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Environmental ideology in far-right Telegram Groups It has long come to public attention that secluded online forums, such as Telegram chats and channels, serve as a safe space for extremism to foster, where individuals can recruit and radicalize new members. In these online spaces there is a constant flux of ideas and, recently, the far-right re-focused their interest on the connection between environmentalism and white supremacy, or so-called ‘ecofascism.’ As paradoxical as the idea of ‘nature-loving' Neo-Nazis may seem, far-right environmentalism has a long history dating back to the Green Wing of Hitler’s NSDAP in the early 20th century. The ideology is a double edge-sword able to easily resonate with people amid today's climate crisis. As such, online ecofascist content is able to pose new security threats, appealing to a broader audience via a universally shared ‘environmental protection’ sentiment. Ecofascism – the far-right green ideology with long roots Ecofascism is an ideology that combines the belief in the importance of environmental protection with the need to combat overpopulation, often through violent means and especially against immigrant populations. The basis for this doctrine is a conviction that there is a spiritual connection between races and their designated lands with which they form an integrated whole, and which must be defended against outsiders at all costs. While this ideology may seem obscure and bizarre at first glance, it has nonetheless been able to inspire several recent terrorist attacks such as the Christchurch and El Paso attacks in 2019, and arsonist attacks in Sweden in 2019. Such events are not simply the product of lone terrorist actors but are best understood as ‘the tip of the iceberg’ of a larger, more invisible process of radicalization that takes place predominantly online. White identity, nature, and online forums Ecofascist content can easily be found on public Telegram channels, popular mainly throughout the US and Europe. Taking a closer look at some of these channels reveals a peculiar blend of white supremacist content and a romanticization of national landscapes. Noteworthy in this is the fusion of century-old fascist ecology with a modern context. Posts often specifically make references to current events such as globalization, immigration, refugee crises, and climate change which are then merged with racist rhetoric. For example, content creators often call for the murder of immigrant groups as a ‘practical’ solution to overpopulation and climate change. In this way, these groups are able to give the old ideology a new spin while simultaneously being able to resonate with their audience in innovative ways. These channels build a white racial identity by placing its roots in the natural landscapes of their nation as well as in European nature. The idealization of rural living and a ‘return to nature’ materializes in the search for one’s spiritual roots that have supposedly been lost through a consumerist society and homogenizing globalization. This rhetoric therefore appeals to people that may feel increasingly lost in a world of urban concrete landscapes, alienating 9 to 5 office jobs, and a perceived loss of cultural values through globalizing forces. Their message is powerful and equally dangerous: It suggests that it is possible to ‘rediscover’ one’s imagined cultural roots in nature and that violence is a form of self-defense to protect these roots against the forces of capitalism and globalization. Unsurprisingly, these justifications often turn into actual calls for violence against anything that is perceived to be a threat to these ideals. Easily accessible calls for violence and terrorism In these channels, overpopulation, immigrants, or the consumerist, capitalist system at large are usually scapegoated for a loss of cultural identity as well as for the destruction of nature in which this identity is rooted. Calls for violence and terrorism are seen as solutions to either directly lower population numbers of specific immigrant groups or to destabilize the entire system and bring about a violent revolution. These calls for violence oftentimes appeal to traditional masculinity. The perceived loss of ‘traditional manhood’ and men as the center of the nuclear, reproductive family unit has long been a concern for the far-right. Similarly, some channels conjure a nostalgic image of traditional manhood through images of muscular and heavily armed men against a backdrop of natural scenery. The suggestion is that a wild and aggressive man as being closer to his natural roots and imagined ancestral identity. This invocation of more traditional masculinity also represents violence as a ‘natural’ response to a loss of habitat. With this, some channels specifically appeal to a male audience some of which may feel alienated by changing gender roles and family structures. Since these groups specifically aim at appealing to popular problems, it is fair to wonder in which ways these channels pose a security threat as they share extremist content that potentially facilitates radicalization. Additionally, ecofascist Telegram channels are easy to access. Often unsecured, they can be publicly previewed, and anyone with a mobile phone number can join them. This differentiates these channels from other far-right forums which often require intricate knowledge of specific jargon and meme culture in order to accept new members. Such channels can then function as potential gateways to more private chat groups. Despite their public availability, ecofascist Telegram groups are still somewhat obscure and hard to track: Barely any channel exists longer than two months before presumably being deleted for violating Telegram’s code of conduct. New ecofascist channels sprout immediately, like the hydra that grows two new heads for each one that is cut. While it is simple to join these channels anonymously, keeping track of their developments from a security viewpoint is challenging. Something to worry about? Given that ecofascist ideology has already inspired some acts of terrorism, it is important to take the security threat it poses seriously. It is worthwhile to understand that and how eco-fascism can respond in unique ways to peoples’ concerns over globalization and climate change. By framing environmental destruction and protection as a matter of identity, roots, and race, this rhetoric is potentially able to spread its tentacles where others failed, while simultaneously providing justifications for acts of violence. Specifically, public Telegram channels are fertile ground for member recruitment and radicalization due to ease of access and thus deserve our concern. About the author: Abra Heinrich is a student currently enrolled in the last year of the MA program Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University. Her research interests cover the extreme right, far right ecologism as well as Latin American studies, with a focus on qualitative methodologies and discourse analysis. She is writing her thesis about the emotional appeal of far right ecologism in white supremacist Telegram channels. She has previously published in Leiden University's journal Medusa.

Why Disillusioned QAnon Conspiracy Theorists Might Become a Serious Security Threat By: Ruben Pfeijffer With Donald Trump losing the 2020 presidential elections and the mysterious ‘Q’ going silent, followers of the popular conspiracy movement QAnon are going through a severe test of faith. While some keep clinging to the hope that there is yet a plan waiting to unfold that will see Trump reinstated as president, others have become increasingly disillusioned by the long list of Q’s failed predictions. The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) now warns that their disillusionment might soon turn into anger, and perhaps even violence. On 28 October 2017, an anonymous user going by the name of ‘Q clearance patriot’, or simply ‘Q’, started posting on 4chan (a controversial online imageboard) in a thread titled ‘The Calm Before the Storm’. The username of the anonymous poster implied they were an insider from the US Department of Energy with Q level clearance. This was not the first time a self-proclaimed whistle-blower started posting anonymously on 4chan. Before Q, there had already been FBIAnon, CIAAnon, and WH Insider Anon. None, however, gained the attention QAnon would accumulate over the years. The real identity of Q remains unknown until this day. Analyses of Q’s posts suggest that multiple persons with divergent writing styles have likely posted as Q at different times. The true motives behind the movement remain therefore similarly unknown. However, it should be noted that Russian bots played a significant role in the movement’s spread during its infancy. Q’s first posts were all a direct reference to another conspiracy theory that had previously originated on 4chan, known as ‘Pizzagate’. The premise of this conspiracy theory was that alleged code words in the leaked emails of John Podesta (Hillary Clinton’s campaign manager) indicated that several pizzerias in Washington D.C. were secretly facilitating the satanic ritual abuse of children. Clinton and other prominent Democrats, like former President Barack Obama, were accused of being involved. Although Pizzagate was immediately debunked by the media, many conspiracy theorists remained convinced that certain members of the American elite were part of a satanic cabal of child abusers. Q used Pizzagate as a base and expanded the conspiracy theory by including the recently elected Donald Trump as a ‘saviour’ that would ultimately bring ‘the Cabal’ to justice in an event called ‘the Storm’. Q claimed that a ‘plan’ had been secretly set in motion by patriots within the government and military to expose the crimes of the Cabal to the world in a process called ‘the Great Awakening’. As the movement grew throughout the years, QAnon’s conspiracy theory continued to expand further, often absorbing other popular pre-existing conspiracy theories. The success of QAnon as a conspiracy movement is unprecedented. While other relatively large conspiracy movements have existed before (flat-earthers, crop circle researchers etc.), they were usually centred around specific topics and restricted to isolated parts of the internet. Conspiracy theorists were often perceived as stereotypical tin-foil hats wearing basement dwellers. QAnon has changed that. It has become the first modern conspiracy movement to have a real impact on mainstream society. An estimated 30 million Americans now believe in QAnon. Worldwide this number is believed to be even higher, being particularly popular among conservative Christians and the alt-right. This can be explained by the movement’s inclusion of themes that typically resonate with these demographics. However, the movement’s central premise of fighting against child abuse has also attracted a lot of followers that normally don’t fit this bill. A further impulse to the movement’s popularity was given by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. By including narratives about the pandemic’s origin in its conspiracy theories, QAnon has gained a lot of support among opponents of lockdown measures. Perhaps the most staggering thing about QAnon’s popularity is the amount of failed predictions the movement has survived. Q’s very first prediction, namely that Hillary Clinton would be arrested in October 2017, never became a reality and it was followed up by countless other predictions about the onset of the ‘Storm’ that similarly never happened. There are multiple explanations for why all QAnon’s failed predictions never really seemed to affect the popularity of the movement. First of all, Q’s posts were generally very cryptic, leaving followers to interpret the posts themselves. Failed predictions could therefore often simply be attributed to ‘faulty interpretations’. Another explanation is Q’s repeated efforts to encourage his followers to simply ‘trust the plan’ and his constant words of reassurance that ‘patriots are in charge.’ Finally, Trump’s presidency was often seen by the movement as proof that the Plan was still working. As long as he remained in charge, the window for the predicted Storm to happen remained open. If it didn’t happen at a certain time, it was often simply assumed it would happen later during his presidency. The US elections of 2020 were an incredibly hard time for a lot of QAnon followers as once again they were promised something that did not materialize. They believed that Trump would win in a landslide victory. When Biden won, some started seriously questioning their beliefs. Others doubled down and remained convinced that Biden winning was actually just all part of ‘the Plan’, and that they needed Biden to cheat in the elections in order to finally bring him to justice. Trump’s refusal to concede the elections and the widespread allegations of voter fraud strengthened this belief. Although Q himself went silent on 8 December, QAnon followers continued speculating on when the promised Storm would take place. A new date was determined: 6 January 2021. On this day, Congress would convene in the Capitol building to confirm the electoral vote in favour of president-elect Joe Biden. In what would go down as one of the darkest days in American democracy, thousands of Trump supporters, including QAnon followers, stormed the capitol, participating in what they believed to be ‘the Storm’. They did this after Trump held an inciting speech outside the capitol in which he encouraged his supporters to march towards the Capitol building. When all rioters were removed from the capitol building, congress reconvened and formally confirmed Joe Biden as the 46th president of the United States. Ending all hope for QAnon followers that the results of the elections could be legally overturned. The Capitol attack was a shocking wake-up call for the world to the potential security threat large conspiracy communities like QAnon can pose. The storming of the capitol building was seen as a genuine attempt to overthrow American democracy. As a result, security measures were significantly tighter for Biden’s inauguration on January 20. Q’s enduring absence and the long list of unfulfilled predictions have plunged the movement into a deep crisis of faith. Since Q is no longer there to convince them to ‘trust the plan’, QAnon followers might feel increasingly inclined to handle matters themselves. As more and more time passes without any sign of ‘the Storm’, the risk that QAnon decides to create another Storm of their own making becomes greater. With tens of millions of Americans believing their country is ruled by a satanic cabal, conspiracy theorists might become one of America’s most dangerous security threats for the coming years. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group. About the author: Ruben Pfeijffer is a graduated anthropologist who currently follows the MA program Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University. While working on his bachelor thesis in the Netherlands during the early stages of the COVID-19 outbreak, Ruben gained experience with conducting ethnographic research under the challenging circumstances of the pandemic, and has learned to be adaptable with his research methods.

Quick Money and Slow Violence: What lingers underneath the surface in the aftermath of post-conflict societies? By: Bob Rehorst Countries that have suffered through political turmoil are increasingly attractive as emerging markets. However, underneath all that potential, hidden risks may linger in the shadows of the country’s turbulent past. This first part focuses on the risks of prolonged environmental degradation and the notion of slow violence in post-conflict societies. To understand this, let us first examine the example of South Lebanon. Well-over a decade ago, a war raged in the south of Lebanon between Israel and the Hezbollah-led ‘Lebanese Resistance’. Six years after the war, the inhabitants of Lebanon’s southern regions, which posed the battleground for the 2006 ‘July War’, insistently spoke about their infertile lands, failed harvests, and dying bodies[1]. Such stories continued to emerge in the long aftermath of the war, long after the UN-brokered a ceasefire and most troops went home. Although difficult to prove, the blame is commonly directed towards the remains of Israeli weapons in the region, including shrapnel, phosphorus and other toxic remnants. The question is, why is this so difficult to prove? Lebanon is, unfortunately, not unique. Vietnam has experienced similar toxicity in the aftermath of its American war in the 60’s and 70’s due to a toxin called Agent Orange. It is this slow, lingering, and often invisible, type of violence that will be explored here. Violence is normally expressive and visible. ‘Normal’ violence is generally defined as an ‘act of physical hurt’[2], and characterised to be immediate in time, explosive and spectacular. Slow violence, on the other hand, is a phenomenon that is described to occur gradually, and out of sight. It is defined as a type of 'delayed destruction' that is spread out across space and can take place over long periods [3]. Examples of this can be the gradual deterioration of soil, health, and ecosystems due to human pollution. Then what are the effects? Because of its gradual nature, slow violence is severely underrepresented in mass media. We live in an era where the black mirrors of our phones and laptops have become, not only part of our daily life, but also a general ecosystem of constant distraction. It seems that we systematically fail to keep focus, beating through our everyday lives with continuous partial attention. News is fast; Twitter is faster, articles get smaller and messaging has become shorter. In this milieu of speeded up time, and brief narration, generating awareness towards the hidden, lingering aftermath becomes tougher. To briefly illustrate this point, let us take a closer look at the Vietnamese case. Agent Orange, used controversially as a defoliant by the Americans during the Vietnam war, caused leaves of jungle trees to die, making it easier to detect enemy positions. However, humans exposed to the substance were at risk of poisoning. In Vietnam, it is estimated that as many as four million people suffered from dioxin poisoning as a result of Agent Orange. More so, babies are reported to be born with defects. Through biomagnification, dioxins build up in the fatty tissues of ducks and fish, pass from nature into everyday life in Vietnam. There is very little attention to this, because attempts to scientifically prove the correlation between Agent Orange and birth defects, for example, failed in U.S. Courts. Contested scientific evidence also occurs in Lebanon. Various actors, pushing deviating political agendas, have opted for fluctuating scientific support or deniability regarding the causal relationship between the remnants of war and its victims. Numerous scientific sources argue that this fluctuation of ‘evidence’ is by design. The common consensus is that there is an active production of doubt, which makes it possible to shift responsibility away from the perpetrators and prolong the circulation of hazardous products.[4] In other words, it is a smokescreen, actively designed to refute blame. Such active creation of doubt around scientific evidence is not only produced by political actors. For several large corporations, this smokescreen provides a perfect stage to continue unsustainable business practices. In sectors such as tobacco or mining corporations, there is money to be made in sustaining doubt surrounding environmental factors to prolong the consensus that their business is, without a doubt, unsustainable. In this way, doubt becomes profitable. The question is then, at what cost? Understanding the deliberate manufacturing of doubt as a factor for prolonged slow violence, as explained in the cases of Vietnam and Lebanon, we can see how this contributes to environmental deterioration, as well as violations of human rights. Businesses aspiring to access emerging markets in post-conflict societies should take note of the existence of slow violence. Because slow violence is not visible on the surface, and the smokescreen of doubt can create confusing surroundings, one should tread carefully. Lack of awareness about such turbulent factors carries the risk of operating in, or contributing to, unsustainable environments. In order to minimise risk and conduct sustainable business, it is advisable to generate an understanding of one’s operational environment. References [1] Touhouliotis, V. (2018). Weak seed and a poisoned land: Slow violence and the toxic infrastructures of war in South Lebanon. Environmental Humanities, 10(1), 86-106. [2] Riches, D. (1986). “The phenomenon of Violence” in D. Riches (Ed.) The Anthropology of Violence, Oxford: Blackwell. [3]Nixon, R. (2011). Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor. Harvard University Press. [4] Touhouliotis, V. (2018), p.92. This article is part one of a series highlighting the potential risks of doing business in post-conflict countries. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author: Bob Rehorst is a Global Security Analyst at Dyami. He has extensive field experience in the Levant-Middle East region, North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. He holds a Graduate Degree in Conflict Studies and Human Rights, and an Undergraduate Degree in Cultural Anthropology, both from Utrecht University. Bob specializes in geopolitics, conflict development and global crises.

Colombia's Years-long Struggles By Alessia Cappelletti Since the 28th of April, Colombians have been taking the streets of the major cities across the country, to protest against a tax reform that would see individuals and businesses increasingly taxed as a response to the pandemic. President Iván Duque deems the reform ‘necessary’ but he agreed to withdraw it and instead present a new version once consensus is reached. On Monday 3rd of May, the minister of Finance announced his resignation. The protests, however, have not stopped and more strikes and marches are planned for the days ahead. Trying to grasp the complexity of the current protests requires an understanding of the country’s history and the lived experiences on the ground. "Protests" by tacowitte is licensed with CC BY 2.0. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/ Not an isolated incident: a short account of last years’ protests Colombia’s recent history, roughly since Duque’s inauguration in August 2018,is filled with protests and reasons to march against the unsatisfying government’s administration. In the second half of 2018, students organized strikes and marches to protest against education expenditure cuts - some of Duque’s first implemented alterations. Protests started in October and diminished in December. Back then, the protest took various forms and shapes; Some people danced, some made music, others were chanting and waving flags representing various factions joining the marches. Very few protests actually turned violent, which generally only occurred in the later hours of the day. The universities were empty, exams got cancelled. Some people stayed home but supported the cause, others, joined for a small bit marching down Carrera 7 towards Plaza Bolivar. Police officers were at the sides of the roads and sometimes one would hear loud bangs. To the outside ear, this could promptly be mistaken for the thunders of fireworks if one is not accustomed to the heavy response of Colombia’s police and ESMAD. The protests ended around mid-December 2018, but in reality they never really did. In November 2019, protests started to reignite. The motives of the protests weren’t as clear-cut as the student’s manifestations of 2018, but signaled a widespread discontent towards the country’s situation then, and now. People walked in the streets for different reasons, from plans to fund education that never saw a follow-through, to state alleged pension funds cuts and decrease of minimum income. Others protested for the continuous deteriorating human rights situation of indigenous people, ex-combatants who agreed to lay down arms and human rights defenders themselves. Colombia, in fact, is one of the countries with the higher number of targeted killings of social and political leaders. Another topic subject to popular critique was (and is) the poor implementation of the 2016 historic Peace Agreement with the FARC-EP. The agreement is an incredibly comprehensive document that seeks to resolve issues of land grabbing, illicit drug trade, political representation and safeguard, victims’ rights abuses, and re-establish as truthfully as possible what happened in the more than 50 years-long conflict. If implemented, the agreement is expected to bring long-lasting peace and positive effects for the country. The current ruling party, however, was already opposed to the agreement when it was signed in 2016, and since it took office in 2018 the efforts to implement it have been minimal. At times the Duque’s administration would even go against what was agreed, such as in the case of approving plans to resume aerial fumigation of coca crops, instead of allocating resources to substitution plans, which would improve long-term living conditions of farmers across the country.[1] As a consequence of this, in August 2019, major factions of the then-at-peace FARC-EP declared they would join the dissidents and continue fighting the government from the frontlines due to the poor implementation of the deal. Some of these dissidents are now being fought by the Venezuelan Bolivarian Armed Forces in the border state of Apure. "Marcha en Colombia: no mas FARC" by AlCortés is licensed with CC BY 2.0. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/ In short, the past few years of Colombia were characterised by continuous protests. To summarise, there have been expenditure cuts protests, anti-tax cut marches, human rights movements, and various other implementations of anti-government policy demonstrations. It is evident that the multi-thematic nature of these protests showcases a deeply rooted grievance present in the minds of the population vis à vis its government. Protests escalating On the 23rd of November 2019, in the middle of the street, an 18 years old student gets shot by the ESMAD - or the riot police force tasked with maintaining public order, The young protestor, Dilan, dies two days later amidst the shock, fear, and anger of the demonstrators. The protests escalated, while curfews are established in Bogotá and Cali [BR1] and protestors keep being dispersed with tear gas. The protests then continued well into 2020, only partially stopped by the pandemic. In February there were peaceful marches, especially participated mainly by students and university professors. It is only after the first impactful wave of coronavirus, however, that serious protests started to re-emerge in the major cities of the country. In September 2020, the streets filled with thousands of people marching. This time, the protests were sparked by police brutality and subsequent impunity after Javier Ordóñez died by the hand of the National Police. The escalations were amplified by the weight of months of coronavirus lockdowns that severely halted economic growth and left marginalized communities to their own devices. People once again filled the streets, but authorities responded repressively leaving dozens injured. There were many online accounts of what happened during the protests of September 2020, which resembled a much more conflict-like situation compared to the initial 2018 protetsPeople’s anger and frustration for injustice and fear for an unpromising future were much more tangible in 2020, as the police response was increasingly more repressive. This sparked the debate on police training, resources, and disproportionate use of force. In October 2020, the protests and symbolic gestures continued and were joined by people from many different backgrounds. On 21 October, Bogotà saw its streets filled with indigenous protesters who arrived in the capital after a 10 days march. Ten days in which they walked across the country to protest against the management of the 2016 peace accords, the lack of human rights protection, and the economic model the country is pushing for. They have been joined by students and farmers who are all equally affected by the government’s neglect. It is not only about the tax reform Fast forward to today. The reform proposed to arrest Colombian debt, create a basic rent and increase a fund for environmental conservation. However, it would do so by increasing taxation on the salary of businesses and individuals above a certain (low) monthly income and raise VAT taxes on certain items. The reform was promptly retracted by President Duque on Sunday. Yet, people are still on the streets. Some may raise an eyebrow - why are the protests not over now that the reform is withdrawn? - but the majority will understand that it is not, and never was, merely about tax reforms. It hardly ever is about one thing. In the night between Monday 3, and Tuesday 4 May, The Guardian reports 16 protestors and one police officer dead as a result of the last days’ clashes. In the early morning of the 4th, the New York Times reports 19. France24 says there were 1.181 abuses of police power and 26 fatalities. Other sources, as grassroots NGOs, estimate that many more people lost their lives in the protests. On Twitter, scenes of police brutality are highly graphic and display severe agony. A quick but careful look in the hashtags #SOSColombia, #ColombiaEnAlertaRoja, or #NosEstanMatando gives an idea of the disproportionality of the violence, as police officers beat up people four on one, shoot bystanders filming the protests, and leave bloody bodies on the streets. The Guardian reports the protests were largely peaceful at the beginning, but the army was mobilised nonetheless, following Duque’s call for ‘military assistance.’ This is a particular provision of Colombian law that permits the military to help police bodies (usually would be implemented in times of war), responding directly to them and their needs. Military planes such the FAC1004 Lockheed were spotted leaving Barranquilla, where part of the military is based, en route to Cali, where major clashes are currently taking place. The Minister of Defence said ex-FARC and other criminal groups are very likely behind the extreme violence in the city. So, el paro sigue. The strikes continue. All over the country, people are marching, blocking highways, organizing cacerolazos, while tanks roam in the cities next to peaceful inhabitants. Every analysis of these protests should then take into consideration what the country has had to endure up to this point. If there is something that emerged after the last days of violence it is that people are tired of the current state of Colombia. This includes the deteriorating economic situation, high taxation, poor future perspectives for students and young professionals, inefficient protection of human rights for many social and political leaders, corruption and crime, and the very little effort the government is showing in implementing the 2016 Peace Agreement which would set the basis for a new Colombian future. This is merely an account that covers, in bits and pieces, the last two years and a half of social unrest in Colombia. Protests did not start in 2018. Depending on who you ask, problems in the country started at different times. Some will tell you it all started with Spanish colonialist rule. Others agree that it all originated in the period of La Violencia of the 1940s, in which Liberals and Conservatives brutally murdered each other. Some will tell you it was the FARC starting in the 1960s, some the paramilitaries following right after. Some will say it was Alvaro Uribe, the 2002 to 2010 president, some will say Juan Manuel Santos (2010 – 2020). However, what matters is not to understand where the conflict started - but that it never ended, and it only built up. This calls for a reforming action by the government, which could start from the implementation of what agreed in 2016. Foreseeably, these won’t be the last protests we will witness in Colombia this year. [1] Aerial fumigation was re-introduced after pressure by the United States, as coca production rates reached an all-time high in 2019. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Authors: Alessia Cappelletti is a Global Security Analyst and Program Manager of DEWIS. She has field experience in South America, Colombia especially, which makes her largely acquainted with the security challenges of the Latin American context. Her expertise includes conflict analysis and investigation, human rights protection, and criminality.

By: Isabel Oriol Llonin After the COVID-19 pandemic hit the world, the race to develop a vaccine began. It was expected that the US, Europe, or China would lead. Russia emerged as an unexpected force developing one of the first vaccines to be approved worldwide: the Sputnik V. Named after the USSR’s world’s first satellite, the Sputnik V claims a 91% efficacy after the second dose. After the Sputnik V’s trial phases results were published, many international health experts were skeptical of the early approval of the vaccine, thus questioning the scientific rigor used in the trials and the safety of the vaccine. The official Twitter account for the Sputnik V dismissed the criticisms, claiming it was ‘big pharma lobby’ and ‘anti-Russian propaganda’.[1] Figure I: Sputnik V doses arriving to Argentina on March 2021 (Argentinian Health Ministry). Today, the Sputnik V has been registered in 60 countries around the world, approximately half of them have purchased doses. Latin America is one of the first regions to seriously incorporate the Russian vaccine into their vaccination strategies, with 9 countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Venezuela) having purchased collectively 60 million doses so far.[2] But how did the Sputnik V vaccine become so on-demand in Latin America? Unequal worldwide vaccine distribution When vaccines began to be approved for mass use and deliveries began towards the end of 2020, numerous health organizations and world leaders, including the WHO, warned about the potential unequal distribution of vaccines around the globe. Several months into vaccination rollouts the warnings were correct: until March 2021 high-income countries, which represent 19% of the global population, had purchased 54% of the globally available doses.[3] High-income countries were accused of ‘hoarding’ vaccines at the expense of the rest of the world, including Latin America. The Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Marcelo Ebrard, called out the inequitable vaccine distribution worldwide at the UN Security Council, of which Mexico is a non-permanent member. Further on, the production delays faced by many western pharmaceuticals exacerbated the unequal distribution of vaccines by prioritizing the supply of high-income countries. Latin America, just like many other non-western regions of the world began to seriously ponder alternative suppliers to the western-produced Pfizer-BioNTech, AstraZeneca, Moderna, and Johnson & Johnson. This is where the Russian Sputnik V, and other vaccines like the Chinese Sinovac, began to be more attractive for Latin American leaders. Argentina led the way by being the first country in the region to approve the emergency use of the Sputnik V vaccine in the country, followed by a negotiation with Vladimir Putin for an initial 5 million dose purchase. Many other Latin American countries followed. Sputnik V: a soft power move by Russia? Sputnik V is providing Russia with much more than just the profit gained from producing and selling the vaccine. A once distanced world power from Latin America has managed to be featured in the front pages of Latin American newspapers, to hold highly media-covered negotiations, to receive the praise of Latin American presidents and leaders, and to be overall, once again talked about. An old-fashioned soft power move. Soft power is an international relations concept coined by Joseph Nye in 1990. Understanding power as ‘the ability to affect others to get the outcomes one prefers’, Nye sees soft power as ‘the ability to obtain preferred outcomes by attraction rather than coercion or payment’.[4] Soft power has been used to describe the type of influence that some nations have that is not based on military force or economic power or the threat of them (hard power), but rather the positive and attractive ideological or cultural influence of a country. In a world that is so desperately looking for a way out of the pandemic, with mass vaccination at its core, Russia is capitalizing on the failures of the west by providing life-saving affordable vaccines to millions. While the past few decades the influence of Russia in Latin America has been unremarkable, with the exception of a few countries, current developments point out a shift in dynamics. Vladimir Putin has received praise from many Latin American presidents for Russia’s role in supplying the region with Sputnik V doses. Mexico’s López Obrador publicly thanked Putin after the initial agreement to purchase 24 million doses while extending him an invitation for an official visit, media outlets were quick to point out that other leaders such as Joe Biden have not yet received such invitation. After being vaccinated himself with the Sputnik V, Argentina’s Alberto Fernández reassured his confidence in the vaccine and thanked Putin for his commitment to supply vaccines to Argentina. Moreover, citizens of diverse countries in Latin America are increasingly favoring the Russian vaccine. Polls show that the Sputnik V vaccine is the most trusted vaccine in Argentina and Peru, the second most trusted in Mexico, and the fourth in other countries such as Brazil or Chile.[5] While Russia continues to hold negotiations with Latin American leaders regarding the vaccine supply, most recently with Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro, its widespread use is becoming more accepted among Latin American citizens. The Russian objective of being seen once again as a world power, through scientific leadership and cooperation, could be making its way into the region. While the US remains the dominant world power in the region, Russia is capitalizing on a power vacuum generated by both the pandemic and the recent Republican American leadership, and while Latin American countries need not choose between one or the other anymore, Russia’s approach should be a cautious one. While the situation is still developing and the Russian Sputnik V vaccine has the potential to be the opening door for closer, more substantive economic and cultural relations with Latin America. This could mark the beginning of a new period for Russian-Latin American relations. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group, as part of the ‘Russian Strategic Interests in Latin America’ research project led by Alessia Cappelletti and Isabel Oriol. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the author: Isabel Oriol Llonin is a contributing analyst at Dyami. She holds a bachelor’s degree in International Relations and has a post-graduate degree in Public International Law from Utrecht University. She has expertise in the Latin American region and the public international law implications of conflict analysis.

Reflecting on the truth and reconciliation process in South Africa, 25 years later By: Puck Holthuis & Chiara Longmore In the aftermath of apartheid, South Africa underwent a major political and societal transition. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established as a process of healing for the country, with formal hearings commencing on 15 April 1996. The TRC was established as a court-like body where victims and perpetrators alike could come to give testimony of their experiences during apartheid. As Mandela commented: “South African people must remember their dreadful past in order to be able to deal with it, to forgive when it is necessary, but never to forget”1 and the TRC was a key framework which facilitated this remembering in order to heal the nation. Peacebuilding through retributive justice For effective peace to be established it is largely understood that justice must be incorporated into peacebuilding processes.2 Nevertheless, the nexus between peace and justice is not straightforward - there is no ‘one-size fits all’ approach. Deciding what peace and justice mechanisms to use, and for whom, is a question policymakers grapple with across different contexts. In South Africa, the peace process emphasised restorative justice - the search for the truth in order to facilitate reconciliation and healing. South Africa’s TRC had a particular emphasis on truth-telling to heal as “dealing with the past means knowing what happened”.3 Figure I: Contemporary South African flag, Flowcomm, available at: https://www.flickr.com/photos/flowcomm/15318490720 The use of restorative justice in South Africa, with the emphasis on truth-telling to reconcile, was crucial in the post-apartheid context. At the time the TRC was established, South Africa was undergoing a transitional process, creating a highly politicised and tense environment where political legitimacy was tenuous.4 Therefore, the use of the truth commission was extremely appropriate in the context of South Africa to ensure that effective peace and healing could take place. No one official version of apartheid was established in South Africa’s TRC, and instead the commission facilitated a rich assembly of perspectives from a diverse range of individuals, both the victims and the perpetrators, who lived through apartheid to voice their lived experience of events.5 TRC testimonies To further our analysis of how the South African TRC functioned, we interviewed a former employee of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Joop Pinckaers. The South African TRC had a unique and never before seen unit, which was the Investigation Unit. During his employment, Joop helped establish and manage this department of the TRC. Prior to his work in South Africa, Joop had travelled to West Tanzania where he and his team examined and sophisticated the security and safety in and around the Rwandan refugee camps after the Rwanda genocide. These camps housed Hutus and Tutsis separately. In Burundi, where Joop and his team travelled to as well, the refugee camps housed mixed Hutu and Tutsi married couples. Joop’s close affinity with the African continent and its people made him a good candidate to try and help the TRC achieve stability in South Africa and help this nation move forward from its painful past. Figure II: Nelson Mandela's release from Victor Verster Prison in Paarl, South Africa. Photograph taken by Puck Holthuis The goal of the Investigation Unit was multiple: it both investigated and corroborated the testimonies bravely put forth by apartheid’s victims and their families, and the information from amnesty applications. Additionally, the unit facilitated through exhaustive investigation the granting of amnesty to perpetrators and, if determined by the commission, would engage in further independent investigation. In doing so, the TRC was better able to map out the apartheid regime and its damage. This in turn allowed the Amnesty Commission, the Human Rights Violations Commission and the Reparation and Rehabilitation Commission of the TRC to more accurately judge the cases before them. As mentioned, making room for healing largely determined the TRC’s course of action. As stated in the final report of the TRC: “However painful the experience, the wounds of the past must not be allowed to fester. They must be opened. They must be cleansed. And balm must be poured on them so they can heal. This is not to be obsessed with the past. It is to take care that the past is properly dealt with for the sake of the future.” 6 A shared traumatic past During the interview, Joop recalled the moment when the Investigation Unit did not trust the full admissions by Eugene de Kock, former commander of Vlakplaas. The Chairman of the Commission submitted this case to the State President who decided to send the case to Court, which would then determine the perpetrator’s punishment. The sentence passed were two life sentences plus 212 years in prison for crimes against humanity. Along with the passed sentence, the above quote is an indication of the difficulties and trauma the TRC faced in order to heal South Africa. This is further illustrated by Joop’s written notes that he took during his employment. He writes: Figure III: Flag during the Apartheid regime, available at: https://pixabay.com/illustrations/south-africa-flag-apartheid-1184104 “[The members of the Investigation Unit] worked with victims and experienced their trauma, anguish and pain. They worked with perpetrators and saw the brutalised, traumatised people who carried out horrific acts of violence. They worked with those stories, stories of torture, rape and murder, of bodies being blown up repeatedly, being burnt for hours. They were there when the remains of victims were exhumed. They saw the bullet holes in the back of heads and felt the terror of those victims in their last hours. They went home to be with their families, to interact with friends. And they returned to work another day to face the trauma, the stress and the anxiety.” 7 Those who could retell their painful experiences and relive their traumas for the sake of their own healing and that of the country, were met by empathetic members of the TRC, many of whom had lived through apartheid themselves. Nevertheless, their pain and grief had also permeated the skin of those who hadn’t lived through it. Local collective healing It is indicative of the South Africa’s use of restorative justice, bringing together individuals through the telling of lived experiences in a process of nation healing. This model of truth-telling to heal in South Africa’s TRC has been adopted by subsequent truth and reconciliation commissions, for example in Sierra Leone, positioning the South African model as one of the most influential templates for peace and justice.8 Whilst South Africa’s TRC is seen as an effective society-driven project of healing, its model of reconciliation may not be as usefully transferred to other contexts, particularly regarding the local level. Indeed, there have been increasing attempts to establish bottom-up peacebuilding approaches which place local communities and individuals at the focus.9 An example of this can be seen in Somalia with the Wajir Women for Peace Group, a group of local Somali women who used familiar customs and sharia law to administer justice and administer reparations between warring sides.10 The Somali case is illustrative of a local peacebuilding process, driven by locals, where the focus was less on reconciliation and more on delivering justice through reparations and indicates the importance of applying the appropriate mechanisms of peace and justice to the relevant contexts. The power of the truth Through examining the case of South Africa it is evident that the TRC’s model of reconciliation was effective through the power of truth-telling. In the aftermath of violence and oppression, establishing truth and allowing individuals to tell their experiences is of vital importance to ensure long-term peace. Indeed, individuals who participated in Sierra Leone’s TRC spoke of how being able to express their truth of events helped them to process the violence they experienced, with one victim stating how she went to the TRC: “[…] to clear my chest. If I just go and sit down and don’t talk, it would burn my heart more and more. But if I go and talk it in public, I will feel better in my heart. That’s what they told me, and it was true.” 11 The power of truth-telling through reconciliation processes is one which should not be underestimated in peacebuilding processes in order to prevent future violence from occurring. This is echoed in the words of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee, when they state that: “Those who forget the past are doomed to repeat it” [these] are the words emblazoned at the entrance to the museum in the former concentration camp of Dachau. They are words we would do well to keep ever in mind.” 12 Moving forward today Nevertheless, South Africa is still struggling to move forward today. The apartheid aftermath remains painfully visible as the nation battles with the many inconsistencies that are a result of the apartheid regime. Funds that should have been directed at the facilitation of reconciliation and rehabilitation were instead spent elsewhere. According to Joop, that is one of the reasons South Africa is not in the state it should have been in by today. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Authors: Puck Holthuis is a master student Conflict Studies & Human Rights at Utrecht University. She recently relocated back to The Netherlands after living abroad since 2006. During that time, she spent many years in South Africa and China. Puck continues to develop her passion for analysis; studying foreign cultures and using that to strengthen her intercultural communication skills. Chiara Longmore is originally from Scotland; however, she has moved to the Netherlands to complete a master’s at Leiden University in International Relations and Diplomacy. With an interdisciplinary background, her bachelor’s was in Liberal Arts, she has analysed situations of violence and conflict with a multi-disciplinary framework, in particular with Political Science, Anthropology, and Sociology.

By: Alessia Cappelletti & Anastasija Kuznecova On the 23rd of March, the United Nations Human Rights Council (OHCHR) passed a resolution demanding free and credible elections in Nicaragua. With 20 votes in favour and 18 abstentions, Russia, together with seven other countries, voted against. The resolution is not only showcasing the increasing international concern for the autocratic moves by Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, but also sheds a light on the continuation and strengthening of the country's bond with Russia. A New Dictatorship? Daniel Ortega rose to power after the Sandinista party's overthrow of the US-backed Somoza dictatorship in 1979. He led Nicaragua until 1990 and during his first administration, he promoted land reforms, wealth redistribution and literacy programs. After three failed election attempts, Ortega returned to the presidency in 2007 and was once again re-elected in 2011. His second term has increasingly become antidemocratic. Daniel Ortega filled the government with his allies and abolished term limits to get himself re-elected in 2016. Today, Sandinista party controls the courts and legislature, and many consider Ortega as bad as, or even worse, than Nicaragua's former dictator Anastasio Somoza.1 Figure I: Banner at Rotonda Metrocentro, Managua, Nicaragua. Jorge Mejía Peralta, taken 7 June 2008. Available at: https://www.flickr.com/photos/45879387@N00/2559645950 In April 2018, protests broke out in Nicaragua due to cuts to social security benefits. The protests developed into demands for Ortega to step down and allow early elections. Police and armed pro-government groups repressed protesters, leading to 328 deaths, more than 2000 injuries, and hundreds of arrests and prosecutions.2 It was reported that many captives were tortured in the prison with methods such as electric shocks, severe beatings, fingernail removal, suffocation, and rape. Sandinista government responded to the protests with accusing the opposition of attempting a coup-launch. As a result, in December 2020, the government approved a law that gives them power to ban citizens classified as "terrorists" or coup-mongers from running in elections This law has raised concerns whether there will be a unified opposition in the upcoming election in November 2021, as many opposition leaders are still being referred to as traitors by Ortega. Steps Towards a Repressive Authoritarianism The Ortega administration approved in 2020 the "Cybercrime Law", also known as the "Gag Law", which imposes jail sentences on journalists when they publish a story the authorities consider fake. The government continues restricting freedom of expression for reporters, as well as human rights defenders, through threats, surveillance, physical attacks, detentions, financial investigations, and forced closures of news outlets. Police raids are not uncommon for opponents of the Sandinista government, and the beginning of 2021 also saw Nicaragua's first police raid of a journalist's home that was carried out without a court order.3 Authorities in Nicaragua have denied COVID-19 impact, refused to implemented measures recommended by global health experts, and covered up suspected COVID-19 deaths. Between the outbreak of the virus and August 2020, more than 31 doctors have been fired from public hospitals due to their disagreement of the inadequate response.4 This treatment of health workers is not new. During the protests in 2018, around 405 health workers were fired from public hospitals because they were providing care to protesters or criticising Ortega and his government.5 Daniel Ortega as Nicaraguan President. Cancillería de Ecuador, taken 10 January 2012. Available at: https://www.flickr.com/photos/dgcomsoc/6679779009/in/photostream/ Inter American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has reported that between April 2018 and April 2020, more than 103,000 Nicaraguans have fled the country,6 with two-thirds seeking refuge in Costa Rica.7 It would be unsurprising if the numbers keep increasing with the continuation of human rights violations, lack of COVID-19 response, and undemocratic elections. International Response So far, the United States and the European Union, as well as other countries, have imposed sanctions on several Nicaraguan government officials who are responsible for human rights abuses, undermining democracy or corruption. Daniel Ortega has denied the allegations and stated that these sanctions constitute an attack on Nicaragua's sovereignty and interference in their internal affairs. On March 26, US Senators introduced the "Reinforcing Nicaragua's Adherence to Conditions for Electoral Reform" (RENACER) Act to pressure Daniel Ortega to keep free and fair elections. The Act recommends new actions to address corruption and human rights violations by the Nicaraguan government and security forces and calls for increased sanctions coordination with Canada and the European Union. RENACER also raises concerns on Russian activity in the country, suggesting that intelligence reporting on the matter has to be improved. The chief of U.S. Southern Command included Nicaragua in the list of ‘malign regional state actors,’ together with Venezuela and Cuba, for opening their doors to external powers (China and Russia) and criminal organizations. Old Friends: Russia and Nicaragua In Nicaragua, a country where 90% of the army is made up by Russian weapons, Moscow finds a substantial support platform in the Western hemisphere since the days of the Sandinista revolution in 1979. Russia and Cuba supported Ortega during the revolution and continue to support him today, and Nicaragua repays the favour. The country was very first to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, which almost immediately granted economic deals with Russian companies in the energy sector.8 Again, whilst half of the world condemns Russia’s actions in Crimea, Nicaragua opened an honorary consulate in the contested peninsula. In February 2021, this costed Nicaragua various sanctions from Ukraine, which defined the action as ‘an openly unfriendly step.’9 Nicaragua also offers miles of territory strategically close to the United States. Russia is allowed to dock warships in Nicaraguan ports and has built facilities for combatting drug trafficking in Managua, the capital, where officials from all over the continent are trained. Moscow recently also installed a satellite navigation system base in Nicaragua, part of the larger GLONASS network of twenty-four satellites operated by Russia’s Aerospace Defence Forces.10 The base is located on the hills of a volcano overlooking the U.S. Embassy in Managua. U.S. officials speculate that the GLONASS base would serve as Russian signal intelligence platform, given its proximity to their Embassy. Officials in Moscow denied the accusations.11 GLONASS project is also present in Brazil – the four Brazilian stations are easily accessible and work in close cooperation with the Brazilian Space Agency. In Managua, however, transparency is lacking surrounding the GLONASS base,12 some fear it could also be used to ‘simply’ spy on domestic critics of the government.13 Most recently, Russia showed its support for Nicaragua through donating doses of the Sputnik V vaccine. When vice-president and first lady Rosario Murillo announced the news in February, she did not disclose the number of doses received, though in January the government stated that 3.8 million doses would arrive. It is also unclear how the pandemic affected the country as number of covid cases and death are said to be heavily underreported.14 Sanctioned Allies Daniel Ortega is likely headed for his fourth consecutive term as president. However, the road is an upward slope for his mandate, with Nicaragua’s GDP consistently falling since 2017, the mismanagement of the COVID-19 crisis, and the various international sanctions received from western countries. The country’s strong financial ties with Venezuela do not help much in economic as well as political matters, as Venezuela has also been severely sanctioned, and neither does its ideological vicinity with Cuba, which has been recently victim of U.S. sanctions too (see Colombia, Cuba and Venezuela). However, the countries remain solid allies under the ALBA umbrella and Russian support for these nations. And as Nicaragua finds friends in countries ‘ostracized’ by western powers, it creates a cradle for Russian influence to grow and a solid axis from which Moscow could exert control over the region. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group, as part of the ‘Russian Strategic Interests in Latin America’ research project led by Alessia Cappelletti and Isabel Oriol. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Authors: Alessia Cappelletti is a Global Security Analyst and Program Manager of DEWIS. She has field experience in South America, Colombia especially, which makes her largely acquainted with the security challenges of the Latin American context. Her expertise includes conflict analysis and investigation, human rights protection, and criminality. Anastasija Kuznecova is a student at the MA program in Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University. She has field experience from Chile, Jamaica and the Balkans, and her interests include issues concerning social inequality, discrimination, and conflict escalation. With her combined practical experience and academic knowledge, Anastasija has a broad understanding of security, development, and human rights.

Does the CIA drone base expansion signal increased concerns over terrorism activities? By: Chiara Longmore Recent satellite images have shown that the CIA’s Dirkou drone base in Niger has been expanding, with a report from the New York Times stating that the CIA are continuing to conduct drone flights from the base. Within Africa’s Sahel region, home to growing violent Islamist extremism, the expansion of the Dirkou base could be indicative of increasing counterterrorism operations in the region. This is a surprising development, given Joe Biden’s statement halting US drone strikes in non-conflict zones. CIA’s Sahara airbase Within Niger’s Sahara Desert, situated next to a small airport, lies the Dirkou air base. The base, used by the CIA since 2018, has been steadily developed under the Trump administration with the purpose of conducting remote drone surveillance operations. A recent report from The New York Times shows satellite images indicating that Dirkou has undergone an expansion, with the site’s runway almost doubling in length. The CIA has made no public statement on the expansion of the base which will now be able to house MQ-9 Reaper drones and U-28 aircraft. The development of the drone base emerges despite the Biden administration’s temporary directive to limit remote airstrikes in non-conflict zones outside of Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. Figure I: USAF Drone Base in Dirkou, Niger [Satellite image]. Hozint – Horizon Intelligence, Political and Security risk monitor [Horizon+]. Brussels, EU. Using MapBox and OpenStreetMap Contributors. Leaflet Javascript. In Niger, the US military has airbases in Agadez and Niamey which carried out drone strikes in Libya during the Trump administration. The Agadez and Niamey airbases have also given support to the French-led International Coalition for the Sahel which aims to address the growing crisis in the Sahel by fighting armed terrorist groups, strengthening armed forces in the region, as well as assisting regional development. The Dirkou base is closer to the Libyan border than Agadez and Niamey and, consequently, is better positioned for counterterrorism surveillance of Islamist militants in southern Libya. Its strategic position may explain the base’s recent expansion, particularly as activities from extremist groups such as the Islamic State in Libya and across the Sahel region have intensified. Crisis in the Sahel Africa’s Sahel region crosses several states including Senegal, Sudan, Mali, Niger, Burkino Faso and Chad. The region has been subjected to growing violent activities from Islamist extremist groups, with the Islamic State based in southern Libya actively recruiting from the West African region. According to the UN, the Sahel has recently seen ‘unprecedented terrorist violence’ against both civilian and military targets, with casualties from terrorist-related attacks increasing ‘five-fold since 2016’ in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Indeed, in January of this year, 100 civilians in northern Niger were killed as a result of Islamist extremist fighting and intercommunal conflict. Contested counterterrorism strategies To combat the crisis in the Sahel, the international coalition led by France has engaged in a military-led strategy, training regional security forces and engaging in direct military engagement with extremist groups. Recently, the US and British militaries’ conducted training of the Somali National Army which demonstrates further military-led counterinsurgency strategies in the Sahel region. The expansion of the Dirkou base does not necessarily indicate increased US military activity, however, it does hint at enhancing military-led surveillance operations as well as the possibility of conducting remote drone strikes. Yet, the efficacy of a military-led counterinsurgency strategy in combatting the Sahel crisis is disputed. A recent report from International Crisis Group has emphasised the need to ‘reorient’ the military-centred approach in the Sahel region and instead focus on strengthening governance in the region. In areas where the security of the state is weak, extremist groups such as the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda assume a form of ‘rebel governance', providing security to civilians in return for their support. Growing discontent in the West African region, for example, the Mali uprising in August of last year, can be attributed to a failure of military-led strategies which do not effectively address the core needs of the regional governments in the Sahel region. Furthermore, ethical issues surround the use of remote strategies in counterterrorism efforts. Ethical issues are a central factor in the Biden administration’s recent halt on remote counterterrorism operations outside conflict zones, given past criticism of US drone attacks causing civilian casualties in, for example, Yemen and Pakistan. Military-led preparedness For an effective and sustainable strategy in the Sahel region, a balance of counterterrorism approaches is necessary to combat the complex issues at hand. On the one hand, ‘crisis of governance’ in the Sahel is indeed vital to address particularly when we consider the challenges that the vast geographic region brings to achieving sovereign power. On the other hand, military-led operations can be extremely useful in governmental support as well as placing needed pressure on Islamist groups with low financial and political costs and deter future recruitment. In conclusion, a comprehensive counterterrorism response in the Sahel is necessary, especially when we consider comments made by the UNOWAS chief that the “geographic focus of terrorist attacks…is increasingly threatening West African coastal States”. This shift towards the coast may be a cause of concern regarding the wider influence of extremist groups such as the Islamic State beyond West Africa. Therefore, while the expansion of the Dirkou Drone Base in Niger may not directly signal US military expansionism in the Sahel, the development of the base may be indicative of intentions to strengthen counterinsurgency surveillance in preparedness for further escalations of terrorist activities within the Sahel. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author: Chiara Longmore is originally from Scotland; however, she has moved to the Netherlands to complete a master’s at Leiden University in International Relations and Diplomacy. With an interdisciplinary background, her bachelor’s was in Liberal Arts, she has analysed situations of violence and conflict with a multi-disciplinary framework, in particular with Political Science, Anthropology, and Sociology.

Loyalist threats raise worries about post-Brexit stability in Northern Ireland By: Ruben Pfeijffer In early March, Northern Irish loyalist paramilitary groups sent a threatening letter to British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his Irish counterpart Michaél Martin. In this letter, the loyalist groups stated that they would withdraw their support for the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, unless the customs border between the UK and Northern Ireland is lifted. The Good Friday Agreement, which formally ended the Troubles and ushered in a new era of peaceful cohabitation and cooperation between republicans and loyalists, has been under increasing pressure since Brexit. The Northern Ireland Protocol The primary source of the current discontent among loyalist groups is the so called ‘Northern Ireland Protocol’ that is part of the Brexit Arrangements between the UK and the EU. The protocol, which went into effect this year, was one of the most heavily debated topics during the Brexit negotiations. Reaching an agreement that was sufficiently satisfying for all involved parties proved to be an enormous challenge. The Northern Ireland protocol was conceived in order to safeguard the terms of the Good Friday Agreement by avoiding a hard border between Ireland and Northern-Ireland, while preventing the UK from having a backdoor into the EU internal market by establishing a customs border between the UK and Northern Ireland. Loyalist groups are upset with this arrangement as they claim it cuts them off from their desired union with the UK, and moves them closer to reunification with Ireland. Republicans on the other hand are relatively satisfied with the Northern Ireland protocol. The arrangement ensures - in accordance with the Good Friday Agreement - the absence of a physical border between Ireland and Northern Ireland, keeping the existing all-island economy intact and safeguarding the rights of Northern Irish citizens with an Irish passport. This apparent disparity in satisfaction with the terms of the Northern Ireland protocol has caused a noticeable increase in unrest among loyalist groups over the last few months, culminating in the threatening letter sent to Boris Johnson and Michaél Martin by the Loyalist Communities Council (LCC). The LCC is a legal umbrella organisation that represents the paramilitary Ulster Volunteer Force, Ulster Defence Association and Red Hand Commandos. Although the LCC has pledged that opposition against the Northern Ireland protocol will remain peaceful and democratic for the time being, they have also warned that they would permanently withdraw from the Good Friday Agreement if the protocol were not repealed or amended according to their terms. EU and UK response Despite the recent threats by the LCC, it is unlikely that the EU is willing to change its stance on the Northern Ireland protocol. On the contrary, they are doubling down on the enforcement of the agreed regulations. On the 15 March, the EU announced that they would launch legal procedures against the UK for breaking international law by circumventing parts of the Northern Ireland protocol. Back in January, the EU allowed the UK a three month ‘grace period’ in order to give affected industries the opportunity to adapt to the new customs border between the UK and Northern Ireland. However, the UK has decided to unilaterally extend the grace period beyond the agreed period of time, a move which is in clear violation of international law. By extending the grace period, the UK and Northern Ireland avoid certain bureaucratic requirements of the Northern Ireland protocol. The UK’s decision to unilaterally extend the grace period was certainly welcomed by unionist/loyalist parties in Northern Ireland, as the absence of most border checks means they remain in relative union with the UK despite the Brexit. However, the UK’s move was met with strong disapproval from republican parties, Ireland and the EU. America as potential mediator Recently, the US has decided to become more involved in the ongoing EU-UK dispute. Home to almost 32 million people of Irish decent, the US has historically often shown interest in (Northern) Irish affairs. In 1998, it was a US senator that chaired over the historical Good Friday Agreement that ended the Troubles. Being of Irish decent himself, US president Joe Biden lately seems to have taken a stronger stance on the Northern Ireland protocols. During a virtual meeting with Irish Prime Minister Michaél Martin on St. Patrick’s day, president Biden expressed his strong support for the Northern Ireland protocols, as he claimed the protocols are integral to preserving peace and stability in Northern Ireland. However, US officials have also stated that they are currently unwilling to pick a side in the EU-UK dispute. Instead, they call upon all involved parties to sit down at the negotiating table and discuss the re-implementation of the protocols. Is the unrest here to stay? Even if the EU and UK are able to resolve their dispute on their own and move towards full implementation of the Northern Ireland protocols, the issue of the LCC will persist. The UK’s circumvention of the bureaucratic requirements of the protocol has so far alleviated unrest among loyalist groups to a certain extent. However, since this move violates international protocols, the British will have no choice but ending the extended grace period in the near future or face possible EU sanctions. Regarding the LCC’s threats, the organisation claims that they will protest against the Northern Ireland protocols peacefully and democratically. Since the horrors of the Troubles are still fresh in the memories of the majority of the Northern Irish population, it is indeed unlikely that a relapse into violence is seen as a preferable solution to the current dispute. Regardless, in recent weeks posters and graffiti with texts like: “Our forefathers fought for our freedoms and rights, no border in the sea or we continue the fight” have been spotted around the country8. While a return to full conflict remains highly unlikely for now, the threat of potential small-scale incidents should be taken seriously. After all, there is also a younger generation of loyalists that has no personal memory of the Troubles. Despite the fact that Brexit negotiators from the EU and UK considered the Northern Ireland protocols as the best possible compromise, it has become increasingly clear that loyalist groups in Northern Ireland will not accept a customs border within the UK under the current terms. Unless their concerns can be addressed and alleviated, it would seem that the current social unrest in Northern Ireland is here to stay for the time being. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author: Ruben Pfeijffer is a graduated anthropologist who currently follows the MA program Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University. While working on his bachelor thesis in the Netherlands during the early stages of the COVID-19 outbreak, Ruben gained experience with conducting ethnographic research under the challenging circumstances of the pandemic, and has learned to be adaptable with his research methods.

The Devastating Impact of COVID-19 By: Anastasija Kuznecova and Puck Holthuis Measures such as lockdowns and travel restrictions implemented to reduce the spread of COVID-19 were initially expected to dissuade human trafficking. Instead, one year later, it has left more people vulnerable to becoming the next victims and a growth in online sexual exploitation of children. With more manpower assigned to COVID-19 related tasks, many governments have deprioritised their responsibility for victims of trafficking and sexual exploitation. Where there already existed insufficient education, resources, and training for law enforcement to combat human trafficking, this industry's perpetrators now have more room to expand their money-making businesses. What is Human Trafficking? The United Nations (UN) defines human trafficking as "the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of people through force, fraud or deception, with the aim of exploiting them for profit".1 Human trafficking can result in sexual exploitation, forced labour, domestic servitude among other types of exploitation. Figure I: "NOT for sale: human trafficking" by Maria Charitou is licensed with CC BY-ND 2.0. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/2.0/ The traffickers often target marginalised people and those in need of economic assistance due to their vulnerability. The majority of trafficked victims are women and girls. In addition, traffickers often target migrants and vulnerable children. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported that in 2018 around one-third of detected victims were children. In low-income countries, the number is even higher, with children accounting for 50 per cent of the identified victims.2 Globally, most child victims are trafficked for sexual exploitation. This is particularly the case of child trafficking in East Asia, Central America and the Caribbean. In Sub-Saharan Africa, there is a trend of children being forced into labour, specifically at plantations, in mines and quarries, as vendors in markets, on farms, and on the street to beg for money. Similarly, in South America, children are exploited for labour at plantations, while in South Asia, they are trafficked for sectors such as agriculture, the garment industry and to work at hotels or in brick kilns.3 Human trafficking occurs both within national borders as well as cross-border, with increasing numbers of detected victims being trafficked within their own country.4 Traffickers often use false recruitment advertisements in a range of economic sectors to target people seeking to work abroad. Fraudulent vacancies have been detected in sectors such as construction, agriculture, modelling, cleaning, and manufacturing, attracting a variety of applicants of different ages, gender and backgrounds. Trafficking is a huge issue globally. It exploits people and violates their human rights. However, it is a crime that is difficult to uncover as it predominantly operates underground and on the dark web. Traffickers have adapted to modern technology and the internet, using it to find their victims, coerce them into forced labour or sexual exploitation, and simultaneously operate in multiple locations. Impacts of COVID-19: Increased Vulnerability and Risk of Exploitation COVID-19 has led to worsening poverty, an increase in unemployment, and reduced income, heightening the risk of vulnerable people being trafficked. Victims of trafficking are more susceptible to contracting the virus and might not have access to healthcare. This, together with reduced access to shelters, reinforces victims' vulnerability both to re-trafficking and to virus infection. Figure II: "Child Labour in Indonesia" by henri ismail is licensed with CC BY-NC-ND 2.0. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/ The pandemic has resulted in fears that identifying victims of human trafficking will become more challenging. This is due to the lockdowns and restrictions that reinforce the isolation of victims and further increases the trafficker's control over the victim's movements. Additionally, isolation and social distancing can aggravate a victim's mental health issues and restrict their access to support networks. Many victims who are currently sexually exploited or are in domestic servitude are experiencing worsening living conditions. Trafficked women in Latin America have been forced to meet men on the street or in their own homes due to hotel closures5. Furthermore, COVID-19 has increased violence against women, which, one could anticipate, has also increased the risk of violence for trafficked women. Original predictions claimed that travelling restrictions would lower the numbers of human trafficking. Police in Thailand reported that in 2020 they experienced the lowest number of trafficking investigations since 2010. However, experts have claimed that this smaller number is not due to fewer people being trafficked, but because of authorities doing fewer inspections.6 In Latin America, church activists who support victims of human trafficking, have reported that the numbers of victims have, in fact, gone up with the pandemic.7 As the pandemic increases economic difficulties experienced globally, more people become at risk of being lured or forced into sexual or labour exploitation. This might suggest that the numbers of victims of trafficking might escalate after the pandemic. Figure III: "Bar ‘Pussy Galore’, Pat Pong district, Bangkok, Thailand." by axlright is licensed with CC BY-NC 2.0. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/ (Disclaimer: whether the women working in this bar were traffic Exploitation of Children Children – an already heavily targeted group before the pandemic – are at a high risk of being trafficked due to school closures, which deprives many children of food and shelter.8 In addition, more children have been forced to help their families by providing food and income, which has increased their risk of both being exploited and of contracting the virus. Perpetrators' utilisation of the internet in the past years has made abuse easier and more accessible as they do not have to leave their houses, acquiring more security for themselves. Victims, on the other hand, experience the opposite. Sexual material can be used as the offender wants; it can be sold, uploaded on various forums, and used for further exploitation. 9 Thus, it increases the perpetrator's power and further contributing to the victim's vulnerability. Social isolation and lockdowns have led to more people spending time on the internet, increasing the online sexual exploitation of children. In 2020, more than 21 000 reports of child exploitation online were recorded, compared to 14 000 reports in 2019.10 These numbers are expected to rise further. Online sexual exploitation can take form in different ways, such as grooming, consuming sexual abuse material, live streaming, and forcing or blackmailing children for material. Many poor households facilitate online exploitation of their children because they see it as a means to earn money, which further shows that economic need contributes to human abuse. There are various forums and platforms dedicated to the production and exchange of sexual material of children. During the pandemic, the demand for child exploitation material has been so high that some of these platforms have crashed.11 Competitions for the best videos have also been arranged both during the pandemic and in previous years. In addition, EUROPOL has found posts where offenders share advice about safely travelling abroad to abuse children or groom them online.12 This increases the fear that online sexual exploitation will lead to more physical abuse of children. Perpetrators use encryptions and software to hide their IP address, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), preventing identification. Thus, law enforcement is struggling to trace the material back to the offenders. Awareness of the possible risks of online sexual exploitation remains low, which also increases the risk of children being abused. The buying and selling of humans and online exploitation of children and adults remains a lucrative business. In fact, it is a billion-dollar industry.13 As there continues to be a market for human beings – arguably a growing one after the pandemic fractured not the trade itself, but the fragile protective system that existed before – human trafficking is often referred to as ‘modern slavery’. Figure IV: "A child flower seller makes rounds through the early morning hours, Pat Pong district, Bangkok, Thailand." by axlright is licensed with CC BY-NC 2.0. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/ Lack of Law Enforcement and Resources Because of its high value, corruption closely ties into the ceaseless trade. With an already existing lack of human trafficking assigned resources and intelligence, the blow becomes even more painful when law enforcement and government officials, such as police and immigration officers, turn a blind eye to the suffering of human trafficking victims to fill their pockets instead.14 This lack of law enforcement with regards to the issue of human trafficking has worsened since the pandemic, with law enforcement stationed elsewhere to tackle COVID-19 related repercussions.15 The recent murder of the 33-year-old British Sarah Everard by metropolitan police officer Wayne Couzens is an example of the difficulties that victims worldwide face when it comes to their dependence on authorities. Although Couzens does not represent all law enforcement officials collectively, it brings to light that much too often, the suffering of victims is caused by the individuals who, instead of upholding standards and morale, abuse their power and break the laws they ought to protect. As described earlier, online platforms have also seen a massive spike in demand for human exploitation. With existing online realms where advertisements for purchasing humans and exploitation can be found advancing and expanding, such as the Deep (Dark) Web, the difficulty of policing the (anonymous) digital world adds fuel to the fire. This further shows that the issue of human trafficking too often remains unaddressed, even though it could affect us all in this age of widely accessible internet. Although the tracking and tracing of those who conceal their online identities for purposes of malice remain possible, the progress the internet has made demands additional research and policies to ensure the safety of millions of people. Efforts made to combat human trafficking and to protect the vulnerable groups of society are shown by, for example, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). This legally-binding international agreement ensures the protection of children’s civic, political, economic and social rights. A progressive 196 countries have ratified this agreement, with only, although shockingly, the USA, South Sudan and Somalia not (yet) participating. The undeniable global power the US has and taking into consideration its status worldwide and the role of law enforcement officials in the continuation of trafficking, we can begin to understand the painful difficulties victims of trafficking face not only whilst being trafficked, but also after they have reclaimed their position in society. At present and in all nations globally, neither protection nor justice is guaranteed for children, women or the disadvantaged.16 The Road Ahead Based on the UN's compiled research and suggestions, what follows are ways in which human trafficking can more efficiently be tackled. - Protect yourself and those around you when going online by staying informed - More investment in education, equal job opportunity and awareness - Education and the discussion of human trafficking should both include the protection of oneself online, but also prevention of an increasing number of perpetrators - More research needs to be conducted on how to protect especially vulnerable groups from online exploitation - More allocated resources and manpower to the issue of human trafficking - Increase cross-border cooperation - Improved training of service providers, police and healthcare workers to identify human trafficking and, - Provide a better support system for service providers and victims of trafficking 17 This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Authors: Anastasija Kuznecova is a student at the MA program in Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University. She has field experience from Chile, Jamaica and the Balkans, and her interests include issues concerning social inequality, discrimination, and conflict escalation. With her combined practical experience and academic knowledge, Anastasija has a broad understanding of security, development, and human rights. Puck Holthuis is a master student Conflict Studies & Human Rights at Utrecht University. She recently relocated back to The Netherlands after living abroad since 2006. During that time, she spent many years in South Africa and China. Puck continues to develop her passion for analysis; studying foreign cultures and using that to strengthen her intercultural communication skills.

How recent violence in Darfur threatens peace in South Sudan By Chiara Longmore Since gaining independence from Sudan a decade ago, South Sudan's early history has been marred by a destructive civil war. Slow steps towards peace have been made, with the latest ceasefire agreement being signed in October 2020. Nevertheless, with recent violent clashes in neighbouring Sudan's Darfur region threatening to rekindle old conflicts, the prospect of stable peace in South Sudan remains hanging in the balance. Violent Beginnings Since gaining independence from Sudan in 2011, South Sudan has experienced a bloody and violent birth as a new state. In December 2013, Vice President Machar's Sudan People's Liberation Party-In Opposition (SPLM-IO), largely reflecting the Nuer population, split from President Kiir's Sudan People's Liberation Party (SPLM), representing the Dinka people. However, South Sudan's violence is not merely 'Kiir-led-Dinkas vs. Machar-led-Nuers'. The complexity of the war in South Sudan is mostly related to the range of actors involved, from a variety of different ethnic/tribal groups. Despite the conflict's ethnic dimensions, the cause of violence cannot be reduced to ethnic divisions. Instead, the South Sudanese war's origin is rooted in its very creation, one which did not adequately consider the establishment of effective political institutions; and where President Kiir's new government mismanaged the country's economic potential in oil.1 This intensified political tensions in a state which was already heavily militarised from its recent fight for independence from Sudan. This has had catastrophic effects with an estimated 400,000 people being killed since the violence began, and 2.3 million refugees and asylum seekers created.2 The delicate balance of peace Since violence began, there have been various attempts at peace in South Sudan, with negotiated peace settlements in 2013 and 2015 failing, and accompanied by a series of ceasefires violations, notably in 2017 and 2018.3 The negotiated 'Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan' signed by Machar, Kiir and other parties in 2018 offered South Sudan a step in the right direction. The complex myriad of actors involved in South Sudan disrupted this when non-signatory groups, such as the National Salvation Front (NAS), joined a coalition of rebel groups called South Sudan Opposition Movement Alliance (SOMA).4 who clashed with the government's SPLM/IO army. This forced the creation of 'the Rome Declaration'; a ceasefire agreement signed by the SSOMA and the government in October 2020, which has seen a period of reduced violence in South Sudan. Nevertheless, as South Sudan has made some small movements towards greater stability and peace in the last six months, neighbouring Sudan has taken drastic steps back as violent clashes have rippled through the Darfur region. Since the joint UN-African Union Mission (UNAMID) withdrawal on 31 December 2020, the UN has reported a 'sharp uptick of intercommunal violence in Sudan's Darfur region'.5 In January of this year, days of violent clashes saw an estimated 250 people killed and 100,000 more displaced6. As of 11 February, East Darfur reported a State of Emergency due to violent clashes between groups.7 Local cycles of violence The recent violence in Sudan is predominantly being carried out by ethnic and tribal pastoralist groups.8This reflects a vital feature of the conflicts in Sudan and South Sudan through cattle raiding. This is a long-standing cultural tradition of pastoral communities in East Africa, where local groups steal cattle from each other to 'restock' after their own cattle had been lost to drought or disease as well as acquire status and wealth.9 Due to decades of conflict in the region, this tradition from pastoralist communities has recently taken on an intensely violent nature. Cattle raiding has not only being co-opted by 'commercialised criminal networks'10, but also by political elites in South Sudan who saw an opportunity through the local pastoralist tribes to garner support for their own agendas11. Such violence is not isolated and crosses Sudan, and South Sudan's borders through the Darfur region with the nomadic Misseriya in Sudan travel to Aweil East County in South Sudan, often clashing violently with the Dinka cattle herders12. Recently the killing of a Misseriyan tribesman caused the closure of the border between Sudan and South Sudan. Whilst cattle raiding is an intrinsic part of the violence in South Sudan and Darfur and is responsible for intense cycles of violence on the local level; it is an issue which has been left unaddressed by broader peace processes. In fact, the recent border closure was "the first time that the Sudanese government was directly involved in addressing the conflict" according to a representative of the Dinka Malul13. Recent steps have also been taken by the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to confront the problems of cattle raiding across the Sudan/South Sudan border, with an agreement been drawn up with the South Sudanese government and UNMISS' local partners to promote the freedom of movement without possession of weapons. Whilst the conflict in South Sudan and the Darfur region cannot be solely reduced to cattle raiding, acknowledging its role as a driving force for local-level violence is vital for sustainable peace and stability in the region. It is even more prevalent when we see consider how the recent events in the Darfur region raise concerns about a return of 'Sudan's old conflict'14, which will undoubtedly threaten South Sudan's tenuous peace. Therefore, continued collaborative efforts across the Sudan/South Sudanese border are imperative to reduce local-level conflicts which risk reigniting violence in the region. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group. It has also been published by Africa Nexus, an independent organisation seeking to provide focussed informational and strategic insights into extremism and conflict in Africa. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author Chiara Longmore is originally from Scotland; however, she has moved to the Netherlands to complete a master’s at Leiden University in International Relations and Diplomacy. With an interdisciplinary background, her bachelor’s was in Liberal Arts, she has analysed situations of violence and conflict with a multi-disciplinary framework, in particular with Political Science, Anthropology, and Sociology.

Developing disputes over the river’s basin amidst regional conflict By: Chiara Longmore The Nile, one of the longest rivers in the world, spanning across 11 African countries with around 280 million people living in its basin. Recently, a developing dispute has emerged between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia over the construction of the Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam (GERD), which will impact the flow of the river into Egypt and Sudan. Placed within the wider context of conflict and instability in the region, the use of the Nile as a potential bargaining chip is one which could escalate disputes with devastating consequences. Egypt’s River The Nile river has long been an important source of fertility for the land it traverses. In particular, Egypt has cultivated the river’s basin for more than 5,000 years, with the Nile Delta in the north measuring 161km. The Nile river flows from south to north and, as Egypt is a lower riparian state and has lower levels of rainfall than upper riparian states, the state is heavily reliant on the Nile as a water resource. Often referred to as ‘Egypt’s largest food basket’ the Nile Delta contributes to around half of Egyptian agricultural production, with the annual flooding of the riverbanks depositing nutrient rich silt. Whilst the Nile is a lifeblood for Egyptian agriculture, Egypt’s historic dominance over the Nile can be linked to colonialism. In 1929 the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was signed between Britain and Egypt, which granted Egypt the right to veto any projects which may impact its control and share of the river. Other African states in the Nile basin, such as Ethiopia, had no say in this treaty which ultimately granted Egypt a monopoly over the river. Egypt maintains that the 1929 agreement still stands, along with the 1959 treaty which gave Egypt access to 66% of the river’s annual water supply, Sudan access to 22%, and Ethiopia the rights to nothing. Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam Ethiopia’s historic exclusion from access to the Nile has left it unable to utilise its own natural resources. It is therefore unsurprising that Ethiopia has sought to rebalance this by building the Grand Renaissance Dam (GERD) on its border with Sudan. The hydroelectric dam project is one of the largest in Africa, its reservoir covering 74 billion cubic metres. Whilst hydroelectric power has advantages in its low emission energy production, it is also an economic opportunity for many developing nations. For Ethiopia, GERD’s production of electricity will be greater than the country’s domestic demand, producing a total 6,450MW, and this will allow Ethiopia to export around 2,000MW of excess electricity making it Africa’s major electricity provider. The export of energy is vital for developing countries to generate foreign income and stimulate their economic growth and GERD aims to generate around $1 billion per year in revenue for Ethiopia, making it Africa’s biggest exporter of electricity. GERD is situated on the Blue Nile, one of the river’s main tributaries. Starting in Lake Tana in Ethiopia, it crosses into Sudan and its capital Khartoum, and up into Egypt. The construction of the dam close to Sudan could benefit the country, specifically in its potential to prevent flooding. Nevertheless, Ethiopia’s dam could reduce levels of fertile silt in Sudanese lands which would impact its agricultural production and threaten the country’s food security. For Egypt, the construction of large hydroelectric dams by its southern neighbours is one of strategic concern. In particular, Egypt is alarmed at the timeframe by which GERD is filled by Ethiopia, as this could inflict significant damage to the region. Predictions indicate that if the dam is filled in 5 years this would cause Egypt to lose around half of its fertile land and cause a water deficit of 36%. Egyptian fears over its water resources are not unsubstantiated. In 2007 the country faced the “Revolution of the Thirsty” where water scarcity in the Nile Delta saw protests over limited access to clean water. Due to the tensions which have arisen over the development of GERD, a series of negotiations have been initiated between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan. In January of this year, talks chaired by the African Union quickly fell through over disagreements about the second filling of the dam planned for July of this year. Last week, Sudan’s Prime Minister Hamdok met with Egyptian President el-Sisi in Cairo to sign a military cooperation agreement and discuss the ongoing GERD dispute. Their calls for international involvement to mediate that talks have been rejected by Ethiopia, with Ethiopian Foreign Minister calling for “African problems to be solved through African solutions”. A Context of Conflict It is important to place the developing dispute over GERD and the Nile within the broader context of conflict and instability facing the Horn of Africa. Since obtaining power in 2018, Ethiopia’s President Abiy has overseen drastic political change in the country, establishing a more centralised system. Yet recently in the northern region of Tigray, violence has steadily escalated between the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian military, resulting in a devastating humanitarian crisis in the region. Mass movement of tens of thousands of refugees spilling across the Sudanese-Ethiopian border has increased tensions between the two states, with violent clashes between Ethiopian and Sudanese military occurring just last week. Sudan is also facing its own internal problems with East Darfur declaring a state of emergency on February 11 as violence in the region escalates. With recent reports emerging that Eritrean military have entered the Tigray region, the potential for a protracted and potentially inter-state conflict is one which seriously threatens the region. Within this context the dispute over GERD, and more broadly access to the Nile, risks becoming increasingly intertwined with the current political and military disputes of the region. As an upper riparian state, the GERD gives Ethiopia an advantageous position to potentially shut off water supplies to neighbouring states, particularly as Ethiopia’s President Abiy seeks to assert greater political and economic dominance in the region. This would have devastating consequences not just for Egypt and other lower riparian communities, but also to the wider international community as key trade routes such as the Suez Canal would be detrimentally impacted. The Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) estimates that by 2030, the current population within the Nile’s basin will increase by between 61-82%, placing further strain on the river basin. Therefore, with water becoming a more valuable resource due to increasing demands, the potential for the Nile to be used as political leverage is a frightening, but not unrealistic prospect in the midst of developing conflict and instability in the region. This article is a publication of the Dyami Early Warning for International Security (DEWIS) Working Group. It has also been published by the Planetary Security Initiative, launched by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2015. *Major Contribution from Akash Ramnath This article was written in collaboration with Akash Ramnath who is currently working at the Planetary Security Initiative at The Clingendael Institute in The Hague. Akash’s primary research interests focuses on climate security, specifically in relation to water security and the geopolitics of the energy transition. Akash is also currently completing an Advanced Master’s in International Relations and Diplomacy at Leiden University. For source references, please download the PDF version. About the Author: Chiara Longmore is originally from Scotland; however, she has moved to the Netherlands to complete a master’s at Leiden University in International Relations and Diplomacy. With an interdisciplinary background, her bachelor’s was in Liberal Arts, she has analysed situations of violence and conflict with a multi-disciplinary framework, in particular with Political Science, Anthropology, and Sociology.