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Border Tensions and Migratory Implications for the Region By: Chiara Longmore and Kasper Veltman The northern parts of Ethiopia recently have been home to a worrying conflict. President Abiy Ahmed Ali of Ethiopia has sent federation troops to the region of Tigray, where troops of the Tigrayan 'People's Liberation Front (TPLF) attacked several Ethiopian military positions. Human rights advocates remain very worried about developments within the region, as the region remains largely locked-off. With several large organisations like the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reporting that there is a full-scale humanitarian crisis developing within the region.1 Why Does This Happen? The TPLF was one of the parties that came out on top after the Ethiopian civil-war in 1991. Since then, the TPLF shaped the Ethiopian federal system in such a way that Tigrayan minority-rule was ensured up until 2018. In 2018 Abiy Ahmed Ali managed to merge all the ruling coalition partners in 'The Prosperity Party', except the TPLF, who vehemently rejected the idea. The merging of the coalition ended Tigrayan hegemony over the Ethiopian federation. The new division of power did provide for a new power imbalance. With the federation now ruled mostly by elites of the Amhara ethnic group, the Tigrayan people were facing new problems, as grievances from their governance period did not disappear. Currently, Tigrayan autonomy, which they enjoyed in their long period of governing, is now at stake. After the Ethiopian government cancelled regional elections in Tigray because of COVID-19, the TPLF had seen enough. They organised regional elections themselves. The federal government subsequently did not acknowledge the results of these elections. As a result, fights broke out between the TPLF and the federal forces on 4 November 2020. TPLF forces attacked several Ethiopian positions. Following these attacks, the Ethiopian government reacted quickly and opened fighting with the TPLF and has so far almost achieved victory. Now the federal troops are close to victory, the regional administration has been dismissed and is being purged. The regional administration is primarily run by TPLF supporters or members, making them untrustworthy in the federation's eyes. This is where the accusations of human rights violations largely stem from, as a manhunt for TPLF members is taking place.2 Border Tensions with Sudan Misery loves company. As the humanitarian crises in Tigray worsens, tensions along the Ethiopian-Sudanese border have also escalated. On 10 February 2021, it was reported that there had been violent clashes when an Ethiopian border patrol engaged a Sudanese patrol. Reportedly, there were severe casualties on both sides. A Sudanese officer is said to be killed, with Sudan claiming to have killed the Ethiopian assailants.3 This is one of multiple instances of violence which have erupted along the Ethiopian-Sudanese border since late last year, which threatens to lead to a dangerous escalation. The Ethiopian-Sudanese border is an area that has long been disputed. Characteristic of border dynamics in the African region, the lines demarcated by past colonial rulers do not reflect realities on the ground.4 The Ethiopian-Sudanese border region of al-Fashqa is an example of this, where local communities have cultivated fertile farmland from both Sudan and Ethiopia for many decades. Despite Sudanese sovereignty being historically acknowledged in the region, Ethiopian farming groups have established themselves in regions such as Al-Fashqa, establishing agricultural projects in the region. Any violence along the Ethiopian-Sudanese border has therefore historically been related to local level skirmishes over the rich agricultural land.5 The Sudanese government has largely ignored border regions such as Al-Fashqa, yet recent surges of intercommunal violence in Sudan6 have placed the 'country's internal peace and stability in a precarious position. There have been reportedly 250 deaths and 100,000 people displaced in 'Sudan's Darfur region since January 7, and last week (11 February) East Darfur declared a state of emergency due to violent clashes8. As such, the external strain of tens of thousands of Ethiopian refugees spilling across the Sudanese border, as well as an increased presence of Ethiopian Amhara militias, has pushed the Sudanese government to assert greater military presence on the border with Ethiopia, which resulted in the border-clash of 10 February. A Deteriorating Relationship Since tensions have erupted across the border, relations between the two states have deteriorated further, with Sudan accusing Ethiopia of trying to infringe on their sovereignty. The states have since begun escalating the conflict. The increase in political attention to the border has serious potential to escalate what were traditionally localised instances of violence to a potentially critical standoff between the two states. This February, Sudan pulled its ambassador to Addis Ababa following the violent border clash that was mentioned earlier. As a result, further escalating politically, Ethiopia signed a military cooperation treaty with South Sudan on 19 February, which has historically abysmal relations with Sudan.9 While both states' internal struggles make it unlikely that further military escalation will follow, the measures taken are following a pattern that is normally befitting of a situation that will escalate in such a manner. Especially since Sudan has stated that military deployment to the region is permanent, and withdrawal is out of the question for them.10 The region is definitely one to watch at the moment, as tensions are rising, and the risk of conflict is high. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group. For source references, please download the PDF version. This article was featured in Leiden University’s ISSA Podcast. Follow the link below to listen to full episode: https://soundcloud.com/issa_podcast/what-should-you-know-about-the-tigray-conflict-issa-podcast-22 About the Authors: Chiara Longmore is originally from Scotland; however, she has moved to the Netherlands to complete a master’s at Leiden University in International Relations and Diplomacy. With an interdisciplinary background, her bachelor’s was in Liberal Arts, she has analysed situations of violence and conflict with a multi-disciplinary framework, in particular with Political Science, Anthropology, and Sociology. Kasper Veltman is a MA graduate in International Relations from Leiden University. During his master’s he followed the specialisation “Global Conflict in the Modern Era”, analysing rebel groups, insurrections and private warfare. Furthermore, he took a keen interest in the Horn of Africa, writing his thesis on Somaliland.

ELN’s activity fosters regional tension and global polarisation By: Alessia Cappelletti & Anastasija Kuznecova On the 2nd of February 2021, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) released their annual conflict report highlighting 10 conflicts to worry about in 2021. Likewise, the International Crisis Group (ICG) had already put out a similar list on the 30th of December 2020. Both lists barely focus on Latin America, though where they do, they warn about two different countries: Colombia and Venezuela. According to ACLED, Colombia is to observe closely for violence against political leaders. On the other hand, the ICG spots Venezuela as the next possible battleground. Neither focused on the conflict that might escalate between the two countries, involving factions at play in their border areas, and the broader geopolitical tensions in connection to that. Insurgency presence Colombia has been suffering from insurgency and paramilitarism presence throughout the country since the 1960s. Even though a seemingly successful peace agreement with the leftist Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) was approved and signed in November 2016, Colombia is far from achieving countrywide peace. A substantial number of FARC members went back to fighting after the peace agreement had been poorly implemented and paramilitary affiliates often still engage in serious human rights breaches and drug trafficking. However, the one insurgency that failed to ever arrive close to a peace accord is the ELN. The ELN, or Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army), is a Colombian guerrilla active since the 1960s and of Marxist-Leninist and Christian imprint. Recent ELN activity After years of battles and kidnappings, in 2002 some preliminary peace discussion started and continued in 2005 in Cuba. Peace consultations began again in February 2017, and achieved a ceasefire for the presidential transition of 2018, but were subsequently suspended by the elected Iván Duque administration (2018-present). The talks ended drastically at the beginning of 2019. On the 17th of January 2019, a car bomb exploded in Colombia’s capital, killing 21 people, and injuring around 70. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by the ELN who stated the bombing was a response to the attacks of the Colombian army during the previous ceasefire. The government of Ivan Duque, which already opposed the peace agreement reached with the FARC in 2016, officially suspended the peace talks with the ELN. First Political Tensions: Cuba, Colombia and the ELN After the attack, President Duque announced that Colombia will double down on the persecution of the guerrilla and called for the extradition of the ELN leaders from Cuba. However, the country did not extradite the ELN members nor responded to an Interpol Red Notice against the commander Nicolas Rodriguez. Cuba supposedly acted in such way to comply with negotiation protocols signed with the previous Santos administration.1 Almost two years after the request was made and no action taken, on the 11th of January 2021, the United States blacklisted Cuba for aiding terrorism, and mentioned the bomb attacks to justify the action. On the 8th of February 2021, Cuba’s ambassador warned the Colombian government about a possible ELN plan to attack Bogotá. The missive spoke about a ‘military’ – and not ‘terrorist’ - attack in the capital, which led some to think Cuba does not see the ELN as a terrorist threat.4 As the relations between Cuba and Colombia have been at a stall since 2019, the gesture has broader geopolitical implications. It could either be a show of willingness to cooperate or a strategy for leaving the US blacklisting for terrorism as fast as possible. More tensions: ELN and Venezuela ELN’s recent history signals that the relation between the guerrilla and the Venezuelan military had its hiccups along the way, but the two have benefitted from each other for a while. An investigation conducted by InSight Crime in 2018 found that the ELN was present in twelve Venezuelan states, and clashes between the guerrilla and the military, sometimes also involving civilians, occurred often. However, the government of Venezuela always refused to acknowledge the presence of the guerrilla in its territory or even properly respond to its attacks. Already in 2018, the ELN allegedly had the support of the National Armed Forces of Venezuela (FANV).5 It is clear what the ELN can get out of such a relationship. The group enjoys protection, a degree of power over marginalized communities and a place from where to manage their illegal activities unbothered. Venezuela, on the other hand, may be getting access to the drug trade and some degree of military protection along the border areas. Already in 2019, a reportage by The Telegraph warned about the willingness of the ELN to protect Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in case of a US invasion. In February 2021, Caracol News revealed a series of videos and emails that indicate the presence of Colombian guerrilla groups enjoying protection from certain sectors of Venezuelan government. Notably, the name of Defence Minister Vladimir Padrino López was also mentioned. According to Caracol, FARC dissidences had contacted Russian government’s officials in Venezuela to buy weapons, while the ELN had contacts with the current Venezuelan ambassador in Mexico. A member of the central command of the ELN, alias Pablito, may be also involved in drug trafficking with members of the FANV.6 Risk of Armed Conflict In September 2019, President Duque already denounced the government of Maduro for working against Colombia, claiming he has proof that Venezuela and ELN plan to attack Colombia. This issue was supposed to be investigated by the UN, but never got solved. Similarly, Vladimir Padrino, declared on February 28 that Venezuela will be denouncing Colombia to the UN for attempting to destabilise their country. Padrino accused Colombia of having paramilitary groups that are against the Venezuelan government in its territory, stating that it constitutes an “act of war.”10 For years, the Colombian-Venezuelan border has been filled with various armed and illegal groups abusing citizens of both countries. Military action in the neighbour’s territory is therefore not an unthinkable event. Already in 2008, President Álvaro Uribe, who leads the current presidential party, authorised an attack on a FARC camp in Ecuador, showing his devotion to fight – rather than dialogue with – guerrilla groups. The tensions between the two countries and the longstanding animosity between the Colombian presidential party and former Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez’ legacy make for a time bomb to watch closely. Growing Regional Tensions Cuba's and Venezuela's ties with ELN have increased their tensions with Colombia. The former US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, indicated that Cuba's support for FARC and ELN beyond their own borders, as well as of Maduro has facilitated "permissive environment for international terrorists to live and thrive within Venezuela."7 The sanctions imposed in January on the island have hurt Cuba's economy as it has affected their trade with other countries and increased investors' concerns. In addition, US foreign assistance and loans by institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have been restrained. The growing tensions with Cuba worry Colombia’s political opposition. They have stated that the current Peace Commissioner, Miguel Ceballos, is a threat to peace in the country as he refuses to restart the peace negotiations with ELN and celebrated the US government’s decision of blacklisting Cuba.8 Some experts believe that the sanctions have pushed Cuba and Venezuela closer together.9 This leads to increased tensions in the region, as Colombia and Venezuela are currently, and have been for years, at odds given the allegations of the Venezuelan government cooperating with ELN and FARC dissidents. Zooming out on the geopolitical scene The sanctions on Cuba seem to have strengthened the country's relationship with Russia. The two countries' military cooperation dates back to the Soviet era. In addition, the countries cooperate in the energy sector. Russia has also supported Cuba with debt relief and Russian news media, such as RT and Sputnik, are often used as main sources by Cuban media. Russia has additionally strong ties with Venezuela, which strengthened with Chávez presidency and has continued with Maduro. Venezuela has been specifically dependent on Russian financial support in the country's economic crisis. In addition, Russia has also invested in Venezuelan oil and gas sector, and likewise provides space for Russian media. The closer bond between Venezuela and Cuba seems to benefit Russia and its interest in the region. Particularly since Russian's relationship with Colombia has been kept on low-level economic interaction due to the country's ties with the US. Russia has historically supported ELN and FARC, and traded weapons for cocaine.11 The US has, on the other hand, historically always shown great support to the Colombian government, especially during Uribe’s presidency (2002-2010). By sanctioning Cuba and denouncing Maduro’s regime, it is clear that there is, once again, polarisation between the US and Russia power plays. During the Trump administration, US Special Representative for Venezuela Elliott Abram said the US would support Colombia if an armed conflict would break out between Colombia and Venezuela.12 Biden’s administration has shown dissatisfaction with Colombia's efforts of stopping the increasing number of murders of Colombian social leaders. However, the new administration is also strongly opposed to Maduro’s regime, and openly supports opponent Juan Guaidó. Increased Russian Presence Russia's presence in Latin America and the Caribbean has increased in recent years, mainly focusing on arms sales, commercial agreements, and political outreach. Cuba, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela have been Russia's main arms traders in the region. In addition, Russia has had a specific interest in Latin America's energy sector with Russian firms heavily invested in the oil and gas sector in countries such as Venezuela, Mexico, and Bolivia. In addition, Russia is becoming more popular in Latin America due to their supplies of Sputnik V COVID-19 vaccine. At least 10 countries have received or are expecting the vaccine, and they are often accepted with media coverage and presence of political leaders. This way Russia is able to promote themselves not only as a country that trades arms and supports the same ideology, but also as someone who is “sending medicine that is necessary for surviving.”13 This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group, as part of the ‘Russian Strategic Interests in Latin America’ research project led by Alessia Cappelletti and Isabel Oriol. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Authors Alessia Cappelletti is a Global Security Analyst and Program Manager of DEWIS. She has field experience in South America, Colombia especially, which makes her largely acquainted with the security challenges of the Latin American context. Her expertise includes conflict analysis and investigation, human rights protection, and criminality. Anastasija Kuznecova is a student at the MA program in Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University. She has field experience from Chile, Jamaica and the Balkans, and her interests include issues concerning social inequality, discrimination, and conflict escalation. With her combined practical experience and academic knowledge, Anastasija has a broad understanding of security, development, and human rights.

Diplomatic Expulsions and Euro-Russian Diplomacy By Ruben Pfeijffer In early February, Russia expelled three diplomats from Germany, Poland and Sweden, further escalating recent tensions between Russia and the EU over the arrest of Russian opposition leader Aleksej Navalny. What is the exact story behind these recent diplomatic expulsions, and what influence will they have on Russian-European diplomatic relations going forward? Geopolitical Dilemma In 2021, Russian-European diplomatic relations have become increasingly complicated due to two significant geopolitical developments: the arrest of Russian opposition leader Aleksej Navalny and The Lancet’s recent report on the success of the Russian Sputnik V COVID-19 vaccine program. The EU now faces a serious dilemma over its diplomatic approach to Russia. On the one hand, the EU is almost ideologically obliged to express their support for Navalny, Putin’s main political rival who recently found temporary refuge in Germany after being poisoned, for which he accused the Russian Federal Security service (FSB) in August last year. The EU simply cannot afford to stay silent on Navalny’s arrest or the violent police crackdown on his supporters, as ignoring such a blatant attack on democracy would undoubtedly lead to a serious backlash from EU member states and important Western allies like the US. On the other hand, the EU sees the recently proven safe and effective Russian Sputnik V COVID-19 vaccine as a valid option to fill the vaccine stockpile gaps that underdelivering European manufacturers left behind. Normalizing the currently tense diplomatic relations with Russia would likely make them more inclined to distribute their vaccine to European markets. Humiliation On 5 February, it became painfully clear that Russia is very aware of their current strong diplomatic position vis-à-vis the EU when the EU's High Representative Josep Borrell visited Russian Foreign Minister Sergej Lavrov in Moscow to talk about Navalny’s arrest and the possibility of acquiring the Russian vaccine. Despite being warned against visiting Russia by the governments of multiple EU member states, Borrell insisted on going to Moscow, stating that it is vital to pursue constructive dialogue and to put aside negative rhetoric. Russia, however, had different plans. During his meeting with Lavrov, Borrell was surprised by announcements on Twitter that Russia had decided to declare three diplomats from Germany, Poland and Sweden persona non grata for allegedly attending ‘illegal’ pro-Navalny protests. Accusations that were immediately denied by the respective governments of the countries involved. Borrell was later publicly humiliated during the joint press conference in what seemed to be a coordinated attack between Lavrov and the Russian media. He was asked several provocative and challenging questions on alleged malpractices of important EU allies in an apparent attempt to provoke a denunciation of these practices or otherwise lay the fundament for accusations of hypocrisy. Lavrov also held several damning monologues denouncing the EU’s support for Navalny and calling the EU an unreliable partner while Borrell, in the observers’ eye, stood by and watched. Clear intentions The intentions behind Russia’s recent diplomatic actions seem clear. They know the EU is seriously interested in acquiring the Sputnik V vaccine, so they plan to use that as a bargaining chip to force the EU to back out of their support for Navalny. Expelling three European diplomats for their alleged attendance at a pro-Navalny demonstration – at the exact moment Borrell was in Moscow to talk about the acquisition of the Sputnik V vaccine – was their method of getting that message across. Russia is simply making the most of its current position of strength. As long as Europe's COVID-19 vaccine stockpile shortages persist, the Kremlin and their Sputnik V vaccine are a geopolitical player that is hard to ignore. EU response Borrell faced significant backlash when he returned from his trip to Moscow. Several MEP's scolded him for his weak performance, while others even called for his resignation. Germany, Poland and Sweden reacted to their diplomats' expulsion by expelling three Russian diplomats in return, but it seems unlikely the EU will leave it at that. Borrell himself has also changed his tone significantly since his return and now proposes that EU members impose new sanctions on Russia. With the EU is currently unwilling to back out of their support for Navalny in exchange for the Russian vaccine and the potential of new sanctions for Russia looming on the horizon, it seems very likely that Russian-European diplomatic relations will remain tense for the time being. The question remains what Russia’s exact response to the EU’s refusal to back down will be. As pro-Navalny demonstrations continue across Russia, the recent diplomatic expulsions may be a sign of more to come. However, Russia also has much to gain by supplying Europe with the Sputnik V vaccine, even when the EU does not rescind its support for Navalny. It would allow them to present themselves as the ‘saviours of Europe’ in their ongoing propaganda war while also generating much income through vaccine sales. In any case, the fact that their diplomatic display at the Moscow meeting instigated significant internal uproar in the European Parliament, and damaged the EU’s image internationally, is not an undesirable preliminary outcome for Russia. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author: Ruben Pfeijffer is a graduated anthropologist who currently follows the MA program Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University. While working on his bachelor thesis in the Netherlands during the early stages of the COVID-19 outbreak, Ruben gained experience with conducting ethnographic research under the challenging circumstances of the pandemic, and has learned to be adaptable with his research methods.

Insurgency in Cabo Delgado: How radical Islamist ASWJ can disrupt established ‘drug peace’ in Mozambique By: Alessia Cappelletti In the 1990s, drug traffickers started to prefer East African corridors over the more usual Balkan route, as the eyes of the world pointed at post-conflict Yugoslavia. The countries along the Indian Ocean coastline, especially Kenya and Tanzania, became the protagonists of this trafficking scheme. Despite being often overlooked, Mozambique has also been playing a pivotal role in drug trafficking to Europe and South Africa. The drug economy is widely integrated into the social and political fabric of Mozambique. In 2018, extensive research carried out from ENACT Africa shed light on the intricate yet highly regulated trafficking scheme put in place in Mozambique. The illicit ring is led by Mohamed Bachir Suleman (MBS) and families of Asian descent with ties to the political elites. The ring smuggles heroin and hashish easily in and out of the country, passing through Dubai or the Indian Ocean, with complete political protection. MBS is still thought to have a substantial influence over the Mozambican drug trade, despite his bad health and a US blacklisting for drug trafficking. His second man is Momade Rassul Abdul Rahim, who has ties with the presidential party and he is FRELIMO’s economic agent. Despite his involvement in illegal activities and his arrest for money laundering in 2017, Rassul is still referred to in Mozambican media as a ‘businessman.’ The second and third families tied to MBS are run by Gulam Rassul Moti and Faruk Ayoob, respectively. Moti is based in the city of Nacala and manages the port. According to a leaked US report, Moti mostly introduces heroin in the country through the port of Nacala using dhow boats, whereas MBS imports drugs from Pakistan through Dubai, hidden in containers. The network would hide the drugs among goods imported for the political elites, and therefore tax and control free. Given the high-level corruption present in the country, it is rumored that there is some level of informal state regulation of the drug trade. Mozambique served as a transit country for heroin since the 1990s. Yet, in this period, there has been no drug war, no high-level conviction, and no significant quantity of heroin seizures registered. This means that either (1) no heroin passes through Mozambique, or (2) the trafficking network has been working very smoothly for the past 30 years and enjoys protection at high political levels. Given that foreign bodies do identify MBS as a drug trafficker; there are proven connections between the political elites and businesspeople linked to the drug trade; and local level police and customs officers report incongruencies and malpractice in law enforcement, option (2) is more likely to be true. These mechanisms create a 'drug peace' in which the flow of illicit goods runs without encountering problems or rivalries, and the roles of who manages such flow are clearly assigned. However, three events signal that a shift in the power dynamics of the Mozambican drug trade is likely to happen soon. The first event was the newly elected president Nyusi in 2015. Since his presidency, ties to the illegal drug trade and the presidential office appear less strong, since the president does not seem to have relations with the underworld. Second, there is evidence of grassroots 'freelancer' drug mules organizing themselves independently through social media and driving heroin around the country. This practice functions quite effortlessly since bribery is a common and effective practice throughout the country. Third, and perhaps most importantly, there is a new powerful player in the field who may have the tools needed to take away the drug business from elite families; Islamist insurgency in Cabo Delgado, Al-Sunnah Wa Jamo. A new player in the field Al-Sunnah Wa Jamo (ASWJ) is a militia of Islamist imprint born in 2007 in the northern region of Cabo Delgado. Initially, the ASWJ was created in collaboration with the Islamic State Central African Republic (ISCAP). The government and other stakeholders have widely underestimated ASWJ until in 2017 they attacked the city of Mocimboa da Praia and repeatedly stormed nearby villages. More so, in August 2020, they commandeered Mocimboa da Praia as their ‘new capital’, which they still occupy to date. The group has been increasing the lethality and frequency of the attacks. On November 9, ASWJ beheaded 50 people in the Muidumbe area, making clear to the eyes of the world that they are a threat to be taken seriously. The UN calls for a thorough investigation of the attack, whilst the Mozambican government asks for foreign aid to combat the militant forces, as their strategic sophistication is improving dramatically. There is no documentation to date that proves ASWJ is involved in heroin trafficking; however, the group has demonstrated to be a militarily competent player. It conquered a significant port city and has also increased its maritime capabilities to the extent that in mid-September it overran four Islands of the Quirimbas Archipelago, known to be used for drug transshipments. ASWJ also took hold of the main road going north to south, which gives them quite some power over import and export activities. ASWJ has all the cards in place to start profiting from the Mozambican transit corridor as active players or as ‘tax authorities’ of the illegal trade, giving them access to a 600 million dollar market. If they decide to do so, ASWJ and political elites would need to find an agreement on how to manage the trade that has been so far peacefully carried out. This could be a somewhat complex arrangement to make, as the rule of ‘no dialogue with terrorists’ may hold true for corrupt governments as well. In addition to the war against radical Islam, then, Mozambique may be on the verge of witnessing its very first drug war. If ASWJ is to get directly involved with drug trafficking, ruling families who have been making a profit from it since the 1990s may be quite discontent. In that case, the options are two. First, an open war between the families and ASWJ could consolidate the ties between drug traffickers and the government further, making sanctioning a semi-formal alliance possible. Or second, the inclusion of a branch of the Islamic State into the country's institutionalized drug peace, reducing the chances of defeating ASWJ to zero. Whatever the outcome, sustainable peace is not an option for the foreseeable future of the country. Download as PDF (English) About the author: Alessia Cappelletti is a Global Security Analyst and Program Manager of DEWIS. She has field experience in South America, Colombia especially, which makes her largely acquainted with the security challenges of the Latin American context. Her expertise includes conflict analysis and investigation, human rights protection, and criminality.

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We are proud to announce that Willem de Bruin joined Team Dyami. Strengthening our pallet of services that we offer to organisations conducting business overseas. After completing his military service with the Dutch Royal Navy, Willem de Bruin joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During his 43-year career in the Foreign Service, he has served in 13 diplomatic and consular Missions in Europe, Asia, and Australasia. Willem was posted at embassies in high-risk areas like Beijing (Tiananmen uprising), Tehran (Islamic revolution and Iraq – Iran war), and a five-year posting in Islamabad where, as First Secretary of the Embassy he led a team detecting corruption and fraud within the local Administration with the aim of preventing identity fraud, illegal migration and people smuggling to Europe. Upon completing his assignment in Pakistan he was appointed Head of the Department of Special Investigations at the Security Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Willem completed his official career as Netherlands Dty Consul-General in Sydney (Australia.) This international background enables Dyami to test facts and circumstances in studies with a foreign aspect in a broader context as well as from an intercultural perspective.

Traditionally security risks in Mexico are commonly associated with organised crime, drug trafficking and other sources of violence. However, there are other aspects of the Mexican context that should be considered when making a risk analysis, such as how political change and national policies can impact mid-term and long-term investments. By: Isabel Oriol Llonin Political changes are usually not seen as an imminent security risk in Mexico, or in most parts of Latin America, however, they can represent a risk to mid and long-term business interests. A new government can bring a drastic change in the country’s approach to economic policy and business affairs with international companies. Such is the case of Mexico with president Andrés Manuel López Obrador who took office in late 2018. A new era for Mexico with López Obrador López Obrador -or AMLO as he is known- is the first left-wing president that Mexico has had in recent decades. His victory broke a cycle of governance between the two major parties that have been in power in the last years, the PAN and the PRI, the first a conservative party, and the second a self-proclaimed centrist party, both with a history of strong neoliberal economic policies. With a society increasingly tired of the political elite and corruption scandals, AMLO ran a campaign based on the idea of being 'one of the people', with a strong preference for austerity policies and the promise to end corruption in the high political spheres. He also inherited a country with alarming rates of violence, crime, and rumours of organised crime infiltrated at all levels of government. Therefore, it is unsurprising that his government has been characterised by efforts to appear different from the traditional political elite. One of these efforts has been transforming the Mexican economy from the conventional neoliberal economic policies that the country has held for decades to a more state-controlled economy. Since his presidential campaign, both the national and international private sectors were unsettled about the potential consequences of such changes. Two years into his government, some of those concerns have proven to be true. Lessons learned from the Mexico City Texcoco Airport The Mexico City Texcoco Airport was a megaproject located in the highly populated capital of the country, a city with approximately 20 million inhabitants in its metropolitan area. It was intended to replace the current airport and meet the demand for a higher air traffic capacity in the city. The ambitious USD 13 billion projects, expected to have a capacity of 125 million passengers per year at its completion, was launched in 2016 by the previous administration led by Enrique Peña Nieto. As a presidential candidate, López Obrador took a strong stance against the project claiming it was too expensive. The Texcoco Airport project became a symbol of his discourse against 'unnecessary spending', playing into his narrative of a 'people's president' who refuses to favour the elites. The project also had some environmental concerns regarding the land in which it was being built, so AMLO then proposed the cheaper alternative of adapting the Santa Lucía military base, north of the city. However, critics pointed out several issues with this alternative: the project had severe viability concerns that would probably raise the cost of construction in the future -this was later proven to be true- and the environmental impact report had not been released to the public. In December 2018, within less than a month of taking office, President López Obrador announced the official cancellation of the Texcoco Airport after 30% of the project had already been built. Naturally, this raised serious concerns among the business sector, undermining investor’s confidence in public projects, and added to the overall air of uncertainty in the country. Image 2: An aerial view of the unfinished Texcoco Airport. AFP. Uncertainty in the energy sector In 2013 former President Enrique Peña Nieto spearheaded a comprehensive energy constitutional reform that would, among other changes, allow the private and foreign investment across the energy sector. Along with the auctioning of untapped oil and gas blocks across the country, the reform ended a 75 year-long state monopoly over oil and energy supply chains. Fast forward to the current government; the energy sector has been a critical area in the efforts of López Obrador to counter decades of neoliberal economic policies. He has criticised the 2013 energy reform as fraudulent by pointing out the corruption and bribery scandals that have surrounded it since the beginning. Moreover, his government has been characterised by his attempts to strengthen the inefficient and indebted state-owned oil (PEMEX) and electricity (CFE) companies as key pieces to 'recover economic sovereignty'. This has led to several controversial decisions. At the beginning of his presidency, López Obrador indefinitely postponed all auctions on oil and gas blocks to private companies, proving once again to foreign investors that previous administration's deals were at risk with the new government. In 2020, he announced a new sustainable energy policy that would impose considerable limitations and additional requirements to private renewable energy farms. The government argued it was intended to protect the reliability of the national supply of energy during the crisis. However, critics have speculated that it was an effort to protect the state-owned Federal Commission of Energy (CFE). The new sustainable energy policy resulted in the temporary closing of 44 farms of renewable energy while putting at risk investments for USD 6 billion and almost 30,000 jobs. However, after a series of legal battles, the Supreme Court ruled that the president’s policies were unconstitutional, and most farms were allowed to carry out operations again. While the government did not win this battle, the actions it implemented certainly undermined investor’s confidence and could potentially harm the development of renewable energy soon. It is not completely clear what direction the government will take now, especially considering the economic and health crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic. The significant drop in oil prices is forcing national oil companies around the world to reconsider their long-term projects and investments, potentially allocating more resources to other sources of energy. While private investment into the energy sector, especially into renewable resources, could be the boost that the Mexican economy needs to revive after the crisis, it seems unlikely that López Obrador's government will take that path. With four more years left as president, chances are the business sector -especially the energy sector- will navigate a certain degree of uncertainty in Mexico. Therefore the political context should be considered in any security risk analysis. This article is part one of a series highlighting the importance of political change in security risk analysis in the region of Latin America. Download as PDF About the Author Isabel Oriol Llonin is a contributing analyst at Dyami. She holds a bachelor’s degree in International Relations and has a post-graduate degree in Public International Law from Utrecht University. She has expertise in the Latin American region and the public international law implications of conflict analysis.

Today I can proudly welcome Jos Meijer to Team Dyami. Jos will be added to our pool of experts. In the role of Privacy & Data Protection Consultant, Jos will add to the services we offer to the aviation industry. Jos Meijer is an experienced aviation professional with over 36 years within KLM. His expertise covers various areas, like contract/vendor management, customs, airport processes. His last position was focused on privacy/data protection. Jos has gained vast knowledge of the EU General Data Protection Regulation(GDPR) and how to implement subject requirements in a (large) international organization. He recognizes the advantage of the use of personal data, but also the risks related to the same. Moreover, the use of personal data in relation to security is a familiar topic for Jos, like the use of PNR/API data in the aviation environment. Next to that Jos gained knowledge in the use of personal data to improve processes, like the use of biometrics. Recently adding insights on the use for personal data in Covid19 related programs. #privacynews#privacylaw#pnr#api#aviationsecurity#gdprcompliance#privacyofficer#dataprotection#gdpr

The Effects of COVID-19 on the Cocaine Trade in Latin America and Europe By: Anastasija Kuznecova COVID-19 has brought lockdown measures and disruptions in transportation all around the world, leading to various challenges in both production and trafficking in the illegal drugs market. However, a year later, new trends are emerging indicating that the cocaine industry has adapted to the pandemic increasing the flow to Europe with maritime transportation. The Impact of COVID-19 on the Cocaine Market Measures implemented to prevent the spread of the pandemic has led to reports of a global shortfall of diverse types of drugs at retail level, increased street prices, and reduction in purity.1 However, the cocaine industry seems to be faring well with the consequences of the pandemic, as compared to other industries that suffered heavy losses. The cocaine market has benefited from its continuous storing of large amounts of cocaine in warehouses and other secretive storage places. The industry also has experience with various trafficking methods, making them more adaptable to the pandemic, with reports of a rise in the usage of sea routes and replacing street dealing with home deliveries and drive-in services. The drug industry can lead to negative impact on the legal economy and increase drug-related violence. This is particularly true in exporting countries, where the cocaine industry often provokes internal conflicts, intensifies corruption, leads to environmental destruction and increases exploitation of vulnerable and indigenous populations. In addition, drug profits are often invested in other crimes, such as human trafficking and money laundering. Production of Cocaine in Latin America The three main producers of cocaine in Latin America are the Andean nations of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) have reported that during 2020, the law enforcements in Colombia have increased their activities against drug trafficking and despite lockdowns, continued with its coca bush eradication campaign.2 Due to restricted transportation, the country is experiencing a shortage of gasoline, necessary for cocaine production, as it used to be imported from Venezuela. However, at the moment, this will not have any significant impact on the drug trade, as most drug gangs store large amounts of cocaine on hand. Bolivia might experience an increase in its cultivation as the country's political conflict in November 2019 and the consequences of the pandemic have limited the current government's capability to control coca bush cultivation. Peru, on the other hand, experienced a decline in the price of cocaine at the beginning of the pandemic, which at first seemed to reduce the country's level of drug trafficking. However, due to the continuing economic crisis, more farmers may increase or take up coca cultivation in all three countries. This trend is already noticeable in Peru where several farmers have switched from harvesting coffee beans to coca plants due to the fall in coffee prices, as coca cultivation offers more stability than other types of crops even though the coca price has still not fully recovered.3 Increase in Maritime Support One explanation for the continuing high numbers of cocaine smuggling to Europe is due to the industry's reliability on maritime trafficking, as it is the transportation method that has been the least affected by the pandemic. Usually, cocaine is trafficked in containers filled with legal products. Reports from Colombia have indicated that maritime transport has increased due to COVID measures, specifically the use of submersibles for drug trafficking to Central America and container cargos for trafficking to Europe.4 In addition, other types of drug trades, which previously relied on overland and air traffic, seem to have also increased their use of sea routes due to the ongoing measures. Latin American and European law enforcements are aware of the threat posed by sea trafficking. Even though Europe experienced a record-high number of cocaine seizures in 2020,5 only two percent of the containers around the world are inspected, thus, creating perfect opportunities for the drug traffickers.6 The Cocaine Market in Europe Europe is the second-largest market for cocaine, with an estimated minimum retail value of EUR 9.1 billion in 2017.7 The key points for cocaine trafficking in Europe are in Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands. From here, the drug is exported to other parts of Europe, as well as increasingly to other markets such as Australia, New Zealand and countries in the Middle East and Asia. Colombian and Italian organised crime groups continue to have a central role in cocaine distribution. However, other groups are increasingly gaining more power, including Albanian-speaking, British, Dutch, French, Irish, Moroccan, Serbian, Spanish and Turkish criminal groups. European criminal groups are also establishing themselves in Latin America and purchasing cocaine closer to the production regions at a lower cost, which increases competition and violence within the market, as well as corruption within Europe. Increase in Use of Digital Technology The pandemic has increased the use of dark web markets, social media and mobile apps for the distribution of cocaine, and methods such as food deliveries and drive-in services have been used by the dealers. In addition, the drug trade has had a decrease in reliance on cash and face-to-face dealing. Some of these adaptations are predicted to last after the restrictions will be lifted, as they are considered to be more convenient.8 Growing Risk The cocaine marked in Latin America and Europe has adapted to the restrictions implemented as a result of the pandemic. The trade seems to expand in Europe, generating a major source of income for organised crime groups. This could explain the increase in number of criminal groups involved in the cocaine trade. These changes threaten European nations at their very core, eroding their political security, economy, as well as undermining their efforts to protect human rights. In short, we can see how the cocaine marked continues to negatively impact Latin American and European countries, creating new challenges for law enforcement. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author: Anastasija Kuznecova is a student at the MA program in Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University. She has field experience from Chile, Jamaica and the Balkans, and her interests include issues concerning social inequality, discrimination, and conflict escalation. With her combined practical experience and academic knowledge, Anastasija has a broad understanding of security, development, and human rights.

Russia's Strategic Interests in East Africa (and beyond) By: Ruben Pfeijffer The quest for strategically located warm water ports has always played an important role in Russia's foreign policy. After consolidating ice-free access to the seas in the country's direct vicinity, it seems Russia has now set its sights on the coast of East Africa. Warm water ports The absence of warm water ports has historically been a significant challenge to Russia's maritime ambitions. The largely landlocked country possesses very few ports that remain ice-free throughout the year. Even less are located on the Russian mainland itself. This has always been a significant strategic disadvantage compared to rivalling military powers like NATO, who have access to warm water ports all around the globe. Therefore, Russia has gone to great lengths to acquire and retain its current three warm-water ports outside of the Russian mainland: Kaliningrad, Sevastopol and Tartus. Kaliningrad Kaliningrad is Russia's only ice-free naval base in the Baltic Sea. The port city used to be the capital of Prussia but was acquired from the Germans during the Potsdam Conference. Through Russification of the population, the Russians managed to retain the naval base after the fall of the Soviet Union. However, this turned Kaliningrad into an exclave, cut off from mainland Russia and stuck between NATO members Poland and Lithuania. Nevertheless, the port remains ice-free throughout the year, making it of utmost strategic importance for Russia's maritime ambitions in the Baltic Sea, North Sea and Atlantic Ocean. Sevastopol Sevastopol is home to a strategically important naval base that provides the Russians access to the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea, Sea of Azov and the Caspian Sea. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia leased the base from their newly independent Ukrainian neighbours. This deal lasted until the Ukrainian crisis when Russia took a severe geopolitical risk and annexed the Crimean peninsula in order to safeguard their strategic interests in the region. This action made clear that Russia is willing to take serious steps to retain possession of their warm water ports. Tartus Tartus is Russia's only naval base in the Mediterranean and is located on the coast of Syria. Tartus initially only functioned as a small naval support facility. However, in return for Russia's military support for Assad's regime during the Syrian Civil War, the port has been allowed to expand further into a fully functioning naval base that can house up to eleven naval vessels. The naval base in Tartus makes the Russian 5th operational squadron in the Mediterranean less dependent on the Bosporus crossing, which is controlled by NATO member Turkey. The next step Recently, Russia seems to be no longer satisfied with just its current three warm water ports. In November last year, Russian officials announced a lease agreement with the Sudanese government for a new naval base on the coast of Sudan.1 This would be Russia's first military base in Africa and would position them along major shipping routes in the Red Sea. An estimated 10% of all global trade passes through these waters, making it a strategically valuable region to control. According to the Russians, the base in Sudan will only function as a 'naval logistics facility' that is used to carry out repairs and replenish supplies.2 However, considering the recent expansion of the initially small naval facility in Tartus, it is entirely possible that Russia plans a similar expansion for the Sudanese base in the future. Secret report The announcement of the base in Sudan is consistent with the content of a secret report from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs leaked to the media three months earlier.3 The report claimed that Russia had concluded military agreements with up to twenty-one African countries. Six of those countries, the Central African Republic, Egypt, Eritrea, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Sudan, would allegedly become the location of future Russian military bases. Russian officials have so far only confirmed the future establishment of Red Sea naval facilities in Eritrea and Sudan. Looking at the map of Africa, the strategic relevance of the alleged future Russian military bases immediately becomes clear. Egypt, Eritrea and Sudan are all perfectly located alongside the Red Sea, while Mozambique and Madagascar are located alongside another major shipping route, the Mozambique Channel. New naval bases in these countries would thus give Russia the strategic capabilities to disrupt trade as a geopolitical instrument and provide some form of counterbalance against the US 5th fleet, who previously had free reign in the region. Beyond East Africa There is reason to believe Russia will not stop at East Africa in its quest for additional warm water ports. Before the country was plunged into a constitutional crisis, it was reported that Venezuela and Russia had agreed to station Russian long-range bombers on the island of La Orchila, which is home to a Venezuelan naval base and military airfield.4 The deal is a testament to Russia's renewed strategic interests in the Caribbean, a region they have largely avoided since the Cuban Missile Crisis. Whether a future navy base is on the cards remains to be seen, however, as the Caribbean's close proximity to the US might make it too risky a geopolitical manoeuvre, even for Russia. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author: Ruben Pfeijffer is a graduated anthropologist who currently follows the MA program Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University. While working on his bachelor thesis in the Netherlands during the early stages of the COVID-19 outbreak, Ruben gained experience with conducting ethnographic research under the challenging circumstances of the pandemic, and has learned to be adaptable with his research methods.

When Might Liberal Peace Fail and Illiberal Peace Prevail? By: Puck Holthuis Liberal peacebuilding is a term many Western nations are familiar with and support. It commits to democratic ideals, such as rule of law, human rights, free markets, property rights and inter-group reconciliation.1 Often, Western actors dominate the process of (liberal) peacebuilding in post-conflict nations, while these often involve non-Western countries. This is an issue for liberal peacebuilding, as it has been criticized for being too monolithic. It does not consider that non-Western nations or regimes and their cultures may be less receptive to Western democratic politics. Illiberal Peacebuilding Although Western presence in the form of liberal peacebuilding is commonly implemented in non-Western post-conflict nations, it occasionally backfires when the methods used do not align with local processes, laws and culture. Not only is the transition from a post-conflict nation to a democracy a delicate process with many risks involved, but collaborating with foreign cultures also requires thoughtful consideration. A different kind of peacebuilding, called illiberal peacebuilding, is a process that is more common in a number of Southeast Asian countries, among other nations. Illiberal peacebuilding is dominated by local actors as opposed to Western powers, and drives on clientelism, cronyism and corruption, rather than economic neo-liberalism. An additional important characteristic of illiberal peacebuilding is that regime security is prioritised, rather than stability, accountability, human rights and social inclusion.1 Illiberal peacebuilding in Practice Several Southeast Asian countries showcase this type of peacebuilding. For example, whereas stability is a liberal peacebuilding ideal, Aceh (a province of Indonesia) and Nepal would not fare well in terms of equity should these nations initially opt for stability. Negotiating with subnational elites in Indonesia and Myanmar would ultimately be more promising for maintaining long-term peace, even though this process may be viewed unethical from a Western perspective as it encourages inequality. Sri Lanka and Myanmar (also known as Burma) showcase that elite bargaining (discrete agreements that seek out redistribution of power and resources among the elites) is more politically inherent. As a consequence, these more common practises should not be discarded as improper characteristics of a system that, from a Western perspective, may seem inappropriate and unfair. Instead, understanding such practises and acknowledging their pertinence could foster better cooperation and yield more desirable results. The recent protests in Bangkok against Thailand’s current regime highlight the local illiberal peacebuilding characteristics as well, such as the prioritization of regime security. Individuals can receive up to 15 years in prison for insulting the Royal family. This includes stepping on Thai currency on which the king’s face is printed or making negative remarks on the monarchy. It follows that many locals refrain from commenting on their king out of fear of persecution, or simply because they are unwilling to do so. In many Western nations, however, freedom of speech is not only the norm, but a much respected and appreciated pillar on which societies are built and continue to develop. This logically makes it difficult to understand practices that move away, even against, practices that are deemed valuable in Western nations. Understanding and Cooperation The practices and objectives of illiberal peacebuilding are perhaps controversial, as they risk strengthening corruption, inequality and elitism. Yet, in countries where politics and culture differ greatly from how Western nations tend to operate, identical methods for peacebuilding in both these parts of the world struggle for similar success. That is not to say that practises of inequality or corruption should be condoned. Rather, it is important to understand how peacebuilding tends to manifest in certain Southeast Asian nations as well as in other parts of the world. The means to achieve peace and stability in Southeast Asia differ from how most Western nations would approach this objective through liberal peacebuilding. However, there are many alternatives to this way of peacebuilding depending on the region of interest.2 Liberal peacebuilding is not a one-size-fits-all process, although it has been successful in various nations. However, for countries to achieve stability and peace, it is a better option to work alongside their culture and norms as opposed to implementing a sudden new way of life that may be too drastic a change. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author: Puck Holthuis is a master student Conflict Studies & Human Rights at Utrecht University. She recently relocated back to The Netherlands after living abroad since 2006 spending most of her years in South Africa and China. She combines her love for writing with her analytical capabilities, shaping an ambitious young professional with global insights.

An Introduction: By: Alessia Cappelletti Though Russia is known to be active in seeking control over neighbouring countries, its interests extend well beyond geographical proximity. In a region where US presence is a controversial topic, and Chinese influence is mainly manifested through business practices, Russia has plenty of opportunities to be the ‘alternative’ to US power. In order to analyze Russia’s interest in Latin America one has to consider three aspects: the economic, social, and geopolitical ones. The economic aspect clearly stands alone in that Latin America is an attractive, relatively new, and highly profitable environment, which would help Russia to diversify its portfolio. However, states are not businesses and never act on economic principles alone. The geopolitics has much to do with the closeness to the United States and European and US sanctions on Russian goods. The social sphere, instead, deals with Russia’s strategic communication and the use of soft power. After the fall of the Soviet Union and during the late 1990s and early 2000s Russia was virtually absent from the Latin American scenario. Moscow and its Hispanic counterparts started a deeper collaboration only in the late 2000s. This collaboration has seen import-exports to and from the region increase, focusing on bilateral agreements. Imports and exports of goods between Russia and the Hispanic region were around 2180 million dollars in 2000 and increased to 12,106 million in 2016, after reaching an all-time high in 2013 with 18,659 million dollars of goods being exchanged between the two regions. Still, trade between Russia and Latam is still relatively low, representing only 2,3% of the total Russian trade of 2016 [1]. Throughout academic and journalistic literature, it is accepted that Russia’s stance throughout Latin America follows a pragmatic doctrine aiming at “becoming a major power in a multipolar world” [2]. Moscow wants to leave behind an EU and US-centered world and aims at forming its identity as an ‘alternative’ to Western power, therefore originating from a binary tension. However, the days in which the world was polarized solely between the US and Russia are gone. A changing world China is a powerful new player that Russia must consider and growing regional powers should also be closely monitored. However, while China is affirming itself as an international economic power and relatively adhered to a line of non-interference [3], Russia has always meddled widely in world matters and continues to do so. Given its impossibility to contrast China commercially, Russia is likely to use trade as an opportunity to strengthen its print on the region. Economic powers are also on the rise in Latin America, with Brazil and Russia both being part of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). On the economic level, they (should) operate as peers. With the dominant economies of Latin America (Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina), the Kremlin plays a careful game that is based on creating economic interest and tries to break away from western dependence. After the EU and US’ economic sanctions against Russia, the Kremlin had to start scouting for trading partners finding Latin American countries interesting allies, as the majority abstained from implementing said sanctions. Looking at the future, the Kremlin must also consider the end of Trump’s presidency. Political relations with the Americas deteriorated under Trump. In Latin America Trump left a political void, at times filled with insensitive statements and clear anti-immigration rhetoric, that Biden will have to rescue promptly. The world will see the United States trying to assert themselves more on the international stage, which could mean reversing the gradual escalation of Russia in Latin America, or their relation turning sourer than before. Strategic Communication and Soft Power The Kremlin is also implementing a carefully curated communication strategy in Latin America, which in some instances has been directly compared to the one of Daesh [4]. Since 2010, for example, Russia Today (now RT) started to broadcast in Spanish, signaling a wish to expand its influence over the continent. RT is a state-owned company that broadcasts in various languages, including Arabic, and a brand of TV Novosti later demarcated as an organization of “strategic importance for Russia” by Vladimir Putin. Results of the effectiveness of this practice are quite visible with the Sputnik V vaccine against Covid-19. Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela already registered and received the vaccine, alongside countries like Iran, Palestine, and Armenia. Brazil will start producing the Sputnik V shortly, whereas Mexico approved the vaccine on February 2, and bought millions of doses after showing the highest rate of awareness worldwide regarding the Sputnik V [5]. In the worldwide race to get out of the covid crisis, western-manufactured vaccines have been almost entirely bought by richer countries leaving little for the rest of the world. Russia’s Sputnik V has the opportunity to be the leading vaccine for lower-income countries, together with Chinese Sinovac. In that way, the two countries may exploit the vaccine distribution to gain significant soft power among non-western countries (and western too, as Hungary). Even more so the Sputnik V, being the first vaccine to be approved worldwide. Away from profit and interests: The case of Venezuela Despite the claim about Russia's investments in Latin America being ‘pragmatic,’ [6] in Venezuela another storyline is visible. Russia also largely and controversially invested in Venezuela’s oil apparatus which was debated as it was seen as short-lived. Indeed, according to Reuters’ investigation, the Russian Rosneft oil company invested billions of USD in its Venezuelan counterparts, state-owned PDVSA. However, Reuters analyzed documents and communications that showed the internal auditor’s worries about the investment. [7] It is then clear that the project was political and directly contrasts the ‘pragmatic’ view that researchers tend to take when observing Russian interests abroad. In March 2020, after the US released a 15 million USD bounty for the capture of President Maduro for narco-terrorism charges, Russia apparently retired their economic investments into the country. This also coincided with the fall of oil prices after the beginning of the Coronavirus pandemic, which made recovering Rosneft’s investment virtually impossible. [8] However, Russian hegemony over PDVSA is far from being over, as Rosneft simply sold the related shares to another Russian state-owned oil company, this time fully under the control of the state (Moscow only owns 40% of Rosneft). Therefore, the Kremlin still has a key role to play in managing Venezuela’s rich resources [9]. The Research Project Clearly, Russia did not completely abandon its wish to become a world power, that much echoes that of the USSR. Being close to Washington but far away from Moscow, Latin America is both a difficult challenge and a priceless outpost to achieve such a wish. It has become clear that Russia is actively taking steps to ‘come back’ to the region, however, the story of its strategic interests in Latin America is not a linear one and ought to be explored with different geopolitical angles. The Russian ‘pragmatism’ in the region does not manifest in Venezuela and the trade between the countries is too insignificant to be the main strategy used by the Kremlin throughout the whole region. Therefore, Russia is seemingly implementing different strategies that vary per country, depending on political affinity (Venezuela and Nicaragua), closeness to the US (Colombia), and economic potential (Mexico and Brazil). As there is no coherent document that discusses different foreign strategies implemented by Russia in Latin America, this report aims at monitoring Russian strategy and highlighting observable trends. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group, as part of the ‘Russian Strategic Interests in Latin America’ research project led by Alessia Cappelletti and Isabel Oriol. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author: Alessia Cappelletti is a Global Security Analyst and Program Manager of DEWIS. She has field experience in South America, Colombia especially, which makes her largely acquainted with the security challenges of the Latin American context. Her expertise includes conflict analysis and investigation, human rights protection, and criminality.