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Foreign Money but Internal Losses: When liberal peace schemes increase the country’s vulnerabilities By Alessia Cappelletti It is generally accepted that economic investment in the form of foreign aid or business ventures into post-conflict societies is a fruitful activity that can often enhance local peace and stability. The underlying reasoning of this ‘economic peace’ is to make stability more profitable than war - this is generally known as the ‘liberal peace’ framework. However, the reality is never as clear-cut as theories because local dynamics are not linear nor straightforward. Certain studies proved that there is no actual correlation between foreign direct investment (FDI) and post-conflict peace. Quickly re-opening the country to foreign investment may even destabilize the country further by introducing new influential stakeholders. In some instances, foreign economic interest is proven to be detrimental to the humanitarian development of the country. This is because they tend to create new elites or exacerbate preexisting cultural hierarchies. Often, in war-torn countries, discrimination against minorities is systematically enforced, and corruption is a common practice carried out at the - literal - expenses of minorities. If foreign donors or business people are not aware of this, they risk seriously aggravating the situation. Businesses in the Post-Conflict In Myanmar, it has been documented that the government-supported multinationals contributed to the instability of the country. At the end of the military regime in 2011, the country opened its doors to foreign businesses believing that the new frontier for a stable peace was the economic development of the territory. Whether this could be true in theory, the reality was different. Very few people benefitted from liberal peace models implemented in the country. Elites got richer, but tensions between Rakhine and Rohingya intensified since the 'development' promises that were made to the population ultimately did not materialise. The Rakhine population was promised a fortune from the business deals. Still, as exclusion became clearer, Rohingya Muslims were blamed - which is both a symptom and an aggravation of the active ethnic targeting being perpetrated to their expenses. As a result of these culturally unresponsive economic endeavours, the country is still far from the peace and stability it hoped to achieve at the beginning of the economic opening. Ethnic grievances have transformed into frequent clashes around the country between the military, Rakhine's armed group, and the rebel faction of the Shan state. In addition to this, there is, of course, the ethnic cleansing of millions of Rohingya Muslims taking place. Donors in the Post-Conflict Examples of such failed 'liberal peace' schemes are everywhere to be found, from Colombia to Congo, to Sierra Leone. Where foreign involvement is disconnected from local realities, it can result in unhelpful or useless projects and, in the worst-case scenarios, projects that are harmful to the local population. That is the case also for Nepal, in which foreign aid organisations often reinforced cast divisions, negotiating with the elites and excluding the rest of the population. Nepal suffered a ten-years long conflict, from 1996 to 2006, between the government of Nepal and Maoist insurgencies. The conflict came to an end in 2006, with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord and the abolition of the monarchy. In Nepal, foreign aid is now considerably significant (in 2018-19 it represented 22% of the yearly state budget) and after the accords, even the Maoist Party welcomed it. The issue is that the political elite's relatives manage the NGOs that receive foreign funding, which then is associated with one party or another,  thus creating a 'development cast.' Even by trying to operate as locally as possible, problems of power and authority did not change, and money flows are often ultimately controlled by some other elite – though not passing through the central government. This situation created a stall in which the subsistence of post-war Nepal is based on foreign money in-flow. Should this stop, the government would be severely underfunded. This also erodes the government's authority and legitimacy among the population, as only (some) foreign implemented projects are effective in reducing poverty. Moreover, the government is perceived to fail systematically at addressing the needs of the poor. Thereby, foreign investment has created a cycle that reinforces local structures of inequality, similar to the case of Myanmar. Conclusions Ultimately, 'going abroad' with a substantial investment capacity always needs an in-depth risk assessment, not only at the beginning stage of the project but also during its implementation. A constant re-evaluation and honest and transparent evaluation of the benefits of such projects will ultimately benefit the local population. If investment or aid is perceived as being detrimental for ethnic and class discrimination, or if it exponentially increases the dependence of the country, region, or village on foreign money, rather than empowering them, it should be stopped and re-assessed. This article is part two of a series highlighting the potential risks of doing business in post-conflict countries. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the author: Alessia Cappelletti is a Global Security Analyst and Program Manager of DEWIS. She has field experience in South America, Colombia especially, which makes her largely acquainted with the security challenges of the Latin American context. Her expertise includes conflict analysis and investigation, human rights protection, and criminality.

Europe's Failed Strategy in Libya By: Anton Witchell-Chibber European powers have struggled to devise a coherent strategy in Libya ever since long-standing dictator Colonel Muammar Qadhafi was ousted from power in a NATO-backed rebellion in 2011. The NATO mission, led by Britain and France – and initially opposed by Germany and Poland – led to a transferral of power to the National Transitional Council (NTC), and later to the General National Congress (GNC). Whilst these institutions were recognised in European capitals, as political and military power in Libya splintered, so did consensus in Europe on how to respond to the deteriorating security situation and political impasse. Rather, European actors supported opposing power centres and have been accused of prioritising parochial interests – such as countering Islamic extremist terrorism and controlling migration flows – over long-term goals to foster national reconciliation and lasting peace. A European Union? In November last year, an agreement was reached in Tunis between Libya's warring factions in the 75-member Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), led by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), to hold presidential and parliamentary elections on 24 December 2021. . In a rare display of unity on the Libya question, Britain, France, Germany and Italy released a joint statement on 23 November 2020 which 'welcome[d] the results of the […] Forum', called for 'Libyan parties to fully implement the ceasefire agreement', expressed 'full support to the UNSMIL led process' and called on 'all Libyan and International parties to refrain from any parallel… For the full article and source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author: Anton Witchell-Chibber is a contributing analyst at Dyami. He has a postgraduate degree in Conflict Studies & Human Rights from Utrecht University and has specialist knowledge on Chinese foreign policy and sectarian conflict in fragile states.

How the Amazon’s destruction is pushing away investors in Bolsonaro’s Brazil By: Isabel Oriol Llonin In the last article 'When political change becomes a risk: how the Mexican government undermined investor's confidence' a case was made that political change in some Latin American countries can bring about a drastic change in a country's economic policies. This can represent a risk for mid-term and long-term business interests. This Dyami Insights will discuss how political change in Brazil has impacted business interests with the new government of Jair Bolsonaro. As a controversial figure, Jair Bolsonaro has made world headlines for his far-right, discriminatory remarks. However, his problematic comments are not the only issue that has impacted Brazil's international image. The international community has not welcomed his environmental policies and the rise of deforestation and human-made fires in the Amazon rainforest. They have ultimately damaged investor's confidence in Brazil. A country in need of change The election of a far-right leader in Latin America's leading economy stirred controversy around the world. Many were afraid Brazil would take on a completely different direction bringing uncertainty to the country and the entire region, especially after 13 years of left-wing governments led by the Worker's Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores​). In the five previous years to Bolsonaro's election, Brazil faced the worst economic recession in the country's history with rising numbers of unemployment and crime. In 2014, operation 'Car Wash' (Lava​ Jato​) uncovered deeply rooted corruption at the highest levels of politics, extending to several government officials, companies, and countries across the region mostly in the form of handouts and briberies in the oil and energy sector. For many Brazilians, the Worker's Party and its leaders were responsible for such high levels of corruption, crime, and a struggling economy. Bolsonaro exploited people's discontent with a very discredited left and presented himself as the heavy-handed anti-establishment candidate the country needed to end corruption and crime. Once elected, Bolsonaro pledged to the outside world to 'eliminate uncertainty for foreign trade flows', by lowering taxes and loosening regulations in order to appeal to international investors.[1] However, major foreign businesses have started to see Brazil as unappealing for investments due to a different issue than economic policies: the Amazon rainforest. How the Amazon was put under the world’s spotlight The Amazon rainforest is the largest and most biodiverse rainforest globally; it comprises more than half of the world’s rainforest areas. The Amazon plays a crucial role in sustaining life on the planet, and it is estimated that it absorbs 5% of the CO2​ annual emissions, playing a vital role in preventing climate change. While the Worker's Party leadership in Brazil did not have a clean sheet in terms of environmental damage, regulations were put in place to contain the Amazon's deforestation. Since Bolsonaro, a climate-change denier took office, many of these regulations have been removed, and deforestation continues at alarming rates. Between August of 2019 and July 2020, a total of 11,080 sq km were deforested, a 9.5% increase from the year before setting the record for a 12-year high.[2] Additionally, in 2019 the Amazon made world headlines due to an increase in wildfires. By 2020 the situation had worsened with a rise of 28% in July 2020 over the previous year, almost 50% in September from a year earlier.[3] Many of the wildfires are human-made and illegal with the aim to repurpose the land for the production of beef and soybeans. Bolsonaro has been accused of turning a blind eye to these unlawful practices. A burned area in the Amazon Rainforest in Prainha, Para state, Brazil. (AP Photo/Leo Correa) Concerned about their reputation and the security of their long-term investments, international investors have urged the Brazilian government to curb deforestation. In June 2020, a group of financial institutions collectively managing more than $3.7 trillion in assets urged the Brazilian government to reconsider its environmental policy claiming it has generated "uncertainty about the conditions for investing in or providing financial services to Brazil".[4] Private investors are not the only ones pressing the Brazilian government for a change in the Amazon management. In 2019 president Emmanuel Macron of France called the Amazon wildfires a global crisis that should be addressed at the G7 summit. President Bolsonaro did not welcome this comment and accused Macron of colonialist tendencies. The tension between the two leaders had impactful consequences. Macron stated that France would be opposing the EU-Mercosur free trade agreement if Brazil failed to contain deforestation in the Amazon. The EU-Mercosur (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay) agreement is reaching the end of negotiations after nearly 20 years. It would create the largest free trade agreement area in the world. After the rejection of other European countries to Brazil's environmental policies, the deal now hangs by a thread. More recently US president-elect Joe Biden pledged to spearhead a $20 billion international effort to protect the Amazon while threatening with 'economic consequences' if Brazil failed to cooperate. So far Bolsonaro has been defiant of Biden's and other foreign leaders' remarks regarding the Amazon and framing it as an issue of Brazilian sovereignty. Concluding Remarks It is likely that in the upcoming months, with president-elect Biden taking office in January, the topic will regain attention. The US might join efforts with others in the international community to leverage against Brazil's environmental policies by imposing economic sanctions or encouraging companies to stop importing Brazilian products (just like Timberland, Vans, and The North Face have already done). This could potentially represent a significant blow to the Brazilian economy, which has been hit hardly by the COVID-19 economic crisis. It is a risk that Brazil might not want to take. This article is part two of a series highlighting the importance of political change in security risk analysis in the region of Latin America. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the author Isabel Oriol Llonin is a contributing analyst at Dyami. She holds a bachelor’s degree in International Relations and has a post-graduate degree in Public International Law from Utrecht University. She has expertise in the Latin American region and the public international law implications of conflict analysis.

How the Mexican Government has Underminded Investor's Confidence By: Isabel Oriol Llonin Traditionally security risks in Mexico are commonly associated with organised crime, drug trafficking and other sources of violence. However, there are other aspects of the Mexican context that should be considered when making a risk analysis, such as how political change and national policies can impact mid-term and long-term investments. Political changes are usually not seen as an imminent security risk in Mexico, or in most parts of Latin America, however, they can represent a risk to mid and long-term business interests. A new government can bring a drastic change in the country’s approach to economic policy and business affairs with international companies. Such is the case of Mexico with president Andrés Manuel López Obrador who took office in late 2018. A new era for Mexico with López Obrador López Obrador -or AMLO as he is known- is the first left-wing president that Mexico has had in recent decades. His victory broke a cycle of governance between the two major parties that have been in power in the last years, the PAN and the PRI, the first a conservative party, and the second a self-proclaimed centrist party, both with a history of strong neoliberal economic policies. With a society increasingly tired of the political elite and corruption scandals, AMLO ran a campaign based on the idea of being 'one of the people', with a strong preference for austerity policies and the promise to end corruption in the high political spheres. He also inherited a country with alarming rates of violence, crime, and rumours of organised crime infiltrated at all levels of government. Therefore, it is unsurprising that his government has been characterised by efforts to appear different from the traditional political elite. One of these efforts has been transforming the Mexican economy from the conventional neoliberal economic policies that the country has held for decades to a more state-controlled economy. Since his presidential campaign, both the national and international private sectors were unsettled about the potential consequences of such changes. Two years into his government, some of those concerns have proven to be true. Lessons learned from the Mexico City Texcoco Airport The Mexico City Texcoco Airport was a megaproject located in the highly populated capital of the country, a city with approximately 20 million inhabitants in its metropolitan area. It was intended to replace the current airport and meet the demand for a higher air traffic capacity in the city. The ambitious USD 13 billion projects, expected to have a capacity of 125 million passengers per year at its completion, was launched in 2016 by the previous administration led by Enrique Peña Nieto. As a presidential candidate, López Obrador took a strong stance against the project claiming it was too expensive. The Texcoco Airport project became a symbol of his discourse against 'unnecessary spending', playing into his narrative of a 'people's president' who refuses to favour the elites. The project also had some environmental concerns regarding the land in which it was being built, so AMLO then proposed the cheaper alternative of adapting the Santa Lucía military base, north of the city. However, critics pointed out several issues with this alternative: the project had severe viability concerns that would probably raise the cost of construction in the future -this was later proven to be true- and the environmental impact report had not been released to the public. In December 2018, within less than a month of taking office, President López Obrador announced the official cancellation of the Texcoco Airport after 30% of the project had already been built. Naturally, this raised serious concerns among the business sector, undermining investor’s confidence in public projects, and added to the overall air of uncertainty in the country. Uncertainty in the Energy Sector In 2013 former President Enrique Peña Nieto spearheaded a comprehensive energy constitutional reform that would, among other changes, allow the private and foreign investment across the energy sector. Along with the auctioning of untapped oil and gas blocks across the country, the reform ended a 75 year-long state monopoly over oil and energy supply chains. Fast forward to the current government; the energy sector has been a critical area in the efforts of López Obrador to counter decades of neoliberal economic policies. He has criticised the 2013 energy reform as fraudulent by pointing out the corruption and bribery scandals that have surrounded it since the beginning. Moreover, his government has been characterised by his attempts to strengthen the inefficient and indebted state-owned oil (PEMEX) and electricity (CFE) companies as key pieces to 'recover economic sovereignty'.[1] This has led to several controversial decisions. At the beginning of his presidency, López Obrador indefinitely postponed all auctions on oil and gas blocks to private companies, proving once again to foreign investors that previous administration's deals were at risk with the new government. In 2020, he announced a new sustainable energy policy that would impose considerable limitations and additional requirements to private renewable energy farms. The government argued it was intended to protect the reliability of the national supply of energy during the crisis. However, critics have speculated that it was an effort to protect the state-owned Federal Commission of Energy (CFE). The new sustainable energy policy resulted in the temporary closing of 44 farms of renewable energy while putting at risk investments for USD 6 billion and almost 30,000 jobs.[2] However, after a series of legal battles, the Supreme Court ruled that the president’s policies were unconstitutional, and most farms were allowed to carry out operations again. While the government did not win this battle, the actions it implemented certainly undermined investor’s confidence and could potentially harm the development of renewable energy soon. It is not completely clear what direction the government will take now, especially considering the economic and health crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic. The significant drop in oil prices is forcing national oil companies around the world to reconsider their long-term projects and investments, potentially allocating more resources to other sources of energy. While private investment into the energy sector, especially into renewable resources, could be the boost that the Mexican economy needs to revive after the crisis, it seems unlikely that López Obrador's government will take that path. With four more years left as president, chances are the business sector -especially the energy sector- will navigate a certain degree of uncertainty in Mexico. Therefore the political context should be considered in any security risk analysis. This article is part one of a series highlighting the importance of political change in security risk analysis in the region of Latin America. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the author: Isabel Oriol Llonin is a contributing analyst at Dyami. She holds a bachelor’s degree in International Relations and has a post-graduate degree in Public International Law from Utrecht University. She has expertise in the Latin American region and the public international law implications of conflict analysis.

An Introduction By: Bob Rehorst In February 2019, the Washington Post reported the existence of a 'secret' Chinese military base in the remote and inhospitable Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province of eastern Tajikistan. According to the report, local sources have witnessed Chinese soldiers purchasing goods and phone credit since 2017 at a nearby market. A Chinese soldier told the Post's investigator: "Remember, […] You never saw us here."1 Though, Chinese military presence abroad is not unique to Tajikistan. Since 2017, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has also constructed an operational military base in Djibouti, expanding its influence in the Horn of Africa – and has increased its presence in the South China Sea. China's external operations appear to be increasing, especially in the Central and Southern Asian region. This introductory article will explore and contextualise the apparent expansion of China's military presence abroad, indicating a move away from the PRC's core principle of 'non-interference'. It will question whether this phenomenon has developed in tandem with China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in order to protect Chinese commercial and economic interests abroad. One Belt One Road in Central Asia The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), previously known as ‘The Silk Road Economic Belt’ or the ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR), is a great illustration of the scope and size of Chinese ambitions abroad. The project, which aims to engender greater connectivity between China and the world, envisages a series of transportation networks which will traverse the Eurasian heartland towards Europe. Its total scope imagines global transportation connections via land, sea, air, and electronic means (a.k.a. the digital silk road). Here, we focus specifically on three economic corridors (EC’s) of the BRI, namely: (1) The New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor, (2) the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and the China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor. China’s ambition to operate overland through Central Asia – a region long overlooked as the vast and distant ‘heartland’ of the world – carries the possibility of major economic benefits for China. As a simple illustration, the average transport time from Shanghai to the Polish port of Gdansk by sea freighter is between thirty and thirty-three days. By rail transport, however, the already operational China-Poland connection takes between nine and fourteen days. Evidently, the Eurasian overland routes have the potential to decrease transportation time and costs for the PRC substantially. Consequently, China’s Western Xinjiang province, historically the country’s remote ‘back door’ bordering on the former Soviet ‘Stans’, is transforming into the CCP’s front gates. Generally, the BRI signifies the development of infrastructure and new foreign investment projects, which, not only further develops and globalises Chinese economy, but also warrants greater security initiatives beyond China’s borders to protect its trade and communication routes.[1] China’s flexible approach to non-interference: Interestingly, since the 1950s, Chinese governance has adhered to a strict ‘non-interference’ policy, as part of the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’.[2] In theory, this entails that China will refrain from intervening in the foreign affairs of other nations which stands in contrast to other regional and international power players such as the US, UN, EU, Russia, or even Turkey. In recent years, however, China’s strict adherence to its non-interference principle has unravelled, as its interests abroad have expanded.[3] While the 2015 National Security Law and Anti-Terrorism Law already permits China to partake in counter-terrorism operations abroad, this trend is no more apparent than in China’s 2019 White Paper: ‘China’s National Defence in the New Era’. The paper emphasises the need to strengthen the Chinese military and develop its overseas capacity in order to promote world peace and stability.[4] Chinese policy aims to realise a strategy where soft-power instruments, such as successful economic trade and investment (e.g. the BRI), eases recipients towards an increased Chinese presence, eventually opening up the possibility for other modes of influence. For example, the establishment of a Chinese military base in Djibouti, the first of its kind, marks a turning point in Chinese foreign policy and security.[5] Initially, the Djibouti base was stated to be a facility to support Chinese logistics and provide assistance in combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden. However, the CPP aims to have developed the PLA into a full-fledged military force by 2050 and we can expect that, not too far into the future, the Chinese military in Djibouti will fulfil other tasks such as extraditing nationals from hostile environments and take part in combat operations.[6] In short, Chinese security and military developments appear to coincide with its strategic interests in need of protection, the Djibouti Base being an example of defending Chinese interests in the turbulent Horn of Africa region. Now we can explore the case of the military presence in South-East Tajikistan. A military base in the mountains The base in Tajikistan, located approximately 30 kilometres away from the Chinese border and about thirteen kilometres from the Tajik-Afghan Border, is located deep within the Pamir mountain range. Chinese officials have explained how its security presence in Tajikistan extends into Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor, but is simply there for training and logistical purposes, not military occupation.[7] However, given the increased likeliness of US military withdrawal from Afghanistan, in relation to China’s operations against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, it is plausible that this base serves an alternative purpose. Uyghurs, TIP and China’s perceived threat In Xinjiang, the Strike Hard Campaign continues to control the repressed Uyghur population by means of mass surveillance. Human Rights Watch reports almost a million ‘vanished’ Uyghurs while others are being continuously monitored and harassed by Chinese authorities.[8] Aimen Dean, former Al-Qaeda operative and MI6 informant, has warned that that the repressive policies implemented against the Islamist community of the Uyghurs may effectively increase radicalisation within and against China – mainly by returning Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) militants, a prominent force in the Syrian civil war – rather than combat it.[9] Indeed, throughout China’s war on the ‘three evil forces’ (terrorism, separatism, and extremism), it has operated on the existence of a ‘direct threat’ towards China. Now that the US is moving forward with its withdrawal from Afghanistan, China increasingly fears that Afghanistan could become a potential ‘springboard of terrorism’ into the PRC. Dean has echoed this fear and has advocated dialogue between the Uyghurs and Beijing to prevent a mass insurgency targeting China and Chinese assets abroad. The Research Project A few things have become clear over the past years. Firstly, Chinese expansionism is manifesting itself heavily in Africa, the South China Sea and now also into Central- and South Asia. Secondly, subsequent to Chinese expansion through soft-power instruments, it seems that China is dead set on protecting its foreign investments. The Tajikistan Case presented here is indicative of a larger trend of China pivoting slowly into the Eurasian Heartland as part of its defensive strategies against terrorist threats coming from neighbouring countries. Now that China is expanding Westward, it is stepping out into possible inhospitable environments which may prove more sinophobic than anticipated. As a result, if China is to protect its strategic interests in Eurasia, it may be compelled to increase its military presence as well. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group, as part of the ‘Defending Chinese Strategic Interests in the Eurasian Heartland’ research project led by Anton Witchell-Chibber and Bob Rehorst. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author: Bob Rehorst is a Global Security Analyst at Dyami. He has extensive field experience in the Levant-Middle East region, North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. He holds a Graduate Degree in Conflict Studies and Human Rights, and an Undergraduate Degree in Cultural Anthropology, both from Utrecht University. Bob specializes in geopolitics, conflict development and global crises.

Why peace in the Caucasus might remain elusive By: Ruben Pfeijffer On 9 November 2020, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a Russian-brokered armistice that ended ongoing hostilities over the possession of Nagorno-Karabakh. However, growing discontent in Armenia over the terms of the armistice might jeopardize the fragile peace in the Caucasus region. Under pressure The political situation in Armenia recently has become increasingly unstable after the general staff of the Armenian army openly called for Prime Minister Pashinyan's resignation in a joint statement on 25 February, citing that "The ineffective management of the current authorities and the serious mistakes in foreign policy have put the country on the brink of collapse"1. The statement follows months of large-scale demonstrations that erupted in the wake of the Russian-Brokered armistice that ended the Nagorno-Karabakh war of 2020. Pashinyan's insecure position raises significant worries about the possible implications his resignation -or removal- might have for the current peace with Azerbaijan. Historical background Located within the territories granted to Azerbaijan after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Nagorno-Karabakh is a region mainly inhabited by ethnic Armenians, who, as the self-proclaimed republic of Artsakh, fought a war of secession against Azerbaijan in the early 1990s. With the help of the Armenian army, Artsakh managed to force Azerbaijan to sign a ceasefire in 1994, in which the Azeri’s de-facto ceded control over Nagorno-Karabakh and several surrounding territories to the Armenians. However, in the following decades, continuous breaches of the ceasefire would constantly add fuel to the animosity between Armenia and Azerbaijan, causing significant armed clashes. Geopolitical relevance Apart from being the source of a long-standing national dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh has also increasingly become the locus of Russian and Turkish power projections in the Caucasus region. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan serve as a proxy-state in this geopolitical struggle. Armenia is a member of a defensive military alliance with Russia (CSTO), while Azerbaijan is historically backed by its 'brother-nation' Turkey. This means that an escalation of violence between Armenia and Azerbaijan would typically also involve these two major regional powers. The war of 2020 On 27 September, both Armenia and Azerbaijan mobilized their armies after a series of serious clashes erupted in the border region. In the following month and a half, Azerbaijan, with Turkey's military aid, was able to make significant territorial gains on Armenia, who, despite their defensive alliance with Russia, were largely left to fend for themselves. There could be several explanations as to why Russia decided not to get militarily involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh war. They may have wanted to avoid a confrontation with Turkey, as such a confrontation has the potential of sparking a severe regional - or given Turkey's NATO membership - even global conflict. Another explanation is that Russia simply was not eager to come to the aid of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who toppled the previous pro-Russian Prime Minister during the Velvet Revolution of 2018. Regardless, even without intervening militarily. Russia managed to safeguard its influence in the Caucasus region by brokering the Nagorno-Karabakh armistice that was signed on 9 November. The Russian-brokered armistice After suffering a series of military defeats, including the loss of Shusha, one of the main cities in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan agreed to sit down at the negotiating table with his Azeri counterpart Ilham Aliyev at the behest of Russian President Vladimir Putin. According to the terms of the resulting armistice, Armenia would cede several occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan and withdraw all their troops from the border area. A Russian peacekeeping force of 19,600 soldiers would take their place and guard the buffer zone, with Turkey acting as observers2. Azerbaijan was allowed to keep ‘the spoils of war’ while Russia significantly enhanced their military presence in the Caucasus region at the cost of Turkey, who were limited to an ‘observers’ role. Even though the majority of Nagorno-Karabakh would remain in Armenian hands, Armenia had to make some painful concessions that undoubtedly left them with a sense of defeat. Joy and anger While the armistice was widely celebrated around Azerbaijan as a great victory over their long-standing enemies, reactions in Armenia. were -as expected- significantly less enthusiastic. Right after the terms of the armistice were made public by the Armenian media, hundreds of protesters, angered by the territorial concessions made to Azerbaijan, stormed the Armenian parliament. They demanded the resignation of Prime Minister Pashinyan, whom they held responsible for the failed war effort and 'weak' negotiations with Azerbaijan and Russia3. After months of political unrest, the Armenian army has now decided to become involved as well by demanding Pashinyan's resignation. Peace at stake The current political instability in Armenia has potentially severe implications for the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh armistice. The terms of the armistice, which many Armenians perceive as highly unfavourable towards Armenia, will likely remain a significant source of unrest in the country for the foreseeable future. Although the Armenian military has not yet made a move beyond their earlier political statement, it cannot be ruled out that an actual military coup is on the cards if Pashinyan refuses to step down. Regardless, even if Pashinyan steps down voluntarily, it is far from certain whether his democratic successor will respect the terms of the armistice with Azerbaijan. Armenia's developing situation also leaves Russia in an awkward situation, who now have to deal with a politically unstable ally who might seek to reignite the conflict with Azerbaijan as soon as its current leadership changes. Furthermore, Russia's limited support for the Armenians during the war might force Armenia to turn their gaze to others for help, which could, in turn, insert yet another geopolitical player into the already cramped Caucasus region. While Turkey might be content with Azerbaijan's military victory over Armenia, they are likely frustrated about being 'left out' of the peacekeeping force. Although the Nagorno-Karabakh armistice has secured peace, for now, it seems probable that the region will remain a hotbed for conflict until an accord that is satisfactory to all sides has been reached. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author: Ruben Pfeijffer is a graduated anthropologist who currently follows the MA program Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University. While working on his bachelor thesis in the Netherlands during the early stages of the COVID-19 outbreak, Ruben gained experience with conducting ethnographic research under the challenging circumstances of the pandemic, and has learned to be adaptable with his research methods.

Russian National Interest and its ‘peaceful’ strategic outposts By: Bob Rehorst Russia, the largest country in the world. It is the country that contains massive forests, lakes, rivers, tundra’s, steppes, mountains – everything about it is big. Stretching from the Bering Sea to the Baltic, Black and Caspian Sea, its size is representative of its ambitions. Ever since the fall of the Soviet Empire, the big bear of Russia has been there, hibernating, waiting for the moment to wake up again. That moment has long passed, and Russia seems to be increasingly active across the globe once more. Rather than full military offensives, the awoken bear is cunning, strategic and calculative. There are very little coincidences in Russian foreign policy. More pertinently, in the 1990s, NATO's expansionist behaviour began to raise former Soviet nations to an allied status aggressively. The Russian bear was still licking its wounds, and NATO was bringing chunks of its empire into the fold of the Allied forces. For a long time, Russian presence across the globe scaled down substantially, while its enemies raised military presence around its periphery. Now Russia is reclaiming its position on the world stage because they simply have to. A striking example of Russia’s craftiness is its slow but steady disruptive methods in Ukraine. Russia managed to annex Crimea by using Russian ethnic votes and utilising the Ukrainian unrest to send forces into the peninsula. Questions that arise then are, why Crimea, why Ukraine, and, where else is Russia active? This Dyami insights will provide a brief introduction into Russian foreign ambitions. The Crimean annexation serves Russia as a strategic outpost to project military power in other places like Georgia, Ukraine and Syria. What is often overlooked, however, is that control over Crimea means control over the Sea of Azov, which directly links to the Caspian Sea via the Volga-Don Canal. The ability to move warships from the Caspian shorelines (including Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and, Iran) to the Black Sea, allows Russia larger maritime options, as well as flexibility when crises erupt in the region. For example, before WWI started, 50 per cent of all Russian exports, and 90 per cent of its agriculture exports passed through the Bosphorus channel of Istanbul out of the Black sea. Today, every fifteen minutes an oil tanker passes through the same channel, carrying Russian and Kazakh oil. This exemplifies the fact that, throughout history, Russia’s Black Sea ports, being the country’s only warm water port, have always served Russian commercial interests. Currently, the Crimean peninsula also serves as a strategic outpost for Russian power projections in the region, as well as for energy projects, pipelines and trade corridors. It ensures its position in the region by sending in troops to ‘protect Russian people’ in the peninsula. Russian ambitions in the Black Sea are no secret, and Crimea served as a highly strategic starting point. However, it is not the only outpost that was seized via hybrid strategies by Russia. We see similar patterns emerging in Georgia’s breakaway region of Abkhazia. After the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia, the northern regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have played a role in Russia’s ‘creeping occupation[ Alexander Lanoskar, “Russian hybrid warfare and extended deterrence in eastern Europe,” The Royal Institute of International Affairs 92 (1), 2016, 175–195.]’ of Georgia. Georgia’s ‘western ambitions’ in regards to trade and alliances are a thorn in Russia’s side, and Moscow continues to undermine Georgian hegemony, as well as its developments to European logistical and economic status[ Cappelletti, A. & Rehorst, B. 20 November 2020. ‘Doing Business in the Post-Conflict part III – The Case of Georgia: Between Western ‘darling’ and Russian strategic outpost’. Dyami Strategic Security Solutions. https://www.dyami.services/post/doing-business-in-the-post-conflict-part-iii-the-case-of-georgia.]. For now, Abkhazia contains approximately 4,000 Russian troops (originally dubbed as 'peacekeeping forces'), and Russia remains ever-present in the South-Caucasus region. Thereby solidifying additional coastal outposts on the Eastern end of the Black Sea. A third strategic outpost is the Transnistria region of Moldova. Its etymology is essential here (Transnistria is Romanian colloquial for ‘Beyond the Dniester River') because it indicates a Romanian description of an otherwise Russian-speaking region. In the region itself, the breakaway state is referred to as 'Pridnestrovye’, which is a name also used in Russian. The area has been a long-standing outpost of Russia in post-Soviet times, and it was the stage for a two-year civil between pro-Russian separatists and the Moldovan defence forces between 1990 and 1992. The conflict was frozen through the brokering of a ceasefire, and Russia sent in 'peacekeepers', which remain in Transnistria to this day. Peacekeepers in Abkhazia, peacekeepers in Transnistria, ‘protective forces’ in Crimea, it appears that Russian ‘peacekeeping’ interest serve alternative purposes. At the time of writing, Russia has been deploying peacekeeping troops to the Nagorno-Karabakh region, as part of a Russian-brokered peace deal between Russian President Vladimir Putin, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenia's prime minister Nikol Pashinyan[ BBC World News, 10 November 2020. ‘Nagorno-Karabakh: Russia deploys peacekeeping troops to region’. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54885906]. Russia had previously brokered a ceasefire with Turkey and Syria, demonstrating its reinsertion as a powerful actor in the Middle-East and beyond. Nagorno-Karabakh was the only post-Soviet conflict without Russian presence, which was a source of incredible frustration for Moscow. All the while, Azerbaijan was supported by its patron, Turkey, by means of drones and Syrian mercenaries. This was a clear threat to Russia and its sphere of influence, and it seems that Russian troops are deployed to push back against Turkey's regional power moves. According to Thomas de Waal, a senior fellow with Carnegie Europe, "[…] Russia is reinserting itself into that region, where it's been in retreat"[Losh, J. 25 November 2020. ‘Russian Troops in Nagorno-Karabakh ‘Clearly a Win for Moscow’’. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/25/russian-troops-nagorno-karabakh-peackeepers-win-moscow-armenia-azerbaijan/]. While Armenia expressed discontent with the current peace deal, for Moscow, this is a clear win. On a final note, Moscow’s gaze extends well beyond former Soviet nations, as it recently signed a deal with Sudan to establish a new military naval base near the Port of Sudan on the Red Sea. It seems that with this move, Russia aims to increase its military foothold in Africa, as well as challenge the influence of American, French and Chinese naval forces based in Djibouti. The list of examples above raises a series of questions regarding Russia's plans. As Winston Churchill once wrote, “I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest”[ Col Mastriano, D., PHD, (Collective of authors), Project 1721: A U.S. Army War College Assessment on Russian Strategy in Eastern Europe and Recommendations on How to Leverage Landpower to Maintain the Peace, Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College 2016, p. xi]. Russian national interest, here, looks primarily like Moscow’s classic power projections. However, the majority of the outposts are illustrations of Russia’s ancient ambition of a warm water port. Whether these outposts are mere power projections, buffer zones or satellite power regions, Russian peacekeeping missions serve a purpose. That purpose is, indeed, Russian national interest being pushed under cover of 'peace operations'. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the author: Bob Rehorst is a Global Security Analyst at Dyami. He has extensive field experience in the Levant-Middle East region, North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. He holds a Graduate Degree in Conflict Studies and Human Rights, and an Undergraduate Degree in Cultural Anthropology, both from Utrecht University. Bob specializes in geopolitics, conflict development and global crises.

2021 a challenging year for Latin America By: Isabel Oriol Llionin The series ‘When political change becomes a risk’ outlines how there is a Latin American tendency to uncertainty when major political changes take place, presenting a risk for business interests in the region. From protectionist policies in megaprojects and the energy sector in Mexico to environmental disaster mismanagement in Brazil, significant political changes can undermine investor’s confidence. After being hit by the COVID-19 crisis in 2020, Latin America is heading for an uncertain 2021. With deepened structural issues, tensions on the rise due to the health and economic crisis, and elections coming up this year in several countries; the stage is set for a very challenging 2021. A country in need of change The 2020 crisis exacerbated social and political tensions Before 2020, many countries in the region were already facing high social and political tensions. Millions protested in the streets of Chile and Colombia against inequality and the government’s economic and social policies. The migration crisis from Central America intensified. The institutional crisis in Peru resulted in the dissolution of Congress. Venezuela’s presidential crisis continued and further aggravated the humanitarian emergency. And Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina elected new controversial governments. The situation was worsened by the 2020 crisis driven by the COVID-19 pandemic. According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the current is the worst economic crisis the region has faced in over 120 years.[1] The health and economic crisis have deepened already existing structural problems: inequality, unemployment, and rising numbers of poverty. A deeper social discontent is cooking in Latin America, and with it, political change is just around the corner. Setting the stage for political change The COVID-19 crisis response of many Latin American governments has been fiercely criticized. From poor outbreak management, overwhelmed public health systems, insufficient economic relief, loans from the IMF with strings attached, undelivered vaccination promises, or the symbolic gesture of presidents refusing to wear masks in public (notably López Obrador, Bolsonaro, Piñera); the pandemic response has further decreased the population’s confidence in governments and the political elite. The combination of aggravated structural issues and the worsened distrust in the political elite are opening the door for new political discourses and the emergence of outsiders or anti-establishment politicians. As an already present phenomenon in Latin America, self-proclaimed outsiders have managed to win elections in Brazil, Mexico, and El Salvador by capitalizing on the social discontent about corruption and making promises to change the system. The same populist discourses that have brought controversial politicians like Andrés Manuel López Obrador and Jair Bolsonaro to power are likely to be used in the COVID-19 crisis-era by taking advantage of the population’s discontent with the pandemic management and the devastating economic crisis. What to watch out for Elections are coming up in a number of countries in Latin America. The first one in Ecuador has already been pushed to a second ballot between Andrés Arauz, a former government official of ex-president Rafael Correa; and Guillermo Lasso prominent banker and businessman. Leading candidate Arauz has opened the debate about whether the dollar should be the national currency -which most view as a stabilizing factor in the Ecuadorian economy-, he has also declared that if elected he will renegotiate the agreement made with the IMF by current president Lenín Moreno. Ecuador will go to the polls again on April 11. Peru will be having presidential elections in April this year after an institutional crisis in which Congress voted to remove former president Martín Vizcarra for “moral incapacity”. Protests broke out for several days in the streets with some claiming it was a disguised coup or at the minimum an abuse of power by Congress. The discontent with the political elite (due to corruption, and the mismanagement of the pandemic, among others) elevates the possibility for an outsider to win the election in Peru. A strong example is former professional footballer George Forsyth, also known for his time as mayor of La Victoria and his strong discourse against crime and corruption, who is currently leading the polls. Chile will have presidential elections in November this year, and after the far-reaching protests in 2019 and the devastating crisis that followed in 2020, the stakes could not be higher. Outgoing president Sebastián Piñera had a low approval rate of 15% at the end of 2020. So far, polls point to three major candidates: center-right Joaquín Lavín, communist party member Daniel Jadue, and journalist and TV personality Pamela Jiles. Additionally, members of the constituent assembly will be elected on April 11 for the demanding -and divisive- task to redact a new constitution. Nicaragua will hold elections by the end of the year, in which current president Daniel Ortega will likely seek reelection for a fifth term as president. After anti-government protests broke out in 2018, Ortega was accused of using the justice system against critics of his government. While the opposition is in the process of organizing, likely precandidates have already pledged to back a single candidate for the elections in order to defeat Ortega. Among the profiles, there are exiled academics, former political prisoners, and journalists. Honduras will be electing a new president by the end of this year. After accusations against president Juan Orlando Hernández of taking briberies from organized crime have surfaced in a US-based trial, he will not be seeking reelection as previously speculated. In a similar fashion to Nicaragua, the opposition in Honduras is likely to form two major alliances in hopes to defeat the National Party (currently in power). Finally, Mexico and Argentina will hold parliamentary elections that will be an indirect test to the governments of López Obrador and Alberto Fernández, respectively. Both left-wing governments that recently came into power, their policies and management of the crisis will be tested by the voters. Unprecedented times can lead to unprecedented events. While nations across Latin America continue to fight the COVID-19 pandemic and the devastating effects of the economic crisis, major political change will likely take place in 2021. Election results, vaccination strategies, and economic recovery plans will have a crucial impact on the stability each country will have in the following months, and years. This article is part three of a series highlighting the importance of political change in security risk analysis in the region of Latin America. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the author: Isabel Oriol Llonin is a contributing analyst at Dyami. She holds a bachelor’s degree in International Relations and has a post-graduate degree in Public International Law from Utrecht University. She has expertise in the Latin American region and the public international law implications of conflict analysis.

Developing Alliances and Global Influences By: Puck Holthuis China’s economic and political influence in Central Asia is rapidly expanding. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) strategically crosses through the region and onwards through Europe, aiming to improve the welfare of these nations as well as that of China itself. However, the BRI’s effects do not stop there. What is the BRI? The BRI is an extensive route, stretching from Eastern China all the way to Latin America by land, sea and cyberspace. Closely resembling the ancient Silk Road, the BRI is commonly referred to as the ‘New Silk Road’. This route allowed for significant economic, cultural and religious development in the region through which it ran 1400 years ago. Nevertheless, the Silk Road was gradually abandoned during the rise and fall of various Eurasian empires. The new and improved BRI is comparable in size and includes 140 countries in five continents, their people together making up more than 60% of the world population. The objectives of the BRI are numerous. They echo those of the Silk Road but are perhaps more ambitious this time around. They include elevating economic prosperity in the countries along the route, strengthening of their cultural and political ties and scaling up their infrastructure, to name a few.3However, there are more objectives to consider as well. Central Asia and the BRI The BRI has already proven itself valuable in many aspects. In a timespan of three years (2014-2017), the BRI resulted in $6 trillion in trade between China and the participants of the BRI. However, like many projects on a massive scale, it is not a flawless endeavour. According to China Power, $26 trillion is required for the infrastructure of the BRI, of which China has undertaken to give $1 trillion. A number of the participating nations, however, simply don’t have the funds to spend on this large undertaking, leaving many of them taking loans from China. The original Silk Road also left a lasting impression on the Central Asian nations that are partaking again this time in terms of their economy, culture and politics. Various nations in Central Asia (e.g., Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) were, until recently, economically dependent on Russia. Now, we are seeing a dependency shift towards China. When we zoom in on some of these individual relationships, we quickly land on Pakistan and China and their shared initiative of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). CPEC and the lives of locals The Gwadar Port in the province of Balochistan in the South of Pakistan is one strategic end of the CPEC, connected to the other end in Kashgar, China. Balochistan is Pakistan’s poorest and most underdeveloped province. Consequently, China’s investment in the region is a welcomed idea. In an interview in early February, Pakistan’s President Arif Alvi said that “[…] CPEC projects have greatly improved Pakistan’s infrastructure and energy supply,” and added that “[CPEC] will bring a large number of job opportunities to the Pakistani people.” However, the local situation in Balochistan continues to present various difficulties to its residents and obstacles for BRI shareholders. The area around Gwadar Port lacks basic necessities such as electricity, and water is scarce. Development surrounding CPEC has been rather quiet, leaving many promises of improved welfare unfulfilled. Balochs themselves are growing impatient with the little progress CPEC has thus far made, and Baloch separatists, such as the Baloch Raaji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS) or the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), pose a growing threat to both Chinese and Pakistani government commercial activities in the region, condemning them as exploitative. These militant groups will continue to be a (growing) concern both the Chinese and Pakistani government have to face. In fact, Yumi Washiyama of The Diplomat states that: “If the BLA cannot be brought to the table or completely dismantled, then the outlook for the security risk environment remains bleak.” Why, then, does China continue its efforts to develop this area? Pakistan and China: cooperation and interdependence Despite the mentioned predicaments, Gwadar is economically relevant and continues to be a strategic entry point into China’s North-western Xinjiang province, the country’s current ‘front-gates’, which are an undeniably important part of the BRI. In other words, Gwadar cannot be missed from the BRI equation. China’s investment can certainly help alleviate poverty and foster the desired development. Nevertheless, with more loans taken out to facilitate the BRI’s progress, Pakistan is increasingly dependent on China and the Chinese economy for the country itself to continue flourishing. This has created an interdependent relationship between these two nations that, on the one hand withholds China from leaving Pakistan and, on the other hand, cultivates a stronger alliance. Additionally, Gwadar serves another vital purpose. The development of the Gwadar port, among other Pakistani regions, was previously an objective of both the USA and the Soviet Union. Pakistan played a key role in times of conflict for these nations during the Cold War, and billions were spent to develop the region long thereafter. This plan failed, however, and Southern Pakistan remains in an uncompleted state today. As a result, China has possibly taken an interest in the region for this reason, too. With the development of the Gwadar port, China is taking on the challenge that powerful nations have failed to overcome in the past. It gives China a chance to showcase its relevance on the global stage by proving it can succeed in Gwadar. Additionally, the BRI and Gwadar in particular grant China the opportunity to develop and expand their economic, social and political network in Central Asia and beyond. The BRI is all encompassing in the sense that the initiative could bring economic prosperity as well as stronger cultural ties in Central Asia and China itself. Simultaneously, the BRI serves as a bridge from China to Europe and further West. This possibly brings with it new political dynamics and cultural influences from the East to the West that may reshape our shared future. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group, as part of the 'Defending Chinese Strategic Interests in the Eurasian Heartland' research project led by Anton Witchell-Chibber and Bob Rehorst. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author: Puck Holthuis is a master student Conflict Studies & Human Rights at Utrecht University. She recently relocated back to The Netherlands after living abroad since 2006. During that time, she spent many years in South Africa and China. Puck continues to develop her passion for analysis; studying foreign cultures and using that to strengthen her intercultural communication skills.

Understanding Somalia’s Breakaway Entities Kasper Veltman Along the longest shoreline of Africa lies a state that does not often make the news in a positive manner. Often used as the primary example of a failed state, history has not been kind towards Somalia. Suffering under the reigns of the dictatorial Siad Barre regime from 1969 to 1991, the state was not set up for success. The power vacuum that followed from Barre’s demise led to a collapse of the state. Groups that once lived under one flag were being driven apart. Multiple clans and entities declared that they were no longer willing to live under the flag of Somalia and decided to declare independence. The most notable secessionists being Somaliland, Galmudug and Puntland. The seceding movements were not Somalia’s only problem. To this day, Somalia has been dealing with the Al-Shabaab insurgency parallel to its civil war. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has offered some much-needed pushback against Al-Shabaab, but a decisive victory does not seem to be in sight. Despite that, the Federal Government of Somalia is still pursuing a restoration of its de jure territory. Because of that strategy, it is important to understand the breakaway entities of Somalia. Not only are they a piece of the puzzle that is needed to solve the seemingly never-ending unrest in the country, but they are also key partners in tackling more international problems. For instance, help of Somaliland and Puntland has been a major contributing factor to the success of the international fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden.1 Who are the breakaway entities of Somalia? Situated in the North-Western tip of Somalia, we can find Somaliland. Somaliland was one of the first entities to declare independence from Somalia in 1991. The aspiring state is bordering both Djibouti and Ethiopia. Its seat of power is in Hargeisa. Berbera, its main port, has the potential to become one of the most influential harbours within Somalia, because it provides to landlocked Ethiopia. Somaliland is home to a largely fairly elected parliament. Even though Somaliland was always seen as a beacon of democracy within struggling Somalia, the past years have seen some erosion of the democratic institutions.2 Their unilateral declaration of independence was fuelled by two different factors. Firstly, the region of Somaliland historically fell under a different administration. It used to be a British protectorate, where Somalia was an Italian colony. Secondly, the Isaaq clans of Somaliland felt that they were underrepresented in Somalia and that their size should warrant a state of their own. On the 18th of May in 2021, they will be celebrating their 30th anniversary of their independence. Even though this is one of the more stable and safe regions of current day Somalia, it is yet to be recognised by any other state. One of the other large entities that tried to break away from Somalia is the region of Puntland. In 1998, political elites; clan elders and several influential business elites started a constitutional conference to provide services to the population of Puntland after the Somalian state collapsed. Puntland is situated eastward of Somaliland and has its power mostly concentrated around the tip of the Horn. Its capital Garowe harbours its own semi-autonomous government. Puntland is currently an autonomous state in the Federal Government of Somalia. There are current tensions between Puntland and Somaliland over disputed territory. The final major breakaway entity was the state of Galmudug. Internationally this state does not come up much in security dialogue, but it still holds a powerful position within Somalia. As the most central state, just north of Mogadishu, it has a powerful location. Galmudug has however committed itself to the Federal Government of Somalia. In the process it did ensure its autonomy, now operating as a state within the federation. Galmudug closely operates with Puntland on matters of security, following several Al-Shabaab attacks with significant casualties.3 Historically, relations with Puntland have been more cold, with the federation ceding Galmudug territory to appease Puntland elites. The renewed security cooperation seems to have left that in the past, however. Galmudug is trying to maintain relative autonomy from the federation, but efforts by the federation to make them submit to them as a federal member-state seem to have been effective. Somalia’s future? Right now it is hard to tell what the coming years will bring for Somalia. The envisioned strategy is that all defector states within the de jure territory of Somalia will return power to the state they are trying to defect from. In this case that would be the Federal Government of Somalia, that took over the duties of the Transitional Federal Government in 2012. De jure territory meaning the legally set borders as recognised by the international community. Getting all the states to submit themselves to the federation might be troublesome. Some of the defector states do seem to agree to the idea. The ruling parties in Puntland have stated that they are willing to enter in such a federation if their autonomy is secured. Galmudug has similar sentiments. Somaliland however, is considerably less enthusiastic. Perhaps rightfully so. For years many different parties and states have been involved in capacity building in Somaliland. Official delegations have visited Somaliland and Somaliland’s government officials have visited other states. Former Dutch secretary of state for Foreign Affairs Ben Knapen has for instance laid the first stone of the House of Elders in Somaliland in 2011.4 It seems to be contradictive to help increase capacity in Somaliland and Puntland and subsequently ask them to make themselves subservient to a federal Somali government. Especially since it has long been known that Somaliland in particular aspires to be its own state. Strengthening their government structures will then likely not get them to commit to a federal government. Context in this case is then key. Parties that supported state-building efforts in Somaliland, like the Netherlands, would largely profit from a stronger state-like entity in the region. As they deemed that such an entity would help in preventing the root causes of piracy. Which it ultimately did, as piracy numbers within the Gulf have seen a decrease over the past decade. Now, the strengthened states, are however less willing to fully commit to a federation. In short, president Farmajo of the Federal Government of Somalia seems to have his work cut out for him to secure the goals that the federation wishes to achieve. Respecting all the individual breakaway entities and their political elites will be key in maintaining stability within the country. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author Kasper Veltman is a MA graduate in International Relations from Leiden University. During his master’s he followed the specialisation “Global Conflict in the Modern Era”, analysing rebel groups, insurrections and private warfare. Furthermore, he took a keen interest in the Horn of Africa, writing his thesis on Somaliland.

Strategic Seaports and the Case of Brazil By: Jaap Muijs For hundreds of years, seaports are being used as the main driver for trade, interdependence, and connectivity between countries. Seaports are a crucial element of the economic development of a nation-state. Besides, seaports are strategically crucial for naval operations and geopolitical interests. Seaports being used as a naval base or military port is a military base where warships and naval ships are, or can be, docked. They serve as an intermediary point for supplies, refuelling, and ammunition. Around the world, big Chinese companies buy significant shares of seaports. The buying of these seaports is under the strategic framework of what has been dubbed the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) — the watery part of the broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by the Chinese government. The BRI a Chinese strategic initiative to increase investment, stimulate the economy, and foster collaboration across the world. The initiative is often called a state-backed campaign for global dominance by Chinese investments across the world. Ports are being bought strategically at, for example, 'choke points', where naval forces could block critical maritime routes and economically strategic locations. Furthermore, analysts suggest that almost all the ports being built can be dual-use for commercial and military purposes. Recently, China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti and is building and buying ports close to some United States military bases, as, for example, in Haifa, Israel. The Chinese alternative The United States and Western dominance are declining for years. China is stepping up its game to offer an alternative and is becoming economically and military more and more dominant under different beliefs and political systems. German Minister of Foreign Affairs Sigmar Gabriel stated that 'China is developing a comprehensive systemic alternative to the Western model that, in contrast to our own, is not founded on freedom, democracy and individual human rights. For multiple decades, China offers a systemic alternative that is economically successful without using Western values and standards. Chinese economic activities in Europe and worldwide are increasingly regarded by European politicians and policy-makers as potentially harmful, especially when state-owned enterprises are involved in these activities and occur in strategically important sectors, such as ports. European leaders fear that China uses its economic heft into a political pull and will use the ports for other ends then trade. Chinese state-owned enterprises are buying influence across the world and even in Europe. It is estimated that China controls one-tenth of European ports. Beijing tries to become less dependent on foreign elements and is increasing its influence across the world. China has been buying up the development and operational rights of ports across the globe. In the past few years, China has created a wholly state-owned and operated maritime empire. State-owned enterprises (SOE's), wherein 2017, running 29 ports in 15 countries and 47 terminals in 13 countries, and this amount is growing significantly. China is not the only country owning multiple ports and terminals across the world. For example, countries like Denmark, Switzerland, and Dubai also own ports and terminals worldwide. However, unlike other countries, China state-owned enterprises have to align with state policy, which is significantly different from Western policy standards. Furthermore, by building ports, China is trying to create political leverage in countries where they built ports and is China increasing its geopolitical reach and influence worldwide. Moreover, China is using the debts it is owed by other, mostly poor, countries to purchase or invest in strategically located ports around the world on terms favourable to Beijing. This purchasing and investing apply not only to ports but often to a country's broader infrastructure. Latin America: Brazilian ports Privatization of ports is promoted to create more logistical efficiency. Since 1993, Brazil is selling its ports and terminals to enterprises, and on short notice, Brazil is planning to sell another 22 terminals worth 1,75 billion dollars. It is likely that China will show interest in these terminals and might buy the majority of stakes. For enterprises, Brazil is an exciting trade partner, as it is one of the most important exporters of raw materials in the world. Almost 95% of the Brazilian raw materials are exported through seaports, making it a vital section of the Brazilian economy, and are the ports offering many economic opportunities. In recent years, China has shown increased interest in Brazilian ports. In 2017, China Merchants Port Holdings Co Ltd agreed to buy 90 percent of TCP Participações SA, Brazil's most profitable port terminal, and have recently intended to invest in more Brazilian ports. These ports are strategically crucial for China, as China is the biggest trading partner of Brazil and the biggest customer of Brazilian soy exports. Play by Chinese rules: operational risks Chinese investments and buying of ports bring strategic risks. It enables Beijing to potentially restrict access for rivals, gather intelligence, and exploit the ports during a conflict. The buying of ports mostly aligns with the broader Chinese military, economic and political interest. Some signs indicate that China is using ports to increase its military and political reach. When doing business in ports that are owned or partially owned by Chinese companies, enterprises must consider these businesses' governmental influences. Chinese businesses often enjoy state, financial, and regulatory support from the Chinese government. Furthermore, Chinese culture and politics differ significantly from the more Western-oriented corporate culture. When doing business in ports with Chinese influences, political and cultural awareness is crucial for success. The business and political model that is being used is not built on freedom, democracy and human rights, and enterprises might be subjected to various operational and strategic risks in these ports. China is known for stealing Intellectual Property (IP), and China's legal system enables these thefts. Enterprises should consider and be aware of the risks of bringing their data, IP, and other assets to those Chinese owned ports. Moreover, enterprises might be drawn into a conflict. As ports are made for commercial and military use, they might be exposed to intelligence gathering strategies, subjected to state-conflict, and get involved in China's broader geopolitical interest. China is not buying these ports solely to make money and stimulate the economy; a much broader interest is involved, which must be considered and assessed. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author: Jaap Muijs is a global security consultant at Dyami, currently pursuing a master’s degree in International Security and investigating social structures concerning international security issues. At this moment, he is writing his master’s thesis about disinformation and international security.

By: Anastasija Kuznecova Mexico's first leftist president in seven decades, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, got elected in 2018 based on a campaign run on promises of transforming Mexico; from lowering the economic inequality and crime rates in the country, to eliminating corruption. However, two years into the presidency, little seem to have changed. Since taking office in December 2018, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, known by the acronym AMLO, has differed from his predecessors by reducing his own salary, renouncing living in the presidential residence, and promising to fly commercial. The president has increased social benefits, including pensions, numbers of scholarships, as well as established an allowance for people with disabilities. However, it is not anticipated that they will have significant results on the economy. Obrador’s policies are not only considered insufficient, his direction towards state-controlled economy and a new law on electricity supply has hurt investors and increased environmental concerns. In 2019, Mexico's real GDP decreased with 0,3%, and the president's poor handling of COVID19 has had further catastrophic consequences for the country's economy, leading to 9% decline in 2020, as well as thousands of deaths, becoming one of the worst-hit countries in Latin America. Focus on Corruption - Tool for Political Power or Political Change? Corruption was the most important issue for voters in 2018. When López Obrador took office, he promised to tackle corruption from the top down, starting with the government. In the first months, he went on a cost-cutting spree, specifically with government expenditures as he wanted to eliminate the privileges often enjoyed by politicians. However, this has led to significant losses in the public sector, more specifically surgery delays and reduction in testing in Mexico's public hospitals, objections by judges over their salary cuts, as well as expansion of forest fires as there has been lack of firefighters. In September 2020, López Obrador received support from the Supreme Court for a referendum on whether to allow five former presidents – Enrique Peña Nieto, Felipe Calderón, Vicente Fox Quesada, Ernesto Zedillo and Carlos Salinas de Gortari, who each served a six-year presidential term between 1988 and 2018 – to be tried for corruption. This move has been criticised by experts, who believe that a referendum should not decide whether criminal acts get a fair trial and proper punishment. Other critics stated that it is a distraction from the government's insufficient management of the pandemic. In addition, López Obrador has suggested to hold the referendum at the same day as mid-term elections in June 2021, which some consider a maneuverer to secure control of the Congress. The National Anti-Corruption System The current government has further been criticised for lack of institution-focused reforms, specifically for their inadequate efforts with enforcing the National Anti-Corruption System (Sistema Nacional Anticorrupción, SNA), approved in 2015 and 2016 during the Peña Nieto presidency. SNA is a group of institutions which works as a "mechanism for coordinating the myriad anti-corruption institutions at all levels of government," and it is responsible for the development and implementation of anti-corruption policies. A unique segment of the system is its Citizen Participation Committee, a civilian oversight body which connects the institutions with civil society, whose president also functions as the president of the entire mechanism. With this system, the citizens are getting a bigger role in Mexico's anti-corruption fight. Despite these efforts, president López Obrador has not fulfilled his constitutional obligation to nominate all the 18 anti-corruption magistrates of the Federal Tribunal of Administrative Justice, which is a part of SNA and is necessary to process sanctions of dozens corruption cases. In addition, the president has ignored to suggest leadership positions for the regional chambers, as well as provided little funding at the state level which has impacted prosecutors' capacity to process cases. Corruption Allegations In August 2020, a video of the president's younger brother, Pío López Obrador, receiving cash from a state political operator in 2015 was circulating the news outlets, undermining López Obrador’s promises of fighting corruption. The president promised to get the corruption allegations investigated, but claimed in his defence that the money was donations for his political campaign. According to the Mexican electoral law, donations must be registered. However, requests for documents that prove the money López Obrador’s brother received were legally registered have been ignored. Public Perception Despite of the government's lack of institutional reforms, Mexico moved up in the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, ranking 124 out of 198 countries (compared to 130 in 2019, and 138 in 2018). In addition, in 2019, 61% of citizens thought that the government was doing a good job in their fight against corruption, compared to 24% in 2017, under AMLO's predecessor. Nevertheless, in 2019, 44% thought that corruption had increased in the last 12 months, 34% experienced paying a bribe for public services, and 50% said they were offered bribes in exchange for votes. Furthermore, higher percentage of citizens thought that Mexican institutions were corrupt compared to the results in 2017. Moving Forward Amid pandemic's toll and economic consequences, as well as continuing high perception of corruption, the president's approval rating has been persistent around 60%. However, if López Obrador wants to eliminate corruption in Mexico, institutional reforms must be implemented. In addition, discourses of fighting corruption can be used as a tool to gain political power, as politicians can use it against their opposing parties. Thus, current government needs to secure open and fair trials, where the same rules and inspection are applied to López Obrador’s allies. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author: Anastasija Kuznecova is a student at the MA program in Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University. She has field experience from Chile, Jamaica and the Balkans, and her interests include issues concerning social inequality, discrimination, and conflict escalation. With her combined practical experience and academic knowledge, Anastasija has a broad understanding of security, development, and human rights.