan/]. While Armenia expressed discontent with the current peace deal, for Moscow, this is a clear win. On a final note, Moscow’s gaze extends well beyond former Soviet nations, as it recently signed a deal with Sudan to establish a new military naval base near the Port of Sudan on the Red Sea. It seems that with this move, Russia aims to increase its military foothold in Africa, as well as challenge the influence of American, French and Chinese naval forces based in Djibouti. The list of examples above raises a series of questions regarding Russia's plans. As Winston Churchill once wrote, “I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest”[ Col Mastriano, D., PHD, (Collective of authors), Project 1721: A U.S. Army War College Assessment on Russian Strategy in Eastern Europe and Recommendations on How to Leverage Landpower to Maintain the Peace, Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College 2016, p. xi]. Russian national interest, here, looks primarily like Moscow’s classic power projections. However, the majority of the outposts are illustrations of Russia’s ancient ambition of a warm water port. Whether these outposts are mere power projections, buffer zones or satellite power regions, Russian peacekeeping missions serve a purpose. That purpose is, indeed, Russian national interest being pushed under cover of 'peace operations'. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the author: Bob Rehorst is a Global Security Analyst at Dyami. He has extensive field experience in the Levant-Middle East region, North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. He holds a Graduate Degree in Conflict Studies and Human Rights, and an Undergraduate Degree in Cultural Anthropology, both from Utrecht University. Bob specializes in geopolitics, conflict development and global crises.

2021 a challenging year for Latin America By: Isabel Oriol Llionin The series ‘When political change becomes a risk’ outlines how there is a Latin American tendency to uncertainty when major political changes take place, presenting a risk for business interests in the region. From protectionist policies in megaprojects and the energy sector in Mexico to environmental disaster mismanagement in Brazil, significant political changes can undermine investor’s confidence. After being hit by the COVID-19 crisis in 2020, Latin America is heading for an uncertain 2021. With deepened structural issues, tensions on the rise due to the health and economic crisis, and elections coming up this year in several countries; the stage is set for a very challenging 2021. A country in need of change The 2020 crisis exacerbated social and political tensions Before 2020, many countries in the region were already facing high social and political tensions. Millions protested in the streets of Chile and Colombia against inequality and the government’s economic and social policies. The migration crisis from Central America intensified. The institutional crisis in Peru resulted in the dissolution of Congress. Venezuela’s presidential crisis continued and further aggravated the humanitarian emergency. And Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina elected new controversial governments. The situation was worsened by the 2020 crisis driven by the COVID-19 pandemic. According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the current is the worst economic crisis the region has faced in over 120 years.[1] The health and economic crisis have deepened already existing structural problems: inequality, unemployment, and rising numbers of poverty. A deeper social discontent is cooking in Latin America, and with it, political change is just around the corner. Setting the stage for political change The COVID-19 crisis response of many Latin American governments has been fiercely criticized. From poor outbreak management, overwhelmed public health systems, insufficient economic relief, loans from the IMF with strings attached, undelivered vaccination promises, or the symbolic gesture of presidents refusing to wear masks in public (notably López Obrador, Bolsonaro, Piñera); the pandemic response has further decreased the population’s confidence in governments and the political elite. The combination of aggravated structural issues and the worsened distrust in the political elite are opening the door for new political discourses and the emergence of outsiders or anti-establishment politicians. As an already present phenomenon in Latin America, self-proclaimed outsiders have managed to win elections in Brazil, Mexico, and El Salvador by capitalizing on the social discontent about corruption and making promises to change the system. The same populist discourses that have brought controversial politicians like Andrés Manuel López Obrador and Jair Bolsonaro to power are likely to be used in the COVID-19 crisis-era by taking advantage of the population’s discontent with the pandemic management and the devastating economic crisis. What to watch out for Elections are coming up in a number of countries in Latin America. The first one in Ecuador has already been pushed to a second ballot between Andrés Arauz, a former government official of ex-president Rafael Correa; and Guillermo Lasso prominent banker and businessman. Leading candidate Arauz has opened the debate about whether the dollar should be the national currency -which most view as a stabilizing factor in the Ecuadorian economy-, he has also declared that if elected he will renegotiate the agreement made with the IMF by current president Lenín Moreno. Ecuador will go to the polls again on April 11. Peru will be having presidential elections in April this year after an institutional crisis in which Congress voted to remove former president Martín Vizcarra for “moral incapacity”. Protests broke out for several days in the streets with some claiming it was a disguised coup or at the minimum an abuse of power by Congress. The discontent with the political elite (due to corruption, and the mismanagement of the pandemic, among others) elevates the possibility for an outsider to win the election in Peru. A strong example is former professional footballer George Forsyth, also known for his time as mayor of La Victoria and his strong discourse against crime and corruption, who is currently leading the polls. Chile will have presidential elections in November this year, and after the far-reaching protests in 2019 and the devastating crisis that followed in 2020, the stakes could not be higher. Outgoing president Sebastián Piñera had a low approval rate of 15% at the end of 2020. So far, polls point to three major candidates: center-right Joaquín Lavín, communist party member Daniel Jadue, and journalist and TV personality Pamela Jiles. Additionally, members of the constituent assembly will be elected on April 11 for the demanding -and divisive- task to redact a new constitution. Nicaragua will hold elections by the end of the year, in which current president Daniel Ortega will likely seek reelection for a fifth term as president. After anti-government protests broke out in 2018, Ortega was accused of using the justice system against critics of his government. While the opposition is in the process of organizing, likely precandidates have already pledged to back a single candidate for the elections in order to defeat Ortega. Among the profiles, there are exiled academics, former political prisoners, and journalists. Honduras will be electing a new president by the end of this year. After accusations against president Juan Orlando Hernández of taking briberies from organized crime have surfaced in a US-based trial, he will not be seeking reelection as previously speculated. In a similar fashion to Nicaragua, the opposition in Honduras is likely to form two major alliances in hopes to defeat the National Party (currently in power). Finally, Mexico and Argentina will hold parliamentary elections that will be an indirect test to the governments of López Obrador and Alberto Fernández, respectively. Both left-wing governments that recently came into power, their policies and management of the crisis will be tested by the voters. Unprecedented times can lead to unprecedented events. While nations across Latin America continue to fight the COVID-19 pandemic and the devastating effects of the economic crisis, major political change will likely take place in 2021. Election results, vaccination strategies, and economic recovery plans will have a crucial impact on the stability each country will have in the following months, and years. This article is part three of a series highlighting the importance of political change in security risk analysis in the region of Latin America. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the author: Isabel Oriol Llonin is a contributing analyst at Dyami. She holds a bachelor’s degree in International Relations and has a post-graduate degree in Public International Law from Utrecht University. She has expertise in the Latin American region and the public international law implications of conflict analysis.

Understanding Somalia’s Breakaway Entities Kasper Veltman Along the longest shoreline of Africa lies a state that does not often make the news in a positive manner. Often used as the primary example of a failed state, history has not been kind towards Somalia. Suffering under the reigns of the dictatorial Siad Barre regime from 1969 to 1991, the state was not set up for success. The power vacuum that followed from Barre’s demise led to a collapse of the state. Groups that once lived under one flag were being driven apart. Multiple clans and entities declared that they were no longer willing to live under the flag of Somalia and decided to declare independence. The most notable secessionists being Somaliland, Galmudug and Puntland. The seceding movements were not Somalia’s only problem. To this day, Somalia has been dealing with the Al-Shabaab insurgency parallel to its civil war. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has offered some much-needed pushback against Al-Shabaab, but a decisive victory does not seem to be in sight. Despite that, the Federal Government of Somalia is still pursuing a restoration of its de jure territory. Because of that strategy, it is important to understand the breakaway entities of Somalia. Not only are they a piece of the puzzle that is needed to solve the seemingly never-ending unrest in the country, but they are also key partners in tackling more international problems. For instance, help of Somaliland and Puntland has been a major contributing factor to the success of the international fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden.1 Who are the breakaway entities of Somalia? Situated in the North-Western tip of Somalia, we can find Somaliland. Somaliland was one of the first entities to declare independence from Somalia in 1991. The aspiring state is bordering both Djibouti and Ethiopia. Its seat of power is in Hargeisa. Berbera, its main port, has the potential to become one of the most influential harbours within Somalia, because it provides to landlocked Ethiopia. Somaliland is home to a largely fairly elected parliament. Even though Somaliland was always seen as a beacon of democracy within struggling Somalia, the past years have seen some erosion of the democratic institutions.2 Their unilateral declaration of independence was fuelled by two different factors. Firstly, the region of Somaliland historically fell under a different administration. It used to be a British protectorate, where Somalia was an Italian colony. Secondly, the Isaaq clans of Somaliland felt that they were underrepresented in Somalia and that their size should warrant a state of their own. On the 18th of May in 2021, they will be celebrating their 30th anniversary of their independence. Even though this is one of the more stable and safe regions of current day Somalia, it is yet to be recognised by any other state. One of the other large entities that tried to break away from Somalia is the region of Puntland. In 1998, political elites; clan elders and several influential business elites started a constitutional conference to provide services to the population of Puntland after the Somalian state collapsed. Puntland is situated eastward of Somaliland and has its power mostly concentrated around the tip of the Horn. Its capital Garowe harbours its own semi-autonomous government. Puntland is currently an autonomous state in the Federal Government of Somalia. There are current tensions between Puntland and Somaliland over disputed territory. The final major breakaway entity was the state of Galmudug. Internationally this state does not come up much in security dialogue, but it still holds a powerful position within Somalia. As the most central state, just north of Mogadishu, it has a powerful location. Galmudug has however committed itself to the Federal Government of Somalia. In the process it did ensure its autonomy, now operating as a state within the federation. Galmudug closely operates with Puntland on matters of security, following several Al-Shabaab attacks with significant casualties.3 Historically, relations with Puntland have been more cold, with the federation ceding Galmudug territory to appease Puntland elites. The renewed security cooperation seems to have left that in the past, however. Galmudug is trying to maintain relative autonomy from the federation, but efforts by the federation to make them submit to them as a federal member-state seem to have been effective. Somalia’s future? Right now it is hard to tell what the coming years will bring for Somalia. The envisioned strategy is that all defector states within the de jure territory of Somalia will return power to the state they are trying to defect from. In this case that would be the Federal Government of Somalia, that took over the duties of the Transitional Federal Government in 2012. De jure territory meaning the legally set borders as recognised by the international community. Getting all the states to submit themselves to the federation might be troublesome. Some of the defector states do seem to agree to the idea. The ruling parties in Puntland have stated that they are willing to enter in such a federation if their autonomy is secured. Galmudug has similar sentiments. Somaliland however, is considerably less enthusiastic. Perhaps rightfully so. For years many different parties and states have been involved in capacity building in Somaliland. Official delegations have visited Somaliland and Somaliland’s government officials have visited other states. Former Dutch secretary of state for Foreign Affairs Ben Knapen has for instance laid the first stone of the House of Elders in Somaliland in 2011.4 It seems to be contradictive to help increase capacity in Somaliland and Puntland and subsequently ask them to make themselves subservient to a federal Somali government. Especially since it has long been known that Somaliland in particular aspires to be its own state. Strengthening their government structures will then likely not get them to commit to a federal government. Context in this case is then key. Parties that supported state-building efforts in Somaliland, like the Netherlands, would largely profit from a stronger state-like entity in the region. As they deemed that such an entity would help in preventing the root causes of piracy. Which it ultimately did, as piracy numbers within the Gulf have seen a decrease over the past decade. Now, the strengthened states, are however less willing to fully commit to a federation. In short, president Farmajo of the Federal Government of Somalia seems to have his work cut out for him to secure the goals that the federation wishes to achieve. Respecting all the individual breakaway entities and their political elites will be key in maintaining stability within the country. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author Kasper Veltman is a MA graduate in International Relations from Leiden University. During his master’s he followed the specialisation “Global Conflict in the Modern Era”, analysing rebel groups, insurrections and private warfare. Furthermore, he took a keen interest in the Horn of Africa, writing his thesis on Somaliland.

Developing Alliances and Global Influences By: Puck Holthuis China’s economic and political influence in Central Asia is rapidly expanding. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) strategically crosses through the region and onwards through Europe, aiming to improve the welfare of these nations as well as that of China itself. However, the BRI’s effects do not stop there. What is the BRI? The BRI is an extensive route, stretching from Eastern China all the way to Latin America by land, sea and cyberspace. Closely resembling the ancient Silk Road, the BRI is commonly referred to as the ‘New Silk Road’. This route allowed for significant economic, cultural and religious development in the region through which it ran 1400 years ago. Nevertheless, the Silk Road was gradually abandoned during the rise and fall of various Eurasian empires. The new and improved BRI is comparable in size and includes 140 countries in five continents, their people together making up more than 60% of the world population. The objectives of the BRI are numerous. They echo those of the Silk Road but are perhaps more ambitious this time around. They include elevating economic prosperity in the countries along the route, strengthening of their cultural and political ties and scaling up their infrastructure, to name a few.3However, there are more objectives to consider as well. Central Asia and the BRI The BRI has already proven itself valuable in many aspects. In a timespan of three years (2014-2017), the BRI resulted in $6 trillion in trade between China and the participants of the BRI. However, like many projects on a massive scale, it is not a flawless endeavour. According to China Power, $26 trillion is required for the infrastructure of the BRI, of which China has undertaken to give $1 trillion. A number of the participating nations, however, simply don’t have the funds to spend on this large undertaking, leaving many of them taking loans from China. The original Silk Road also left a lasting impression on the Central Asian nations that are partaking again this time in terms of their economy, culture and politics. Various nations in Central Asia (e.g., Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) were, until recently, economically dependent on Russia. Now, we are seeing a dependency shift towards China. When we zoom in on some of these individual relationships, we quickly land on Pakistan and China and their shared initiative of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). CPEC and the lives of locals The Gwadar Port in the province of Balochistan in the South of Pakistan is one strategic end of the CPEC, connected to the other end in Kashgar, China. Balochistan is Pakistan’s poorest and most underdeveloped province. Consequently, China’s investment in the region is a welcomed idea. In an interview in early February, Pakistan’s President Arif Alvi said that “[…] CPEC projects have greatly improved Pakistan’s infrastructure and energy supply,” and added that “[CPEC] will bring a large number of job opportunities to the Pakistani people.” However, the local situation in Balochistan continues to present various difficulties to its residents and obstacles for BRI shareholders. The area around Gwadar Port lacks basic necessities such as electricity, and water is scarce. Development surrounding CPEC has been rather quiet, leaving many promises of improved welfare unfulfilled. Balochs themselves are growing impatient with the little progress CPEC has thus far made, and Baloch separatists, such as the Baloch Raaji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS) or the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), pose a growing threat to both Chinese and Pakistani government commercial activities in the region, condemning them as exploitative. These militant groups will continue to be a (growing) concern both the Chinese and Pakistani government have to face. In fact, Yumi Washiyama of The Diplomat states that: “If the BLA cannot be brought to the table or completely dismantled, then the outlook for the security risk environment remains bleak.” Why, then, does China continue its efforts to develop this area? Pakistan and China: cooperation and interdependence Despite the mentioned predicaments, Gwadar is economically relevant and continues to be a strategic entry point into China’s North-western Xinjiang province, the country’s current ‘front-gates’, which are an undeniably important part of the BRI. In other words, Gwadar cannot be missed from the BRI equation. China’s investment can certainly help alleviate poverty and foster the desired development. Nevertheless, with more loans taken out to facilitate the BRI’s progress, Pakistan is increasingly dependent on China and the Chinese economy for the country itself to continue flourishing. This has created an interdependent relationship between these two nations that, on the one hand withholds China from leaving Pakistan and, on the other hand, cultivates a stronger alliance. Additionally, Gwadar serves another vital purpose. The development of the Gwadar port, among other Pakistani regions, was previously an objective of both the USA and the Soviet Union. Pakistan played a key role in times of conflict for these nations during the Cold War, and billions were spent to develop the region long thereafter. This plan failed, however, and Southern Pakistan remains in an uncompleted state today. As a result, China has possibly taken an interest in the region for this reason, too. With the development of the Gwadar port, China is taking on the challenge that powerful nations have failed to overcome in the past. It gives China a chance to showcase its relevance on the global stage by proving it can succeed in Gwadar. Additionally, the BRI and Gwadar in particular grant China the opportunity to develop and expand their economic, social and political network in Central Asia and beyond. The BRI is all encompassing in the sense that the initiative could bring economic prosperity as well as stronger cultural ties in Central Asia and China itself. Simultaneously, the BRI serves as a bridge from China to Europe and further West. This possibly brings with it new political dynamics and cultural influences from the East to the West that may reshape our shared future. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group, as part of the 'Defending Chinese Strategic Interests in the Eurasian Heartland' research project led by Anton Witchell-Chibber and Bob Rehorst. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author: Puck Holthuis is a master student Conflict Studies & Human Rights at Utrecht University. She recently relocated back to The Netherlands after living abroad since 2006. During that time, she spent many years in South Africa and China. Puck continues to develop her passion for analysis; studying foreign cultures and using that to strengthen her intercultural communication skills.